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Eigenstate: The Facts Are Inconsistent With My Metaphysics? Well, so Much the Worse For the Facts.

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David Bentley Hart calls subjective self-awareness the “primordial datum.” It is a fact that cannot not be known. It follows that everyone knows it to be a fact. Denying that it is a fact immediately descends into absurdity. Consider “I deny that I am subjectively self-aware.” Here is a chart of the chemicals that make up the human body:

201_Elements_of_the_Human_Body-01

A group of oxygen atoms do not have the capacity to deny a truth claim. I am sure you would agree that the sentence “the oxygen atoms denied truth claim X” is absurd, no matter what X is. What is true for oxygen is also true for the atoms of the other elements of the body, i.e., carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, calcium, phosphorus, etc.

Suppose one gathers together all of the various elements that compose a human body (i.e., oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, etc.) and mixes those chemicals up in exactly the same quantities and proportions that are found in a human body and puts it all in a bag. Does that bag of chemicals have any more capacity to deny a truth claim that a rock? Of course not.

A materialist must say that the human body is nothing but a bag of chemicals. At the basic levels of ontological analysis, the bag of chemicals that we call “human body” is, for the materialist, not in principle different from any other bag of chemicals in terms of its capacity to deny truth claims. Therefore, a materialist must agree with everyone else that the sentence “this bag of chemicals denies that it is really subjectively self-aware,” is absurd.

But all the time materialists say the sense we have that we are subjectively self-aware is an illusion. This, of course, is equivalent to saying “I deny that I am really subjectively self-aware.” And, for the materialist, this sentence is equivalent to the sentence “this bag of chemicals denies that it is really subjectively self-aware,” which, as we have just seen, is absurd.

Summary: Subjective self-awareness is a fact. Indeed, in a sense, it is “the ultimate fact,” from which all other facts can be perceived. It is a fact everyone knows. It is literally undeniable. Any attempt to deny it is incoherent, absurd and false.

In light of this, let us examine another one of eigenstate claims in my “driving a stake” thread:

Something similar is at work with “folk psychology”. There is no “disembodied I”, in the dualist/supernatural/superstitious sense. But such a conclusion based on scientific analysis does not “remove the ‘I’”. Our understanding is just upgraded to something that is consonant with the data and knowledge available about how brains operate. Just like there’s no “impetus”, but motion, acceleration, and gravity remain (and are more clearly and fully understood), there’s no “dualist ‘I’” that is needed or adds any value to our understanding of consciousness, perception, meta-representation, etc.

All of which is to say, Barry, that your “sky-is-falling” dramatics are much too broad in their concerns. The science available is deeply problematic for many of your particular intuitions, but what’s at stake is just a refinement and re-organizing of the models we may use to understand brains and their activities. Beliefs as “disembodied top-down convictions of a ghost-like homunculus” are judged to be misconceptions, or “illusions” for you, if you suppose this is a kind of fundamental perception you have. But beliefs as physical phenomena, discrete characteristics of the brain that map to very complex, but nevertheless concrete states and patterns of brain activity, remain, and not only remain, but are illuminated by the science.

Eigenstate claims that truth claims such as “I am subjectively self-aware” are true and false depending on the sense in which one uses the phrase. To avoid confusion, let us very carefully describe the two senses.

Sense A: The phrase “subjectively self-aware” in the everyday meaning of the phrase speaks of an “agent that perceives his own awareness.” The everyday understanding of the phrase is infused with philosophical “intentionality,” which means the phrase is a mental state that is “about” or “directed at” something. Intentionality is inherently agent-object oriented. In this case, the agent “I” perceives an object “self-awareness.”

Sense B: Eigenstate claims the eliminative materialist believes the phenomenon “subjectively self-aware” is a complex, but nevertheless concrete state and pattern of brain activity, the kind of phenomenon you could observe and measure with an fMRI, or some more advanced instrument yet to be developed.

Eigenstate claims that the sentence “I am subjectively self-aware” is false if the phrase “subjectively self-aware” is used in Sense A and true if the phrase “subjectively self-aware” is used in Sense B.

And how does eigenstate know this? Why, he says that science has demonstrated it.

Lunacy. Sheer lunacy. Science has demonstrated no such thing. I hereby call eigenstate’s bluff. Kindly point to the scientific experience that solved the hard problem of consciousness.

Let me save us some time. No such experiment exists. Materialist do not rule out Sense A subjective self-awareness based upon the findings of science (though they say or imply that incessantly). They rule out Sense A subjective self-awareness because ruling it out is absolutely required by their metaphysics.

But we have just demonstrated that Sense A subjective self-awareness is a fact. It is more than a fact. It is “the fact.” We have even demonstrated that any attempt to deny Sense A subjective self-awareness is absurd.

Yet materialist deny it anyway. Why? Richard Lewontin tells us why:

[W]e have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism. It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door.

For purposes of our discussion today, set aside that last phrase about the Divine Foot. Dualism does not necessarily entail a divinity, and in this post I want to focus on whether materialism is coherent, not on whether theism is a coherent replacement (I believe it is; but that is a topic for another day).

The key to the passage is, of course, the unwavering a priori commitment to materialism. For materialists it is always “materialism first; facts second.” This means that they must absolutely affirm incoherent and absurd statements like “Sense A subjective self-awareness is false.”

In other words, for a materialist, if the facts don’t fit with materialism, so much the worse for the facts.

If I were wearing metaphysical blinders that required me to deny undeniable facts and affirm incoherent and absurd statements, I hope I would reexamine my metaphysics. Otherwise, I am afraid I would be like this guy:

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Comments
I’m not interested in unpredictability by randomizing mechanisms—which has nothing to do with freedom—, or how real illusions may appear. What I’m interested in is who is in control in the real sense. Freedom is about self-causation—causa sui if you will.
Well, dualism is no help, then, and materialism is no hindrance to you. Say I claim that all my choices are due to a "random number generator in my brain". This is a wholly nature, monist state of being, no spooky stuff involved. Random sampling from some noise signal is the causa sui, the means within the self by which choices are made. If the process is truly random, it's as non-deterministic as it can get. Now, humans don't really work like that, but I point that out as a setup for looking at a "dualist causa sui". For the dualist, there is either a) randomness, or b) external dynamics (determinism), just like there is for the monist! If you doubt this, examine a choice -- say the choice as to whether to fold, check, bet when you are dealt a pair of sixes and its your turn (or select something more profound as a choice, doesn't matter), I will simply ask what caused that factor in your choice making. For any given deeper factor, I will ask whence this factor. For example: Me: Why did you choose to "check", there? You: I considered the cards I have, the number of other players, the size of the stacks, etc. and decided checking maximized my odds of winning. Me: Why did you want to maximize your chances to win? You: It's more fun to win then lose, plus I can use the money. Me: And why is it more fun for you win than lose? You: ???. I put question marks there at the last answer because this is where the problem really becomes apparent and branches way out. I imagine if asked that, I'd point to my evolved human nature, and point out that we are wired to be both competitive and selfish in terms of goals and resource acquisition. A Christian might say "God made me that way". But there, you've lost the causa sui you are intent on locating, the basis for choices that obtain wholly from within. That's an incoherent concept "choices being made from within", and I use that term advisedly here in light of the pervasive misuse of that word on this blog. It does not hold together, unless, and only unless one finally grants that the choice arises without purpose, pattern or plan -- randomly. Note that's where I started this, above. Why? Because as soon as you can point to some purpose, pattern or plan, something non-random in your choice making, it begs to broken down into constituent parts. And this regresses ad infinitum until and unless you hit a random, brute bottom layer that leaves you the same position as the most hardcore materialist. "It's just the way I am" doesn't get you out of the problem. Not only is that the materialist position, unless you are an omnigod, your choices then are determined by whoever or whatever made you what you are. There is no escape. There is only avoiding the problem with sloppy and superstitious thinking, accepting uncritically that a "supernatural dimension" to this problem helps. It doesn't because it can't. If you want to try this, let me know and we will look a choice you pick, and I'll ask you for the contributing causal factors for your choice, and the contributing causal factors for those factors, etc., on and on until you see the problem. So, there is no causa sui for humans as understood by the materialist. But neither is any causa sui available to the dualist human, unless that human claims to be an omnigod, the Prime Mover himself. Maybe that's Barry's claim.... ;-)
“My choice” is incoherent, when you discover “your” choices, as opposed to actually making them, then obviously it follows that it is not “you” who is doing the choosing. It’s not your conscious decision.
There's no conflict here. First, my choice is "my" choice because I'm the one who discovers it, and I'm the one who takes action based on those choices, and the one who must live with the consequences of those choices. It doesn't get more "my" than that. Second, my decision is a conscious one -- manifestly I am aware of being in the act of choosing from alternatives -- but it's not exclusively conscious or "front of mind" and cannot be. Subconscious factors are at work, as well, and environmental factors which may perhaps not even consider "subconscious" play a role, too -- for example, if you are coming down with the flu and have a fever, your choice to go do something you otherwise would choose to do may tip you against, even if you are not consciously aware of that influence. The subconscious component of our choices cannot be dismissed. Soon, et al [2008] (see here for example, reviews an experiment where researchers were able to predict choices from subjects many seconds in advance of their conscious awareness of their own choice-making. The instrumentation was able to determine what the choice would be at far higher percentages than chance based on data that came well before the subject *thought* they were making a choice. This does not eliminate the "conscious" part of choosing, but it does mean that a demand like it appears you are making here that choice must be "purely conscious", or somehow devoid of other contributing factors is at odds with how humans observably work.
Again, I’m not interested in illusions or how convincing that may look in practical daily life.
OK. In my experience the resistance to this idea is very often followed by an argument from consequences: if there's no "dualist free will", then there can be no morality or responsibility! All will devolve into chaos and mayhem!. Etc. My points on "social freedom" go toward those concerns. If you aren't motivated by those concerns, good on ya.
I do have a profound problem with your position. I find it utterly incoherent. Allow me to explain.
OK.
If YOU don’t make choices,
But i
do make choices, and so do you, under materialism. If I look at a CNC mill running it's program to cut, say, electric guitar bodies out of billets of maple or mahogany, that machine has perfectly no consciousness about or say in the matter, but it is still, nevertheless, making guitar bodies. It doesn't make guitar bodies as a causa sui -- it requires three stage power, drill bits, computer and software, hydraulics, wood billets, etc. It has intenionality, it is a directed device, creating guitar bodies ready for sanding and painting from raw billet. You are not a "universe unto yourself", any more than the CNC machine is, but you make your decisions, and draw upon the resources needed to make them: experience, emotions, beliefs, goals... You have intentionality, and are making choices from the raw materials of choice, just as the CNC machine is making guitar bodies from the raw materials for guitar bodies.
but if the choices are made for you by blind forces (particles in motion or conglomerates of particles; like neuronal patterns), which are subordinate to natural laws only and not in the least interested in truth, reason, morality or anything then there is no reason whatsoever to trust your choices, reason, morality and so forth—if you had the choice.
Neurons can't see, but collections of neurons assembled in human brains can see, working in concert. There's that 'level of description' problem, once again, the Fallacy of Composition error. A neuron cannot "emote", but a collection of neurons in a human body (connected to neuro-receptors) can. Same song, different verse for investigating truth claims, making ethical judgements, moral choices, etc. If you are thinking you must use "neurons" (or atoms, or elementary particles, etc.) as just some diffuse, unconnected set of neurons laying around as your basis for thinking and choosing, your concerns would be well founded. But collections of neurons such as you will find in your own brain have -- demonstrably -- the capabilities you are concerned about.eigenstate
April 21, 2015
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Eigenstate, Thank you for your clear answer. I'm not interested in unpredictability by randomizing mechanisms—which has nothing to do with freedom—, or how real illusions may appear. What I'm interested in is who is in control in the real sense. Freedom is about self-causation—causa sui if you will.
Eigenstate: My choice was firmly determined before I “discovered” my choice, so I’m not choosing in any dualist or superstitious sense. (...) the deterministic processes coalesce the neuronal patterns in my brain that are my choice.
"My choice" is incoherent, when you discover "your" choices, as opposed to actually making them, then obviously it follows that it is not "you" who is doing the choosing. It's not your conscious decision. Again, I'm not interested in illusions or how convincing that may look in practical daily life. I do have a profound problem with your position. I find it utterly incoherent. Allow me to explain. If YOU don't make choices, but if the choices are made for you by blind forces (particles in motion or conglomerates of particles; like neuronal patterns), which are subordinate to natural laws only and not in the least interested in truth, reason, morality or anything then there is no reason whatsoever to trust your choices, reason, morality and so forth—if you had the choice. It does not make sense. p.s. And don't tell me that 'interest in truth, reason, morality and so forth' is an emergent property "just like walking", because that line of reasoning has been debunked too many time already.Box
April 21, 2015
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@Box
I would like to make sure that I understand you correctly. Irrelevant randomizing processes aside, you are saying that there is no freedom whatsoever, right? A human is 100% the result of upward causation by physical forces, correct? So, it’s your position that freedom is 100% illusion. Correct?
There is no "non-material freedom", no "freedom whatsoever" where freedom depends on an immaterial homunculus, a ghost in the machine (that can't provide the kind of 'freedom' subscribers to that idea suppose it can either, but that's a topic for another discussion). What we do have is "agent freedom", or "social freedom". By that I mean we have both a level of unpredictability in assessing our own choices, and a much greater level of unpredictability of action when dealing with other agents. In the first case, we don't know what we will choose for all the various situations that arise day to day. For other agents -- other people around us -- we carefully protect our local state, our decisions, to avoid being trivially manipulated. Being unpredictable from an outside perspective, unpredictable in terms of what others should expect our actions to be, providers power and social equity. It matter naught that this protective stance or strategy is wired into us, or completely deterministically set for us. The existence of that establishes "social freedom", and grounds social structures like morality, ethics, legal jurisprudence. So, when you say "freedom whatsoever", I think that is false. It's not freedom at all in the dualistic, immaterial-homunculus sense. That kind of freedom doesn't exist. But humans, as evolved social animals, have "degrees of freedom" available to them in terms of what the self can foresee, and what others can expect that provide the context for "freedom" in a natural world, a world without gods or ghosts, in the machine or out. That's not *you* kind of "freedom", I expect, but that is the "freedom" that obtains. An example a professor long ago used with me is a poker game. Assume that humans are "deterministic machines", or "moist robots" as I recall a Dlibert cartoon referred to humans-as-wholly-natural, IIRC. There is no disembodied part of the self, the brain is the whole mind, etc. I have my pocket sixes, and it's my turn to bet. Do I want to play it safe? Bluff? Fold? If we understand that my evolved nature, and my personal history/experiences govern what I will choose to do, and this is "pre-determinable", it is still true to say that before I decide and take action, I still have several courses of action available to me. I am in some sense going to discover my own choice in the process of deciding; it must be this way, as if I knew what I was going to decided, I'd not be "undecided". This is "agency" at the practical level. I have to choose 1 on N options, and they are all available to me, and up to no one but me. My choice was firmly determined before I "discovered" my choice, so I'm not choosing in any dualist or superstitious sense. But I understand myself to have multiple avenues available, even as I am unaware of what I am "pre-determined" by factors out of my control to choose. The other players see me as even more opaque. They don't know what I'm going to decide, nor do they know what cards I have in my hand. Maybe I'm playing "loose" over the past several hands, but are unaware that as part of a macro-strategy (which comes about through the same deterministic dynamics in my head) to pivot toward a more tight still of play, just to keep the others on their toes, etc. They see me, and can only see me as a "free agent", an autonomous chooser that they must assess as being able to go any of N routes with the choice still at hand, and for different reasons in each case. That doesn't change the fact that my choice is pre-determined and "automatic". From their point of view, and that's the crucial aspect of this, I'm a "free willed agent". I'm unpredictable, and they can only guess and estimate what my choice will be. I'm "free" in that respect, and cannot be "bound" or "determined" in their view, as they are not party to the information that will select the choice that is finally selected. Even *I* am not party to that information at some level, so I'm "free" in my own self-introspective analysis, practically speaking. As long as you have minds interacting with each other where the deterministic factors are not discoverable, or at least discoverable in real time, you have "social freedom", the practical agency that grounds promises and punishment, ethical guidelines, law, romantic relationships, etc. If you see me as substantially unpredictable, and you cannot do otherwise, I am free in a profoundly practical sense, in relation to you. Some experiments in past years have pushed back the "mind reading" time on some choices back as far as 10 seconds (Soon, et al, is one example that comes to mind). Currently, the time it takes for analysis is hours and days; the fMRI machine and the analysis of the data it captures can beat the odds of chance by a huge margin in determining what the subject will choose by up many full seconds. But it can't currently be done quick enough to tell you what you will choose (or record it for later checking so it doesn't influence your eventual pronouncement) before you choose it. If it could, and there's no reason this can't be done with better technology and processes, then you would have humans interacting with us much like a computer would on those questions. We "survey the registers, and do the calcs" and get what we expect from a human what we would expect from a computer (allowing for the still fuzzy factors of reading neuronal impulses vs discrete states in a computer). This scenario I mention because it shows the "unfree" scenario in contrast to the freedom we obtain from the unknowability of our deterministic outcomes. Put me in some next-gen fMRI and now have me play Texas Hold 'Em. With the instrumentation available to you, I'm a machine that can be read like a machine. Now you can tell what I'm going to decide to do before I know myself. I still have my "personal freedom", if I'm not able to see the instrument panels you see; my choice is still unknown to me until I make it, and I'm "free" until then. Even with the sci-fi fMRI device imagined here, I am still "free' even to you until such time as the deterministic processes coalesce the neuronal patterns in my brain that are my choice. But your better knowledge reduces my freedom, my agency to the extent (and when) you can eliminate my predictability. All of which to say, our social freedom is real, practically effective and impossible to function without day to day, but it's predicated on unpredictability, practical limits of our knowledge of how the determinism of the natural world will play out in detail. So long as that unpredictability remains for us, as long as the details of the determining are not knowable in real time, we have practical agency.eigenstate
April 21, 2015
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Yet another reason immaterial minds as an illusion is self-defeating can be understood as follows: Imagine for the sake of argument that it is true, and the mind (for lack of a better term) only knows what the brain "sees". Our brain only sees or is able to know of light because the wavelengths interact in an objective and physical way with the rods and cones in our eyes. Our brain only hears sound because of the vibration of the tympanic membrane, another physical interaction. This makes sense because for a purely material brain to "see" something or be aware of it, it has to interact materially with it. This falsifies eliminative materialism. Given how intimately aware of our consciousness we are at any moment, even if it were an "illusion" (whatever that means anyway) it is impossible for our consciousness not to influence matter in an objective physical way. In other words. Like light and sound, if the subjective aspect of our reality was "not real", as materialists say, it couldn't influence the material world, and if it couldn't influence the material world, we could never be aware of it's existence to begin with, because our brains couldn't interact with it physically. Eigenstate, all your base are belong to us. ;)Yarrgonaut
April 20, 2015
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Eigenstate,
Eigenstate: Free? No, if by “free” you mean “unconstrained or undetermined by natural processes”. “Free” as in “libertarian free will”? Not possibly. There are parts of the process that are probabilistic, so decisions, beliefs, choices etc. are not determined in any clockwork/Laplacian way. But the probabilistic/indeterminate aspects of the process are wholly contained in the natural dynamics of STEM — no supernatural spooky stuff, obviously.
I would like to make sure that I understand you correctly. Irrelevant randomizing processes aside, you are saying that there is no freedom whatsoever, right? A human is 100% the result of upward causation by physical forces, correct? So, it's your position that freedom is 100% illusion. Correct?Box
April 20, 2015
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Bill Vallicella on Dennett, excerpt:
(...) "Only a theory that explained conscious events in terms of unconscious events could explain consciousness at all." (Consciousness Explained, 1991, p. 454.) (...) Amazingly, on p. 455 he retracts what he said on the previous page about successful explanations having to leave something out. He now writes:
"Thinking, mistakenly, that the explanation leaves something out, we (...)"
The whole passage is a tissue of confusion wrapped in a rhetorical trick. And that is the way his big book ends: on a contradictory note. A big fat load of scientistic sophistry. (...) To sum up. A successful explanation cannot eliminate the explanandum. That is nonnegotiable. So if we agree with Dennett that a successful explanation must leave something out, namely, our epistemic access to what is to be explained, then we ought to conclude that consciousness cannot be explained.
Box
April 20, 2015
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eigenstate @ 20 "Did I sound like I was joking?" Hard to tell with some of your posts. Waffle: "to talk or write a lot without giving any useful information or any clear answers:" Cambridge Dictionary. BTW, I am not picking on Bennet, I view evo physiology as the pseudo science of pseudo sciences. Its mostly unsubstantiated waffle. In fact, it is the emperor with no clothes, with all the other PhD's pretending that any of this waffle makes any sense at all for fear of seaming dumb. Of course, that's only my opinion, assuming that I exist to have an opinion. I may be offering this answer freely, or I may have no choice in the matter. You may be free to advise me which is right or you may have no choice in the matter. I think my head hurts, but it may only be an illusion. CheersCross
April 19, 2015
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@Cross,
Are you seriously suggesting the article is not taking a deterministic view and that is not why you quoted it?
Yes, of course. Did I sound like I was joking? I quoted it because it provides some discussion on the prospects of morality if our our world is a deterministic one.
Dennets contribution is full of evo phsycology unsubstantiated waffle. ie: “Dennett views morality as a “costly merit badge” to display our cooperator status in an era when the arms race of rationality no longer allows us to wear a hat reading “cooperator” in order to reap the long-term benefits. ” Waffle.
I thought "waffling" was "being indecisive", or "wishy washy" or going and back and forth on your opinions. You obviously have something else in mind with that word. What?eigenstate
April 19, 2015
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If "belief" is equivalent to "particular set of neural connections" then no two men can share the same belief. For no two men share the same set of neural connections, even if the content that their beliefs/neural connections produce is identical. In fact, since I am not physically identical to the person I was 5 minutes ago, I don't share the same beliefs I did when I started to write this reply. In common language, "belief" refers to an agent accepting the truth of a non-physical proposition, which is why materalists have to change the meaning of the word before using it. The duplictity isn't found in having an otherwise ordinary word with a specific technical meaning as one might when engaged in law or physics, rather it is in the smuggling in of the non-standard meaning of a term with heavy philosophical presuppositions. The admission that the common-sense usage of the term "belief" leads one to dualism and theism is quite revealing. It's almost as if we were wired toward certain metaphysical conclusions once we thought long and hard (reasoned) from obvious truths in the world. Of course "folk psychology" is another poorly devised term; we are talking about the ontology of mind not psychology, so "folk wisdom" or "folk philosophy" fits better. At some level one must accept the world as it seems; one cannot discover illusions and misconceptions without first having some fundamental knowledge that is itself not susceptible to being an illusion or misconception. But naturalism doesn't have that luxury.GW
April 19, 2015
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eigenstate @ 17 Conclusion of the article: "While cutting-edge attempts at locating the origins of morality through naturalistic processes and tools such as selection pressures remain works-in-progress seeking further empirical support to bolster their claims, the principles of such modeling endeavors harbor significance for issues of determinism’s relationship with moral responsibility. They suggest that the potential truth of macro-level determinism need not result in a loss of rationality for moral responsibility, and therefore its disintegration. When taken collectively, the arguments of both Strawson and Dennett provide moral and personal responsibility with a free-floating rationale and simultaneously allow the separation of such principles from the “garden of forking paths” model of choice. We can act no other way from a set of actual initial conditions and yet still talk rationally about morality and responsibility. " Are you seriously suggesting the article is not taking a deterministic view and that is not why you quoted it? Dennets contribution is full of evo phsycology unsubstantiated waffle. ie: "Dennett views morality as a “costly merit badge” to display our cooperator status in an era when the arms race of rationality no longer allows us to wear a hat reading “cooperator” in order to reap the long-term benefits. " Waffle. CheersCross
April 19, 2015
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@Cross,
More fact free, unsubstantiated waffle. Assumes its conclusion “we are in a deterministic world”.
Did you even read the quote, let alone the article? It neither argues for nor concludes that "we are in a deterministic world". Rather, it the dynamics of morality if the world is a deterministic world. "If X, they Y is possible", does NOT conclude or argue for X.eigenstate
April 19, 2015
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eigenstate @ 13 quotes from "Moral Responsibility in a Deterministic Universe" "The difficulties that the forking paths model of choice faces under a deterministic universe may illuminate much of the opposition to determinism. After all, typical concepts of free agency or free will in our society tend to stem from choice models similar to the “garden of forking paths.” Without such a framework for interpreting “choice” and responsibility, alarmists may fear that a deterministic universe cannot accommodate morality or provide any rationale for personal responsibility. Since most religious concepts of morality derive themselves from selecting “rightly” or “wrongly” from a forking paths model, an emotional or metaphysical drive may fuel the ferocity of opposition to determinism. Simply stated, how can a person be held responsible for the path he or she is taking if it was never selected from alternative choices? Thus, while accepting a deterministic universe and eliminating the concept of alternative paths proves problematic for the concepts of moral responsibility involved in religious judgments and theological conceptions of man, the work of two philosophers, P.F. Strawson and Daniel Dennett, suggests that on a practical level, moral and personal responsibility can survive and thrive in a deterministic world. In fact, personal responsibility not only remains viable in a deterministic universe, but morality also maintains a free-floating rationale independent of deterministic principles." More fact free, unsubstantiated waffle. Assumes its conclusion "we are in a deterministic world". CheersCross
April 19, 2015
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If humans are made of nothing but atoms, and everyone knows an atom cannot walk, humans would not be able to walk!
But atoms do walk. They just don't purposely walk to the local eatery so that they can satisfy their hunger. And they don't purposely frequent intelligent design blogs so that they can demonstrate how irrational they are.Mung
April 19, 2015
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Eigenstate: Reasonable? Sure.
How does one get from chemistry to reason?
Reppert: . . let us suppose that brain state A, which is token identical to the thought that all men are mortal, and brain state B, which is token identical to the thought that Socrates is a man, together cause the belief that Socrates is mortal. It isn’t enough for rational inference that these events be those beliefs, it is also necessary that the causal transaction be in virtue of the content of those thoughts . . . [But] if naturalism is true, then the propositional content is irrelevant to the causal transaction that produces the conclusion, and [so] we do not have a case of rational inference. In rational inference, as [C S] Lewis puts it, one thought causes another thought not by being, but by being seen to be, the ground for it. But causal transactions in the brain occur in virtue of the brain’s being in a particular type of state that is relevant to physical causal transactions.
Box
April 19, 2015
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@Box,
In Eigenstate’s perception something can be completely determined by its parts—blind particles in motion are behind the steering wheel and nothing else; 100% upward-causation by blind forces—, and still be a free moral reasonable self-aware agent.
Self-aware? Sure. Moral? Sure. Reasonable? Sure. Free? No, if by "free" you mean "unconstrained or undetermined by natural processes". "Free" as in "libertarian free will"? Not possibly. There are parts of the process that are probabilistic, so decisions, beliefs, choices etc. are not determined in any clockwork/Laplacian way. But the probabilistic/indeterminate aspects of the process are wholly contained in the natural dynamics of STEM -- no supernatural spooky stuff, obviously. On morality in a deterministic universe, here's an interesting article on the subject: Moral Responsibility in a Deterministic Universe A quote from the article:
The difficulties that the forking paths model of choice faces under a deterministic universe may illuminate much of the opposition to determinism. After all, typical concepts of free agency or free will in our society tend to stem from choice models similar to the “garden of forking paths.” Without such a framework for interpreting “choice” and responsibility, alarmists may fear that a deterministic universe cannot accommodate morality or provide any rationale for personal responsibility. Since most religious concepts of morality derive themselves from selecting “rightly” or “wrongly” from a forking paths model, an emotional or metaphysical drive may fuel the ferocity of opposition to determinism. Simply stated, how can a person be held responsible for the path he or she is taking if it was never selected from alternative choices? Thus, while accepting a deterministic universe and eliminating the concept of alternative paths proves problematic for the concepts of moral responsibility involved in religious judgments and theological conceptions of man, the work of two philosophers, P.F. Strawson and Daniel Dennett, suggests that on a practical level, moral and personal responsibility can survive and thrive in a deterministic world. In fact, personal responsibility not only remains viable in a deterministic universe, but morality also maintains a free-floating rationale independent of deterministic principles.
eigenstate
April 19, 2015
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Astounding. Utterly astounding. Just when I think eigenstate can't say anything more outrageous, he does himself one better. You see what he is going @ 9. It boils down to "no, I do not deny Sense A subjective self-awareness so long as by "Sense A subjective self-awareness" you mean Sense B subjective self-awareness. My God man. It must be that you are so confused that you don't even understand what you are doing. Or did you really think you were going to get away with that? Wow. Just wow. I will address this:
“Self awareness” does not entail dualism, if that is an assumption you’re looking to wedge in here.
I am not trying to "wedge" any "assumptions." I am pointing to an obvious fact. I notice that you completely ignored the first half of the post. Barry Arrington
April 19, 2015
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Eigenstate: There’s no contradiction between “choice” and “wholly upwardly determined”.
This says it all. In Eigenstate's perception something can be completely determined by its parts—blind particles in motion are behind the steering wheel and nothing else; 100% upward-causation by blind forces—, and still be a free moral reasonable self-aware agent.Box
April 19, 2015
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Yes, there absolutely is such an “I”. Logic dictates it.
Ok, what's the logic you're thinking of, here? Maybe you can provide a syllogism that demonstrates the problem.
Yes, it most certainly does. The idea that the “I” is brought about by blind unreasonable particles in motion is probably the most incoherent and shortsighted idea ever.
What do find does not "hold together", here, and find incoherent? 1. Man evolves through natural processes. 2. Like many other animals, man has a brain that provides awareness of surroundings and cognition. Man's cognition is particularly powerful in that features meta-representational abilities. 3. Man's meta-representational cognitive abilities enable self-contemplation (that's where the 'meta-' applies), and multiple layers of indirection. 4. Man considers the self. The natural brain processing semantic propositions about itself. If it can consider counterfactuals about, say, a hunting scenario, or consider what another human might be thinking in this situation or that, self-contemplation is just point the subject of consideration at the self, rather than another. Again, it's good to remember that an atom can't walk, but a person can walk, and a person is made of out atoms. Do you find that observation incoherent?
What is an abomination to logic cannot be consonant with all the data and hardly with any.
You've not shown any of this logic you are applying, here. What's the formula you are using that you find problematic for monist self-awareness?
An independent “I” is essential and adds all the value to our understanding of consciousness etc.
What do you mean by "independent" there? Independent of what?
No consciousness without top-down overview, no perception without the elements of perception in top-down hierarchal coherence—materialism cannot explain either.
"Consciousness" I understand to be "awareness of one's surroundings". That presumes perception, as percepts are by definition the means of receiving input from our surroundings to be aware of. Is the fish in my fish tank conscious-with-perception, in your view?
Note on your precious science: if materialism is true—and blind moronic particles are in the driver’s seat of reason—we would not be able to do science.
Why not? This sounds exactly like: If humans are made of nothing but atoms, and everyone knows an atom cannot walk, humans would not be able to walk! Dualist intuitions seem to be deeply associated with the fallacy of composition... ETA: block quote formattingeigenstate
April 19, 2015
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@Barry,
Eigenstate claims that truth claims such as “I am subjectively self-aware” are true and false depending on the sense in which one uses the phrase. To avoid confusion, let us very carefully describe the two senses.
I haven't claimed such. We are self-evidently self-aware. This blog has a few posters who conflate "self-evident" with "I think this is true", and do so often, but the experience of consciousness is one case of self-evidence that fits the term. What underwrites that awareness, on the other hand, is not self-evident.
Sense A: The phrase “subjectively self-aware” in the everyday meaning of the phrase speaks of an “agent that perceives his own awareness.”
This is not problematic as long as we are clear on "agent": a human as a wholly natural animal is an agent. In the dualist view, the "immaterial homunculus", the "ghost in the machine" is an agent. As written, "agent that perceive his own awareness" works both ways. If you suppose that "agent" can only refer to the "immaterial homunculus" -- if your use of "agent" is loaded toward your metaphysics, in other words -- then I'd deny the statement on those grounds, and say: "A wholly natural human that perceives her own consciousness", where "wholly natural" excludes any of the immaterial spooky stuff -- just STEM. "Self awareness" does not entail dualism, if that is an assumption you're looking to wedge in here. Just so we're clear. The everyday understanding of the phrase is infused with philosophical “intentionality,” which means the phrase is a mental state that is “about” or “directed at” something. Intentionality is inherently agent-object oriented. In this case, the agent “I” perceives an object “self-awareness.” (Be careful to use "intentionality", and not "intentional" (as in "intentional states"), as you've now begun to insist that we must use the common everyday sense of words only, and "intentional" here must mean "deliberate"!) [UDEidtors: You are giving us instructions on ensuring that everyone knows we are using a word is a special way? The needle on the irony meter just moved over to the stop. What we did -- explain when one is using a common word is a special way -- is exactly what you did not do and should have done, and that is why had to take you to the woodshed earlier today.]
Sense B: Eigenstate claims the eliminative materialist believes the phenomenon “subjectively self-aware” is a complex, but nevertheless concrete state and pattern of brain activity, the kind of phenomenon you could observe and measure with an fMRI, or some more advanced instrument yet to be developed.
Right. As for the rest, self-awareness is not the 'hard problem of consciousness'. The 'hard problem' is why do we have the phenomenal experiences we do within or consciousness. For example, why does "redness" give us the sensation it does? Subjective self-awareness and intentionality are different subjects; the 'hard problem of consciousness' is a philosophical question: why does it feel that way to us. As many scientists have noted, it's an unanswerable question for science because it's not empirical. It can't be adjudicated on the evidence no matter how much we have, because it's a qualitative, subjective question. That's different than "what is a belief in the brain?", or "what is the brain doing when it is thinking of the self, or contemplating it's own awareness?" If you want to revise your post so that you're focused on where you started -- "beliefs" -- that's an area we can look at for contrasts in scientific findings and key aspects of folk psychological notions of "belief". See here for an example of a scientific treatment of the question of "religious belief": Cognitive and neural foundations of religious belief An quote from the article relates the cognitive structure of religious belief, and the measurable mapping of components of those beliefs to specific processing areas of the brain:
The MDS results confirmed the validity of the proposed psychological structure of religious belief. The 2 psychological processes previously implicated in religious belief, assessment of God’s level of involvement and God’s level of anger (11), as well as the hypothesized doctrinal to experiential continuum for religious knowledge, were identifiable dimensions in our MDS analysis. In addition, the neural correlates of these psychological dimensions were revealed to be well-known brain networks, mediating evolutionary adaptive cognitive functions.
There's a lot(!) more to grok in the article, but it provides and example of how more specific kinds of mental content are broken down and analyzed.eigenstate
April 19, 2015
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Eigenstate: Something similar is at work with “folk psychology”. There is no “disembodied I”, in the dualist/supernatural/superstitious sense.
Yes, there absolutely is such an "I". Logic dictates it.
Eigenstate: But such a conclusion based on scientific analysis does not “remove the ‘I’”.
Yes, it most certainly does. The idea that the “I” is brought about by blind unreasonable particles in motion is probably the most incoherent and shortsighted idea ever.
Eigenstate: Our understanding is just upgraded to something that is consonant with the data and knowledge available about how brains operate.
What is an abomination to logic cannot be consonant with all the data and hardly with any.
Eigenstate: Just like there’s no “impetus”, but motion, acceleration, and gravity remain (and are more clearly and fully understood), there’s no “dualist ‘I’” that is needed or adds any value to our understanding of consciousness, perception, meta-representation, etc.
An independent "I" is essential and adds all the value to our understanding of consciousness etc. No consciousness without top-down overview, no perception without the elements of perception in top-down hierarchal coherence—materialism cannot explain either. Note on your precious science: if materialism is true—and blind moronic particles are in the driver’s seat of reason—we would not be able to do science.Box
April 19, 2015
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mahuna:
I read somewhere that when human babies are quite young they cannot distinguish between Me and Not-me. They assume they are the only intelligence in the universe, and everything (Mom, milk, dirty diapers, cats, etc.) is an extension of themselves...etc.
That is a viewpoint that, in light of research, developmental psychology abandoned decades ago. What the research has disclosed is that human infants have vastly more differentiated perceptual and social-cognitive capacities - including awareness of self versus others - than previously suspected.Reciprocating Bill
April 19, 2015
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It doesn't follow from the statement "There is no 'disembodied I'" that one is denying that one is self-aware. Because, of course, what we are saying is that you, I and everyone else is an instance of an "embodied I," an embodied I that is self-aware. Of course, it follows that when the body that embodies the "I" ceases to sustain the requisite functional organization (i.e. dies and dissipates), the "I" ceases all awareness, including self-awareness, as well. Hence the non-dualist is only denying self-awareness after death. Which seems to me what is really at stake in most of these debates.Reciprocating Bill
April 19, 2015
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You're not being especially fair. How about we take not only the raw chemicals needed to make a flatworm, but the actual pieces of a flatworm? And then we assemble the flatworm and turn it loose. Is the flatworm self-aware? What if we assemble 2 flatworms and put them together in the same dish? Are they aware that there is another flatworm that is distinct from itself and therefore the Self is a unique thing? I'm guessing that there won't be a lot of depth to the philosophizing by either of the worms, but I'm also guessing that flatworms can tell the difference between Me and Not-me. Especially if Not-me is attractive, in a very wormy kinda way. I read somewhere that when human babies are quite young they cannot distinguish between Me and Not-me. They assume they are the only intelligence in the universe, and everything (Mom, milk, dirty diapers, cats, etc.) is an extension of themselves. They are then frequently frustrated by their failures to make the extensions do what Baby desires, although the Mom-extension is pretty easily convinced to provide milk and remove dirty diapers. But slowly they begin to theorize, with their powerful but data-deficient little brains, that although those Toe things at the ends of their Feet are probably Me, that nasty thing named Big Sister might just possibly be Not-me. And if Big Sister is Not-me, how much else of the Universe is also Not-me? This is a troubling time for young minds and produces the Terrible Twos. But although I'm open to being convinced that plants can somehow distinguish Me and Not-me, I'm pretty sure the rock next to the plant CANNOT even distinguish Me.mahuna
April 19, 2015
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Now, the thing is, as a bystander, I would like to see WJM and Barry go to swords. Why? Because you both have diametrically opposed theological positions on the nature of "hell", i.e, God placing people in a place of eternal torment for sins done in this life. Going out the gate, I'll say I side with WJM: I don't believe in any such notion. But I'd like to see William (and fellow travellers) and Barry (and fellow travelers) duke it out over the concept. That could be fun. No? What say?mike1962
April 19, 2015
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Creating entire blog posts to reply to a commenter who the blog owner thinks is out of line is not a good idea because it can attract trolls to their site. There are people who think that being a troll on the internet is a pleasant recreational activity. Such people congregate at certain places on the internet and brag about their trolling successes by linking to the results of their trolling. The problem for web site owners is that any site that encourages trolling by allowing trolls to demonstrate their prowess will attract more trolls who will try to obtain their own evidence of success. This is why most professional moderators refrain from naming trolls, and delete all their activity and all replies to them, once they are identified as a troll - because otherwise more trolls will be attracted to the site. Likewise, creating entire blog posts as a response to a particular commenter who the blog owner thinks is out of line would generally be a bad idea because it can attract trolls to the site. Even if the commenter is not himself a troll, and I don't mean to imply any particular commenter here is in fact a troll, I would leave that judgment to the moderators, I only mean that giving recognition to commenters that seem to be out of line is not a good idea because it might attract trolls to the site.Jim Smith
April 19, 2015
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If self-awareness is an illusion, so is everything the mind expresses via self-awareness - including the idea of "facts". Thus, facts are also illusions. True statements are illusions. Eigenstate is necessarily an illusion carrying on about some how it is a fact that facts are illusions, as if his first use of the term "fact" was not illusory. I guess what eignestate doesn't get is that if facts are illusions, if truth is illusory, then there are no actual facts as such, and no actual truths as such. Words and sentences don't factually mean anything; it's all illusory. There are only the sounds of leaves rustling in the wind. I guess if you read him correctly, what he is really saying is that "it is an illusion that science has proven this", and "it is an illusion that materialism is true".William J Murray
April 19, 2015
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As someone on the sidelines, and someone with a fair amount of introspection of "my own" consciousness, I have to ask, what is the point in continuing? Either one "sees" their own consciousness as primary or they do not. If they do, they know in an immediate way that "materialism" is false and no further argument is necessary. Otherwise, they don't, and no amount of intellectual gyrations are going to convince them of the fact.mike1962
April 19, 2015
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