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AS vs eyewitness experience, “non-testimonial” evidence and the reasonableness of Ethical Theism

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In a recent UD thread on evidence vs selectively hyperskeptical dismissal, AS has been challenging that “religious” belief [= theism as worldview, worked into way of life]  is ill founded, lacks evidence beyond testimonials, and the like. (Such is not new, already at UD I have had occasion to rebut his blanket dismissals of religious “dogma.”)

At 64, he sums up his perspective particularly succinctly:

AS, 64: I think religions have an emotional appeal that some people are more susceptible to than others. For those that succumb to that emotional need, evidence is superfluous. Those that lack that need aren’t swayed by testimony. Whether they might be impressed by evidence other than testimony is yet to be tested.

This is the old religion as a crutch fallacy.

(BTW, when I all but broke my ankle one Christmas morning as a student and had a doctor tell me I was very lucky once the X-Rays came out, I learned a lesson about crutches: when you need one, you need one real bad. Just ask the lovely and ever-cheerful Sis N, a lifelong Polio victim who walks with the aid of a pair of crutches and the most impressively muscled arms I have ever seen on a woman.)

Now, while debating theism is not the main purpose of UD, there is a matter of intellectual justice vs secularist prejudice — and even in some cases bigotry — here; the tendency to scorn theists as intellectually inferior emotional wrecks depending on unwarranted blind “faith” must be set straight.

As, BTW, John Lennox does very well here:

[youtube YPaBXf0gXNg]

Nor should the parting words of testimony as an eyewitness and chief spokesman of the 500+ witnesses at the core of the Christian contention, the Apostle Peter, about to be judicially murdered by Nero on a false charge of arson at Rome in AD 64, be ignored:

2 Peter 1:13 I think it right, as long as I am in this  body, to stir you up by way of reminder, 14  since I know that the putting off of my body will be soon,  as our Lord Jesus Christ made clear to me. 15 And I will make every effort so that after my departure you may be able at any time to recall these things.

 16 For we did not follow  cleverly devised myths when we made known to you the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, but  we were eyewitnesses of his majesty . . . .

19 And  we have the prophetic word [E.g. Isa 53, c 700 BC] more fully confirmed, to which you will do well to pay attention  as to a lamp shining in a dark place, until the day dawns and the morning star rises in your hearts, 20 knowing this first of all, that no prophecy of Scripture comes from someone’s own interpretation. 21 For  no prophecy was ever produced by the will of man, but men spoke from God  as they were carried along by the Holy Spirit. [ESV]

Where (given the Christian Faith is a primary target) I note, this is what Peter was talking about, vid:

[vimeo 17960119]

Or, as Barrister Frank Morison so aptly put the matter eighty plus years past now:

[N]ow the peculiar thing . . . is that not only did [belief in Jesus’ resurrection as in part testified to by the empty tomb] spread to every member of the Party of Jesus of whom we have any trace, but they brought it to Jerusalem and carried it with inconceivable audacity into the most keenly intellectual centre of Judaea . . . and in the face of every impediment which a brilliant and highly organised camarilla could devise. And they won. Within twenty years the claim of these Galilean peasants had disrupted the Jewish Church and impressed itself upon every town on the Eastern littoral of the Mediterranean from Caesarea to Troas. In less than fifty years it had began to threaten the peace of the Roman Empire . . . .

Why did it win? . . . .

We have to account not only for the enthusiasm of its friends, but for the paralysis of its enemies and for the ever growing stream of new converts . . . When we remember what certain highly placed personages would almost certainly have given to have strangled this movement at its birth but could not – how one desperate expedient after another was adopted to silence the apostles, until that veritable bow of Ulysses, the Great Persecution, was tried and broke in pieces in their hands [the chief persecutor became the leading C1 Missionary/Apostle!] – we begin to realise that behind all these subterfuges and makeshifts there must have been a silent, unanswerable fact. [Who Moved the Stone, (Faber, 1971; nb. orig. pub. 1930), pp. 114 – 115.]

Where also, we would do well to bear in mind the remarks of famed jurist (and former skeptic) Simon Greenleaf, in the opening chapter of his treatise on evidence (where, such of course includes eyewitness testimony and record of same):

Evidence, in legal acceptation, includes all the means by which any alleged matter of fact, the truth of which is submitted to investigation, is established or disproved . . . None but mathematical truth is susceptible of that high degree of evidence, called demonstration, which excludes all possibility of error [–> Greenleaf wrote almost 100 years before Godel], and which, therefore, may reasonably be required in support of every mathematical deduction.

Matters of fact are proved by moral evidence alone; by which is meant, not only that kind of evidence which is employed on subjects connected with moral conduct, but all the evidence which is not obtained either from intuition, or from demonstration. In the ordinary affairs of life, we do not require demonstrative evidence, because it is not consistent with the nature of the subject, and to insist upon it would be unreasonable and absurd. 

The most that can be affirmed of such things, is, that there is no reasonable doubt concerning them.

The true question, therefore, in trials of fact, is not whether it is possible that the testimony may be false, but, whether there is sufficient probability of its truth; that is, whether the facts are shown by competent and satisfactory evidence. Things established by competent and satisfactory evidence are said to be proved.

By competent evidence, is meant that which the very-nature of the thing to be proved requires, as the fit and appropriate proof in the particular case, such as the production of a writing, where its contents are the subject of inquiry. By satisfactory evidence, which is sometimes called sufficient evidence, is intended that amount of proof, which ordinarily satisfies an unprejudiced mind, beyond reasonable doubt.

The circumstances which will amount to this degree of proof can never be previously defined; the only legal test of which they are susceptible, is their sufficiency to satisfy the mind and conscience of a common man; and so to convince him, that he would venture to act upon that conviction, in matters of the highest concern and importance to his own interest. [A Treatise on Evidence, Vol I, 11th edn. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1888) ch 1., sections 1 and 2. Shorter paragraphs added. (NB: Greenleaf was a founder of the modern Harvard Law School and is regarded as a founding father of the modern Anglophone school of thought on evidence, in large part on the strength of this classic work.)]

So, trying to sweep the report of millions of people whose lives have been transformed by meeting God off the table is patently ill-advised.

Now, too, I replied to AS initially at 165, pointing to the significance of worldview foundations:

KF, 165: Evidence and linked argument regarding the reality of God needs to be assessed in light of worldview foundations and comparative difficulties.

A summary of why we end up with foundations for our worldviews, whether or not we would phrase the matter that way}
A summary of why we end up with foundations for our worldviews, whether or not we would phrase the matter that way}

In that context, to blanket-dismiss the experience of millions across the world and across the ages of life-transforming encounter with the living God, is tantamount to implying general delusion of the human mind. This leads straight to self-referential incoherence. I suggest, you may find it relevant to contrast the chain and the rope. KF

Of chains, ropes and cumulative cases
Of chains, ropes and cumulative cases

PS: I point out that evolutionary materialism credibly does entail general delusion by way of self-referential incoherence, e.g. as the well known evolutionary theorist Haldane noted:

“It seems to me immensely unlikely that mind is a mere by-product of matter. For if my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically. And hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms. In order to escape from this necessity of sawing away the branch on which I am sitting, so to speak, I am compelled to believe that mind is not wholly conditioned by matter.” [“When I am dead,” in Possible Worlds: And Other Essays [1927], Chatto and Windus: London, 1932, reprint, p.209. [–> and in response to a silly distractor, what Haldane says here is pivotal and needs to be seriously attended to and addressed on its merits.]]

In reply to this, AS went off on a tangent as to why denominations and variants of theism exist and why their adherents quarrel or even fight. To which the basic answer is obvious, we humans are factious. Then, at 176, AS repeated his challenge and dismissal of testimony, in reply to a question on what research he has recently done on religious evidence:

AS: None, recently. Where do you suggest I start, bearing in mind that testimony isn’t going to cut it for me?

Of course, this is already a clear case of selective hyperskepticism, dismissal of a cumulatively powerful category of evidence in a context where AS patently knows that eyewitness testimony on experience, is a crucial component of a lot of knowledge and decision-making. There are millions who have met and been transformed by God, so much so that in my longstanding 101 critique of evolutionary materialism as self-referentially incoherent, I noted:

c: But human thought, clearly a phenomenon in the universe, must now fit into this [a priori evolutionary materialistic] meat-machine picture.  So, we rapidly arrive at Crick’s claim in his  The Astonishing Hypothesis (1994): what we subjectively experience as “thoughts,” “reasoning” and “conclusions” can only be understood materialistically as the unintended by-products of the blind natural forces which cause and control the electro-chemical events going on in neural networks in our brains that (as the Smith Model illustrates) serve as cybernetic controllers for our bodies. 

The Derek Smith two-tier controller cybernetic model
The Derek Smith two-tier controller cybernetic model

d: These underlying driving forces are viewed as being ultimately physical, but are taken to be partly mediated through a complex pattern of genetic inheritance shaped by forces of selection [[“nature”] and psycho-social conditioning [[“nurture”], within the framework of human culture [[i.e. socio-cultural conditioning and resulting/associated relativism]. And, remember, the focal issue to such minds — notice, this is a conceptual analysis made and believed by the materialists! —  is the physical causal chains in a control loop, not the internalised “mouth-noises” that may somehow sit on them and come along for the ride.

A neural network is essentially a weighted sum interconnected gate array, it is not an exception to the GIGO principle
A neural network is essentially a weighted sum interconnected gate array, it is not an exception to the GIGO principle

(Save, insofar as such “mouth noises” somehow associate with or become embedded as physically instantiated signals or maybe codes in such a loop. [[How signals, languages and codes originate and function in systems in our observation of such origin — i.e by design —   tends to be pushed to the back-burner and conveniently forgotten. So does the point that a signal or code takes its significance precisely from being an intelligently focused on, observed or chosen and significant alternative from a range of possibilities that then can guide decisive action.])

e: For instance, Marxists commonly derided opponents for their “bourgeois class conditioning” — but what of the effect of their own class origins? Freudians frequently dismissed qualms about their loosening of moral restraints by alluding to the impact of strict potty training on their “up-tight” critics — but doesn’t this cut both ways?  Should we not ask a Behaviourist whether s/he is little more than yet another operantly conditioned rat trapped in the cosmic maze? And — as we saw above — would the writings of a Crick be any more than the firing of neurons in networks in his own brain?

neurobrain750

f: For further instance,  we may take the favourite whipping-boy of materialists: religion.  Notoriously, they often hold that belief in God is not merely cognitive, conceptual error, but delusion. Borderline lunacy, in short. But, if such a patent “delusion” is so utterly widespread, even among the highly educated, then it “must” — by the principles of evolution — somehow be adaptive to survival, whether in nature or in society. And so, this would be a major illustration of the unreliability of our conceptual reasoning ability, on the assumption of evolutionary materialism.

g: Turning the materialist dismissal of theism around, evolutionary materialism itself would be in the same leaky boat. For, the sauce for the goose is notoriously just as good a sauce for the gander, too.

h:  That is, on its own premises [and following Dawkins in A Devil’s Chaplain, 2004, p. 46], the cause of the belief system of evolutionary materialism, “must” also be reducible to forces of blind chance and mechanical necessity that are sufficiently adaptive to spread this “meme” in populations of jumped- up apes from the savannahs of East Africa scrambling for survival in a Malthusian world of struggle for existence.  Reppert brings the underlying point sharply home, in commenting on the “internalised mouth-noise signals riding on the physical cause-effect chain in a cybernetic loop” view:

. . . let us suppose that brain state A, which is token identical to the thought that all men are mortal, and brain state B, which is token identical to the thought that Socrates is a man, together cause the belief that Socrates is mortal. It isn’t enough for rational inference that these events be those beliefs, it is also necessary that the causal transaction be in virtue of the content of those thoughts . . . [[But] if naturalism is true, then the propositional content is irrelevant to the causal transaction that produces the conclusion, and [[so] we do not have a case of rational inference. In rational inference, as Lewis puts it, one thought causes another thought not by being, but by being seen to be, the ground for it. But causal transactions in the brain occur in virtue of the brain’s being in a particular type of state that is relevant to physical causal transactions. [[Emphases added. Also cf. Reppert’s summary of Barefoot’s argument here.]

AS comments:

AS, 189: KF writes:

…to blanket-dismiss the experience of millions across the world and across the ages of life-transforming encounter with the living God, is tantamount to implying general delusion of the human mind.

Well, “delusion” is a bit strong, but, yes, I do think people who believe that the various gods exist are mistaken. But I don’t think belief in something that is not true is per se a terrible thing. It is only when religion is used as an excuse to attack the out-group, be they infidels, women, gays and so on, that it becomes something that must be opposed.

Of course, we have just come off a century where ideologies of irreligion, atheism, materialism, scientific racism or class-ism, amorality disguising itself under the label of advancing novel rights and rescue for favoured groups [= the essence of fascism]  and the like, secularism and evolutionism were used as a key part of agendas that murdered well over 100 millions, just inside states. Names such as Stalin, Pol Pot, Mao, or even Hitler (who definitively was NOT a Christian, pace too many atheistical online rants), are not to be found in the generally acknowledged lists of religious leaders. Nor is such exactly news, Plato long since warned 2350 years ago, speaking in the voice of the Athenian Stranger in The Laws bk X:

Ath. . . .[The avant garde philosophers and poets, c. 360 BC] say that fire and water, and earth and air [i.e the classical “material” elements of the cosmos], all exist by nature and chance, and none of them by art . . . [such that] all that is in the heaven, as well as animals and all plants, and all the seasons come from these elements, not by the action of mind, as they say, or of any God, or from art, but as I was saying, by nature and chance only [ –> that is, evolutionary materialism is ancient and would trace all things to blind chance and mechanical necessity] . . . .  [Thus, they hold] that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature, but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them; and that the alterations which are made by art and by law have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the moment and at the time at which they are made.- [ –> Relativism, too, is not new; complete with its radical amorality rooted in a worldview that has no foundational IS that can ground OUGHT.] These, my friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, which find a way into the minds of youth. They are told by them that the highest right is might [ –> Evolutionary materialism — having no IS that can properly ground OUGHT — leads to the promotion of amorality on which the only basis for “OUGHT” is seen to be might (and manipulation: might in “spin”)], and in this way the young fall into impieties, under the idea that the Gods are not such as the law bids them imagine; and hence arise factions [ –> Evolutionary materialism-motivated amorality “naturally” leads to continual contentions and power struggles influenced by that amorality], these philosophers inviting them to lead a true life according to nature, that is, to live in real dominion over others [ –> such amoral factions, if they gain power, “naturally” tend towards ruthless abuse], and not in legal subjection to them.

But, the core issue needed some elaboration. So, at 207, I pointed to ontological and linked issues. This, I believe, should be headlined for record:

I have long since suggested that we start with the foundations of worldviews and then overnight, that we focus on a pivotal issue, root of being in a necessary being and of what character. Cf here for an outline i/l/o modes of being and ontology:

https://uncommondescent.com…..eat-being/

I must assume that you have not simply ignored a linked discussion, in haste to drum out talking points in disregard of there being another side to the story.

If you all are unable to recognise this as addressing a body of evidence on the general approaches of inference to best explanation, comparative difficulties and particularly grand sense-making, in light of evidence accessible to all who would inquire, then it shows logical, epistemological and broader philosophical impoverishment.

Which, is unsurprising.

Let me do a basic outline of key points:

1: A world, patently exists.

2: Nothing, denotes just that, non-being.

3: A genuine nothing, can have no causal capacity.

4: If ever there were an utter nothing, that is exactly what would forever obtain.

5: But, per 1, we and a world exist, so there was always something.

6: This raises the issue of modes of being, first possible vs impossible.

7: A possible being would exist if a relevant state of affairs were realised, e.g. heat + fuel + oxidiser + chain rxn –> fire (a causal process, showing fire to depend on external enabling factors)

Fire_tetrahedron

8: An impossible being such as a square circle has contradictory core characteristics and cannot be in any possible world. (Worlds being patently possible as one is actual.)

9: Of possible beings, we see contingent ones, e.g. fires. This also highlights that if something begins, there are circumstances under which it may not be, and so, it is contingent and is caused as the fire illustrates.

10: Our observed cosmos had a beginning and is caused. This implies a deeper root of being, as necessarily, something always was.

11: Another possible mode of being is a necessary being. To see such, consider a candidate being that has no dependence on external, on/off enabling factors.

12: Such (if actual) has no beginning and cannot end, it is either impossible or actual and would exist in any possible world. For instance, a square circle is impossible,

One and the same object cannot be circular and square in the same sense and place at the same time
One and the same object
cannot be circular and
square in the same
sense and place at the same time

. . . but there is no possible world in which twoness does not exist.

13: To see such, begin with the set that collects nothing and proceed:

{ } –> 0

{0} –> 1

{0, 1} –> 2

Etc.

14: We thus see on analysis of being, that we have possible vs impossible and of possible beings, contingent vs necessary.

15: Also, that of serious candidate necessary beings, they will either be impossible or actual in any possible world. That’s the only way they can be, they have to be in the [world-]substructure in some way so that once a world can exist they are there necessarily.

16: Something like a flying spaghetti monster or the like, is contingent [here, not least as composed of parts and materials], and is not a serious candidate. (Cf also the discussions in the linked thread for other parodies and why they fail.)

Flying Spaghetti Monster Creation of Adam
Flying Spaghetti Monster Creation of Adam

17: By contrast, God is a serious candidate necessary being, The Eternal Root of being. Where, a necessary being root of reality is the best class of candidates to always have been.

18: The choice, as discussed in the already linked, is between God as impossible or as actual. Where, there is no good reason to see God as impossible, or not a serious candidate to be a necessary being, or to be contingent, etc.

19: So, to deny God is to imply and to need to shoulder the burden of showing God impossible. [U/D April 4, 2015: We can for illustrative instance cf. a form of Godel’s argument, demonstrated to be valid:]

godel_ont_valid

20: Moreover, we find ourselves under moral government, to be under OUGHT.

21: This, post the valid part of Hume’s guillotine argument (on pain of the absurdity of ultimate amorality and might/manipulation makes ‘right’) implies that there is a world foundational IS that properly bears the weight of OUGHT.

22: Across many centuries of debates, there is only one serious candidate: the inherently good, eternal creator God, a necessary and maximally great being worthy of loyalty, respect, service through doing the good and even worship.

23: Where in this course of argument, no recourse has been had to specifically religious experiences or testimony of same, or to religious traditions; we here have what has been called the God of the philosophers, with more than adequate reason to accept his reality such that it is not delusional or immature to be a theist or to adhere to ethical theism.

24: Where, ironically, we here see exposed, precisely the emotional appeal and hostility of too many who reject and dismiss the reality of God (and of our being under moral government) without adequate reason.

So, it would seem the shoe is rather on the other foot.

In the day since, there has been a tip-toe around. But, given that there has been a global challenge to the basic rationality of theists, rooted in a priori evolutionary materialist scientism, it is appropriate to headline this matter as a question on science, scientism, worldviews, cultural agendas and society. END

 PS: Trollish conduct will not be tolerated. Comment at UD is a privilege on good behaviour — basic civility and what in my neck of the woods is termed broughtupcy; especially in a world where there are any number of soap boxes out there and a blog can be set up in fifteen minutes at no cost. Abuse of privilege will lead to forfeit.

PPS: It seems some notes on first rules of right reason are required:

red_ball

Here we see a bright red ball on a table, marking a world partition {A | NOT_A }.

From this we can generalise to see the force of first principles of right reason:

Laws_of_logic

That is, the world partition pivoting on our ball or any entity having a distinct identity immediately imposes that A is A, A is not also at the same time and in the same sense NOT_A, and that anything will either be A or not A but not both or neither. This directly applies to for instance what happens when we try to communicate. As noted in comment 98 below to P:

. . . you object using a definite, structured language based on distinct sounds and using text that is based on distinct symbols. That is already pregnant with implications that decisively undermine your argument (i.e. WJM is right). Let me go to an often neglected classical source, Paul of Tarsus, speaking to requisites of articulate, intelligible language and implications thereof:

1 Cor 14:7 If even inanimate musical instruments, such as the flute or the harp, do not give distinct notes, how will anyone [listening] know or understand what is played? 8 And if the war bugle gives an uncertain (indistinct) call, who will prepare for battle?

9 Just so it is with you; if you in the [unknown] tongue speak words that are not intelligible, how will anyone understand what you are saying? For you will be talking into empty space!

10 There are, I suppose, all these many [to us unknown] tongues in the world [somewhere], and none is destitute of [its own power of] expression and meaning. 11 But if I do not know the force and significance of the speech (language), I shall seem to be a foreigner to the one who speaks [to me], and the speaker who addresses [me] will seem a foreigner to me. [AMP]

In short, the very project of communication in symbolic language or music depends on and manifests the self evident nature of distinct identity, linked contrast and associated dichotomy. A is A (let’s use the bright red ball sitting on a table case in point I have used here at UD for years . . . I will append to OP for reference) directly distinguishes itself via a dichotomising world partition:

{ A | ~ A }

As immediately present corollaries of distinct identity (LOI), we have LNC, that A AND ~A cannot hold of the same thing and sense, and also excluded middle (LEM) by virtue of partition: A X-OR ~ A.

These are first, self evident truths that we must imply or acknowledge just in order to communicate.

So, my first, foremost point, is that it is thereafter useless to seek to dismiss the reality and presence of foundational, self evident truths.

To try to protest such is to hopelessly depend on them, it is absurd. Manifestly absurd.

The case you attempt to make collapses with literally the first word of your own, in comment no 83:

{Y | ~Y} + {o | ~o} + {u | ~u}

 

 

 

 

 

Comments
AS asks:
Do we have anyone prepared to testify that they have some tangible evidence for God?
Witnesses who testify are not required to produce physical evidence in order for their accounts to be considered evidence.
Does he speak to them? Write notes? Neale Donald Walsch has produced his “conversations with God”. Are his writings evidence for the existence of his God or are they open to the interpretation that he makes stuff up? Does his God jibe with your God?
How one assesses the credibility of various testimonial evidence is entirely irrelevant to the point that it exists as evidence.
Well, there are the observations. Whether they indicate a “designed” universe is another matter.
Yes, and that other matter is the use of those observations as evidence for a particular theory - that the universe is designed. Just as objectors make use of the observed fact that 99.99% of the universe is uninhabitable by life as evidence that the universe is not designed for life. Both sets of facts are used as evidence in light of their respective viewpoints. Arguments are made both ways, which themselves count as evidence (as per the definitions I provided twice).
I keep saying that, whatever the merits of the argument for some “ground of being”, the entailments of such being are not derived from the argument but merely assumed.
The logically necessary entailments of such a being are indeed derived from the arguments. In the morality argument, for example, we don't "begin with" the assumption that god is the source of objective morality, but rather through logic determine that (1) only an objective morality can properly ground any sensible, logically coherent morality which also coincides with how we must behave, (2) then the only explanation we have for an objective morality is an existential purpose that objectively exists which we can in some way sense; (3) an existential purpose indicates a creator with a purpose in mind; (4) thus, we have used logical argument to derive from observation/experience a necessary entailment of a being we call god: as source of existential purpose and thus a ground for objective, perceivable morality. The other logical arguments do the same thing; argue from either self-evidently true statements or necessary statements based on observation/experience back towards a fundamental premise that can properly ground that which we observe, know and experience.
I hear what you say. Yet where is the evidence, other than personal or reported testimony, for the existence of deities? Do you consider “Conversations with God” evidence of Walsch’s deity?
As I have said repeatedly: there is the fine-tuning evidence and the logical-argument evidence, neither of which are testimonial evidence. Of course Walsch's testimony is evidence of his deity (although I've never read the book). All testimony is evidence by definition; what matters is (1) the credibility of the witness, and (2) whether or not there is corroborating/supportive evidence and the quality of that evidence. Sometimes, a single highly credible witness is all we need to reach a provisional conclusion; other times, we require much more.William J Murray
April 5, 2015
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F/N: WJM is telling:
If you do not assume the law of non-contradiction, you have nothing to argue about. If you do not assume the principles of sound reason, you have nothing to argue with. If logic is not assumed to be a causally independent, authoritative arbiter of true statements, there’s no reason to apply it. If you do not assume libertarian free will, you have no one to argue against. If you do not assume morality to be an objective commodity, you have no reason to argue in the first place. If you do not assume mind is primary, there is no “you” to make any argument at all.
For the broad worldview level discussion "at Mars Hill, Athens," cf here: http://nicenesystheol.blogspot.com/2010/11/unit-2-gospel-on-mars-hill-foundations.html#u2_bld_wvu KFkairosfocus
April 5, 2015
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WJM: Evidence both mattered and matters much to me, too. KF PS: Let us all remind ourselves, as clipped in the OP, from Greenleaf in his Treatise on Evidence:
Evidence, in legal acceptation, includes all the means by which any alleged matter of fact, the truth of which is submitted to investigation, is established or disproved . . . None but mathematical truth is susceptible of that high degree of evidence, called demonstration, which excludes all possibility of error [--> Greenleaf wrote almost 100 years before Godel], and which, therefore, may reasonably be required in support of every mathematical deduction. Matters of fact are proved by moral evidence alone; by which is meant, not only that kind of evidence which is employed on subjects connected with moral conduct, but all the evidence which is not obtained either from intuition, or from demonstration. In the ordinary affairs of life, we do not require demonstrative evidence, because it is not consistent with the nature of the subject, and to insist upon it would be unreasonable and absurd. The most that can be affirmed of such things, is, that there is no reasonable doubt concerning them. The true question, therefore, in trials of fact, is not whether it is possible that the testimony may be false, but, whether there is sufficient probability of its truth; that is, whether the facts are shown by competent and satisfactory evidence. Things established by competent and satisfactory evidence are said to be proved. By competent evidence, is meant that which the very-nature of the thing to be proved requires, as the fit and appropriate proof in the particular case, such as the production of a writing, where its contents are the subject of inquiry. By satisfactory evidence, which is sometimes called sufficient evidence, is intended that amount of proof, which ordinarily satisfies an unprejudiced mind, beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances which will amount to this degree of proof can never be previously defined; the only legal test of which they are susceptible, is their sufficiency to satisfy the mind and conscience of a common man; and so to convince him, that he would venture to act upon that conviction, in matters of the highest concern and importance to his own interest. [A Treatise on Evidence, Vol I, 11th edn. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1888) ch 1., sections 1 and 2. Shorter paragraphs added. (NB: Greenleaf was a founder of the modern Harvard Law School and is regarded as a founding father of the modern Anglophone school of thought on evidence, in large part on the strength of this classic work.)]
kairosfocus
April 5, 2015
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SA: You aptly bring out the force of injecting general delusion into the world of thought:
One of the ‘facts about the brain’ is that it generates illusions. We can tell the difference between illusion and truth because the brain tells us. So, the same brain that is telling us that something is true, is also generating illusions and tricking us with those.
The fact that the mind is the brain [--> BIG questions begged here, and announced as "fact!] guarantees that there is no free will. It rules out any purposes or designs organizing our actions or our lives.
The brain has not explained to us why it generates illusions of free will, and then, at the same time, convinced us that those illusions are false. But physical states cannot generate falsehoods. They can only generate what exists. Whatever a physical brain generates must be real – it cannot produce an illusion. If there was only physical brains, there would be no way to validate whether the brain is ‘correct’ or not, since it is the very same brain which is observing, auditing, judging, generating information and validating. It’s like asking a software program to detect errors in its own code which prevent it from functioning correctly. In order to validate itself, it has to function correctly in the first place (and it has to understand itself and what the ‘correct’ code should be). Errors in the code prevent the software from working, and thus prevent the software from doing any self-analysis. If the brain produces and convinces us of illusions, then the very same brain cannot be used to validate whether it is producing illusions, since the validation would be part of the illusion-producing brain.
Just one of many ways that evolutionary materialist scientism becomes self-referentially incoherent and arguably self-refuting. KFkairosfocus
April 5, 2015
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F/N: It seems I need to further document, bearing in mind that the issue at root is the evident implications of a physicalist-materialist view. Crick, in The Astonishing Hypothesis, 1994:
. . . that "You", your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules. As Lewis Carroll's Alice might have phrased: "You're nothing but a pack of neurons." This hypothesis is so alien to the ideas of most people today that it can truly be called astonishing. [--> But plainly, if Sir Francis is included, this dramatically undermines his own thought. This is why ID thinker Phillip Johnson responded that Dr Crick should therefore be willing to preface his books: “I, Francis Crick, my opinions and my science, and even the thoughts expressed in this book, consist of nothing more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules.” (In short, as Prof Johnson then went on to say: “[[t]he plausibility of materialistic determinism requires that an implicit exception be made for the theorist.” [In, Reason in the Balance, 1995.]]
In the Devil's Chaplain of course, Dawkins said much the same in speaking of excess neurons and jumped up East African apes. Where, maybe the most direct statement is this from Provine in the well-known 1998 U Tenn Darwin Day address:
Naturalistic evolution has clear consequences that Charles Darwin understood perfectly. 1) No gods worth having exist; 2) no life after death exists; 3) no ultimate foundation for ethics exists; 4) no ultimate meaning in life exists; and 5) human free will is nonexistent [--> which entails no responsible freedom, required for rational choice, reasoning, warranting and so genuine knowledge as opposed to embedded programming] . . . . The first 4 implications are so obvious to modern naturalistic evolutionists that I will spend little time defending them. Human free will, however, is another matter. Even evolutionists have trouble swallowing that implication. I will argue that humans are locally determined systems that make choices. They have, however, no free will . . .
With David Chalmers on Facing up to the Hard Problem of Consciousness a close second:
The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience. It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does. [--> catch the deeply embedded assumptions and resulting self-referential incoherence?] If any problem qualifies as the problem of consciousness, it is this one. In this central sense of "consciousness", an organism is conscious if there is something it is like to be that organism, and a mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in that state. Sometimes terms such as "phenomenal consciousness" and "qualia" are also used here, but I find it more natural to speak of "conscious experience" or simply "experience". Another useful way to avoid confusion (used by e.g. Newell 1990, Chalmers 1996) is to reserve the term "consciousness" for the phenomena of experience, using the less loaded term "awareness" for the more straightforward phenomena described earlier . . . . Why are the easy problems easy, and why is the hard problem hard? The easy problems are easy precisely because they concern the explanation of cognitive abilities and functions. To explain a cognitive function, we need only specify a mechanism that can perform the function. The methods of cognitive science are well-suited for this sort of explanation, and so are well-suited to the easy problems of consciousness. By contrast, the hard problem is hard precisely because it is not a problem about the performance of functions. The problem persists even when the performance of all the relevant functions is explained. (Here "function" is not used in the narrow teleological sense of something that a system is designed to do, but in the broader sense of any causal role in the production of behavior that a system might perform.) . . . .
Reppert, again, cuts to the heart of the matter:
. . . let us suppose that brain state A, which is token identical to the thought that all men are mortal, and brain state B, which is token identical to the thought that Socrates is a man, together cause the belief that Socrates is mortal. It isn’t enough for rational inference that these events be those beliefs, it is also necessary that the causal transaction be in virtue of the content of those thoughts . . . [[But] if naturalism is true, then the propositional content is irrelevant to the causal transaction that produces the conclusion, and [[so] we do not have a case of rational inference. In rational inference, as Lewis puts it, one thought causes another thought not by being, but by being seen to be, the ground for it. But causal transactions in the brain occur in virtue of the brain’s being in a particular type of state that is relevant to physical causal transactions.
So, while many try to rhetorically brazen the matter out while using loaded language to subtly denigrate those who dare raise it, the problems are real and intractable. A priori evolutionary materialist scientism is quite evidently self-referentially incoherent. And, those fellow traveller systems built to live with and accommodate it then face the implications of that ill-advised alliance. Where also, to point out and give reasons for with cases of self referential incoherence is not insubstantial dismissiveness. It is addressing a critical issue that any worldview or worldview influenced position must answer to: factual adequacy, coherence and adequate and balanced explanatory power, per comparative difficulties. KF PS: I am willing to take the point on Seversky vs VS. PPS: Debates on Bible interpretation are irrelevant to the issues of worldview foundations addressed on ontological, moral and linked considerations raised in the OP and comments above. Here, it should be noted, I speak as a design oriented thinker [per the force of empirical evidence and analysis of the origin of FSCO/I] and ethical theist [per the force of ontological and moral reasoning and concerns], on evidence accessible to all [a literal world full of evidence, with the classic case highlighted by Irving Copi, the flame, as key case study, as well as of course after Popperian popped up, a bright red ball on a table as second study leading to first principles of reason, as well as of course Josiah Royce's point on error exists as a pivotal instance of certain, undeniably warranted, self-evident knowledge], not within any particular theological tradition. It is illuminating that so many objectors cannot seem to understand the difference. Simplest put: roots in Athens, here; not in Jerusalem.kairosfocus
April 5, 2015
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velikovskys:
So are you saying practicality is the evidence for absolute morality?
No, I'm saying that pragmatism doesn't favor the atheist/materialist in their case against objective morality.
Subjective morality certainly is not.
Unless one considers "because I feel like it, because I can" a moral principle, subjective morality is empty because it necessarily relies upon ulitimately immoral justifications.
Morality allows humans to live in groups is a logical reason, believing one’s group has objective morality is logically beneficial to the group. Just as non moral shared beliefs, nationalism etc
A logical reason to have moral rules is not the same thing as those moral rules making logical sense or their application being logically consistent with (1) their worldview about what morals are, and (2) their actual behavior. Believing that morality is subjective while acting like it is objective (being willing to, in some cases, coerce others) is either irrational (you don't realize what you're doing), hypocritical (you realize it and do it anyway), and/or immoral (ultimately stems from "because I feel like it, because I can). You have to ask yourself: If morality is subjective in nature, what, in your mind, do you think gives you the right to step in and intervene if you see a child being gratuitously tortured? William J Murray
April 5, 2015
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velikovskys:
Yet we know from the law of contradiction some are incorrect, so any sane person should be aware that the subjective belief that one’s morality is absolute can be erroneous.
Any sane person knows that alltheir beliefs are subjective beliefs that they may be mistaken about. Nobody here that I know of is asserting that they have "objective" beliefs. You are stating a triviality here as if it somehow adds weight against the idea that we all act as if morality refers to an objective commodity just because we disagree on our descriptions of morality. Yes, because our descriptions vary (in some cases, widely) we should exercise (IMO) great caution in our moral activities.
Of course there are sane utilitarian reasons to act as if one’s morality is binding on all others.
Sane? Perhaps. But there is no moral principle by which one can justify coercing others to abide what they consider to be entirely subjective moral views. It would boil down to forcing what one believes to be nothing more than personal views on others because they want to and because they can (even writ large via society). Do you consider forcing your personal views on the behavior of others (when you beleive them to be subjective in nature) a moral activity?William J Murray
April 5, 2015
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JD Welbel asks:
I am not suggesting that this discussion and others like it are useless, to the contrary, I am learning a great deal simply reading through the comments. I just keep wondering why evidence matters.
Evidence may not matter to those that are "fiercely defending their ideological territory"; but not everyone is so committed to their view. Some are actually looking for information and evidence through which they can develop a worldview model - perhaps they are disillusioned, perhaps they never thought about it much, perhaps they are honest seekers of truth. Evidence mattered to me a great deal in developing a intellectually and spiritually satisfying theism.William J Murray
April 5, 2015
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KF: VS: You really need to read Rosenberg as cited at 159 above. It is he who is drawing out the problem — though I think he does not fully recognise its force, not me. And his opinion is gospel for what reason? More importantly since the argument was directed to Seversky does he? Rosenberg does apparently believe things exist. Let us know when you have an answer; this is not one where you can project a dismissive remark at those who are “other” then act as though it’s a no-problem situation. I am not a materialist would seem to be adequate answer. But it is interesting that you invoke dismissive, that is what I found that line of reasoning. Essentially " your argument fails because I think you believe you don't actually exist " or you are merely serving up a platter of piping hot red herring. Is there a third option?velikovskys
April 5, 2015
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Kf: this is not primarily a Bible interpretation discussion [it is about a phil issue in response to a grievous accusation . . . ) but again you err for want of knowledge of the scriptures. God didn't cause the flood? The following was pointed out to you specifically at 126, but seems to have not been attended to: While I appreciate the elucidation I believe the quote which lit the fire under you was written by Seversky. n that light, there is no good reason to try to force unto the Judaeo-Christian scriptural tradition any notion that God’s knowledge of the future [as he is present everywhere and every-when] im[lies that responsible freedom is undermined. If freedom is limited to only responsible choices it is not freedom.velikovskys
April 5, 2015
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Rosenberg, as quoted by Box & KF
We’ll give up all the answers to the persistent questions about free will, the self, the soul, and the meaning of life that the illusion generates.
The mind generates the illusion that there is a self, soul and that life has meaning and purpose. This illusion is so strong, that it convinced us of these things. However ...
Even after scientism convinces us, we’ll continue to stick with the first person. But at least we’ll know that it’s another illusion of introspection and we’ll stop taking it seriously.
The brain that convinced us of the illusion of self, also convinced us that scientism is true. But for some reason, apparently, we know that scientism is not an illusion. Somehow, the illusion-producing brain also told us that scientism is true. Only meaning, purpose, self, morality and the soul, apparently, are illusions created by the brain. The very same brain that convinced us by illusions, also convinces us of the truth of things.
We can be sure of a great deal about how the brain works because the physical facts fix all the facts about the brain.
One of the 'facts about the brain' is that it generates illusions. We can tell the difference between illusion and truth because the brain tells us. So, the same brain that is telling us that something is true, is also generating illusions and tricking us with those.
The fact that the mind is the brain guarantees that there is no free will. It rules out any purposes or designs organizing our actions or our lives.
The brain has not explained to us why it generates illusions of free will, and then, at the same time, convinced us that those illusions are false. But physical states cannot generate falsehoods. They can only generate what exists. Whatever a physical brain generates must be real - it cannot produce an illusion. If there was only physical brains, there would be no way to validate whether the brain is 'correct' or not, since it is the very same brain which is observing, auditing, judging, generating information and validating. It's like asking a software program to detect errors in its own code which prevent it from functioning correctly. In order to validate itself, it has to function correctly in the first place (and it has to understand itself and what the 'correct' code should be). Errors in the code prevent the software from working, and thus prevent the software from doing any self-analysis. If the brain produces and convinces us of illusions, then the very same brain cannot be used to validate whether it is producing illusions, since the validation would be part of the illusion-producing brain.Silver Asiatic
April 5, 2015
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AS
Well the Shroud of Turin is, if permission were granted, available for scrutiny. If it’s age were confirmed by radio carbon dating as consistent with the first century rather than medieval, what would that demonstrate?
Good question. With scientific and historical evidence of the shroud, there has to be multiple lines of evidence. Carbon dating alone is one thing - but it can be subject to question (as the current carbon-dating is by many researchers). If you bring together historical, testimonial, physical, logical, artistic and technological evidence, you have a stronger basis on which to decide about the shroud. But you have to look at it all - look at the work that has been done and then evaluate it through your own interpretation. It's the same with other religious evidence. To conclude that the evidence is not convincing, it's important to really look into it. There's a good documentary on the shroud by the History Channel "The Real Face of Jesus", where some of the best, most current scientific evidence is explored. The show correctly points out that science can't 'prove' that the Shroud is real, but that's true of any scientific claim. You can't really 'demonstrate' aspects of historical science. But you can see physical evidence in the Shroud that requires an explanation. Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WNJPJ4JwHeE KFSilver Asiatic
April 5, 2015
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AS (attn, phoenix), again, note what you have actually said in the final word on evidence thread, which directly led to the OP:
AS, 64: I think religions have an emotional appeal [--> in context, a dismissive assertion on why people take up ethical theism in the Judaeo-Christian tradition] that some people are more susceptible to [--> loaded language] than others. For those that succumb [--> loaded language, implying pathology way beyond mere "mistakes"] to that emotional need, evidence is superfluous [--> BTW, a blatant falsehood]. Those that lack that need aren’t swayed by testimony [--> testimony is evidence and may amount to warrant]. Whether they might be impressed by evidence other than testimony is yet to be tested. [--> another falsehood, as there are longstanding lines of evidence and linked reasoning that point to the reasonableness of ethical theism, some of which I took up in the OP]
Attempting to suggest that you have merely argued for being mistaken, is misleading, given just this . . . and there is more. Now, p. has tried to imply tu quoque. This probably refers to something like my presentation of argument in the OP, that specifically evolutionary materialist scientism is self-referentially incoherent and self-refuting. Where, above, this crops up further in the thread of discussion. The difference is, I have provided specific evidence and warrant for such, and have made no appeal to pseudo-psychological ad hominem narratives. I have pointed out the obvious, that such has become a dominant and entrenched ideology in science and science education, as well as many halls of influence and power. That, can be warranted by for example citing Lewontin as one of many indicators:
the problem is to get them to reject irrational and supernatural explanations of the world, the demons that exist only in their imaginations, and to accept a social and intellectual apparatus, Science, as the only begetter of truth [[--> NB: this is a knowledge claim about knowledge and its possible sources, i.e. it is a claim in philosophy not science; it is thus self-refuting]. . . . To Sagan, as to all but a few other scientists, it is self-evident [[--> actually, science and its knowledge claims are plainly not immediately and necessarily true on pain of absurdity, to one who understands them; this is another logical error, begging the question , confused for real self-evidence; whereby a claim shows itself not just true but true on pain of patent absurdity if one tries to deny it . . ] that the practices of science provide the surest method of putting us in contact with physical reality, and that, in contrast, the demon-haunted world rests on a set of beliefs and behaviors that fail every reasonable test [[--> i.e. an assertion that tellingly reveals a hostile mindset, not a warranted claim] . . . . It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes [[--> another major begging of the question . . . ] to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute [[--> i.e. here we see the fallacious, indoctrinated, ideological, closed mind . . . ], for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door . . . [Billions and billions of demons, NYRB, Jan 1997. In case yu may have been led to imagine this is "quote-mined" and/or idiosyncratic; kindly look at the fuller annotated citation here on, and the following four other clips.]
For the self-referential incoherence of such, cf. this as cited in the OP, from Reppert:
. . . let us suppose that brain state A, which is token identical to the thought that all men are mortal, and brain state B, which is token identical to the thought that Socrates is a man, together cause the belief that Socrates is mortal. It isn’t enough for rational inference that these events be those beliefs, it is also necessary that the causal transaction be in virtue of the content of those thoughts . . . [[But] if naturalism is true, then the propositional content is irrelevant to the causal transaction that produces the conclusion, and [[so] we do not have a case of rational inference. In rational inference, as Lewis puts it, one thought causes another thought not by being, but by being seen to be, the ground for it. But causal transactions in the brain occur in virtue of the brain’s being in a particular type of state that is relevant to physical causal transactions.
. . . and cf. J B S Haldane's remark that is its remote ancestor:
"It seems to me immensely unlikely that mind is a mere by-product of matter. For if my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically. And hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms. In order to escape from this necessity of sawing away the branch on which I am sitting, so to speak, I am compelled to believe that mind is not wholly conditioned by matter.” [["When I am dead," in Possible Worlds: And Other Essays [1927], Chatto and Windus: London, 1932, reprint, p.209.]
Nancy Pearcey (who studied and worked under leading mid c20 Christian thinker Francis Schaeffer) has recently amplified in her recent book, Finding Truth:
A major way to test a philosophy or worldview is to ask: Is it logically consistent? Internal contradictions are fatal to any worldview because contradictory statements are necessarily false. "This circle is square" is contradictory, so it has to be false. An especially damaging form of contradiction is self-referential absurdity -- which means a theory sets up a definition of truth that it itself fails to meet. Therefore it refutes itself . . . . An example of self-referential absurdity is a theory called evolutionary epistemology, a naturalistic approach that applies evolution to the process of knowing. The theory proposes that the human mind is a product of natural selection. The implication is that the ideas in our minds were selected for their survival value, not for their truth-value. But what if we apply that theory to itself? Then it, too, was selected for survival, not truth -- which discredits its own claim to truth. Evolutionary epistemology commits suicide. Astonishingly, many prominent thinkers have embraced the theory without detecting the logical contradiction. Philosopher John Gray writes, "If Darwin's theory of natural selection is true,... the human mind serves evolutionary success, not truth." What is the contradiction in that statement? Gray has essentially said, if Darwin's theory is true, then it "serves evolutionary success, not truth." In other words, if Darwin's theory is true, then it is not true. Self-referential absurdity is akin to the well-known liar's paradox: "This statement is a lie." If the statement is true, then (as it says) it is not true, but a lie. Another example comes from Francis Crick. In The Astonishing Hypothesis, he writes, "Our highly developed brains, after all, were not evolved under the pressure of discovering scientific truths but only to enable us to be clever enough to survive." But that means Crick's own theory is not a "scientific truth." Applied to itself, the theory commits suicide. Of course, the sheer pressure to survive is likely to produce some correct ideas. A zebra that thinks lions are friendly will not live long. But false ideas may be useful for survival. Evolutionists admit as much: Eric Baum says, "Sometimes you are more likely to survive and propagate if you believe a falsehood than if you believe the truth." Steven Pinker writes, "Our brains were shaped for fitness, not for truth. Sometimes the truth is adaptive, but sometimes it is not." The upshot is that survival is no guarantee of truth. If survival is the only standard, we can never know which ideas are true and which are adaptive but false. To make the dilemma even more puzzling, evolutionists tell us that natural selection has produced all sorts of false concepts in the human mind. Many evolutionary materialists maintain that free will is an illusion, consciousness is an illusion, even our sense of self is an illusion -- and that all these false ideas were selected for their survival value. So how can we know whether the theory of evolution itself is one of those false ideas? The theory undercuts itself. A few thinkers, to their credit, recognize the problem. Literary critic Leon Wieseltier writes, "If reason is a product of natural selection, then how much confidence can we have in a rational argument for natural selection? ... Evolutionary biology cannot invoke the power of reason even as it destroys it." On a similar note, philosopher Thomas Nagel asks, "Is the [evolutionary] hypothesis really compatible with the continued confidence in reason as a source of knowledge?" His answer is no: "I have to be able to believe ... that I follow the rules of logic because they are correct -- not merely because I am biologically programmed to do so." Hence, "insofar as the evolutionary hypothesis itself depends on reason, it would be self-undermining."
And, Box recently drew my attention to Alex Rosenberg, of Duke University, in his The Atheist's Guide to Reality, in opening words of ch 9, that inadvertently underscore Pearcey's point:
FOR SOLID EVOLUTIONARY REASONS, WE’VE BEEN tricked into looking at life from the inside. Without scientism, we look at life from the inside, from the first-person POV (OMG, you don’t know what a POV is?—a “point of view”). The first person is the subject, the audience, the viewer of subjective experience, the self in the mind. Scientism shows that the first-person POV is an illusion. Even after scientism convinces us, we’ll continue to stick with the first person. But at least we’ll know that it’s another illusion of introspection and we’ll stop taking it seriously. We’ll give up all the answers to the persistent questions about free will, the self, the soul, and the meaning of life that the illusion generates. The physical facts fix all the facts. The mind is the brain. It has to be physical and it can’t be anything else, since thinking, feeling, and perceiving are physical process—in particular, input/output processes—going on in the brain. We can be sure of a great deal about how the brain works because the physical facts fix all the facts about the brain. The fact that the mind is the brain guarantees that there is no free will. It rules out any purposes or designs organizing our actions or our lives. It excludes the very possibility of enduring persons, selves, or souls that exist after death or for that matter while we live. Not that there was ever much doubt about mortality anyway.
So, no, the turnabout does not "take." To see the force of this, contrast the almost studious evasiveness above in response to my direct presentation of multiple, cumulative lines of argument, with the focal strands being ontological and moral considerations . . . which have been tip-toed around and diverted from but have not been squarely faced and addressed cogently. Yes, I argue that we find ourselves under moral governent . . . that is a direct implication of for example p's tu quoque above and the apparent desperate need to find especially Christians in the wrong by dint of a litany of real and imagined wrongs joined to angry readings of the moral stance found in base texts. (Onlookers troubled by such may wish to read here on; with a particular emphasis on the contrasting attitude of Bernard Lewis.) Yes, it is quite evident that we human beings find ourselves under the government of OUGHT. If one argues to this is delusional, that implies general delusion and leads straight to self-referential incoherence, as there are no firewalls in the mind. If one takes it seriously, that points to our facing a worldview foundational IS capable of bearing the weight of ought. Where, after many centuries of debate, there is but one serious candidate: the inherently good creator-God, a necessary and maximally great being, worthy of service by doing the good, and frankly of worship and prayer. The God of ethical theism as philosophy, in a nutshell. A rather familiar figure for those with some nodding acquaintance with the Judaeo-Christian tradition, but not rooted in readings of texts or testimonies of encounter with God. (Though such have validity as evidence.) Going beyond, you will note reference to necessary being and maximal greatness. These refer to a parallel and supportive line of thought also outlined in the OP: ontological considerations. In brief outline, nothing denotes non-being, and this time around, let me clip here for variety (which will bring to bear some design thought too): ____________ >> let us begin with some observations: O1: It is a fact that something exists including us O2: It is a fact that we exist as contingent beings in a credibly contingent world, one that is rich with functionally specific complex organisation and associated information in both the world of cell based life and in the fine tuning of the cosmos that is the framework for such life O3: It is a fact that this is the ONLY world that we have ordinary physical experience of O4: But also, we experience that world as self-aware, self-moved beings able to choose and act into the world in ways that make a difference. That is, we ourselves are causally effective and minded. Also, we are credibly under the moral government of OUGHT. O5: Moreover, we have never seen anything that begins come into existence without a cause. Now, let us consider the issue [on propositions etc]: P1: We exist in a going-concern world C2: Something patently exists, rather than nothing, per O1 - 4. (If someone denies this, ask: how can nothing -- non-being -- argue or assert claims?) P3: Nothing, properly, denotes non-being P5: Non-being has no causal power C6: Were there ever nothing, there could not thereafter be something C7: Therefore, there never was nothing. C8: So also, there always was something. C9: For any possible world (which excludes non-being), there must always be something C10: There is no possible world in which there is nothing C11: In the actual experienced world, there always was something C12: The world being credibly contingent, that always-something would be independent of on/off enabling causal factors antecedent to it, and so would be a necessary being P13: Matter, being inherently composite, dependent on space and being convertible into energy, cannot be a necessary being. C14: The necessary being at the causal root of our world is necessary and immaterial, and powerful enough to be the primary cause of the world. C15: So, once we start from a going concern world perspective, we see that provided something now is, something always was. C16: Where also, had there instead been nothing, there never would be something. P17: So also, we reckon with the principle that, being independent of ON/OFF enabling factors, a serious candidate necessary being will either be impossible . . . having core attributes that stand in mutual contradiction (cf. a square circle) . . . or else will be in any possible world, including that which we are a part of. C18: Therefore, once we stand in a world with something, there must be something that is a successful, serious candidate necessary being, with capability to be causal root of a cosmos fine tuned for C-Chemistry, aqueous medium, self-replicating cell based, code and algorithm using [thus, language using . . . ] cell based life. P19: Where, it is not credible that language, codes and complex algorithms with associated execution machinery came about in our cosmos by blind chance behaviour and/or blind forces of mechanical necessity. P20: Where also, the fine tuned cosmos that enables such life, is rooted in physics and cosmology that equally reflect functionally specific, complex organisation and associated information. P22: Where also, both experience of trillions of cases of the origin of such FSCO/I and the challenge to successfully blindly search vast configuration spaces within reasonably available resources point to purposeful, skilled intelligence as the only empirically and analytically credible source of FSCO/I. C23: Therefore, the observed something, the cosmos we live in and the life we experience point to an intelligent designer of both cosmos and cell based life in it. P24: where also, we find ourselves morally governed by binding force of OUGHT attested by conscience and the credible worth of others that are as we are, leading to a need for a world-foundational IS capable of sustaining OUGHT. P25: Across many centuries, there has been but one serious candidate for such: the inherently good creator God, a maximally great and necessary being, the originating and sustaining root of reality. C26: Thus, as God is the main serious candidate necessary being in view, one faces the choice: God is impossible or actual C27: But, credibly, God is not impossible, so is actual. ___________________________________________________ GC28: Therefore, the best explanatory reason why there is something rather than nothing is that there has always necessarily been the inherently good creator God, a maximally great and necessary being, the originator and sustainer of reality. Can one reject this argument? Yes. But, then one has some serious explaining to do on why one's alternative is factually adequate, coherent and explanatorily powerful and balanced. In particular, one will need to tackle the issue of God as serious candidate necessary being and the challenge: impossible or actual. That is where the pivotal challenge lies.>> ______________ Theists, on good reason, hold that God is possible and actual. Those who object should provide good reason to conclude that he is in fact impossible. This, by and large, is not done. So the claimed mirror-image equivalence fails. And, in response I have brought to bear another vantage point on the matters at stake. Onlookers, let us see if at length we can see those who resort to the God is an imaginary, emotional crutch fallacy -- and BTW, if you need a crutch, you need one! -- can bring themselves to the point of acknowledging that this is an utterly unworthy line of argument, an unjustifiable strawman caricature and ad hominem. KFkairosfocus
April 5, 2015
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kairosfocus, to Aurelio Smith:
You have indicted millions.
So have you, KF. If you are correct about your views, as you claim to be, then millions of others -- including millions of other theists -- are wrong about theirs.phoenix
April 4, 2015
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I'm not sure i'm aware of this. please help me to understand what group or groups fall under messianistic neopagan regimes Nazism-Fascism, esp. the former. KFJD Welbel
April 4, 2015
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Just remember, on order of millions of Christians have been murdered by hostile secularist and linked politically messianistic neopagan regimes over the past 100 years. KFkairosfocus
April 4, 2015
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KF Thank you for that. If I understand correctly, you seem to be saying that, for one thing, producing evidence in a manner which can withstand logical and philosophic scrutiny goes a long way to balancing the matter for onlookers. Naturally, the discussion itself could potentially have immense value and I certainly understand the desire to diffuse hostility towards one's beliefs.JD Welbel
April 4, 2015
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JDW, there has been a sneering dismissal of theists as in effect emotional basket cases leaning on an imaginary crutch, God. Ignoring the balance of relevant history, this has been linked to claimed inherent irrationality and being a menace to the community. Those things need to be answered, and at first level I have done such on ontological and moral issues and worldview level considerations. Not to somehow prove God's reality to people who in some cases -- cf above -- are willing to burn down evidence, knowledge and reason -- but to show to the reasonable onlooker that theism is a reasonable worldview option. On the broader question, evidence and reasoning matter due to the pivotal importance of knowledge, which is best understood as warranted, credibly true belief. Where, warrant and certainty of belief come in differing appropriate degrees depending on the type of case in hand. KFkairosfocus
April 4, 2015
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I see potential benefits of particular belief systems and as I have stated elsewhere, I am no anti-thiest. Still, i don't understand why some of us feel that it's important to present evidence of the validity of said beliefs. Though it seems to me that we exist on a spectrum of entities of which we seem to occupy a position not the least complex nor the most. The same goes for orders of intelligence. Perhaps these apparent "levels" are illusory but to me it appears as such and it points me to the probability that humankind does not represent the only possible entities possesing complex intelligence. Extrapolating from there I come to the possibility of an entity or entities who exist outside of our experiential environment or perhaps encompass our environment (in fact ARE the worlds around us). This barely explored beginning of a thought process which might lead one to imagine an entity of divine properties and proportions does not seem deluded or irrational to me. The thing is, in my admittedly limited experience, it seems that for many people, thier beliefs are fiercely defended ideological territories. Evidence will never be compelling for these individuals, in fact, any belief system which comes with evidence which contradicts any aspect of the competing ideology will only be met with greater hostility and more fear. I am not suggesting that this discussion and others like it are useless, to the contrary, I am learning a great deal simply reading through the comments. I just keep wondering why evidence matters.JD Welbel
April 4, 2015
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F/N: The past week and more have made it clear that those evolutionary materialism objectors and/or fellow travellers who have so disdained and sneered at theists as irrational clingers to an imaginary emotional crutch labelled "God," have patently had no cogent response to even a first level reply on the ontological and moral concerns we face, even before we go on to other points in a cumulative case for ethical theism and ultimately the reasonableness of the Judaeo-Christian tradition and worldview. This should be noted for record i/l/o the course of this pivotal thread. KFkairosfocus
April 4, 2015
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VS: You really need to read Rosenberg as cited at 159 above. It is he who is drawing out the problem -- though I think he does not fully recognise its force, not me. Let us know when you have an answer; this is not one where you can project a dismissive remark at those who are "other" then act as though it's a no-problem situation. KFkairosfocus
April 4, 2015
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Kf: Sev, cf 159 above . . . do you (or other adherents/ fellow travellers with evolutionary materialism) have a right to say I or We, much less observe etc? Is that really supposed to be persuasive, the material does not exist unless the immaterial does or is your argument different?velikovskys
April 4, 2015
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VS, this is not primarily a Bible interpretation discussion [it is about a phil issue in response to a grievous accusation . . . ) but again you err for want of knowledge of the scriptures. The following was pointed out to you specifically at 126, but seems to have not been attended to:
Jer 18: 1 The word that came to Jeremiah from the LORD: 2 “Arise, and go down to the potter’s house, and there I will let you hear my words.” 3 So I went down to the potter’s house, and there he was working at his wheel. 4 And the vessel he was making of clay was spoiled in the potter’s hand, and he reworked it into another vessel, as it seemed good to the potter to do. 5 Then the word of the LORD came to me: 6 “O house of Israel, can I not do with you as this potter has done? declares the LORD. Behold, like the clay in the potter’s hand, so are you in my hand, O house of Israel. 7 If at any time I declare concerning a nation or a kingdom, that I will pluck up and break down and destroy it, 8 and if that nation, concerning which I have spoken, turns from its evil, I will relent of the disaster that I intended to do to it. 9 And if at any time I declare concerning a nation or a kingdom that I will build and plant it, 10 and if it does evil in my sight, not listening to my voice, then I will relent of the good that I had intended to do to it. 11 Now, therefore, say to the men of Judah and the inhabitants of Jerusalem: ‘Thus says the LORD, Behold, I am shaping disaster against you and devising a plan against you. Return, every one from his evil way, and amend your ways and your deeds.’ [ESV]
In short, there is a dimension of conditionality in prophetic warnings and blessings, in a wider context of dynamic, responsive shaping. There is no playing of a canned, pre-set movie of inevitability here in the Biblical understanding of human responsibility. But instead, a dynamic of moral government. We are moral not mechanical. Yes, we have mechanical body parts, but those are parts of a cybernetic whole with a higher order centre of control that carries out responsible agency, cf the Smith Model in the OP for architectural ideas. (NB: Biblical discussions are not the focus of this thread, the focus is still on the accusation of being delusional and demand for evidence of God that is not testimony, answered primarily by way of ontological and moral reasoning.)
In that light, there is no good reason to try to force unto the Judaeo-Christian scriptural tradition any notion that God's knowledge of the future [as he is present everywhere and every-when] im[lies that responsible freedom is undermined. At this stage, with a specific correction having been made 50 comments back, that sounds rather like verging on a strawman caricature. KFkairosfocus
April 4, 2015
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Seversky: First, if we look at examples from the Bible of where God or Jesus predict the future there are no conditionals, no suggestions that this is but one of many possible futures that diverge from any point in time. When Jesus tells Peter that he will deny knowing Him three times before the cock crows, it’s a definite “you will” and, of course, according to the Bible, that’s exactly what he does. It is worse than that, killing everyone except a few for the exercise of free will would seem put a damper on free will. I will concede the Biblical God. I thought the question you raised was more general, can free will be compatible with an omniscient God. Your second argument seems to raise that question My question is, do we have any reason to privilege any one of those ‘presents’ over any of the others. Was 1776 the ‘real’ one, or 2015 or 2255 or 2495? Or are they all equally valid? If one person’s unknown future is another’s settled history, doesn’t that imply that the history of this Universe is already set out? It implies it is logically a possibility. What causative factor could our present knowledge of a past event have on that event occurring? If everyone believed the Battle of Hastings happened in 1065, would it change the past? Would non historical people have free will since history has no record of their existence? And doesn’t that mean that our sense of free will is only possible because of our ignorance about what the future holds Certainly not it science fiction, choosing a or b can lead by different paths to same outcome. Certainly it seems intuitively true our present choices and chance can affect future realities, you are proposing it can change past occurrences as well? That is a bit like the Dembski's theory that even though original sin happened after a event ,it time travelled back to affect the past. an ignorance which allows us to flatter ourselves we actually have some say in what will happen? That seems a different question from whether an omniscience God precludes free will. There could alternate explanations for the illusion of free will if true.velikovskys
April 4, 2015
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@Aurelio Smith: A simple "No" would have sufficed.ScuzzaMan
April 4, 2015
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Sev, If you look at the OP, you will see that evaluation of evidence to moral certainty has long been recognised as an act of judgement by the reasonable and reasonably unbiased person of ordinary common good sense . . . in British thought, the man in the Clapham Bus Stop. The point is, that the standard is passed if to act as though X were not sufficiently warranted would be irresponsible, even though typically absolute proof is not in our gift. These days, 100+ years after Greenleaf, Math has limits too. In short we look for a standard of sufficient objective warrant that to consistently reject cases at that level would be absurd or patently harmful. Classically, in the mouth of two or three independent witnesses shall a word be established. KFkairosfocus
April 4, 2015
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Sev, cf 159 above . . . do you (or other adherents/ fellow travellers with evolutionary materialism) have a right to say I or We, much less observe etc? (The self referentiality issues on the table cut that deeply.) KFkairosfocus
April 4, 2015
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To re-state what should be obvious now, what I prefer to call data are the observations we collect about the natural world. On their own, they are just a collection, they don't necessarily mean anything. However, of they can be shown to fit within an explanatory framework - that they are predicted by that explanation - then they become evidence for it. Observations of the finch population on the Galapagos Islands, including their eating habits and beak morphology, on their own are just a collection of data. When it can be shown that a theory of adaptive evolution could account for those observations then they become evidence for that explanation. It doesn't mean that the theory is necessarily true but it does mean we can invest greater confidence in it and, when it comes down to it, degrees of confidence is really what we are talking about. There are very few things of which we can be absolutely certain. I don't regard religious believers as emotional basket cases. There is no doubt some of the smartest and most-well-balanced people this world has ever seen have been believers of one sort or another. But I think there is also some truth in Marx's "opium of the people" dig. Religion offers a number of pragmatic benefits which alone could account for its popularity: a close and supportive society that rallies around its members in times of personal crisis, the promise of better things to come, especially personal survival after the death of the body and a supreme being who has the knowledge and power to guarantee all these things and has a special purpose for us alone in the case of Christianity. Atheism and agnosticism can't offer anything remotely comparable. Is the vast body of personal testimony concerning religious experience evidence that there is a god? Unless you specify which god you are talking about, there is no way to decide. Remember that data needs to fit into an explanation to be evidence? An undefined god is not an explanation. You might just as well call it a mxyzptlk. It's meaningless. If you specify a particular god, say the God of Christianity, which is defined by certain broad attributes or properties, then we can certainly look at whether all these personal testimonials are consistent with such a being. Of course, if you do that then straightaway you are going to have to discount a large part of that data because the accounts concern different gods. It also undercuts the reliability of those accounts which do attest to the Christian God. If witnesses can be wrong about all those other gods, how much confidence can we have that those witnessing to the Christian God are right? The root of the fine-tuning argument is just observations and calculations from physics concerning the values of certain fundamental physical constants, that if they varied even slightly from their current values this universe would not exist. Extrapolating from that to the belief that this universe was created specifically for us is in my view, unwarranted by the data. There are many other possible explanations. For those of a foundationalist bent, I thought that the definition of "moral certainty" from law.com, kindly provided for us by kairosfocus, pointed out how much the assessment of evidence depends on human judgment of what is "reasonable", it's not something that can be rigorously defined or precisely quantified"
moral certainty n. in a criminal trial, the reasonable belief (but falling short of absolute certainty) of the trier of the fact (jury or judge sitting without a jury) that the evidence shows the defendant is guilty. Moral certainty is another way of saying “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Since there is no exact measure of certainty it is always somewhat subjective and based on “reasonable” opinions of judge and/or jury.
Seversky
April 4, 2015
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Wjm: velikovskys, besides the fact that all sane people act as if morality is objective anyway (first link), Yet we know from the law of contradiction some are incorrect, so any sane person should be aware that the subjective belief that one's morality is absolute can be erroneous. Of course there are sane utilitarian reasons to act as if one's morality is binding on all others. So are you saying practicality is the evidence for absolute morality? and besides the fact that morality is an empty concept under atheism/materialism/naturalism (second link) Subjective morality certainly is not. there is also the logical fact that there is no logically sustainable form of subjective morality that does not inexorably lead back to self-evidently immoral principles (might makes right, because I feel like it, because I can). The subjective belief that one has access to an absolute, objective morality does not solve that problem, just substitutes another justification for those actions !the ends justify the means, divine command, it is self evidently true. The only way morality makes any logical sense, the only reason we would have to care about it Morality allows humans to live in groups is a logical reason, believing one's group has objective morality is logically beneficial to the group. Just as non moral shared beliefs, nationalism etc ,the only thing that explains our actual moral behaviors Empathy, self interest, delayed gratification can explain moral behaviors. You provide the evidence by your exclusion to the rule, psychopaths, "traditionally defined as a personality disorder characterized by enduring antisocial behavior, diminished empathy and remorse, and disinhibited or bold behavior" Lack of empathy,antisocial. sense of obligation and responsibility is according to the view that morality refers to an objective commodity. It has objective usesvelikovskys
April 4, 2015
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F/N: I note again that 38 above specifically answers to the world of evidence point as at was it two or three loops of "there is no evidence . . . " ago. KFkairosfocus
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