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Failure to Educate? Failure to Persuade.

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Larry Moran replied to my latest post with an admission of failure. He thinks he has failed to educate, but I think rather he is confusing the word ‘persuade’ with the word ‘educate’.

He thinks I am rationalising junk DNA with a pile of ‘what-ifs’. But the fact is that most of my ‘what-ifs’ are already known to have some basis in reality. I am not denying any obvious reality. Indeed, the basic machinery of life looks like design, far more than when Paley was around. Yes, there could also be a great deal of junk. That’s why I have said a number of times that ID is not committed to the idea that there is no junk.

Yet, from my point of view, I see a whole pile of Darwinian/post-Darwinian materialists who have only partly explored the genome, working from an assumption that the genome was not designed, and thus are jumping the gun on the evidence. For example, Larry still seems to think that pseudogenes are of themselves ‘solid evidence’ of broken genes despite the fact that we know that at least some pseudogenes influence the rate of translation of real genes by competing with them; a simple design reason why there should be ‘false genes’ = pseudogenes. Who has explored the rest of them?

From his emotive response to my perfectly valid, albeit speculative suggestions (though they were not plucked out of the air either), I don’t trust this guy to think clearly and calmly about the possibility of design. That’s the real problem.

—-
Edit 12 May 2013:

Larry’s insistence that pseudogene = ‘broken gene’ comes from a particular way of thinking about biology: thinking of it in terms of a historical narrative rather than simply reporting the facts of what we see now. This affects much of what he talks about, but here I am choosing to focus on pseudogenes. The best way to talk science is to first state facts and provide an explanation, and then let the observer make up his mind, having been educated, and then let the observer attempt his own explanation of the facts. Being clear about what are facts, and what are interpretations, aids this, but Larry does not practice this when dealing with ID.

The facts are that we have many false genes (pseudogenes) that look like strikingly like particular real genes, and that some of them are known to be functional, and some of those are known to operate by regulating their corresponding real genes by generating competing transcripts. One possible history that would arrive at these observations is if a real gene was duplicated and then one copy was broken to make the pseudogene, and that some subsequently ‘discovered’ a function by chance. Larry believes this is the only possible explanation. He asserts ‘pseudogenes are broken genes’, as if true by definition. However, it is not the only explanation if one considers design. A designer might well make a false gene to regulate a real gene in this way. Why not? But Larry doesn’t consider design. He doesn’t even look at the possibility. That’s why he doesn’t understand that pseudogenes are not necessarily broken genes, and thus are not evidence for junk.

Larry was rather snide about computer scientists, as if they don’t understand the fundamentals of biology. Hmmm. I am more of a mathematical physicist than a computer scientist, and it seems to me that Larry doesn’t understand that stories/narratives about genes breaking and then discovering new function, are not enough for those looking for a natural (physical) explanation. I want to see hard probabilities. It seems that biologists are too happy with narrative and don’t realise the importance of probabilities. If you don’t know how to estimate probabilities, I am sure people like Doug Axe and the Biologic Institute could help you.

Comments
RDFish @389, thanks for your thoughtful response, and I'll let your comments there stand as the last word between us for the subject on this thread. I have appreciated our exchange, and it's been fun and challenging. However I've grown weary of the back-and-forth and it's cost in terms of time, and don't expect to make any more progress; there's been enough content generated between us that onlookers can decide for themselves about the issues raised. So I bid you farewell for now. Best, ChanceChance Ratcliff
June 1, 2013
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Hi StephenB,
The issue here is the Law of Causality. I accept it; you do not.
Nope, you've over-simplified and mischaracterized as usual. You believe: Everything has a cause, although the choices that humans make are uncaused (it isn't clear if you think other animals' choices are caused or not). I believe: Everything in our direct experience has a cause, except perhaps human and animal choices (nobody knows if our choices result from physical cause). Outside of the realm of our experience (i.e. quantum effects, outside of spacetime) it appears that we can't apply our the concept of causality as we currently conceive of it. If you'd like to stop there and agree to disgree on this, that's fine.
Notice, that when we were discussing this in the abstract, I didn’t just make the claim that the LoC is derived from the LNC, I did the derivation in your presence and in the presence of everyone else who cared to observe. Since you, nor anyone else, provided any rational objections, the matter should have been settled then and there.
Your "derivation" was nonsense, as I pointed out. There are two problems I identified. First, you rely on the absurd notion that things which do not exist can still do things, such as receive things. If something does not exist, it cannot do anything. Second, your assertion that something can "receive being" sounds like it violates the Law of Conservation of Mass/Energy. Do you believe that this conservation law can be violated? Your "derivation" of the LoC from the LNC is wordplay, not analytic philosophy, and certainly not science. Look at the the way you state the LoC: Every effect has a cause. And how do you define "effect"? Why, as "the result of a cause" of course! So the way you put it, the LoC is not even a true statement about the world - rather, it is simply true by definition - a tautology! And when you don't want something to be caused (like human choices) you simply say "Oh, that isn't an effect!" It's all just semantic sleight-of-hand. It's nonsense. In contrast, scientists treat the LoC as an actual proposition about how the world works. They say Every event has a cause. Now that is an actual proposition that isn't just true by definition, but it is making an assertion about the world. Is it true? Does this law hold? It does in our everyday experience, but apparently not in the quantum world, nor outside of spacetime.
You disagree and insist that it is logically possible to get the former from the latter–to get more in the effect than is in the cause.
Yes in terms of the amount of matter involved, I believe it would violate conservation laws, but not logic. I think, then, that it is fair to ask you to show how it is, indeed, logically possible–to provide the logical connection between the raw material (splinter) and the finished product (wood beam). I've already answered that it is physically impossible, but not logically impossible.
Here is something to keep in mind. I have the advantage of knowing with apodictic certainty that you cannot defend your claim because I know with that same level of certainty that the Law of Causality is a valid rule of right reason for which there are no exceptions.
Yes, I would say this is a very important thing for all of us to keep in mind when discussing anything with you. You are defiantly incapable of considering the possibility that you are mistaken.
That is why I can say boldly and with the utmost confidence that you will not even try to defend you claim. You will either simply repeat it or change the subject.
In my view, I have considered your arguments to the best of my ability, and articulated my objections to each of them. Given your remarks, I am even more confident in my assessment of our fundamental difference. You want to believe you can build an absolutely certain understanding of the world from self-evident truths and logic. In this I think you could not possibly be more wrong. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 1, 2013
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Hi Chance,
I asserted that a program will produce the same output on the same input from the starting state. This point still stands.
We agree that a computer will produce the same output on the same input from the same starting state. I don't see why this is relevant. In comparing people to computers, people do not reset, and so when comparing the non-deterministic output of computers to that of people, we ought not think of resetting the computer either. That's the whole point: We human beings are the sum total of our initial state as acted upon by a virtually infinite number of interactions with the world in our lifetimes.
So you weren’t using nondeterministic input as a justification that computers make free choices?
(Reminder: We now have agreed to commit to your definition of "free"). Computers do not make free choices.
Random effects are contingent, and they conform to a probability distribution.
I find this definition to be nonsense. First, everything conforms to some sort of probability distribution, even an unbroken series of identical outputs. Second, all that "contigent" means (as far as you've defined it) is "not determined". What causes something that is not determined? Are nuclear decay events caused by anything? Are they determined? Random? Both?
RDF: I did not make a claim that computers make free choices; I simply pointed out that according to my definition, computers made free choices. It was not a statement of fact, but rather a matter of definition.” CR: Your claim was made in your conversation with Phinehas at #211: RDF: My point was that no computer can be morally responsible for anything, because that which gives us moral accountability is absent from computers. While both humans and computers can make free choices, computers lack the human concept of morality.
That is correct. What is your question? DID YOU FORGET THAT I WAS USING MY DEFINITION FOR "FREE" THERE?
The only distinction you were making was that computers lack moral accountability — otherwise according to you, both humans and computers make free choices. Whatever notion of “free” you had in mind, you were imputing it to both computers and humans. Was this the determined free, or the nondetermined free?
As I clearly stated, my definition of "free choice" was "selecting from multiple possible options based on internal states". I beg you to stick to your own defintion of "free" so we do not constantly have to revisit this.
RDF: 3) Programs can change themselves non-deterministically given non-deterministic input CR: So you never intended this to be taken in the context of free choices?
Computers cannot make free choices, because their output does not fit your definition of free. Programs can, however, change themselves, and if the input controlling these changes is non-deterministic, these changes will likewise be non-deterministic. Let's drop this - it doesn't really matter to the central issue of our discussion.
CR: Consistent with my definition, human beings output non-random, contingent digital strings like this very sentence, which is neither random nor explicable by physical law. RDF: Just because we can’t explain it by physical law does not mean it is not produced by deterministic means. This is crucial for you to understand, and there can be two sorts of reasons for our inability to explain things. CR: How is it that contingent output which is not random can be explained by deterministic means, even in principle?
Why do you say that human output cannot be explained by deterministic means in principle? I completely disagree. If anyone could demonstrate that, it would revolutionize science, philosophy, and our understanding of just about everything! We cannot currently explain how humans think, plan, design, use language, and so on, and perhaps we never will, but we have no proof or demonstration that it is impossible in principle to explain our mental abilities in deterministic terms. This is the crux of our entire discussion.
Wow, eight question marks! What would indicate more incredulity, nine question marks? Or perhaps you could duplicate some vowels: WHAAAAAT???????? Obviously my remarks are so beyond the pale, that any number of question marks, all caps, and the addition of extraneous vowels could not possibly convey how ridiculous a notion it is to suppose that only a nondetermined process could produce nondetermined output.
Hahahaha, very good. I am duly chastised :-) :-)
The effects of weather occur because of sufficient conditions — the properties of air and water, differential temperatures, and so on. In this sense it is necessary. The individual patterns are unpredictable, hence contingent. This is all the working of physical law and is not controversial.
Right. We can't prove that it nothing in a storm violates physical cause, but there is certainly no reason to postulate additional extra-physical causes.
What is controversial is how a determined, physical process could output contextual meaning, like this very paragraph. You can’t show how this is even possible in principle.
We cannot explain how our minds work. We have no theory of intelligence. However, there is no theory that shows in principle that the processes that result in our behaviors are anything but deterministic. That is the very question we are discussing! Nobody knows the answer. There are some things that we can show cannot be true in principle. We cannot in principle know the exact simultaneous location and momentum of a photon. We cannot in principle prove all true theorems in any formal logic of sufficient power. We know these things because of scientific and mathematical results that are well understood and tested. However, we have no similar reason to say that in principle we can never explain human mental abilities in terms of deterministic processes. We simply do not know.
The question is, can a deterministic process generate nondeterministic ouput without smuggling in nondeterministic input, if it even exists.
I think you are assuming that things like these posts we're writing are nondeterministic. This is confused. Here: Imagine you come across a room, and periodically a piece of paper comes out from a slot in the (locked) door with English writing on it - meaningful, grammatical sentences. Can you decide from looking at this writing that the process that created this writing is deterministic or not? No, of course you can't - it could well be a deterministic computer writing these things, right? There is nothing inherently "non-deterministic" about English sentences! Oh, you say that even if it's a computer writing these sentences, the programmer of the computer must have been non-deterministic? Well how do you know that? Maybe the programmer was actually another computer that was programmed to generate programs that output sentences. Ah, you say that the programmer of the program that wrote the program that output the sentences must have been non-deterministic? Well, how do you know? I trust you see where we're going here. Your insistence that humans are non-deterministic because they produce "non-deterministic" output is nothing but the argument from First Cause. You say the First Cause is non-deterministic; I ask "How do you know?"
RDF: No, you cannot observe that. There is no way of knowing if our output (our sentences, designs, plans, art, music, etc) is the result of a deterministic process or not. CR: I cannot observe that the output of human behavior is nondeterministic?
Yes that is correct. There is no way at all to tell if some artifact is produced by deterministic or non-deterministic means.
So are you saying that sentences are deterministic,...
First, it is not the sentence that is either deterministic or not, but rather we are questioning whether the process that produced the sentence was deterministic. With that said, the answer is we do not know whether the process (our minds) that produce sentences are deterministic or not.
... or just that nondeterministic output can be had by a purely deterministic process?
We do not know if our mental processes are deterministic or not, and nobody knows any way to answer the question.
If our behavior merely produced chaos, or just produced regular patterns reducible to simple descriptions, there would be no controversy: we could easily attribute this behavior to physical processes.
If our behavior was what you describe, tehre would be no controversy because nobody would be able to think or talk :-)
The fact that the controversy exists is demonstrative that there’s a problem.
A mystery indeed! How do human beings think and experience conscious awareness? In my view this is the central problem of our existence, and I've thought about it my entire long life.
CSI-rich output is neither chaotic nor necessary.
You are asserting your conclusion. We do not know how humans produce CSI.
So the all-important question is, can a purely deterministic process produce this sort of nondeterministic output?
I would say the question is, Can a deterministic process produce CSI?
I’ve argued that the warrant exists, because of the empirical fact of this CSI-generating behavior, to conclude, at least provisionally, that we make free choices,
CSI provides no clue as to whether or not mental processes are deterministic.
...barring some legitimate explanation of how to get nondeterministic output from a purely deterministic process.
You are assuming by default that human minds operate outside of laws of physics, and saying you want to continue believing that without evidence until somebody proves to you that deterministic processes can produce CSI. I think that is a dogmatic position. My position is that we do not know if human minds operate outside the laws of physics (that we know, or even that we do not yet understand).
It’s no less problematic accounting for sophisticated technology and communication by a deterministic process. It can’t be shown to be possible, even in principle.
Nobody knows.
I think there is warrant to accept that non-random contingent output requires a non-random contingent “process.”
There is no "warrant" to think that at all. Unlike gravity or electrons or other theoretical constructs, you have no way of characterizing this "non-random contingent process" in such a way that we can test for its existence.
Is contingency logically consistent with necessity, or are they different things?
I think discussing this will lead us into further confusion and won't help with the central issue, so let's skip that. The central issue is: Do human minds operate according to deterministic processes or not?
And I have noted that we actually observe non-random contingency in the output of human behavior. Are you taking issue with that observation?
Yes I take issue with that. We output CSI (there are problems with the definition of CSI too, but let's not go there - I accept that CSI means a type of complex form and function that we all can recognize as something that occurs in biological systems and human artifacts. How does CSI get into human artifacts? We don't know how we do it. Maybe our minds operate deterministically, and maybe they don't. How does CSI get into biological systems? We don't know this either. Maybe whatever lead to biological complexity operated deterministically, and maybe it didn't. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 1, 2013
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How about we run a poll. Who else agrees with Stephen that it is logically impossible (not physically impossible) for a splinter to turn into a plank?5for
June 1, 2013
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Hi RD
You ought not imagine that I am insane and hallucinatory and think splinters morph into wood beams. Our argument is about epistemology, not about splinters or snow men. You think you ground your certainty of these things in 100% absolute certain self-evident logic, and I (and most epistemologists) disagree with that.
RD, we need to wind this thing down. The issue here is the Law of Causality. I accept it; you do not. We can only do so much in the abstract. Sooner or later, we have to use concrete examples so we can sort things out and make them clear. If I didn't understand the subject matter, I could not produce a relevant example. If you do understand the subject matter, then you will recognize its aptness. You think it is logically possible to get a wood beam from a splinter. I say that this proposition violates both the Law of Non-Contradiction and the derivative Law of Causality. Notice, that when we were discussing this in the abstract, I didn't just make the claim that the LoC is derived from the LNC, I did the derivation in your presence and in the presence of everyone else who cared to observe. Since you, nor anyone else, provided any rational objections, the matter should have been settled then and there. Still, you would not accept the Law of Causality as a general principle, even in the teeth of my abstract proof, so I returned to the concrete example, pointing out that you cannot get a two-by-four piece of wood from a splinter. This would would certainly violate the Law of Causality and, by extension, the Law of Non-Contradiction from which it is derived. It would mean that we were getting more in the effect than was in the cause. You disagree and insist that it is logically possible to get the former from the latter--to get more in the effect than is in the cause. I think, then, that it is fair to ask you to show how it is, indeed, logically possible--to provide the logical connection between the raw material (splinter) and the finished product (wood beam). Here is something to keep in mind. I have the advantage of knowing with apodictic certainty that you cannot defend your claim because I know with that same level of certainty that the Law of Causality is a valid rule of right reason for which there are no exceptions. That is why I can say boldly and with the utmost confidence that you will not even try to defend you claim. You will either simply repeat it or change the subject. Best WishesStephenB
June 1, 2013
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Sorry, my #385 above is addressed to RDFish's #382.Chance Ratcliff
June 1, 2013
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Weren’t you previously defending the notion that computers make free choices by appealing to nondeterministic input?
No, I wasn’t. You had claimed that computers necessarily produce the same input given the same output, and I pointed out otherwise.[1] I also made a distinction between the deterministic operation of the computer and the output of any given program, which could be as nondeterministic as the input. Furthermore, I pointed out that the program itself could change nondeterministically, again given nondeterministic input.[2]
[1] We can revisit this claim. I asserted that a program will produce the same output on the same input from the starting state. This point still stands. [2] So you weren't using nondeterministic input as a justification that computers make free choices?
"I still don’t know what you mean by “random” however."
Random effects are contingent, and they conform to a probability distribution.
"I did not make a claim that computers make free choices; I simply pointed out that according to my definition, computers made free choices. It was not a statement of fact, but rather a matter of definition."
Your claim was made in your conversation with Phinehas at #211:
"My point was that no computer can be morally responsible for anything, because that which gives us moral accountability is absent from computers. While both humans and computers can make free choices, computers lack the human concept of morality."
The only distinction you were making was that computers lack moral accountability -- otherwise according to you, both humans and computers make free choices. Whatever notion of "free" you had in mind, you were imputing it to both computers and humans. Was this the determined free, or the nondetermined free?
"3) Programs can change themselves non-deterministically given non-deterministic input"
So you never intended this to be taken in the context of free choices?
Consistent with my definition, human beings output non-random, contingent digital strings like this very sentence, which is neither random nor explicable by physical law.
Just because we can’t explain it by physical law does not mean it is not produced by deterministic means. This is crucial for you to understand, and there can be two sorts of reasons for our inability to explain things.
How is it that contingent output which is not random can be explained by deterministic means, even in principle?
RDF: Now, you need to tell me how you can determine whether or not humans are free. What sort of test would you run? What sort of evidence would you provide?” CR: I would examine the outputs of human behavior, which are contingent but not random upon inspection, just as my definition of “free” indicates.
WHAT????????[1] No, Chance, you cannot decide if human thought is or is not deterministic by “examining the output” of human behavior. Can you decide if storms are deterministic by looking at weather maps, or following tornados? We assume that storms actually do proceed deterministically, because we have no reason to assume that something in the weather is transcending physical cause. But we can’t know that simply by looking at the weather!!![2]
[1] Wow, eight question marks! What would indicate more incredulity, nine question marks? Or perhaps you could duplicate some vowels: WHAAAAAT???????? Obviously my remarks are so beyond the pale, that any number of question marks, all caps, and the addition of extraneous vowels could not possibly convey how ridiculous a notion it is to suppose that only a nondetermined process could produce nondetermined output. [2] The effects of weather occur because of sufficient conditions -- the properties of air and water, differential temperatures, and so on. In this sense it is necessary. The individual patterns are unpredictable, hence contingent. This is all the working of physical law and is not controversial. What is controversial is how a determined, physical process could output contextual meaning, like this very paragraph. You can't show how this is even possible in principle.
"A deterministic process can produce nondeterministic output given nondeterministic input.[1] Nobody knows if “contingent, non-random” effects exist, period.[2]"
[1] Sure, so as long as we can feed a process nondeterministic input, if such a thing even exists, it can produce nondeterministic output, if such a thing even exists. So regardless of the process, nondeterministic output requires a nondeterministic factor. The question is, can a deterministic process generate nondeterministic ouput without smuggling in nondeterministic input, if it even exists. [2] The character arrangement of this sentence is contingent and non-random.
"You have no way of knowing if what we type is the output of a deterministic process or not. That is the whole point."
The whole point is that even a deterministic process requires a nondeterministic factor if it's going to produce nondeterministic output.
…and then observe that human beings can output non-random contingency.
No, you cannot observe that. There is no way of knowing if our output (our sentences, designs, plans, art, music, etc) is the result of a deterministic process or not.
I cannot observe that the output of human behavior is nondeterministic? So are you saying that sentences are deterministic, or just that nondeterministic output can be had by a purely deterministic process?
"Now let’s deal with the fact that while humans make “CSI”-rich things like books and sculptures, tornados just make a big mess. I think this is a critical distinction, and I believe we do not understand how CSI-rich human beings came to exist in the first place (i.e. I do not believe evolution explains it). However, we do not know how humans think, so we don’t know how we design things, make plans, etc. The explanation may turn out to reduce to physics as we currently understand (lots of people think this, like Dan Dennett), or it may require new physics (people like Roger Penrose think this), or it may require an entirely new understanding of mind (people like David Chalmers think this). Nobody knows the answer yet."
I think that's an important point. If our behavior merely produced chaos, or just produced regular patterns reducible to simple descriptions, there would be no controversy: we could easily attribute this behavior to physical processes. The fact that the controversy exists is demonstrative that there's a problem. CSI-rich output is neither chaotic nor necessary. So the all-important question is, can a purely deterministic process produce this sort of nondeterministic output? I've argued that the warrant exists, because of the empirical fact of this CSI-generating behavior, to conclude, at least provisionally, that we make free choices, barring some legitimate explanation of how to get nondeterministic output from a purely deterministic process.
Perhaps you disagree that the output of human behaviors can be both contingent and not random. Is that the case?
It isn’t that I disagree, but I have two problems with it. First, as I tried to point out, I don’t think anyone has characterized what it means to be non-random and non-deterministic. Either something happens for a reason (deterministic) or it doesn’t (random). This is a complicated point, but many people including me find the notion of neither-chance-nor-necessity conceptually problematic.[1] Second, there is simply no empirical way of deciding if human thought is free in this sense.[2]
[1] It's no less problematic accounting for sophisticated technology and communication by a deterministic process. It can't be shown to be possible, even in principle. [2] I think there is warrant to accept that non-random contingent output requires a non-random contingent "process."
However non-random contingency isn’t logically compatible with necessity, as far as I can tell.
BY DEFINITION non-random contingency is not consistent with necessity.[1] CR, you mix up what philosophers call analytic truths (things that are true by defintion) with synthetic truths (things that are true because we observe them to be true in the world). You have defined “non-random contingency” to mean “not random and not determined” – in other words, free.[2]
[1] Is contingency logically consistent with necessity, or are they different things? [2] And I have noted that we actually observe non-random contingency in the output of human behavior. Are you taking issue with that observation?Chance Ratcliff
June 1, 2013
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Hi StephenB,
RDF: There is a difference between logical and physical possibility. SB: In this case, your dichotomous descriptions do not apply. We are discussing the logical possibilities of a physical process. I don’t know why you would not know what that means.
When something is logically impossible, it means it has no consistent meaning because involves a logical contradiction. There is a logical contradiction in saying "a square circle". When something is physical impossible, it means we have good reason to believe that it can't happen in our physical reality. There is no logical contradiction in saying "A piece of ice turned into a snowman". A piece of ice turning into a snowman is physically impossible, but it does not itself contain a logical contradiction. I suggest we drop this logical/physical distinction - it's getting very old - and focus on the main point of that aspect of our discussion, which is certainty. Here's what I think you and I are really arguing about in that regard: As far as I can tell, you believe that we can build an edifice of knowledge by starting with undeniable self-evident truths and using the Rules of Reason to derive more truths that only unreasonable people would disagree with. And that these truths encompass deep questions of existence such as the origin of the universe, the relation between mind and body, the nature of human volition, and so on. Is that a fair characterization of your view? In my opinion that is pie in the sky. The Logical Positivists had similar views about Rules of Reason and certainty (although they eschewed metaphysics altogether). There aren't any Logical Positivists any more and haven't been for about sixty years for many reasons, including the reasons I've given here: Logic does not encompass rationality, and epistemology has no objectively grounded foundation.
SB: You think it is logically possible that a piece of ice can give rise to a 10? snowman with facial features and a corncob pipe.” RDF: Yes, logically possible. SB: Show me how. Bridge the gap. Make the reconciliation.
It is logically possible because it does not involve a contradiction; it is physically impossible, however, so we can't possibly "bridge the gap"!
Are you kidding? If we cannot agree on something as simple and obvious as the fact that something cannot come from nothing, or that splinters cannot morph into wood beams, or that an ice cube cannot produce a 10’ snowman with facial features and a corncob pipe, what would be the point of reverting back to our discussion on the far more complicated issue of causality, free will, and libertarianism.
Stephen, please take a minute and try to act in good faith here. You and I have been writing back and forth, and I certainly take you for a sane and intelligent person who would not imagine that ice cubes can turn into snowmen. You ought to think the same of me - you ought not imagine that I am insane and hallucinatory and think splinters morph into wood beams. Our argument is about epistemology, not about splinters or snow men. You think you ground your certainty of these things in 100% absolute certain self-evident logic, and I (and most epistemologists) disagree with that.
If effects can occur without causes, there is no reason to talk to anyone about anything.
That's a weird thing to say. Why would we not want to talk to each other just because in certain contexts that are far removed from our human experience, things happened that violated cause-and-effect relationships? Effects don't occur without causes in our day-to-day existence; so what if they do in laboratory experiments or 13B years ago when the universe started? Also, if you read my posts here (yes, all 100 of them :-)) I've never said "effects occur without causes". What I think we have good reason to believe is that in the context of QM events, or the start of the universe, our conception of causality (which is connected to time) doesn't apply. That is a bit different.
I just pointed to your two latest contradictions on certainty and nothingness.
I didn't contradict myself. You are talking about things that don't exist but can still do things, which is a pretty blatant contradiction I'd say.
The next time that I argue that “nothing” cannot give being or movement that it doesn’t have, or that something that already has being or movement cannot also receive it, please don’t pretend that you don’t know what “nothing” means in that context so that you can avoid confronting the argument.
You said something that doesn't exist could receive being from something else. That is nonsense, because if it doesn't exist it can't do anything. Besides, it violates conservation of mass/energy. I don't even understand why we are talking about this.
RDF: If you look at what I’ve said about causality, you’ll see that my claim is that without locality and realism, causality as we understand it does not apply at the quantum scale. SB: With respect to our discussion, the only thing that Bell’s theorem shows is that the physical world and some effects are not local. What does that have to do with the Law of Causality and the fact that all effects require causes?
As you see, I've said "causality as we understand it does not apply". Obviously, our intuitive understanding of causality is local, and QM violates that aspect of causality. But it's not just that effects can happen anywhere: As we understand things, causes must temporally precede effects. In QM, an event at A has an effect at B, and the temporal order of these effects is undefined. This is not at all how we understand causality. The other context in which our understanding of causality doesn't apply is the beginning of the universe. You've ignored this point thus far, but what is your response? If cause-and-effect requires that the cause precede the effect in time, how can something cause something else when time does not exist?
Indeed, as I keep telling you, the experimental results they came up with presuppose the Law of Causality in the first place. If evidence could invalidate the assumptions of causality that informed it, then the evidence itself would be invalidated since it would be based on a false premise. LOL This is called sawing off the branch that you are sitting on.
No, that would only be true if all causality was denied. Nobody is doing that.
How is that relevant to the fact that every effect requires a cause? I already agree that Bell’s theorem seems to indicate that physical effects are not local. I have read from some that Bell’s theorem is wrong, but I feel no need to go down that road. I will grant it arguendo. The problem is that you, and perhaps others, are trying to make more out of it than can be rationally justified.
All I want to say with this is that our most fundamental concepts - time, space, matter, mind, causality - are not as simple and obvious and objectively certain as you take them to be.
Tell me how you get the finished product of a two-by-four from the raw materials of a splinter.
That would be physically impossible, but not logically impossible.
Well, if he does, then he is wrong. At that point, he would then have to explain on what basis the LNC could possibly be unreliable—without using the LNC. Good luck with that one.
Imagine your mind is malfunctioning in such a way that your beliefs about properly basic truths are incorrect. You believe that 1+1=3, and that A=~A, and you believe that you have sound justifications for these beliefs, even though all of these beliefs are completely wrong. No, if this was true of you, how would you know this is the case? You wouldn't, because your mind would be unreliable. So, how do you know that this is not true of you right now? You don't. Certainty is uncertain - and yes, you can quote me on that :-) Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 31, 2013
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HI RFD SB: That’s a nice try, but we are discussing the logical possibilities of a physical process. RDF
I don’t understand what this means. There is a difference between logical and physical possibility.
In this case, your dichotomous descriptions do not apply. We are discussing the logical possibilities of a physical process. I don’t know why you would not know what that means. “You think it is logically possible that a piece of ice can give rise to a 10' snowman with facial features and a corncob pipe.”
Yes, logically possible.
Show me how. Bridge the gap. Make the reconciliation.
I’m defining ice as “frozen water” – how about you?
Yep.
Listen, we’re just running around in silly semantic circles here, and I’d like to return to arguing about things that matter, such as the relation between libertarian will and morality, the evidence for libertarianism and dualism, and maybe other things.
Are you kidding? If we cannot agree on something as simple and obvious as the fact that something cannot come from nothing, or that splinters cannot morph into wood beams, or that an ice cube cannot produce a 10’ snowman with facial features and a corncob pipe, what would be the point of reverting back to our discussion on the far more complicated issue of causality, free will, and libertarianism. If effects can occur without causes, there is no reason to talk to anyone about anything.
As our other reader has pointed out, it is not that I contradict myself, it is that you seem incapable of reading and understanding these arguments.
I just pointed to your two latest contradictions on certainty and nothingness. Would you like for me to repeat them word for word.
As far as what “nothing” means, it means the absence of anything. Let us not play with words here, OK?
Yes, let’s not play with words. The next time that I argue that "nothing" cannot give being or movement that it doesn't have, or that something that already has being or movement cannot also receive it, please don’t pretend that you don’t know what “nothing” means in that context so that you can avoid confronting the argument.
If you look at what I’ve said about causality, you’ll see that my claim is that without locality and realism, causality as we understand it does not apply at the quantum scale.
With respect to our discussion, the only thing that Bell’s theorem shows is that the physical world and some effects are not local. What does that have to do with the Law of Causality and the fact that all effects require causes? Absolutely Nothing. Indeed, as I keep telling you, the experimental results they came up with presuppose the Law of Causality in the first place. If evidence could invalidate the assumptions of causality that informed it, then the evidence itself would be invalidated since it would be based on a false premise. LOL This is called sawing off the branch that you are sitting on.
Ok, your turn: Find some reference that explains why violations of Bell’s Theorem do not disprove locality + realism, or that explains why Bell’s Theorem isn’t violated.
How is that relevant to the fact that every effect requires a cause? I already agree that Bell’s theorem seems to indicate that physical effects are not local. I have read from some that Bell’s theorem is wrong, but I feel no need to go down that road. I will grant it arguendo. The problem is that you, and perhaps others, are trying to make more out of it than can be rationally justified. KF is the most reputable source of information you can find on this (or the only one!), that should tell you something. KF is one of the few practicing physicists that I know of who is well grounded in philosophy. This is a philosophical issue at least as much as it is a scientific one. A good physicist is not necessarily a good philosopher and cannot, therefore, address the relationship between QM and the LoC.
Still, let it not be said that I’m closed-minded, so if KF has something on Bell’s Theorem in particular explaining why locality+realism are not violated, I will read it.
I will pass the word along. “For that matter, how is it logically possible to get a two-by-four wooden beam from a wood splinter? How is it possible to get a gold bar from a gold sliver? Please step up to the plate and address the topic.”
None of these are logical contradictions. They are physical impossibilities – contingent, empirical truths that do not hold in all possible worlds. I’m really tired of explaining this to you because you won’t learn about epistemology 1A
I have my graduate credentials in philosophy. Please don’t play that card. Tell me how you get the finished product of a two-by-four from the raw materials of a splinter. Tell me how you get the gold bar from a gold sliver. Give me a logical explanation of how this is possible.
Plantinga says, by implication, that the LNC is subject to uncertainty
Well, if he does, then he is wrong. At that point, he would then have to explain on what basis the LNC could possibly be unreliable—without using the LNC. Good luck with that one. Best WishesStephenB
May 31, 2013
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Hi Chance,
RDF: I would hope you’d agree that computers have “internal states”! CR: Non sequitur.
Um, my hope is a non-sequitur? Really?
Weren’t you previously defending the notion that computers make free choices by appealing to nondeterministic input?
No, I wasn't. You had claimed that computers necessarily produce the same input given the same output, and I pointed out otherwise. I also made a distinction between the deterministic operation of the computer and the output of any given program, which could be as nondeterministic as the input. Furthermore, I pointed out that the program itself could change nondeterministically, again given nondeterministic input. We're sticking with your definitions of "free choices" here, right? So we agree that no matter what the input, computers do not make free choices.
Since you’ve been avoiding randomness, that leaves non-random contingency. Isn’t that the notion of freedom you were indicating, or were you actually defending compatibilism all along?
My position is that we do not know if human beings act according to deterministic causality or not.
If the latter, why did you formerly insist that programs make free choices if their inputs are nondeterministic?
I just explained this.
And what nondeterministic input did you have in mind, the “free” kind or the random kind?
I said whatever type of nondeterministic input the computer is given can be reflected in the output of the program or in changes to the program itself. Do not put the word free in scare quotes, because we know what we mean by this word: We are using your definition for the word, which is not random and not determined. OK? I still don't know what you mean by "random" however.
So when you made the claim that computers make free choices, you were justifying it with a definition that comports with determinism.
I did not make a claim that computers make free choices; I simply pointed out that according to my definition, computers made free choices. It was not a statement of fact, but rather a matter of definition.
Why then did you insist that computers can make free choices if their input is nondeterministic?
Once again: 1) Computers operate deterministically 2) Program output can be non-deterministic in the same way the input is 3) Programs can change themselves non-deterministically given non-deterministic input 4) According to our definition of free, computers are not free
Consistent with my definition, human beings output non-random, contingent digital strings like this very sentence, which is neither random nor explicable by physical law.
Just because we can't explain it by physical law does not mean it is not produced by deterministic means. This is crucial for you to understand, and there can be two sorts of reasons for our inability to explain things. First, the phenomena may be too complex and chaotic. Say a lightning bolt hits a particular tree. We cannot explain by physical law why that particular tree was hit; we can only generally describe the sorts of processes involved (build-up of static electricity in the cloud, ionization of air, and so on). But any given individual weather event can't be predicted or explained because weather is complex and chaotic. Second, we might not understand the relevant physics. We can't explain why there is more matter than anti-matter in the universe, because none of our theories of physics accounts for this. When it comes to human thought, we cannot explain it in any way at all. It may be that it is fully accounted for in general by the neural processes we're familiar with, but too complex and chaotic for us to understand and predict in detail. Or, it may be that we do not understand the relevant physics. And finally, I would say that the truth of the matter may be so different from what we call "physics" that our minds be entirely outside of physical causality. Nobody knows which of these might turn out to be the case.
RDF: Now, you need to tell me how you can determine whether or not humans are free. What sort of test would you run? What sort of evidence would you provide?” CR: I would examine the outputs of human behavior, which are contingent but not random upon inspection, just as my definition of “free” indicates.
WHAT???????? No, Chance, you cannot decide if human thought is or is not deterministic by "examining the output" of human behavior. Can you decide if storms are deterministic by looking at weather maps, or following tornados? We assume that storms actually do proceed deterministically, because we have no reason to assume that something in the weather is transcending physical cause. But we can't know that simply by looking at the weather!!! (I understand that humans produce complex form and function, or "CSI", or whatever you want to call it, and weather systems don't, but that is not relevant to this particular point - see below).
Is it logically consistent to suggest that a process which acts according to necessity would have contingent and non-random output, or does that result in a contradiction?
A deterministic process can produce nondeterministic output given nondeterministic input. Nobody knows if "contingent, non-random" effects exist, period.
I observe that human beings construct contingent, non-random entities, such as meaningful strings of text.
You have no way of knowing if what we type is the output of a deterministic process or not. That is the whole point.
Once again: 1) We agree on a definition of “free choice” that means not random or determined. 2) Using that definition, we agree computers cannot make free choices 3) The question is, Can humans make free choices? 4) My position is: we do not know if humans or anything else make free choices 5) Your argument regarding humans building machines is completely irrelevant, because you are simply assuming that humans are free and then concluding the exact same thing. And so, you have provided precisely zero evidence that humans can act in a way that is neither random nor determined. #1-4, fine. #5, nope.
Four out of five isn't bad :-)
I define “free” as non-random contingency
Right - that is our working definition; let's not change it! Free means non-random and non-deterministic.
...and then observe that human beings can output non-random contingency.
No, you cannot observe that. There is no way of knowing if our output (our sentences, designs, plans, art, music, etc) is the result of a deterministic process or not.
It’s simply consistent with the definition, just like your notion that computers make free choices if we define “free” in a way that’s consistent with determinism.
Your definition is fine. It's not a matter of being consistent with the definition here - the matter is that nobody knows how we think, and you can't tell from what we do any more than you could tell if a tornado is deterministic just by watching it. Now let's deal with the fact that while humans make "CSI"-rich things like books and sculptures, tornados just make a big mess. I think this is a critical distinction, and I believe we do not understand how CSI-rich human beings came to exist in the first place (i.e. I do not believe evolution explains it). However, we do not know how humans think, so we don't know how we design things, make plans, etc. The explanation may turn out to reduce to physics as we currently understand (lots of people think this, like Dan Dennett), or it may require new physics (people like Roger Penrose think this), or it may require an entirely new understanding of mind (people like David Chalmers think this). Nobody knows the answer yet.
Perhaps you disagree that the output of human behaviors can be both contingent and not random. Is that the case?
It isn't that I disagree, but I have two problems with it. First, as I tried to point out, I don't think anyone has characterized what it means to be non-random and non-deterministic. Either something happens for a reason (deterministic) or it doesn't (random). This is a complicated point, but many people including me find the notion of neither-chance-nor-necessity conceptually problematic. Second, there is simply no empirical way of deciding if human thought is free in this sense.
However non-random contingency isn’t logically compatible with necessity, as far as I can tell.
BY DEFINITION non-random contingency is not consistent with necessity. CR, you mix up what philosophers call analytic truths (things that are true by defintion) with synthetic truths (things that are true because we observe them to be true in the world). You have defined "non-random contingency" to mean "not random and not determined" - in other words, free. And nobody knows if anything in the universe acts in such a way. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 31, 2013
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I don’t remember agreeing to this, but it doesn’t matter.
I would hope you’d agree that computers have “internal states”!
Non sequitur. And it's clear that I know this, since it's been a subject of discussion between the two of us.
Your above definition of “free” comports with determinism, not freedom.
And there you go assuming your conclusion! Compatibilists hold that freedom is compatible with physical determinism, and incompatbilists hold it is not. You can’t win a debate about free will simply by declaring or insisting that “freedom” be used in the incompatibilist sense! You actually have to make an argument.
Weren't you previously defending the notion that computers make free choices by appealing to nondeterministic input? Since you've been avoiding randomness, that leaves non-random contingency. Isn't that the notion of freedom you were indicating, or were you actually defending compatibilism all along? If the latter, why did you formerly insist that programs make free choices if their inputs are nondeterministic? And what nondeterministic input did you have in mind, the "free" kind or the random kind?
I could just as well define “free” to mean “unpredictable” and then we could both agree that coin flips are free choices under that definition.
Yes, precisely so. This is why it is so important to define the terms before we argue, instead of run around in circles using different definitions. That is why I said there are no right or wrong definitions (only definitions that are more or less useful). You can define words however you’d like, as long as you’re clear and consistent.
So when you made the claim that computers make free choices, you were justifying it with a definition that comports with determinism. Why then did you insist that computers can make free choices if their input is nondeterministic?
As long as we can define words any old way then anything can be free.
Yes, of course. Now that we’ve got that settled, if you’d like to use your definitions, that is fine – I’ve said that all along. Using your definitions, “free” means “neither random nor determined”. In that case, computers are most definitely not free. Moreover, using your definition, we do not know if humans – or anything else in the universe – are free. It is an open question.
Consistent with my definition, human beings output non-random, contingent digital strings like this very sentence, which is neither random nor explicable by physical law.
"So let’s avoid further confusion and stick to your definitions from now on, OK? Then we agree that computers are not free. Now, you need to tell me how you can determine whether or not humans are free. What sort of test would you run? What sort of evidence would you provide?"
I would examine the outputs of human behavior, which are contingent but not random upon inspection, just as my definition of "free" indicates. Is it logically consistent to suggest that a process which acts according to necessity would have contingent and non-random output, or does that result in a contradiction?
PLEASE, PLEASE, PLEASE... For the 100th time, your definition is fine.
Your condescention is not appreciated.
"...do not make your same mistake of saying “Well, humans can build complex machines and things that aren’t free can’t, so humans must be free”. This is a logical error! You are assuming your conclusion, because you have failed to show that humans are free in the first place, and thus you cannot claim you already know that things that aren’t free can’t build complex machines!!!!"
I observe that human beings construct contingent, non-random entities, such as meaningful strings of text. This comports with my definition of free.
"I’m sorry Chance, but you were confused about most everything."
At least I'm consistent.
Once again: 1) We agree on a definition of “free choice” that means not random or determined. 2) Using that definition, we agree computers cannot make free choices 3) The question is, Can humans make free choices? 4) My position is: we do not know if humans or anything else make free choices 5) Your argument regarding humans building machines is completely irrelevant, because you are simply assuming that humans are free and then concluding the exact same thing. And so, you have provided precisely zero evidence that humans can act in a way that is neither random nor determined.
#1-4, fine. #5, nope. I define "free" as non-random contingency and then observe that human beings can output non-random contingency. It's simply consistent with the definition, just like your notion that computers make free choices if we define "free" in a way that's consistent with determinism. Perhaps you disagree that the output of human behaviors can be both contingent and not random. Is that the case? However non-random contingency isn't logically compatible with necessity, as far as I can tell. What sort of necessity mechanism could in theory have nondeterministic output?Chance Ratcliff
May 31, 2013
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Hi Stephen,
That’s a nice try, but we are discussing the logical possibilities of a physical process.
I don't understand what this means. There is a difference between logical and physical possibility.
You have presented two contradictory arguments.
Ok, so you refuse to acknowledge what every freshman philosophy student learns for the test: There is a difference between physical and logical possibility. We won't be able to move forward on this topic unless you realize this.
Why don’t we just forget about the contradiction and stay with [a].
Both say the same thing.
You think it is logically possible that a piece of ice can give rise to a 10? snowman with facial features and a corncob pipe.
Yes, logically possible.
What is important that you understand is that ice cannot be what it is and also be something else. You cannot continually change the meanings of words in midstream and hope to remain credible.
I'm defining ice as "frozen water" - how about you? Listen, we're just running around in silly semantic circles here, and I'd like to return to arguing about things that matter, such as the relation between libertarian will and morality, the evidence for libertarianism and dualism, and maybe other things. You and I both understand that some things happen in our uniform and repeated experience, and some things don't. Pieces of ice don't turn into snowmen in our experience, and so we say it is "impossible". Philosophers would call this a contingent rather than a necessary fact. Let's move on.
It is also important that you realize that you cannot continually contradict yourself and expect to get away with it.
As our other reader has pointed out, it is not that I contradict myself, it is that you seem incapable of reading and understanding these arguments. If you won't even acknowledge the most fundamental aspects of epistemology, such as the limits of knowledge and the difference between logical and physical necessity, we really can't procede here. Instead of trying to construe everything I say as a contradiction, if you'd try to actually understand my points (rather than "winning a point" for yourself) we might be able to make progress.
Is that your argument? You don’t understand what kairosfocus is saying because you don’t like his writing style and you don’t understand my arguments that something cannot come from nothing because you don’t know what “nothing” means? Is that really where you want to go?
WHAT??? You are the one trying to argue from authority here! And of all the authorities you choose, it's KF, the anonymous "professional physicist" who writes endless screeds that - IMHO - reads like crackpottery of the first degree. Let's leave KF out of this, please, and let neither of us try to argue from authority, deal? As far as what "nothing" means, it means the absence of anything. Let us not play with words here, OK?
You need to spend less time questioning my familiarity with the subject and more time explaining how and why you think all these studies challenge causality. Kairosfocus and I are saying that these studies don’t prove what you think they prove. The issue is all about interpretation.
Here is a good explanation from a reputable source of what I'm talking about: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bell-theorem/
Bell's Theorem is the collective name for a family of results, all showing the impossibility of a Local Realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics.
If you look at what I've said about causality, you'll see that my claim is that without locality and realism, causality as we understand it does not apply at the quantum scale. There are hundreds of other reputable sources explaining the implications of Bell's Theorem - just Google it. Ok, your turn: Find some reference that explains why violations of Bell's Theorem do not disprove locality + realism, or that explains why Bell's Theorem isn't violated. If KF is the most reputable source of information you can find on this (or the only one!), that should tell you something. Still, let it not be said that I'm closed-minded, so if KF has something on Bell's Theorem in particular explaining why locality+realism are not violated, I will read it.
How is it logically possible to get a 10? snowman with a face and a pipe from a piece of ice without a human designer?
SB, what do you think the difference between logical and physical is?
For that matter, how is it logically possible to get a two-by-four wooden beam from a wood splinter? How is it possible to get a gold bar from a gold sliver? Please step up to the plate and address the topic.
None of these are logical contradictions. They are physical impossibilities - contingent, empirical truths that do not hold in all possible worlds. I'm really tired of explaining this to you because you won't learn about epistemology 1A.
RDF: Plantinga is one of the most famous contemporary philosophers, and is responsible for new and creative Christian apologetics, and has written entire books on these sorts of issues – possible worlds, epistemic warrant, self-evident propositions, reliabilism, and so on. SB: How do you expect me to respond to meaningless generalities like that. It is ironic that you accuse would me of oversimplifying. What does Plantinga have to say about the Law of Non-Contradiction and our capacity to be certain about it. This is not a hard question. You either know the answer or you do not.
Here's a bit of logic for you: 1) Plantinga says that all knowledge is subject to uncertainty 2) Knowledge of the LNC is in fact knowledge 3) Therefore Plantinga says, by implication, that the LNC is subject to uncertainty I'm not going to play this game any more. Let's agree to disagree on the following, and we won't have to debate it: 1) SB believes there is only one sort of possibility, and denies possible world logics; RDF believes that epistemologists categorize possibility into logical, physical, and other types as well, and that possible world logic underlies much of contemporary philosophy, including the well-known Christian apologetics of Plantinga. WE AGREE TO DISAGREE ON THIS 2) SB believes that we can justify with absolute 100% certainty any number of facts about both logic and the world; RDF denies this, and points out that Plantinga and virtually every other philosopher agrees with him and acknowledges limits to all certainty. WE AGREE TO DISAGREE ON THIS I'm not sure what there is left to talk about, but at least we've clarified our differences. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
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RDFish:
I was assuming you understood the difference between things that are logically impossible and physically impossible. I’m sorry – apparently you aren’t familiar with these concepts.
Related things to read about include “possible worlds”, and subjunctive possibility in general.
That's a nice try, but we are discussing the logical possibilities of a physical process. You have presented two contradictory arguments. [a] it is possible to get a snowman from a piece of ice (a physical process) and [b] it is impossible to get a snowman from a piece of ice (a physical process). Why don't we just forget about the contradiction and stay with [a]. You think it is logically possible that a piece of ice can give rise to a 10' snowman with facial features and a corncob pipe.
What’s important is that you understand the difference between this logical and physical (or necessary and contingent) possibility. We really can’t have this conversation until you do.
What is important that you understand is that ice cannot be what it is and also be something else. You cannot continually change the meanings of words in midstream and hope to remain credible. It is also important that you realize that you cannot continually contradict yourself and expect to get away with it. as in, [a] we can never have 100% certitude [b] we can have 100% certitude about having no certitude or [a] “Nothing” is not something that can give or receive things." [b] "You can’t talk about the properties of nothing – not even the properties it doesn’t have – because there is no “it” to talk about." If you don't understand why [b] contradicts [a], go back and reread it.
I’m sorry, but I can’t understand what this “professional physicist” writes, and my belief is that he does not either. In any case, there are thousands of books and papers available that describe Bell’s Theorem, and all of them agree: quantum causality does not respect local realism
Is that your argument? You don't understand what kairosfocus is saying because you don't like his writing style and you don't understand my arguments that something cannot come from nothing because you don't know what "nothing" means? Is that really where you want to go?
As I’ve explained a number of times, you are talking about different aspects of QM. I’m not talking about uncertainty (or virtual particle formation, etc). Rather, I’m talking about Bell’s Theorem violations, nonlocality and non-realism. If you don’t know what these are, you really oughtn’t to take a position on the matter.
You need to spend less time questioning my familiarity with the subject and more time explaining how and why you think all these studies challenge causality. Kairosfocus and I are saying that these studies don't prove what you think they prove. The issue is all about interpretation.
The person building the snowman does the face and the pipe, right? Without a human being, the snowman ending up with a face would be a physical – but not a logical – impossibility!
How is it logically possible to get a 10' snowman with a face and a pipe from a piece of ice without a human designer? For that matter, how is it logically possible to get a two-by-four wooden beam from a wood splinter? How is it possible to get a gold bar from a gold sliver? Please step up to the plate and address the topic.
Plantinga is one of the most famous contemporary philosophers, and is responsible for new and creative Christian apologetics, and has written entire books on these sorts of issues – possible worlds, epistemic warrant, self-evident propositions, reliabilism, and so on.
How do you expect me to respond to meaningless generalities like that. It is ironic that you accuse would me of oversimplifying. What does Plantinga have to say about the Law of Non-Contradiction and our capacity to be certain about it. This is not a hard question. You either know the answer or you do not.StephenB
May 31, 2013
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Hi StephenB,
RDF: They both are: Getting the snowman is physically, but not logically, impossible. SB: No. Sorry, but that will not work. You argued [a] It is possible to get a snowman from ice And you also argued [b] It is not possible to get a snowman from ice. That is a contradiction. It is either possible or impossible.
I was assuming you understood the difference between things that are logically impossible and physically impossible. I'm sorry - apparently you aren't familiar with these concepts. Here is a very short, simple reference to start with that will explain this to you: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_possibility What you'll learn is that there are different types of impossibilities. I've been using these terms for some time thinking you understood them; if you read up on logical/physical possibilities I think we can more forward a bit. Related things to read about include "possible worlds", and subjunctive possibility in general. You'll find there are even more types of possibility (nomological possibility, which is sort of like physical possibility, and metaphysical possibility, which is sort of like logical possibility) and so on. It gets quite complicated and controversial of course, which is what I meant when I said "epistemology is not solved".
The Law of Non-Contradiction allows for no excluded middle (as in “Physically impossibe, but logically possible”). You are trying to have it both ways.
Stephen, you have a tendency to over-simplify pretty much everything. You'll probably roll your eyes and complain that I make things too complicated, but if you spend just a little while reading you'll see it really isn't me. Plantinga is one of the most famous contemporary philosophers, and is responsible for new and creative Christian apologetics, and has written entire books on these sorts of issues - possible worlds, epistemic warrant, self-evident propositions, reliabilism, and so on.
I am asking you to affirm one of your arguments and negate the other.
If you have a favorite philosopher or theologian, from Plantinga to William Craig to... whomever, you'll find that they would disagree entirely with your naive view of possibility. Here is what we need to agree on: * Everything that is logically impossible is also physically impossible * Not everything that is physically impossible is logically impossible. * Anti-gravity boots are physically impossible, but logically possible. * Drawing a Euclidean triangle with interior angles not summing to 180deg is both physically and logically impossible
According to the Law of Identity, which you claim to believe in, Ice is what it is and is not something else. Ice doesn’t expand. If it did expand, it wouldn’t be ice.
Ice actually does expand, but not to the extent we're talking about here... anyway that's not important. What's important is that you understand the difference between this logical and physical (or necessary and contingent) possibility. We really can't have this conversation until you do. But what you'll find is that - of course - philsophers argue about all the details too, and then there are paradoxes and unresolved problems... epistemology is really quite a mess!
You have already violated your own principle. You claim to have imagined something that violates logic by imagining ice can expand. Ice doesn’t expand.
I haven't violated my own principle, Stephen. First, ice actually does expand:
The effect of expansion during freezing can be dramatic, and ice expansion is a basic cause of freeze-thaw weathering of rock in nature.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ice You may quibble that it is water expanding rather than ice, but that isn't clear, and people say "ice expansion", and... it doesn't matter at all to our discussion. The point is this: Whether or not ice (or iron or granite) expands are physical, contingent facts that could be different without involving logical contradction.
Read kairosfocus’ (who is a professional physicist)...
I'm sorry, but I can't understand what this "professional physicist" writes, and my belief is that he does not either. In any case, there are thousands of books and papers available that describe Bell's Theorem, and all of them agree: quantum causality does not respect local realism.
We already know about the “hard results” of the experiments. The intellectual task is in determining what they mean. The one thing we can be sure they don’t mean is that causality has been invalidated.
As I've explained a number of times, you are talking about different aspects of QM. I'm not talking about uncertainty (or virtual particle formation, etc). Rather, I'm talking about Bell's Theorem violations, nonlocality and non-realism. If you don't know what these are, you really oughtn't to take a position on the matter.
Putting aside the problem of ice expanding (Ice doesnt’ expand), you have yet to explain how you get the snowman’s facial features and his corncob pipe.
Huh? The person building the snowman does the face and the pipe, right? Without a human being, the snowman ending up with a face would be a physical - but not a logical - impossibility! Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 31, 2013
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RDFishL
On the contrary, this claim [acausal quantum events] is supported by the most successful scientific theory in history, and a gigantic mountain of precisely confirmed data. You are really looking a bit naive on this one. Tell me: Do you understand Bell’s Theorem and its implications? These are not controversial findings or interpretations – they are hard results of physics experiments, like it or not.
Read kairosfocus' (who is a professional physicist) comments @374 and check his reference @375. We already know about the "hard results" of the experiments. The intellectual task is in determining what they mean. The one thing we can be sure they don't mean is that causality has been invalidated.
They both are: Getting the snowman is physically, but not logically, impossible.
Putting aside the problem of ice expanding (Ice doesnt' expand), you have yet to explain how you get the snowman's facial features and his corncob pipe.StephenB
May 31, 2013
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RDFish:
They both are: Getting the snowman is physically, but not logically, impossible.
No. Sorry, but that will not work. You argued [a] It is possible to get a snowman from ice And you also argued [b] It is not possible to get a snowman from ice. That is a contradiction. It is either possible or impossible. The Law of Non-Contradiction allows for no excluded middle (as in "Physically impossibe, but logically possible"). You are trying to have it both ways. I am asking you to affirm one of your arguments and negate the other. According to the Law of Identity, which you claim to believe in, Ice is what it is and is not something else. Ice doesn’t expand. If it did expand, it wouldn’t be ice. By assuming it can expand, you are saying that it is what it is and is also something else, violating both the Law of Identity and the Law of Non-Contradiction. Thus, when you say that it is possible for ice to expand into a snowman, you are saying that ice is something other than it is, violating the Law of Identity that you claim to believe in. Again, you are trying to have it both ways. You are trying to say that ice is ice, but it need not be. Ridiculous.
Try to imagine a square circle, a married bachelor, a number both greater and less than 4, something that is both all red and all green, and so on. We can’t picture these things because they violate logic – they don’t make any sense.
You have already violated your own principle. You claim to have imagined something that violates logic by imagining ice can expand. Ice doesn’t expand. It is what it is. You tried to imagine ice being ice and also something else at the same time and in the same sense, violating the very principle that you claim to hold.StephenB
May 31, 2013
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OOPS: The WAC on quantum theory is here on.kairosfocus
May 31, 2013
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Onlookers: It is time for a bit of "Chorus" walking on stage. Observe the rhetorical tactics being used to duck, dodge, obfuscate, bend into pretzels and generally avoid addressing the foundational significance of first principles of right reason. In particular, note the effect of formally acknowledging at least some aspects on one hand then subtly pulling off the table again with the other. Observe also, the effect of refusing to attend to accessible contrary evidence, thus continuing misrepresentations, here multiplied by a projection that no it is you who don't understand. That turnabout, in a context where onlookers are not sufficiently alert to what has been going on, is a very powerful means to cloud the issue. Indeed, it has long been a major tool used by ruthless propagandists. I highlight to you, how on this general topic, there has long been a distortion game, starting with how Paley's Watch argument from 1802 on has been distorted by the simple expedient of pretending that all that Paley had to say that was relevant was in Ch 1 of his Book, when Ch 2 IMMEDIATELY goes on to address major points on the what about reproduction/self replication talking point. But if, in a situation, one is in a position to get away with such a tactic of strawman caricature, that can be very powerful. A similar case is of course the contemporary attempt to brand design thought a species of "Creationism," Creationism havng long since been successfully smeared as irrational, dangerous and potentially an enemy of academic and general freedom. After all, look at the Inquisition, the rack and the thumbscrews. (What is not usually acknowledged -- notice the poisonous, ad hominem laced, set alight strawman game again -- is that by far and away most Creationsts are convinced small-d democrats, that [so little known that one has to give a handy reference] biblical principles and people consciously living by them had a lot to do with the rise of modern liberty and democratic systems of government in the aftermath of the reformation, and that the Judaeo- Christian worldview and Christians had a lot positively to do with the rise of modern science, not least because of the vision of a God who is Reason himself [LOGOS] and who made us in his image and a world that is intelligible, working in an orderly way on rational principles.) Similarly, observe the unwillingness to face the obvious and immediate corollaries of there being identifiable things, say A in the wider world, W, such that we can distinguish between A and NOT-A: W = {A | NOT-A } Thus immediately: {A | NOT-A } {A | NOT-A } That is, the law of identity, that A is itself and is thus distinct from not A ,inherently stands with that A cannot also be NOT-A, that as well, on dichotomy, there is not a third option to being A or NOT-A. Similarly, the objectors, ignore the principle of sufficient reason and its immediate corollaries on causality on contingency, thence the implication of the possibility of necessary beings. As to the issue of mind, body and genuinely responsible freedom of agents, the pivotal point that we know what blind necessity and chance can credibly do on the gamut of our solar system or the observed cosmos, and it is utterly outside the range of what agency routinely does, is ignored. never mind that to object, the objectors have to provide examples of functionally specific, meaningful strings of symbols in English that the blind resources of the observed cosmos, acting for its lifespan, could not credibly find. That is, on recognising that we are intelligent designers, we see that such designers manifest a radically diverse signature form what blind watchmaker mechanisms can do. Intelligent watchmakers have to be recognised as a separate category of causal factor, noting as well that such design cam bars and stored digital programs to instruct programmed entities, whether the glorified toys of the C18 or the looms using punched cards or tape, or the modern car engine, or the digital stored program computer. That factor is functionally specific, complex organisation and associated information, FSCO/I for short. We then must observe, that unless an agent is sufficiently free and responsible, he cannot do more than be an automaton carrying out a program. Internal states for agents must go beyond merely carrying out programs however they got there, and as we saw in outline, chance is not enough to break the iron implications of the scope of sampling possible in our solar system or observed cosmos, relative to the exponential explosion of possible and overwhelmingly non-functional configs of components. In short, unless agents are self-moved, initiating causes, we are locked into an endless chain of physical force per deterministic laws and chance disturbances, which simply cannot account for reason and moral responsibility. That is, the absurdities of a priori ideological evolutionary materialism (these days, usually dressed up in a lab coat)and its accommodationist fellow traveller systems, emerge. (Cf, here on.) You will note that several times above, an actual framework for an architecture was highlighted, that would account for the phenomena of intent, intelligent purpose, reason etc above and beyond blind forces, the Smith Model [there is a summary and an onward link to a book length monograph by Smith . . . ] with a two tier controller. One being in the loop the other supervisory to the loop. Already in primitive forms, we have adaptive and learning cybernetic control systems that give us an inkling as to what such could entail. The suggestion that Quantum systems are somehow beyond cause is a characteristic symptom of those overly influenced by popularisation and/or distortions of the significance of QM on such matters. I refer to the UD WAC here and onward. But the overall pattern should be clear, we are not dealing here with a genuine responsiveness to evidence, but a locked-in system that is significantly incoherent but which is reinforced by powerful social forces and factions. This is a part of the ongoing disintegration of our civilisation, which is accelerating as men begin to forget or willfully defy the canons of reason and the principles of morality and justice. To such, I say: listen to the ghost of Alcibiades, on the folly of refusing correction of one's political ambitions, here. Socrates' take-down of ignorance pretending to knowledge, in Alcibiades I [and yes we know that is not likely to be genuinely from Plato's hand], is worth clipping:
SOCRATES: You do, then, mean, as I was saying, to come forward in a little while in the character of an adviser of the Athenians? And suppose that when you are ascending the bema, I pull you by the sleeve and say, Alcibiades, you are getting up to advise the Athenians-do you know the matter about which they are going to deliberate, better than they?--How would you answer? ALCIBIADES: I should reply, that I was going to advise them about a matter which I do know better than they . . . . SOCRATES: A man is a good adviser about anything, not because he has riches, but because he has knowledge? ALCIBIADES: Assuredly. SOCRATES: Whether their counsellor is rich or poor, is not a matter which will make any difference to the Athenians when they are deliberating about the health of the citizens; they only require that he should be a physician. ALCIBIADES: Of course . . . . SOCRATES: But can they be said to understand that about which they are quarrelling to the death [i.e. matters of justice and the like triggering wars]? ALCIBIADES: Clearly not. SOCRATES: And yet those whom you thus allow to be ignorant are the teachers to whom you are appealing. [A had claimed to have learned from the many, on second thought, and S is now taking apart that appeal] ALCIBIADES: Very true. SOCRATES: But how are you ever likely to know the nature of justice and injustice, about which you are so perplexed, if you have neither learned them of others nor discovered them yourself? ALCIBIADES: From what you say, I suppose not . . . . [Socrates then corrected, it was not Socrates the questioner but Alcibiades the speaker who drew out his own ignorance and the ignorance of those he appealed to as his teachers.] . . . SOCRATES: Then, Alcibiades, the result may be expressed in the language of Euripides. I think that you have heard all this ‘from yourself, and not from me’; nor did I say this, which you erroneously attribute to me, but you yourself, and what you said was very true. For indeed, my dear fellow, the design which you meditate of teaching what you do not know, and have not taken any pains to learn, is downright insanity . . . . ALCIBIADES: I solemnly declare, Socrates, that I do not know what I am saying. Verily, I am in a strange state, for when you put questions to me I am of different minds in successive instants. SOCRATES: And are you not aware of the nature of this perplexity, my friend? ALCIBIADES: Indeed I am not. SOCRATES: Do you suppose that if some one were to ask you whether you have two eyes or three, or two hands or four, or anything of that sort, you would then be of different minds in successive instants? ALCIBIADES: I begin to distrust myself, but still I do not suppose that I should. SOCRATES: You would feel no doubt; and for this reason-because you would know? ALCIBIADES: I suppose so. SOCRATES: And the reason why you involuntarily contradict yourself is clearly that you are ignorant? ALCIBIADES: Very likely. SOCRATES: And if you are perplexed in answering about just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable, good and evil, expedient and inexpedient, the reason is that you are ignorant of them, and therefore in perplexity. Is not that clear? . . . . SOCRATES: Or if you were on a voyage, would you bewilder yourself by considering whether the rudder is to be drawn inwards or outwards, or do you leave that to the pilot, and do nothing? ALCIBIADES: It would be the concern of the pilot. SOCRATES: Then you are not perplexed about what you do not know, if you know that you do not know it? ALCIBIADES: I imagine not. SOCRATES: Do you not see, then, that mistakes in life and practice are likewise to be attributed to the ignorance which has conceit of knowledge? ALCIBIADES: Once more, what do you mean? SOCRATES: I suppose that we begin to act when we think that we know what we are doing? ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: But when people think that they do not know, they entrust their business to others? ALCIBIADES: Yes . . . . SOCRATES: And can there be any matters greater than the just, the honourable, the good, and the expedient? ALCIBIADES: There cannot be. SOCRATES: And these, as you were saying, are what perplex you? ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: But if you are perplexed, then, as the previous argument has shown, you are not only ignorant of the greatest matters, but being ignorant you fancy that you know them? ALCIBIADES: I fear that you are right. SOCRATES: And now see what has happened to you, Alcibiades! I hardly like to speak of your evil case, but as we are alone I will: My good friend, you are wedded to ignorance of the most disgraceful kind, and of this you are convicted, not by me, but out of your own mouth and by your own argument; wherefore also you rush into politics before you are educated. Neither is your case to be deemed singular. For I might say the same of almost all our statesmen, with the exception, perhaps of your guardian, Pericles . . .
The challenge of soundly and persuasively addressing "the ignorance which has conceit of knowledge" has long been on the table, and the best thing to do about it is to make sure of our way from foundations of reasoning on up. Where as Socrates showed by successively questioning Alcibiades' notions, leading that worthy to find himself in a perplexity of self-contradiction [revealing the ignorance which has conceit of knowledge], the laws of thought are absolutely crucial. Which leads me to seriously question why it is that so many in our day would take such controls on the ignorance which has conceit of knowledge off the table. KFkairosfocus
May 31, 2013
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Hi 5for, Glad you've been enjoying the discussion! And thank you for trying to explain this to StephenB.
Stephen you seem to be wilfully missing RDFish’s points
I know it gets frustrating when I repeat and clarify these points endlessly and he still doesn't seem to get it. But I honestly don't think it is "willful" that he does it... you know? :-) Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 30, 2013
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Hi StephenB,
Causality is not self-evident, and obviously you cannot get a 10? snowman from a piece of ice, as we know from experience (rather than logic) that such things do not happen.
So, you have changed your earlier position from this:
Causality is not self-evident. Neither is the fact that you can’t get a 10? snowman from a piece of ice! What if ice expanded when you sculpted with it? No logical contradication there at all.
This is exactly the same argument. The first says: Getting the snowman is physically, but not logically, impossible. The second says the exact same thing: Getting the snowman is physically, but not logically, impossible.
Which one is your final argument
They both are: Getting the snowman is physically, but not logically, impossible.
If, as you say, we can’t conceive logical contradictions, ...
That's right. Try to imagine a square circle, a married bachelor, a number both greater and less than 4, something that is both all red and all green, and so on. We can't picture these things because they violate logic - they don't make any sense.
...then if follows that we cannot conceive of something both existing to give movement and, at the same time, not existing to receive movement, which would be exactly the same thing as conceiving movement without a cause. At best, you could conceive the beginning of movement.
I imagine something at rest, and then imagine it moving without antecedent cause. No problem. Let's look at the phrases you use: "existing to give movement" and "not existing to receive movement". I'm not even sure what these phrases mean. I'm talking about something that exists - like an 8-ball - sitting at rest, and then starting to move. It exists the whole time; it's just at one moment it is still and the next moment it is moving and nothing interacted with it. There is simply nothing logically contradictory about that at all!
RDF: 1) Knowledge is never 100% certain (even per Christian foundationalists) SB: That is simply a claim without support.
Wait a minute: Are you saying that my claim about Christian foundationalists is unsupported, or are you saying that these foundationalists (e.g. Plantinga) are making unsupported claims? If you meant the former, I'll go find the relevant citations, but only if you promise to concede the point if I do. If you meant the latter, then we can agree to disagree - me and Plantinga and every other epistemologist on one side, and you on the other.
Indeed, I have already proven that we can be 100% certain that you cannot get a snowman from a piece of ice and you finally agreed after first taking the opposite position.
Getting the snowman is physically, but not logically, impossible. But even those things we believe are physically impossible we can never know with 100% certitude, because there is no such thing as 100% certitude. Honestly, Stephen: Have you ever read anything at all about epsitemology?
Are you going to revert back again to your a) argument after changing to the b) argument.
I've never changed one single position on anything since we began debating. Sorry to disappoint!
RDF: 2) Casaulity as we conceive of it does not appear to apply at quantum scales or any context where temporal relations do not apply (e.g. if spacetime did not exist). SB: This is simply another claim with no support.
On the contrary, this claim is supported by the most successful scientific theory in history, and a gigantic mountain of precisely confirmed data. You are really looking a bit naive on this one. Tell me: Do you understand Bell's Theorem and its implications? These are not controversial findings or interpretations - they are hard results of physics experiments, like it or not.
Indeed, I have already proven the Law of Causality with the Law of Non-Contradition. You had no answer.
I answered; you just don't understand. Let's try again. First let's take a look at your attempt to derive causality from LNC ... and why it doesn't actually make sense:
An effect is something that begins to be or receives something (being) that it did not have.
This makes no sense because if something doesn't exist it can't receive anything and it can't have or not have anything. It can't begin or end or do anything at all... because there is no "it". You are referring to nothing as though it was already something.
It can either receive being from itself or from something else.
As Kant famously demonstrated, existence is not a predicate. "Nothing" is not something that can give or receive things. You can't talk about the properties of nothing - not even the properties it doesn't have - because there is no "it" to talk about. But beyond this difficulty with your formulation, I've already pointed out that we're talking about two types of relationships that you are calling "cause-and-effect". The first is when A causes B to exist. I've already said that this kind of "causality" violates the most fundamental laws of science - the conservation laws - and it has never been observed to happen. The second is when A causes B to change (has some effect on B, for example to change its color or its location or its motion or its size or...). That is the sort of causality that science deals with. Here is what you said about that sort of causality:
If one does not have ... movement, it must be received from something else. It is a self-evident truth.
If it was self-evident, Newton would not have had to articulate it in his first law of motion. Really, you can test this for yourself: Just try to imagine something that is at rest, and then begins to move. It's easy, right? No contradiction, no logical inconsistency. As it turns out, this doesn't happen in our world, but it can in some possible world. There is no possible world in which there exists a square circle. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 30, 2013
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Hi Chance,
I don’t remember agreeing to this, but it doesn’t matter.
I would hope you'd agree that computers have "internal states"!
Your above definition of “free” comports with determinism, not freedom.
And there you go assuming your conclusion! Compatibilists hold that freedom is compatible with physical determinism, and incompatbilists hold it is not. You can't win a debate about free will simply by declaring or insisting that "freedom" be used in the incompatibilist sense! You actually have to make an argument.
I could just as well define “free” to mean “unpredictable” and then we could both agree that coin flips are free choices under that definition.
Yes, precisely so. This is why it is so important to define the terms before we argue, instead of run around in circles using different definitions. That is why I said there are no right or wrong definitions (only definitions that are more or less useful). You can define words however you'd like, as long as you're clear and consistent.
As long as we can define words any old way then anything can be free.
Yes, of course. Now that we've got that settled, if you'd like to use your definitions, that is fine - I've said that all along. Using your definitions, "free" means "neither random nor determined". In that case, computers are most definitely not free. Moreoever, using your definition, we do not know if humans - or anything else in the universe - are free. It is an open question.
My definition is clearly more appropriate. Free: neither determined nor random.
Your definitions are just fine.
This gives us non-random contingency, which is necessary for any reasonable understanding of freedom.
This is the entire debate, Chance. You can't simply declare that your view is the only reasonable one. You actually must argue that other conceptions are incoherent, or inconsistent, or at odds with reality. So let's avoid further confusion and stick to your definitions from now on, OK? Then we agree that computers are not free. Now, you need to tell me how you can determine whether or not humans are free. What sort of test would you run? What sort of evidence would you provide? PLEASE, PLEASE, PLEASE do not make your same mistake of saying "Well, humans can build complex machines and things that aren't free can't, so humans must be free". This is a logical error! You are assuming your conclusion, because you have failed to show that humans are free in the first place, and thus you cannot claim you already know that things that aren't free can't build complex machines!!!!
You already agree that free choices cannot be determined or random.
In other words I accept your definition. This is not a matter of fact, it is a matter of definition. You choose to define "free" as "not determined or random", and that's fine, but you haven't argued that humans or anything else actually are free in this sense.
My definition is jointly exhaustive of all types of causation under discussion, when taken with chance and necessity.
For the 100th time, your definition is fine.
Exactly what is confused about that?
I'm sorry Chance, but you were confused about most everything. Once again: 1) We agree on a definition of "free choice" that means not random or determined. 2) Using that definition, we agree computers cannot make free choices 3) The question is, Can humans make free choices? 4) My position is: we do not know if humans or anything else make free choices 5) Your argument regarding humans building machines is completely irrelevant, because you are simply assuming that humans are free and then concluding the exact same thing. And so, you have provided precisely zero evidence that humans can act in a way that is neither random nor determined. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 30, 2013
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5for
There is no contradiction in the 2 snowman comments.
The contradiction is clear. Can is the opposite of cannot. Since you want to get in the game, and since you seem to identify with RD's denial of causality, respond to the relevant question: If a snowman can come from a piece of ice, how do you get the facial features and the corncob pipe? While you are at it, explain how you get a two-by-four beam from a wood. splinter.StephenB
May 30, 2013
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PS: Once we see the significance of enabling, on/off, necessary causal factors, the line about quantum events being causeless evaporates. No radioactive atom, no possibility of decay. Not knowing the SUFFICIENT cluster of causal factors to sustain a deterministic causal description is not to be confused with the notion that quantum phenomena such as decay have no cause. (We do know sufficient factors to set up a stochastic circumstance and can usually identify some necessary ones.)But as usual, we have entrenched talking points, stoutly defended against all correction.kairosfocus
May 30, 2013
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F/N: As I passed by the claim that causality is not self-evident caught my eye. It seems RDF is still refusing to read that which would correct and inform him. (Revealing, at this stage, as an investment of a few minutes would have sufficed at any time, e.g. here on.) Strictly, what is self evident is the principle that if a given distinct thing, A is, then we may ask and seek to answer why that is so. Causality exists as an immediate corollary once A is contingent -- it has a beginning, or may cease, or is composite, etc. Where A has not got the implied dependency on external enabling factors, it would instead be a necessary being. If A were a candidate for such, but the set of attributes required contradict, A would be an impossibility such as a square circle.) The identity cluster is similar, once a distinct A exists in the world: W = { A | NOT_A }. We IMMEDIATELY see the instantly existing reality that A has a stable identity, it cannot also be NOT-A and that thanks to the dichotomy there is not a third option. All the while that RDF tries to affirm such with one hand and take away with the other, we see how refusing to acknowledge such lands him in the boat of using said principles while seeking to undermine. In particular it may be asked why certain contingent linguistic entities -- posts by RDF -- exist in the thread. And we see they are contingent beings exhibiting FSCO/I, signs of the presence of a causal factor beyond the reach of blind chance and mechanical necessity, Design, here by an intelligent agent. One, who to be able to compose, has to have freedom of choice and rational mind. KFkairosfocus
May 30, 2013
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I have been enjoying this conversation, but Stephen you seem to be wilfully missing RDFish's points. There is no contradiction in the 2 snowman comments. We know that ice doesn't expand like this in real life, but there is nothing logically incoherent about it doing so. It reminds me for example of the scenes in Terminator 2 where the terminator's hand could suddenly expand into a hugely long metal prong. It looked crazy and you know that no substance we are aware of can do this, but it's not illogical. We can conceive of it, we can even create a film of it (it would be trivial to create a special effect in a film of a piece of ice expanding into a snowman). But as RD keeps saying, you can't conceive of a square circle, and similarly we could not create one with special effects. But who knows maybe in the future we will invent a kind of ice that can expand into a snowman.5for
May 30, 2013
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RDFish:
Causality is not self-evident, and obviously you cannot get a 10? snowman from a piece of ice, as we know from experience (rather than logic) that such things do not happen.
So, you have changed your earlier position from this:
Causality is not self-evident. Neither is the fact that you can’t get a 10? snowman from a piece of ice! What if ice expanded when you sculpted with it? No logical contradication there at all.
Which one is your final argument a) Is it your first argument: A piece of ice can expand into a snowman through the sculpting process. b) Or is it your second argument: A piece of ice cannot expand into a snowman under any circumstances.
We can all conceive of something starting to move spontaneously, without logical contradiction. Thus it is not logically necessary that things require impetus to begin moving. Causality is not a logically necessary truth, but rather an empirical.
If, as you say, we can't conceive logical contradictions, then if follows that we cannot conceive of something both existing to give movement and, at the same time, not existing to receive movement, which would be exactly the same thing as conceiving movement without a cause. At best, you could conceive the beginning of movement.
1) Knowledge is never 100% certain (even per Christian foundationalists)
That is simply a claim without support. Indeed, I have already proven that we can be 100% certain that you cannot get a snowman from a piece of ice and you finally agreed after first taking the opposite position. Are you going to revert back again to your a) argument after changing to the b) argument.
2) Casaulity as we conceive of it does not appear to apply at quantum scales or any context where temporal relations do not apply (e.g. if spacetime did not exist).
This is simply another claim with no support. Indeed, I have already proven the Law of Causality with the Law of Non-Contradition. You had no answer.StephenB
May 30, 2013
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RDFish @364,
"I provided a definition of “free choice” under which we both agreed computers’ choices were free (i.e. they are based on internal states)."
I don't remember agreeing to this, but it doesn't matter. Your above definition of "free" comports with determinism, not freedom. I could just as well define "free" to mean "unpredictable" and then we could both agree that coin flips are free choices under that definition. As long as we can define words any old way then anything can be free. My definition is clearly more appropriate. Free: neither determined nor random. This gives us non-random contingency, which is necessary for any reasonable understanding of freedom. You already agree that free choices cannot be determined or random. My definition is jointly exhaustive of all types of causation under discussion, when taken with chance and necessity. Any selection based on internal states is deterministic. In order to circumvent this you would have to say something about how the states are switched, appealing to a non-random, nondeterministic mechanism for state switching. In other words, you would have to presume "free" state switching under my definition. Exactly what is confused about that?Chance Ratcliff
May 30, 2013
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Hi Chance,
Anyone following along can decide for themselves whether I’m begging the question and providing useless categorizations of intelligence and free choice.
Yes, I'm fine with that. I've shown that you've assumed that human actions transcend chance+necessity in your premise, and then you conclude that human actions transcend chance+necessity. This is a very clear case of begging the question.
I think it’s clear that RDFish has not provided any compelling evidence that computers make free choices, nor any convincing argument to that effect.
I provided a definition of "free choice" under which we both agreed computers' choices were free (i.e. they are based on internal states). You provided a definition of "free choice" under which we both agreed computers' choices were not free (i.e. neither random nor determined). And then you turn around and complain that I haven't provided compelling evidence regarding free choice in computers??? I'm afraid you've revealed either a short memory or a very confused take on this issue! :-) Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 30, 2013
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Hi StephenB,
Causality is self-evident. You cannot get a 10? snowman from a piece of ice.
This is a non-sequitur. Causality is not self-evident, and obviously you cannot get a 10' snowman from a piece of ice, as we know from experience (rather than logic) that such things do not happen.
In order to receive the addition to being (movement) a thing cannot exist in that state until it receives it.
You did not respond to my argument on this. We can all conceive of something starting to move spontaneously, without logical contradiction. Thus it is not logically necessary that things require impetus to begin moving. Causality is not a logically necessary truth, but rather an empirical truth. You ignored my other arguments, which I take to mean you have no responses to them: 1) Knowledge is never 100% certain (even per Christian foundationalists) 2) Casaulity as we conceive of it does not appear to apply at quantum scales or any context where temporal relations do not apply (e.g. if spacetime did not exist). Cheers, RDFishRDFish
May 30, 2013
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Link correction for #361: My #353 and RDFish's response at #354. I must remember to double check links before posting. ;)Chance Ratcliff
May 30, 2013
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