What is knowledge?

_{kairosfocus

November 26, 2017

Food for thought, Logic and Reason, Philosophy, Sciences and Theology, Selective Hyperskepticism}

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Sometimes, exchanges at UD come down to truly basic (and hard) issues.

This is one such time, where Origenes has challenged prolific objector Critical Rationalist in the Personal Incredulity thread:

>>100 Origenes November 25, 2017 at 7:01 pm

CR

What is your definition of valid knowledge?>>

I have thought this worthy of responding to and of headlining:

KF, 106: >> Origines,

Generally, I would argue that “knowledge” is used in a weak form sense: warranted, credibly true (and reliable) belief.

Drawing out, slightly:

Warranted —

there is an available account (as opposed to internal to the given knower, who may simply accept a message from reliable sources . . . ) that, properly understood, would justify accepting or treating belief x as true in serious contexts.

Credibly true —

the warrant for and circumstances of belief x are such that we can have good confidence that the belief is likely to be true or capture enough truth that we are entitled to trust it.

Reliable —

the warrant for x is such that if we act on the belief that-x in a consequential situation, we are unlikely to be let down.

Belief —

that which is accepted, perceived, or held to be so; often in this context, for good reason.

Of course in today’s day and age, “faith” and “belief” are often despised and dismissively contrasted with “science,” “reason/rationality” and “knowledge,” etc. as though acknowledged faith/trust/belief is invariably ill-warranted.

Such reflects dominance of radical secularism and evolutionary materialistic scientism, which, ironically are not well warranted, are not trustworthy (being fallaciously rooted, esp. through self-referential incoherence and/or the fostering of ill-advised cognitive biases) and should not be permitted to act as gate-keepers on what we regard as knowledge.>>

So, arguably, knowledge is well-warranted, credibly true (and reliable) belief.

Many will find that unpalatable, but I confidently predict that they will have difficulty proposing another succinct account that answers to issues ranging from the classical “justified, true belief” definition of epistemology, to the fact that scientific knowledge is not utterly certain, to the challenge of Gettier counter-examples, to the Grue issue, to the Agrippa trilemma challenge and more. END

Comments

Critical Rationalist:
An abstract designer who “just was”, complete with the knowledge of which genes would result in just the right proteins that would result in just the right features, already present, doesn’t serve an explanatory purpose.
So? The same can be said of abstract "no-design laws."Mung_{November 30, 2017
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DaveS @140
I’m afraid it doesn’t. You’re translating Deutsch’s statement, which is clear enough on its own, into one that is trivially false.
Show me what my translation leaves out.
Do you really think he is so stupid?
Yes I do. Moreover his entire "philosophy" is founded on this fundamental mistake. Deuutsch's philosophy in short: 1. All knowledge is suspect and there is nothing that can point you towards the truth. Everything you believe is false. No basis for anything. 2. But we have traditions of criticism which makes it all okay. He does not understand that (1) negates the possibility of (2), which is a tight fit with self-reference. Moreover he does not understand that (1) cannot be claimed without arrogating to himself a position outside "the circle" (see my previous posts on this issue: #5, #42, #47, #89 ).Origenes_{November 30, 2017
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F/N: Perhaps, it is useful to address the challenges of what we may descriptively term the conjecturalist thesis, which is much in evidence above and elsewhere. Again, Dykes -- and kindly, note that an ad hominem bsed dismissal will again fail to address the substantial point:
http://www.libertarian.co.uk/lapubs/philn/philn065.htm Popper called conjecture and refutation a "new way of knowing" [OSE2 383]. However, from a common sense point of view, it can immediately be objected that we do not normally claim to 'know' something which is unjustifiable, tentative or hypothetical. Knowledge, for most people - and for most scientists - is something which it is possible to be sure of, to justify, to validate, to prove; in other words, to know.
[ --> I add here, that the weak form in the OP subsumes the relatively few cases of self-evident certainty, and cases where warrant per experience of the world is utterly decisive. What I highlighted is that we commonly use "knowledge" in a weaker sense too. A sense in which the warrant is not utterly certain and not subject to correction, i.e. a sense in which claimed or accepted knowledge is reliable but potentially falsifiable. And should a point fail, then the knowledge of that failure and its warrant may also be fallible. We may be confident enough to act, but our knowledge claim may be in error, requiring us to balance trust and doubt on the cusp of action.]
Conjecture, on the other hand, is by definition not knowledge. According to Chambers English Dictionary, a conjecture is "an opinion formed on slight or defective evidence or none: an opinion without proof: a guess". Since one cannot define an idea by means of other ideas which are contrary to it, it is clearly illegitimate to place knowledge in the same category as conjecture. More pointedly, the proposition "all knowledge remains conjectural" is a contradiction in terms. The objection gathers strength when one notices that Popper's proposition is itself not conjectural. Universal and affirmative, it states that "All knowledge remains conjectural" - which is a claim to knowledge. The proposition thus asserts what it denies and is self-contradictory on a second count.19 Another immediate problem is that the notion of 'conjecture' depends for its intelligibility upon the prior concept of 'knowledge.' The idea of a 'conjecture' arose precisely to designate a form of mental activity which was unlike knowledge, and to distinguish clearly from knowledge an idea put forward as opinion without proof. In the Objectivist philosophy of Ayn Rand this error is known as 'the fallacy of the stolen concept.' A classic example was Proudhon's claim that 'property is theft.' But the concept of 'theft' depends on the prior concept of 'property' and would be unintelligible without it.20 In exactly the same way, and to repeat, the concept of 'conjecture' cannot be understood apart from the prior concept of knowledge - from which it is to be distinguished. For example, 'Northern Dancer might win the Kentucky Derby' was once a conjecture. When the horse did come first, its win became an item of knowledge. The invalidity of the proposition 'All knowledge remains conjectural' becomes even more apparent when one considers that Popper employed a large vocabulary of English and German words all of which he had to learn, and to know, in order to express any or all of his ideas. There is little conjectural about the words of a language: either the German word Forschung means 'scientific discovery' or it does not. Similarly, in all his philosophical and scientific work Popper depended on a broad range of core concepts - evolution, energy, light, atom, mass, force, etc - all of which are normally recognised as unalterable brute facts, not as conjectures. 'All knowledge is conjectural' may sound intriguing, but throughout his career Popper actually worked within a framework of knowledge, not of conjecture. A further problem arises when one considers the concept of 'growth' in Popper's claim that knowledge grows through conjectures and refutations. (The subtitle of his book by that name is The Growth of Scientific Knowledge.) A legitimate response to this assertion is: 'What exactly is it that grows?' The concept of growth implies the existence of a thing, a body, an entity of some sort, that which grows. It may well be true that conjectures and refutations play a role in the growth of knowledge, but they could hardly do this without some knowledge to work on. The growth of knowledge via conjecture and refutation presupposes pre-existing knowledge, not pre-existing conjectures.21 That the growth of knowledge implies knowledge is another illustration of Popper's dependence on something he attempted to deny, effectively 'stealing' a concept. CR is supposed to replace our commonsense idea of inductively-acquired knowledge with a more accurate one of a continuous process of conjecture and refutation. But that process would be meaningless without something for the process to process, and that something is knowledge, not conjecture. Lastly, the proposition 'all knowledge is conjectural' is simply not true. The writer's observation that 'the sun is shining' is not conjectural, it is a fact known to him and countless other observers. At 11am on 5 May 2003 in western England the sun is shining. The observation is no more conjectural than 'George Bush is President of the USA (at time of writing),' or 'Einstein's grandparents are dead,' or 'the French for 'yes' is 'oui,'' or '2 plus 2 = 4.' These statements are true. They are demonstrable to any sane person; either ostensibly, or through the presentation of evidence beyond reasonable doubt, via simple common sense, or by means of logic. They constitute knowledge, not conjecture . . .
Food for further thought. KFkairosfocus_{November 30, 2017
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CR, Thanks for those interesting observations regarding nihilism and infallibilsm. Regarding:
Then again, a popular strategy for attacking a theory one find objectionable is to present a false version of it and then point out how it is false. Perhaps I’ve giving him too much credit?
I don't think so. Origenes regularly posts useful and challenging questions/comments, IMO.daveS_{November 30, 2017
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CR, Pardon but why do you insist on doing a switcheroo from inference to design as causal process per tested reliable sign and debates over designers? That's a strawman caricature of the substantial argument. The issue is simple, take an entity with functionally specific complex coherent organisation and associated information. On trillions of observed cases, it is a sign of design as cause. Such FSCO/I is also not found to come from blind chance and/or mechanical necessity -- unsurprising, on analysis of search challenge of configuration spaces beyond 500 - 1,000 bits. To overturn this inference, show credibly observed cases of blind chance and/or mechanical necessity producing such FSCO/I: _____ Predictably, you cannot, and of course you reject such an inductive inference as on your view induction is invalid . . . you reject that empirical evidence can support a conclusion through its pattern. In reply, I suggest to you that if FSCO/I is a key feature of an entity, there is good reason to hold that per a trillion member observation base all around us, it in part comes from intelligently directed configuration. Your objecting posts are actually further cases in point. And further ones will be more of the same. Designers exist and are known to be intelligent and purposeful, leading to artifacts manifesting FSCO/I. We have no good reason to hold that humans exhaust the set of possible designers . . . even as a black swan was abstractly possible. So, if we see FSCO/I or another reliable sign of design, we are epistemologically entitled to infer the best current explanation: intelligently directed configuration. That's not so hard, is it? KF PS: Your strawman caricatures on knowledge and unjustified fear-mongering about nihilism (we are entitled to read: Nazism) do not speak well of your argumentation. I suggest you take time out and actually read what the OP says, then ponder why I have for years pointed out that error exists is a self-evident, undeniable and indeed infallible truth that says of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not. Notice, E = Error exists, put up denial ~E, i.e. it is an error to assert E. Oopsie. Instantly, E is undeniable, demonstrably true and infallible as to try to deny only manages to confirm.kairosfocus_{November 30, 2017
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@daveS
Do you really think he is so stupid?
There is a sort of symbiosis between infallibilism and nihilism, in that they justify each other. I suspect that Origenes, as well as others, find themselves in this same conundrum and cannot imagine a way out.
The theory of knowledge is a tightrope that is the only path from A to B, with a long, hard drop for anyone who steps off on one side into “knowledge is impossible, progress is an illusion” or on the other side into “I must be right, or at least probably right.” Indeed, infallibilism and nihilism are twins. Both fail to understand that mistakes are not only inevitable, they are correctable (fallibly). Which is why they both abhor institutions of substantive criticism and error correction, and denigrate rational thought as useless or fraudulent. They both justify the same tyrannies. They both justify each other.
Then again, a popular strategy for attacking a theory one find objectionable is to present a false version of it and then point out how it is false. Perhaps I've giving him too much credit?critical rationalist_{November 30, 2017
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@Origenes
It should be clear by now, that anyone who tells you “No one can tell you the truth” does not show awareness of the problem of self-reference.
Again, see #133.
Now, exchange Popper with Deutsch.
Deutsch doesn’t precede every sentence with “this is a conjecture”. So what?
It's as if you cannot conceive of anyone actually holding that view, so you stick your fingers in your ears as say "nana, nana, nana, nana, I can't hear you!" when you are corrected. Let's try it?
In #126 you wrote, a la Deutsch: “I cannot infallibly tell you what is infallible”, which can be translated with: “I cannot tell you the truth.” Obviously, this runs into the exact same problem.
"This is a conjecture: I cannot infallibly tell you what is infallible" And then there is this, in which he describes what the alternative might be if he was mistaken...
The trouble is that error is a subject where issues such as logical paradox, self-reference, and the inherent limits of reason rear their ugly heads in practical situations, and bite. Paradoxes seem to appear when one considers the implications of one’s own fallibility: A fallibilist cannot claim to be infallible even about fallibilism itself. And so, one is forced to doubt that fallibilism is universally true. Which is the same as wondering whether one might be somehow infallible—at least about some things. For instance, can it be true that absolutely anything that you think is true, no matter how certain you are, might be false? What? How might we be mistaken that two plus two is four? Or about other matters of pure logic? That stubbing one’s toe hurts? That there is a force of gravity pulling us to earth? Or that, as the philosopher René Descartes argued, “I think, therefore I am”?
critical rationalist_{November 30, 2017
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Origenes,
I hope that helps.
I'm afraid it doesn't. You're translating Deutsch's statement, which is clear enough on its own, into one that is trivially false. Do you really think he is so stupid?daveS_{November 30, 2017
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@Dionisio
The neodarwinian and third way evo-devo folks are having quite a huge problem trying to figure out how to resolve their own basic formulation:
In the current conception of physics? Yes. But in constructor theory? No, they are not. The basic formulation is described in the constructor theory of life.critical rationalist_{November 30, 2017
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@KF An abstract designer who "just was", complete with the knowledge of which genes would result in just the right proteins that would result in just the right features, already present, doesn't serve an explanatory purpose. This is because one could more efficiently state that organisms "just appeared", complete with the knowledge of which genes would result in just the right proteins that would result in just the right features, already present. IOW, if this designer "Just was" it is not explanatory. And if it's not explanatory, then It's an authoritative source. So, what did I get wrong? Is science not about creating explanations? An authoritative source that "just was" is not an explanation. As indicated in #29, do we not keep theories until a replacement can explain the same phenomena in addition to the results of a critical test? In what way does "Just was" better explain the order of least to most complex appear of organisms? Or is "just was" is a misrepresentation of your position? If so, what explanation are you referring to that is the origin of those features?critical rationalist_{November 30, 2017
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DaveS: I don’t think that implies I infallibly told you the infallible. Suppose I tell someone “2 + 2 = 4” and another person that “2 + 2 ? 4”. Have I infallibly told one of the people what is infallible? If so, we’re setting the bar pretty low.
The bar is set at telling the truth. The truth is "what is infallible". Given that “2 + 2 = 4” is infallible (is true), you have indeed “infallibly told one of the people what is infallible”. Look, Deutsch’s mangled sentence “nothing can infallibly tell you what is infallible” can be translated by “nothing can tell you what is certain” or, even better for our purposes, “no one can tell you the truth.” Deutsch holds that direct experience is also incapable of ‘telling’ us the truth, which explains his use of “nothing” instead of “no one”, but that is irrelevant to our discussion. It should be clear by now, that anyone who tells you “No one can tell you the truth” does not show awareness of the problem of self-reference. In #126 you wrote, a la Deutsch: “I cannot infallibly tell you what is infallible”, which can be translated with: “I cannot tell you the truth.” Obviously, this runs into the exact same problem. I hope that helps.Origenes_{November 30, 2017
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KF, The neodarwinian and third way evo-devo folks are having quite a huge problem trying to figure out how to resolve their own basic formulation: Dev(d) = Dev(a) + Delta(a,d) Every new discovery in biology research is making things more difficult for them. And the “weather” forecast doesn’t look encouraging for them at all. They ain’t seen nothin’ yet. Their situation shall worsen by day. The most fascinating discoveries are still ahead. Just watch and see.Dionisio_{November 30, 2017
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CR, rubbish. What is to be explained is the origin and onward transformation of cell based life that effectively uses alpbabetic, coded genetic information in a coupled metabolic entity. The code system and underlying existence of language need to be causally explained (whatever imaginary replication scheme that is imperfect that can be put up, and that too needs empirically backed causal explanation . . . ), the effecting apparatus -- which is based on key-lock fit, fine tuned components, the coupling to the metabolic system, and more. Where, a hypothetical high error rate system is first unlikely to work, must work in a very different way [so that is a strawman distraction], and given the relative abundance in the field of possibilities it will predictably race away into noise and failure. It has to be this locked in an evolutionary materialistic scientism, so-called methodological naturalism circle of question begging will not work, nor will oh maybe it was that. And, kindly show empirically observed cases in point that demonstrate that such lo fi mechanisms work in real world natural environments, not computer simulations or highly fine tuned lab set ups. Which must include a solution to the problem of the racemic vs homochiral forms. KFkairosfocus_{November 30, 2017
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@ Origenes The paradox you're referring to is explicitly addressed in @32. Examples are provided. So, again, how is your argument not addressed? Did you not read that "horrible" article either?critical rationalist_{November 29, 2017
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@Origenes
I did read that horrible article and nowhere are my arguments addressed. So, I have no idea what you are talking about.
Did you read #105? Specifically..
Popper doesn’t precede every sentence with “this is a conjecture”. So what?
Now, exchange Popper with Deutsch.
Deutsch doesn’t precede every sentence with “this is a conjecture”. So what?
Now, exchange Deutsch with myself.
I haven't preceded every sentence with “this is a conjecture”. So what?
Again, you're making the same mistakes as Dyke. Or can't you see that either? Furthermore, "horrible" is incredibly vague criticism. I could just as well respond my saying "I read your horrible comment and nowhere are my arguments addressed. So, I have no idea what you are talking about. " Productive isn't it?critical rationalist_{November 29, 2017
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@UB
You argued that Darwinian evolution is the source of the genetic translation apparatus. I corrected you that Darwinian evolution requires the genetic translation apparatus in order to exist. If A requires B for A to exist, then A cannot be the source of B.
And then I corrected you in pointing out a translation system is only required for high-fidelity replication. From this paper......
3.3 Natural selection is permitted under no-design laws These conclusions imply that an accurate self-reproducer - together with an accurate replicator - is permitted under no-design laws that allow for information media. So, under such laws, it can be constructed from generic resources only, given enough knowledge: it could continue to exist, say, had a chemical lab created it. However, one must also address the question: can accurate self-reproducers arise from generic resources only, under such laws? Note that what the prevailing conception would aim to prove is that the emergence of accurate self-reproducers follows (with some probability) given certain initial conditions and laws of motion. This approach, informing the search for viable models for the origin of life, [25], is suitable to solve scien- tific problems such as predicting the existence of life elsewhere in the uni- verse - e.g., by providing bounds to how probable the emergence of those self-reproducers is on an earth-like planet. Here I am addressing a differ- ent problem: whether accurate self-reproducers are possible under no-design laws. This is a theoretical (indeed, constructor-theoretic) question and can be addressed without resorting to predictions. Indeed, the theory of evolu- tion provides a positive answer to that question, provided that two further points are established. I shall argue for them in what follows. The first point is that the logic of evolution by natural selection is compatible with no-design laws because - in short - selection and variation are non-specific to its end products. This can be seen by modeling the logic of natural selection as an approximate construction, whose substrates are populations of replicators and whose (highly approximate) constructor is the environment. This occurs over a much longer time-scale than that of self- reproduction, whereby replicators - constructors on the shorter scale - become now substrates. Evolution relies upon populations being changed by variation and selection over the time-scale spanning many generations. Crucially, the mutations in the replicators, caused by the environment, are non-specific, (as in section 3.1), to the “end product” of evolution (as Dawkins put it, not “systematically directed to improvement” [27]). This constructor-theoretic characterization of mutations replaces the less precise locution “random mutations” (as opposed to non-random selection, [5]). These mutations are all transmitted to the successfully created individuals of the next generation, by heredity - irrespective of their being harmful, neutral or beneficial in that particular environment. Selection emerges from the interaction between the replicators and the en- vironment with finite resources. It may lead to equilibrium, given enough time and energy. If so, the surviving replicators are near a local maximum of effectiveness at being replicated in that environment. Thus, the environment is passive and blind in this selection process. Since it retains its ability to cause non-specific variation and passive selection again, it qualifies as a naturally-occuring approximation to a constructor. Crucially, it is a crude approximation to a constructor: crude enough that it could have arisen by chance and requires no explanation. Its actions - variations and selection - require no design in laws of physics, as they proceed by non-specific, elementary steps. So the logic of evolution by natural selection is compatible with no-design laws of physics. The second point is that natural selection, to get started, does not require accurate self-reproducers with high-fidelity replicators. Indeed, the minimal requirement for natural selection is that each kind of replicator produce at least one viable offspring, on average, per lifetime - so that the different kinds of replicators last long enough to be “selected” by the environment. In challenging environments, a vehicle with many functionalities is needed to meet this requirement. But in unchallenging ones (i.e. sufficiently unchang- ing and resource-rich), the requirement is easily met by highly inaccurate self-reproducers that not only have no appearance of design, but are so inaccurate that they can have arisen spontaneously from generic resources under no-design laws - as proposed, for instance, by the current theories of the origin of life [11, 31]. For example, template replicators, such as short RNA strands [32], or similar “naked” replicators (replicating with poor copying fidelity without a vehicle) would suffice to get natural selection started. Since they bear no design, they require no further explanation - any more than simple inorganic catalysts do.(11) I conclude that the theory of evolution is compatible with no-design laws of physics, that allow, in addition to enough time and energy, information me- dia. These requirements do not contain the design of biological adaptations. Hence, under such laws, the theory of evolution fully explains the appearance of design in living organisms, without their being intentionally designed.
Your response? You argued that the very distant past would resemble the distant past. But, that's just a variation on the future resembling the past, which is inductivism. So we're back where we started with a flawed argument.critical rationalist_{November 29, 2017
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Origenes,
Do you think that it is likely that you cannot infallibly tell me what is infallible? If yes, if you hold that this is likely the case, then it is very likely that you just infallibly told me what is infallible.
You mean in such a case I might have answered a single question correctly? I don't think that implies infallibility. Edit: Or rather, I don't think that implies I infallibly told you the infallible. Suppose I tell someone "2 + 2 = 4" and another person that "2 + 2 ≠ 4". Have I infallibly told one of the people what is infallible? If so, we're setting the bar pretty low.daveS_{November 29, 2017
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DaveS Do you think that it is likely that you cannot infallibly tell me what is infallible? If yes, if you hold that this is likely the case, then it is very likely that you just infallibly told me what is infallible.
Is this going somewhere?
The question is: when will you get it?Origenes_{November 29, 2017
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Origenes,
One day you will get it. Stay with me on this. Here we go: Is your claim infallible? If yes, then you just infallibly told me what is infallible. If not, do you think that it is likely that you cannot infallibly tell me what is infallible?
My claim is not infallible---that is, my belief is that my claim is not infallible; I should have stressed that above. My belief is that I cannot infallibly tell you what is infallible. Sooner or later I will make a mistake, judging by past history. Is this going somewhere? Maybe you can cut to the chase and identify the exact problem.daveS_{November 29, 2017
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Mung at 125, Ha! Now I get it. Thanks for clearing that up!Upright BiPed_{November 29, 2017
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DaveS: I cannot infallibly tell you what is infallible.
One day you will get it. Stay with me on this. Here we go: Is your claim infallible? If yes, then you just infallibly told me what is infallible. If not, do you think that it is likely that you cannot infallibly tell me what is infallible?Origenes_{November 29, 2017
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Origenes, Some of these phrases have mutated quite a bit. Deutsch says nothing can infallibly tell you what is infallible, not that no one can tell you the truth. And no, I cannot infallibly tell you what is infallible. Presumably that holds for all humans.daveS_{November 29, 2017
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Upright BiPed:
If A requires B for A to exist, then A cannot be the source of B.
This argument is deeply and irrevocably flawed in that it appears inductive in nature. Don't you get it? sheeshMung_{November 29, 2017
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Dave @123 - I strongly believe that no one can tell you the truth. Are you sure about that? - No Do you think that your belief is likely to be true? - Let's leave aside the issue of likelihood. Does "no one" mean that you are also incapable of telling me the truth? - Of course. "No one" means no one. So, you cannot tell me the truth. - Yes. That's what I am saying. Right? Right? - - - - -Origenes_{November 29, 2017
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Origenes, I'm only addressing my own belief, and cannot quantify the likelihood of it being true.
So it is also very very likely that “nothing can tell you what is certain” is not certain [because you just said it and, per your own strongly held belief, cannot be done]?
Leaving aside the issue of likelihood, yes, I stated such explicitly above.
Is "nothing can tell you what is certain" certain? D: No.
daveS_{November 29, 2017
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DaveS @121 nothing can tell you what is certain. edit: For your convenience: D: I strongly believe that "nothing can tell you what is certain." Is "nothing can tell you what is certain" certain? D: No. But is "nothing can tell you what is certain" very very likely? D: Yes "nothing can tell you what is certain" is very very likely. So it is also very very likely that "nothing can tell you what is certain" is not certain [because you just told me and what is told to me is, per your own strongly held belief, very likely not certain]? D: oopsOrigenes_{November 29, 2017
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Could you clarify exactly what "what you just said" is?daveS_{November 29, 2017
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DaveS How about this: D: I strongly believe that nothing can tell you what is certain. Is that certain? D: No. But is it very very likely? D: Yes it is. So it is also very very likely that what you just said is not certain? D: oopsOrigenes_{November 29, 2017
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Origenes, No, it wouldn't go like that. If I were in a discussion with you, I would be very careful to explicitly point out my lack of certainty from the start:
D: I strongly believe that nothing can tell you what is certain. Is that certain? D: No. So there may be something which can tell me what is certain? D: Yes.
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DaveS @117
I would answer “no” at that point.
Okay, so then we get: D: Nothing can tell you what is certain. Is that certain? D: No. So there may be something which can tell me what is certain? D: Nothing can tell you what is certain. Or not? D: oopsOrigenes_{November 29, 2017
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