The Big Bang, The First Cause, and God

_{Eric Anderson
July 10, 2016

Atheism, Big Bang, Cosmology, Fine tuning, Logic and Reason, Multiverse, Philosophy

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Atheism
Big Bang
Cosmology
Fine tuning
Logic and Reason
Multiverse
Philosophy}

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Over on a recent thread there has been much interesting discussion about a recent debate between theist philosopher Rabbi Daniel Rowe and atheist philosopher A.C. Grayling. HeKS provided a review of the matter, focusing largely on his analysis of Jerry Coyne’s responses.

I agree with HeKS’s general observation that Coyne failed to adequately address the issues. Indeed, it seems Coyne failed to adequately understand some of the issues, a situation that is all too common.

However, I want to focus in this post on a specific aspect of the discussion, namely, some of the points raised by sean samis, starting @37 on that thread. In his comments, samis urges caution in drawing any conclusion from the Big Bang about deity’s existence or involvement. I do not necessarily share all of his conclusions, but I think a number of his points are worthy of additional discussion.

First of all, let me apologize to HeKS for starting a new thread. I initially began this as a comment to the prior thread, but it became long enough that it required a separate post. Additionally, I want to focus on a specific issue that tacks in a slightly different direction than the prior thread.

If the Universe Had a Beginning, then What?

samis begins by addressing the question of the universe being created ex nihilo:

The proper response to the creation ex nihilo argument is that science does not believe or claim that our universe was created ex nihilo. The argument is a red herring.

This is an important point, and one on which the Big Bang arguments for God seem to flounder. The fact that the universe had a beginning (and we should note here for accuracy’s sake that this is not a “fact” in an observational sense, but an inference), does not mean that whatever caused the universe had to be the First Cause or had to be God, in any sense of that word. That the universe had a beginning just means that something caused the universe. Nothing more; nothing less.

We can, indeed we must, approach claims of a multiverse or cosmic bubbles or some other universe-generating natural phenomenon with extreme skepticism. There are many problems with such ideas, which have been well detailed previously in these pages. But it simply does not follow that because the universe had a beginning that it must have been caused by the First Cause or that the First Cause has to be God.

Rather, what can be said is that: (a) no-one has any real observational evidence as to the cause of the universe; and (b) it is possible that the cause of the universe was the First Cause. In addition, we might add that (c) it is possible that the First Cause had a plan, a purpose, an intent, a desire, a design – attributes similar to what we see ourselves possessing as rational, intelligent, individual, creative beings.

The foregoing is a more modest claim. It is a reasonable claim, a supportable claim, a claim that is not at all challenged by the silly responses of the likes of Coyne & Co. It is certainly as good of a claim – probably better from most rational points of view – than the contorted naturalistic explanations we are often treated to.

Yet we must acknowledge that it is still a claim based more on likelihood and inference, than on certainty and deduction.

samis later remarks:

That [the First Cause is spaceless, timeless and immaterial] does not follow unless we are careful to specify that whatever space, time, or material this “non-extensional something” might be composed of, it is not the space, time, or material which is part of our universe.

In other words, this “non-extensional something” can (and probably does) occupy space, experience time, and is composed of some material, but it is not of the space, time, or material of our universe.

Also a point worth considering. Again, that the universe had a cause does not mean that the universe is all that there is or that the cause has no attributes similar to the attributes of our universe. It is probably fair to say – definitionally so – that the cause of the universe exists outside the universe, but that does not speak directly to other attributes of that cause.

samis continues:

Much less is it given that this First Cause have attributes of intelligence (mind, intention, goals, wants, relationships, affection, etc.). Absent these this First Cause would not be any deity but a mere “thing” or “things”.

This is true up to a point. Most of the attributes projected onto the First Cause flow not from any logical requirement of the First Cause itself, but from our personal beliefs and preferences about what we think that First Cause is, or should be. That is well enough as a philosophical or religious matter, but it is not sustainable as a logical, scientific or deductive matter.

That said, there are some hints of purpose and goal-oriented activity and planning that strike any thoughtful observer of the cosmos. Although not rising to the level of logical deduction, such hints certainly provide reasonable grounds to infer that the cause of the universe has certain attributes.

—–

How Far Can We Go?

It seems that with regard to the observable universe we have, at most, the following situation:

An inference, from observable facts, that the universe had a beginning.
A deduction that the universe had a cause.
A deduction that the cause was not within the universe itself (i.e., existed outside of the universe, both spatially and temporally).
An inference, from observable facts, that the universe has been finely tuned.
A deduction that the cause was capable of producing the universe and of finely tuning the constants.

Most everyone is in agreement up to this point. One additional item that everyone should agree on is the following:

Ultimately, when traced back, there must be a First Cause – that which existed in and of itself, without a beginning.

It is true that whether the universe was caused by the First Cause or by some intermediate cause is entirely open to question. However, at some point, we must regress to a First Cause. We trust everyone is in agreement with this concept of a First Cause.

Identifying the First Cause, unfortunately, is a trickier matter.

The Nature of the First Cause

A number of proposals might be put forward, but let us focus on the two most common.

One proposal on the table is that the First Cause was a purely naturalistic phenomenon: some unidentified, never-before-seen, essentially indescribable, powerful phenomenon, that coincidentally (through sheer luck or sheer repetition over time) managed to produce the finely-tuned universe in which we find ourselves.

A second proposal on the table is that the First Cause is God. The materialist will quickly argue that God is likewise unidentified, never-before-seen, and essentially indescribable. Even if we grant this for purposes of discussion, this argument does not serve to strengthen the materialistic claim of a naturalistic First Cause, but only serves to put the God proposal on at least the same footing.

Yet they are not quite on the same footing.

We would be remiss if we did not acknowledge that many individuals have claimed (often at great risk to their reputation and physical safety) to have had a personal encounter with God and have tried, with varying degrees of completeness, to describe God. This holds both for the rare visual experiences, as well as the less-concrete but far more common emotional or spiritual experiences. The materialist may well argue that these individual accounts are disparate, unverified in some cases, and open to challenge. That may well be true. But the fact remains that there is some evidence, independent of the observations of the cosmos itself, of God’s existence, however scattered and fragmentary it may be. It may not be much. But it is more than can be said for the naturalistic proposal.

Furthermore, there is an additional aspect of the cosmos that even ardent materialists acknowledge demands an explanation: that of the finely-tuned constants and the apparent purposeful way in which everything works together to make our very existence possible The universe, to put it bluntly and to borrow a phrase from Richard Dawkins uttered in the biological context, gives “the appearance of having been designed for a purpose.”

Now it may be that the materialist is right, that this apparent design is an illusion, that the existence of our universe is the result of a cosmic – or, shall we say, “extra-cosmic” – lottery. That is one potential explanation, as a matter of sheer logical possibility. But it is lacking in evidence, provides absolutely no intellectual comfort, and is certainly nothing to hang our hat on.

The concept of God at least has the benefit of positing a First Cause with the ability to make the purpose real, to fine tune for a purpose, to have a plan and a goal and an intended outcome; in other words, a First Cause that helps explain the apparent design in the universe, not one that tries to explain it away.

Finally, it is noteworthy – not definitive in any sense of the word, mind you, but noteworthy – that some of the very attributes attributed to God over the ages (tremendous power, vast intelligence, setting a plan in place, showing a personal interest in human affairs), have gained support centuries later in scientific discoveries. If not at the level of deduction, then at least at the level of reasonable inference.

—–

Conclusion

So what are we left with?

The inference that the universe had a beginning does not allow us to identify the First Cause. We cannot say, it seems to this author, as a matter of logic and deduction that the First Cause is God. We cannot even say that the universe was caused by the First Cause, rather than some intermediate cause. Indeed, as a matter of dispassionate objective scientific inquiry and reasoning, we can say but very little about the First Cause.

In that sense, the claim that the First Cause is God must be viewed with some caution. But it must not be viewed with derision. Rather, it should be seriously viewed as a live possibility, very much worthy of consideration.

Indeed, when compared against the materialistic claim, the proposal that the First Cause is God is eminently reasonable – being more consonant with the evidence, with our experience, and with the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from scientific inquiry. While recognizing a significant lack of direct observational evidence on either side of the debate, the objective observer must at least consider the existence of God as a live possibility and, when weighed against the alternative, as the more rational and supportable possibility.

In the final analysis, the individual who holds to the idea that the First Cause is God should not go a bridge too far by attempting to shoehorn the observed attributes of our universe into a definitive, deductive claim for God’s existence. Yet neither should he feel threatened by the materialistic claim, even more lacking as it is in evidence. In the face of the materialistic mindset that so often rules the day, he can approach the debate with a healthy dose of humility, recognizing that his claim of God’s existence is based on inference (and hopefully personal experience), while at the same time feeling confidently grounded in the comparative strength of his position and feeling no need to apologize for the same.

Comments

Eric Anderson,
EA: I’m curious, however, about your use of the word “fundamental,” and then applying that concept to parts. Surely if there can be one eternal, uncaused entity there could be more than one? There is no principle of logic that dictates there can only be one.
If the First Cause consists of distinct parts, which explain the First Cause, then the First Cause is not (explanatory) fundamental. In that scenario their would be parts which are fundamental to the First Cause. IOWs their would be parts which explain/cause the First Cause. Such a state of affairs would be incoherent. Therefore, the First Cause cannot consist of parts. Therefore, the First Cause must be one and indivisible. - - - - - Also, the First Cause is (explanatory) fundamental, so we cannot situate the First Cause within a context (e.g. matter, space, time and laws), which the First Cause does not explain. IOWs the First Cause cannot be encapsulated by anything which is not explained/caused by the First Cause. Therefore, the First Cause can operate outside time and space.Origenes_{July 14, 2016
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PS: John Leslie:
One striking thing about the fine tuning is that a force strength or a particle mass often appears to require accurate tuning for several reasons at once. Look at electromagnetism. Electromagnetism seems to require tuning for there to be any clear-cut distinction between matter and radiation; for stars to burn neither too fast nor too slowly for life’s requirements; for protons to be stable; for complex chemistry to be possible; for chemical changes not to be extremely sluggish; and for carbon synthesis inside stars (carbon being quite probably crucial to life). Universes all obeying the same fundamental laws could still differ in the strengths of their physical forces, as was explained earlier, and random variations in electromagnetism from universe to universe might then ensure that it took on any particular strength sooner or later. Yet how could they possibly account for the fact that the same one strength satisfied many potentially conflicting requirements, each of them a requirement for impressively accurate tuning? [Our Place in the Cosmos, 1998] and also: . . . the need for such explanations does not depend on any estimate of how many universes would be observer-permitting, out of the entire field of possible universes. Claiming that our universe is ‘fine tuned for observers’, we base our claim on how life’s evolution would apparently have been rendered utterly impossible by comparatively minor alterations in physical force strengths, elementary particle masses and so forth. There is no need for us to ask whether very great alterations in these affairs would have rendered it fully possible once more, let alone whether physical worlds conforming to very different laws could have been observer-permitting without being in any way fine tuned. Here it can be useful to think of a fly on a wall, surrounded by an empty region. A bullet hits the fly Two explanations suggest themselves. Perhaps many bullets are hitting the wall or perhaps a marksman fired the bullet. There is no need to ask whether distant areas of the wall, or other quite different walls, are covered with flies so that more or less any bullet striking there would have hit one. The important point is that the local area contains just the one fly.
It is not a good, empirically well supported explanation to suggest arrival at a deeply isolated operating point by chance, absent direct evidence of adequate search resources and opportunity. The observational evidence of a quasi-infinite multiverse is effectively nil. Where, the carpeted portion of the Leslie wall, on recent discussion, is, a Boltzmann brain popping up then vanishing by fluctuation. The deeply isolated island of complex organised information-rich function does not go away so easily. PPS: It seems we can identify a fallacy of dismissal by word-count. A substantial point takes reasonable space, and is not to be got rid of by clipping and pasting into a word-count app. Twitter-length headline/ comment/ textual soundbite/ snidely dismissive talking point is not generally a sound basis for responsible decision and action. (Especially, when it is little more than rhetorical appeal to prejudice and/or party-spirit driven polarisation.) PPPS: Nor is citation of a responsible or significant source on a point an empty argument. Acknowledging intellectual source is an intellectual virtue not a vice, and it is the facts and logic in play that need to be substantially addressed.kairosfocus_{July 13, 2016
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F/N: As fine tuning is being rhetorically dismissed here on one excuse or another, I point to a current FTR: https://uncommondescent.com/atheism/fyi-ftr-luke-barnes-on-fine-tuning-and-the-case-of-the-fine-structure-constant/ The issue is plainly on the table, and the rhetorical pattern in too many attempts to avoid or sideline it in the end tell us more about its strength and the unwelcome nature of what it points to than anything else. Where, actually, fine tuning of systems that sets them at operating points is a commonplace feature of designed entities, with millions of examples, starting with telecommunications equipment. As Barnes and Hoyle and others have highlighted, we see no super-physics that sets the frame of our physics where it is in parameter space, and it can be added that such a super-physics would in turn be fine tuned at the next level. So, there is a relevant empirical base, that points to design as reliable cause of fine tuned systems. There is a good logical-analytical reason to see that we are in a lone fly swatted situation rather than one amidst a carpet of flies one. That is very suggestive indeed and calls for a sensible inference to the best explanation. Where, design is the candidate to beat, absent ideologically imposed, lab coat clad a priori, self-refuting -- so, necessarily false -- evolutionary materialism. KFkairosfocus_{July 13, 2016
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Phinehas @ 83, Haha, nice one! No response naturally. ;-) -QQuerius_{July 13, 2016
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Eric, I thought harry's post in 59 makes some good points. I agree that we can make few if any inferences about the extra- or super- something that was the cause of our universe. Compared to our existence it must be extremely powerful. But whether it consists of the same kind of space-time, mass-energy, with the same physical laws--gravity, quantum mechanics, dark energy, and what not is actually doubtful when you consider that one of it's properties is to be able to spawn a universe such as ours. My conscious action can collapse wavefunctions into mass-energy, but I can't run out into the night shouting "let there be light" and have anything happen (well, beyond irritated neighbors turning on their lights). But according to people who actually know something about quantum mechanics, wavefunctions were indeed generated and collapsed to form our universe. The wavefunctions, as probability waves, could have found a comfortable home in any spreadsheet. Maybe they did. So turning to the Kalam, one could claim that ultimately there must be an uncaused cause, a prime cause. It does not good to argue that an UCC/PC is not acceptable on the ground of infinite regression, because here we are. Furthermore, there is no evidence that suggests that the UCC/PC is more than one step removed from our universe on account of parsimony. What is intriguing to think about is that since our consciousness, which seems to have the power of collapsing wavefunctions, does have a small amount of transcendent control, it might actually belong to the extra- super- existence outside our universe! Maybe our spirits do sit in heavenly places! -QQuerius_{July 13, 2016
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Dionisio, What I've observed about information is the parallels to our natural world. This includes its fractal and chaotic nature--it seems to grow in dendritic patterns of abstraction levels, and you cannot predict what will turn out to be critically important. Programmers have told me that they're essentially capturing a thought pattern of logical relationships. The rest is coding. That professor Vedral recognized the binary nature of the universe seems really significant to me, although I don't understand it. That entangled information seems to be able to change instantly regardless of locality reminds me of the changes that cascade through a spreadsheet. And then there's the dynamics of parametric metadata that throws a whole new level of information about information! As I said, I admit that I really don't understand information theory, but I sometimes wonder whether there isn't a lot more to it. For example, unprovenanced antiquities may not be any different physically, but in the absence of Context, they lose most of their value. Just some thoughts to add to yours. -QQuerius_{July 13, 2016
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Sean, Does it even occur to you that your entire argument in 89 consists of unsupported assertions? Go read your post again. Is there a single quote from a quantum physicist? Any links to papers? How about live interviews with qualified researchers? No? All we get is assertions that are logically equivalent to saying "She's a witch." My conclusion as a result is that you're not aware of the latest discoveries in QM, nor do you have the slightest intention of following the data. -QQuerius_{July 13, 2016
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KF @ 75;
SS, Before going further, I suggest you answer substantially to Sir Fred Hoyle: [650 word cite omitted]
As a rule, I don’t debate dead men. They cannot comment on my answers or reply to my questions. If you have questions, KF, ask.
PS: Your discomfort with the widely recognised observations on fine tuning of physics that supports cell based life is inadvertently revealing. BTW, sweet spots are a manifestation of fine tuning.
“Fine tuning” has never been observed, it has only been inferred. Nobody we know of watched a designer “fine tune” any universe—much less ours; this is what an observation would require. Sweet spots could be a manifestation of design (a point I acknowledged) but they could also just be chance. We might be able to test the later supposition, we can’t test the former. sean s.sean samis_{July 13, 2016
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Querius @ 66;
... you’ll have no trouble following the data from quantum mechanics to the demonstrated conclusion that “natural” reality as it is commonly thought of doesn’t actually come into existence apart from observation and measurement. Right?
The “observer effect” in QM is a really poorly chosen term that leads to major confusion. It’s a common misconception that quantum mechanics requires the mind of a conscious observer to cause reality to come into existence. That is totally wrong; it does not and never has. Standard quantum mechanics does not care if an experimenter is watching their experiment, or if they leave the room and leave the “observing” to inanimate detectors and recording devices. It is the inanimate objects which amplify the microscopic events into macroscopic measurements and then record them. As long as this process is time-irreversible, the quantum event is recorded and the experimenter will eventually see the results. In the case of the LHC, results are recorded and not even reviewed for months. These inanimate devices are not magical. They are just inanimate objects carefully arranged so as to react to quantum events in ways that allow experimenters to know what happened. Out in the world, naturally arranged inanimate objects similarly react at the quantum level; reality does not need some person observing it to come into existence; quantum events resolve themselves all the time. I realize that for a believer, the observer effect is damned tempting, but you must resist it because it’s a false lead. sean s.sean samis_{July 13, 2016
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Origenes @ 40:
I’m no physicist so the following question may very well show my ignorance, but how can an “eternal universe” not be in a state of “heat death” — a state of no thermodynamic free energy? How can it be that in an eternal universe suns have not already died?
Suns have already died in our universe so I take this to ask how it could be that all suns have not died. Since no one is suggesting that our universe is actually eternal, I take this question to be about whatever multiverse/cosmic-bubble/etc. that might have created our universe; how could such a “universe” have avoided heat-death? We don’t know. However, we also don’t know that the concept of entropy even applies to such a multiverse/cosmic-bubble/etc. sean s.sean samis_{July 13, 2016
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I can see from HeKS’s comments here that, on the other thread I have annoyed him. That certainly was not intentional; if anything I try to avoid annoying people because it just gets in the way of productive discussion. A particular problem seems to be some disagreement about what exactly was the argument in HeKS’ OP. In #8 (on this thread) HeKS wrote;
I was commenting on the lack of validity in Sean Samis’ response to the issues addressed in my OP. ...
As HeKS wrote, there were multiple issues addressed in the OP. As for which is the most due a response, I will defer to what appears to be HeKS’ thought on the matter, from comment # 8:
As you say in your article:
In his comments, samis urges caution in drawing any conclusion from the Big Bang about deity’s existence or involvement.
Any attempt to counter the argument described in my OP by appealing to the possibility of something like a mulitverse or any other higher level spacetime or material state preceding the Big Bang is doomed to failure because the argument says nothing about the Big Bang in particular. The argument is that anything that is extended in time and/or space, which includes both time and space themselves, cannot have existed infinitely into the past. ... Emphasis added.
In the commentary that follows HeKS’ OP and up to comment 260, the letter string “extension” was used 39 times, but there was never an explanation of why extentional objects cannot also be eternal. I’ve not found words to the effect that: “all things that are extensional are finite and cannot ever transition from being finite to being infinite, which means that they cannot occupy an infinite amount of space and they cannot exist for an actually infinite amount of time” BECAUSE of [insert missing rationale here]. The claim about extensional reality is asserted repeatedly, but these claims are never explained or justified. I reread the comments on the other thread (and those here) and I cannot find anyone who actually explains it. The closest on HeKS’ thread was a comment by KF: (#164)
Seversky, the classical theistic view has long since been stated, the world was created from no material or quasi-material predecessor. Where, nothing, properly, denotes non-being. And, even through multiverse speculations, it remains so that no material atom based entity or extensional entity like that can but be contingent. Which is not self explanatory. Emphasis added.
“... not self-explanatory”. Indeed; it is profoundly obscure. In comment 8, HeKS continues further on,
Sean’s appeals to the idea that the First Cause must have just been some other “thing” made of “stuff”, just not stuff from our universe, utterly fails to respond to the argument. Emphasis added
As far as I can see, there’s no argument to respond to. There are just bare, unfounded claims; that is not an argument. I have responded to the claim, and I’d love to respond to the rationale, but it’s nowhere I can find it. And then:
But as I’ve said above, [scientific explanations] require some extensional reality existing infinitely into the past, which is simply not possible. And so the argument educates “science” by informing it that we are forced to conclude that there was some point at which there was either a) absolutely nothing at all or b) some non-extensional reality with the characteristics described in my OP, and logic forces us to conclude that it was (b).
The force of this claim is severely attenuated by the simple fact that the premise remains unfounded. Why is it true that “some extensional reality existing infinitely into the past ... is simply not possible”? So what is the explanation? Without one, all we have is a pile of assertions; a house built on sand. The closest HeKS has come to justifying this claim is in comment # 1 on this thread in which HeKS wrote about his OP;
“However, the argument presented by Rabbi Rowe was not the Kalam Cosmological Argument but the Argument from Extensionality. The latter works like the Kalam applied to any physical spacetime, like making the second premise of the Kalam (“the universe began to exist”) operate on a variable in place of the term “universe”, so that it becomes “X began to exist”. As such, the Argument from Extensionality is agnostic regarding whether or not our universe is the only physical spacetime and its conclusion regarding the need for a non-extensional First Cause holds with equal force regardless of whether or not our universe exists within any kind of higher level super-space... ” Emphasis added.
I am familiar with W.L. Craig’s formulation of the Kalam, it is severely defective; what I know of the Argument from Extensionality (Calosi and Tarozzi) does not really apply here or compel the conclusions HeKS insists on. Perhaps someone could explain how it works here? Perhaps this conversation would be more productive if HeKS stated his thesis clearly and justified his reasoning. Short of that, confusion and futile commentary are likely. Regarding,
I would love to engage Sean Samis on his arguments because I don’t think any of them hold up at all, but as I said in comment #1 of my OP, I simply don’t have the time to engage right now because of my work schedule. Maybe in a couple weeks I’ll have some time to revisit the issue. ... If only I had more time on my hands.
I understand that, I’m wedging my writing in-between things too. I look forward to being able to continue this discussion as time permits. Fortunately, the topics are not perishable. I will do my best to not annoy, but I will not simply accept unexplained assertions as facts or reasoning. And I expect to be held to the same standard. That’s only fair. sean s.sean samis_{July 13, 2016
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KF @53: Your point is well taken and I mean no disrespect to the principles passed down through the ages. I am trying to home in on a careful distinction between what can be deduced versus what can be inferred, between what is an absolute necessity versus what is a reasonable possibility, between what must be versus what we have rational warrant to think is.Eric Anderson_{July 13, 2016
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Origenes @81:
EA: We cannot say, it seems to this author, as a matter of logic and deduction that the First Cause is God. Origenes: I don’t agree. There are excellent arguments which show that the First Cause is very likely God.
Of course you agree. :) Notice the use of your word "likely." I have in my discussion, I hope, carefully drawn a distinction between (a) what can be deduced as a matter of pure logic, and (b) what can be reasonably inferred based on various bits of evidence. Bare logic and deduction do not get us to God as the First Cause. But, as I concluded in my essay, God might well be a reasonable inference based on clues and the evidence. Indeed, likely (to borrow your word) a better candidate than the various materialistic notions.
EA: We cannot even say that the universe was caused by the First Cause, rather than some intermediate cause. Origenes: I agree, but this doesn’t weaken the case for the supernatural nature of the First Cause.
Agreed. I don't think it speaks to it one way or another.
EA: Indeed, as a matter of dispassionate objective scientific inquiry and reasoning, we can say but very little about the First Cause. Origenes: You seem to think that arguments concerning the First Cause depend on whether it is the direct cause of the universe or not. If so, I don’t agree with that notion.
I'm not proposing that directly. Let me see if I can better explain. There are two things: First is the question of whether there is a First Cause. That does not depend on whether the First Cause is the direct cause of the universe. I agree with you there. One way or another we get back to a First Cause. Materialist and theist alike -- everyone has to go back to a First Cause. Second is the question of particular characteristics of the First Cause. Many -- no doubt not all, but many -- of the the arguments I've heard over the years about this or that characteristic of the First Cause depend on a negation of what our universe is like. Such arguments rest on an assumption that the characteristics of our universe cannot have existed prior to our universe. So the alleged characteristics of the First Cause then end up being just a list of negations of characteristics of our universe: our universe has space, mass, energy, etc., so, the thinking goes, the First Cause must not have any of those characteristics.Eric Anderson_{July 13, 2016
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Origenes @52: I'm not sure we are that far apart. In the part you quoted I was referring to the cause of universe, not the First Cause. I'm curious, however, about your use of the word "fundamental," and then applying that concept to parts. Surely if there can be one eternal, uncaused entity there could be more than one? There is no principle of logic that dictates there can only be one.Eric Anderson_{July 13, 2016
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“Fine Tuning” is a conclusory term and should not be used.
Could we say the same of "natural selection?"Phinehas_{July 13, 2016
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EA, it is not the best way to interject a potential infinity of intermediates without warrant. Perhaps, use world in the wider sense to mean the domain of reality that enfolds our observed cosmos. Then, ask, what is the root of the world. KFkairosfocus_{July 13, 2016
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Eric Anderson, I agree with all these points:
EA: (1) An inference, from observable facts, that the universe had a beginning. (2) A deduction that the universe had a cause. (3) A deduction that the cause was not within the universe itself (i.e., existed outside of the universe, both spatially and temporally). (4) An inference, from observable facts, that the universe has been finely tuned. (5) A deduction that the cause was capable of producing the universe and of finely tuning the constants. Most everyone is in agreement up to this point. One additional item that everyone should agree on is the following: (6) Ultimately, when traced back, there must be a First Cause – that which existed in and of itself, without a beginning. It is true that whether the universe was caused by the First Cause or by some intermediate cause is entirely open to question. However, at some point, we must regress to a First Cause.
The fact, that it is entirely open to question whether the universe was created by the First Cause or by some intermediate cause, makes discussing the First Cause an entirely independent matter from discussing the cause of the universe. In fact, when Aquinas contemplated the First Cause, he did not consider the Big Bang. But you don't treat the 'First Cause' and 'the cause of the universe' as separate issues. You mix things up:
EA: Identifying the First Cause, unfortunately, is a trickier matter. The Nature of the First Cause A number of proposals might be put forward, but let us focus on the two most common. One proposal on the table is that the First Cause was a purely naturalistic phenomenon: some unidentified, never-before-seen, essentially indescribable, powerful phenomenon, that coincidentally (through sheer luck or sheer repetition over time) managed to produce the finely-tuned universe in which we find ourselves.
What is being discussed here? The 'First Cause' or 'the cause of the universe'? With the arguments provided by Aquinas and others it's easy to show that a purely naturalistic phenomenon fails horribly as a First Cause, but it can indeed qualify as a cause (intermediate cause) of the universe.
EA: The inference that the universe had a beginning does not allow us to identify the First Cause.
I agree. It can be some intermediate cause.
EA: We cannot say, it seems to this author, as a matter of logic and deduction that the First Cause is God.
I don't agree. There are excellent arguments which show that the First Cause is very likely God.
EA: We cannot even say that the universe was caused by the First Cause, rather than some intermediate cause.
I agree, but this doesn't weaken the case for the supernatural nature of the First Cause.
EA: Indeed, as a matter of dispassionate objective scientific inquiry and reasoning, we can say but very little about the First Cause.
You seem to think that arguments concerning the First Cause depend on whether it is the direct cause of the universe or not. If so, I don't agree with that notion.Origenes_{July 13, 2016
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Querius @51:
Since space-time had its beginning with the big bang . . .
Ah, but that it precisely the assumption that makes the description of the cause circular. Our space-time may have begun with the Big Bang, but we have already claimed that something exists outside of our space-time.
Why would you say it’s circular? If space-time had a beginning, it had a primary cause. That primary cause could not possibly have existed within space-time, otherwise a non-existent space-time managed to cause itself to exist.
Yes, if our space-time had a beginning, it had a cause. But when you say the “primary cause could not possibly have existed within space-time,” you are making a critical unstated assumption: our universe is all that there is; nothing exists except in the context of our universe (which has certain characterstics, such as space-time). And yet at the very same time we are arguing that something does exist outside of our universe.
All this is easily imaginable and possible with virtually none of the complexity of our current understanding of physics, chemistry, and biology. It’s far more likely that existence outside our space-time is far more complex. Try imagining two or more time dimensions “orthogonal” to each other . . .
Exactly. Another dimension, another plane of existence . . . something. Some state of existence. I fully agree. And it is a state of existence about which we have essentially no observational information. All we know for sure is that it is some type of existence; that it is not nothing; that it has some kind of characteristics. So when we claim that it has none of the characteristics of our universe simply because it is not in our universe we are going a bridge too far and going beyond what can be deduced from the evidence.Eric Anderson_{July 13, 2016
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It is really not all that surprising that an atheist would insist fine-tuning is illusory instead of real since everything within the atheistic worldview, even the atheist himself, turns out to be illusory:
Why Evolutionary Theory Cannot Survive Itself – Nancy Pearcey – March 8, 2015 Excerpt: To make the dilemma even more puzzling, evolutionists tell us that natural selection has produced all sorts of false concepts in the human mind. Many evolutionary materialists maintain that free will is an illusion, consciousness is an illusion, even our sense of self is an illusion — and that all these false ideas were selected for their survival value. So how can we know whether the theory of evolution itself is one of those false ideas? The theory undercuts itself.,,, Of course, the atheist pursuing his research has no choice but to rely on rationality, just as everyone else does. The point is that he has no philosophical basis for doing so. Only those who affirm a rational Creator have a basis for trusting human rationality. http://www.evolutionnews.org/2015/03/why_evolutionar094171.html Atheistic Materialism - Where All of Reality Becomes an Illusion - video https://www.facebook.com/philip.cunningham.73/videos/1213432255336372/ Darwinian evolution, and atheism/naturalism in general, are built entirely upon a framework of illusions and fantasy https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Q94y-QgZZGF0Q7HdcE-qdFcVGErhWxsVKP7GOmpKD6o/edit
Humorously, it is precisely because of fine-tuning of the universe that the 'illusory' atheist, if he actually existed as a real person, would be forced to believe that pink unicorns are real, i.e. would be forced to believe that illusory entities are real.
Fine Tuning, Multiverse Pink Unicorns, and The Triune God – video https://www.facebook.com/philip.cunningham.73/videos/vb.100000088262100/1145151962164402/?type=2&theater Why Most Atheists Believe in Pink Unicorns - May 2014 Excerpt: Given an infinite amount of time, anything that is logically possible(11) will eventually happen. So, given an infinite number of universes being created in (presumably) an infinite amount of time, you are not only guaranteed to get your universe but every other possible universe. This means that every conceivable universe exists, from ones that consist of nothing but a giant black hole, to ones that are just like ours and where someone just like you is reading a blog post just like this, except it’s titled: “Why most atheists believe in blue unicorns.” By now I’m sure you know where I’m going with this, but I’ll say it anyway. Since we know that horses are possible, and that pink animals are possible, and that horned animals are possible, then there is no logical reason why pink unicorns are not possible entities. Ergo, if infinite universes exist, then pink unicorns must necessarily exist. For an atheist to appeal to multiverse theory to deny the need of a designer infers that he believes in that theory more than a theistically suggestive single universe. And to believe in the multiverse means that one is saddled with everything that goes with it, like pink unicorns. In fact, they not only believe in pink unicorns, but that someone just like them is riding on one at this very moment, and who believes that elephants, giraffes, and zebra are merely childish fairytales. Postscript While it may be amusing to imagine atheists riding pink unicorns, it should be noted that the belief in them does not logically invalidate atheism. There theoretically could be multiple universes and there theoretically could be pink unicorns. However, there is a more substantial problem for the atheist if he wants to believe in them and he wants to remain an atheist. Since, as I said, anything can happen in the realm of infinities, one of those possibilities is the production of a being of vast intelligence and power. Such a being would be as a god to those like us, and could perhaps breach the boundaries of the multiverse to, in fact, be a “god” to this universe. This being might even have the means to create its own universe and embody the very description of the God of Christianity (or any other religion that the atheist otherwise rejects). It seems the atheist, in affirming the multiverse in order to avoid the problem of fine-tuning, finds himself on the horns of a dilemma. The further irony is that somewhere, in the great wide world of infinities, the atheist’s doppelganger is going to war against an army of theists riding on the horns of a great pink beast known to his tribesman as “The Saddlehorn Dilemma.” https://pspruett.wordpress.com/2014/05/12/why-most-atheists-believe-in-pink-unicorns/
So basically, fine-tuning forces illusions (atheists) to believe that they are having illusions (pink unicorns)! :) Edgar Allen Poe would be very pleased:
Take this kiss upon the brow! And, in parting from you now, Thus much let me avow- You are not wrong, who deem That my days have been a dream; Yet if hope has flown away In a night, or in a day, In a vision, or in none, Is it therefore the less gone? All that we see or seem Is but a dream within a dream. I stand amid the roar Of a surf-tormented shore, And I hold within my hand Grains of the golden sand- How few! yet how they creep Through my fingers to the deep, While I weep- while I weep! O God! can I not grasp Them with a tighter clasp? O God! can I not save One from the pitiless wave? Is all that we see or seem But a dream within a dream? - Edgar Allan Poe
bornagain77_{July 13, 2016
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Headlined FTR: https://uncommondescent.com/atheism/fyi-ftr-luke-barnes-on-fine-tuning-and-the-case-of-the-fine-structure-constant/ --> notice, the key illustration on the fine structure constant and the strong nuclear forcekairosfocus_{July 13, 2016
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F/N: Luke Barnes has a useful semi-pop summary:
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-fine-tuning-of-natures-laws Today, our deepest understanding of the laws of nature is summarized in a set of equations. Using these equations, we can make very precise calculations of the most elementary physical phenomena, calculations that are confirmed by experimental evidence. But to make these predictions, we have to plug in some numbers that cannot themselves be calculated but are derived from measurements of some of the most basic features of the physical universe. These numbers specify such crucial quantities as the masses of fundamental particles and the strengths of their mutual interactions. After extensive experiments under all manner of conditions, physicists have found that these numbers appear not to change in different times and places, so they are called the fundamental constants of nature. These constants represent the edge of our knowledge. Richard Feynman called one of them — the fine-structure constant, which characterizes the amount of electromagnetic force between charged elementary particles like electrons — “one of the greatest damn mysteries of physics: a magic number that comes to us with no understanding by man.” An innovative, elegant physical theory that actually predicts the values of these constants would be among the greatest achievements of twenty-first-century physics. Many have tried and failed. The fine-structure constant, for example, is approximately equal to 1/137, a number that has inspired a lot of worthless numerology, even from some otherwise serious scientists. Most physicists have received unsolicited e-mails and manuscripts from over-excited hobbyists that proclaim, often in ALL CAPS and using high-school algebra, to have unlocked the mysteries of the universe by explaining the constants of nature. Since physicists have not discovered a deep underlying reason for why these constants are what they are, we might well ask the seemingly simple question: What if they were different? What would happen in a hypothetical universe in which the fundamental constants of nature had other values? There is nothing mathematically wrong with these hypothetical universes. But there is one thing that they almost always lack — life. Or, indeed, anything remotely resembling life. Or even the complexity upon which life relies to store information, gather nutrients, and reproduce. A universe that has just small tweaks in the fundamental constants might not have any of the chemical bonds that give us molecules, so say farewell to DNA, and also to rocks, water, and planets. Other tweaks could make the formation of stars or even atoms impossible. And with some values for the physical constants, the universe would have flickered out of existence in a fraction of a second. That the constants are all arranged in what is, mathematically speaking, the very improbable combination that makes our grand, complex, life-bearing universe possible is what physicists mean when they talk about the “fine-tuning” of the universe for life.
That's the issue in broad overview, from one angle. Barnes adds some details that we can ponder for a moment:
. . . we can calculate all the ways the universe could be disastrously ill-suited for life if the masses of these [fundamental] particles were different. For example, if the down quark’s mass were 2.6 x 10-26 grams or more, then adios, periodic table! There would be just one chemical element and no chemical compounds, in stark contrast to the approximately 60 million known chemical compounds in our universe. With even smaller adjustments to these masses, we can make universes in which the only stable element is hydrogen-like. Once again, kiss your chemistry textbook goodbye, as we would be left with one type of atom and one chemical reaction. If the up quark weighed 2.4 x 10-26 grams, things would be even worse — a universe of only neutrons, with no elements, no atoms, and no chemistry whatsoever. The universe we happen to have is so surprising under the Standard Model because the fundamental particles of which atoms are composed are, in the words of cosmologist Leonard Susskind, “absurdly light.” Compared to the range of possible masses that the particles described by the Standard Model could have, the range that avoids these kinds of complexity-obliterating disasters is extremely small. Imagine a huge chalkboard, with each point on the board representing a possible value for the up and down quark masses. If we wanted to color the parts of the board that support the chemistry that underpins life, and have our handiwork visible to the human eye, the chalkboard would have to be about ten light years (a hundred trillion kilometers) high. And that’s just for the masses of some of the fundamental particles. There are also the fundamental forces that account for the interactions between the particles. The strong nuclear force, for example, is the glue that holds protons and neutrons together in the nuclei of atoms. If, in a hypothetical universe, it is too weak, then nuclei are not stable and the periodic table disappears again. If it is too strong, then the intense heat of the early universe could convert all hydrogen into helium — meaning that there could be no water, and that 99.97 percent of the 24 million carbon compounds we have discovered would be impossible, too. And, as the chart to the right shows, the forces, like the masses, must be in the right balance. If the electromagnetic force, which is responsible for the attraction and repulsion of charged particles, is too strong or too weak compared to the strong nuclear force, anything from stars to chemical compounds would be impossible. Stars are particularly finicky when it comes to fundamental constants. If the masses of the fundamental particles are not extremely small, then stars burn out very quickly. Stars in our universe also have the remarkable ability to produce both carbon and oxygen, two of the most important elements to biology. But, a change of just a few percent in the up and down quarks’ masses, or in the forces that hold atoms together, is enough to upset this ability — stars would make either carbon or oxygen, but not both.
And more. This is not an illusion, it is a significant point. And, Robin Collins aptly used the concept of a bread factory. A super-physics that forces these constants to a just-right range would be like how a factory has to be in a Goldilocks just-right zone to bake good loaves. In short, pushing up the fine tuning one level does not get rid of it. And a bread factory bakes a LOT of loaves, so if we have it randomly tuned, if the just right zone is not broad and easily found on a well behaved fitness slope, then things begin to get tricky: we should not be at this sort of deeply isolated operating point. That is, John Leslie was right, locally isolated operating points are like the lone fly on the patch of wall swatted by a bullet. Matters not that other stretches may be carpeted and any bullet would hit a fly. In this zone, there's the one fly. Crack-splat. Tack-driver rifles and marksmen capable of using that capability don't come along just so. Just ask Olympics champs about their training regimes and rifles. Then, take a look at how the AR-15 family has evolved by design to take up features of such rifles. (Then ask how such a rifle would work at 1,000 m.) KFkairosfocus_{July 13, 2016
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Origines, There are simply not enough white dwarfs -- cooling off old stars -- around. In addition, the H-R diagrams for clusters show main sequence branching to the giants bands. Such branching often points to a H-rich ball physics model age of 6 - 8 BY. Notoriously, cosmological expansion points to perhaps 14 BY. As for thermodynamics, its message is simple. Molecules etc behave stochastically; indeed that is tied to what temperature is an index of. As a direct result in an isolated system there is a strong overall trend to degrade concentrations of energy. There is little or no actual empirical observation of anything more than the observed cosmos, all else is speculation. So, the key point is to ignore the lab coats and point out that putting speculation in mathematical terms does not change its character. It is still metaphysics, not physics. On such, we then have the metaphysical right to insist that there are no privileged worldviews, all must sit to the table of comparative difficulties. All must answer to the facts across the board (including those of us sitting here and reasonably arguing while being prompted by conscience). All must answer to coherence. All must answer to balanced explanatory power. With that on the table, evolutionary materialist scientism does not fare well. It cannot ground responsible, rational freedom sufficient to be able to argue like we must and do. KFkairosfocus_{July 13, 2016
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SS, Before going further, I suggest you answer substantially to Sir Fred Hoyle:
>>[Sir Fred Hoyle, In a talk at Caltech c 1981 (nb. this longstanding UD post):] From 1953 onward, Willy Fowler and I have always been intrigued by the remarkable relation of the 7.65 MeV energy level in the nucleus of 12 C to the 7.12 MeV level in 16 O. If you wanted to produce carbon and oxygen in roughly equal quantities by stellar nucleosynthesis, these are the two levels you would have to fix, and your fixing would have to be just where these levels are actually found to be. Another put-up job? . . . I am inclined to think so. A common sense interpretation of the facts suggests that a super intellect has "monkeyed" with the physics as well as the chemistry and biology, and there are no blind forces worth speaking about in nature. [F. Hoyle, Annual Review of Astronomy and Astrophysics, 20 (1982): 16.]>> . . . also, in the same talk at Caltech: >>The big problem in biology, as I see it, is to understand the origin of the information carried by the explicit structures of biomolecules. The issue isn't so much the rather crude fact that a protein consists of a chain of amino acids linked together in a certain way, but that the explicit ordering of the amino acids endows the chain with remarkable properties, which other orderings wouldn't give. The case of the enzymes is well known . . . If amino acids were linked at random, there would be a vast number of arrange-ments that would be useless in serving the pur-poses of a living cell. When you consider that a typical enzyme has a chain of perhaps 200 links and that there are 20 possibilities for each link,it's easy to see that the number of useless arrangements is enormous, more than the number of atoms in all the galaxies visible in the largest telescopes. [ --> 20^200 = 1.6 * 10^260] This is for one enzyme, and there are upwards of 2000 of them, mainly serving very different purposes. So how did the situation get to where we find it to be? This is, as I see it, the biological problem - the information problem . . . . I was constantly plagued by the thought that the number of ways in which even a single enzyme could be wrongly constructed was greater than the number of all the atoms in the universe. So try as I would, I couldn't convince myself that even the whole universe would be sufficient to find life by random processes - by what are called the blind forces of nature . . . . By far the simplest way to arrive at the correct sequences of amino acids in the enzymes would be by thought, not by random processes . . . . Now imagine yourself as a superintellect working through possibilities in polymer chemistry. Would you not be astonished that polymers based on the carbon atom turned out in your calculations to have the remarkable properties of the enzymes and other biomolecules? Would you not be bowled over in surprise to find that a living cell was a feasible construct? Would you not say to yourself, in whatever language supercalculating intellects use: Some supercalculating intellect must have designed the properties of the carbon atom, otherwise the chance of my finding such an atom through the blind forces of nature would be utterly minuscule. Of course you would, and if you were a sensible superintellect you would conclude that the carbon atom is a fix. >> . . . and again: >> I do not believe that any physicist who examined the evidence could fail to draw the inference that the laws of nuclear physics have been deliberately designed with regard to the [--> nuclear synthesis] consequences they produce within stars. ["The Universe: Past and Present Reflections." Engineering and Science, November, 1981. pp. 8–12]>>
KF PS: Your discomfort with the widely recognised observations on fine tuning of physics that supports cell based life is inadvertently revealing. BTW, sweet spots are a manifestation of fine tuning.kairosfocus_{July 13, 2016
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Querius Thank you for the very insightful comments on the referred interview. You pointed to a few interesting details I had not noticed when I read that article. At this moment I don't understand much of QM, but will heed your advice to look into it deeper. My poor understanding about complex specified information (CSI), which sometimes I additionally qualify as "procedural prescriptive purpose-oriented" CS(PPPO)I, is mostly based on empirical observation and analysis of the process of developing software for engineering design systems. My boss, a brilliant engineer, directed the project I worked on. The functionality of the software existed in his mind before he explained to us how it should look on the screen and work and before he wrote the technical specifications for the programmers to write the code for the compiler to translate our code to a lower level code that ultimately was converted into the lowest level code that the computer operated on to produce the resulting system my boss had so clearly visualized earlier. The morphogen gradient formation and interpretation issues are a relatively 'simple' example for illustrating the same concept of CS(PPPO)I. There are several references to related papers in the thread "Mystery at the heart of life". This has been one of the cases where biologists have stumbled while trying to describe their observations. Actually, professor L.M. himself failed to answer a simple question related to this very issue. Apparently that made him write that he would not discuss further with me because I don't ask honest questions. News wrote that probably what professor L.M. meant was that since his was a losing position he better quit. :) If you want more details on this, I'll gladly provide them to you.Dionisio_{July 13, 2016
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Eric @69, WRT to my question "how can it be that in an eternal universe suns have not already died?" I have found this article by W.L.Craig. It's a rather technical piece, but the take-home message seems to be that the second law of thermodynamics is indeed unstoppable. W.L.Craig:
As we have seen, the application of relativity theory to cosmology has altered the shape of the eschatological scenario predicted on the basis of the Second Law, but it has not materially affected the fundamental dilemma. Thus, the same pointed question raised by classical physics persists: why, if the universe has existed forever, is it not now in a cold, dark, dilute, and lifeless state? In contrast to their nineteenth century forbears, contemporary physicists have come to question the implicit assumption that the universe is eternal in the past. P. C. W. Davies reports, Today, few cosmologists doubt that the universe, at least as we know it, did have an origin at a finite moment in the past. The alternative - that the universe has always existed in one form or another—runs into a rather basic paradox. The sun and stars cannot keep burning forever: sooner or later they will run out of fuel and die. The same is true of all irreversible physical processes; the stock of energy available in the universe to drive them is finite, and cannot last for eternity. This is an example of the so-called second law of thermodynamics, which, applied to the entire cosmos, predicts that it is stuck on a one-way slide of degeneration and decay towards a final state of maximum entropy, or disorder. As this final state has not yet been reached, it follows that the universe cannot have existed for an infinite time.11 Davies concludes, "The universe can't have existed forever. We know there must have been an absolute beginning a finite time ago."12
You mention,
Eric Anderson: It seems the idea would be some kind of expanding/collapsing cycle — not a currently held view, to be sure, but theoretically possible.
an idea that is being addressed in the article:
In the 1960s and '70s some cosmologists tried to escape this conclusion by adopting an oscillating model of the universe which never began to exist nor ever reaches a final state of equilibrium .... ... Not only was such a theory extraordinarily speculative, but the prospects of such a model were severely dimmed in 1970 by Roger Penrose and Stephen Hawking's formulation of the Singularity Theorems which bear their names.14 The theorems disclosed that under very generalized conditions an initial cosmological singularity (or beginning point) is inevitable, even for inhomogeneous and non-isotropic universes. ... But wholly apart from these difficulties, the thermodynamic properties of this model turned out to imply the very problem that its proponents sought to avoid. For entropy is conserved from cycle to cycle in such a model, which has the effect of generating larger and longer oscillations with each successive cycle .... As one scientific team explains, "The effect of entropy production will be to enlarge the cosmic scale, from cycle to cycle. . . . Thus, looking back in time, each cycle generated less entropy, had a smaller cycle time, and had a smaller cycle expansion factor then [sic] the cycle that followed it." ... In fact, astronomer Joseph Silk estimates on the basis of current entropy levels that the universe cannot have gone through more than 100 previous oscillations. ...
Other speculative models have been proposed, such as the 'Chaotic Inflationary Model'. Craig concludes:
Since such speculative conjectures fail to elude the problem, we seem left with the conclusion that the universe is not past eternal. The Big Bang represents the absolute beginning of the universe, just as it does in the Standard Big Bang model; and the low entropy condition was simply an initial condition. Indeed, thermodynamics may provide good reasons for affirming the reality of the singular origin of space-time postulated by the Standard Model.
Origenes_{July 13, 2016
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Eric, Mung noted that
If things with[in] the universe can have no cause then science is a myth.
I don't think Mung's statement was too broad. Once to eliminate the need for causality in nature and in science, you cease to be able to make reliable inferences. "Yes, the apple dropped from the tree, but was it due to gravity or an anomaly?" You could never be sure. -QQuerius_{July 13, 2016
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Dionisio, First of all, thank you for posting the link to the interview of Dr. Vedral by Aleks Krotoski, who asked brilliant, insightful questions. Dr. Vedral's self deprecation was not false humility, but his recognition of the dichotomy between QM and various explanations of its significance. QM has been demonstrated as precisely as 10 parts per billion. It is considered to be the most thoroughly challenged and experimentally validated of all the sciences. However, the explanations of its significance is wildly controversial. Dr. Vedral did explain that information is expressed in terms of material existence, but he did not go on to describe that the collapse of probabilistic wavefunctions through observation and measurement is the cause for this material expression. I noticed that Dr. Vedral stumbled over the false notion that God must be subject to time before time even came into existence, which as a result, led Dr. Vedral to think that it would lead to an infinite regression of gods creating gods. Since we live temporally it's very difficult for us to imagine existence without time (or space). A related question might be, "If God is infinite, how can He fit into the universe?" The answer is the same. Dr. Vedral rejected the notion of a mechanistic, predictable universe (that has no necessity or room for God), and he noted that the origin of the laws of physics is currently a mystery. Also, I didn't think Dr. Vedral adequately addressed Ms. Krotoski's question about how our physical, social, and economic existence traces itself back to information. Both Dr. Vedral and Ms. Krotoski seemed very nervous about bringing up the subject of God. :-) If you're not already familiar with quantum entanglement, quantum erasure, and the zeno effect, you might want to look into them, realizing that everything in our macro existence ultimately traces back to quantum interactions. I freely admit that I don't understand the theory of information and its classification. Dr. Vedral pointed out that the information is much simpler than we make out. It also intrigued me that he touched on the binary nature of information, which, by the way, is a primary theme in the Genesis account of creation. For example, the separation of light from darkness generated information. Yes, I do think Dr. Vedral was struggling with the metaphysical implications of QM. As you heard, he admitted that he was a simpleton with regards to the significance of QM. -QQuerius_{July 13, 2016
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Mung @45:
Anything that is caused requires a cause. It follows that there must be a first cause. Whether the universe had a beginning or not is irrelevant. [For determining whether there must be a first cause.] If it has a cause for its existence, there must be a first cause. Perhaps the universe is eternal. So what. It still either requires a cause of its existence or it does not.
Agreed. Up to this point.
If the universe can be uncaused, then by what principle must everything in the universe have a cause?
No principle. The need for causation is based by our observation and analysis. If we observe (or infer on good evidence) that something needed a cause, then so be it. We conclude that thing required a cause.
If things with[in] the universe can have no cause then science is a myth.
That is too broad a statement, referencing, as it does, everything in the universe. Furthermore, science -- understood as an objective, evidence-driven, search for truth -- could certainly help lead us to conclude that something is eternal, if that is in fact the case. Whether something has a cause or not doesn't prevent science from observing that fact and pointing us in the right direction. Now if what you mean is slightly more modest, namely that we generally carry out our scientific activity on the assumption that everything we see in the physical world around us has a cause, then, yes, I agree. The assumption that things have a cause is a highly useful and time-worn principle of doing science in the real world. Not necessarily a purely material cause, mind you -- the whole principle of intelligent design being an argument against that materialistic version of "science." But some kind of cause.Eric Anderson_{July 12, 2016
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Origenes @40: Great question. It seems the idea would be some kind of expanding/collapsing cycle -- not a currently held view, to be sure, but theoretically possible. Your point is well taken, at least regarding the universe as we experience it. That experience might not translate well to whatever the cause of the universe is, but it is still an observation that should give us some pause.Eric Anderson_{July 12, 2016
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Querius @63 #67 addendum You quoted Oxford professor Vlatko Vedral (originally from Belgrade, Serbia). Professor Vedral's idea of information seems kind of materialistically defined in terms of collection of atoms or something like that? At least that was my perception from his interview by British "The Guardian" over 6 years ago: https://www.theguardian.com/science/2010/mar/07/vlatko-vedral-interview-aleks-krotoski Did I get it right? Did I miss or misinterpreted something in that article? Are software programs just a bunch of tiny electronic impulses wildly dancing around? There's an abysmal difference between information and complex specified information which contains procedural prescriptive purpose-driven meaning. Oxford math professor John Lennox said that nonsense remains nonsense even if said by famous scientists.Dionisio_{July 12, 2016
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10:35 PM
10
10
35
PM
PDT}

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