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Darwinism: Why its failed predictions don’t matter

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From Wayne Rossiter, author of Shadow of Oz: Theistic Evolution and the Absent God: at his book blog:

It’s an odd pattern. It was this problem that came to mind as I recently revisited Living with Darwin: Evolution, Design and the Future of Faith, by Philip Kitcher. Kitcher is a philosopher at Columbia University, and he specializes on biology. His book was published by Oxford University Press, and was the recipient of the 2008 Lannan Notable Book Award. We should take his views seriously.

His book begins with a forceful assertion: “From the perspective of almost the entire community of natural scientists world-wide, this continued resistance to Darwin is absurd. Biologists confidently proclaim that Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection is as well established as any of the major theories in contemporary science.”

This is not really a prediction. But, it is a statement that was wrong even before it was penned. More.

People who are committed to intellectual integrity in their own work often miss this central point: Once a bully pulpit like Darwinism has been established the occupant does not need to be correct, accurate or even useful. He can be a drag on the system. He can lead the march into degenerate science. He can, incidentally, fix you good if you try to offer an alternative view however grounded.

Bullies are not dislodged by being shown to be wrong, only by being successful opposed. Efforts so far have been commendable but quite honestly, more is needed.

See also: Biologist Wayne Rossiter on Joshua Swamidass’ claim that entropy = information

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Comments
It's been a long time since this discussion took place. My initial position was counter to the position that ID opponents sometimes take. They say that the probability of ANY hand dealt from a standard deck of cards is highly improbable, and yet it happens all the time. From this they then go on to say that highly improbable events happen all the time and so ID's arguments against evolution involving improbabilities is illegitimate. The thought came to me the other day that this is what took place in this very prolonged discussion: we never took notice of the actual probability scheme we were dealing with. We weren't properly identifying the actual 'event' we had at hand (pardon the pun). Here's what it now looks like to me. We have two independent probabilities that have become confused. We have the probability of dealing a hand. Let that be P(Hand). And we have the probability of a certain set of cards ending up in a 'hand' consisting of 5 cards dealt from a standard, shuffled deck. Let this be P(X1,X2,X3,X4,X5) with the X's being random variables. The probablity of the 'event' associated with the 'dealing a hand' is then: P(Hand) x P(X1,X2,X3,X4,X5). But P(Hand), as I've argued throughout, is 1. Hence the probability any "particular" hand, as jdk stipulates, is 1 x P(X1,X2,X3,X4,X5)= P(X1,X2,X3,X4,X5). So, this is where the confusion comes in: we overlook this compound event, which involves both the face value of cards and the act of shuffling dealing. So, to say in the case of dealing cards that highly improbable events happen all the time is simply to confuse P(Hand) x P(X1,X2,X3,X4,X5) with P(Hand).PaV
October 8, 2018
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Yes, nothing but a theological speculation.jdk
June 7, 2017
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Miller's claim is a theological one unless he only claims to be speculating.hnorman5
June 7, 2017
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Thanks, Phinehas: I appreciate that, and your other comments about the value of this conversation. I too have learned a lot by thinking about the issues and trying to articulate my thoughts.jdk
June 7, 2017
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EA:
Another problem with Miller’s approach: it isn’t “evolution” as the term is understood in academia, a fact which earned him a lot of scorn from the materialist evolutionists.
Indeed. The term is used to mean, as G.G. Simpson put it: "Man is the result of a purposeless and natural process that did not have him in mind." But, of course, the moment that "purposeless" is a demonstrable scientific proposition, ID's efforts to detect purpose are also validated as such. Which puts materialists making such claims in quite the pickle.Phinehas
June 7, 2017
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jdk @429 My apologies if I implied that it was your position. I meant that it was my position, and that what you wrote had informed it, and in fact changed it in significant ways over the course of this thread.Phinehas
June 7, 2017
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Phinehas writes,
I think, given what jdk has argued successfully @105 and @192, that you would not be entitled to claim that the probability of drawing that permutation was 1 in 4 x 10^21.
I disagree that that is my position, or that my posts said that. The question of whether a hand is significant or not is a matter of human cognition. That is an additional element added to the issue of theoretical probability. Every hand has a probability of 1 in 4 sextillion: I have repeatedly said that. That is the probability irrespective of any specification any one has or hasn't made. I know you and others have argued otherwise, but I don't agree with your interpretation. So, to be clear, the probability is what it is, given a certain set of parameters, irrespective of whether any specifications are made by anyone. I did explain the probability of getting a significant hand probably gets smaller as the sample space gets larger. I will be amazed, and conclude cheating, if I get all spades in order and not if I get {4 clubs, 7 diamonds, jack diamonds, ace hearts ... in some non-patterned fashion}, but NOT because all spades in order is more or less likely than {4 clubs, 7 diamonds, jack diamonds, ace hearts ... in some non-patterned fashion}.jdk
June 7, 2017
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But let's remember Miller's approach was essentially an effort to have his cake and eat it too: still believe in God while keeping his other foot firmly in the camp of fully materialistic explanations for life and biology. Rather cute, to be sure, but not an impressive intellectual stance to take. One problem with Miller's approach: there is no evidence for it. Another problem with Miller's approach: it isn't "evolution" as the term is understood in academia, a fact which earned him a lot of scorn from the materialist evolutionists.Eric Anderson
June 7, 2017
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Origenes @421 and Phinehas: We, as intelligent beings, have the ability to collapse probabilities. Indeed, this is precisely how we act as causal agents in the real world. I would note that this ability is also a fundamental aspect of the very concept of intelligence, which by its very etymology means: to choose between [contingent possibilities]. Unlike inanimate matter, we have the ability to choose: to act, not just be acted upon.Eric Anderson
June 7, 2017
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jdk:
You have described the basic explanation that Ken Miller uses in “Finding Darwin’s God” for how God interacts with the natural world without violating any physical laws or otherwise “miraculously” intervening in the world.
Interesting. I haven't read "Finding Darwin's God" but I imagine Miller and I would still differ quite a bit on whether or not God was constrained to interacting with the world in this way, or whether it must never be His intention to interact otherwise.Phinehas
June 7, 2017
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DS:
Am I now entitled to claim that the probability of drawing that permutation was/is 1 in 4 x 10^21? Am I entitled to claim a very unlikely event occurred? If so, why?
I think, given what jdk has argued successfully @105 and @192, that you would not be entitled to claim that the probability of drawing that permutation was 1 in 4 x 10^21. This is based on the idea that some percentage of 13-card hands have an admittedly amorphous pre-specification of being "significant." If we suppose that, for a 13-card hand as has been described, the number of potential "significant" hands is 5% of the total number of possible configurations, then I would say the probability of drawing that permutation would be 1 in 4 x 10^21 x 0.05 (or whatever the proper math would be for what I've described, since I have more confidence in my logic than in my math :P). But these are still very long odds, so I think you would indeed be entitled to claim that a very unlikely event occurred.Phinehas
June 7, 2017
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to Dave at 423: I think you have a described an inconsistency in some of the ideas being presented about the role specifications play. to Phinehas at 422: (very off-topic!) You have described the basic explanation that Ken Miller uses in "Finding Darwin's God" for how God interacts with the natural world without violating any physical laws or otherwise "miraculously" intervening in the world.jdk
June 7, 2017
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I've probably said just about all I have to say about this subject, but I wonder about one issue that came up earlier. Suppose I draw a 13-card permutation P at random, and it definitely looks "random"---no obvious pattern. I think it's being argued that I am not entitled to then claim that the probability of that outcome occurring was 1 in 4 x 10^21. Or perhaps I just can't claim that a very unlikely event occurred. However, suppose the permutation came up in ascending order of face value (ace, 2, 3, ...), with the suits alternating hearts/diamonds/hearts/diamonds... . I didn't predict this, that's just the permutation that was drawn. Am I now entitled to claim that the probability of drawing that permutation was/is 1 in 4 x 10^21? Am I entitled to claim a very unlikely event occurred? If so, why?daveS
June 7, 2017
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Origenes:
This doesn’t violate quantum randomness, because a selection can be non-random at the macro level, but random at the micro level.
Fascinating insight. I've often thought about a sort of corollary to this. Quantum randomness seems to allow for a high degree of improbability at the micro level so long as the probabilities even out at the macro level. If I were a being who wished to exert control over circumstances, but in a way such that my fiddling could not be definitively denied as a random occurrence, quantum randomness provides quite the convenient setup. Behind its veil, for instance, I could set up the butterfly sneezes that dictate weather patterns to my heart's content so long as the macro-probabilities fell out into the expected patterns. To carry this thought further, supposing I had complete access to the quantum state of every particle, I might, if I so desired, even set up the XOR logical operation described above in someone's brain as a function of my will rather than that of the person to whom the brain belonged.Phinehas
June 7, 2017
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Phinehas: But it is all intuition, feeling like there is an important truth just outside my mind’s ability to grasp it.
Same here. Something that VJTorley once wrote seems somehow relevant:
…[I]t is easy to show that a non-deterministic system may be subject to specific constraints, while still remaining random. These constraints may be imposed externally, or alternatively, they may be imposed from above, as in top-down causation. To see how this might work, suppose that my brain performs the high-level act of making a choice, and that this act imposes a constraint on the quantum micro-states of tiny particles in my brain. This doesn’t violate quantum randomness, because a selection can be non-random at the macro level, but random at the micro level. The following two rows of digits will serve to illustrate my point. 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 The above two rows of digits were created by a random number generator. The digits in some of these columns add up to 0; some add up to 1; and some add up to 2. Now suppose that I impose the non-random macro requirement: keep the columns whose sum equals 1, and discard the rest. I now have: 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 Each row is still random (at the micro level), but I have now imposed a non-random macro-level constraint on the system as a whole (at the macro level). That, I would suggest, what happens when I make a choice.
His illustration may have to do with what a 'collapse' from randomness into outcome might be and how we might be involved in that process.Origenes
June 7, 2017
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Origenes:
Yes correct Kitcher! But there is one small problem, you did not independently specify the hand.
And even that wouldn't be a big deal without, "But you did," which is where I feel like there is a claim that something happened which did not in reality happen. To expand on #412, I just get the sense that the questions we are asking are reaching down to the very core of our experience of reality, especially as it relates to probability and time. But it is all intuition, feeling like there is an important truth just outside my mind's ability to grasp it.Phinehas
June 6, 2017
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Kitcher: “Consider the humdrum phenomenon suggested by [Michael] Behe’s analogy with bridge. You take a standard deck of cards and deal 13 to yourself. What is the probability that you get exactly those cards in exactly that order?
What is the question here? After 13 cards are dealt a particular hand is guaranteed. Probability 1. Works all the time. Furthermore, since there is no independent specification to match, the term "exactly" is completely inappropriate in Kitcher's question, since all possible hands would have been equally "exact". Each and every hand would "exactly" match the post-specification. So, again, what is being asked? Perhaps the question is: What is the probability that the hand exactly matches the post-specification? Well the answer to that is, assuming that post-specification is done accurately: probability 1. Or the question is the following (and this option seems most likely to me):
What is the probability that you get exactly those cards in exactly that order, if you had independently specified it?
Now things make sense:
Kitcher: The answer is one in 4 x 10^21.
Yes correct Kitcher! But there is one small problem, you did not independently specify the hand. - - - - - P.S. I too would like to express my genuine appreciation for jdk and DS. - - - - - P.P.S. Phinehas #412 makes my head spin.Origenes
June 6, 2017
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Thanks, Phinehas. The questions from you and others here have been very challenging and interesting as well.daveS
June 6, 2017
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I realize we are getting to a point where it may feel like we are talking past each other and that this can cause tension and frustration to rise. Before that happens, I would really like to express my genuine appreciation to jdk and DS for what has been a very enlightening and fascinating discussion for me, helping me to nail down exactly what I believe about the situation and why through their wonderfully challenging questions and objections. Seriously. THANK YOU.Phinehas
June 6, 2017
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jdk:
No “that” means the particular throw. I am looking at the coin and heads is up. That is what “that” refers to.
OK. You are looking at the coin and heads is up. Is it possible for heads not to be up? If that question causes some confusion, it should. It is the same confusion that is swirling around this whole notion of trying to retrofit a particular onto something generic that already happened.Phinehas
June 6, 2017
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DS: But you didn't say "3" you said "the number that was generated." This is more like saying "n" than saying "3". And "n" is a variable. It is a stand-in that can mean any one of the possible numbers. If "n" is not initialized before the random event, then it is undefined. Assigning it a value after the fact doesn't change this.Phinehas
June 6, 2017
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If your “that” means “I got one of the two possibilities
No "that" means the particular throw. I am looking at the coin and heads is up. That is what "that" refers to.jdk
June 6, 2017
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Phinehas,
The problem is that there is no first “particular number”. There is simply “the number that was generated” which was not a “particular number” but a “generic number”. The probability of getting a “generic number” is 1 in 1.
"Generic number"? In this experiment, exactly one number comes up. Just like when you roll a 6-sided die, you get exactly one element of {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. I just rolled a die, and a "3" came up, for example.daveS
June 6, 2017
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I think Origenes said something earlier about probability collapsing. This makes me wonder if we aren't touching a bit on quantum physics here. I'm decidedly a layman on the subject, but it seems to me that the act of "observing" the random event may collapse the probability wave function into a single outcome. This may be why trying to retrofit a "particular" just doesn't work. Anyway, FFT.Phinehas
June 6, 2017
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DS:
There is no second “particular number”. There is simply the number that was generated. The probability of getting that number was 1 in 4 x 10^21, since all the numbers have that same probability of coming up.
The problem is that there is no first "particular number". There is simply "the number that was generated" which was not a "particular number" but a "generic number". The probability of getting a "generic number" is 1 in 1.Phinehas
June 6, 2017
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jdk:
Am I justified in saying “The probability of that having happened is 1/2?” I understand what you are saying, but I would like you to assume that your point is made, and just answer my question.
If your "that" means "I got one of the two possibilities" then you will always get one of the two possibilities, which indicates a probability of 1/1 not 1/2. And your "that" more correctly means "I got one of the two possibilities" than it does "I got a particular outcome" when there was not really a particular outcome specified prior to the random event.Phinehas
June 6, 2017
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re 404: I know you said all the same stuff as before, but you didn't answer the simple question. I flip a coin, and get heads. Am I justified in saying “The probability of that having happened is 1/2?” Notice, no one called heads. There was no prior specification. I just flipped a coin. Am I justified in saying “The probability of that having happened is 1/2?” I understand what you are saying, but I would like you to assume that your point is made, and just answer my question.jdk
June 6, 2017
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Origenes,
DaveS: Do you accept the truth of the statement “All outcomes in the experiment of drawing a random 13-card permutation are equally likely”?
Yes of course. And “All outcomes” is, in fact, a (compressed) list of all sextillion possible specifications. Here is a snapshot:
Specification 200645: king of hearts, 10 of spades, 3 of clubs, jack of clubs, 9 of diamonds, queen of hearts, 4 of clubs, 8 of clubs, 10 of hearts, king of diamonds, 6 of diamonds, queen of diamonds, and an ace of spades Specification 200646: king of hearts,...
But you won't accept that:
For all permutations of 13 cards E, E occurs about once in every 4 x 10^21 trials.
without further qualification, is true?daveS
June 6, 2017
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Phinehas,
Yes, but this is not all he is saying. He is equating the random number you generate with a particular number after the fact.
There is no second "particular number". There is simply the number that was generated. The probability of getting that number was 1 in 4 x 10^21, since all the numbers have that same probability of coming up.daveS
June 6, 2017
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jdk:
I flip a coin, and get heads. Am I justified in saying “The probability of that having happened is 1/2?”
Again, the probability of what having happened. 1) The probability of matching that one particular specification? 2) The probability of matching one of the two possible specifications? Repeating myself... The equivocation is in supposing that 2 is the same as 1. It is only 2 that has happened in reality (as opposed to theoretically, or in our imagination), unless one of the two possible specifications has been made “particular” before the random event. You could write out the two possible specifications and attempt to claim based on this that a particular outcome has been specified, but in reality, you’ve only attempted to make all of the possible outcomes “particular” which tends to violate the meaning of the word a bit. In any case, when all possible specifications are “particular,” then your probability of “particular” permutations over possible permutations becomes 2/2, or 1. The equivocation is in then pretending that the probability is 1/2, but that would only be the case if a single particular outcome had been specified in reality prior to the random event rather than theoretically or in our imagination or merely by using the label "particular." Now, I could see an argument being made that this is simply an alternate way of looking at the same thing. That it is an issue of semantics. Or that it is a potato, po-tah-to sort of thing. If that is the case, then I think the perspective Origenes and I have been describing has the added advantage of lining up better with our intuition, expectation, or experience of surprise. The vast gulf between these realities and the idea that "the improbable happens all the time" is not highlighted as well with the example of a coin as it is with something as complex as Hamlet. Here, we can see the difference in sharp relief in the notion that something unimaginably improbable to the point of being practically impossible (given the finite resources of the known universe) can be claimed to happen every time I run a program to generate a string of characters the length of Hamlet. But do I experience any shock at this? Does it violate my expectations in any way? Which is more in line with my intuition or response to what happened in reality? 1) That something has occurred which has a 1 in 3.4 × 10^183,946 chance of occurring? 2) That something has occurred which has a 1 in 1 chance of occurring? For me, my intuition, level of surprise, shock, expectations, etc. all line up much more strongly with 2 than with 1. Which tends to suggest that 2 may be the perspective which lines up more closely with reality.Phinehas
June 6, 2017
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