What is knowledge?

A computer is “improbable” in the sense that it is improbable that blind particles in motion on their own can cause its existence. That is correct.

The goal was to define what it means for something to have the appearance of design in an exact way so it can be applied to various kinds of replicators to see if they actually exhibit the that property and to what degree. That is, if they can arise from generic resources and laws. That probably of the appearance of design has anything to do with the vague idea of "blind particles in motion" is a non-exact statement about the appearance of design.

So, a computer AND a keyboard together have a greater appearance of design than either separately? And you can say that in constructor-speech? That’s all very interesting.

I'm not sure that you're even being serious here, as It's unclear how you reached that conclusion from the the excerpt. For example, you haven't elaborated on in what sense is a computer AND a keyboard together. Again, the motivation for constructor theory is to make exact statements. This isn't one of them.critical rationalist

December 3, 2017

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CR @203 “Appearance” of design …

CR: Something with the appearance of design is often described as “improbable” [27, 28].

A computer is “improbable” in the sense that it is improbable that blind particles in motion on their own can cause its existence. That is correct.

CR: This is misleading because probability measures are multiplicative; so that would mean that two independent objects with the appearance of design would have much more of that appearance than they do separately.

Is it misleading? Is it not more improbable that blind particles in motion spontaneously self-organize into a battleship AND a nuclear power plant? I would say yes, but I must admit, that blind particles in motion self-organizing into one or the other is “improbable” enough for me.

CR: But that is not the case when the two objects have unrelated functionalities (such as, say, internal organs of different organisms). In contrast, two organs in the context of the same organism, coordinating to the effect of gene propagation, do have a greater appearance of design than either separately. This can be expressed naturally in constructor-theoretic terms for programmable constructors.

So, a computer AND a keyboard together have a greater appearance of design than either separately? And you can say that in constructor-speech? That’s all very interesting.Origenes

December 3, 2017

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To again clarify, "no design laws" is an example of making exact statements in constructor theory. Specifically, it's an exact statement that allows us to distinguish between laws that contain the design of high-fidelity replicators and those that do not. "no-design laws" are equal to quantum mechanics, which is the most fundamental physical theory in our current conception of physics, described in constructor theoretic terms. The ability to make exact statements about what was considered our most fundamental physical theory, in terms of what is physical transformations are possible, which transformations are impossible, and why, is what makes constructor theory more fundamental physical theory than quantum mechanics. As UB might say , do you follow this?critical rationalist

December 3, 2017

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From this paper….

However, the constructor theory that I shall propose in this paper is not primarily the theory of constructions or constructors, as the prevailing conception would require it to be. It is the theory of which transformations input state of substrates ? output state of substrates (2) can be caused and which cannot, and why. As I shall explain, the idea is that the fundamental questions of physics can all be expressed in terms of those issues, and that the answers do not depend on what the constructor is, so it can be abstracted away, leaving transformations (2) as the basic subject matter of the theory. I shall argue that we should expect such a theory to constitute a fundamental branch of physics with new, universal laws, and to provide a powerful new language for expressing other theories. I shall guess what some of those laws may be, and explore the theory’s potential for solving various problems and achieving various unifications between disparate branches of physics and beyond, and propose a notation that may be useful in developing it.

The constructor theory of life is just one example of "expressing other theories" in this new language.critical rationalist

December 3, 2017

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UB: We can start by summarizing the core physical requirements of the system we are trying to explain: an autonomous self-replicator with open-ended potential (i.e. it can describe itself or any variation of itself).

The system we are trying to explain is the relatively recent, cell, which is capable of high-fidelity replication. Namely, when a cell replicates it first makes a copy of the recipe of which transformations of raw materials (matter) are required to make copy of itself. Then it performs those transformations to make a copy of the vehicle from that same recipe. This is contrast to replication in the form of making an atom by atom copy of an entire, previously existing cell, already constructed. This is a key point as if the cell performed a copy of itself in its entity, any damage it incurred during its lifetime would be coped as well. Nor is there is no way to perform error correction by on a vehicle only cell as that requires a recipe for which to compare and correct the entire end result, which would be exponentially more difficult at that stage anyway. To allow for error correction, the recipe must also contain which transformations to perform to correct errors that occur. And the recipe must be stored in such a way that the information it contains is in digital form. This is in contrast to analog information storage (or analog computers), which is not self correcting and fidelity is subject to even slight amounts of drift. All of these things are required for high-fidelity replication. Now, on to the question of “what are the core physical requirements” for this system we are trying to explain. If only there was some problem or criticism that motivated people to actually work on this very question in detail? What about Von Neumann? While he pioneered the key concept of replicator-vehicle logic described above, his attempt to provide the design of an actual self-reproducer, in the terms of atoms and microscopic interaction was unsuccessful. However, fortunately for us there is indeed such a problem. Just as it had brought challenges to our most fundamental theories of information, some members of the scientific community suggested specific aspects of quantum mechanics brought a challenge to our theory of life in that it was incompatible with self-replication. Specifically, they posited some “biotonic” laws, containing the design of organisms or some key aspect of self-replicators, must supplement quantum mechanics. Why? From section 1 of this paper…

But even more striking is that living cells can self-reproduce to high accuracy in a variety of environments, reconstructing the vehicle afresh, under the control of the genes, in all the intricate details necessary for gene replication. This is prima facie problematic under no-design laws: how can those processes be so accurate, without their design being encoded in the laws of physics? This is why some physicists - notably, Wigner and Bohm, [12], [13] - have even claimed that accurate self-reproduction of an organism with the appearance of design requires the laws of motion to be “tailored” for the purpose – i.e., they must contain its design [12]. These claims, stemming from the tradition of incredulity that living entities can be scientifically explained, [14], highlight a problem. The theory of evolution must be supplemented by a theory that those physical processes upon which it relies are provably compatible with no-design laws of physics. No such theory has been proposed; and those claims have not been properly refuted.

Note that the term “no-design laws” refers a set of “core physical requirements” (our current laws of physics, including quantum mechanics). It’s not a new set of laws. Rather, it’s referring to existing, general purpose laws and resources, that are not design-specific. In fact it’s the absence of a new set of yet to be proposed laws that somehow contain the design of self replicating cells, already present. While this was not specifically directed at ID or UB’s claims (there are no alternative theories to Neo-darwinism, including ID, because there has yet to be proposed a critical test for which ID can explain the same phenomena at least as well, let alone any critical difference indicated in any yet to be proposed critical test. Nor does merely pointing out a problem in Neo-darwinism result in creating a new theory. [see #175]), it is still relevant to the question at hand. This because this criticism results in asking the question: which physical laws (“core physical requirements”) are compatible with high-fidelity replication. (This more fundamental question is key because, even if we could go back in time and watch life appear and evolve into the biosphere we see today, one could always retreat to the claim that the design of critical aspects of self replicating cells, or even all organisms, was already preset in the laws of physics, at the outset. This would be like the claim of “front loading” but at the laws of physics, rather than the genome.) So, why had no theory yet to have been presented to supplement neo-Darwinism, properly refuting those claims?

Indeed, the central problem here – i.e., whether and under what circumstances accurate self-reproduction and replication are compatible with no-design laws – is awkward to formulate in the prevailing conception of fundamental physics, which expresses everything in terms of predictions given some initial conditions and laws of motion. This mode of explanation can only approximately express emergent notions such as the appearance of design, no-design laws, etc.

This is why Von Neumann was unsuccessful and is yet another reason why the paper doesn’t merely attempt to predict anything specific, such as the appearance of a goat, is true or probably true, given some initial conditions and the laws of motion. ?What we need is a way to express the “core physical requirements” of the system, along with concepts such as the appearance of design, information, no-design laws, etc, in exact terms, as apposed to approximations.

The prevailing conception also forces a misleading formulation of the problem, as: what initial conditions and laws of motion must (or must probably) produce accurate replicators and self-reproducers (with some probability)? But what is disputed is whether such entities are possible under no-design laws. More generally, it cannot express the very explanation provided by evolutionary theory – that living organisms can have come about without intentionally being designed. It would have aimed at proving that they must occur, given certain initial conditions and dynamical laws. To overcome these problems I resort to a newly proposed theory of physics, constructor theory. [16, 17, 18]. It provides a new mode of explanation, expressing all laws as statements about which transformations are possible, which are impossible and why. This brings counterfactual statements into fundamental physics, which is key to the solution. The explanation provided by the theory of evolution is already constructor-theoretic: it is possible that the appearance of design has been brought about without intentionally being designed; so is our problem: are the physical processes essential to the theory of evolution - i.e., self- reproduction, replication and natural selection - possible under no-design laws?

Our motivation to answer the very question UB asked, which “core physical requirements are necessary”, is where constructor theory comes into play.

Constructor Theory’s mode of explanation also delivers an exact physical expression of the notions of the appearance of design, no-design laws, and of the logic of self-reproduction and natural selection.(5)?

However, it seems that UB isn’t really serious about finding out what those “core physical requirements” are as he appears to be willing to settle for incomplete approximations. This would be like settling for Newton’s laws of motion with is much more of an approximation than Einstein’s more fundamental general relativity. Example? UB wrote….

1) a sequence of representations in a medium of information. 2) a set of physical constraints to establish what is being represented. 3) a system of discontinuous association between representations and referents, based on spatial orientation (i.e. a reading-frame code) 4) functional coordination (semantic closure) between two sets of sequences; the first set establishes the constraints that are necessary to interpret the representations, and the second set establishes a system whereby the representations and their constraints are brought together in the specify way required to produce a functioning end product – an autonomous self-replicator. Coordination is required because changes to the first set affect the second set.

The first problem is that UB’s theory of information, if we can call it that, is an approximation. We cannot use it at the level of quantum physics any more than you can use Newton’s laws to build a GPS satellite. It simply doesn’t scale. Furthermore, he appeals to these approximations as if they somehow support “his theory”, as someone might might try to appeal to the ability to launch rockets into space somehow presets a problem to Einstein’s general relativity. It doesn’t. Again, this was addressed in #175. Second, UB’s theory does not address key aspects of the system, such as copying information, error correction, distinguishability, digital information, as opposed to analog, etc. These key aspects are what make high-fidelity replication possible. Furthermore, if some designer put the information of which genes will result in the right proteins which will result in the right features, into the cell as ID claims that too would reflect the same process that occurs when the same information is copied during replication. Right? Or does ID suggest that information spontaneously appeared there because the designer wanted it to? None of UB’s “information theory” addresses “the core physical requirements” for these key aspects of the system. So, it’s not that I “do not follow” what UB presented. It’s very much the opposite. I follow them well enough to recognize what he presented is expressible as more fundamental, exact statements in constructor theoretic terms. Specifically, a network of tasks with subtasks of subtasks, etc. which eventually reaches a subtask that is not specific to replication. IOW, we can exactly model cells as constructors in constructor theory. This is outlined in detail in section 3.1 of the referenced paper. IOW, the paper answers the question of what these “the core physical requirements” are. Yet, apparently, he has some yet to be disclosed objection. This is like UB objecting to pointing out launching rockets into space can be explained more accurately and at a more fundamental level by using Einstein’s GR, than by using Newton’s laws. The very aspects of the physical objects that play the roles UB describes in the translation system themselves represents information. Example? Some one in a lab could apply transformations to move stop codons from their naturally occurring locations to test a theory of protein expression. Those transformations represent information need to setup up a repeatable experiment. If all information needs to be interpreted, then you either have a circular definition of distinguishability or an infinite regress. Again, this is outlined in the constructor theory of information which defines information based on a set of physically possible tasks. This includes what tasks must be possible to copy information, which is a key aspect of replication. Again, UB’s theory says nothing about this.

So … when you remove the translation machinery in order to simplify the system (to meet your ideological requirements), you remove the capacity of the system to specify objects among alternatives.

First, no one suggests any point in cellular development consisted of cells with the current level of high-fidelity replication (and necessary aspects described above to enable them) but with the translation machinery removed. That’s simply false. Is there no one willing to actually address the arguments actually being presented, as opposed to a straw man? Second, you have confused the universal theory that knowledge grows via some form of variation and criticism with an “ideological requirement”. Theories are tested by observations, not derived from them. As such, so would any theory that suggests cells were always capable of high-fidelity replication. That idea isn’t out there for anyone to observe any more than any other. Third, as the paper points out, we can model replication via constructor theory as constructors with a spectrum of various degrees of accuracy - with replication being performed initially by the environment and then transitioning to both the environment and self replication. Again, this represents the very question UB asked: “what are the core physical requirements” for this system.

However, one must also address the question: can accurate self-reproducers arise from generic resources only, under such laws??Note that what the prevailing conception would aim to prove is that the emergence of accurate self-reproducers follows (with some probability) given certain initial conditions and laws of motion. This approach, informing the search for viable models for the origin of life, [25], is suitable to solve scientific problems such as predicting the existence of life elsewhere in the uni- verse - e.g., by providing bounds to how probable the emergence of those self-reproducers is on an earth-like planet. Here I am addressing a differ- ent problem: whether accurate self-reproducers are possible under no-design laws. This is a theoretical (indeed, constructor-theoretic) question and can be addressed without resorting to predictions. Indeed, the theory of evolution provides a positive answer to that question, provided that two further points are established. I shall argue for them in what follows.?The first point is that the logic of evolution by natural selection is compatible with no-design laws because - in short - selection and variation are non-specific to its end products. This can be seen by modeling the logic of natural selection as an approximate construction, whose substrates are populations of replicators and whose (highly approximate) constructor is the environment. This occurs over a much longer time-scale than that of self- reproduction, whereby replicators - constructors on the shorter scale - become now substrates.?Evolution relies upon populations being changed by variation and selection over the time-scale spanning many generations. Crucially, the mutations in the replicators, caused by the environment, are non-specific, (as in section 3.1), to the “end product” of evolution (as Dawkins put it, not “systematically directed to improvement” [27]). This constructor-theoretic characterisation of mutations replaces the less precise locution “random mutations” (as opposed to non-random selection, [5]). These mutations are all transmitted to the successfully created individuals of the next generation, by heredity - irrespective of their being harmful, neutral or beneficial in that particular environment.?Selection emerges from the interaction between the replicators and the environment with finite resources. It may lead to equilibrium, given enough time and energy. If so, the surviving replicators are near a local maximum of effectiveness at being replicated in that environment.?Thus, the environment is passive and blind in this selection process. Since it retains its ability to cause non-specific variation and passive selection again, it qualifies as a naturally-occuring approximation to a constructor. Crucially, it is a crude approximation to a constructor: crude enough that it could have arisen by chance and requires no explanation. Its actions - variations and selection - require no design in laws of physics, as they proceed by non- specific, elementary steps. So the logic of evolution by natural selection is compatible with no-design laws of physics.

This is a natural transition because such a transition already exists when self-replication specific recipe subtasks eventually rely on generic, elementary tasks that are not specific to replication and are found in the environment.

Note, however, that the recipe is in one sense incomplete: as remarked in section 3.1, the recipe is not required to include instructions for the elementary tasks, which occur spontaneously in nature. These are indeed relied upon during actual cell development - they constitute epigenetics and environ- mental context. As remarked by George C. Williams, “Organisms, wherever possible, delegate jobs to useful spontaneous processes, much as a builder may temporarily let gravity hold things in place and let the wind disperse paint fumes”, [29].

Note that constructor theory allows us to exactly define what is mean by the appearance of design, which is crucial to indicating what kinds of constructions exhibit it and therefore require different levels of accuracy, resources, storage types, etc.

3.1.1 Appearance of design Something with the appearance of design is often described as “improbable” [27, 28]. This is misleading because probability measures are multiplicative; so that would mean that two independent objects with the appearance of design would have much more of that appearance than they do separately. But that is not the case when the two objects have unrelated functionalities (such as, say, internal organs of different organisms). In contrast, two organs in the context of the same organism, coordinating to the effect of gene propagation, do have a greater appearance of design than either separately. This can be expressed naturally in constructor-theoretic terms for programmable constructors. Consider a recipe R for a possible task T. A sub-recipe R? for the task T? is fine-tuned to perform T if almost any slight change in T? would cause T to be performed to a much lower accuracy. (For instance, changing the mechanism of insulin production in the pancreas even slightly, would impair the overall task the organism performs.) A programmable constructor V whose repertoire includes T has the appearance of design if it can execute a recipe for T with a hierarchical structure including several, different sub- recipes, fine-tuned to perform T. Each fine-tuned sub-recipe is performed by a sub-constructor contained in V : the number of fine-tuned sub-recipes performable by V is a measure of V ’s appearance of design. This constructor- theoretic definition is non-multiplicative, as desired.

So, to summarize. Neo-Darwinism cannot explain the appearance of life under the current conception of physics. This is because the current conception doesn’t allow defining key aspects of the problem in exact terms. However this is possible though using a new mode of explanation: constructor theory, which does allow defining those key aspects in more fundamental and exact ways.critical rationalist

December 3, 2017

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201 was headlined: https://uncommondescent.com/science/can-we-regard-scientific-theories-as-factual-knowledge/kairosfocus

December 2, 2017

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F/N: Can we regard scientific theories as factual knowledge? This is a deep challenge, especially on the so-called pessimistic induction that historically theories in effect have hidden sell-by dates. That is, theories show more of a track record of replacement (sometimes presented as refinement) than we are comfortable with. A first answer is that a theory, from the abductive angle, is a "best current explanatory framework," often involving dynamics which may be deterministic or stochastic (or tempered by stochastic factors), and may be empirically reliable in a known or unknown range of circumstances. The turn of C20 surprises faced by Newtonian dynamics have been a major lesson. The import is, that often theories are more like models that are "useful fictions"(with perhaps a few grains of deep truth in them) than descriptions of factors at work in reality that are all credibly true. This becomes especially so where theories address remote reaches of space or time where we cannot directly observe the actual circumstances. In these cases, we are limited to observations of traces of the circumstances, and we make models of the place and time, we have not got direct checks. Scientific simulations or scenarios and visualisations tied to such, then become even more remote from the right to claim credible truth. Of course, actual credible observations are much better as candidates for credible and reliable truth claims. Such suggests that we need to be far more circumspect in our evaluation of scientific theories than we are sometimes wont to be, e.g. the tendency to say of climate dynamics models and projected developments of climate under human impact, that the science is "settled," or that those who hold appropriate background -- or even laymen expressing concerns -- and raise questions on key issues are "deniers." The future is beyond current observations, so while we may be well advised to act with prudence, we should not exaggerate our knowledge claims on the future. Similarly, we should be cautious about exoplanet studies and especially artistic renderings of suggested planets. These are -- with a few exceptions -- not direct observations, they are inferred from gravitational effects. We may be confident that planetary objects are there and may infer they are terrestrial or gas giant etc, but we should be cautious. Reconstructions of the past of the cosmos, our solar system and planet, as well as the history of life are also beyond direct observation and should be presented with due cautions. Evidence such as the detection of clear cases of dinosaur soft tissues from a claimed 65+ MYA, should give us pause. And if there are cases where the smell of death/decay is still there, that should give us pause. I know there is a recent headline on a Triceratops horn being dated to 30+ kYA, but that should be taken with a grain of salt for the moment too. When it comes to wider senses of science such as Economics, we should be even more cautious. Even something like GDP or an unemployment rate is a calculation not an observation. Often useful, but use with due caution. I begin to suggest that we view theories more like models of high reliability that we hope capture something significant regarding the true dynamics of our world, but we are less than certain of that. The theories may be part of the body of knowledge of a field of study, but that is a matter of observing the field of study as itself a phenomenon subject to observation and evaluation. The credible truthfulness of the contents of a given theory and its key objects or processes and laws etc are something that we should likely take a very eclectic case by case view on. No-one has actually directly observed an electron, but we are highly confident that these entities exist, never mind weird quantum properties of such a "wavicle." We can make a much better case for more or less observing an atom, given scanning techniques. The remote future, or remote reaches of space or the remote past of origins, we do not directly observe. We would be well advised to be cautious, and to bear in mind the limitations of inductive methods of investigation. Ironically, on the design inference debates, the reality of something like FSCO/I and its empirically observed origin are far better observed than the suggested deep-time powers of chance variation and differential reproductive success. But institutional power makes a big difference on how things are perceived. Which, is yet another caution: scientific "consensus" or the ex cathedra statements of august panels and their publicists should be taken with a grain of salt. Science at its best is openly provisional and open-ended. KFkairosfocus

December 1, 2017

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CR, do we or do we not live in a generally orderly and reasonably predictable world in which we have days and nights, seasons, hot and cold cycles, a frame of natural law studied in Physics, Chemistry and so forth, the reliability that food will be food and water will be water etc? If you are reduced to attempted mockery and projecting accusations or insinuations of question-begging in response to such an observation, then you are simply out of touch with reality. Your problems begin long before you get to debates such as the above, in short. Please, think again. KFkairosfocus

December 1, 2017

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CR, 30:

Knowledge is information that, when embedding in a storage medium, plays a causal role in being retained.

This needs to be addressed on points: >>Knowledge is information>> 1 --> Only when knowledge is specifically coded will it be information in the sense of a string of characters in a readable frame. 2 --> Often knowledge is intuitive, an implicit pattern that is recognised and used without being articulated in a coded form, e.g. knowing someone's peculiar voice. 3 --> Similarly, many perceptions or beliefs are knowledge, e.g. of the threat posed by a car hurtling down a road towards you as you try to cross. >> that, when embedding in a storage medium,>> 4 --> Code/representation centric again, and codes are themselves sophisticated expressions of knowledge, i.e. perilously close to question-begging. >> plays a causal role>> 5 --> Stored information is passive, there is need to have active machinery for reading and using it, driving effectors. 6 --> this begs the questions UB has put on the table again and again regarding the architecture of cybernetic systems. >>in being retained.>> 7 --> this again ducks the points that are pivotal. 8 --> Information as coded or modulated and stored etc is passive, and it is a wider system of processing that gives it effect. 9 --> When information in a system contributes to the system's success, it is likely to be retained, but that is utterly different from that information being true or well warranted as credibly true. This is a key to modelling theory, models are successful simplifications of or metaphors for reality that may foster easier decisions and actions that can be successful without being true or even approximately true. think of electronic circuit models or economic models or the use of gear trains in a planetarium. 10 --> If stored information is somehow functional as processed and applied and so contributes to system success, this points to reliability, not to truth or to warrant or to knowledge. 11 --> System effectiveness is not truth or warrant as credibly true. 12 --> But CR will dismiss such a reference, so why do I make it? 13 --> Because of what he is diverting attention from. Knowledge is a term of language, and refers to a particular phenomenon that is commonly experienced and observed. Thus, there is a question of basic accuracy of concept. 14 --> Namely, knowledge is associated with knowers, who claim to know things they believe . . . perceive, strongly accept, firmly opine . . . are true or are at least credibly true and reliable enough to bank on when something of high value is at risk, up to and including life. 15 --> But belief is not knowledge, it is a component of it. 16 --> For belief to move into knowledge territory, it has to be adequately warranted as being credibly true and reliable, or even in the strong form as utterly certainly true and reliable. 17 --> Such warrant needs not be fully held by the knower, nor must s/he -- it is conscious agents who know -- hold the full argument or demonstration that warrants, it is enough that s/he holds on good authority that in turn is well founded in its claims. 18 --> We do this when we routinely look up words in dictionaries etc. 19 --> Founded is another trigger word, I simply point out that warrant comes in chains that for us finite knowers must be finite, and must not be circular, i.e. we start from finitely remote good first principles, observations, facts etc. 20 --> These must be able to hold their own on factual adequacy, coherence, reliability, ability to predict, coherence, explanatory power etc. Try mathematics out for size. 21 --> Such knowledge may well be reduced to coded form and embedded into systems that then can effect actions using that information and will perhaps be reliably successful by some measure. Thus there will be little reason to make changes in that information as such. 22 --> But this is all engineering, obviously downstream of what makes it knowledge. 23 --> In attempting to create what looks like an operational definition, we have a failure due to question-begging and distraction from the actual core meaning of the matter. Sad but unsurprising. KFkairosfocus

December 1, 2017

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KF, Origenes, UB, You guys impress me with your patience to deal with your politely dissenting interlocutorsDionisio

December 1, 2017

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UB, dead on target (not merely a loose straddle), heavy gunfire at maximum rate please. KFkairosfocus

December 1, 2017

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CR, regrettably, you love to project "assumption" as a dismissive epithet. No, on ordinary meanings of words and remarks using words, Deutsch's remarks are self-referential, they necessarily include the utterer in the set they refer to. Such remarks, philosophers warn us against as they are apt to question begging and/or self-contradiction. As Origenes has repeatedly shown, and as I have too and likely others, Deutsch's remarks are repeatedly self-referentially incoherent and/or meaningless through that reference. Which provides warrant for rejecting them as ever making a meaningful, much less an accurate description of features of reality. Thus, per the direct logic of being definitively not true per reductio ad absurdum, they are necessarily false. this has nothing to do with "assuming" that knowledge is justified true belief, which no one in-thread has defended. Per Gettier counter-examples, one may be justified in a belief which is not knowledge, as was also discussed above. beliefs are perceptions and opinions, and without belief there is not knowledge, but belief does not suffice. We need further, warrant as credibly true and reliable, to get to weak form knowledge. For strong form knowledge, we need warrant that delivers utter certainty of truth and reliability. That is an explanation in brief, it is not an assumption. Later, I think I will pause and dissect the definition you have proffered as a substitute, showing why it is dependent on the just mentioned and why it is inferior. KF PS: The examples of key self-evident beliefs I used were chosen for obvious reasons, which have long been given just ignored. The triple first principles of right reason . . . LOI, LNC, LEM . . . tied to the nature of distinct identity are recognised as the start-point of logic from the days of Aristotle. If you are ignorant of this, you are ill-equipped to take on this matter. Distinct identity, requires A vs ~A, thus implies twoness, and by contrast one-ness and zero emerge. Mix in the von Neumann construction and you necessarily lay out the endlessness of the naturals. That is basic set theory. As for the principle error exists, this was identified in C19 by Josiah Royce, a significant philosopher; and, was popularised in C20 by Elton Trueblood. But that is not where it gets its force from, ~ who-sed-it. But instead, error exists, E is such that ~E, its attempted denial, is necessarily false and therefore E is necessarily and undeniably, self-evidently true. I notice that you seem to have great difficulty even typing those words. I am not saying basic or properly basic beliefs but self-evident truths. truth says of what is, that it is and of what is not that it is not, comes from Aristotle in metaphysics 1011b, but gains its force from its utter aptness. That consciousness is undeniably true is of like character as that E is self-evident -- to deny it is an act of conscious thought or speech and so its denial is futile, and probably was made prominent through the likes of Descartes. beyond, I think it was Aristotle who defined a true nothing, non-being as what rocks dream of. It is the Angelic Doctor, Aquinas, who emphasised that little errors at the beginning produce grave consequences in schemes of thought as they flow on down from those springs of error.kairosfocus

December 1, 2017

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CR,

And I corrected you in that it is only high-fidelity replication requires the translation system. When did you get around to responding to this?

I think it might have been around April or May.

If you can’t point to it, then why don’t you summarize it?

Sure, why not? We can pretend that the last 9 months didn’t happen, and then when I am through, you can go back to dissembling about quantum memory, induction, explanations having reach, and the rest of your war on science and reason. We can start by summarizing the core physical requirements of the system we are trying to explain: an autonomous self-replicator with open-ended potential (i.e. it can describe itself or any variation of itself). The system requires: 1) a sequence of representations in a medium of information. 2) a set of physical constraints to establish what is being represented. 3) a system of discontinuous association between representations and referents, based on spatial orientation (i.e. a reading-frame code) 4) functional coordination (semantic closure) between two sets of sequences; the first set establishes the constraints that are necessary to interpret the representations, and the second set establishes a system whereby the representations and their constraints are brought together in the specify way required to produce a functioning end product – an autonomous self-replicator. Coordination is required because changes to the first set affect the second set. Did you follow all that? You have to have a medium of information, representations, constraints, discontinuous association, a reading-frame code, and semantic closure in order to create a material system capable of Darwinian evolution. Each interdependent piece has a physical manifestation, and each brings a critical capacity to the system. So … when you remove the translation machinery in order to simplify the system (to meet your ideological requirements), you remove the capacity of the system to specify objects among alternatives. You remove the physical capacities that are enabled only by having a medium of information organized within a system (i.e. RNA, for instance, is only a medium of information when it is organized as such, otherwise it’s just another molecule with its particular characteristics, determined by energy). In other words, you remove the very system that enables Darwinian evolution to exist, not to mention removing the very thing that enables biological organization in the first place. Thus, what are you then left with? You are left with a system that can only organize itself based upon the energy of the individual and collective components in the system (i.e. your “no-design laws”). But, magnetism does not establish a medium of information. Thermodynamics does not create a reading-frame code. Dissipative processes do not coordinate semantic closure among unrelated sequences of symbols. In other words, you have nothing but your prior assumptions. So now that we have a lay of the land, we can take a look at your claims: Claim #1: Darwinian evolution is the source of the translation apparatus. This claim is dead on arrival. The only way to resuscitate this claim is through a) massive equivocation of terms, and b) abject denial of molecular science. In other words, it’s right up your alley. Claim #2: Only high fidelity replication requires translation. You need to get your head straight. The simpler system you are talking about is not a semiotic system that merely operates with poor fidelity, it is a non-semiotic system that operates by pure dynamics. It doesn’t establish a medium of information; it cannot specify objects among alternatives, and it obviously cannot achieve semantic closure. In an effort to save your theory, you can certainly start to equivocate on terms like “specify” and “medium of information”, but at the end of the day, the only thing that such an entity can lead to (be the source of) will be determined solely by dynamics. Thus, I asked you the clarifying question: Does the non-semiotic system you assume preceded and created the semiotic system have to specify the semiotic system that follows it? If so, then how does it do that? You have no response to that question that doesn’t also include repeating your claim and assuming its true. The bottom line is that there is no conceivable environment at the origin of life on Earth that inanimate matter operating under physical law (your “no-design laws” for crying out loud) where purely dynamic properties such as electromagnetism, hydrophobicity, etc., will push and pull and cajole molecules and constituents into simultaneously creating a sequence of symbolic representations, interpretive constraints, a system of discontinuous association, a reading frame code, and semantic closure. In short, the issues surrounding the origin of a semiosis in the cell are not about “fidelity”, they are about organization instead. Just like I told you months ago. - - - - - - - - - - - - - Now I am happy to step away, and you can return to your spineless war on reality.Upright BiPed

December 1, 2017

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Not quite right Deutsch. Fallibilism, as the belief that “all knowledge is suspect”, is simply self-defeating or meaningless at best:

The idea that it would be self-defeating or meaningless assumes that knowledge is true, justified belief, which is not Deutsch's position. That's your position, and the very thing that is in question. You're projecting that on Deutsch. Again, Is there no one willing to actually address the arguments actually being presented, as opposed to a straw man? Or perhaps the title of the OP isn't a real question directed at me, which is what I asked earlier. If not, how have you justified the idea that knowledge is true, justified belief?critical rationalist

December 1, 2017

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Do you not see how this becomes self-refuting?

No I don't. Apparently, you're still confused. Example?

This nails it. Swirling into the abyss of emptiness without end. As Roger Scruton puts it, “A writer who says that there are no truths, or that all truth is ‘merely relative’, is asking you not to believe him. So don’t.”

See above. Saying someone is confused about what knowledge is and how it grows is not saying there is absolutely no knowledge or that it does not grow! Again,

Furthermore, if we try to explain things in terms of ultimate essences we might be tempted to think the ideas we have tell us what the essences are and that would be bad because we might be wrong. An example of this: I have seen some philosophical discussions in which the participants start the discussion by defining knowledge as justified true belief and discussing that definition. The discussion didn’t go anywhere because there was nowhere for it to go: the problem had been set up in such a way that it was completely unsolvable.

Seem familiar?critical rationalist

December 1, 2017

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FYI, for anyone but the willfully blind (observe, the issue of the crooked yardstick), we live in a world with an orderly reality connected to its distinct identifying characteristics, not a chaos that is utterly unpredictable; something we rely upon day by day to simply live.

And there we have it. It's obvious! Anyone who isn't blind knows this. We can see it's happening now and has happened in the past, so it must work, despite being irrational. For the umpteenth time, saying someone is confused about what knowledge is and how it grows is not saying there is absolutely no knowledge or that it does not grow! This is a false dilemma that you keep presenting. Again, is there no one willing to actually address the argument being made? Example?

KF: That’s why the Grue paradox, so called, is not a serious option, it would turn the world into an unstable unintelligible chaos. And, beneath too much of your argument against what you seem to regard as a dirty word, induction, is what sounds more and more like unwillingness to accept the world as it is, including that we may know in part and will likely err in part, so we must be open to learn better . . . which only makes sense if we can indeed learn and know.

What did I actually say?

How can we proceed? By referring to explanations, such as optics, geometry, not induction and dictionary definitions.

IOW, the idea that we cannot make progress without induction is your idea, not mine. You keep projecting that idea on me.critical rationalist

December 1, 2017

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KF @190

KF: Do you not see that fallibilism is little more than self referentially incoherent skepticism? Let me clip:

Fallibilism is the philosophical position that all human endeavors , attempts to create knowledge or achieve anything, are subject error that there’s no such thing as a guarantee that a project to create something new will succeed.

Including itself? And including that judgement, and so on to infinite regress? Do you not see how this becomes self-refuting?

This nails it. Swirling into the abyss of emptiness without end. As Roger Scruton puts it, “A writer who says that there are no truths, or that all truth is ‘merely relative’, is asking you not to believe him. So don’t.”Origenes

December 1, 2017

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CR, Do you not see that fallibilism is little more than self referentially incoherent skepticism? Let me clip:

Fallibilism is the philosophical position that all human endeavors , attempts to create knowledge or achieve anything, are subject error that there’s no such thing as a guarantee that a project to create something new will succeed.

Including itself? And including that judgement, and so on to infinite regress? Do you not see how this becomes self-refuting? We can instead simply start with Errors exist, E. Try the denial, ~E, which is in effect it is an error to suggest that errors exist. This last is self-defeating, leading immediately to the conclusion that we have here a self-evident truth, E, which is undeniable. This is a point of utterly certain knowledge, one that bridges to the world as errors include that descriptions of the world, and it shows that we can know truth to utter certainty in some cases. So any species of fallibilism that does not leave room for certain truths known beyond possibility of error, specifically self-evident truths, is futile. Deutsch et al are grossly mistaken, but seem to be clinging to a crooked yardstick and will not yield to the voice of the plumbline in correction. KFkairosfocus

December 1, 2017

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@KF

Furthermore, you are a concrete example of the very thing you deny. When presented the idea that no ideas are infallible, what did you do? You presented three examples of supposedly basic beliefs. And how did you select those examples as opposed to other ideas? You criticized them, in relation to all other ideas. The ones that were left were ideas that you lacked good criticism of. Of course, feel free to present a different explanation as to why having presented those specific ideas wasn’t an arbitrary choice on your part. I won’t be holding by breath. Note: I’ve asked you this question at least half a dozen times, and you have yet to respond. What gives?

Still waiting....critical rationalist

December 1, 2017

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CR, that is now looking a lot like an attempt to make a cheap turnabout projection to dismiss what you have not cogently answered. Which is why BA pointed to the difference between arguing and typing. FYI, for anyone but the willfully blind (observe, the issue of the crooked yardstick), we live in a world with an orderly reality connected to its distinct identifying characteristics, not a chaos that is utterly unpredictable; something we rely upon day by day to simply live. That very predictability is why we so confidently know apples are safe to eat but beach apples are destructively caustic (though apparently sweet at first bite). Likewise, we can safely rely on gravity, on air and many other things. That has to be accounted for reasonably and responsibly. Per inference to the best explanation, such a pattern of order traces to ordering principles connected to the core characteristics of our world. Notions that consistently end in self referential incoherence (thanks Origines) and/or open the door to the presumption of grand delusion regarding reality, can be safely dismissed. That's why the Grue paradox, so called, is not a serious option, it would turn the world into an unstable unintelligible chaos. And, beneath too much of your argument against what you seem to regard as a dirty word, induction, is what sounds more and more like unwillingness to accept the world as it is, including that we may know in part and will likely err in part, so we must be open to learn better . . . which only makes sense if we can indeed learn and know. Please, think again. KFkairosfocus

December 1, 2017

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@KF

No criticism without a critic capable of critical judgement.

From this video...

Fallibilism is the philosophical position that all human endeavors , attempts to create knowledge or achieve anything, are subject error that there's no such thing as a guarantee that a project to create something new will succeed. And in the case of knowledge, having got something that you consider knowledge there's no such thing as a foundation which if it's put on that foundation is guaranteed to be true - no such thing as a foundation such that if it's put on that foundation it is guaranteed to be probable or anything like that.... On the other hand, fallibilism also says the very idea that we are subject to error implies that there is such a thing as being right - there such a thing as the truth and that we can sometimes find some of this truth. So fallibilism, as I understand it, is a fundamentally optimistic positive world view... Although it's it says we are subject to error, the closer we look at that for example if you look at it's negation which is that there are some things that are infallible some people that are infallible that's that's all very pessimistic and and frightening kind of take to have on the world.

Taking that seriously, that means the project of finding errors in an idea may not only take years, decades, centuries, millennia, etc. It might fail completely. Since the contents of new theories do not come from observations, we might completely fail to conceive of alternate explanatory theories. Or we might decide that some ideas are not subject to criticism, etc. Again, Is there no one willing to actually address the arguments actually being presented, as opposed to a straw man?critical rationalist

December 1, 2017

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CR @184 This feels like stealing candy from a baby.

Deutsch: Paradoxes seem to appear when one considers the implications of one’s own fallibility: A fallibilist cannot claim to be infallible even about fallibilism itself. And so, one is forced to doubt that fallibilism is universally true. Which is the same as wondering whether one might be somehow infallible—at least about some things.

Not quite right Deutsch. Fallibilism, as the belief that “all knowledge is suspect”, is simply self-defeating or meaningless at best:

1. All knowledge is suspect. 2. “All knowledge is suspect” is knowledge. Therefore, from (1) and (2) 3. It is suspect that “all knowledge is suspect”. Therefore 4. “All knowledge is suspect” is either self-defeating or meaningless.

But don’t let that stop you Deutsch. Carry on.

Deutsch: For instance, can it be true that absolutely anything that you think is true, no matter how certain you are, might be false?

Ah! a simple question. No Deutsch. No, that cannot be true, because, that would be yet another self-defeating statement:

1. Everything I think is true is false. 2. “Everything I think is true is false” is something that I think. Therefore, from (1) and (2) (3) “Everything I think is true is false” is false. Therefore (4) Not everything I think is false.

Deutsch: What? How might we be mistaken that two plus two is four? Or about other matters of pure logic? That stubbing one’s toe hurts? That there is a force of gravity pulling us to earth? Or that, as the philosopher René Descartes argued, “I think, therefore I am”?

Well go on Deutsch. Why don’t you answer your own questions? What are you waiting for? Tell us about the fallibility of "2 + 2 = 4" and “I think, therefore I am.” Tell us that you may not exist.Origenes

December 1, 2017

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@KF

This thread has been enough to identify the core failure you and your ilk have made with reasoning by induction, failure to recognise that things up to and including our world have a distinct identity that often has core, stable characteristics.

Merely repeating this claim isn't helpful, as there is a problem you keep ignoring. I mentioned it in regards to Dyke in #69 Even if we grant that was true, how would you know of those core characteristics were, under what conditions do you expect them to be stable? What good is saying if something were an A it would be an A, if your don't have access to that knowledge? And if they were stable, caterpillars would never turn into butterflies, etc. I keep bringing this up, yet you keep ignoring it, then claim I've failed. Popper calls what you're describing essentialism.

Anti-essentialism is a Popperian idea that many people are either unaware of or do not understand. Many people are essentialists, particularly people who think they understand philosophy, but essentialism is a bad mistake. There are two separate ideas that Popper criticises. (1) Essentialism is the idea that reality consists of ultimate essences and we ought to try to explain what we see in terms of ultimate essences. (2) There is another closely connected idea: we ought to define our terms before we start a discussion otherwise we might get lost. Let’s take point (1) first. Suppose that reality does consist of ultimate essences. Whatever they are we don’t have direct access to them and so the idea that we should use them seems to require knowledge we don’t have. What would an explanation in terms of essences look like? We start with terms like “cat” and then define the essence of a cat by listing all the features that all cats have in common: whiskers, weird looking eyes, make meowing noises and so on. We would then take all of the cat features and use them to explain what cats do. The problem is that each time we define an essence we use many undefined terms and so we would have to define the new undefined terms and we would get into an infinite regress without ever explaining anything. Nor can definitions reduce ambiguity, as mentioned in point (2): every definition we introduce uses undefined ambiguous terms. Popper suggests that a better way of thinking about definitions is that a defined terms should be used as shorthand for a longer description: methodological nominalism. So instead of saying “negatively charged particle with spin-1/2 and about 1/1000 the mass of a proton” we say “electron” as a shorthand. Furthermore, if we try to explain things in terms of ultimate essences we might be tempted to think the ideas we have tell us what the essences are and that would be bad because we might be wrong. An example of this: I have seen some philosophical discussions in which the participants start the discussion by defining knowledge as justified true belief and discussing that definition. The discussion didn’t go anywhere because there was nowhere for it to go: the problem had been set up in such a way that it was completely unsolvable.

Sound familiar? Second, you've personally referred to Goodman's new riddle of induction, when you mentioned grue, which illustrates the problem with this idea. That an emerald is either green or grue is equally supported by the very same sense input. How can we proceed? By referring to explanations, such as optics, geometry, not induction and dictionary definitions.critical rationalist

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@ Origenes

Okay, Deutsch never said he was “certain”, so, we get the following exchange: [...] – So what does your claim mean? What are you saying? D: Oops

And you've done it again. Deutsch explained what it would mean to be fallible about fallibilism in #32. That you have to pretend that he didn't doesn't bode well for your argument. For your convenience...

The trouble is that error is a subject where issues such as logical paradox, self-reference, and the inherent limits of reason rear their ugly heads in practical situations, and bite. Paradoxes seem to appear when one considers the implications of one’s own fallibility: A fallibilist cannot claim to be infallible even about fallibilism itself. And so, one is forced to doubt that fallibilism is universally true. Which is the same as wondering whether one might be somehow infallible—at least about some things. For instance, can it be true that absolutely anything that you think is true, no matter how certain you are, might be false? What? How might we be mistaken that two plus two is four? Or about other matters of pure logic? That stubbing one’s toe hurts? That there is a force of gravity pulling us to earth? Or that, as the philosopher René Descartes argued, “I think, therefore I am”?

"Oops" comes from your belief that, unless we can be certain something is true or probably true, then it's not knowledge. Yet that is exactly not what Deutsch is saying. Again, Is there no one willing to actually address the arguments actually being presented, as opposed to a straw man?critical rationalist

December 1, 2017

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CR @172

CR:

Origenes: D: No one can tell you what is certain. - Is that certain? D: Sure. - So … you just told me what is certain? D: Yes, I sure did. - But you said that no one can do this? D: Oops.

Except, “Oops”, Deutsch never said he was “certain”. When you have to resort to putting words in someone’s mouth, the doesn’t bode well for the strength of your argument.

Okay, Deutsch never said he was “certain”, so, we get the following exchange: - - - - D: This is my claim: "No one can tell you what is certain." - Is your claim certain? D: No, my claim is not certain. - Is your claim probable? D: You should know better than to ask me this. Did you not read my article where it is clearly stated, that no one can tell you “what is probable”? So, no, I cannot tell you that it is probable either. - So you cannot tell me that your claim is certain and you can also not tell me that your claim is probable. D: That’s right. - Are you sure? D: Well, of course not! Are you not listening? - So what does your claim mean? What are you saying? D: OopsOrigenes

December 1, 2017

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Here's an example of what's going on in relation to knowledge accumulation in biology: This 5-year old insightful paper -coauthored by the distinguished professor Yukiko Yamashita: "Asymmetric stem cell division: precision for robustness" is cited by 35 Pubmed Central articles, but according to researchgate it is cited by 63 papers. Many of the citing papers are cited somewhere else too. Where's the end of this chain?Dionisio

December 1, 2017

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Our knowledge increases. What's the limit? As outstanding questions get answered, new interrogations are raised. Unending Revelation of the Ultimate Reality. (c) At the end of the day the whole discussion boils down to the radical difference between two irreconcilable opposite worldview positions: On one extreme the ones who believe that all is based on matter and energy. Some of us believe that the ultimate reality is defined in the first few verses of the first chapter of the fourth book in the NT. That's why the most important knowledge one can posses is referenced @7.Dionisio

December 1, 2017

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KF, A very heated discussion has catapulted this thread up to a position among the most visited recently. The title of your timely OP is "What is knowledge?" There's a comment about knowledge @15. Science is based on limited but constantly expanding knowledge about this universe and world. EugeneS posted this quote @33 in another thread: "Science cannot solve the ultimate mystery of nature. And that is because, in the last analysis, we ourselves are part of the mystery that we are trying to solve." -Max Planck [https://uncommondescent.com/mind/can-ai-become-just-like-us/#comment-641489] Biology research is moving ahead at accelerated pace, increasingly revealing more complex functionally specified informational complexity that can only be the product of an absolutely powerful mind. No one has arguments strong enough to debate this. Our increasing knowledge of the biological systems confirms everyday that the gross macroevolutionary extrapolation made from microevolutionary processes is doomed to an embarrassing failure. Just wait and see. We ain't seen nothin' yet. The most fascinating discoveries are still ahead. The most important knowledge we can have is referenced @7.Dionisio

December 1, 2017

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BA, we have here a test case that lets us understand some of the ways our critics think. I doubt that this performance we are seeing from CR commends itself to the hypothetical reasonable onlooker. And it surfaces what lurks beneath the veneer of rationality and sophistication of all too many of our critics. See, we are not making up straw-critics, this is what they are like in some key cases, live. KFkairosfocus

December 1, 2017

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F/N: Notice, again, AmHD and the redefinition game on the concept, criticism:

crit·i·cize (kr?t??-s?z?) v. crit·i·cized, crit·i·ciz·ing, crit·i·ciz·es v.tr. 1. To find fault with: criticized the decision as unrealistic. See Usage Note at critique. 2. To judge the merits and faults of; analyze and evaluate: criticizes art for a living. v.intr. To act as a critic. crit?i·ciz?a·ble adj. crit?i·ciz?er n. Synonyms: criticize, censure, condemn, denounce, decry These verbs mean to express an unfavorable judgment. Criticize can mean merely to evaluate without necessarily finding fault; however, usually the word implies the expression of disapproval: formed a panel to criticize the students' works; was angry when his parents criticized the way he dressed. Censure refers to the often formal pronouncement of strong criticism: "[He] censured from the pulpit what many others have welcomed as a much-needed religious awakening" (John Edgar Wideman). Condemn usually applies to harsh moral judgment: "The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so malignant and so devastating that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored because it cannot survive their being repeated" (Robert H. Jackson). Denounce and decry imply public proclamation of condemnation or repudiation: "Fictionalizing in the writing of biography ... has been largely denounced by critics ... and teachers" (Margaret Bush)."The worship of the senses has often, and with much justice, been decried" (Oscar Wilde). American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fifth Edition. Copyright © 2016 by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company. Published by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company. All rights reserved.

No criticism without a critic capable of critical judgement. KFkairosfocus

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