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Backgrounder on ID-friendly law prof: Tenure still hangs in balance

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Recall Frank Beckwith, that gifted prof at Baylor, who specializes in church-state issues, who was mysteriously denied tenure recently?

Beckwith appealed, was turned down again* – by a narrower margin, it is said – and a decision is expected shortly. What’s come out since the first denial is that his former department chair, who is believed to have undermined Beckwith’s tenure chances, recently resigned amid allegations that he plagiarized the work of Ronald Numbers , a well-known American scholar, best known for his studies of creationism.

As World‘s Mark Bergin notes,

Beckwith is among academia’s foremost pro-life advocates and has written articles supporting the constitutionality of teaching intelligent design. The tenure committee accused him of inappropriately focusing on such areas of expertise in his courses on church-state relations. In his appeal of tenure denial, Beckwith responded that “because these ethical issues are central to the most important and disputed questions in church-state studies today, it seems to me to be not only permissible, but obligatory, for a professor in this area of study to address these issues.”

Well, um, yes. Anyone in the news business knows that stories about abortion or intelligent design lead over the mast. Should Beckwith have asked students to wade through tomes on interstate trucking rules instead? How about “Proper venting for turnips in transit – a federal or state responsibility?” or “Bovine-produced methane gas in re current environment regulations”?

The tenure committee further charged Beckwith with assigning only his published works for a class on religion and society. In fact, Beckwith’s writings amounted to only 15 percent of the course’s required reading.

Given that Beckwith has authored a fair whack of stuff on the subjects in question, it’s surprising he didn’t assign more of his own.

Bergin also notes that the chair was friends with the Dawsons, a powerful Texas clan. Seems the church-state center at Baylor, where Beckwith worked as associate director, was named after granddaddy Dawson, and the clan notables think that grandaddy would not have seen eye to eye with Beckwith. As a result, a whole heap of Dawsons has been campaigning against Beckwith for years, making Baylor sound like Hayseed U.

The whole story leaves me wondering why Beckwith even wants tenure at Baylor. But maybe if he gets it, he can help them recover the original vision to be a “Protestant Notre Dame.”

Some have wondered whether Beckwith’s association with the Discovery Institute and with ID mathematician Bill Dembski, whose ill-fated Michael Polanyi Center at Baylor, was holding conferences on intelligent design issues a few years ago, cooked his goose. Beckwith has defended the constitutionality of teaching about intelligent design in publicly funded schools (but that’s not the same thing as thinking it is a good idea). But sources I trusted said no, it was mainly because he is pro life.

More generally, controversy has dogged Beckwith throughout his career, not because he is especially flamboyant but principally because he is a talented cultural conservative. Baylor is a Baptist university desperately seeking acceptance in a liberal environment; the last thing it needs is a prof who comes up with good arguments for cultural conservatism.

When the decision to deny tenure was first announced in March, a Baylor student lamented:

When I first heard the news I experienced for the first time what is known as cognitive dissonance. I couldn’t hold the two ideas in my mind. Professor Beckwith. Denied tenure. It was impossible to believe. There were people who told me it could happen, but I discounted the notion. After all, even political enemies have consciences, right? They have some commitment to integrity, don’t they?

No clear reason that makes any sense ever emerged for denying Beckwith tenure, though a lack of “collegiality” was mooted. The “collegiality” claim has become notorious, actually, as a way of getting rid of people who do not march in lockstep.

(Studying Beckwith’s case, I get the impression that it’s okay at Baylor to yay-hoo for Jesus as long as you make a fool of yourself and no one takes you seriously. Well, we’ll see.)

*Beckwith has written me to say, “The University Tenure Committee only recommends to the Provost. So, technically, I was not “turned down again.”

Comments
A person is a person when, in the normal course of events, he/she is identifiable as a unique human being (unfertilized gametes need not apply) and when he/she has or can be reasonably presumed to have in the future the ability to reason, be self-conscious, and continue to have a unique identity. In other words, a human's future, if it has a reasonable chance of a future, should not be taken away. In this definition a brain-dead person is no longer a person nor is a person in a coma from which there is statistically little chance of ever waking. Newborns are also protected. Unless we add further arbitrary considerations as to age since conception this covers all humans from the beginning of their life which is of course the moment of conception. Adding arbitrary additional considerations is purely and solely in order to provide the opportunity for care-free, responsibility-free vaginal intercourse. I cannot approve trading in death for care-free sex and will continue to vote accordingly and support the appointments of federal judges that will acknowledge the right of the American people to establish laws that reflect their moral values.DaveScot
September 18, 2006
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The thing is if 'personhood' (whether or not we are people) determines whether we have rights, how do we measure it and determine those rights? Obviously, we cannot measure 'personhood' directly, so we must look for a measurable attribute that corresponds to 'personhood'. The thing is, the only attribute that can really be said to correspond to 'personhood' is life itself, which is binary (you either have it or you don't) and begins at conception. There are many other proposed 'measuring sticks' for 'personhood', but these all have problems. I'll run through as many as I can in the time I have, starting with the most rediculous and working my way up. Location: "If it hasn't been born it isn't a person." The only difference between an unborn child and a newborn is where it happens to be. This barely deserves a refutation, but it is so commonly used that I thought I'd better mention it. Size: This is generally phrased along the lines of, "How can you say something the size of a speck of dust is a person?!". The problem with this is that a newborn is smaller than a five year old. Does that make the five year old more of a person with more rights than the newborn? What rights should the newborn have? It's the same size as it was just before it was born, should the mother be allowed to kill it? What do we do when we get to adults? If you are bigger than someone else, does that mean you are more of a person and therefore entitled to more rights? I would hate to live in a society that followed through on this. Viablility: "It's not really a person until it can survive outside it's mother." Viablility, however, isn't really an attribute of the baby, but rather a measurment of our level of technology. Premature babies that could not have survived a hundred years ago are now able to make it to adulthood with few problems. Nor is it inconcievable that in the future we might develop the technology to grow a child outside the womb. Not only that, but viability depends on your enviroment. An astronought in space is not viable outside his protective atrificial environment. I am not viable in the middle of the ocean. Does that mean that I am not a person in that situation? Consciousness: "It's not aware of anything, how can it be a person?" The first problem is how we determine when a child first becomes conscious. When it first starts kicking? But it could have been conscious before that and not acted. The second is that if we use consciousness to determine 'personhood', does that mean I am less of a person when I am asleep? What of those in comas, should they be given fewer rights? Development: "Only a nut would think of a bunch of cells as a person." This suffers from similar problems to using size as our 'personhood' metric. Why give the child the right to life at birth? Why not five years later? What about those people who never properly develop, or grow malformed? Should they be given a lower status, on the basis of having less 'personhood'? Brain Activity: "We use brain activity to determine the end of life, so why shouldn't we use it to determine the beginning?" The cases, however, are not really comparable. The fetus is capable of developing to a state where brain activity is measurable, if allowed to. A more accurate comparasin would be to someone with a temporally flat EEG. Let us say that at some stage in the future some poor indivdual has an accident and is sent to hospital but is found to be in a coma with no measurable brain activity. Let's suppose these doctors, however, are familiar with this condition, and know that he will recover in time, even though he will have to remain on life support for nine months and will require a lot of care when he awakes because he will have to relearn how to walk, talk, and even feed himself. Would denying him life support, knowing that he could recover, be murder? How is his condition different from that of the unborn child? Some euthenasia advocates might say he should be allowed to die, but I think they would have a hard time arguing that anyone else (even his mother) should be allowed to make the choice for him. BTW, it's intersting how many of the pro-choice arguments blur into pro-eugenics arguments. Can't think of any more 'personhood' measuring sticks at the moment. Tell me if you think I've missed any.StephenA
September 17, 2006
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26 contains an important metaphysical insight, but the ethical and legal implications of this insight are difficult to track. For example: we don't allow people under 18 to vote. Why not? There's a right that under the law that adults have which children don't have. Etc. We allow different stages of the human life-cycle to different kinds of legal representation, and sure it's arbitary, but do you really want five year olds to vote? (Incidentally, it probably wouldn't make any difference.) I know it's a silly example, but it points to the fact that under the existing legal culture, we do make distinctions as to which rights someone has at a certain time in their development. And, granting this, it needs to be shown that the "right to life" is not a right like that. I can easily see why, given the Western cultural heritage, a right to life attaches to all persons. (If someone isn't convinced of this, we can just tell her to read Hobbes and Locke. No biggie.) But personhood is a metaphysical state.
So Carlos, count backwards for me from birth, minute by minute, and demarcate the precise point where a person is not a person. Explain why they are no longer a person. This is of course if you consider a newborn to be a person. If not, pick any arbitrary stage of life where you’re sure a human is a person then go backwards in time from there.
Uh-uh; momma didn't raise no fool. As I said in 23, the impossibility of drawing a strict line between two categories doesn't show that there's no point in making a distinction at all. (As an analogy, consider ring species.) It seems to me that, if we're going to make the pro-life argument work, we're going to need an argument to the effect that the distinction between persons and cell clusters cannot be drawn in a non-arbitary way. (For it can be drawn, after all -- but the burden of proof can be put on the pro-choicers to show that the distinctions are not arbitrary.) For only if one can show that that the distinction cannot be drawn in a non-arbitrary way, does it follow that the path of prudence requires us to regard zygotes as persons. The definition of person you gave me exludes newborns, people in comas, etcetera, because it includes ability to reason and self-consciousness. The real working defintion is a human with the future POTENTIAL to reason, be self-conscious, and have a continuing identity. Thus newborns and people in comas who have a chance of waking up have a right to life. A person who is “brain dead” does not. Well, here's where things do get dicey. A consistent ethics that justifies certain kinds of abortion, on the grounds that the zygote or embryo is not yet a person, may also justify certain kinds of nonvoluntary euthanasia, on the grounds that the comatose or vegetative individual is no longer a person. That might be a bullet worth biting, or least worth coming back to. For now, a word of warning about "potential." Consider again: is the caterpillar a potential butterfly, or potential bird-food? You might think you can get out of this one by stipulating "potential" in terms of "x is a potential y if the majority of xs become ys." But even that's not going to work, is it? Not for caterpillars, and not for human embryos, either. How about, "x is a potential y if, under normal conditions, enough xs become ys so as to insure the production of future xs?" A butterfly is just a caterpillar's way of making another caterpillar, right? But how do we know what "normal conditions" are? And now the notion has been watered down so much that it's hard to see how we're going to squeeze the ethical requirements out of it. Another problem with potential: every person who was born in the United States is a potential President. But none of them have the rights or abilities of the President, except for the one who is. This shows that there's no general argument for "an x is a potential y, therefore it has the rights of a y." Substitute x for embryo and y for person, and you see the problem. Given that there's no general argument of this form, we need to know why the "embryos have the rights of persons" schema is a valid exception. Now, I presented above (in 17) an argument for getting around this problem by introducing the notion of a moral patient. If all and only persons are moral agents, we can use the notion of a moral patient to show that babies and animals have rights, even without duties. And if babies are moral patients, then so too are fetuses and perhaps also embryos. Importantly, the status of moral patients is intrinsic. It doesn't depend on whether they will become moral agents or not. Some moral patients do become moral agents (most human babies), and some don't (mentally retarded humans, animals). But they all have rights, just the same, and that could include a right to life. Of course, this means that, if this line of argument works, pro-lifers will have to become vegetarians, but that's OK. But when we get down to zygotes and the first two weeks or so of development, it gets tricky again, because these organisms don't even exhibit the sort of responsiveness to stimuli that qualify moral patients. At best one could say that they are potential moral patients. And now all the problems of the metaphysics of potentiality come back to haunt us again.Carlos
September 17, 2006
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DaveScot wrote:
So Carlos, count backwards for me from birth, minute by minute, and demarcate the precise point where a person is not a person. Explain why they are no longer a person. This is of course if you consider a newborn to be a person. If not, pick any arbitrary stage of life where you’re sure a human is a person then go backwards in time from there.
Dave, Start at the time two gametes are mature, but in separate bodies, male and female. Now count forward, minute by minute, and demarcate the precise point where the two gametes become a person. Explain why they are suddenly a person. This is of course if you believe that two separate gametes are not a person. Otherwise, pick an earlier stage where you're sure they're not a person and go forward in time from there. To make the same point using my driving age analogy: In our society, we agree that nineteen-year-olds have the right to drive (barring disability or previous convictions), and that ten-year-olds do not. Start with a ten-year-old and go forward in time, minute by minute, to the precise point where the child deserves the right to drive. Explain why. Now start with a nineteen-year-old and go backward in time, minute by minute, to the precise point where he or she no longer deserves the right to drive. Explain why. In both cases, there is no sensible way to draw a precise line between the two categories. If I apply the logic of your argument to this situation, I get two contradictory answers: 1. If I start with the ten-year-old, I conclude that nineteen-year-olds don't deserve the right to drive, because after all, there is no point at which I can say "One minute ago you didn't deserve the right to drive, but now you do." 2. If I start with the nineteen-year-old, I conclude that ten-year-olds deserve the right to drive. After all, there is no point where I can say "You don't deserve the right to drive now, but one minute from now you will." If a method of reasoning leads to contradictory answers while starting from the same premises, you can be sure that either the premises are contradictory or the reasoning is faulty.Karl Pfluger
September 17, 2006
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Moderators, I believe I have a comment in the spam queue, probably because I used a word that means "male gametes". Could you fish it out for me? Thanks, Karl PflugerKarl Pfluger
September 17, 2006
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russ wrote:
Karl, I disagree with your experiment because it’s inconsequential if Dave’s beard is no longer a beard after removing 1 or 10,000 wiskers. In both cases (beards and abortions) their may be difficulty drawing a line. But if you get it wrong in the first case, it matters to no one. In the second case, a human life is at stake, so one could argue it’s presumptious to attempt to draw a line after the obvious one—conception.
Russ, Logic is logic, regardless of the stakes. If A implies B, then A implies B, whether B is important or trivial. Indeed, I would argue that it is especially important to apply logic carefully and correctly to moral questions, precisely because the stakes are so high. We don't want to get it wrong, and changing our logic is not the way to get it right. I do think it is presumptuous to draw the line at conception. First of all, when exactly? The moment the sperm touches the egg? The moment the egg's membrane is penetrated? The moment the sperm and egg membranes merge? The moment the nuclei merge? At any one of those moments you can ask, "Why now, and not the moment before?" The argument also applies before the egg and sperm meet. After all, what's so special about two cells touching? If they are a human being when touching, how can you assert that they aren't human the moment before, merely because they are not in contact? And in that case, isn't it immoral to use birth control to prevent egg and sperm from uniting? Isn't it immoral to use coitus interruptus? Isn't it immoral for a woman to say "Not tonight, honey, I have a headache"? She may, after all, be denying a future to a human being. Carlos wrote:
The “beard argument” only shows that the impossibility of drawing a precise division between two categories doesn’t mean that there isn’t some distinction between the categories. There’s a continuum between having a beard and not having one, so that it’s hard to tell just where the Rubicon is crossed — but that doesn’t mean that having a beard is the same as not having one. Useful distinctions can be made without having to be precise.
Exactly right. The human mind loves to draw neat divisions between categories, even when those divisions are arbitrary and empirically unsupportable. We grant teens the right to drive on a certain birthday, but does anyone really believe that they are not ready to drive on the previous day? Or that all teens are equally mature at the same age? Of course not. Carlos:
Likewise, the impossibility of drawing a precise line between a bona fide moral agent and a sack of cells isn’t going to show that a sack of cells is a bona fide moral agent.
Well put. Tina:
It is a frank rebellion against this clear natural law to desire a world in which cause and effect become unhinged from one another.
Is it "rebellion" to desire a world where heart failure is "unhinged" from death, via defibrillators? Or where famine is "unhinged" from widespread starvation by the shipment of food on airplanes? Tina:
To desire this disconnect so badly that the life of another human being could be considered as cheaply as it is in the act of abortion, is a disastrous development.
We agree that it is a disaster when the life of a human being is devalued. Where we differ is in deciding what exactly constitutes a human being.Karl Pfluger
September 17, 2006
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Carlos The definition of person you gave me exludes newborns, people in comas, etcetera, because it includes ability to reason and self-consciousness. The real working defintion is a human with the future POTENTIAL to reason, be self-conscious, and have a continuing identity. Thus newborns and people in comas who have a chance of waking up have a right to life. A person who is "brain dead" does not. Of course there's one more requirement. You have to have been born. A person by the really important metrics of being human and possessing the potential to reason, be self-concious, and have a continuing identity isn't quite enough and by that failure to have escaped from the womb the otherwise person can have an arbitrary sentence of death passed on him or her by the whim of a single individual. The means of death too would be considered cruel and unusual in any other circumstance.DaveScot
September 17, 2006
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So Carlos, count backwards for me from birth, minute by minute, and demarcate the precise point where a person is not a person. Explain why they are no longer a person. This is of course if you consider a newborn to be a person. If not, pick any arbitrary stage of life where you're sure a human is a person then go backwards in time from there.DaveScot
September 17, 2006
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Carlos: persons are one form of "life". For the person, the developmental unfoldment begins at conception and ends at death in a perfectly smoothe, uninterrupted continuum. Period. If we choose to break this perfect continuum up into discreet periods for our own disposal and convenience, that is our choice. It is not, however an organic designation, but an artificial imposition. I would never make the claim that taking of any form of life at any time is unethical. This standard is preposterous. Every time I walk across the grass I take life. The distinction is not at all so difficult with regard to abortion, because in this case you have an organism whose very existence was brought about by the free-willing choices of two consenting adults. When I refer to the disastrous consequences of the desire to live without consequences, I think of the paragraph I read in a prominent pro-choice book (the title of which screed now eludes me) which went something like this (in paraphrase): 'People who oppose reproductive choice don't like sex' And then the author went on to make a sincere effort to connect the dislike of sex with the belief that one should be responsible for the consequences of sex. Ellen Goodman, an editorial writer, very recently wrote an editorial in which she lamented the horror that the new "morning-after pill" would become available with strings attached; namely that women 18 and under would need parental consent to use it. To this mild restriction she responded 'now we are sending our young women the message that motherhood is their punishment for enjoying sex.' Help.tinabrewer
September 17, 2006
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It strikes me that "life" is precisely the category that we should not be talking about. To do so would sanctify all life, qua life. Is then immoral to take antibiotics? Or to eat vegetables? Well, maybe the Jain or the PETA folks are right, and that is the right way to go. But it seems to me, in light of the synthesis of Greco-Roman law and Judeo-Christian ethics that makes up the Western cultural heritage, that the relevant category is not bare life -- which belongs to the E. coli in my intestines no less than it belongs to me -- but personhood.Carlos
September 17, 2006
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The category we are talking about here is "life". Where in life, as a broad category, is there anything BUT developmental unfolding from immature to mature states? It is a property of nearly every organism at nearly every time. Developmental unfolding, being intrinsic to the life process, defies artificial divisions. Life IS PROCESS, and this is no less so for the fetus. I think the question of abortion should center, rather, on the choice/responsibility continuum as Dave points out. Every act has a consequence. It is a frank rebellion against this clear natural law to desire a world in which cause and effect become unhinged from one another. To desire this disconnect so badly that the life of another human being could be considered as cheaply as it is in the act of abortion, is a disastrous development.tinabrewer
September 17, 2006
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The "beard argument" only shows that the impossibility of drawing a precise division between two categories doesn't mean that there isn't some distinction between the categories. There's a continuum between having a beard and not having one, so that it's hard to tell just where the Rubicon is crossed -- but that doesn't mean that having a beard is the same as not having one. Useful distinctions can be made without having to be precise. Likewise, the impossibility of drawing a precise line between a bona fide moral agent and a sack of cells isn't going to show that a sack of cells is a bona fide moral agent. So, if you want to show that the distinction between a person and a cell cluster shouldn't be drawn, I think you'll need a different argument than the argument from imprecision.Carlos
September 17, 2006
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#18: "Dave, As a thought experiment, I want you to imagine that you’ve let your beard grow out (assuming you don’t already have one). Now I want you to imagine that once a minute, you select a hair at random and pluck it out of your beard. Tell me exactly when your beard ceases to be a beard, and why." Comment by Karl Pfluger — September 16, 2006 @ 8:23 pm Karl, I disagree with your experiment because it's inconsequential if Dave's beard is no longer a beard after removing 1 or 10,000 wiskers. In both cases (beards and abortions) their may be difficulty drawing a line. But if you get it wrong in the first case, it matters to no one. In the second case, a human life is at stake, so one could argue it's presumptious to attempt to draw a line after the obvious one---conception.russ
September 17, 2006
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In response to (14), (19), and (20): just so my own position (and conscience) is clear, please note that I enjoy being an academic, and that for the time being I can't even imagine doing something else with my life, despite what I say in (9). I love teaching, and I love research. It's the rest of it -- the political stuff -- that I don't like. but which I'm learning to accept as part of the gig.Carlos
September 17, 2006
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Carlos wrote: "As someone who’s been in academia for a few years now, I can tell you that tenure decisions are a viper’s nest of pettiness and egotism. Academic politics are so vicious because the stakes are so small. Refusal to compromise isn’t going to start a war, so people are at liberty to let their egos run amok. Combine that with the fact that most academics don’t take any time off between high school and a tenure-track job, and you’ve got a recipe for permanent immaturity." I've just used SnagIt to screencapture that gem! I shall print it out, tape it to my refrigerator, and recite it every day as an affirmation (or perhaps, a disaffirmation). Just brilliant!filmGrain
September 16, 2006
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This is one of the rare times I agree with Carlos. I spent several years in academia and can vouch for the large egos and small issues. The minutiae that took up faculty meetings was incredible. Grade inflation is everywhere and especially in night school where I taught my last course. This was after I left teaching to start a business and did an old teaching friend a favor and taught a course. All the students were working and nearly all were being reimbursed by employers. One catch, they didn't get reimbursed if they got less than a B. When several didn't make the cut, they went in mass to the dean to get me to change the grades. Michael 7 (just an observation and question. How many more violent attacks will it take for the world to admit Islam is not violent? Scratching head), when we stop using gasoline to fuel our cars. Unless we make nice to the Muslims they could shut down our economy in a heart beat. What is Bush or anyone else going to do. Act macho with Saudi Arabia and some others over there and the unemployment rate will be above 10% in a few months and the ones who follow those now in power will make the current regime look very moderate. They are not rational people and we wouldn't care a rat's rear end about them except for the oil. So we do a dance but it is you and I and all the rest of us who put us in that bind. We all want to drive even at $3.40 a gallon which is where it got to in some places recently.jerry
September 16, 2006
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DaveScot wrote:
Now, as a thought exercise, I want the baby killers (no inflammatory language there, right? ) out there to count backward minute by minute from birth to conception and tell me exactly where and why (logically & scientifically) the human in question should lose its legal right to life.
Dave, As a thought experiment, I want you to imagine that you've let your beard grow out (assuming you don't already have one). Now I want you to imagine that once a minute, you select a hair at random and pluck it out of your beard. Tell me exactly when your beard ceases to be a beard, and why.Karl Pfluger
September 16, 2006
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Carlos, what would be a good rational argument for you? What would convince you from a pro-life view? Meaning, what would convince me that pro-life is correct? Let me go back and say what I think has and hasn't been established by contemporary biology and by ethical theory, then see how that connects up to legal issues. First, I don't think that any argument from biology that goes directly to ethics is going to work. It is an undeniable fact that a zygote is a genetically unique member of Homo sapiens from the moment of conception. Pro-choicers attempt to deny this, but by now it's clear that their arguments don't work. On the other hand, it's not clear what this undeniable fact means, ethically speaking. If there's a direct connection, then HeLa cells are persons, and that just seems a little bit wacky. So there's no direct inference from genetics to personhood. How about an indirect one? The philosopher Tom Regan distinguishes between "moral agents" and "moral patients." Moral agents are capable of recognizing their duties and acting on the basis of that recognition. Moral patients are not capable of doing so, but nevertheless are capable of suffering, of being harmed or hurt. Moral agents have duties and rights; moral patients only have rights. Regan uses this distinction to defend a strong view of animal rights, but the same distinction could be used in service of a pro-life position. A "Reganite" pro-life argument could then maintain that, just as infants as moral patients, so too are fetuses and embryos. But on what basis? On the basis that, over the course of embryological development, the human being develops its capacities for sensing changes in its environment, including responses to pleasure and pain. That's not enough for moral agency, but it might be enough for moral patience. Now, when we turn to capacities, the metaphysical issues get trickier. (Here's one way of seeing the problem: consider a caterpillar. Most of us what would to say that a caterpillar is a potential butterfly. But is it -- or is potential bird food?) Morever, capacities themselves aren't one-off things. A tree has the capacity to convert light energy into chemical energy -- but it's not doing so at night. (Technically, the "dark reaction" part of photosynthesis doesn't need light -- this is where simple molecules are converted into sugars.) So does a zygote have the capacity for responsiveness to pleasure and pain? Or the capacity for developing that capacity? If the problems with capacities and potentials can be sorted out, then there's a case to be made for ascribing moral patience to zygotes. But I won't hold my breath. Barring that, I do think that moral patience can be ascribed to many phases of embryonic development -- from the moment that the embryo shows responsiveness to stimuli (e.g. mother's heartbeat), at least. One might attribute equivalent degrees of moral patience -- and so of rights -- to human beings across ontogeny and to different species of comparable levels of biological complexity. E.g. zygote amoeba, one-month-old embryo fish, etc. This might be viable approach, if worked out in sufficient detail, but it seems dicey, some how. Still, it seems clear to me that fetuses must be considered moral patients, if babies are, and babies are if animals are. The fact that development is a gradual process with no cut-and-dried, objective divisions does make it trickier. In cases like this I find it hard not to rely on some very crude moral intuitions -- if it has a face, it's a moral patient -- so, gastrulas, no; end of first trimester, yes. In any event, that's only the moral side of the problem. There's still the legal side. Myself, I think that the best position has been staked out by Sen. Clinton:
Abortion is "a sad, even tragic choice to many, many women," said Clinton. Then she went further: "There is no reason why government cannot do more to educate and inform and provide assistance so that the choice guaranteed under our constitution either does not ever have to be exercised or only in very rare circumstances." Does not ever have to be exercised. I searched Google and Nexis for parts of that sentence tonight and got no hits. Is the press corps asleep? Hillary Clinton just endorsed a goal I've never heard a pro-choice leader endorse. Not safe, legal, and rare. Safe, legal, and never.
But notice that this means that the immorality of abortion, if it is immoral, doesn't mean that it must be illegal. There could be situations in which it is the least or lesser evil. And I don't think it is the role of the government to decide what those situations are, precisely because the decision to carry a child to term -- let alone raise it! -- is too personal, is of too great existential importance, to be left to the crude and clumsy devices of the law. In order to generate a successful pro-life argument, it would not only be necessary to show that a zygote has the capacity to form capacities -- which is a metaphysical sticky wicket, if you begin to look at the academic literature on counterfactuals -- but also that it is such a great evil that it can never be the least or less evil, or -- alternatively -- that the law must step in and prevent it from ever happening, or least that the law is the right tool with which to regulate the situations under which it does happen. Anyway, that's a long-winded answer to a short and sweet question. My apologies to those I've bored to tears.Carlos
September 16, 2006
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Carlos, what would be a good rational argument for you? What would convince you from a pro-life view? "In a landmark 1998 paper, researchers at the Medical College of Georgia, in Augusta, USA, found that the mammalian embryo (they worked with mice) produces a special enzyme, called indoleamine 2,3-dioxygenase, or ‘IDO’, which suppresses the mother’s T cell reaction and allows pregnancy to proceed.2 Follow-up work in humans revealed the same effect, and it was also demonstrated that the IDO was produced on the embryo side of the placental membrane (which separates mother from child) and not on the mother’s side.4" "And the most recent work in humans has established beyond doubt that IDO is a specific mechanism at the mother–child interface for preventing the mother’s immune system from rejecting her child." "At conception, the new person's genetic instructions come together for the first time—in a single cell called the zygote. But it is not until day 6 that IDO production kicks in.6 Why day 6? Well, day 6 is a preparation for day 7, when the new embryo first attaches itself to its mother’s womb so that it can draw nutrients from its mother’s bloodstream.8 This is exactly the time when the mother’s killer T cells would normally begin to attack and reject it—if not for the amazing protection already provided by the baby’s IDO production on the previous day." see ref. Abortion argument unravels, Alexander Williams, B.Sc. M.Sc.(Hons): http://www.creationontheweb.com/content/view/4633/ Dave, As an aside, in recognition of suspension of Godwin's Law. Muslims compare Pope to Hitler, "Benedict, the author of such unfortunate and insolent remarks, is going down in history for his words," Kapusuz added. "He is going down in history in the same category as leaders such as Hitler and Mussolini." http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060915/ap_on_re_mi_ea/pope_muslims In other news, Islamic followers "attack" 5 churches in Palestine, demand apology from Pope for calling Islam "violent". Just an observation and question. How many more violent attacks will it take for the world to admit Islam is not violent? Scratching head.... and a little satire: Latest "word of intelligence" from The View, Rosie says, "See, I toldya. Its those 'radical Christians' faults" Back to Beckwith, I hope things get cleared up for him soon. He has more ammo today with which to fight for pro-life. And pro-id: Rodent's bizarre traits deepen mystery of genetics, evolution. evolutionhttp://news.uns.purdue.edu/UNS/html4ever/2006/060914DeWoodyVole.html hattip: CreationSafaris.com. This article about voles and their genetic differentiation is fascinating for a topic on genetics.Michaels7
September 16, 2006
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Carlos, since professors hold so much power over students, and since young people tend to hold their teachers in awe, I don’t think most professors are accustomed to being challenged on a regular basis. Do you suppose this contributes to inflated egos and an unwillingness to consider other views? It might, but I'm not sure. I was the sort of student who tried to show off in class by challenging the teacher as much as possible, and my favorite professors were the ones who appreciated that attitude. Now that I'm on the other side of the desk, I still like the students who challenge me. But there is something ego-inflating about standing in front of dozens of people, talking about such-and-such, and then realizing -- they are actually writing down what I'm saying as if it's important! On the other hand, I think that the unwillingness to consider other views arises from the structure of the discipline itself, and not from the student-professor relationship. Having gone from the sciences (as an undergrad) to the humanities (as a grad and now a newly-minted prof), I'll add this. In the sciences, there are well-defined criteria for what counts as an innovation or discovery. There are still arguments and disagreements, but even then, it's not too hard to figure out where the common ground is, what's accepted by both sides, what's at stake in the debate. In the humanities, it's all much fuzzier -- what's contentious, what's accepted, who is talking past whom. There's much more ambiguity, and much less agreeement, as to what's going to count as a right answer to a question, or even what the right questions are. Interestingly, this also means that in the sciences, objective criteria of quality are much easier to articulate and maintain. Consequently there's somewhat less grade inflation. My impression, at any rate, is that grade inflation is much more prevalent in the humanities than in the sciences. Any specific (dare I say juicy) non-incriminating examples? Neither I'm inclined to share. "What happens in academia, stays in academia." I mean, if non-academics realized that academics can be just as petty and shitty to each other as the rest of you, our fantasy of being a secular priesthood would be out the window. And believe me, that fantasy counts for a lot more than most non-academics realize. No one goes into academia for the money or the hours -- although some do like it for the flexibility (i.e. one can work any sixty-hour week one wants to. If you do your best work between 11 pm and 3 am, then that's what it takes). It's the status, and the collegiality (sometimes!) which serve as the draw -- plus the thought of spending one's life playing with some really cool ideas and, maybe, contributing the advancement of human knowledge and learning.Carlos
September 16, 2006
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Carlos ---Combine that with the fact that most academics don’t take any time off between high school and a tenure-track job, and you’ve got a recipe for permanent immaturity. Very cool, Carlos. Dittos.tribune7
September 16, 2006
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I don't believe Beckwith was denied a second time following his appeal. If so, this information is new and has not yet reached me (a student at Baylor, very much in tuned to this tenure issue). I believe a decision is coming soon, a decision that will help decide in which direction Baylor will move as a university. If you support Dr. Beckwith's tenure, please email Baylor University President John Lilley at John_Lilley@baylor.edu and express your concerns.SChen24
September 16, 2006
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*** As someone who’s been in academia for a few years now, I can tell you that tenure decisions are a viper’s nest of pettiness and egotism. Academic politics are so vicious because the stakes are so small. Refusal to compromise isn’t going to start a war, so people are at liberty to let their egos run amok. Combine that with the fact that most academics don’t take any time off between high school and a tenure-track job, and you’ve got a recipe for permanent immaturity. *** Thanks for the insight Carlos :) Any specific (dare I say juicy) non-incriminating examples?jpark320
September 16, 2006
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Dave -- absolutely!! Godwin's law is suspended! Margaret Sanger liked Nazistribune7
September 16, 2006
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"Academic politics are so vicious because the stakes are so small. Refusal to compromise isn’t going to start a war, so people are at liberty to let their egos run amok. Combine that with the fact that most academics don’t take any time off between high school and a tenure-track job, and you’ve got a recipe for permanent immaturity." Carlos, since professors hold so much power over students, and since young people tend to hold their teachers in awe, I don't think most professors are accustomed to being challenged on a regular basis. Do you suppose this contributes to inflated egos and an unwillingness to consider other views?russ
September 16, 2006
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As someone who's been in academia for a few years now, I can tell you that tenure decisions are a viper's nest of pettiness and egotism. Academic politics are so vicious because the stakes are so small. Refusal to compromise isn't going to start a war, so people are at liberty to let their egos run amok. Combine that with the fact that most academics don't take any time off between high school and a tenure-track job, and you've got a recipe for permanent immaturity.Carlos
September 16, 2006
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Oh man, If a conservative can't get tenure at Baylor whats that say for other institutions? I love how ppl say they are open minded except to the other side :) I wouldn't say i'm fully "open minded," but i wouldn't deny tenure to someone based purely on the fact that they are a pro-choice Darwinian.jpark320
September 16, 2006
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That’s a very rare thing in my experience - changing someone’s mind on abortion. In point of fact I’ve never observed a person (other than me) being persuaded to change their mind.
I used to annoy the heck out of my "pro-choice" students. They'd write papers from a pro-choice perspective, and they'd always bring up the "rape or incest" argument. Then I'd point out that it doesn't follow, from the thought that abortion is morally permissible in this one kind of situation, that it's morally permissible in all situations (i.e. "on demand"). They didn't like this being pointed out to them, as you might well imagine. (I also pushed my pro-life students to the wall on their views, just be fair about it.) I looked at Beckwith's article on the pro-life view. It seems decent. I usually stay away from teaching abortion in my ethics class because the pro-life stuff is not very good. (Neither is the pro-choice stuff; Judith Jarvis Thompson's "Talented Violinist" is usually taught, but it rests on such a bleak view of human relationships that most people who read it, if they have any human sympathy, become pro-life. The ones who don't become libertarians.) I'd only known of John Noonan's article. But Beckwith's seems to get somewhere.Carlos
September 16, 2006
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from moderator Denyse: It's great to see that we can discuss abortion here while keeping it civil. (?) That's more fun for readers, especially when people like Dave have put a lot of thought into the topic. I'm not sure that Hitler is strictly relevant, whatever his views, and even mentioning his name causes some to blow a gasket.O'Leary
September 16, 2006
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"(L)iberals don't think a majority of Americans support abortion -- otherwise they would welcome the overturning of Roe v. Wade, which would do nothing more than put abortion to a vote. As their theatrics on Roe demonstrate, the last thing they want is a vote. Once Americans were allowed to vote on abortion. Then Roe came along and overturned the democratically enacted laws of forty-eight states." -- Ann Coulter, Slander, P. 201DaveScot
September 16, 2006
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