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Logic and Reason

Logic and First Principles of right reason

KH vs Sandy: “What you see as “self evident first principles”, others may not see it that way”

In the Why thread, commenter KH has challenged: KH, 157:>>What you see as “self evident first principles”, others may not see it that way. And, with respect, the tone in which you berate them I’d not going to do anything to convince them that you are right.>> Now, the issue is of course both more complex than that and more simple than that. On tone, it is easy to pose as on one side of an issue as a moderate then spend one’s rhetorical effort undermining that side. Given the history of abuse, targetting and trollery that regularly invades UD, that unfortunately has to be reckoned with; and in a wider context of addressing very serious and destructive agendas haunting Read More ›

The self-falsifying error of dismissive, hyperskeptical certitude

It seems that Seversky has fallen into an exemplary case of error in the nothing certain thread that needs to be headlined and corrected for the record: Sev, 13: >>What I see in the writings of the likes of kf, BA and BA77 is the same craving for certainty [in context, held by murderous dictators of C20 and compared to “religious zealots” of the remoter past] – some impregnable bedrock Truth – on which their lives and beliefs can be founded. Let me say that I don’t believe for one moment that anyone here would knowingly do anyone any harm in the name of their beliefs. But the siren-song of that need for certainty is what can and has lured Read More ›

The Fallacy of Question-Begging Definition

One of the issues that has come up in recent days is the fallacious misuse of definitions that beg questions at stake. Accordingly, I think it advisable to headline a comment from the Nihilism thread and give an example from origins issues: _____________ KF, 262: >>Aleta (attn BA, LH, ES & WJM): While a lot else happened, this is important: [A, 227:] A definition, as a stipulation within a logical system, can’t be in error because we are just declaring that it is what it is. Definitions, even in formal systems, can beg questions (etc. of course) and become dubious as a result. The fallacy of begging the question in an explicit definition or a definition by discussion or a Read More ›

WJM on the truth denialism issue

WJM, of course, often puts up gems well worth headlining and pondering. Here, he tackles truth denialism in reply to KS in the is nothing certain thread: _______________ >>I’ve never understood what Keiths point is in making this argument. So there is some technical chance that god or aliens or demons are deceiving us into believing false propositions. So what? What difference in day to day life would it make to keep reminding oneself that there is a technical possibility that they are in error about anything they think? People still have to act as if they are certain about all sorts of things. People still have to argue as they know some things are true. Keith is as operationally Read More ›

A = A . . . is it important?

In the Nihilism thread, Aleta has asked whether A = A is of real-world importance. Given the depth of the breakdown in reason that we are seeing, I think this is important to take up. I took a moment to suggest an answer, which I think I should headline: ______________ KF, 111: >>Aleta, 100: >>can anyone give an example of a logical argument that uses A = A to help advance the argument? Examples from math are easy. In solving 2x – 5 = 17, students write 5 = 5 in order to “add 5 to both sides of the equation”, invoking a principle [–> an axiom held to be self-evident, in fact] from Euclid that “if equals are added Read More ›

Darwinist rhetorical tactic: the “you don’t know how to reply” talking point

The list of fallacious darwinist rhetorical resorts continues to grow day by day. The one I now headline turns on a failure to realise that each of us is personally accountable before the truth and the right, and so should seek to make sure that he is correct, regardless of anyone else being able to rebut or dismiss. And recall, this tactic is being used in the teeth of the LOI, LNC, LEM cluster, i.e. self-evident first principles of right reason that only the stubbornly irrational will dismiss: _____________ >> . . . as for the you don’t know how to reply rhetorical gambit [remember you are objecting to self evident truths], here is the real problem, per Robert L. Read More ›

Darwinist rhetorical tactic: invidious projection of arrogance to the certainty in the teeth of self-evident truths (LOI, LNC, LEM)

Overnight I have felt it necessary to reply to a case as just outlined, in the Nihilism thread, adding to the long and yet growing list of fallacious Darwinist rhetorical tactics that have had to be headlined in warning: _________________ KF, 47: >>I cannot but comment on this: [LH, 20, to BA:] Are you asserting that you are infallible only when it comes to analytic propositions? I cannot but notice the personalisation and subtext of accusation. First, no sane human being claims infallibility, which does not prevent us from being demonstrably right on certain matters. Even, before we rise to the matter of self-evident truth. Second, the matter at stake is self-evident truths, to wit, such as: SELF-EVIDENT TRUTHS: 1: Read More ›

Chains of warrant and of causation in Origins Science

As has come up as pivotal in recent discussions here at UD, we must recognise that logic and first principles underlie any serious discussion, including origins science, and in sciences  — especially those addressing origins — the issue of chains of cause will be pivotal. The two are connected, as can be seen by first examining chains of warrant: Now, Peter D. Klein, in the Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, highlights: The epistemic regress problem is considered the most crucial in the entire theory of knowledge and it is a major concern for many contemporary epistemologists. However, only two of the three alternative solutions have been developed in any detail, foundationalism and coherentism. Infinitism was not seriously considered as a solution Read More ›

FYI-FTR, Attn LH: a Pepperoni Pizza, sliced . . .

Pizza, sliced: (Relevant to, is a finite whole greater than any of its proper parts?) BTW, Euclid, opening remarks: Axioms. i . Things which are equal to the same, or to equals, are equal to each other. ii . If equals be added to equals the sums will be equal. iii . If equals be taken from equals the remainders will be equal. iv . If equals be added to unequals the sums will be unequal. v . If equals be taken from unequals the remainders will be unequal. vi . The doubles of equal magnitudes are equal. vii . The halves of equal magnitudes are equal. viii . Magnitudes that can be made to coincide are equal. ix . Read More ›

FYI-FTR: SS’s red herring –> strawman abuse of the Golden Rule vs the needed World-Root IS that grounds OUGHT

For some weeks now, in the teeth of repeated correction, SS [attn, LH, DK etc] has been abusing the Golden Rule by dragging it as a red herring across the track of the issue of grounding OUGHT in a world-root level IS, and then setting up a strawman argument on how reciprocity adequately founds moral government of responsibly free agents. He has done it yet again in the ongoing DK -Euthyphro dilemma thread, and so, it is now necessary to headline(and augment)  a corrective for record: ______________ >>SS, 130, I have addressed the world-root level grounding question on this thread and other places and times on UD, as well as extensive comments about the so-called OUGHT-IS gap (bridged by reciprocity Read More ›

FYI-FTR: P burns down rationality in order to save “critical rationality”

Sometimes, it is a sad necessity to make a public example. In this case, P has been attacking not only inductive reasoning but chains of reasoning in general, in order to try to make the generic chaining of warrant illustrated in the following infographic — and especially its focus on the trichotomy, (i) infinite regress, (ii) circularity, (iii) finitely remote first plausibles — seem dubious: (NB: To see where that frame of thought goes, cf here on in context. Also, here.) P commented at 101 in the DK etc thread, and I replied as follows, at 120 by clipping and commenting: _______________ >>Here is the bit of rhetorical trickery and attempted ridicule in the face of what you knew (as Read More ›

TT: “. . . “scientism” (which I think is a bogus term)” . . . or, NOT

Here. Now, let us collect a well-known live example, Lewontin, in NYRB 1997, reviewing Sagan’s The Demon-Haunted world; here, with my annotations: >>. . . to put a correct view of the universe into people’s heads [–> notice, the context of intended indoctrination, with a hint of being backed up by secularist institutional power to enforce such indoctrination] we [–> who? the Evolutionary Materialist elites, that’s who] must first get an incorrect view out . . .   the problem is to get them to reject irrational and supernatural explanations of the world [–> note the ready equation of ethical theism with ignorance and irrationality], the demons [–> notice, equating the inherently good Creator God, a necessary and maximally great being, Read More ›

Mung to SB: What about Laws of (human?) Nature . . .

SB is one of UD’s treasures, who often puts up gems as comments. Accordingly, I headline his current response to Mung on laws of (human) nature: _______________ >>Mung SB, Can you explain why the natural moral law requires a lawgiver? ETA: I don’t believe in natural laws, I believe in natures/essences. So keep that in mind. [SB, reply:] Very interesting comment. Let me try to say something that might bring us together. I assume that we agree that a physical “law,” is really just a human paradigm that describes a “law-like” regularity that is observed in nature. So, ontologically, we are referring to an event that happens over and over again, trying to make sense of it and giving it Read More ›

What is knowledge? (A response to Popperian)

ID debates often bring up foundational worldview issues, and the following exchange in the current Answering P thread is also worth headlining: ___________________ P, 62: >>Knowledge is information that, when embedded in a storage medium, plays a causal role in it being retained. This includes books, genomes and yes, brains. Furthermore, knowledge is objective in that is is independent of anyone’s belief. So, while I would agree that merely having a belief doesn’t make it true, we have a reason to suppose that our brains can genuinely contain knowledge. What explanation do you have for the growth of knowledge? Let me guess: the reason why our beliefs may be true is because “that’s just what God must have wanted”?>> KF, Read More ›

Answering Popperian’s challenge: “why doesn’t someone start out by explaining how human beings generate emotions, then point out how the universality of computation does not fit that explanation . . .”

There are some key motifs that often come up in discussions of design theory and linked ideas. Popperian, as captioned, has posed one of these. Notice, his view, that we GENERATE emotions, suggesting a dynamo churning away and generating electricity. That is, the motif that would reduce explanations to mechanisms is here revealed.  I think it is well worth the pause to address it by headlining an in-thread response: ___________ >>Popperian, re: why doesn’t someone start out by explaining how human beings generate emotions, then point out how the universality of computation does not fit that explanation. Effectively stating “It’s magic and computers are not magic doesn’t cut it.” Pushing the problem into an inexplicable mind hat exists in an Read More ›