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L&FP, 47: The challenge of “proof” in a world of radical doubt and hyperskepticism

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“Prove it . . .” is a familiar challenge, one, often strengthened to “unless you prove it I can disregard what you claim.” However, ever since Epictetus, c. 100 AD, it has met its match:

Epictetus c 50 – 135 AD

DISCOURSES
CHAPTER XXV

How is logic necessary?

When someone in [Epictetus’] audience said, Convince me that logic is necessary, he answered: Do you wish me to demonstrate this to you?—Yes.—Well, then, must I use a demonstrative argument?—And when the questioner had agreed to that, Epictetus asked him. How, then, will you know if I impose upon you?—As the man had no answer to give, Epictetus said: Do you see how you yourself admit that all this instruction is necessary, if, without it, you cannot so much as know whether it is necessary or not? [Notice, inescapable, thus self evidently true and antecedent to the inferential reasoning that provides deductive proofs and frameworks, including axiomatic systems and propositional calculus etc. Cf J. C. Wright]

Lesson one, there are unproven antecedents of proof, including the first principles of right reason, here especially laws of logic. In this case, if one tries to prove, one is already using them and if one tries to object one cannot but use them, so we sensibly accept them as self-evident, pervasive first principles.

As there are always those who need it, pardon a diagram that abstracts from a bright red ball A on a table, to help us recognise the first cluster of such principles:

Okay, okay, here is my actual example of a ball on the table:

And, here is one in the sky, for good measure, Betelgeuse, as it dimmed in 2019 . . . identity with change:

In for a penny, in for a pound. Let me suggest a partial but useful list of such principles of logic and wider right reason . . . and yes, this chart marks a stage in my understanding of Cicero’s point:

This is already a big hint on our limitations in reasoning. We may now bring to bear in effect the Agrippa trilemma, to see how chains of proof and wider warrant confront us with a triple challenge, leading to having to — usually, implicitly — accept finitely remote first plausibles:

A summary of why we end up with foundations for our worldviews, whether or not we would phrase the matter that way}

We are already duly humbled.

It gets “worse.”

For, “proof” itself is a slippery concept. The very model is of course Euclidean Geometry, with its complex system of theorems — derived from, uh, ah, um, first claims, i.e. axioms. Which, in this case, were subjected to a huge debate and now Mathematical systems are often viewed as logic-game worlds constructed from frameworks of axioms we find interesting and/or useful.

Then, came Godel, and SEP is helpful:

Gödel’s two incompleteness theorems are among the most important results in modern logic, and have deep implications for various issues. They concern the limits of provability in formal axiomatic theories. The first incompleteness theorem states that in any consistent formal system F within which a certain amount of arithmetic can be carried out, there are statements of the language of F which can neither be proved nor disproved in F. According to the second incompleteness theorem, such a formal system cannot prove that the system itself is consistent (assuming it is indeed consistent). These results have had a great impact on the philosophy of mathematics and logic . . .

Proof, in the sense, accessibility from some reasonable, finite cluster of axioms, for systems of reasonable complexity, is thus different from truth. Truth, accurate description of states of affairs. (And BTW, practical axiomatisations typically are built to be compatible with recognised facts, some of which may be self-evident like || + ||| –> |||||.)

Already, we are in trouble. It gets deeper once we come to Science. As in, follow the Science, Science has proved etc. Next to me is a gift [thanks Aunt X], “Proving Einstein right.” Only, science is incapable of such strong-sense proof. We may empirically support theories as explanations through empirical evidence, but at most we can say our theories are plausible and may prove — test out — to be at least partly true but are subject to the limits of inductive thinking. That is, we face the pessimistic induction, that our explanations that seemed ever so plausible have historically consistently been sharply limited or outright wrong often enough to give us pause.

We already saw a weaker sense of to prove, to test with some rigor. Bullet proof, means, tested and found credibly resistant to certain specified standard projectiles.

So, by extension scientific proofs can be reinterpreted to mean that science is a case of weak-sense knowledge: tested, warranted, credibly . . . or plausibly, or even possibly . . . true [so, reliable] belief.

It gets worse, welcome to . . . tada . . . RHETORICAL proof. Pisteis, as in:

Richard Nordquist

Updated July 30, 2019

In classical rhetoric, pistis can mean proof, belief, or state of mind.

Pisteis (in the sense of means of persuasion) are classified by Aristotle into two categories: artless proofs ( pisteis atechnoi), that is, those that are not provided by the speaker but are pre-existing, and artistic proofs ( pisteis entechnoi), that is, those that are created by the speaker.”
A Companion to Greek Rhetoric, 2010

Etymology: From the Greek, “faith”

Yes, pisteis comes from pistis, for faith, confident (and hopefully well supported) trust. Which brings up Aristotle’s three main appeals of “artistic” proof, pathos, ethos, logos. Roughly, force of emotions, force of credibility [to bring trust], force of facts and logic. Our emotions have a cognitive aspect and so we can asses the quality of judgements and expectations. Authorities, experts or even witnesses carry credibility to varying degrees but are no better than underlying facts, assumptions, reasoning. So, in the end it is to facts logic and associated assumptions that we must go. And, lo, behold, the result: reasonable, responsible faith.

Our humbling is now complete. We cannot but live by faith, the issue is, which faith, why. Where, hyperskepticism is now exposed as smuggling a certain unquestioned faith in the back door.

This brings us full circle to common sense principles, that we should heed Locke: roughly, we should accept that it is better to walk by the limited and perhaps flickering candle-light we have, than to demand full light of day and snuff out the candle, leaving us in the dark.

Coming back to a recent diagram, here we are, as credibly embodied, error prone but knowing creatures sharing a common world:

Reason, warrant and truth are not fully captured in the net we call proof. Where, too, proof itself is not as firm as we may naively imagine. Let us therefore seek prudence. END

75 Replies to “L&FP, 47: The challenge of “proof” in a world of radical doubt and hyperskepticism

  1. 1
    kairosfocus says:

    L&FP, 47: The challenge of “proof” in a world of radical doubt and hyperskepticism

  2. 2
    zweston says:

    It is important that everyone knows they live a life of faith, particularly those who are hyper skeptical. That should open their mind to understand they are all evaluating existing data, information, and experience to find confidence in a worldview that cannot be “proven” in the cartesian sense.

  3. 3

    Obviously the creationist conceptual scheme is superior.

    – it defines the logic of opinion
    – it defines the logic of fact

    Unlike your scheme, it doesn’t really require axioms. It doesn’t put a limit on logical proof, like with Godel, whose theorems it was proven, can be avoided.

    I will try to interpret your “law of identity” on creationist terms. There are 2 ways of identification in creationism, opinion and fact.

    A fact is obtained by evidence of a creation, forcing to produce a 1 to 1 corresponding model of it, in the mind.

    That it is what it means to “identify” a creation. The model of the creation, is the fact of it.

    Like to say, there is a camel out back. The statement models there being a camel out back, which is a statement of fact.

    A creation “A” is preceded by the possiblity of it, the possibilities “A”, “not A”, which possiblities are then chosen.

    A creator is identified with a chosen opinion.

    By spontaneous expression of emotion with free will, an opinion is chosen on what it was, that made a decision turn out the way it did.

    So then to say someone is “kind”, the opinion is chosen.

  4. 4
    Lieutenant Commander Data says:

    We cannot but live by faith, the issue is, which faith, why.

    Yep everything is reduced to this sentence. Everything is faith.
    Next step :
    Theism vs Materialism :
    Cells complex information can be produced ONLY by intelligence. Theism win.
    Next step:
    Monotheism Vs Polytheism. Monotheism win.
    Next step:
    What kind of Monotheism is more credible Christianity vs Islam . Christianity win.
    Next step:
    What Christian Church is closest to Primal Church founded by Christ and have continuity from Apostle till today? Ortodox Christian Church win.
    Next step:
    Becoming a saint.
    The end.
    😉

  5. 5
    Jack says:

    Goodie! More useless, unpersuasive arguments. 😀

    KF, if you want to change the world, learn the science of persuasion.

    It’s how brains work. I promise.

  6. 6
    kairosfocus says:

    Jack, more cynical skepticism . . . see how dismissive sneering works, and feels? There is a difference between manipulative persuasion and laying out literally first principles of sound thinking. Where BTW, brains are computational substrates, they cannot be the locus for rational responsible freedom to think. That was laid out already but obviously you were not paying attention. Pop quiz, one, what is an oracle machine and why does it out-perform a Turing machine? Two, how does a Smith two-tier controller connect to an oracle machine and to a cybernetic loop? Three, how does such connect to our being embodied, rational, responsible, significantly free but error-prone creatures in a going concern world? Four, what are the elements of Aristotle’s triangle of rhetoric and why is it that only the third actually directly connects to warrant? Let’s add, fifth, what are the limitations of proof, and why do we need to understand them in a cynical, hyperskeptical age? KF

  7. 7
    kairosfocus says:

    MNY, any deductive scheme or broader pattern of warrant has start-points, which for finite, fallible creatures who seek to avoid question-begging, must both be finitely remote and able to stand comparative difficulties. Those start points embed first plausibles far beyond self evident first principles etc, which collectively define our faith points. The issue is not whether faith, but which. As for the role of God and revelation, God would be the ultimate oracle; however, we need clear warrant that God is there and that candidates claiming to be God are trustworthy. Likewise, for other suggested roots of reality. That provision of clear warrant is non-trivial, and one of the purposes of exercises like this is to provide substantial . . . not manipulative, shallow . . . reflections that allow us to think through such issues, especially in an age of cynical hyperskepticism. KF

  8. 8
    kairosfocus says:

    ZW, yes, we need to recognise that we have worldviews that go far beyond the strictly provable and trace to our faith-points. So, we need at least the basics of comparative difficulties analysis as outlined above. In that light, we need to be very aware of the complexities and limitations that lurk in that seemingly simple, powerful word, proof. Which in the end, comes down to: provide a reasonable test of warrant and cause to trust that a knowledge claim is adequately warranted. KF

  9. 9
    kairosfocus says:

    LCD, an interesting chain. The steps, though, bristle with complex evaluations and issues. For example, evolutionary materialistic scientism is an institutionally dominant school of thought and it is exceedingly hard to get those indoctrinated into it or manipulated by its publicists, to see that it is in fact self-referentially incoherent and self-defeating at outset. Likewise, it is hard to get the indoctrinated to realise that they are looking at 4-state, complex, algorithmic digital code — so, language and goal-directed step by step processes — in the living cell, which are glaring signs of the design of cell based life by language using intelligence. The linked debates have played out here at UD for many years. KF

  10. 10

    KF Axioms is not actually what faith is about. Faith is about being true to something in the spiritual domain. For example faithful marriage is being true to the love in marriage. It basically means making decisions based on that love, and for that love.

    Why don’t you see the greatness of the creationist conceptual scheme? It has the real potential of turning things around in society. Your ideas are too idiosyncratic.

    It is hugely important to have intellectual validation of subjectivity. For many reasons.

    – it is simply obvious that if you understand how subjectivity works, you generally would make better personal opinions, because then you know what you are doing in forming personal opinions.

    – religion is helped a lot with understanding of subjectivity.

    – evidence shows that lack of understanding of subjectivity causes great problems, in respect to nazism and scientific socialism

    But somehow you come to a different valuejudgement than me, that subjectivity is not all that big of an intellectual issue, of no particular consequence, and that objectivity is where it is at.

    I just cannot fathom it, how you don’t appreciate the fundamental importance of subjectivity. But nobody else does either, so you are not alone in not appreciating it.

    Your scheme doesn’t even have a straightforward definition of objectivity and fact either, besides not having a definition of subjectivity and personal opinion.

    The creationist conceptual scheme is vastly superior in practicality, to your scheme. It is simple and straightforward, while you use idiotsyncratic ideas like “twoness” “oughtness” etc.

  11. 11
    kairosfocus says:

    MNY, axioms and the like are part of worldviews. KF

  12. 12
    Lieutenant Commander Data says:

    KF, I guess can be proven logically that to be a materialist requires to have MUCH MORE faith than to be a theist. :))) Basically the materialist need an insane amount of illogical faith that would make a fairy to blush.

  13. 13
    kairosfocus says:

    LCD, one of the gaps in our formal and informal education is, worldviews thinking. And yet, as the OP illustrates, it is easy to see that warrant chains, so that Agrippa has a point, we face infinite regress or circularity or finitely remote first plausibles. The challenge is to realise that proofs and broader warrant must start somewhere, where self-evident first truths, principles and facts are nowhere near enough. Common sense is important, not least to avoid falling into self-referential, self-defeat of the credibility of one’s ability to be rational. This includes avoiding grand, spreading delusion similar to Plato’s Cave or the matrix. Using the latter, how can one be confident the pills aren’t triggering a level two delusion? And more. In that context evolutionary materialistic scientism is indeed incoherent and it is indeed just as much a worldview as any other, never mind liking to dress up in a lab coat. Which is difficult to acknowledge and often leads to denial and lashing out. KF

    PS: For those who need it, yes Darwin tried to use his doubts about the convictions and inferences of a jumped up monkey brain/ mind — more or less the same on the relevant views — to dismiss challenges to his scientific claims and wider linked views. However, the matter is plainly self-referential and self-discrediting. Hence the issue that our rational responsible freedom points to an oracle in our cybernetic loop, as supervisory controller. Deny the freedom, and we are back to a computational substrate, with GIGO staring us in the face. Deeper than that, they don’t have the basis to account for the complex — beyond 500 – 1,000 bits will do — functionally specific organisation and coded information in a cell much less a brain. But, you are not going to hear this taken seriously, a big sign of what is going on and is spreading across ever so many other issues now. Civilisation-level, structural foundational cracks are showing up, multiplying like rabbits and spreading fast. It is time to face the crisis.

  14. 14
    Jack says:

    KF: Jack, more cynical skepticism

    I call ’em as I see ’em, baby

    If you want to change the world, learn the science of persuasion.

    It’s how brains work.

    Don’t you want to learn?

    If you keep doing what you’re doing, you’ll keep getting what you’re getting.

  15. 15
    kairosfocus says:

    Jack, the pop quiz is still open:

    one, what is an oracle machine and why does it out-perform a Turing machine? Two, how does a Smith two-tier controller connect to an oracle machine and to a cybernetic loop? Three, how does such connect to our being embodied, rational, responsible, significantly free but error-prone creatures in a going concern world? Four, what are the elements of Aristotle’s triangle of rhetoric and why is it that only the third actually directly connects to warrant? Let’s add, fifth, what are the limitations of proof, and why do we need to understand them in a cynical, hyperskeptical age?

    Manipulation is not warrant. And what is on the table is a matter of first principles that we tend to neglect, leading to many errors. If ever our civilisation is to get out of the needless trouble we are in, that is what we will have to face. Here, the limitations of “proof” and how that clears up the problem of hyperskepticism.

    KF

  16. 16

    KF, you don’t understand how subjectivity works. You should learn it.

    Example: to say someone is “kind”.

    The opinion is formed by feeling what the personal character of someone is, and then expressing that feeling by spontaneous expression of emotion with free will, thus choosing the word “kind”.

    And then that person is said to have made decisions out of the personal characteristic “kindness”.

    So the logic of subjectivity is that an opinion is chosen, and that an opinion expresses what it is that makes a choice. All personal opinions have that same underlying logic.

    And if a stated opinion does not have that logic, then the personal opinion is invalid. For example if someone is forced to say a painting is beautiful, so that the opinion is not chosen, that provides an invalid personal opinion.

  17. 17
    jerry says:

    Kf,

    I have agree with Jack. What you write is not persuasive.

    It may be correct/sound logically but no one can follow the logic so it is useless.

    You have been told this several times, so one has to assume your OP’s are not written to explain or persuade.

    He’s also right when he says

    If you keep doing what you’re doing, you’ll keep getting what you’re getting.

    This explains most of the contention over the last 9 months. Some have reacted to your OP’s with obvious nonsense probably as a reaction to how you have presented your ideas. Not to the ideas themselves.

    You are getting two reactions among many.

    Similar to mine that is based on the little that is understood, mainly agree.

    Those who don’t agree with the implications of your basic ideas will create all sorts of nonsense to supposedly refute you. How can they not and maintain self consistency?

    For example, anything that make Christianity rational and relevant will be fought in all sorts of ways. So using biblical references is a trigger for them to object in some way.

  18. 18
    kairosfocus says:

    Jerry, I am by no means persuaded that the logic above cannot be followed. It is in fact in key part review of things that I know were received and understood, even welcomed. Recall, it leads with Epictetus, whose exchange is a 2,000 year classic. The case of using a red ball on a table [or in the sky] to outline Identity, non contradiction and excluded middle is unexceptional. The list of first principles is perhaps open to debate by those who disbelieve, but they can be answered. For example, the weak form PSR and link to cause are not vulnerable to the usual objections to PSR. Agrippa’s trilemma is a classic, and the pointing out that we are forced to finitely remote first things taken as plausible is a fair conclusion, which sets up comparative difficulties analysis of worldviews; all of which bristle with difficulties. As for the going concern summary, it is simply listing challenges we face. So, I suspect, rather, that we are dealing with rebranded disagreements that choose you are unpersuasive over, I disagree with the listed first principles of reason. KF

    PS: As for proof, the point is, it is an overly broad term, which needs to be reassessed. Proofs cannot chain forever, we are finite and fallible. There are therefore unprovable antecedents of proof; some, being self-evident first principles, others are convenient axioms such as Euclid’s 5th postulate. Science cannot prove to deductive certainty, and scientific explanations cannot be proved through empirical evidence, they can only be supported so far. The pessimistic induction points to a long list of theories that met empirical failure or at least limits, such as Newtonian Dynamics, 1880 – 1930. And more.

    PPS: The Godel results are a classic which demonstrate limits of Math as a deductive system. After 90 years, they should be increasingly well known. If one doubts the summary from Stanford Enc of Phil and the onward link, his quarrel is with foundations of Mathematics, not me.

  19. 19
    jerry says:

    Kf,

    You will not listen. Therefore, you will not learn.

  20. 20
    kairosfocus says:

    F/N: On Bible references, they simply don’t appear above. Yes, Christians such as Paul endorsed Principle of Identity and Modus Tollens (and Ponens) reasoning. They also endorsed Euclidean Geometry. It is a true point to simply recognise that the Hebraic and Christian Scriptures come to us as part of the classical era’s deposit, even as say Homer’s works; where, our civilisation’s roots lie in Jerusalem, Athens and Rome, with onward roots in the two key river valleys and the wider fertile crescent. As for, endorsing a core of natural law thinking, that is a simple fact of history, the first duties of reasoning stand on their own merits, e.g. I hardly think we find ourselves responsible if we were to approve or, endorse or promote the untruthful, deceitful, erroneous, imprudent etc. These things stand on their own merit. KF

  21. 21
    kairosfocus says:

    Jerry, as I spoke specifically to merits above, this is now clearly ad hominem argument, which conveniently shifts focus from merits. I will endeavour to be as clear as possible and reasonable, though as finite, fallible etc I will fail from time to time; I will try to improve as I can but will never be perfect — which is a fair conclusion. What remains is, here with reference to the OP, that there is a substantial issue on the table that needs to be seriously faced on pain of sobering further consequences. KF

  22. 22

    You’ve got no logic of opinion, and you’ve got no logic of fact.

    That is the truth, is it not?

    So…..you’ve got nothing much, and it is certainly not first principles.

  23. 23
    jerry says:

    What remains is, here with reference to the OP, that there is a substantial issue on the table that needs to be seriously faced on pain of sobering further consequences.

    I haven’t got a clue what this issue is.

    I stopped reading after a few sentences. I don’t want to expend the time and effort to understand just what you are saying because I doubt it will be anything new. Too much is extraneous or obscure. I also doubt anyone reads your OP’s. I see no evidence of it in any of the comments except to make fun of your visuals.

    Make your case in 3-4 short declarative statements.

  24. 24
    Lieutenant Commander Data says:

    Mohammadnursyamsu

    You’ve got no logic of opinion, and you’ve got no logic of fact.

    That is the truth, is it not?

    So…..you’ve got nothing much, and it is certainly not first principles.

    Better go to school first . You make no sense.

    Jerry

    stopped reading after a few sentences. .

    Why are you here? Go play somewhere else where you can understand the ideas or are posted only pictures.

  25. 25

    lcd, you’re not making a rational arguent. Sounds like you are a fact obsessed atheist / materialist, who is clueless about personal opinions.

  26. 26
    jerry says:

    Why are you here? Go play somewhere else where you can understand the ideas or are posted only pictures.

    Maybe I understand as well as anyone. Why don’t you state Kf’s proposition in a few sentences. Without pictures. I’m pretty sure I could do it if I wanted to take several hours dissecting it sentence by sentence.

    I’ll wait for your analysis.

    Also I have been commenting here longer than anyone here. Might be one or two longer but not more. Definitely before Kf.

  27. 27
    kairosfocus says:

    Folks,

    for years, we tried to deal with the design inference and why objections seemed so deep rooted so intractable in the face of what should have been decisive evidence. Gradually, it became clear that mere scientific debates were downstream of deeper issues, tied to reasoning and worldviews with deeply entrenched cultural agendas. It is in that context that I saw we needed to work through logic and first principles.

    Where, this one is about the concept of proof, and so also linked start-points of logic. BTW, this also connects across to Mathematics, as that is best summarised as the study of the logic of structure and quantity.

    In that context, those willing to see can readily observe from the OP that Epictetus identifies that there is a core of logic that is antecedent to proof, is about first principles that are the stuff of proof. Where, we further see that proofs cannot chain infinitely, leading to worldview cores. Going further, even in Mathematics, proofs face the Godel incompleteness issue. Mathematicians live by faith.

    We further find that proof is broader than deductive logic chains, we have to address limits of scientific warrant and the even broader issue of rhetorical proof, pisteis. Which brings out that we all live by faith, pistis, the issue is to have reasonable, responsible faith.

    A hard pill to swallow, especially for those miseducated — yes, this is a key part of our problem — to imagine faith and reason are almost opposites. Worldviews are structured on clusters of first plausibles, may be assessed on comparative difficulties and cannot be built up wholly from utter certainties. What are the core things we cannot prove but find ourselves trusting, why?

    KF

  28. 28
    kairosfocus says:

    Jerry, in short, you are reacting to projections set up on assumptions you made. KF

  29. 29
    kairosfocus says:

    Folks, what is “proof”? Deductive, mathematical, scientific, forensic, historical, rhetorical? What are the limitations of proof in these senses, is there any common concept? Or is there just a vague family resemblance bound up in a rhetorical bundle by the prestige of claiming to have proof? Not to mention the rhetorical power of hyperskeptically demanding proof to arbitrary degree of certainty for what one is inclined to disbelieve or dismiss? KF

  30. 30
    jerry says:

    you are reacting to projections set up on assumptions you made.

    I haven’t a clue what this means.

    This is my point. Does anyone know what you mean besides yourself?

  31. 31

    KF, the deeper issues people have with intelligent design, are the same as the deeper issues people have with “choice”.

    As William Dembski said, intelligent design is about choice. Lots of intellectuals throughout the ages have had problems with free will.

    The problem of free will is, that people want to fundamentally understand making a choice in terms of figuring out the best option. That definition doesn’t work for science, because there is no physics of the best.

    The proper definition of making a choice is in terms of spontaneity (randomness). The subjective spirit spontaneously making one of alternative futures the present.

    Having all the DNA configurations directly available as possibilities in a decision on them, is what enables ID to surmount the mathematical improbabilities of obtaining an efficient, viable, DNA configuration.

    But then ID theory requires an added sensing mechanism besides choice, to search the directly availble possible DNA configurations for an optimal solution.

    In any case, it is very obvious that people have problems with the understanding of choice, and that this is the reason why intelligent design theory is rejected. The attachment to choosing in terms of what is best, is deeply psychological, highly emotive. People have built their lives on that notion of choosing in terms of what is best.

  32. 32
    kairosfocus says:

    Jerry, notice what you stated about how little you read before drawing inferences? That is a clue, meanwhile, duly noting the focus stated in the title and the point illustrated by Epictetus, I will proceed with the main point, the challenge of proof. KF

  33. 33

    The proof is the demonstration of the logic, that it works, and that there is no error in it.

    The logic of fact is, that a fact is obtained by evidence of a creation, forcing to produce a 1 to 1 corresponding model of it, in the mind.

    So then the proof that Jack indeed murdered Jane, is the demonstration of the evidence of what happened, forcing to the 1 to 1 corresponding model, of Jack murdering Jane.

  34. 34
    kairosfocus says:

    F/N: Let us note on what proof is, advancing the OP’s main point.

    First, Merriam-Webster:

    Definition of proof

    (Entry 1 of 3)
    1a : the cogency of evidence that compels acceptance by the mind of a truth or a fact
    b : the process or an instance of establishing the validity of a statement especially by derivation from other statements in accordance with principles of reasoning

    2 obsolete : experience
    3 : something that induces certainty or establishes validity
    4 archaic : the quality or state of having been tested or tried especially : unyielding hardness [–> compare, bullet-proof]
    5 : evidence operating to determine the finding or judgment of a tribunal

    Next, Wikipedia:

    A proof is sufficient evidence or a sufficient argument for the truth of a proposition.[1][2][3][4]

    The concept applies in a variety of disciplines,[5] with both the nature of the evidence or justification and the criteria for sufficiency being area-dependent. In the area of oral and written communication such as conversation, dialog, rhetoric, etc., a proof is a persuasive perlocutionary speech act, which demonstrates the truth of a proposition.[6] In any area of mathematics defined by its assumptions or axioms, a proof is an argument establishing a theorem of that area via accepted rules of inference starting from those axioms and from other previously established theorems.[7] The subject of logic, in particular proof theory, formalizes and studies the notion of formal proof.[8] In some areas of epistemology and theology, the notion of justification plays approximately the role of proof,[9] while in jurisprudence the corresponding term is evidence,[10] with “burden of proof” as a concept common to both philosophy and law.

    In most disciplines, evidence is required to prove something. Evidence is drawn from the experience of the world around us, with science obtaining its evidence from nature,[11] law obtaining its evidence from witnesses and forensic investigation,[12] and so on. A notable exception is mathematics, whose proofs are drawn from a mathematical world begun with axioms and further developed and enriched by theorems proved earlier.

    Exactly what evidence is sufficient to prove something is also strongly area-dependent, usually with no absolute threshold of sufficiency at which evidence becomes proof.[13][14][15] In law, the same evidence that may convince one jury may not persuade another. Formal proof provides the main exception, where the criteria for proofhood are ironclad and it is impermissible to defend any step in the reasoning as “obvious” (except for the necessary ability of the one proving and the one being proven to, to correctly identify any symbol used in the proof.);[16] for a well-formed formula to qualify as part of a formal proof, it must be the result of applying a rule of the deductive apparatus of some formal system to the previous well-formed formulae in the proof sequence.[17]

    Proofs have been presented since antiquity. Aristotle used the observation that patterns of nature never display the machine-like uniformity of determinism as proof that chance is an inherent part of nature.[18] On the other hand, Thomas Aquinas used the observation of the existence of rich patterns in nature as proof that nature is not ruled by chance.[19]

    Proofs need not be verbal. Before Copernicus, people took the apparent motion of the Sun across the sky as proof that the Sun went round the Earth.[20] Suitably incriminating evidence left at the scene of a crime may serve as proof of the identity of the perpetrator. Conversely, a verbal entity need not assert a proposition to constitute a proof of that proposition. For example, a signature constitutes direct proof of authorship; less directly, handwriting analysis may be submitted as proof of authorship of a document.[21] Privileged information in a document can serve as proof that the document’s author had access to that information; such access might in turn establish the location of the author at certain time, which might then provide the author with an alibi.

    Contrast, Webster’s 1828:

    Proof

    PROOF,noun

    1. Trial; essay; experiment; any effort, process or operation that ascertains truth or fact. Thus the quality of spirit is ascertained by proof; the strength of gun-powder, of fire arms and of cannon is determined by proof; the correctness of operations in arithmetic is ascertained by proof

    2. In law and logic, that degree of evidence which convinces the mind of the certainty of truth of fact, and produces belief. proof is derived from personal knowledge, or from the testimony of others, or from conclusive reasoning. proof differs from demonstration, which is applicable only to those truths of which the contrary is inconceivable.

    This has neither evidence of truth, nor proof sufficient to give it warrant.

    3. Firmness or hardness that resists impression, or yields not to force; impenetrability of physical bodies; as a wall that is of proof against shot.

    See arms of proof

    4. Firmness of mind; stability not to be shaken; as a mind or virtue that is proof against the arts of seduction and the assaults of temptation.

    Notice, the key concepts from Webster’s 1828 that seem to have been eroded over the past nigh on 200 years:

    In law and logic, that degree of evidence which convinces the [–> unprejudiced, we safely add] mind of the certainty of truth of fact, and produces belief. proof is derived from personal knowledge, or from the testimony of others, or from conclusive reasoning. proof differs from demonstration, which is applicable only to those truths of which the contrary is inconceivable.

    Notice the contrast to demonstration, which is to utter certainty as the denial is inconceivable, i.e. incoherent or absurd. This — given the date — would include self-evident truths and theorems derived from presumably firm axioms by logical implications and linked constructions. A hundred years later, a direct consequence of Godel is that for sufficiently complex mathematical domains, axiom schemes cannot reach all truths and there is no scheme to guarantee their coherence. This, a further ninety years later, leaves us with only self evident truths as utterly certain, and insofar as such are pervasive first principles, these are not provable, strictly speaking. (The attempts will already use the principles.)

    Further to this, we see that proof is multifaceted and person-relative. That is, a warped or prejudiced or indoctrinated or closed mind may well find an adequate proof unconvincing. Of course, cognitive dissonance may well obtain, and blame will be projected to some suitable other. Indeed, a good part of ideological indoctrination is programming that makes such projection plausible and automatic.

    On experience, this includes defying logic, even logical demonstration. As a specific case, it is demonstrable from Boolean Algebra or truth table exhaustion of possible T/F states that when in p => q, p = (a AND b), this entails a => p and/or b => q. For example that Socrates is a man as well as that men are mortal each directly entail Socrates’ mortality. (And yes, this is a bridge from implication logic to syllogisms.)

    The reaction I recall, is that the indoctrinated case is somehow, “different.” It took deeply painful, life wounding experiences to break the programming in most cases.

    As a further consequence, let us note how the original Webster’s defined proof:

    . . . that degree of evidence which convinces the [–> unprejudiced, we safely add] mind of the certainty of truth of fact, and produces belief. proof is derived from personal knowledge, or from the [–> credible] testimony of others, or from conclusive reasoning.

    See the reference to certainty? Notice the context, personal knowledge, credible testimony, conclusive reasoning? These are terms that indicate that what constitutes a proof will vary depending on type of problem, circumstances and individuals involved. Where, of course, certainty notoriously comes in degrees starting with moral certainty. While onward it ranges upwards to utter, incorrigible certainty, the first threshold is that certainty is that degree of conviction due to such warrant that if X meets the level, it would be irresponsible or derelict to act as though X were false. Classically, criminal cases in Anglophone jurisdictions are to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. That is, the man in the Clapham bus stop will be convinced it is his duty to find the defendant guilty and subject to severe penalty, even though a residual abstract possibility of error remains. Civil cases are decided at a weaker standard, preponderance of evidence, which seems related to the willingness to bet standard often used with practical cases of Bayesian reasoning and/or likelihood. Scientific hypotheses and theories seem to be decided at a related lower standard.

    This last being noted, separate from degree of credit regarding actual truth of such a hypothesis, its empirical reliability in a tested range can be established independent of actual truth. For example, though we know the limitations, Newtonian Dynamics is still widely used. Similarly, device, circuit and network modelling in electronics can be highly reliable even though obviously contrived. One can argue similarly regarding a lot of accounting, financial and economics modelling.

    Coming back, yes there is a common core concept of proof, but it cannot confer utter certainty.

    We thus see that rhetorical proof pisteis, providing good support but not absolute warrant, per Aristotle’s pathos-ethos-logos triangle, is a legitimate sense of proof, capable of conveying warrant adequate for knowledge that is defeat-able but confidently held. (Such a “reasonable, responsible conviction” standard is further informed by the Agrippa trilemma forcing resort to finitely remote first plausibles in the roots of our worldviews.)

    Proof is by no means as simple or as cut and dry as we may have been led to initially believe.

    That goes on to the opening remarks in the OP [I add highlights, educationally helpful though not stylistically fashionable], which, strictly, are adequate to firmly set up the core point:

    Prove it . . .” is a familiar challenge, one, often strengthened to “unless you prove it I can disregard what you claim.” However, ever since Epictetus, c. 100 AD, it has met its match:

    DISCOURSES
    CHAPTER XXV

    How is logic necessary?

    When someone in [Epictetus’] audience said, Convince me that logic is necessary, he answered: Do you wish me to demonstrate this to you?—Yes.—Well, then, must I use a demonstrative argument?—And when the questioner had agreed to that, Epictetus asked him. How, then, will you know if I impose upon you?—As the man had no answer to give, Epictetus said: Do you see how you yourself admit that all this instruction is necessary, if, without it, you cannot so much as know whether it is necessary or not? [Notice, inescapable, thus self evidently true and antecedent to the inferential reasoning that provides deductive proofs and frameworks, including axiomatic systems and propositional calculus etc. Cf J. C. Wright]

    Lesson one, there are unproven antecedents of proof, including the first principles of right reason, here especially laws of logic. In this case, if one tries to prove, one is already using them and if one tries to object one cannot but use them, so we sensibly accept them as self-evident, pervasive first principles.

    It seems this brief but quite adequate argument cuts across our deeply held culturally induced expectations and perceptions regarding proof and the default of skepticism.

    Re-thinking is in order, methinks.

    KF

  35. 35
    kairosfocus says:

    MNY, kindly note the just above. “Proof” is a slippery eel. KF

  36. 36

    KF, Obviously with “proof”, as with many things, there is an objective notion of it, and a subjective notion of it.

    Feelings of certitude, being convinced, are the subjective notions of proof, and the demonstration of logic is the objective notion of proof.

    I well remember Abner Mintz on talk.origins, his argumentation was that he was not convinced by my argumentation. That was his entire argumentation, that he was not convinced.

  37. 37
    kairosfocus says:

    MNY,

    of course, proofs must address objective warrant, to the point that to disregard them is irresponsible.

    Beyond that threshold, some relatively few things are capable of being shown to far higher warrant, including that some things are utterly certain. Though, ironically some of those are incapable of proof as they are pervasive principles or facts of reason so the attempt already uses what was hoped to be proved.

    Where, in particular, credible scientific observations hold credibility as observations not because we tag them Science. Beyond, Scientific explanations — and especially those on the remote and unobservable actual past of origins — cannot amount to moral certainty. The pessimistic induction puts paid to that as the list of sharply limited or outright dead theories is long. Further to this, empirical support and inferences on causal factors is a best explanation inductive argument. Let’s add, that when scientific theories are tested, reliable in some gamut of experience [so can be used in engineering etc] that is itself a matter of experience and acquires credibility through that not through the imagination that we have discovered the big-T truth. Many known to be strictly false engineering models are highly empirically reliable.

    We therefore see a telling pattern in the Evolution as Fact and Theory Wiki post:

    Fact is often used by scientists to refer to experimental or empirical data or objective verifiable observations.[14][15] “Fact” is also used in a wider sense to mean any theory for which there is overwhelming evidence.[16]

    A fact is a hypothesis that is so firmly supported by evidence that we assume it is true, and act as if it were true. —Douglas J. Futuyma[6]

    In the sense that evolution is overwhelmingly validated by the evidence, it is a fact. It is frequently said to be a fact in the same way as the Earth’s revolution around the Sun is a fact.[6][17] The following quotation from Hermann Joseph Muller’s article, “One Hundred Years Without Darwinism Are Enough,” explains the point.

    There is no sharp line between speculation, hypothesis, theory, principle, and fact, but only a difference along a sliding scale, in the degree of probability of the idea. When we say a thing is a fact, then, we only mean that its probability is an extremely high one: so high that we are not bothered by doubt about it and are ready to act accordingly. Now in this use of the term fact, the only proper one, evolution is a fact.[18]

    The National Academy of Sciences (U.S.) makes a similar point:

    Scientists most often use the word “fact” to describe an observation. But scientists can also use fact to mean something that has been tested or observed so many times that there is no longer a compelling reason to keep testing or looking for examples. The occurrence of evolution in this sense is a fact. Scientists no longer question whether descent with modification occurred because the evidence supporting the idea is so strong.[19]

    Stephen Jay Gould also points out that “Darwin continually emphasized the difference between his two great and separate accomplishments: establishing the fact of evolution, and proposing a theory – natural selection – to explain the mechanism of evolution.”[20] These two aspects are frequently confused. Scientists continue to argue about particular explanations or mechanisms at work in specific instances of evolution – but the fact that evolution has occurred, and is still occurring, is undisputed.

    Fail, grand fail.

    Especially pernicious, when we recall the old sliding reference switcheroo. “Evolution” is first defined on population changes and minor often loss of function adaptations — micro evolution — is pointed to as observable, e.g. circumpolar species and Galapagos Finches etc. Then this is slid over into body plan origin level macro evolution as though a serious information threshold issue does not exist.

    Going further, origin of life and more get smuggled in, all presented as beyond responsible dispute so any objector starts under a cloud of suspicion that s/he is ignorant, stupid, insane or wicked.

    Multiply by selective hyperskeptical dismissal of objections and positive inferences to design and we see the indoctrination at work.

    So, part of the ground work we have to do is to sort out logic and first principles so that we can for example clear up the confusion as to what a proof is, what knowledge is, what a fact is, what warrant is, what a self-evident truth is, what a pervasive first principle of reasoning is.

    Then, there is the matter that the naturally evident end of rationality is truth, thus the inescapable first duties of reason in the community of the responsibly, rationally free: to truth, to right reason, to prudence [including warrant], to sound conscience, to neighbour, so too to fairness and justice etc. Down the road of that etc lies the ability to articulate sound frameworks for civil government, sound governance and law. In short, civilisation itself is at stake on these matters.

    KF

  38. 38

    You can see that the evolutionists use all kinds of subjective terminology in relation to fact. “overwhelming”, “firmly” “extremely high” “not bothered” “compelling”

    But there doesn’t seem to be much of any emotion required for statements of facts. No feelings of certainty need be associated to statements of fact.

    Simply looking at things, then basically automatically what is looked at, enters into the mind, in a perfect 1 to 1 corresponding model of it. Looking at the red ball on the table, then closing your eyes, you would still have some good representation of the red ball on the table in your mind, even now you do not see it anymore.

    The objective logical proof of evolution, has a lot of holes in it, regardless that evolutionists feel very certain about it. People can feel very certain that the earth is flat.

    Intelligent design theory, is a competing logically valid theory, consistent with the evidence.

    And the fact that choice is real, makes it a certainty that intelligent design theory is true.

    The high feeling of certainty in daily life that choice is real, can be transferred to feelings of certainty associated to intelligent design theory being true.

  39. 39
    kairosfocus says:

    F/N: I find the following clip on G E Moore (and Wittgenstein) responding to Cartesian-style doubts, noteworthy:

    ‘HINGE PROPOSITIONS’ AND RADICAL SKEPTICISM
    Nicola Claudio Salvatore

    [ . . . ]

    The feature of Cartesian-style arguments is that we cannot know some empirical propositions (such as “I have a body”, or “There are external objects”), as we may be dreaming, hallucinating, deceived by a demon, or be “brains-in-the-vat” (BIVs—i.e., disembodied brains floating in a vat connected to supercomputers). Therefore, as we are unable to refute these skeptical hypotheses, we are also unable to know propositions that we would otherwise accept as being true if we could rule-out these scenarios.

    Let’s take a skeptical hypothesis, SH, such as the BIV hypothesis mentioned above, and M, an empirical proposition like “ I have a body” that would entail the falsity of a skeptical hypothesis. We can then state the structure of Cartesian skeptical arguments as follows:

    (S1) I do not know not-SH
    (S2) If I do not know not-SH, then I do not know M
    [__________]
    (SC) I do not know M

    Considering that we can repeat this argument for each and every of our empirical knowledge claims, the radical skeptical consequence that we can draw from this and similar arguments is that our knowledge is impossible.

    A way of dealing with “Cartesian style” skepticism is to deny the premise S1) of the skeptical argument, thus affirming contra the skeptic that we can know the falsity of the relevant skeptical hypothesis.

    For instance, in his “A defence of commonsense” (1925, henceforth DCS) and “Proof of the external world” (1939, henceforth PEW), G. E. Moore famously argued that we can have knowledge of the “commonsense view of the world”, that is of propositions such as “I have a body”, “There are external objects” or “The earth existed long before my birth” and that this knowledge would offer a direct response against skeptical worries.

    Wittgenstein wrote the 676 anti-skeptical remarks published posthumously as On Certainty (1969, henceforth OC) under the influence of both DCS and PEW, and of the conversations he had about these papers with his pupil and friend Norman Malcolm.

    As I’ve briefly mentioned, Moore’s affirmation that he knows for certain the “obvious truisms” of commonsense is pivotal in his anti-skeptical strategy; his knowledge-claims would allow him to refute the skeptic.

    But, argues Wittgenstein, to say that we simply “know” Moore-style propositions would be somewhat misleading. First, because in order to say “I know” one should be able, at least in principle, to produce evidence and/or to offer compelling grounds for his beliefs. This is to say, the “language game” of knowledge involves and presupposes the ability to give reasons, justifications and evidence. Now this seems highly problematic in the case of Moore-style propositions.

    This is because, argues Wittgenstein (OC 245), Moore’s grounds aren’t stronger than what they are supposed to justify. Just imagine, for instance, than one attempted to legitimate one’s claim to know that p by using the evidence that one has for p (for example, what one sees, what one has been told about p and so on). Now, if the evidence we adduce to support p is less secure than p itself, then this same evidence would be unable to support p.

    But if it would be somewhat odd to claim that we simply ‘know’ Moore-style propositions, still, argues Wittgenstein, they cannot be object of doubt. If someone is holding seriously a denial of a Moore style proposition, for instance by saying that she has no body, we would not investigate the truth-value of her affirmations, but her ability to understand the language she is using or her sanity; for a similar false belief would more likely be the result of a sensorial or mental disturbance (OC 526).

    Also, for Wittgenstein doubts must be based on grounds: that is, they are internal to a precise practice and must be in a way or another justified. If they don’t, they are constitutively empty. Wittgenstein gives the example (OC 310) of a pupil that constantly interrupts a lesson questioning about the existence of things, or of the meaning of words. His doubts will lack any sense, and at most it will lead to a sort of epistemic paralysis; he will just be unable to learn the skill/subject we are trying to teach him (OC 315).

    More generally, for Wittgenstein any proper epistemic inquiry presupposes that we take something for granted; if we start doubting everything, there will be no knowledge at all. As he remarks at one point:

    If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either […] If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty (OC 114-115).

    Not knowable or doubtable, Wittgenstein calls Moore-style propositions “hinges” (OC 341-343); just apparently empirical contingent claims which on closer inspection perform a different, more basic role in our epistemic practices.

    This of course hints of self-evident truths, and the absurdities that stem from attempted radical denial.

    KF

  40. 40
    William J Murray says:

    This all depends on where you draw the “radical” line when applying or entertaining skepticism. I would draw the “radical” line at existential unavoidables.

    Is it innately “radical skepticism” to doubt we have an extra-mental, physically material body? You don’t get to draw that line for others for free. You can call people who doubt that “radical skeptics,” but that’s just your personal perspective. Based on current scientific evidence, it is entirely reasonable to doubt that our “physical bodies” exist in the manner we thought prior to that evidence. Our experience of a physical body is undeniable, but that is a statement about experience and is not also a concomitant statement about what it is that experience represents.

    Yes, you do get the undeniable experience of a physical body; but no, you do not also get what you believe that experience represents.

    As I’ve pointed out, there is a difference between what we experience and what we think that experience means, indicates, or represents. The experience of having a physical body and a consistent, mutual physical world around us does not tell us how to think about those experiences. Our sensory experiences do not tell us how to think about our sensory experiences.

    That is fully, rationally and reasonably debate-able, especially given the current evidence.

  41. 41
    kairosfocus says:

    WJM, our first conscious experience is that of embodiment. KF

  42. 42
    William J Murray says:

    WJM, our first conscious experience is that of embodiment. KF

    Yes, we are in complete agreement on that. Did you think otherwise?

  43. 43

    The correct procedure is to first figure out the logic that you are already using in ordinary common discourse. First find out what you say is true, instead of finding out what is really true. Then second if you find errors in that logic, then you can fix those errors, to find out what is really true.

    We use creationist logic of opinion and fact in common discourse. There are no errors in it. It works.

    These kinds of considerations about not feeling certain that something exists seem to just be psychological considerations, and not logical. They don’t seem to improve on the logic as used in common discourse, it just goes nowhere.

    And who really needs feelings of certainty anyway? It is a very bland neutral feeling. Objectivity is a very passive pursuit in my experience. It just goes on automatically, in a forced way, without much of any feeling to it. Subjectivity is obviously where feelings are at.

    So in comparison, you assert self evident truths as the basis, while I assert a critical understanding of the logic used in common discourse as the basis, the creationist conceptual scheme.

    You also use common discourse, because it is unavoidable, besides using self evident truths. So you posit extra things, while I posit just the minimum.

  44. 44
    Sandy says:

    Somebody preseted the rules of this world (body ,soul, morality,free will) and we are too dumb to understand all the mechanisms that are behind the scene. We are actors , Somebody else set the stage and the rules.

  45. 45
    kairosfocus says:

    Once the first experience of consciousness, through which others are acquired is deemed dubious, the onward cascade is obvious . . . self-referential absurdity.

  46. 46
    William J Murray says:

    Once the first experience of consciousness, through which others are acquired is deemed dubious, the onward cascade is obvious . . . self-referential absurdity.

    Nobody here is “deeming” our senses dubious, KF. Did you think otherwise?

  47. 47
    William J Murray says:

    Apparently, KF, you are conflating the experience of embodiment (a given) and sensory experience (again, a given) with perspectives about what those experiences mean, what they refer to, how to organize them, etc. Once again: I’m not doubting the experience of embodiment and I’m not doubting sensory experience other than anyone would regardless of their beliefs because we all know error exists.

    You can repeat it any number of times to make it seem like I am doubting my experience of embodiment, or doubting my sensory experience more than what is appropriate given the potential for error in any belief system, but that is entirely a straw man. I do not doubt those things. What I am challenging is what those things mean, what they refer to.

    Are you incapable of understanding that distinction? I’ve repeated it now many times.

  48. 48

    The complete superiority of the creationist conceptual scheme over all the other philosophical stuff:

    1. Because the creationist logic is inherent in ordinary common discourse, it is therefore God given

    2. It covers reality in it’s entirety, leaves nothing out

    3. It has no logical errors

    4. It is practically useful, as creationist logic is used in common discourse by everyone

    5. It defines subjectivity and opinion

    6. It defines objectivity and fact

    7. It directly supports the main mechanism of intelligent design theory, which is choice

    8. It is in line with nature, because as the creationist conceptual scheme has 2 fundamental categories, so also the brain has 2 halves.

    9. It is the most intellectually honest theory, because it is in line with common discourse. So then there is no duplicity between common discourse sayings, and intellectual sayings.

    10. In it’s application in common discourse it presents a continuity and shared understanding, of all people everywhere, throughout history.

    11. The creationist conceptual scheme is the lesson that should be learned from the holocaust, where asserting matters of opinion as if they were matters of fact (social darwinism), led to personal and societal catastrophy.

    12. It is the most fundamental theory possible, because there is nothing more fundamental than origins, and the creationist conceptual scheme covers origins.

    1. Creator / chooses / spiritual / subjective / opinion
    2. Creation / chosen / material / objective / fact

    Where choosing is defined in terms of spontaneity, making one of alternative futures the present. Or, to make a possible future the present, or not the present.

    And opinion is defined as a chosen expression based on emotion, which expression identifies a creator, and the attributes of a creator like personal character and emotions.

    And fact is defined as a 1 to 1 corresponding model of a creation in the mind, forced by the evidence of it.

  49. 49
    kairosfocus says:

    We have been down this road before. I repeat for cause: “Once the first experience of consciousness, through which others are acquired is deemed dubious, the onward cascade is obvious . . . self-referential absurdity.”

  50. 50
    kairosfocus says:

    Further, all of this is in effect distractive from the focal issue in the OP, that we have to sort out our gaps in addressing the concept, proof.

    I note here, Simon Greenleaf, in his multivolume Evidence . . . and, note the direct echo of Webster’s 1828::

    Evidence, in legal acceptation, includes all the means by which any alleged matter of fact, the truth of which is submitted to investigation, is established or disproved . . . None but mathematical truth is susceptible of that high degree of evidence, called demonstration, which excludes all possibility of error [–> Greenleaf wrote almost 100 years before Godel], and which, therefore, may reasonably be required in support of every mathematical deduction. [–> that is, his focus is on the logic of good support for in principle less than utterly certain conclusions, i.e. in the modern sense, inductive logic and reasoning in real world, momentous contexts with potentially serious consequences.]

    Matters of fact are proved by moral evidence alone; by which is meant, not only that kind of evidence which is employed on subjects connected with moral conduct, but all the evidence which is not obtained either from intuition, or from demonstration. In the ordinary affairs of life, we do not require demonstrative evidence, because it is not consistent with the nature of the subject, and to insist upon it would be unreasonable and absurd. [–> the issue of warrant to moral certainty, beyond reasonable doubt; and the contrasted absurdity of selective hyperskepticism.]

    The most that can be affirmed of such things, is, that there is no reasonable doubt concerning them. [–> moral certainty standard, and this is for the proverbial man in the Clapham bus stop, not some clever determined advocate or skeptic motivated not to see or assent to what is warranted.]

    The true question, therefore, in trials of fact, is not whether it is possible that the testimony may be false, but, whether there is sufficient probability of its truth; that is, whether the facts are shown by competent and satisfactory evidence. Things established by competent and satisfactory evidence are said to be proved. [–> pistis enters; we might as well learn the underlying classical Greek word that addresses the three levers of persuasion, pathos- ethos- logos and its extension to address worldview level warranted faith-commitment and confident trust on good grounding, through the impact of the Judaeo-Christian tradition in C1 as was energised by the 500 key witnesses.]

    By competent evidence, is meant that which the very-nature of the thing to be proved requires, as the fit and appropriate proof in the particular case, such as the production of a writing, where its contents are the subject of inquiry. By satisfactory evidence, which is sometimes called sufficient evidence, is intended that amount of proof, which ordinarily satisfies an unprejudiced mind [–> in British usage, the man in the Clapham bus stop], beyond reasonable doubt.

    The circumstances which will amount to this degree of proof can never be previously defined; the only legal [–> and responsible] test of which they are susceptible, is their sufficiency to satisfy the mind and conscience of a common man; and so to convince him, that he would venture to act upon that conviction, in matters of the highest concern and importance to his own interest.

    [= definition of moral certainty as a balanced unprejudiced judgement beyond reasonable, responsible doubt. Obviously, i/l/o wider concerns, while scientific facts as actually observed may meet this standard, scientific explanatory frameworks such as hypotheses, models, laws and theories cannot as they are necessarily provisional and in many cases have had to be materially modified, substantially re-interpreted to the point of implied modification, or outright replaced; so a modicum of prudent caution is warranted in such contexts — explanatory frameworks are empirically reliable so far on various tests, not utterly certain. Morally certain facts of observation and experience in our common world are not necessary truths.]

    [A Treatise on Evidence, Vol I, 11th edn. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1888) ch 1., sections 1 and 2. Shorter paragraphs added. (NB: Greenleaf was a founder of the modern Harvard Law School and is regarded as a founding father of the modern Anglophone school of thought on evidence, in large part on the strength of this classic work.)]

  51. 51
    William J Murray says:

    KF,

    Yes, we have been down this road several times, and you’re still tilting at straw men, at least when it comes to your responses to my comments. You keep reiterating arguments that do not apply to what I have said, as if they do.

    At this point, I don’t think you are capable of actually understanding my argument and position, or my objections to various aspects of your ontology/epistemology. I’ve corrected you many, many times, to no apparent avail.

  52. 52
    kairosfocus says:

    Re-labelling a fairly serious reductio issue . . . names like Moore, Wittgenstein, Reid or Plantinga et al are not to be lightly disregarded . . . as a strawman caricature simply underscores the force of the point.

    1: Our self-aware consciousness is the first fact of our mental life, involving both responsible rational freedom AND compelling evidence of embodiment. (If one gins up doubt on the latter, contrive to cease breathing for an hour or so, then see if one can come back for onward discussion, an exercise that, predictably will not be done by a sober minded individual. )

    2: If the rationality and/or basic accuracy of core mind comes under serious doubt if certain worldview claims are entertained, this undermines credibility of thought in general for that worldview. (Such is manifestly self-defeating.)

    3: The common sense approach therefore accepts that while errors exist they cannot be accepted as plausibly pervasive, or even the perception of error vs accuracy is in doubt . . . we are error-prone and are bound to seek warrant towards responsible reason and truth, but errors are local not global.

    4: By contrast, grand skepticism narratives privilege doubt and/or denial (similar to the Cartesian or Plato’s cave patterns etc), and so open the door to grand delusion. As a class, they fall under 1 and 2.
    ______________________

    C1: We can never warrant a grand delusion hypothesis, it is self-referentially incoherent, self-defeating and self-destructive to rationality. Such includes denial of embodiment, cave type narratives man vs dreaming butterfly claims, brains in vats, deceitful cosmos controlling demons etc. Any worldview that leads to such is self-discrediting. Basic common sense, without responsible rational, self-aware freedom reasoned thought is impossible so anything that “reasons” to utter irrationality is absurd.

    C2: Any hypothesis that allows or invites or asserts grand delusion in the door is absurd and may be disregarded as self-refuting, self-falsifying.

    C3: This leaves the common sense approach that accepts our embodiment and recognises that mind rises above GIGO-bound computational substrates as “last man standing,” i.e. the human mind involves properties of an [extended] oracle machine as part of the supervision of our cybernetic loop, embodiment.

    C4: This implies in effect trans-dimensionality of our nature. Mind and linked conscience cannot credibly be accounted for on mere action, structure and programming of computational substrates. True rational responsible free mind implies an oracle.

    C5: Thus, there is room for reality beyond our physical, causal temporal domain and reductionism that seeks to claim mind as epiphenomena of computational substrates or the like, but such does not undermine physicality and our embodiment. We may speak to the spirit or the soul meaningfully. This is of course far extended from the basic first common sense point of taking embodiment and rational, community of such persons seriously. See the going concern chart in the OP.

    C6: Spiritual or the like, obviously does not exclude malevolent intelligent agents [starting with fellow humans sold out to evil such as a Stalin or a Schicklegruber etc, but also our own inner strugles], but it does imply their limited character. Reality rooted in ultimate evil and deception as a facet of that ultimate root is off the cards. And yes, we are here looking at ultimate metaphysics, root-source of reality thus worldviews . . . the sustained programme of studiously subverting addressing basic common sense has forced me to speak briefly for record.

    C7: In that context we must discern spirits, including whether particular dream worlds, visions and participative visions are true or misleading. (In a previous thread, I spoke to this for record on repeated demand and hints of my having no basis to address, far from it, I sought to deal with the basic common sense rationality.)

    C8: Classically, for cause, the test of sound discernment has been regard for Jesus of Nazareth, his incarnation, service, teachings, miracles — including deliverance from malevolent spirits, death, burial and resurrection with 500 witnesses. Disregard for such is a red flag that in such there is no light of day. So is cultivation of hyperskeptical dismissivenesss. Likewise, systematic distortion.

    C9: The very fact that such is likely to be scoffed at and/or dismissed today is itself a strong sign of how far wrong our civilisation now is.

    The issue, clearly, is not objections to my particular worldview [and notice dodging of the issues being raised by serious names . . . in reply to the corrosive hyperskepticism of Western thought over the past several centuries], but undermining of basic rationality rooted in common good sense.

    Are we rational with credible minds, senses and proprioception*? If one cannot answer, yes, our errors will be limited, one destroys the basis for objective reason and serious conversation guided by first duties of responsible reason.

    * proprioception:

    Examination of the Sensory System

    Steven McGee MD, in Evidence-Based Physical Diagnosis (Fourth Edition), 2018
    Proprioception
    I Definition

    Proprioception allows individuals to detect joint motion and limb position when their eyes are closed.17 Like most of the simple sensations, proprioception has distinct sense organs and ascending pathways in the spinal cord. Unlike simple sensations, however, full perception requires a healthy contralateral cerebral cortex; in this way it resembles cortical sensations.18,19 (See the section on Cortical Sensations.)

    Sir Charles Bell originally called proprioception the “sixth sense.” In 1906, Sherrington introduced the term “proprioception” to describe this sensation.17,20

    In short, ability to accurately sense body orientation and pose in the world, i.e. specifics of embodiment. A vital necessity for survival. A core first fact of our conscious self-awareness in the common world. It is through these that we access other facts.

  53. 53
    William J Murray says:

    KF said:

    Re-labelling a fairly serious reductio issue .

    I haven’t re-labeled anything. I’ve pointed out that the labels do not, and should not, determine how we think about that which has been labeled. Labels do not represent reality; the are ways of pointing at something. The labels “sensory experience” and “experience of embodiment” do not point at any particular ontological arrangement of what is being labeled because those labels point at the experience itself, not the ontological interpretation of that experience.

    as a strawman caricature simply underscores the force of the point.

    The only person here using “strawman “caricatures” here is you, when you claim I am doubting the experience itself, and not just a particular ontological interpretation of that experience.

    The issue, clearly, is not objections to my particular worldview…

    My objections are specifically to you, about the worldview you are expressing here. If those other fellas were here, I’d be objecting to them about their worldviews. That others share your worldview is entirely irrelevant.

    [and notice dodging of the issues being raised by serious names . . . in reply to the corrosive hyperskepticism of Western thought over the past several centuries], but undermining of basic rationality rooted in common good sense.

    When Moore, Wittgenstein, Reid or Plantinga show up here, I’ll be happy to take up my argument with them. Your appeals to them are irrelevant; you can either make your case here or you cannot.

    Nobody is being “hyperskeptical” of “basic rationality” whatsoever. As far as “common sense,” honestly, if your argument relies on appeals to “common sense,” you don’t even have a substantial argument.

    As I said, it is apparent you cannot or will not accept that there is a fundamental difference between what we experience and what we believe that experience means or refers to. You don’t get your interpretation for free; your appeal to “common sense” has no weight; your appeal to “common human experience” is a projection of your own experiences writ large; your insistence that my perspective is inherently self-referentially absurd and leads to “grand delusion” is entirely a strawman argument because you clearly do not understand my argument and repeatedly mischaracterize it; you arguments about duty to right reason is one of mind-reading and projection which you hold as if you know my thoughts and motivations better than I do.

    Your “argument” consists entirely of regurgitating your own ontology and epistemology over and over and over as if it somehow applies to mine, as if it can be used to evaluate mine, spending almost zero time even trying to understand mine. You take what I say, change it to what the words I say mean under your paradigm, and respond to that as if that is what I meant when I said those words, even in the teeth of being corrected multiple times.

    Because of this, it seems to me that you are incapable of understanding concepts that diverge from your own ontological/epistemological perspective. Either you do not understand them, or you’re just refusing to address those actual concepts, and are choosing to restate them as different concepts entirely so that you can issue forth canned responses to them.

    Here’s the problem your worldview faces, KF: your interpretation of what “embodiment” and “physical world” means has been scientifically disproved. Those experiences remain, but those experiences must mean something other than what your ontology and epistemology require. Thus, your entire O/E system, like the O/E system of materialists, has been disproved.

    You can keep clinging to it if you wish, but IMO you are no different than those that remain ideologically committed to materialism or forms of Darwinism.

  54. 54

    It is by far more important to understand the logical definition of proof, because then you know what to aim for.

    You have not actually accepted the logical definition of what a fact is. You just only emphasize subjective warranted feelings of certitude.

    Subjective standards like satisfactory, reasonable, competent evidence, etc. are generally besides the point, because they are much arbitrary.

    When is the evidence good enough that the covid vaccines are safe?

    I would say after 3 years of detailed study of the effects of it.

    Other people have other standards. I would say my standards are better. Other people make many other subjective judgements, than I do. I could charge that their subjective judgements are “evil”, “careless”. And viceversa it can be charged.

    And the choices based on these subjective judgements are actionable, that they can be punished if subjectively found to be careless etc.

  55. 55
    kairosfocus says:

    WJM, our experience is of embodiment, through which we experience other aspects of the world and facilitate reflection. Radical “reinterpretation” is, whether you acknowledge or not, tantamount to that experience being a shadow show. A strong illustration of this is the natural sense taken by the vast majority of humanity (and animals for that matter). A thought-test to consider (not to actually carry out due to fatal consequences) would be the stop breathing for an hour exercise. The Plato’s Cave shadow show challenge with level 1, 2, 3 . . . successive delusions cannot be evaded. I have already outlined on various experiences of dream states and of visionary character. If you imagine that a common sense approach that uses law of distinct identity to distinguish mind from body [rational, responsible freedom going beyond GIGO constrained so inherently non rational ipo computational substrates], then extends the oracle machine concept to look at a Smith two tier controller cybernetic loop approach to embodiment is not materially different from evolutionary materialism, that speaks for itself. KF

  56. 56
    Lieutenant Commander Data says:

    What reliable sense did WJM use to reach the conclusion that our senses are unreliable?

  57. 57
    kairosfocus says:

    More from Salvatore:

    To sum up, ‘rules of grammar’ have three features which make them different from empirical knowledge claims. First, they are not descriptive but normative; second, they cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed by reality but rather are ways to make sense of reality; finally, they are not propositions as their negation is not false but senseless.

    In short, we have a window on self-evident truths and on the modern hesitation to acknowledge such.

    KF

  58. 58
    jerry says:

    Yes, our senses are not perfectly reliable. Everyone since the hunter gatherers has known this. We frequently make mistakes of judgment based on imperceptions. Has anyone heard the expression, “mirage?”

    This does not mean that the senses cannot observe the material world reliably. We are constantly reassessing the world based on further observation by ourselves and inputs from others. The observations get incredibly reliable after such additional focusing.

    I am currently looking out the window at our rental unit on the New Jersey shore. I cannot see the beach but know if I go out the front door and walk two blocks it will be there. It will be there tomorrow and every day we are here the beach will be in the same place. Everyone staying with us agrees the beach is there. Fantastically reliable observations by mine and everyone else’s senses.

    If someone came along and said the beach is not there. It’s just our interpretation of our fallible senses, we would humor the person for a short time, but after persistence, ignoring is the only nonorable option. Those who continue to engage are the fools.

  59. 59
    William J Murray says:

    Jerry said:

    If someone came along and said the beach is not there. It’s just our interpretation of our fallible senses, we would humor the person for a short time, but after persistence, ignoring is the only nonorable option. Those who continue to engage are the fools.

    The problem is, nobody has said “the beach is not there,” and the IRT interpretation of what the experience of the beach means does not indict that sensory information as erroneous. The sensory information is not erroneous; the interpretation of what that information means and refers to has been shown via repeated scientific experimentation to be erroneous.

    Dread it. Run from it. The evidence keeps arriving all the same.

    Hat tip to Thanos.

  60. 60
    William J Murray says:

    LCD said:

    What reliable sense did WJM use to reach the conclusion that our senses are unreliable?

    WJM never said or implied that our senses are unreliable. In fact, WJM has repeatedly said the opposite.

  61. 61
    William J Murray says:

    KF @55:

    As I said and have explained exhaustively, you are responding to your straw man version of IRT. It has nothing to do with my actual IRT, regardless of how often you repeat yourself.

    To repeat:

    Here’s the problem your worldview faces, KF: your interpretation of what “embodiment” and “physical world” means has been scientifically disproved. Those experiences remain, but those experiences must mean something other than what your ontology and epistemology require. Thus, because your O/E system requires a disproved interpretation, your entire O/E system, like the O/E system of materialists, has been disproved.

    Dread it. Run from it. The evidence arrives all the same.

  62. 62
    kairosfocus says:

    WJM, sorry, once you backed away from your acknowledgement that we are credibly embodied, it is over. The cascade of grand delusions issue is not going to go away for any proposed view that pivots on skeptically suggesting general unreliability of our embodiment and other first facts of consciousness. KF

  63. 63
    Lieutenant Commander Data says:

    Jerry
    Has anyone heard the expression, “mirage?”

    Where is the unreliability of our senses in case of a mirage ?

    Kairosfocus
    WJM, sorry, once you backed away from your acknowledgement that we are credibly embodied, it is over. The cascade of grand delusions issue is not going to go away

    Kairosfocus would be fun to dismantle piece by piece IRT worldview comparing it with Christianity worldview ,from Origins to Teleology to make WJM stop even mention “his IRT” .

  64. 64
    William J Murray says:

    KF said:

    WJM, sorry, once you backed away from your acknowledgement that we are credibly embodied, it is over.

    Only, I never did any such thing. Straw man.

    The cascade of grand delusions issue is not going to go away for any proposed view that pivots on skeptically suggesting general unreliability of our embodiment and other first facts of consciousness. KF

    At this point, after repeatedly correcting you, it’s appears you have some kind of cognitive blindness operating. And, that’s the charitable interpretation.

  65. 65
    William J Murray says:

    LCD said:

    Kairosfocus would be fun to dismantle piece by piece IRT worldview comparing it with Christianity worldview ,from Origins to Teleology to make WJM stop even mention “his IRT” .

    That would be fun, but KF has never shown an interest in understanding IRT. He’s apparently satisfied with dismantling his straw men over .. and over … and over … and …

  66. 66
    William J Murray says:

    We are 100%, absolutely, credibly embodied.

    The question is, what does that mean, ontologically speaking?

    KF’s ontological perspective of what “embodied” means has been scientifically disproved. My ontological perspective of what “embodied” means is completely supported by about 100 years of scientific evidence.

    Dread it. Run from it. The evidence arrives all the same.

  67. 67
    kairosfocus says:

    WJM, embodiment cannot be disproved by science, science in fact starts from embodied practitioners. Similarly, Science studies the common physical world that we inhabit. Theories as to molecular, atomic and particle structure do not change the core of what it means to be a solid, liquid, gas body etc. but only draw out hos such works. Solids still retain their shape absent stress induced deformation, liquids still flow under the shearing effect of their weight, gases expand to fill a container, etc. It still remains the case that a computational substrate is a non rational, IPO, GIGO limited signal processing mechanical entity. Rationality cannot be explained on computation, as it requires freedom, we are looking at oracles there. And so forth. KF

  68. 68
    kairosfocus says:

    LCD, we are dealing with a distraction, one cannot address worldviews properly until one first shows that there is a way to recognise facts of consciousness and credibility of rational inference. Basic common sense comes first. In thye OP we address the matter of proof thus disproof. And in particular, if a scheme of thought discredits first facts of consciousness it discredits rationality thus becomes self-referentially absurd. We are dealing with attempts to defend absurdities connected to hyperskepticism of types that were injected by Descartes and others, leading to many needless conundrums. KF

  69. 69

    To be “embodied”, it means the body has some kind of organization in terms of decisionmaking processes, and the subjective human spirit decides.

    The spirit being subjective, there is no objective evidence for it whatsoever. So the statement that it cannot be doubted people are embodied, is wrong.

    One might produce a personal opinion that someone has no soul, that the spirit is not there. That could be considered to be a very mean opinion, but being mean is not logically invalid.

  70. 70

    Also, this discussion contintues to be ridiculous.

    KF asks, what is proof? Then throws out any logical definition of it, becaus that logical definition would only apply to some part of mathematics, and not to science and life in general.

    So then without any logical definition of what proof is, KF then argues that proof is a matter of moral judgement. Wich means, proof is whatever you morally judge it to be. Complete aribitrariness.

    When you throw out logic, then you have a total breakdown of all reasoning. A logical definition of proof is required.

  71. 71
    Lieutenant Commander Data says:

    Kairosfocus
    LCD, we are dealing with a distraction, one cannot address worldviews properly until one first shows that there is a way to recognise facts of consciousness and credibility of rational inference. Basic common sense comes first. In thye OP we address the matter of proof thus disproof. And in particular, if a scheme of thought discredits first facts of consciousness it discredits rationality thus becomes self-referentially absurd. We are dealing with attempts to defend absurdities connected to hyperskepticism of types that were injected by Descartes and others, leading to many needless conundrums. KF

    So true and so smart.

    WJM
    We are 100%, absolutely, credibly embodied.

    WJM
    My ontological perspective of what “embodied” means is completely supported by about 100 years of scientific evidence.

    WJM practically says :”we are embodied 100% but … we are not embodied”

  72. 72
    William J Murray says:

    KF said:

    WJM, embodiment cannot be disproved by science, science in fact starts from embodied practitioners.

    Who said otherwise? This is a continuation of your straw man.

    Science studies the common physical world that we inhabit.

    Again, who said otherwise? More straw man.

    Theories as to molecular, atomic and particle structure do not change the core of what it means to be a solid, liquid, gas body etc.

    That’s exactly what 100 years of experimentation has done., KF. It has, in fact, irrefutably changed the core of what that means.

    Dread it. Run from it. The evidence arrives all the same. Your ontology/epistemology, like that of materialists, has been scientifically disproved, whether you like it or not.

  73. 73
    kairosfocus says:

    MNY, actually a proof is defined first by discussion then by key example, a bullet proof material or structure has been tested and shown resistant to some standard projectile. I clip:

    Proof, in the sense, accessibility from some reasonable, finite cluster of axioms, for systems of reasonable complexity [–> deductive sense typified by Math], is thus different from truth. [–> Godel incompleteness] Truth, accurate description of states of affairs. (And BTW, practical axiomatisations typically are built to be compatible with recognised facts, some of which may be self-evident like || + ||| –> |||||.)

    Already, we are in trouble. It gets deeper once we come to Science. As in, follow the Science, Science has proved etc. Next to me is a gift [thanks Aunt X], “Proving Einstein right.” Only, science is incapable of such strong-sense proof. We may empirically support theories as explanations through empirical evidence, but at most we can say our theories are plausible and may prove — test out — to be at least partly true but are subject to the limits of inductive thinking. That is, we face the pessimistic induction, that our explanations that seemed ever so plausible have historically consistently been sharply limited or outright wrong often enough to give us pause.

    We already saw a weaker sense of to prove, to test with some rigor. Bullet proof, means, tested and found credibly resistant to certain specified standard projectiles.

    So, by extension scientific proofs can be reinterpreted to mean that science is a case of weak-sense knowledge: tested, warranted, credibly . . . or plausibly, or even possibly . . . true [so, reliable] belief.

    It gets worse, welcome to . . . tada . . . RHETORICAL proof.

    We are already seriously humbled from our notion of a firm and absolute grasp on truth by the power of our mind to deduce or to infer from observed reliable patterns.

    Now, rhetorical proof comes back in the door– it was there since Aristotle et al — to finish the due humbling:

    Richard Nordquist

    Updated July 30, 2019

    In classical rhetoric, pistis can mean proof, belief, or state of mind.

    ” Pisteis (in the sense of means of persuasion) are classified by Aristotle into two categories: artless proofs ( pisteis atechnoi), that is, those that are not provided by the speaker but are pre-existing, and artistic proofs ( pisteis entechnoi), that is, those that are created by the speaker.”
    A Companion to Greek Rhetoric, 2010

    Etymology: From the Greek, “faith”

    So, we stand duly humbled before, say, the Webster’s 1828 Dictionary, which captures a lost world of by and large forgotten knowledge:

    Proof

    PROOF,noun

    1. Trial; essay; experiment; any effort, process or operation that ascertains truth or fact. Thus the quality of spirit is ascertained by proof; the strength of gun-powder, of fire arms and of cannon is determined by proof; the correctness of operations in arithmetic is ascertained by proof

    2. In law and logic, that degree of evidence which convinces the mind of the certainty of truth of fact, and produces belief. proof is derived from personal knowledge, or from the testimony of others, or from conclusive reasoning. proof differs from demonstration, which is applicable only to those truths of which the contrary is inconceivable.

    This has neither evidence of truth, nor proof sufficient to give it warrant.

    3. Firmness or hardness that resists impression, or yields not to force; impenetrability of physical bodies; as a wall that is of proof against shot.

    See arms of proof

    4. Firmness of mind; stability not to be shaken; as a mind or virtue that is proof against the arts of seduction and the assaults of temptation.

    We need to do some re-thinking.

    KF

  74. 74
    kairosfocus says:

    WJM, you seem to have forgotten that when, on strength of your admission, I noted that we agreed on credibility of embodiment you suddenly backed away. For cause, I note that among the first facts of consciousness is that of embodiment, through which we sense our orientation and pose in the world and thus also other entities therein, decisively shaping our thought and inference. I add, this includes scientific investigations, which manifestlt take our embodiment and the physical world seriously. Any scheme of thought about the world and knowledge that opens the door to radical doubt about or holding delusional on such facts fatally undermines its own credibility; sawing off the branch on which it sits. The thought exercise of one hour’s cessation from breathing and effects, should be enough of a test. Such schemes of radical doubt are incoherent, absurd, discrediting the minds we need to think. They can safely be dismissed as breaches of common sense [the old rule 4 IIRC of one of my high schools]. KF

    PS: Quantum, molecular etc physics changed our understanding of how solids liquids and gases are made up from micro-level components, not the concept that there are macroscopic solids [retaining shape and volume up to elastic deformation], liquids [flowing under internal shear but retaining volume], gases [having neither definite shape nor volume].

  75. 75
    William J Murray says:

    KF said:

    WJM, you seem to have forgotten that when, on strength of your admission, I noted that we agreed on credibility of embodiment you suddenly backed away.

    That never happened.

    What happened is that I pointed out that while we both agree that our embodiment was not only credible, but unquestionable, that doesn’t mean you get to include along with that your ontological interpretation of what embodiment means.

    Your ontological interpretation of what embodiment means has been disproved and mine has been credibly supported by 100 years of experimental results.

    Dread it. Run from it. The evidence arrives all the same.

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