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Logic and First Principles, 15: On the architecture of being. Or, are certain abstract entities (“abstracta”) such as numbers, natures, truth etc real? If so, how — and where?

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For some weeks now, an underlying persistent debate on the reality of numbers has emerged in several discussion threads at UD. In part, it has been cast in terms of nominalism vs platonic realism; the latter being the effective view of most working mathematicians. Obviously, this is a first principles issue and is worth focussed discussion.

Now, No. 14 in this series, on objectivity of aesthetics principles as canons of beauty, begins by pointing to an underlying challenge:

We live in a Kant-haunted age, where the “ugly gulch” between our inner world of appearances and judgements and the world of things in themselves is often seen as unbridgeable. Of course, there are many other streams of thought that lead to widespread relativism and subjectivism, but the ugly gulch concept is in some ways emblematic. Such trends influence many commonly encountered views, most notably our tendency to hold that being a matter of taste, beauty lies solely in the eye of the beholder.

Of course, F H Bradley, long since pointed out that to claim the un-know-ability of things in themselves is already to claim a major point of just such knowledge. So, this is self-referentially absurd. Wisdom, then, is to acknowledge that we can and do err but even that is a point of undeniably certain knowledge therefore we can and do confidently know some aspects of reality as it is, not just as it appears to us. Reality is in part intelligible, it is not utterly inscrutable. Already, this is a hint that there is a rational . . . a logical . . . structure to being which rational creatures may seek to understand, succeeding part of the time. Where of course aspects of that structure will be quantitative.

Let me highlight the core argument (and pardon the inflexibility of the new block style WP is using):

>>to assert that in effect conceptualism about abstracta is true, one relies on abstracta being in reality, e.g. here that a description or assertion can hold a relationship of accurate description with things as they are. Absent the reality of such a relationship independent of our individual or collective concepts, truth is meaningless. If only the concrete exists in reality, truth, an abstract relationship using symbolic representation (other abstracta!) is a case of non-being, illusion. Actually, illusion is another abstract relationship. Meaninglessness is next up, but this too is an abstract state of affairs. The infinite regress of abstracta begging to be acknowledged as real yawns open.

The reality of core abstracta is inescapably the case, i.e. it is necessarily true on pain of not being able to think, communicate conceptually, reason [implication is abstract], speak truth, demonstrate, warrant, know etc.

The serious issue then follows: in what way are such things real?

The best I can answer for now is that such abstracta are connected to the logic of being for worlds or things in the world. They are logically relevant characteristics of being, which in many cases are shared across beings as archetypes that are in-common, or even are in-common across possible worlds. In some cases such as numbers they are in common to all possible worlds as part of the fabric of any distinct possible world.

We may recognise or discover them and try to identify what they precisely are, but in many cases they defy particular definition in words.

Where do they come from, where are they? They come from the logic of being and are embedded as constraints on being. For instance, no entity E is such that it has two core characteristics x and y where y = ~x.

That is why square circles are impossible of being. Regardless of how we may form a fuzzy imagination that oscillates between the shapes or may try to superpose and blend the two.

There are squares, there are circles but no square circles

Thus, abstracta are part of the distinct identity, nature and being of any particular entity. That is, the principle of distinct identity has ontological, not just conceptual, significance. That’s why we recognise it as a first principle of right reason.

So, not a spooky, mysterious, metaphysical world of forms, just the architecture of — rational principles or “logic” of — being or possible being (and of impossibility of being). Where of course a considerable part of that embedded architecture of being is structural and quantitative. That is, Mathematical. Mathematics has in key part ontological import. Hence, Wigner’s point on its astonishing power. The music of the spheres is written in the language of mathematics, with — I daresay — Fourier leading the charge.>>

Fourier in action:

And again (a mechanical implementation in our hearing . . . relevant to octaves and fifths in music etc):

Let me then set it in the context of an ongoing exchange in the thread on beauty, and I take liberty to headline comment 390:

KF, 390: >>H, Let’s roll the tape a bit:


H, 377: >>kf writes,
What happens in the world is independent of [–> antecedent to and insofar as it is intelligible, influences] our thoughts about it [which thoughts in many cases may and do accurately describe reality, concrete and abstract.”
I’ll agree that the world is antecedent to our thoughts: we experience the world and then form thoughts about.
I’ll agree that “insofar as it is intelligible, [the world] influences our thoughts about it, which thoughts in many cases may and do accurately describe reality, concrete and abstract” [sorry, WP suppressed strike-throughs]>>

KF, 378: >>H, that apparent rejection of the reality of certain abstracta, if so, is fatally self-referential for much the same reason as nominalism (which is a form of such rejection) fails.>>

H, 379: >>I’ve explained my position, and see nothing “fatally self-referential” in it. The world is intelligible, and we are intelligent, so our understandings provide reasonably accurate maps of the world. We use abstractions to describe the world, but the world itself is “concrete” in the sense that it is its behavior which we observe that is the source of the material for our abstractions.
Probably no need for you (or me) to repeat ourselves again (although I do have a new thought on the matter that I may share later in the day when I have some time.)>>

KF, 380: >>when an objective matter is on the table, agreement or disagreement is immaterial. Just to make statements you have had to repeatedly rely on abstracta being the case not just perceptions. Indeed, truth is an abstract relationship of statements to what is the case, belief or disbelief, agreement or disagreement too. The reality of core abstracta is inescapable.>>

H, 381: >> I have clearly said that we use abstractions – we have to – just to talk about the world, so of course I agree with you when you write, “Just to make statements you have had to repeatedly rely on abstracta being the case not just perceptions.” Perceptions of the world bring in the data from which we create our abstractions, but abstractions are a necessary, central aspect of our ability, as rational, logical creatures, to understand the world.
Is this the point upon which you think my position is “fatally self-referential”?, because if so it misrepresents me. Perhaps you could explain more about your “fatally self-referential” statement.>>

KF, 382: >>this begins to approach the inescapability of the laws of thought, which embed cases in point. To attempt to deny one is forced to accept implicitly. For instance, you are affirming or implying that somethings are true, are accurate descriptions of reality, which is itself an abstract relationship, indeed the words and what they represent involve abstract relations. That is telling us something — we are at a start-point.>>

H, 383: >>Yes, I have continually said that we use abstract concepts to make statement about reality that are, to various degrees, accurate descriptions.>>

KF, 386: >>we cannot escape core abstracta and they are inescapably true or real as appropriate.>>

H, 389: >>kf writes “that apparent rejection of the reality of certain abstracta, if so, is fatally self-referential.” I accept the reality of the abstract concepts we create that describe the reality we experience. How is that “fatally self-referential”? I don’t see how you have explained that.>>

Notice, how you repeatedly affirm certain things to be true, i.e. to actually accurately describe real states of affairs? That is itself an abstract relationship, which must be real albeit abstract or discussion collapses. Likewise, the Mobius strip’s behaviour pivots on how it has ONE edge, ONE surface, etc. So if by cutting we introduce one or two further edges, it will form a longer loop or two interlocked loops. One-ness, two-ness, three-ness and consequences on the logic of being are abstract but take effect in space and bodies. It does so independent of our thoughts, concepts, expectations, as the relevant abstract properties are part of its core characteristics.

Above, at 375, I again laid out a demonstration as to why numbers are necessary entities that will manifest in any possible world, antecedent to our thoughts about a world. We are contingent beings within an already formed world.

Going back to the self-reference, to assert that in effect conceptualism about abstracta is true, one relies on abstracta being in reality, e.g. here that a description or assertion can hold a relationship of accurate description with things as they are. Absent the reality of such a relationship independent of our individual or collective concepts, truth is meaningless. If only the concrete exists in reality, truth, an abstract relationship using symbolic representation (other abstracta!) is a case of non-being, illusion. Actually, illusion is another abstract relationship. Meaninglessness is next up, but this too is an abstract state of affairs. The infinite regress of abstracta begging to be acknowledged as real yawns open.

The reality of core abstracta is inescapably the case, i.e. it is necessarily true on pain of not being able to think, communicate conceptually, reason [implication is abstract], speak truth, demonstrate, warrant, know etc.

The serious issue then follows: in what way are such things real?
The best I can answer for now is that such abstracta are connected to the logic of being for worlds or things in the world. They are logically relevant characteristics of being, which in many cases are shared across beings as archetypes that are in-common, or even are in-common across possible worlds. In some cases such as numbers they are in common to all possible worlds as part of the fabric of any distinct possible world.
We may recognise or discover them and try to identify what they precisely are, but in many cases they defy particular definition in words.
Where do they come from, where are they? They come from the logic of being and are embedded as constraints on being. For instance, no entity E is such that it has two core characteristics x and y where y = ~x.
That is why square circles are impossible of being. Regardless of how we may form a fuzzy imagination that oscillates between the shapes or may try to superpose and blend the two.

Thus, abstracta are part of the distinct identity, nature and being of any particular entity. That is, the principle of distinct identity has ontological, not just conceptual, significance. That’s why we recognise it as a first principle of right reason.

So, not a spooky, mysterious, metaphysical world of forms, just the architecture of — rational principles or “logic” of — being or possible being (and of impossibility of being). Where of course a considerable part of that embedded architecture of being is structural and quantitative. That is, Mathematical. Mathematics has in key part ontological import. Hence, Wigner’s point on its astonishing power. The music of the spheres is written in the language of mathematics, with — I daresay — Fourier leading the charge.

Speaking of architecture, that does point to architect. But that is an onward discussion tied to the necessary being root of reality. >>

So, what is now on the table is the architecture of — i.e. rational principles or “logic” of — being or possible being or even impossibility of being. Which, in part we may tabulate:

Where also, it is worth the effort to also headline from 375:

KF, 375: >>[W]e can show that key abstract elements of structure and quantity are necessary aspects of the logic of being a distinct possible world.

Consider a distinct possible world, W which is distinct from near neighbours (say W’, W’) by having some aspect of core characteristics A, unique to itself. Were there no A, the world would be indistinguishable from near neighbours and we would recognise that distinct labels have been attached to the same underlying possible world. Such allows us to view W as a structured set:

W = {A|~A}

Now, nothing is in W that is not in A or else ~A, the dichotomy is empty and there is no x in W but not in A or else ~A. This is the quantitative property, nullity; thus zero is present, {} –> 0. Likewise, A is a distinct thing, a unit. Unity is present, so one. Following von Neumann, {0} –> 1, where also A manifests unity. In a different sense, ~A is a complex unity, collecting many other things, pointing to collectives, to systems, to organisation, to function based on organisation etc. For our purposes, ~A is a unit but one different from A, so we need to recognise duality, two-ness, thus two: {0,1} –> 2. Obviously, such succession continues without limit and manifests the naturals, also implying the transfinite ordinals on the premise of order type {0,1,2 . . . } –> w (omega).

Likewise, we may contemplate an inverse such that -x + x –> 0, which is a vector of one dimension. We now have integers. Ratios of integers gives rise to rationals and convergent sums yield the rest of the reals. This gives us continuum. From this, the vector rotation operator i*x repeated twice to give – x allows us to have 2-d vectors in a continuum, a plane. An abstract plane that we may contemplate but which pervades any possible world. Where such a world is sufficiently spatially extended and actualised, we may observe continua, dimensions, vectors, rotations, trajectories etc.

So, we see where any possible world, simply on being distinct, manifests directly 0,1,2 and by extension on the logic of being, N, Z, Q, R, C. The vector phenomenon captured from Z on, allows us to extend the abstract continuum to arbitrarily many dimensions. (Notice the distinction between world manifestations and our extension to n-dimensional entities, n arbitrarily high.In physics we speak of 10^22 degrees of freedom routinely, for statistical thermodynamics, just for a reasonably accessible case.)

Our world manifests three spatial dimensions on the macro scale, and we can observe things like Mobius strips etc.

The underlying point is, that we see intelligible, abstract, necessary, structural and quantitative entities as part of the fabric of any distinct world, part of its framework, part of the logic of its being as a distinct possible world.

In that context, we may identify certain facts of structure and quantity that necessarily obtain.

For instance consider five distinct units and how they may be partitioned into a pair and a triple: ||||| –> || + |||. Obviously, this can be reversed, || + ||| –> |||||. Addition and subtraction have a natural sense of partitioning and combining units. Multiplication and division are extensions as are many onward operations, relations and functions. And so forth.

The point is, that there are abstract, structural and quantitative entities that are intelligible on logic of being which are necessary corollaries of any distinct possible world. These abstracta, we recognise and observe through the effects of the logic of being, we do not invent. They are not merely concepts and constructs we invent and project to a world of things in themselves. That, being in reality just an inner game on the appearances we have and imagine as reflecting the outer world. No, the Kantian ugly gulch fails and we have no good reason to imagine the behaviour of a Mobius strip is some sort of contemplative inner dream. Such dreams we could modify at will, the logic of being is far less yielding than that.

So, we need to frame an understanding of Mathematics that recognises that we may study the logic of structure and quantity, but this is not isolated from the intelligible substance of structure and quantity manifest in the world. Yes, our sense of being and of cause needs to adapt to the logic of being that involves necessary albeit abstract entities. For instance, nullity, the empty set, zero are manifest in a myriad circumstances, indeed in any possible, distinct world. But as {} is indistinguishable from {} there is good reason to see that it is one and the same common entity. Which is a characteristic shown by many abstract entities. >>

So, now, let us further reflect. END

Comments
KF, I find your answers confusing as well, FWIW. Every time, you seem to stop just short of affirming that the real numbers comprise an actual infinite set (actual as opposed to potential). I recall that in the past, the issue of actual vs. potential infinities has caused us some difficulties. But I do believe this is relevant to the discussion over nominalism. You seem to accept the validity of Cantor's argument showing that the set [0, 1] is uncountable, yet the proof depends on the existence of an actual infinite set.daveS
March 25, 2019
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Dave's question is not tangential, as it pertains to what is the nature of abstractions: are they real, and "If So, How — And Where?" My points about the nature of time and space is not tangential also. These are good examples of abstract concepts which are elements of our logical symbolic number system and which provide useful approximations as part of our models of reality at times, but which do not match some real property of the world.hazel
March 25, 2019
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H, tangential at best. What a proposition is, the tied centrality of truth-claims, the inherently abstract relationship of truth have all been identified. Notice, in talking about school level physics, you spoke to falsity, which is a related abstract relationship. Similarly, distinct identity of a world implies structure and quantity of abstract character being embedded: N, Z, Q, R, C. Where, such coupled with relevant onward structures will describe any particular form that space-time manifests in this world. That is separate from the abstract reality of C as a guaranteed flat domain which is an abstract space present in the logical framework of any and every possible world -- the best way to get "the" plane that is so often discussed. We can extend to ijk as spanning a similar abstract space of three dimensions. And much more. Further to such it has long been pointed out that truth or falsity are independent of how well we know such. KFkairosfocus
March 25, 2019
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DS, has it registered that I identified what a transfinite set is, and how this applies to N, Z, Q, R and C? I find your reaction and line of questions strange at best. They are also quite obviously tangential. KFkairosfocus
March 25, 2019
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kf, I think 24 responds to Copi. Also, as an example, for many years the standard model was a Cartesian 3-D space and a separate entity Time, both of which were continuous in a linear fashion, and were the background structure of the world in which particles moved. This model is still the beginning framework for physics. But we now know that that model is false: it is a workable abstract concept for many purposes, but it doesn't accurately describe reality at either the quantum level or in respect to relativity. And, as I noted, the hypothesis of quantum loop gravity, which may have some truth that will eventually be supported (or not) posits that neither space nor time are continuous. So the abstraction of the continuum as represented by the real numbers is perhaps only approximately a “true” model of reality in respect to space and time, and the old abstract model of space and time as continuous containers for the activity of the elements of the world is now outdated, or at least seen as less true than it used to be. This supports my general point, I think.hazel
March 25, 2019
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KF, Ok, this is fairly clear, I think. You do not accept that the real numbers comprise an actually infinite set. Or at least you will not comment on the matter (which would be completely fair, IMHO).daveS
March 25, 2019
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DS, really! I have clearly stated that there are structures and quantities built into reality, indeed I showed -- cf OP -- that N, Z, Q, R and C follow on distinct identity of any possible world. Each of these lays out a transfinite range of quantities in the relevant sense: any finite count of numbers of each type can be exceeded, so the numbers of each type are without limit: immeasurably large. For N, this points to the recognition of the type of quantity, the order type of naturals, a transfinite. Obviously, c for continuum is beyond that. I have pointed to how the term, set, is denoting an identifiable collection and is secondary to the quantities and their structural relationships which are part of the architecture of any particular possible world. As you know from three years past was it, I am noting the proper sense of transfinite: beyond any particular finite measure. For instance for any natural k, we may exceed k+1, K+2 etc, this obviously being recursive. KFkairosfocus
March 25, 2019
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H, please read Copi again, as a standard reference on a proposition: "A proposition asserts that something is the case or it asserts that something is not. We may affirm a propo-sition, or deny it—but every proposition either asserts what really is the case, or it asserts something that is not. Therefore every proposition is either true or false." Our opinion or whether it succeeds or fails notwithstanding, a proposition asserts that X is really the case or X is not the case. So, it asserts a truth claim and thus a structured relationship between assertion and reality. If the claim is successful, it is truth. We here see the abstract relationship, truth. Which has to obtain independent of our views, opinions, degree of confidence, warrant etc.It is independent of the degree to which we may err, so long as this does not entail that we always err (which would be self-referentially absurd by being self-refuting and would at once end serious discussion: the proper end of mind, reason and discussion is truth). Similarly, we find that in implications, only true consequents follow properly on a true proposition, another tie-in between proposition and reality, another sign of ontological import. KFkairosfocus
March 25, 2019
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KF,
DS, why do you think I have not said a definitive yes that there are transfinite sets, such being integral to the logic of a possible world, including infinitesimals?
I don't know (and that is a confusing sentence). I can think of two reasons not to give a definitive yes or no answer: 1) You don't know (which is a respectable position) 2) You prefer to keep your position vague, because it's easier to defend.daveS
March 25, 2019
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Kj writes, “H, are you making statements that assert that certain things are or are not the case?” Sure,( although as I’m pretty sure I’ve said :-) ), such statements (if they are about the world as opposed to a formal logical system) are provisional, and are accurate only to a certain varying degree. But we are certainly justified in saying, with appropriate disclaimers if needed, that certain propositions about the world are true. That doesn’t mean Certainly True, but it certainly means true enough to add into a functioning knowledge system about the world. You write, “ If so, you are making propositions, which are automatically linked to reality by the relationship of truth or falsity (as opposed to our ability to be certain of truth or falsity, cf. Copi).” Not sure what you mean by that. Propositions about the world are “linked to reality” by assessing whether they accurately describe reality. Whether they do are not is sometimes easy to show, and sometimes quite difficult. Not sure who Copi is: I think you mentioned him once before and I agreed with what you quoted, but I can’t remember and could be wrong about that. But anyway, as I said before as far as propositions about the world go, we can not be Certainly Sure about their Truth. You write,
“Thus, in asserting truth claims, you are self-referential [You still haven’t explained what you mean by this.]. In this context, necessarily involving the abstract relationship to reality of claimed truth which may be so or not so. If that bridge is not real in some relevant sense, it reduces truth claims to meaninglessness.
Sure, “the bridge is real”. I just explained, again, that we test our propositions about the world and come to a conclusion as to how valid they are: our abstractions are testable models that describe observable facts about the world. I’ll repeat something I wrote on the other thread, because I think it is a fairly succinct and accurate statement of my position these days:
I’ve explained my position, and see nothing “fatally self-referential” in it. The world is intelligible, and we are intelligent, so our understandings provide reasonably accurate maps of the world. We use abstractions to describe the world, but the world itself is “concrete” in the sense that it is its behavior which we observe that is the source of the material for our abstractions.
P.S. I see now that there was a quote from Copi in a post that I didn't see when I read 20 by kf, but I think my reply covered the points he raised anyway. And as always, we have to distinguish propositions about the world from propositions about the elements of formal logical systems.hazel
March 25, 2019
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DS, why do you think I have not said a definitive yes that there are transfinite sets, such being integral to the logic of a possible world, including infinitesimals? I for cause hold that structure and quantity are primary, labels are secondary. Remember, I have tied N, Z, Q, R, C to the distinct identity of any particular possible world, i.e. such abstracta are necessary to reality. That we call such domains sets is just a way to refer collectively and definably. KF PS: Notice my comment to ET on the continuum.kairosfocus
March 25, 2019
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KF, Is that a yes or a no? It doesn't look like you are willing to say that, for example, the set we normally refer to as [0, 1] actually exists. Likewise for any other actually infinite (abstract) set. But you do talk about the real numbers frequently. Are you a nominalist about infinite sets?daveS
March 25, 2019
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As a digression, I just finished a book on loop quantum gravity, which posits that even space and time are quantized, in which case the continuum of the abstract number system would not exist in the real world.hazel
March 25, 2019
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H, are you making statements that assert that certain things are or are not the case? If so, you are making propositions, which are automatically linked to reality by the relationship of truth or falsity (as opposed to our ability to be certain of truth or falsity, cf. Copi). Thus, in asserting truth claims, you are self-referential. In this context, necessarily involving the abstract relationship to reality of claimed truth which may be so or not so. If that bridge is not real in some relevant sense, it reduces truth claims to meaninglessness. KFkairosfocus
March 25, 2019
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F/N: When Wikipedia does a job reasonably well (at least in the introduction) it is worth noting that. Here, on truth -- as a point of context for further discussion:
Truth is most often used to mean being in accord with fact or reality, or fidelity to an original or standard.[1] Truth is also sometimes defined in modern contexts as an idea of "truth to self", or authenticity. Truth is usually held to be opposite to falsehood, which, correspondingly, can also suggest a logical, factual, or ethical meaning. The concept of truth is discussed and debated in several contexts, including philosophy, art, theology, and science. Most human activities depend upon the concept, where its nature as a concept is assumed rather than being a subject of discussion; these include most of the sciences, law, journalism, and everyday life. Some philosophers view the concept of truth as basic, and unable to be explained in any terms that are more easily understood than the concept of truth itself. To some, truth is viewed as the correspondence of language or thought to an independent reality, in what is sometimes called the correspondence theory of truth. Various theories and views of truth continue to be debated among scholars, philosophers, and theologians.[2] Language is a means by which humans convey information to one another. The method used to determine whether something is a truth is termed a criterion of truth. There are varying stances on such questions as what constitutes truth: what things are truthbearers capable of being true or false; how to define, identify, and distinguish truth; what roles do faith and empirical knowledge play; and whether truth can be subjective or is objective: relative truth versus absolute truth.
Okay, a place to begin: truth says of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not, per Ari in Metaphysics 1011b. Propositions make assertions as to what is the case or is not the case of affairs and are identifiably either true or false. They are the focus of logic, Mathematics, Science and a great deal of philosophy. Let me pull up Copi again:
A. Propositions Propositions are the building blocks of our reasoning. A proposition asserts that something is the case or it asserts that something is not. We may affirm a propo- sition, or deny it—but every proposition either asserts what really is the case, or it asserts something that is not. Therefore every proposition is either true or false. There are many propositions about whose truth we are uncertain. “There is life on some other planet in our galaxy,” for example, is a proposition that, so far as we now know, may be true or may be false. Its “truth value” is unknown, but this proposition, like every proposition, must be either true or false. A question asserts nothing, and therefore it is not a proposition. “Do you know how to play chess?” is indeed a sentence, but that sentence makes no claim about the world. Neither is a command a proposition (“Come quickly!”), nor is an exclamation a proposition (“Oh my gosh!”). Questions, commands, and excla- mations—unlike propositions—are neither true nor false. When we assert some proposition, we do so using a sentence in some lan- guage. However, the proposition we assert is not identical to that sentence. This is evident because two different sentences, consisting of different words differently arranged, may have the same meaning and may be used to assert the very same proposition.
Key concepts. KFkairosfocus
March 25, 2019
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Kf, you write, “H, you continue to try to confine abstracta to our minds.” This is true. That is the main point I am making. The you write the following, with edits as you sometimes do, although I think this makes it hard to read.
In making that as a truth claim, you inescapably infer to what obtains as reality beyond our minds [-> absolutely, there is a reality beyond our minds], involving various abstract structures [-> that is the point I don’t think is true], e.g. the correspondence of proposition to things in themselves [-> such propositions are never an exact correspondence] that allows such to be true or else false [-> as a provisional but never perfect description, map, or model of reality.]
. You write, “This is one aspect of self-reference that continues to show how the attempt to confine fails.” And exactly how do we have self-reference here? You write, “ And of course Mobius strips and many other phenomena likewise demonstrate how the architecture of our world embeds key structural and quantitative abstracta” 34, and counting. You add,
Mathematical platonism is any metaphysical account of mathematics that implies mathematical entities exist, that they are abstract, and that they are independent of all our rational activities. For example, a platonist might assert that the number pi exists outside of space and time and has the characteristics it does regardless of any mental or physical activities of human beings.”
Yes, and as I’ve engaged in these conversations over the last few months, I have decided that I am not a mathematical Platonist.hazel
March 25, 2019
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Continuing: 7a SM: Is the slippery slope argument ALWAYS fallacious? https://uncommondescent.com/logic-and-first-principles-of-right-reason/sm-is-the-slippery-slope-argument-always-fallacious/ 8 Logic & First Principles 8: Bridging the Wigner MATH-PHYSICS GAP (with help from phase/ configuration/ state space) https://uncommondescent.com/physics/logic-first-principles-8-bridging-the-wigner-math-physics-gap-with-help-from-phase-configuration-state-space/ 9 Logic and First Principles, 9: Can we be “certain” of any of our views or conclusions? https://uncommondescent.com/logic-and-first-principles-of-right-reason/logic-and-first-principles-9-can-we-be-certain-of-any-of-our-views-or-conclusions/ 10 Logic and First Principles, 10: Knowable Moral Truth and Moral Government vs. Nihilistic Manipulation https://uncommondescent.com/ethics/logic-and-first-principles-10-knowable-moral-truth-and-moral-government-vs-nihilistic-manipulation/ 11 Logic and First Principles, 11: The logic of Ultimate Mind as Source of Reality https://uncommondescent.com/mind/logic-and-first-principles-11-the-logic-of-ultimate-mind-as-source-of-reality/ 12 Logic and First Principles, 12: The crooked yardstick vs plumb-line self-evident truths https://uncommondescent.com/logic-and-first-principles-of-right-reason/logic-and-first-principles-12-the-crooked-yardstick-vs-plumb-line-self-evident-truths/ 13 Logic and First Principles, 13: The challenge of creeping scientism (and of linked nominalism) https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/logic-and-first-principles-13-the-challenge-of-creeping-scientism-and-of-linked-nominalism/ --> 14 is active. Again, I never was a salesman. KFkairosfocus
March 25, 2019
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F/N: The following are available for the low, low price of a click. Caution, they may require re-thinking so those not inclined to re-think need not apply: Logic and principles series links: 1 Logic & first principles, 1: Analogy, Induction and the power of the principle of identity (with application to the genetic code) https://uncommondescent.com/the-design-of-life/logic-first-principles-analogy-induction-and-the-power-of-the-principle-of-identity-with-application-to-the-genetic-code/ 2 Logic and First Principles, 2: How could Induction ever work? (Identity and universality in action . . . ) https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/logic-and-first-principles-how-could-induction-ever-work-identity-and-universality-in-action/ 3 Logic & First Principles, 3: The roots of right reason and the power/limits of entailment https://uncommondescent.com/mathematics/logic-first-principles-3-the-roots-of-right-reason-and-the-power-limits-of-entailment/ 4 Logic & First Principles, 4: The logic of being, causality and science https://uncommondescent.com/mathematics/logic-first-principles-4-the-logic-of-being-causality-and-science/ 5 Logic and first principles, 5: The mathemat-ICAL ordering of reality https://uncommondescent.com/philosophy/logic-and-first-principles-5-the-mathemat-ical-ordering-of-reality/ 6 Logic and First Principles, 6: Reason/Rationality and Responsibility (i.e. moral government) are inextricably entangled https://uncommondescent.com/logic-and-first-principles-of-right-reason/logic-and-first-principles-6-reason-rationality-and-responsibility-i-e-moral-government-are-inextricably-entangled/ 7 Logic and First Principles, 7: The problem of fallacies vs credible warrant https://uncommondescent.com/logic-and-first-principles-of-right-reason/logic-and-first-principles-7-the-problem-of-fallacies-vs-credible-warrant/ Oh well, I was never a salesman Cont'd:kairosfocus
March 25, 2019
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H, you continue to try to confine abstracta to our minds. However, just in making that as a truth claim, you inescapably infer to what obtains as reality beyond our minds, involving various abstract structures, e.g. the correspondence of proposition to things in themselves that allows such to be true or else false. This is one aspect of self-reference that continues to show how the attempt to confine fails. And of course Mobius strips and many other phenomena likewise demonstrate how the architecture of our world embeds key structural and quantitative abstracta. KF PS: Note, Mathematical Platonism, per IEP, showing that it is not the same as Plato's world of the forms (certainly as popularly thought of):
Mathematical platonism is any metaphysical account of mathematics that implies mathematical entities exist, that they are abstract, and that they are independent of all our rational activities. For example, a platonist might assert that the number pi exists outside of space and time and has the characteristics it does regardless of any mental or physical activities of human beings. Mathematical platonists are often called "realists," although, strictly speaking, there can be realists who are not platonists because they do not accept the platonist requirement that mathematical entities be abstract.
You will recall, my comment (cf. OP):
The reality of core abstracta is inescapably the case, i.e. it is necessarily true on pain of not being able to think, communicate conceptually, reason [implication is abstract], speak truth, demonstrate, warrant, know etc. The serious issue then follows: in what way are such things real? The best I can answer for now is that such abstracta are connected to the logic of being for worlds or things in the world. They are logically relevant characteristics of being, which in many cases are shared across beings as archetypes that are in-common, or even are in-common across possible worlds. In some cases such as numbers they are in common to all possible worlds as part of the fabric of any distinct possible world. We may recognise or discover them and try to identify what they precisely are, but in many cases they defy particular definition in words. Where do they come from, where are they? They come from the logic of being and are embedded as constraints on being. For instance, no entity E is such that it has two core characteristics x and y where y = ~x. That is why square circles are impossible of being. Regardless of how we may form a fuzzy imagination that oscillates between the shapes or may try to superpose and blend the two. Thus, abstracta are part of the distinct identity, nature and being of any particular entity. That is, the principle of distinct identity has ontological, not just conceptual, significance. That’s why we recognise it as a first principle of right reason. So, not a spooky, mysterious, metaphysical world of forms, just the architecture of — rational principles or “logic” of — being or possible being (and of impossibility of being). Where of course a considerable part of that embedded architecture of being is structural and quantitative. That is, Mathematical. Mathematics has in key part ontological import.
PPS: Lost in the laugh is a fail.kairosfocus
March 25, 2019
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ET, we cannot exhaustively list an infinite set but can indicate it. (0,1] an interval, is a continuum and is the mirror to x GRT 1 under y = 1/x, i.e. it contains an infinity of values (again, abstract). {0,1,2 . . . } is likewise countably endless, given unlimited succession, such are part of the logic of quantity for any particular distinct world. KFkairosfocus
March 25, 2019
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DaveS
The special boxed set of the entire 15-part series of posts. Narrated by Liam Neeson, with a guest appearance by Richard Lewontin.
I’m saving up for the director’s cut, with the episode containing agit-prop flaming strawmen and colorful herring set in Plato’s cave. :)Brother Brian
March 25, 2019
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DS (et al), the abstract quantity of endlessness of succession per von Neumann exists as part of the logic of quantity. Any particular finite natural you can state or represent as say k exists and is exceeded k+1, k+2 etc almost as if k were 0, these are part of the logic of quantity expressed in numbers; ties to the distinct identity required for any particular possible world. Thus, we recognise that the transfinite exists as an abstract domain of quantity in any possible world. Also, take a look at the y = ln x curve as x --> 0. This gives good reason to recognise infinitesimals and transfinites, ie. we see a natural catapult function in action, it is the mirror to y = e^x in the line y = x, i.e. in effect an exponential growth downwards approaching 0y and exploding in magnitude as x --> 0. Similar for y = 1/x. Can we have a MATERIAL entity built of atoms that is infinite? No, any particular number of atoms, say u, will be finite. KFkairosfocus
March 25, 2019
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Infinite sets cannot exist for the simple fact that sets are collections of things. Just sayin'...ET
March 25, 2019
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LOL and multiple :-) 'shazel
March 25, 2019
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The thread?
The special boxed set of the entire 15-part series of posts. Narrated by Liam Neeson, with a guest appearance by Richard Lewontin.daveS
March 25, 2019
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The thread?hazel
March 25, 2019
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DaveS
Based on this post, I take it that you believe actually infinite sets, including uncountable sets, do exist. Is that correct?
They exist in an abstract sense, but cannot exist in a real physical sense. :) What do I win?Brother Brian
March 25, 2019
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KF, Based on this post, I take it that you believe actually infinite sets, including uncountable sets, do exist. Is that correct?daveS
March 25, 2019
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Kf writes, “That (truth) is a key abstract entity, a relationship between symbolically expressed ideas and reality as it is.” I agree. Of course the issue, as you have highlighted in your title, is in what ways are abstract entities real. I maintain that truth, both as a general concept and in reference to particular statements, is an abstract concept in our minds. I wrote, in an effort to make our differences clear, that “perhaps this is an accurate paraphrase of your view: that if there is to be true truth about the world, the abstract concepts in our minds must have a valid and complete relationship with corresponding abstractions in the world.>> In response, you wrote a number of things that I don’t understand You wrote, “No one said that THE abstractions as we conceive “must have a valid and complete relationship with corresponding abstractions in the world.”. I don’t understand why you capitalized THE. You wrote, “I am simply alluding to Aristotle’s apt summary: truth says of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not.” I don’t think this sentence, which you commonly quote, says anything useful. Of course the aim of truth is to accurately say something about what is, but that in itself gives us no guidance in establishing what is in fact true. You wrote, “ Thus, there are multiple abstracta at work (symbolisation, representation etc) and an abstract structure of correspondence where a true proposition [abstractum] accurately [abstractum] describes [abstractum] some facet of reality. … The pervasive nature of implicit but very real abstracta is plain.” I don’t know why you keep pointing out that the concepts we use to discuss these things (true proposition, accurate, describes, etc.) are abstractions. Yes, abstractions are real, and we can’t think or talk without them. Again (again!) the issue is in what ways are abstract entities real: as concepts in the minds of human beings (my position) or in some other way. When I wrote. “To me, however, truth is always provisional and partial”, you wrote, “This conflates knowledge of truth, knowledge being warranted, credibly true belief.” Did you mean “knowledge with truth? If so, once again, the issue is what is “credibly true belief”. Your common use of the word “warrant” implies your belief that some truths about the world are certain, and can be shown to be so. You write, “So, again and again we see the implicit use of abstract realities.” Yes, and again and again I point out that this isn’t implicit: I explicitly state that abstract concepts are the means by which we understand the world: we can’t think about or talk about the world without using the abstract concepts that are in our minds. I’ll end by pointing out that I don’t see how what you wrote establishes, or even addresses, your idea that my position is “fatally self-referential”. P.S. It would be easy to follow your posts if you used quotation marks and not double brackets when you quoted people.hazel
March 25, 2019
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F/N: For the now, I simply point out from H: >>Perhaps the issue here is truth. >> 1: That is a key abstract entity, a relationship between symbolically expressed ideas and reality as it is. >>Perhaps this is an accurate paraphrase of your view: that if there is to be true truth about the world, the abstract concepts in our minds must have a valid and complete relationship with corresponding abstractions in the world.>> 2: No one said that THE abstractions as we conceive "must have a valid and complete relationship with corresponding abstractions in the world." 3: I am simply alluding to Aristotle's apt summary: truth says of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not. Thus, there are multiple abstracta at work (symbolisation, representation etc) and an abstract structure of correspondence where a true proposition [abstractum] accurately [abstractum] describes [abstractum] some facet of reality. 4: The pervasive nature of implicit but very real abstracta is plain. >>To me, however, truth is always provisional and partial,>> 5: This conflates knowledge of truth, knowledge being warranted, credibly true belief. 6: there may be truths we do not know, but only believe or are dismissive of or are utterly ignorant of. >> because the abstractions only exist in our minds,>> 7: The conceptualism, which here asserts to be truth or at least believed truth. 8: So, again and again we see the implicit use of abstract realities >> and can never correspond to reality completely. >> 9: Our lack of knowledge and proneness to error has nothing to do with the reality of truth and its knowability in key cases such as error exists. >>Even if our abstractions seem to correspond exactly, that is only because they are abstractions which leave out the huge multiplicity of details which are not being abstracted.>> 10: A particular truth is so independent of the degree of our ignorance of truth in general. Later. KFkairosfocus
March 25, 2019
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