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RDF/AIG as a case of the incoherence and rhetorical agenda of evolutionary materialist thought and/or its fellow- traveller ideologies

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For the past several weeks, there has been an exchange that developed in the eduction vs persuasion thread (put up May 9th by AndyJones), on first principles of right reason and related matters.  Commenter RDF . . .   has championed some popular talking points in today’s intellectual culture.

We can therefore pick up from a citation and comment by Vivid, at 619 in the thread (June 12th), for record and possible further discussion.

Accordingly, I clip comment 742 from the thread (overnight) and headline it:

_____________

>>. . . let us remind ourselves of the context for the just above exchanges, by going back to Vivid at 619:

[RDF/AIG:] And once again I must remind you that you are mistaken. We cannot be absolutely certain of anything, and you will see that I have never said that we could be absolutely certain of anything. I don’t think this is a very difficult point, but you keep misquoting me.

[Vivid, replying:} I apologize I did not intend to misquote you I now understand your position better. You are not absolutely certain that there is no such thing as absolute certainty but you want Stephen[B] to concede to that which you are not absolutely certain about. Got it.

Notice, this is what RDF has to defend, cited from his own mouth:

[RDF:] We cannot be absolutely certain of anything . . .

This absolute declaration of certainty that we cannot be certain of anything, aptly exposes the underlying incoherence of what RDF has been arguing.

"Turtles, all the way down . . . " vs a root cause
“Turtles, all the way down . . . ” vs a root cause

He has spent much time trying to ignore a sound worldviews foundation approach, and has sought to undermine first principles of right reason in order to advance an agenda that from its roots on up, is incoherent.

So, let it be understood that when reason was in the balance, he was found wanting, decisively wanting. Again and again.

In particular, observe his willful unresponsiveness to and “passive” resistance by that unresponsiveness, to the basic point that by direct case, Royce’s Error exists, we can show that there are truths that are generally recognised, are accessible to our experiences, are factually grounded, and can be shown to be undeniably true and self evident, constituting certain knowledge of the world of things in themselves accessible to humans.

Thus, his whole project of want of grounding for reasoning and building worldviews collapses from the foundations.

In particular, observe as well that he has for hundreds of comments, waged an ideological talking point war against cause and effect, trying to poison the atmosphere to disguise the want of a good basis for rejecting it.

For instance, observe how he has never seriously engaged the point that once a thing A exists, following Schopenhauer, we may freely ask, why and expect to find a reasonable, intelligible answer. (This is in part a major basis for science, and also for philosophy.)

This principle, sufficient reason, is patently reasonable and self-evident: that if A is, there is a good explanatory reason for it.

First, that A’s attributes, unlike those of a square circle, are coherent. So, from this point on, the law of non-contradiction is inextricably entangled int he possibility of being. Consequently we see the antithesis: possibility vs impossibility of being.

Next, by virtue of possible worlds analysis, we can distinguish another antithesis: contingent vs non-contingent (i.e. NECESSARY) beings.

A unicorn, a possible being (HT: Baggins Book Blogger, Blogspot)
A unicorn, a possible being (HT: Baggins Book Blogger, Blogspot)

That is, we can have possible worlds in which certain things — contingent beings, C — could exist and others in which C does not exist. For instance, a horned horse is obviously a possible being but happens not to exist as of yet in the actual world we inhabit. But it is conceivable that within a century, through genetic engineering, one may well exist. (I am not so sure that they will be able to make a pink one, but a white one is very conceivable.)

We are of course just such members of class C.

(And this wider class C further opens the way to significant choice by humans, by which we can imagine possible futures, and by rational evaluation of the consequences of our ideas, models and plans, decide which to implement, e.g. by choosing a design of the building to replace the WTC buildings in NYC knocked down by Bin Laden and co on Sept 11, 2001 — a date chosen by him on the probable grounds that it was the 318th anniversary less one day, from the great cavalry attack led by Jan III Sobieski of Poland and Lithuania, which broke the final Turkish siege of Vienna under the Caliph at that time in 1683. That is, by choosing the day, UBL was making a message to his fellow radicalised Muslims that he was taking over from the previous high-water mark of IslamIST expansionism. And that he was doing so in the general area of Khorasan would also be of significance to such Muslims, who would immediately recognise the significance and relevance of black flag armies from that general area. I give these examples, to underscore the significance of contingency and intelligent, willed choice in humans, something that RDF/AIG also wishes to undermine. He does not see the fatal self-referential incoherence that stems from that, and doubtless would dismiss the significance of incoherence as well. The circle of ideological irrationality driven by a priori evolutionary materialism and its fellow traveller ideas and agendas, closes.)

But C has its antithesis in a world partition, class NOT-C; let us call it N.

Necessary beings, such as the number two, 2 or the true proposition 2 + 3 = 5, etc.

Fire_tetrahedron
The fire tetrahedron, showing the cluster of enabling factors that are each necessary and jointly sufficient for a fire to begin (Wiki)

Members of C are marked by dependence on ON/OFF enabling factors, e.g. as we have frequently discussed, how a match flame depends on each of: heat, fuel, oxidiser and chain reaction. Such enabling factors are necessary causal factors, all of which must be present for a member of class C to be actualised. A sufficient condition for such a member will have at least all of the factors like this, met.

We naturally and reasonably say that such a member of C is CAUSED when its conditions to exist are met by a sufficient cluster of factors, and that E is an effect; the cluster of factors being causes. So, even if we do not know the full set of causal factors for C, we can be confident that a contingent being, that has a beginning and may end or could conceivably not have been at all, is caused.

However, not all things are like that. Some things have no such dependence on causal factors, and are possible beings. These beings will be actual in all possible worlds, i.e. they are necessary beings.

One and the same object cannot be circular and square in the same sense and place at the same time
One and the same object
cannot be circular and
square in the same
sense and place at the same time

A serious candidate necessary being will be either impossible (blocked by having incoherent proposed attributes such as a square circle), or it will be possible and actual. As noted, S5, in modal logic, captures part of why. {Cf. here.} In effect we can see that such a being just is, inevitably, and its absence would be impossible.

For example the number 2 just is. Even in an empty world, one can see that we have the empty set { } –> 0. Thence, we may form a set which collects the empty set: {0} –> 1. Then, in the next step, we simply collect both: {0, 1} –> 2. For modern set theory, we simply continue the process to get 3, 4, 5 . . . , but this is enough for our purposes. Doing this abstract analytical exercise does not create 2, it simply recognises how inevitable it is. It is impossible for 2 not to exist. Similarly, the true proposition 2 + 3 = 5 is like that, and much more besides.

We thus see that necessary beings exist and are knowable, even familiar in some cases.

We see further that such beings are without beginning, or end. They are not caused, they hold being by necessity, which its their sufficient reason for existing. They have no dependence on external enabling causal factors.

A flying spaghetti monster knitted doll, showing how this is used to mockt eh idea of God as necessary being (note the words on the chalk board)
A flying spaghetti monster knitted doll, showing how this is used to mock the idea of God as necessary being (note the words on the chalk board)

A serious candidate to be a necessary being will be independent of enabling factors, likewise (flying spaghetti monsters need not apply) and will not be composed of material parts. The abstract, thought-nature of cases like 2, 2 + 3 = 5 etc shows that such beings point to mind, and one way of accounting for such beings is that they are eternally contemplated by God. Where also God is regarded as an eternal, necessary, spiritual being who is minded and the root of all being in our world, the ultimate enabling factor for reality.

BTW, this means that those who would dismiss God’s existence do not merely need to establish that in their view God is improbable, but that God is impossible, as God is a serious candidate to be a necessary being.

That is, since RDF is so hot to undermine the intellectual credibility of the existence of God, it is worth pausing to highlight a few points on this matter, connected to the logic of necessary beings and other relevant points. For, even before we run into other things that point like compass needles to God: the evident design of a fine tuned cosmos set up for C-chemistry, aqueous medium cell based life that makes an extra cosmic, intelligent agent with power to create a cosmos the explanation to beat, the significance of our being minded and characterised by reason, as well as the existence of a world of life in that context, the fact that we inescapably find ourselves under moral government by implanted law, and of course the direct encounter with God that millions report as having positively transformed their lives, and more.

Nope, unlike the pretence of too many skeptics would lead us to naively believe, the acceptance of God’s reality is a very reasonable position to hold. (Scroll back up and observe the studious silence of RDF et al on such matters.)

So, never mind the ink-clouds of distractive or dismissive or confusing talking-points, we are back to the worldview level significance of first principles of right reason and pivotal first, self-evident truths.

{Let us add, an illustrative diagram, on how naturally these principles arise from a world-partition, e.g. by having a bright red ball on a table:}

Laws_of_logic

{And,we may clip Wikipedia’s article on laws of thought:

The law of non-contradiction and the law of excluded middle are not separate laws per se, but correlates of the law of identity. That is to say, they are two interdependent and complementary principles that inhere naturally (implicitly) within the law of identity, as its essential nature . . .   whenever we ‘identify’ a thing as belonging to a certain class or instance of a class, we intellectually set that thing apart from all the other things in existence which are ‘not’ of that same class or instance of a class. In other words, the proposition, “A is A and A is not ~A” (law of identity) intellectually partitions a universe of discourse (the domain of all things) into exactly two subsets, A and ~A, and thus gives rise to a dichotomy. As with all dichotomies, A and ~A must then be ‘mutually exclusive’ and ‘jointly exhaustive’ with respect to that universe of discourse. In other words, ‘no one thing can simultaneously be a member of both A and ~A’ (law of non-contradiction), whilst ‘every single thing must be a member of either A or ~A’ (law of excluded middle).

What’s more . . .  thinking entails the manipulation and amalgamation of simpler concepts in order to form more complex ones, and therefore, we must have a means of distinguishing these different concepts. It follows then that the first principle of language (law of identity) is also rightfully called the first principle of thought, and by extension, the first principle reason (rational thought) . . .

Another illustration shows how world view roots arise:}

A summary of why we end up with foundations for our worldviews, whether or not we would phrase the matter that way}
A summary of why we end up with foundations for our worldviews, whether or not we would phrase the matter that way

Prediction (do, prove me wrong RDF et al): this too will be studiously ignored in haste to push along with the talking point agenda. The price tag for such apparently habitual tactics, is willful neglect of duties of care to be reasonable, to seek and face truth, and to be fair in discussion.

That is, it is “without excuse.”

(And yes, the allusion to Rom 1:19 – 25 and vv. 28 – 32 is quite deliberate.)  >>

____________

A squid ink cloud escape tactic
A squid ink cloud escape tactic (Google)

So, we face the issue of worldview foundations, in light of first principles of right reason.

(One that — per fair comment, for weeks now, RDF/AIG has studiously ducked, behind a cloud of talking points.)

How will we respond?

On what basis of reasoning?

With what level of certainty?

Why? END

Comments
Hi fg good to see you again.
The argument why there is no such thing as absolute certainty has already been laid out – does anyone here disagree with it?
In certain respects I do and I laid them out in #45. Vividvividbleau
June 20, 2013
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P: Good point:
[RDF:] There is no self-referential incoherence involved – that is a mistake that you make because you do not understand that uncertainty about uncertainty simply produces uncertainty, rather than somehow cancelling out. [P:] You’ve got that exactly backwards. I’m the one who has been trying to point out that uncertainty about uncertainty can only ever produce uncertainty. You are the one who claims you can take uncertainty about uncertainty and suddenly become “very certain.” My position is that, once you invoke uncertainty, you can’t somehow get back to certainty on the other side. You’ve already sawed off the branch you need to sit on.
This is of course yet another example of RDF's on the other hand shielding the original point he has just qualified into nothing, but allowing it to proceed rhetorically. Let's refresh our memory from the clip in the OP, on the exchange with Vivid a week ago:
[RDF/AIG:] And once again I must remind you that you are mistaken. We cannot be absolutely certain of anything, and you will see that I have never said that we could be absolutely certain of anything. I don’t think this is a very difficult point, but you keep misquoting me. [Vivid, replying:} I apologize I did not intend to misquote you I now understand your position better. You are not absolutely certain that there is no such thing as absolute certainty but you want Stephen[B] to concede to that which you are not absolutely certain about. Got it.
Poof, ink-cloud fails. KF PS: Your summary of Plantinga's point is pretty good for a rough in a nutshell.kairosfocus
June 19, 2013
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fG (and RDF): The problem is, that knowledge is not merely about degree of certitude or strength of adherence to opinion. Knowledge is about warrant and accuracy to reality, and we can discern two distinct degrees, one that is provisional but reliable enough for practise (e.g. in science, court rooms etc) and another that goes beyond, to certainty. Certainty in the sense that there is no question of provisionality, the matter is final. And the case of Error exists pivots on the fact that our beliefs or findings or conclusions etc are indeed sometimes unreliable, but this highlights that the belief that errors exists is true beyond reasonable doubt. Then, we can symbolise and process, E AND NOT-E must be false as mutually opposed and exhaustive, thence, we have a certain case of error, implying that NOT-E is false. Yes, error exists -- the proposition crops up again, as factually indisputable by the reasonable -- and we can often make mistakes, but this is not at all the same as every opinion or act of mind we have, is erroneous. Our minds are sufficiently reliable to see this, or else we are in chaos. What is still needed, if you dispute this, is to address it on specific terms and show why it is an error. OOPS . . . that would be self-referential wouldn't it? This is part of why Error exists can be said to be undeniably true -- the very attempt to deny it self-refers and affirms it instead. Which is as much of a guarantee as we will ever see: self evident to the point of undeniability, indeed the very attempt to deny or undermine affirms. That is what you really need to address, a very special and pivotal case of self-evident truth, championed by Josiah Royce long ago now and again highlighted by Elton Trueblood decades ago as pivotal in addressing the influence of radical relativism and fallibilism or Plato's Cave/ The Matrix/ Brains in vats/ Boltzmann brains across the board delusionism. (Which all so fatally undermine sense of trust in senses and rationality that they self-undermine. We may confidently lay such aside as entailing the chaos that nothing makes sense. Until there is positive evidence of mass delusion, and there is good reason to see that our senses, reasoning and common sense are utterly delusional -- another self-referential problem lurks there -- we have no reason to see such as anything more than entertaining bits of speculation. But also, each of these implies one thing: error exists. Oops, that same point is underscored again. It is hard to get rid of indeed. And that is what you are dancing around with. Dance with the one that brung ya.) I have put on the table the challenge you need to meet. Let's see if you can. KFkairosfocus
June 19, 2013
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Joe: The problem is not merely that 1, 2, 3, . . . can be matched to 2, 4, 6 . . . or 1, 3, 5 . . . but that it can be transformed into them. So, once we hit a transfinite set and are addressing cardinality -- scale -- Houston, we have a problem. Cf. discussion here, observing the problem of the supertask of counting (and there are uncountable transfinite sets too), leading to the rendering that two sets have the same cardinality iff there is a bijective function between them. A bijective function will transform one to one both ways without omissions of any members of the two sets. That is there is a 1:1 match that can be turned into a little algorithm that we can see would map A to B and back-ways, no left overs, and each element in a set will match just one element of the other. Such a seemingly simple, common-sense definition has in it all the consequences that Cantor has described. KFkairosfocus
June 19, 2013
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Hi FG, I didn't see your post until I'd posted my last one...
Is this entire discussion not about the difference between belief and knowledge?
I would say so, yes - the strength of justification for various beliefs.
I think most would agree that, as RDFish says, there is a continuum that goes from not knowing at all, via intuition, suspicion, belief, knowledge to certainty and eventually absolute certainty. The argument why there is no such thing as absolute certainty has already been laid out – does anyone here disagree with it?
Very good question, to which I've not yet received an answer. People are apparently too busy looking for self-referential incoherence :-)
The rest of the disagreement seems to hinge around deciding when a paticular conviction is a belief and when it is knowledge. Why not share viewpoints on this? Is this just a semantic difference or are belief and knowledge fundamentally different categories? What are the criteria for one and the other?
I've made my position clear on this: I define "knowledge" as "justified true belief", and the amount of justification can vary continuously from "no apparent reason" to "a mountain of good evidence". Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 19, 2013
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5For: Now, that's a thought. At least the All Blacks are doing something, and it is NZ that has the Victoria Cross record for courage in battle in the Commonwealth. Not a mean achievement for a territory with what is it, 4 1/2 millions all told? (That's the population of Jamaica in the Caribbean -- we overseas J'cans add maybe another 6 mn. Trinidad + Jamaics = NZ, population-wise. And there was a rumour some years back that Cuba -- with its formidable sports and medicine base -- wanted in on Cricket. But maybe it is also database expertise we need. Batting against database-trained bowlers and swing magicians is no fun.) KFkairosfocus
June 19, 2013
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Hi Phinehas,
You are the one who claims you can take uncertainty about uncertainty and suddenly become “very certain.” My position is that, once you invoke uncertainty, you can’t somehow get back to certainty on the other side. You’ve already sawed off the branch you need to sit on.
This is actually getting to be a comedy of miscommunication. It is so simple - let's just start over. 1) Think of a continuum reflecting the strength of justification (or "warrant") accruing to any particular claim 2) On one end of this continuum claims with a tremendous amount of justification, and we label this end "Highly Certain Knowledge" 3) On the other end of this continuum are claims with little or no justification, and we label this end "Very Speculative Beliefs" My point is that any particular answer to any of the foundational existential questions (or metaphysical) I've mentioned will lie toward the "Very Speculative Beliefs" end of the spectrum. In contrast to a vast catalogue of common sense and scientific knowledge, the answers to metaphysical questions cannot be clearly derived from our uniform and repeated experience. As a result, despite millenia of concerted effort, no single answer to these metaphysical questions has been demonstrated definitively enough to gain general acceptance. Now, what I've just said is a straightforward comment about the relative certainty of various knowledge claims. It does not entail any sort of paradox at all. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 19, 2013
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Is this entire discussion not about the difference between belief and knowledge? I think most would agree that, as RDFish says, there is a continuum that goes from not knowing at all, via intuition, suspicion, belief, knowledge to certainty and eventually absolute certainty. The argument why there is no such thing as absolute certainty has already been laid out - does anyone here disagree with it? The rest of the disagreement seems to hinge around deciding when a paticular conviction is a belief and when it is knowledge. Why not share viewpoints on this? Is this just a semantic difference or are belief and knowledge fundamentally different categories? What are the criteria for one and the other? fGfaded_Glory
June 19, 2013
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Plantinga’s famous argument against naturalism does exactly this, but his arguments do not undermine themselves (just as mine do not).
While I admit to not being intimately familiar with Plantinga's argument against naturalism, my understanding is that the argument hinges on the self-referential incoherence in depending upon a mind randomly generated and culled for survival in order to discern what is true about naturalism. His arguments do not undermine themselves because he is not a naturalist. I'm pretty sure his argument is nothing at all like yours.
There is no self-referential incoherence involved – that is a mistake that you make because you do not understand that uncertainty about uncertainty simply produces uncertainty, rather than somehow cancelling out.
You've got that exactly backwards. I'm the one who has been trying to point out that uncertainty about uncertainty can only ever produce uncertainty. You are the one who claims you can take uncertainty about uncertainty and suddenly become "very certain." My position is that, once you invoke uncertainty, you can't somehow get back to certainty on the other side. You've already sawed off the branch you need to sit on.Phinehas
June 19, 2013
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I mean, seriously, YEC and disputing set theory?
Seriously, some parts of set theory appear totally bogus and should be disputed. For example if set A = {0,1,2,3,4,...} and set B = {0,2,4,6,8,...}, is set B a proper subset of set A because it's 2 corresponds to set A's 1, it's 4 corresponds to A's 2, it's 6 corresponds to A's 3? Or is it a proper subset of set A because it's 2 corresponds to set A's 2, it's 4 corresponds to set A's 4- IOW we have an exact match and that is how proper subsets are aligned and identified? Those are both still infinite sets and we have an exact match correspondence. And yet we throw all of that out of the window when comparing the cardinality of each set. For whatever reason set B's 2 now corresponds to set A's 1. There's plenty to dispute. And wrt evolutionism, even more to dispute.Joe
June 19, 2013
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Hi Phinehas,
First, why have we suddenly moved to needing a guarantee? Can we not merely be certain or quite certain? It would help greatly if we settled on consistent goal posts for our skepticism.
Much of the noise and confusion in this debate has arisen because we have not been careful with our vocabulary (how odd for a philosophical debate, right? :-)) In my view, certainty is not a step function - it is not binary - but rather it is a continuum. I've described a spectrum where we have "Very Certain" on one end and "No Clue" on the other, trying to point out that there are no absolutes but only a gradient of justification for our beliefs.
The degree of certainty about anything can be no greater than the degree of reliability of the mind behind the certainty.
Yes, indeed!!
I make this argument while assuming that my mind is reliable enough to do so. You make the very same assumption with each of your arguments. Any argument against this assumption can only ever undermine itself.
Plantinga's famous argument against naturalism does exactly this, but his arguments do not undermine themselves (just as mine do not). We simply acknowledge that there is a finite chance that our minds are unreliable, and that modus ponens and LNC and other self-evident truths are actually false. If that is the case, then all of our arguments are unreliable, and that is all that can be said about it. Still and yet, it is one reason why epistemologists like Plantinga concede that there is no such thing as 100% absolute certainty about anything. All of this is, of course, not the interesting part of my point. The point I'm interested in is how the answers to the Big Questions are so much less certain than the vast amounts of common-sense and scientific knowledge that each of us have.
You dismissed this point earlier, but I will make it again. If we were created by an omniscient and omnipotent God, He might very well be able to Reveal to us all sorts of things, including the reliability of our own minds.
Yes, that conditional makes perfect sense.
Even if we assumed there was no positive evidence whatsoever for God’s existence and labeled the above as purely speculative, at least it is a step up from the self-referential incoherence of the radical skepticism that puts all things in doubt while never doubting itself.
There is no self-referential incoherence involved - that is a mistake that you make because you do not understand that uncertainty about uncertainty simply produces uncertainty, rather than somehow cancelling out.
RDF: I ask “If you have such very certain answers to these questions of origins, mind/body ontology, free will, and so on, why does everybody disagree on these issues so radically after millenia of research and debate?. Nobody answers this question. PH: I have no problem answering this question. You just won’t like my answer. Everybody disagrees on these issues because we have the ability to choose what we believe, and some choose to believe what is false.
Well, people who choose different answers than yours don't believe their answers are false, just as you don't. And as opposed to all of the things that we are all certain about (e.g. much of common sense and scientific knowledge), nobody has any way of demonstrating the truth of what they think based on our uniform and repeated experience. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 19, 2013
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Alan Fox:
We could always have a vote, Stephen. I’m sure there is some way of conducting a poll.
As usual, you miss the point.StephenB
June 19, 2013
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When I provide good reasons for saying this, my detractors ignore the points. For example, I ask “How can we be guaranteed that our minds are reliable?”… and nobody answers that fundamental question.
First, why have we suddenly moved to needing a guarantee? Can we not merely be certain or quite certain? It would help greatly if we settled on consistent goal posts for our skepticism. “How can we be guaranteed that our minds are reliable?” The degree of certainty about anything can be no greater than the degree of reliability of the mind behind the certainty. I make this argument while assuming that my mind is reliable enough to do so. You make the very same assumption with each of your arguments. Any argument against this assumption can only ever undermine itself. For me, whether or not we can be guaranteed that our minds are reliable is an open question. (How could it not be, unless I first possess a reliable mind?) However, I feel quite certain that we can never be guaranteed that our minds are unreliable. Further, from a very practical standpoint, we all act and argue as though we are quite certain that our minds are reliable. Any argument against this certainty will be made while relying on exactly what it opposes. This is unavoidable (he said with certainty). You dismissed this point earlier, but I will make it again. If we were created by an omniscient and omnipotent God, He might very well be able to Reveal to us all sorts of things, including the reliability of our own minds. Even if we assumed there was no positive evidence whatsoever for God's existence and labeled the above as purely speculative, at least it is a step up from the self-referential incoherence of the radical skepticism that puts all things in doubt while never doubting itself.
I ask “If you have such very certain answers to these questions of origins, mind/body ontology, free will, and so on, why does everybody disagree on these issues so radically after millenia of research and debate?. Nobody answers this question.
I have no problem answering this question. You just won't like my answer. :) Everybody disagrees on these issues because we have the ability to choose what we believe, and some choose to believe what is false.Phinehas
June 19, 2013
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KF, I have to agree with you about the Windies, but you should try being a NZ supporter. They have been in a rut my whole life...5for
June 19, 2013
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Hi CLAVDIVS,
I do not believe either myself or RDFish are “fellow travellers” of materialism. Neither of us accept a materialist account of biology, in particular because of the mysteries of consciousness, free will, etc. that arise from biological beings like ourselves but do not appear to admit of a reductionist/physicalist explanation. But because from time-to-time we challenge what we see as poor ID arguments, we are not treated as contructive critics but as enemies.
I am stunned to hear your perfect description of my views and find someone who shares them - thank you! Time after time, unless one buys into each of the approved metaphysical views here (roughly including theism, libertarianism, dualist interactionism, divine command theory, and this weird notion that pure logic yields objective truths about the experienced world) one is placed in the enemy camp, which is described as necessarily holding to atheism, determinism, materialism, moral relativism, and nihilism (and perhaps Marxism, anarchism, facism, post-modernism and progressivism as well). Once you are placed in the enemy camp, the object becomes to halt communication and drown you in personal attacks. The arguments degenerate into trying to find the least likely interpretation of everything you say to prove that you are stupid and ridiculous. Come on - let's debate like smart people instead of insane fanatics! Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 19, 2013
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Claudius: I await your further remarks. The Windies, are simply not what they were. For nigh on 20 years now. As for the notion that ID is in a rut, I doubt that. The recently published conference proceedings say not. As to views of individuals, I suggest that above, one person's concerns on the theory of transfinite sets were answered by another design thinker. The design issue is on whether reliable signs of design exist -- patently yes. So we need the courage to follow the inductive logic of such signs in the world of life and the physics of the cosmos. Age of earth or cosmos has nothing to do with that. And just now there is a side discussion on merits on why some take one view or another. My own, in a nutshell, is that we should not project a false aura of neatly absolute certainty. On the matters in this thread, they respond to a month long dispute that started with accusations up to and including motivation by greed, to avoid reading the materials I have ended up clipping this evening. Then, when that was highlighted as out of order, it was passed off as jesting. Nope I don't buy that. And subsequently, there have been too many textbook examples of rhetorical tactics, fallacies and outright absurdities crying out for correction. I suggest, look at Error exists, vs the clip in the OP that is highlighted as self referentially incoherent. and, too many patterns in the above reflect evolutionary materialism, or fellow-traveller ideologies and characteristic talking points and positions. I think time for some serious rethinking in light of the impact of Royce's Error exists, has come. KFkairosfocus
June 19, 2013
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RDF: I cannot but note on this strawman caricature, multiplied by an artfully ambiguous term I will highlight:
I am surprised to see the resistance here to the simple observation that we have no way of establishing our beliefs beyond all doubt.
Our beliefs invites the general interpretation, all or effectively all our beliefs or at least all or effectively all our core beliefs. Had you -- over the past month -- spent five minutes to read what I had to say on worldview foundations, you would have found this (which I have good reason to believe SB will agree with in essence):
First, we must accept that all worldviews have foundational or core "first plausible" basic -- foundational -- beliefs that are not subject to further proof: they are where our proofs must start from. For, to warrant a claim, A, as worthy of trust and acceptance -- i.e. as credible, or even as knowledge -- we need B, and B would need C, and so on. It would help us to see this, by briefly defining the key term, worldview: world·view (wûrldvy) n. In both senses also called Weltanschauung. 1. The overall perspective from which one sees and interprets the world. 2. A collection of beliefs about life and the universe held by an individual or a group. [Translation of German Weltanschauung.] The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Updated in 2009. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. The terms "perspective" and "beliefs" point to the implications of the chain of warrant challenge just outlined. For, in the end we face the proverbial "turtles all the way down" forever; or else circularity; or else, if we are to be logically coherent and rational, we must stop at "first plausibles" that are reasonable . . . . Now, a vicious infinite regress is absurdly impossible for finite, fallible thinkers such as we are: we would never get far back enough to get started with proving, nor could we trust ourselves to be right all along the chain. Looping back through "turtles in a circle" is little better: it ends up assuming what should be shown. That is, the last turtle has to stand somewhere. We are thus forced to stop at some set of first plausibles or other -- that is, a "faith-point" (yes, we ALL must live by some faith or another, given our finitude and fallibility) -- and then we need to compare alternatives and see which "somewhere" -- which worldview foundation -- is least difficult . . . . (NB: At this level, all sets of alternative first plausibles bristle with difficulties. Indeed, the fundamental, generic method of philosophy is therefore that of comparative difficulties.) John Locke aptly summed up our resulting humbling dilemma in section 5 of his introduction to his famous essay on human understanding: Men have reason to be well satisfied with what God hath thought fit for them, since he hath given them (as St. Peter says [NB: i.e. 2 Pet 1:2 - 4]) pana pros zoen kaieusebeian, whatsoever is necessary for the conveniences of life and information of virtue; and has put within the reach of their discovery, the comfortable provision for this life, and the way that leads to a better. How short soever their knowledge may come of an universal or perfect comprehension of whatsoever is, it yet secures their great concernments [Prov 1: 1 - 7], that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their Maker, and the sight of their own duties [cf Rom 1 - 2 & 13, Ac 17, Jn 3:19 - 21, Eph 4:17 - 24, Isaiah 5:18 & 20 - 21, Jer. 2:13, Titus 2:11 - 14 etc, etc]. Men may find matter sufficient to busy their heads, and employ their hands with variety, delight, and satisfaction, if they will not boldly quarrel with their own constitution, and throw away the blessings their hands are filled with, because they are not big enough to grasp everything . . . It will be no excuse to an idle and untoward servant [Matt 24:42 - 51], who would not attend his business by candle light, to plead that he had not broad sunshine. The Candle that is set up in us [Prov 20:27] shines bright enough for all our purposes . . . If we will disbelieve everything, because we cannot certainly know all things, we shall do muchwhat as wisely as he who would not use his legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no wings to fly. [Emphases added. Text references also added, to document the sources of Locke's biblical allusions and citations.] So, we must make the best of the candle-light we have. At worldview choice foundational level, a good way to do that is to look at three major comparative difficulties tests: (1) factual adequacy relative to what we credibly know about the world and ourselves, (2) coherence, by which the pieces of our worldview must fit together logically and work together harmoniously, (3) explanatory relevance and simplicity: our view needs to explain reality (including our experience of ourselves in our common world) elegantly, simply and powerfully, being neither simplistic nor a patchwork where we are forever adding after-the-fact patches to fix leak after leak. Now, let us not lose sight of what we are doing: something truly radical, that cuts across what the avant garde and their wanna-be hangers on really want: to discuss the newest ideas and issues within their comfortable world- system. As a rule, they are NOT really interested in an upending foundational critique that is going to start from exposing the rottenness of roots or the fatal cracks in foundations, or worse, looming icebergs in the path of the Titanic. However, when a system (even one that imagines itself to be the radical, progressive replacement of old fashioned outdated "religious" thought -- notice how "God," "religion," "Christianity," "The Scriptures" and "faith" are practically dirty words in many quarters today . . . ) is fatally flawed, that is necessary. And in this case, we are going after an assessment of foundations of worldviews from the roots up. Just as Jesus did and just as Paul did. The aim being, to create a sounder -- saner -- system to build thought, hopes and lives on. Two key components of this process of foundation level comparative difficulties in pursuit of a worldview that is a reasonable faith, are: (i) first principles of right reason, and (ii) warranted, credible (self-evident) truths . . .
this is in fact the context where I immediately launched into Royce's error exists, as a first case of a limited circle of key self-evident truths warranted to be undeniable on pain of patent absurdity. Then, I explored what happens when we have the now familiar red ball on the table, leading to world-partition discussed in the OP above: W = { A | NOT-A } has as immediate corollaries LOI, LNC and LEM. Then, for A, we may ask, why it is, seeking and expecting a reasonable answer -- weak form sufficient reason. From this we can see possible vs impossible being, and the requirement that possible being has coherent attributes, unlike a square circle. As a side-light, we have a proper definition of nothing -- non-being. Also, we can see contingent vs non-contingent being. Thus, on/off enabling factors and the principle of cause and effect for contingent beings. But notice: the overarching structure of a worldview is that it is elaborated on core first plausibles, most of which are not self evident but are accepted as plausible and lending coherence to the whole. Thence, one chooses as an informed person in light of comparative difficulties on a sort of grand inference to best world-explanation across factual adequacy, coherence and explanatory power. at no point is there any claim that all or all core beliefs or even most are certain. But, it is pointed out that certain pivotal beliefs properly are certain beyond reasonable doubt (selective hyperskepticism is perfectly capable of clinging to absurdity if that is the price of rejecting that which one desperately wishes not to be so). Error exists and the identity and sufficient reason clusters are cases in point. Cases that are being studiously avoided. but of course, the ambiguity in the assertion leaves open a rhetorical out: no, no, it was not intended that ALL or all core beliefs were meant! Tut, tut! Sorry, I do not buy such a squid ink cloud tactic. Certain specific, named principles have been repeatedly shown as self-evident and certain. If you, RDF or another thinks that Error Exists etc are not, kindly show specifically why. In default of a substantial confutation, we have every good reason to conclude that your objection is not well grounded. KFkairosfocus
June 19, 2013
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Dear kairosfocus I'm sorry to hear you lost a post; I think we all know how irritating that is, all the more so for you because of your extraordinary prolixity. If it's of any interest at all I myself have fond memories of sitting on "The Hill" at the Sydney Cricket Ground (now sadly replaced with steel and concrete seating) watching Joel Garner and Viv Richards (not to mention our Lillee, Marsh and Thomson) when the Windies were at their apogee. Regarding my chiding you @ 33, I truly believe you should tone down your rhetoric by removing the barbs and didactic patronising if you wish to contribute to the success of ID. ID appears to me to be stuck in a rut right now and some openness to new ideas and new ways of thinking may be the only way forward. I do not believe either myself or RDFish are "fellow travellers" of materialism. Neither of us accept a materialist account of biology, in particular because of the mysteries of consciousness, free will, etc. that arise from biological beings like ourselves but do not appear to admit of a reductionist/physicalist explanation. But because from time-to-time we challenge what we see as poor ID arguments, we are not treated as contructive critics but as enemies. Yet on the other hand, all sorts of craziness is tolerated on the ID side that surely you can see debases the intellectual standing of ID. I mean, seriously, YEC and disputing set theory? In recent times, to your credit, I've noticed that even you have lost patience with the dogmatic defence of such ideas. I'll visit your post @ 38 later, when I have time to read all of it. Kind regards CLAVDIVSCLAVDIVS
June 19, 2013
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AF: Pardon, but I do listen to such. For instance, here is Sir Francis Crick, in The Astonishing Hypothesis, 1994:
"You", your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules. As Lewis Carroll's Alice might have phrased: "You're nothing but a pack of neurons." This hypothesis is so alien to the ideas of most people today that it can truly be called astonishing.
No wonder, ID thinker Philip Johnson aptly replied that Sir Francis should have therefore been willing to preface his works thusly: "I, Francis Crick, my opinions and my science, and even the thoughts expressed in this book, consist of nothing more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules." Johnson then acidly commented: “[[t]he plausibility of materialistic determinism requires that an implicit exception be made for the theorist.” [[Reason in the Balance, 1995.] Next, let us hear the well known remark by Richard Lewontin in his NYRB review of January 1997:
the problem is to get them [people] to reject irrational and supernatural explanations of the world, the demons that exist only in their imaginations, and to accept a social and intellectual apparatus, Science, as the only begetter of truth [[--> NB: this is a knowledge claim about knowledge and its possible sources, i.e. it is a claim in philosophy not science; it is thus self-refuting]. . . . It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes [[--> another major begging of the question . . . ] to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute [[--> i.e. here we see the fallacious, indoctrinated, ideological, closed mind . . . ], for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door. {If you imagine this is "quote-mining" kindly read the fuller excerpt and notes here.]
No wonder Philip Johnson's reply in First Things, November that same year, ran in key part:
For scientific materialists the materialism comes first; the science comes thereafter. [[Emphasis original] We might more accurately term them "materialists employing science." And if materialism is true, then some materialistic theory of evolution has to be true simply as a matter of logical deduction, regardless of the evidence. That theory will necessarily be at least roughly like neo-Darwinism, in that it will have to involve some combination of random changes and law-like processes capable of producing complicated organisms that (in Dawkins’ words) "give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose." . . . . The debate about creation and evolution is not deadlocked . . . Biblical literalism is not the issue. The issue is whether materialism and rationality are the same thing. Darwinism is based on an a priori commitment to materialism, not on a philosophically neutral assessment of the evidence. Separate the philosophy from the science, and the proud tower collapses. [[Emphasis added.] [[The Unraveling of Scientific Materialism, First Things, 77 (Nov. 1997), pp. 22 – 25.]
William Provine, in his well-known Darwin Day address of 1998 at U of Tenn, is actually inadvertently sobering in his comment:
Naturalistic evolution has clear consequences that Charles Darwin understood perfectly. 1) No gods worth having exist; 2) no life after death exists; 3) no ultimate foundation for ethics exists; 4) no ultimate meaning in life exists; and 5) human free will is nonexistent . . . . The first 4 implications are so obvious to modern naturalistic evolutionists that I will spend little time defending them. Human free will, however, is another matter. Even evolutionists have trouble swallowing that implication. I will argue that humans are locally determined systems that make choices. They have, however, no free will . . .
See the problems? Let me summarise what happens if our responsible freedom and the principles that should guide it are undermined. Reason goes, crash as mind reduces to some version of Crick's neural networks created, and controlled by forces utterly irrelevant to truth, right, soundness or validity. Genes, cellular machines giving effect to genes and psycho-social conditioning are in the driver seat. That is why my longstanding view (first shaped while I was a university student confronting a campus- dominant openly materialist ideology, Marxism . . . and in the aftermath of a mini civil war with that ideology a material factor) has been:
a: Evolutionary materialism argues that the cosmos is the product of chance interactions of matter and energy, within the constraint of the laws of nature; from hydrogen to humans by undirected chance and necessity. b: Therefore, all phenomena in the universe, without residue, are determined by the working of purposeless laws of chance and/or mechanical necessity acting on material objects, under the direct or indirect control of happenstance initial circumstances. (This is physicalism. This view covers both the forms where (a) the mind and the brain are seen as one and the same thing, and those where (b) somehow mind emerges from and/or "supervenes" on brain, perhaps as a result of sophisticated and complex software looping. The key point, though is as already noted: physical causal closure -- the phenomena that play out across time, without residue, are in principle deducible or at least explainable up to various random statistical distributions and/or mechanical laws, from prior physical states. Such physical causal closure, clearly, implicitly discounts or even dismisses the causal effect of concept formation and reasoning then responsibly deciding, in favour of specifically physical interactions in the brain-body control loop; indeed, some mock the idea of -- in their view -- an "obviously" imaginary "ghost" in the meat-machine. [[There is also some evidence from simulation exercises, that accuracy of even sensory perceptions may lose out to utilitarian but inaccurate ones in an evolutionary competition. "It works" does not warrant the inference to "it is true."] ) c: But human thought, clearly a phenomenon in the universe, must now fit into this meat-machine picture. So, we rapidly arrive at Crick's claim in his The Astonishing Hypothesis (1994): what we subjectively experience as "thoughts," "reasoning" and "conclusions" can only be understood materialistically as the unintended by-products of the blind natural forces which cause and control the electro-chemical events going on in neural networks in our brains that (as the Smith Model illustrates) serve as cybernetic controllers for our bodies. d: These underlying driving forces are viewed as being ultimately physical, but are taken to be partly mediated through a complex pattern of genetic inheritance shaped by forces of selection [["nature"] and psycho-social conditioning [["nurture"], within the framework of human culture [[i.e. socio-cultural conditioning and resulting/associated relativism]. And, remember, the focal issue to such minds -- notice, this is a conceptual analysis made and believed by the materialists! -- is the physical causal chains in a control loop, not the internalised "mouth-noises" that may somehow sit on them and come along for the ride. (Save, insofar as such "mouth noises" somehow associate with or become embedded as physically instantiated signals or maybe codes in such a loop. [[How signals, languages and codes originate and function in systems in our observation of such origin -- i.e by design -- tends to be pushed to the back-burner and conveniently forgotten. So does the point that a signal or code takes its significance precisely from being an intelligently focused on, observed or chosen and significant alternative from a range of possibilities that then can guide decisive action.]) e: For instance, Marxists commonly derided opponents for their “bourgeois class conditioning” — but what of the effect of their own class origins? Freudians frequently dismissed qualms about their loosening of moral restraints by alluding to the impact of strict potty training on their “up-tight” critics — but doesn’t this cut both ways? Should we not ask a Behaviourist whether s/he is little more than yet another operantly conditioned rat trapped in the cosmic maze? And -- as we saw above -- would the writings of a Crick be any more than the firing of neurons in networks in his own brain? f: For further instance, we may take the favourite whipping-boy of materialists: religion. Notoriously, they often hold that belief in God is not merely cognitive, conceptual error, but delusion. Borderline lunacy, in short. But, if such a patent "delusion" is so utterly widespread, even among the highly educated, then it "must" -- by the principles of evolution -- somehow be adaptive to survival, whether in nature or in society. And so, this would be a major illustration of the unreliability of our conceptual reasoning ability, on the assumption of evolutionary materialism. g: Turning the materialist dismissal of theism around, evolutionary materialism itself would be in the same leaky boat. For, the sauce for the goose is notoriously just as good a sauce for the gander, too. h: That is, on its own premises [[and following Dawkins in A Devil's Chaplain, 2004, p. 46], the cause of the belief system of evolutionary materialism, "must" also be reducible to forces of blind chance and mechanical necessity that are sufficiently adaptive to spread this "meme" in populations of jumped- up apes from the savannahs of East Africa scrambling for survival in a Malthusian world of struggle for existence. Reppert brings the underlying point sharply home, in commenting on the "internalised mouth-noise signals riding on the physical cause-effect chain in a cybernetic loop" view: . . . let us suppose that brain state A, which is token identical to the thought that all men are mortal, and brain state B, which is token identical to the thought that Socrates is a man, together cause the belief that Socrates is mortal. It isn’t enough for rational inference that these events be those beliefs, it is also necessary that the causal transaction be in virtue of the content of those thoughts . . . [[But] if naturalism is true, then the propositional content is irrelevant to the causal transaction that produces the conclusion, and [[so] we do not have a case of rational inference. In rational inference, as Lewis puts it, one thought causes another thought not by being, but by being seen to be, the ground for it. But causal transactions in the brain occur in virtue of the brain’s being in a particular type of state that is relevant to physical causal transactions. [[Emphases added. Also cf. Reppert's summary of Barefoot's argument here.] i: The famous geneticist and evolutionary biologist (as well as Socialist) J. B. S. Haldane made much the same point in a famous 1932 remark: "It seems to me immensely unlikely that mind is a mere by-product of matter. For if my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically. And hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms. In order to escape from this necessity of sawing away the branch on which I am sitting, so to speak, I am compelled to believe that mind is not wholly conditioned by matter.” [["When I am dead," in Possible Worlds: And Other Essays [1927], Chatto and Windus: London, 1932, reprint, p.209. (Highlight and emphases added.)] j: Therefore, though materialists will often try to pointedly ignore or angrily brush aside the issue, we may freely argue: if such evolutionary materialism is true, then (i) our consciousness, (ii) the "thoughts" we have, (iii) the conceptualised beliefs we hold, (iv) the reasonings we attempt based on such and (v) the "conclusions" and "choices" (a.k.a. "decisions") we reach -- without residue -- must be produced and controlled by blind forces of chance happenstance and mechanical necessity that are irrelevant to "mere" ill-defined abstractions such as: purpose or truth, or even logical validity. (NB: The conclusions of such "arguments" may still happen to be true, by astonishingly lucky coincidence — but we have no rational grounds for relying on the “reasoning” that has led us to feel that we have “proved” or "warranted" them. It seems that rationality itself has thus been undermined fatally on evolutionary materialistic premises. Including that of Crick et al. Through, self-reference leading to incoherence and utter inability to provide a cogent explanation of our commonplace, first-person experience of reasoning and rational warrant for beliefs, conclusions and chosen paths of action. Reduction to absurdity and explanatory failure in short.) k: And, if materialists then object: “But, we can always apply scientific tests, through observation, experiment and measurement,” then we must immediately note that -- as the fate of Newtonian Dynamics between 1880 and 1930 shows -- empirical support is not equivalent to establishing the truth of a scientific theory. For, at any time, one newly discovered countering fact can in principle overturn the hitherto most reliable of theories. (And as well, we must not lose sight of this: in science, one is relying on the legitimacy of the reasoning process to make the case that scientific evidence provides reasonable albeit provisional warrant for one's beliefs etc. Scientific reasoning is not independent of reasoning.) l: Worse, in the case of origins science theories, we simply were not there to directly observe the facts of the remote past, so origins sciences are even more strongly controlled by assumptions and inferences than are operational scientific theories. So, we contrast the way that direct observations of falling apples and orbiting planets allow us to test our theories of gravity . . . . o: More important, to demonstrate that empirical tests provide empirical support to the materialists' theories would require the use of the very process of reasoning and inference which they have discredited. p: Thus, evolutionary materialism arguably reduces reason itself to the status of illusion. But, as we have seen: immediately, that must include “Materialism.” q: In the end, it is thus quite hard to escape the conclusion that materialism is based on self-defeating, question-begging logic. r: So, while materialists -- just like the rest of us -- in practice routinely rely on the credibility of reasoning and despite all the confidence they may project, they at best struggle to warrant such a tacitly accepted credibility of mind and of concepts and reasoned out conclusions relative to the core claims of their worldview. (And, sadly: too often, they tend to pointedly ignore or rhetorically brush aside the issue.)
That is why, when I found Plato's remarks in the Laws Bk X, made c 360 BC, thousands of years ahead of the events of the past 100+ years, they resonated so deeply with a sobering ring of truth:
Ath. . . . [[The avant garde philosophers and poets, c. 360 BC] say that . . . The elements are severally moved by chance and some inherent force according to certain affinities among them-of hot with cold, or of dry with moist, or of soft with hard, and according to all the other accidental admixtures of opposites which have been formed by necessity. After this fashion and in this manner the whole heaven has been created, and all that is in the heaven, as well as animals and all plants, and all the seasons come from these elements, not by the action of mind, as they say, or of any God, or from art, but as I was saying, by nature and chance only. [[In short, evolutionary materialism premised on chance plus necessity acting without intelligent guidance on primordial matter is hardly a new or a primarily "scientific" view! Notice also, the trichotomy of causal factors: (a) chance/accident, (b) mechanical necessity of nature, (c) art or intelligent design and direction.] . . . . [[Thus, they hold that t]he Gods exist not by nature, but by art, and by the laws of states, which are different in different places, according to the agreement of those who make them; and that the honourable is one thing by nature and another thing by law, and that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature, but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them; and that the alterations which are made by art and by law have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the moment and at the time at which they are made.- [[Relativism, too, is not new; complete with its radical amorality rooted in a worldview that has no foundational IS that can ground OUGHT.] These, my friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, which find a way into the minds of youth. They are told by them that the highest right is might [[ Evolutionary materialism leads to the promotion of amorality], and in this way the young fall into impieties, under the idea that the Gods are not such as the law bids them imagine; and hence arise factions [[Evolutionary materialism-motivated amorality "naturally" leads to continual contentions and power struggles], these philosophers inviting them to lead a true life according to nature, that is, to live in real dominion over others [[such amoral factions, if they gain power, "naturally" tend towards ruthless tyranny], and not in legal subjection to them.
KFkairosfocus
June 19, 2013
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...quite certain...
To be serious for a moment, it is interesting to observe how the meaning of "quite" has morphed over time and continents. Rich territory for those more interested in obfuscation than communication.Alan Fox
June 19, 2013
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RDF defines as “astute” those who agree with him. By his definition, Axel, kairosfocus, Barb, Joe, Bornagain77, bb, and, oh yes, your’s truly, are not astute because we don’t agree with him.
We could always have a vote, Stephen. I'm sure there is some way of conducting a poll.Alan Fox
June 19, 2013
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RD
every astute onlooker who has weighed in on this thread and the last one has pretty much agreed with me
LOL: RDF defines as "astute" those who agree with him. By his definition, Axel, kairosfocus, Barb, Joe, Bornagain77, bb, and, oh yes, your's truly, are not astute because we don't agree with him.StephenB
June 19, 2013
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I am quite certain that kairosfocus could do a far better job of summarizing your position than you could ever do in summarizing his position. I am also quite certain that if you had to characterize the nature of his correctives and the rationale behind them, you would be unable to do it.
Why not try dialogue? It could be fun! It does involve communication but you never know where that might lead!Alan Fox
June 19, 2013
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All, I am surprised to see the resistance here to the simple observation that we have no way of establishing our beliefs beyond all doubt. When I provide good reasons for saying this, my detractors ignore the points. For example, I ask "How can we be guaranteed that our minds are reliable?"... and nobody answers that fundamental question. I ask "If you have such very certain answers to these questions of origins, mind/body ontology, free will, and so on, why does everybody disagree on these issues so radically after millenia of research and debate?. Nobody answers this question. Instead of addressing this straightforward issue and answering these questions, people here have tried to play word games, tried to catch me in silly traps (oooh! self-referential inconsistency! hah!), or changed the subject. It is fascinating to watch people who are afraid that they might be wrong about metaphysics! I have no such fear whatsoever, so these things take me by surprise. I am perfectly comfortable with the obvious facts: Nobody knows the answer to these questions! Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 19, 2013
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StephenB,
When RDF is challenging realistic epistemology,...
You have never presented anything that can be called "realistic epistemology"! If you wish to argue that we can know things with absolute certainty, simply tell us how to remove all doubt about our beliefs! We are all waiting! The fact of the matter is this: I agree with the vast majority of epistemologists, including Christian ones, who understand that there are limits to our ability to rigorously prove our beliefs outside of formal math and logic. You very clearly have no understanding of the classic problems of epistemology at all. Furthermore, everyone on this forum who has commented on our debate has agreed with me about this, not you - and that includes Christian ID proponents. You have lost this point (and all the others, by the way) very, very badly, and it would save you further embarassment if you let it drop now. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 19, 2013
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This is not accurate to the discussion as by no means do all onlookers who have weighed in agree with you.
Hi KF, Well he did put the qualifier "astute" so I guess anyone that does not agree is "non astute" It does appear that "cannot" is an absolutist qualifier. Although there are many things we seem to be in agreement there are also areas of disagreement. Unlike RDF I am absolutely certain that I am "experiencing". I am absolutely certain that something cannot "pop into existence",I want to say from nothing, but that would be giving "nothing" and making it a something.But nothing cannot even be concieved its like a square circle. Actually it is easier to concieve of a square circle that to concieve "of" (as if there is an of in nothing) than nothing. I think I have read that in some theoretical extra dimension you can turn a basketball inside out without breaking the plane of its surface but there is at least a basketball and a surface.There is no from, no there, no was, etc, etc. Even the term "pop INTO existence" assumes its not coming from nothing. To go "into" something means it is moving from somewhere else. When I walk "into" my house, I am moving out of something else. From where does something ( existence) move when it moves "into" existence? You are left with "nothing something" not "into" since there is no moving from somewhere else because there is no somewhere or there there when one speaks of nothing. Vividvividbleau
June 19, 2013
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Alan Fox:
Do cruise ships full of evolutionists and fellow travellers call in at Montserrat? What I really wonder is if you ever pause for breath in correcting them and listen for a second or two.
I am quite certain that kairosfocus could do a far better job of summarizing your position than you could ever do in summarizing his position. I am also quite certain that if you had to characterize the nature of his correctives and the rationale behind them, you would be unable to do it.StephenB
June 19, 2013
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RDF"
No, to get as absolute as it gets, one would say “absolutely cannot” of course.
Actually, it depends on which day of the week RDF is commenting: RDF on Monday:
We can be absolutely certain that such a thing [brick wall coming from out of nowhere] can not happen, but our knowledge is empirically rather than logically based.
RDF on Tuesday:
You’re right I did mispeak: I should not have said “absolutely certain”, but rather I should have said “certain” or “extremely certain”.
On Wednesday:
I am utterly certain that nobody understands how human beings reason (i.e. how we think), and I will say that is one of the least controversial statements I can imagine.
RDF on Thursday,
It’s a total mystery to me, and I’m quite certain that nobody understands it.
Of course, we mustn’t forget that, on Friday, RDF is certain (relatively?, quite?, absolutely?, almost?, utterly?, extremely?) that there is no such thing as certainty. If I left out any adverbs or adjectives that RFD uses to obfuscate his position, I apologize to them. There is no way I can give public credit to all of them. When RDF is challenging realistic epistemology, he is utterly certain that he is right, but when he is reminded that he just said he was utterly certain about something he simply walks it back, chooses another adjective, and continues on as sleek as ever. The idea is to say that he is certain and not certain at the same time without doing so explicitly. Thus, he evades, obfuscates, and distorts. If that doesn't work, he starts misrepresenting his comments and those of others as he did on this thread when he denied his own irrational words to the effect that "something from nothing means ex-nilio creation."StephenB
June 19, 2013
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...I have often spoken of evolutionary materialists and their fellow travellers.
Do cruise ships full of evolutionists and fellow travellers call in at Montserrat? What I really wonder is if you ever pause for breath in correcting them and listen for a second or two.Alan Fox
June 19, 2013
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F/N: I should add (for record) that in stating the principle of sufficient reason as a question joined to an expectation, I am giving in effect a weak form, one that asserts an epistemic right to ask and to expect a reasonable answer. This, strictly speaking, leaves open whether that attempt will succeed. However, that is adequate to investigate possibility/impossibility of being, contingency/ non contingency and even non-being, thus leading to the corollaries that have been highlighted. KFkairosfocus
June 19, 2013
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