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Guest Post: Continuity of Thought – A Disproof of Materialism

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Today’s guest post is from nkendall:

We have looked at the phenomena of dreams LINK: Are Dreams Incompatible With Materialism? and constancy of self through near death experiences LINK: Constancy of Self in Light of Near Death Experiences – A Disproof of Materialism as disproofs of materialism. Now I want to look at continuity of thought as a disproof of materialism.

 

Have you ever noticed that your mind is always presented with a continuous stream of related thoughts? There are seldom, if ever, any gaps where your mind is blank. There always seems to be a single, whole, intact thought present in our conscious awareness. I suppose there are exceptions such as seizures. Remarkably, barring interruption, each distinct thought in a sequence of thoughts is related to the adjacent thoughts in time; those before and after and in the context of one’s experiences. This is true whether we are rehashing a similar set of thoughts from memory, or when we are daydreaming or when our imaginations are heightened and presenting us with a novel, sequence of thoughts. Even more astounding is when these streams of thought are found to be creative and unique in human history and contribute to the advancement of human knowledge, human artifacts, artistic renderings and expressions of goodness in fundamental ways. Can these marvelous qualities of mind be reconciled with materialism which posits only the physical brain to account for human consciousness and intellect? No, they cannot; not even in principle.

 

Let’s first look briefly at materialist claims regarding consciousness and human intellect and then examine them in light of the qualities of mind that we all experience each moment of our lives.

 

MATERIALISM

It is not known how thoughts could arise in the brain, how they could be represented in the brain or how they could be rendered in our consciousness much less what consciousness is. For many people these intractable problems are enough to dismiss materialism from the start. But materialism’s grip on Western thought has conditioned the educated class into thinking that there are no plausible alternatives to a brain-only hypothesis of human consciousness and intellect. Only by thinking about the details of our conscious thoughts and about what would have to be the case for materialism to be true, does materialism’s brain-only theory fall apart.

 

Materialism’s reductionist accounting of human intellect requires strict adherence to bottom up causation. Bottom up causation means that it is the sequences of molecular neural events that give rise to one’s thoughts and directs them to our conscious awareness for rendering–somehow. Therefore, the thoughts that appear in our conscious awareness are entirely determined by the prior local causal chain of molecular neural events. But if our thoughts are produced and determined by the prior causal chain of neural events in the brain then they would not be expected or necessitated in any way to produce a coherent, continuous sequences of related thoughts that were recognizable to our conscious experience. There would be no expectation that adjacent brain states (similar configurations) would result in “adjacent” (tightly related) mental states. This decoupling of local causation at the physical level and information and meaning at the mental experience level is a fundamental fact that materialism is bound by. Simply put, physical processes in the brain cannot possibly have any way of knowing what set of physical sequences in the brain would give rise to coherent mental sequences of thought. Therefore, materialism is left with either blind chance or determinism neither of which could possibly produce the rich mental lives we all experience.

 

COMPLEX, SPECIFIED INFORMATION

The sequences of molecular neural events that materialism claims give rise to our thoughts would have to be precise and they would have to be specific. They would have to be precise and specific because there are an incalculable array of thoughts that can arise in our minds and these must then have an incalculable number of physical arrangements to underlie them. Imagine an insight that you have had or bit of knowledge that you have acquired. Then think of the innumerable ways in which it could be slightly modified even in very subtle ways. Each version of this insight would have–must have if materialism is true–a slightly different underlying neural signature otherwise they would not be distinguishable from thoughts which were slightly different. Also, since these physical processes–these sequences of molecular neural events–would have to interface with other putative physical processes, a predictable outcome could only result if the processes themselves, and the interface between them, were precise and specific.

 

Because thoughts and insights unfold over time, they would have underlying sequences of arrangements, not just static arrangements. Once the first thought in a stream of related thoughts were brought forth in our conscious awareness, the subsequent thoughts would be constrained by the content (the meaning) of the initial thought and increasingly so with each new thought as this collection of emerging thoughts matured into a complete insight. The underlying physical processes which materialism claims give rise to these thoughts would, therefore, also be increasingly constrained and more tightly specified as more thoughts were brought forth just as the configurations in my brain causing the movements of my hands and fingers would have to be increasingly constrained as I type out this sentence.

 

Therefore, under a materialist assumption, in order for a continuous, coherent stream of related thoughts to occur, an enormous number of molecular components in the brain would have to be continuously arranged in increasingly very precise and specific ways. The sheer number of molecular components involved betrays a very high degree of complexity. These streams of thought would exhibit extraordinary quantities of complex, specified information and constitute irreducibly complex configurations.

 

Especially noteworthy are the spontaneous emergence of unique and novel thoughts that lead to an expansion of human knowledge in profound and important ways. Although each of us have unique and novel thought streams each day, most are not significant in this regard. If materialism is true, its account of such unique and novel phenomena would entail that the underlying local causation in the brain results in a unique sequence of arrangements of components in the brain–arrangements that these components would have never assumed before. In and of itself that is not significant. By chance, local physical causation of components in the brain will almost always result in unique configurations. But what is special about the complexity here is the types of unique, complex sequences of arrangements of neural molecular components. These arrangements would be highly specified and convey information at the mental level that has meaning–important meaning–in human discourse. These sequences of arrangements would comprise an infinitesimally small set of possible dynamic configurations of the brain’s molecular components, the vast majority of which would convey absolutely no useful information at all in human discourse. (This all of course assumes that a sequence of arrangements of molecules can produce any thing at the mental level at all as materialism claims.)

 

FOREKNOWLEDGE

In addition to a material mechanism to account for the generation of continuous sequences of novel, complex, specified arrangements of physical brain components, there would have to be a physical process in the brain that would somehow know in advance either where those specific neural circuits were that were incubating a spontaneous emerging thought or whether the outcome of a physical process is producing a thought that is useful in an existing sequence of related thoughts. This physical process would also have to know how these thoughts were structured and how they were bounded within the neural circuits such that a whole, distinct, coherent thought could be captured, sequestered, transmitted and presented to our consciousness in a timely fashion. These physical processes in the brain would have to pass these distinct thoughts to another unknown physical process which would serialize them properly with other emerging thoughts and prepare them for rendering in our conscious experience. How these physical processes would know where and when these useful related thoughts were emerging, how they were structured and bounded, how they should be sequence and rendered in our consciousness are intractable mysteries.

 

These seemingly omniscient and clairvoyant physical processes of engendering coherent, contextually relevant thoughts, locating and identifying them as they emerge, sequencing them and preparing them for rendering in our consciousness would have to be repeated continuously and unerringly throughout the entire life of a human such that our conscious awareness was continuously presented with a coherent stream of related thoughts. These putative physical processes of the brain would have to account for the seamless rendering of a continuous stream of thoughts despite interruptions from our senses. They would have to be able to continuously reassert prior thought streams and integrate them with our memories and with any new information presented through the senses.

 

PROBABILITIES

Despite the intuitive implausibility of materialist claims given the foregoing, it is not possible to adequately quantify the probabilities. There are at least two reasons for this. First, we cannot know the scope of the possible alternative brain states, within which any coherent continuous thought stream would reside, because materialism cannot tell us how thoughts are, or could be, generated in the brain or how many physical components would be required to produce them and represent them. But we do know that the super set of possible brain states is vast and the probabilities of landing on a specific sequence of brain states that might produce a specific series of coherent mental states would be very unkind to materialism’s brain-only hypothesis, if it could be done at all. Secondly, thoughts have no obvious material qualities at all and therefore cannot be quantified except by using a proxy calculation using symbolic language which would grossly understate the complexity involved and therefore be excessively charitable to materialism. But materialism would fail miserably nonetheless

 

NEO-DARWINISM

Absent an immaterial mind, materialism is left with the physical brain. The brain then has to account for everything we experience in our mental lives. This is an enormous burden. According to materialism, each quality of mind is underwritten by a physical process in the brain. The only explanation materialism has to offer as to how all these marvelous qualities of mind could have arisen (and arisen so quickly), is evolutionary theory–neo-darwinism. According to neo-darwinism each of these processes would have had to have been assembled piecemeal using the tandem mechanism of random mutation and natural selection. But there are serious problems with this that cannot be overcome, even in principle.

 

One obvious problem with an evolutionary accounting for the brain is that so many of the features and qualities of mind exhibit the signature of modern humanity. It is hard to accept that the brain could have been configured by evolution in the distant past to harbor a vast set of latent capabilities which when manifested would just happen to be useful in the context of 21st century humans. It is one thing to have the general capability for something but quite another thing to explain the specific causes that could bring forth vast quantities of novel, complex specified information spontaneously, continuously and near instantaneously and that offer value to modern humanity!

 

Secondly, in order for evolution to have produced a brain with the capabilities and qualities of mind we all experience, the physical processes which materialism purports gives rise to them in the brain would have to be encoded and stored in the DNA. These configurations might then be subject to “random mutational” changes such that they could be selected. However, the configurations for these processes cannot be identified or even inferred from the DNA. So where does all this complexity come from? And where is it stored? Think of it this way: If materialism is true and if science is the only pathway to truth, then it is reasonable to say that nature and in fact all reality is transparent to human reason. In effect, then, the brain could be said to have the capability of subsuming the complexity of all reality. Yet the complexity of the DNA–especially those more limited segments that produce the brain–is hopelessly insufficient to account for the total complexity of reality. Furthermore, this complexity would have had to have arisen throughout the lives of far too few individuals throughout the brief evolutionary period during which the descent of modern man is believed to have occurred.

 

SUMMARY

I have briefly sketched out the intractable difficulties of a materialist account involving the continuity of human thought. If any of this sounds at all plausible to you then let me suggest that you have been irreparably brainwashed by the scientism which has come to dominate Western academia.

 

If it is unreasonable to believe that these marvelous qualities of mind that we all experience continuously cannot be explained by an electro-chemical “machine” of sorts i.e. the brain, then we have to consider alternatives such as mind/brain dualism and dismiss materialism as a false hypothesis. And in fact it is unreasonable to believe that material processes in the brain could account for these qualities of mind. Setting aside the intractable difficulties in explaining how abstract thoughts are represented in the brain and rendered in consciousness or even what consciousness is, there is no reason to suspect that physical processes would have the foreknowledge to identify specific areas in the vastness of the brain that just happened to be readying themselves to produce a specific, coherent stream of thoughts that have meaning in human discourse. And there is also no reason to believe that it is likely or even possible for the brain–unaided by an immaterial mind–to arrange its components in such a way that it would generate a succession of complex, specified configurations continuously and unerringly throughout one’s life. These problems are fundamental and will not surrender to an entreaty to promissory materialism because foreknowledge and spontaneous generation of novel, continuous, complex, specified information is required and these cannot be accounted for by physical processes in the brain.

 

Let me close with a supreme example of human thought. To believe that the streams of thought Einstein must have experienced, as he sought the solution to the problems whose eventual resolution became a fundamental truth about reality–Relativity, happened as a result of continuous sequences of chance arrangements of molecular neural events, is such a draft on common sense that one would have to conclude–given the general acceptance of materialism–that any belief, no matter how foolish and no matter how contrary to direct human experience, could come to be accepted if wrapped in the sophistication of intellectualism and delivered with the full authority of science. One has to wonder at the irony as to how a method of inquiry–science–which has been spectacularly successful, with its intention to seek truth empirically through open rational inquiry, could lead us down a dead end path and become like that which it sought to counter–the tyranny of an overbearing institutional religion which itself had departed from its own charter.

 

Comments
Hi Box,
Why do you keep misrepresenting/”misunderstanding” everything I say? Why is it that every time you ‘paraphrase’ me I have to point out that I did not say those things?
Because you are not very clear at expressing yourself.
I did not assert that mind is non-materialistic in nature, what I did assert is that our axiomatic concept of rationality is non-materialistic in nature.
See what I mean? When you say something is "axiomatic", what I think you mean is that it is to be accepted as true without proof or reason. Perhaps you mean something different, such as a universally accepted truth? In any event, after all this dodging you still haven't provided a single argument why materialism is false! You haven't addressed a single argument I've made in this discussion! Why not?
RDFish, let’s end this “discussion”. This is getting absolutely nowhere, since you insist on obstructing any attempt of moving forward. This is quite enough already.
Hahahahaha you've been trying to quit since the beginning, because you clearly have no arguments to put forward. Your only point is that materialism is false because it is "axiomatic" (whatever you mean by that) that mind is immaterial. Sorry, but you're just not very good at this. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 21, 2015
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Hi Mung,
If evolution is true, there’s no reason to believe it is true.
Plantinga argues that if evolution is true, we have little reason to think our minds are reliable, and so whatever reason we have to believe in evolution cannot be relied upon. Accepting this arguendo, then in the case that evolution is true, we cannot conclude anything (evolution, ID, theism, or anything else) reliably because it's likely our minds are not reliable.
If our minds are not reliable, there’s still no reason to believe evolution is true.
In this case, there is still no reason to believe anything at all, including Plantinga's argument. So no matter how you say it, it comes out the same: There's no way to use the reliability of our minds to show naturalism is less likely to be true than anything else. In the end, there is just no use assuming our minds aren't reliable. It's like solipsism: There's no way to disprove it, but once you accept it there just isn't much to say :-) Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 21, 2015
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RDFish: If you assert that mind is non-materialistic in nature, (...)
Why do you keep misrepresenting/"misunderstanding" everything I say? Why is it that every time you 'paraphrase' me I have to point out that I did not say those things? Okay, here goes again: I did not assert that mind is non-materialistic in nature, what I did assert is that our axiomatic concept of rationality is non-materialistic in nature. RDFish, let's end this "discussion". This is getting absolutely nowhere, since you insist on obstructing any attempt of moving forward. This is quite enough already.Box
May 21, 2015
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Hi Box,
Nope, I have not stated that intuitive notions of mind should be considered true, I have simply stated that they are non-materialistic in nature.
The topic here is whether or not materialism can be shown to be false. If you assert that mind is non-materialistic in nature, that appears to be tantamount to asserting that materialism is false, but without any supporting argument. Thus, you are assuming your conclusion (begging the question). Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 21, 2015
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If evolution is true, there's no reason to believe it is true. If our minds are not reliable, there's still no reason to believe evolution is true.Mung
May 21, 2015
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RDFish: Because you did not say that the concept requiring revision was merely the common or popular or intuitive conception, rather than the dictionary definition, or the conception of philosophers, for example.
In my opinion common, popular, intuitive and dictionary conceptions of rationality all assume a free person in control of his thoughts, as I have outlined in post #17.
RDFish: Again, the dictionary definition of “rational” says nothing about immaterial causation.
The dictionary may not mention it, however I argue that a free person in control of his thoughts is assumed.
Box: That our axiomatic concept of rationality is non-materialistic is simply stating the obvious, it’s not the conclusion of my argument.
RDFish: Nope, it really is simply your unsupported claim that the naive, intuitive notions of mind that most people assume should be considered to be axiomatically true.
Nope, I have not stated that intuitive notions of mind should be considered true, I have simply stated that they are non-materialistic in nature.Box
May 21, 2015
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Hi Box,
RDFish: We do agree, and have from the beginning, on what people in general intuit regarding volition. BOX: If we do, why would you write: I don’t think compatibilism requires any revision to the concept of “rational”.
Because you did not say that the concept requiring revision was merely the common or popular or intuitive conception, rather than the dictionary definition, or the conception of philosophers, for example. Again, the dictionary definition of "rational" says nothing about immaterial causation.
That our axiomatic concept of rationality is non-materialistic is simply stating the obvious, it’s not the conclusion of my argument.
Nope, it really is simply your unsupported claim that the naive, intuitive notions of mind that most people assume should be considered to be axiomatically true. That is assuming your conclusion. You haven't made an argument. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 21, 2015
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RDFish: We do agree, and have from the beginning, on what people in general intuit regarding volition.
If we do, why would you write:
I don’t think compatibilism requires any revision to the concept of “rational”.
Again, it seems to be your position that a compatibilistic and an intuitive understanding of rationality are identical.
RDFish: But you’ve argued that this means the claim that rationality requires immaterial causation is “axiomatic”. That is just assuming your conclusion. You actually need to argue for your conclusion, but you don’t.
That our axiomatic concept of rationality is non-materialistic is simply stating the obvious, it's not the conclusion of my argument.Box
May 21, 2015
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Hi Silver Asiatic,
So you need to care why an airplane that came together through a random process is reliable. That’s how you understand the origin of things. If you’re not interested in that, then it’s an easier argument.
I'm interested in theories of origins, and in theories of mind - that is why I discuss things here. Plantinga's argument attempts to discount evolutionary theory by saying essentially that: IF we believe in evolution THEN we have little reason to think our minds are reliable and so THEN we have little reason to believe our theory of evolution in the first place My rebuttal is this: IF our minds are reliable THEN Plantinga's argument is moot because our minds are reliable whether or not evolution is true IF our minds are NOT reliable, THEN Plantinga's argument is moot because our minds are NOT reliable, and we can't even believe Plantinga's argument is sound in the first place.
Since our minds are reliable and rational, then they cannot be the creation of irrational processes that create unreliable outputs.
No, that is not Plantinga's argument at all. Again, Plantinga argues that evolutionary theory represents a defeater of itself, because if it is true, then we can't know if it is true because our minds are likely to be unreliable. I simply basically point out that if our minds are unreliable, we can't know if Plantinga's argument is sound either. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 21, 2015
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If we already know that it is reliable, then who cares why?
It's a question of origins. That's what ID is about. So you need to care why an airplane that came together through a random process is reliable. That's how you understand the origin of things. If you're not interested in that, then it's an easier argument. In materialist monism, everything that is, is material/physical. There is nothing else. Can there be categories of true and false in a worldview that posits only "the is"? I don't think so myself.
And if there is no possible way of anyone ever knowing if the airplane is reliable or not, then what difference does it make?
If there's no possible way of knowing for certain about the origin of the universe, the origin of life, the origin of human consciousness (all past historical events), then what difference do arguments about their origin make?
But in Plantinga’s argument, we cannot possibly know if our own minds are reliable or not.
That's not how the argument works. Since our minds are reliable and rational, then they cannot be the creation of irrational processes that create unreliable outputs.Silver Asiatic
May 21, 2015
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Hi Box,
I don’t think compatibilism requires any revision to the concept of “rational”. you obviously hold that a compatibilistic and an intuitive understanding of rationality are identical. For me, that’s where discussion ends.
I can see you are anxious to end the discussion, but it doesn't appear to be for the reason you are stating. We do agree, and have from the beginning, on what people in general intuit regarding volition. But you've argued that this means the claim that rationality requires immaterial causation is "axiomatic". That is just assuming your conclusion. You actually need to argue for your conclusion, but you don't. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 21, 2015
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RDFish: People have intuitive understandings of all sorts of things that turned out to be wrong.
Sure, however we cannot have a discussion if we cannot agree on what those intuitive understandings are. When you state:
I don’t think compatibilism requires any revision to the concept of “rational”.
you obviously hold that a compatibilistic and an intuitive understanding of rationality are identical. For me, that's where discussion ends.Box
May 21, 2015
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Hi Silver Asiatic,
Materialism is a theory of origins.
Oh, no, it is not. How did you ever get that idea? Materialism (or physicalism) is not a theory and it does not address origins. Rather, it is a metaphysical doctrine, one solution to the question of ontology.
I have an airplane the origin of which is purported to have been an assembliy by a random, unintelligent process. Why would that airplane be reliable?
If we already know that it is reliable, then who cares why? And if there is no possible way of anyone ever knowing if the airplane is reliable or not, then what difference does it make? Yours isn't a good analogy, because we can always tell if airplanes are reliable (they don't crash). But in Plantinga's argument, we cannot possibly know if our own minds are reliable or not. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 21, 2015
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Hi Box, People have intuitive understandings of all sorts of things that turned out to be wrong. Intuitively we feel that the Earth is stationary, that heavy things fall faster than lighter ones, that matter is ontologically different from energy, that everything (even electrons) must exist in one place at one time, that time is absolute, that causality is local, and so on. We also intuit that our volitional decisions cannot precede our conscious awareness of them, which is also wrong. We intuit libertarianism and dualism, yes, but that obviously does not mean that these metaphysical views are true. Rather than being able to admit that the mind/body problem and the related problem of free will remain unsolved, you claim your own particular view to be the truth, but you don't even attempt to say why. Instead, you simply declare that particular definitions of words (like "rationality" or "thought") that you prefer and that are most intuitive to most people prove your position is correct. This is not an argument, just a foot-stomp. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 21, 2015
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We have a brain which is purported to have been cobbled together by material processes; why would that be reliable? Materialism is a theory of origins. I have an airplane the origin of which is purported to have been an assembliy by a random, unintelligent process. Why would that airplane be reliable? The airplane is reliable or not. If it is, then it doesn't matter what process created it? Again, it's a question of origins. Non-rational material processes do not give rise to rationality.Silver Asiatic
May 21, 2015
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RDFish: Again, compatibilism per se doesn’t require that we consider free will (or the self, etc) an illusion. Instead, it just describes free will in terms of an unencumbered ability to act, and that definition is compatible with determinism. (...) As with all of these discussions, most of these disagreements concern definitions of words rather than matters of fact. (...) I don’t think compatibilism requires any revision to the concept of “rational”.
Okay, it seems that we cannot agree on what I termed “our axiomatic concept of rationality”, which I have outlined in post #17. This shared concept of rationality—I do hold that your position is a rare exception—is foundational to my argument, as is the notion that no one starts off with the compatibilist concept of rationality (and 'freedom' and 'personhood'). But you don’t seem to agree, or cannot make up your mind. From this I conclude that there is no basis for our discussion. Thanks for trying.Box
May 21, 2015
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Hi Mung, Yes I refute Plantinga's argument. Again: 1) Either our minds are reliable or they are not 2) If our minds are reliable, then they are reliable no matter how minds came to exist, and no matter what is true of ontology. In this case Plantinga's argument does not apply. 3) Otherwise, if our minds are unreliable, then we can’t rely on anything we think, including Plantinga's argument. So Plantinga's argument does not apply in this case either. 4) Therefore, we cannot use the reliability of minds to argue against materialism, and we cannot conclude that materialism entails (or makes likely) that our minds are unreliable. If you find some problem with my refutation, make sure to let me know :) Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 21, 2015
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Hi nkendall,
I think we are getting somewhere. You are like trying to pick up a drop of mercury but I think I would like to keep trying.
Ok fine by me; again, it's refreshing to find someone who will debate these things in good faith and good spirits! (Hmm, "faith" and "spirit"? Perhaps this theism/dualism is rubbing off on me here?) I may at some point have to move on before my wife pulls the plug on my computer, but till then have at it :) Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 21, 2015
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Hi drc466,
The only way this is true, is if you redefine “thinking”...
Just as I was saying to Box, these debates are almost always about definitions of words rather than facts about the world. So for example, dualists will insist that "thinking" must necessarily entail conscious awareness, and/or libertarian freedom, while physicalists will define "thinking" as "reasoning, problem solving, information processing" and so on, making no particular reference to consciousness. This is what Dr. McDermott meant with his airplane quip. If you define "flying" to mean "flapping one's wings to become airborne", then airplanes don't fly. But if you define "flying" to mean "moving above ground supported by air" then airplanes do fly.
By this generic a definition of “thinking”, a pushbutton and motor relay “think” about starting a motor. A video game “thinks” about shooting people. In the world of biology, your liver “thinks” about cleaning your blood. Deep Blue is a control system with an output that simulates the results of thought – it isn’t thought.
With regard to this particular issue, I happen to agree with the very radical materialist and evolutionist Dan Dennett, although I agree with him on almost nothing else. Dennett describes "the intentional stance" as our way of talking about certain systems or entities in terms of beliefs, desires, intentions, and so on, because it is practical to do so. It is awkward in the extreme to try and talk about complex AI systems (that learn, forget, remember, try, give up, infer, guess, decide and so on) without using intentional language, while it is a little silly to use that sort of language about a thermostat (that tries or "wants" to keep the room temperature stable).
Strong AI is alchemy, not science.
Strong AI is neither of those things; it is merely what we call something that does not exist yet, and may or may not ever exist: A computing machine that experiences conscious awareness the way humans do. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 21, 2015
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Hi Box,
Hence the term “illusion”, so as to why you disagree with my statement is not clear.
Again, compatibilism per se doesn't require that we consider free will (or the self, etc) an illusion. Instead, it just describes free will in terms of an unencumbered ability to act, and that definition is compatible with determinism. I just went on to address the fact that "people do speak of the illusion of free will" because of how we intuitively feel that our conscious decisions cause our actions (although this feeling can be demonstrably wrong - aside from the Libet type of experiments see Daniel Wegner).
If we are to conclude, based on these experiments, that many (or all) of ‘our’ rational decisions are made without involvement of consciousness—if not consciousness but brain chemicals are behind the steering wheel of reason—then our axiomatic concept of rationality is in need of radical revision.
As with all of these discussions, most of these disagreements concern definitions of words rather than matters of fact. Why do you insist that "rational" necessarily implies "non-physical"? Dictionary definitions of the word make no allusion to how rationality is accomplished. So no, I don't think compatibilism requires any revision to the concept of "rational".
BTW in this post I briefly address the questionable experiments you may allude to.
The Libet type of experiments aren't conclusive regarding libertarian will of course, nor about material reductionism (as per your cite in the other post). They do strongly suggest, however, that we are not conscious of (at least some of) our decisions until after we make them, which is what I was saying.
I’m not sure I understand what you are saying here. Can we agree that although a deterministic mechanism might be compatible with the illusion of freedom, it can never be compatible with the real thing?
Again we're arguing definitions rather than matters of fact. We can define "freedom" to mean "unfettered ability to act in the world", in which case autonomous robots would be free. Or we can define "freedom" to mean "uncaused by physical antecedent", in which case we don't know if anything is free, but we're sure that robots are not. I'd like to ask you what I asked nkendall:
RDF: If your decision is free in the libertarian sense, then it is not random, and it is not caused by antecedent states and physical law. In that case, what is it caused by? Mind of course! And what causes your mind to decide one thing vs another? Nothing of course – we are free!. So, what is “free” about making decisions that are caused by nothing at all?
Can you elaborate on this thought? What do you mean by “choice” if our behavior is determined by antecedent brain states?
I mean "selection". Say an autonomous robot encounters a novel situation on Mars. Depending upon the robot's circuitry, programming, what it's learned from prior experiences, and so on, it may select to do one thing or another. There is nothing contradictory, illusory, or incoherent about referring to this action as a "choice": The robot chooses to collect a sample of soil.
If you mean to say that a word processor is in control of the printer, similarly to a person in control of his thoughts (consistent with our axiomatic concept of rationality), then you are saying something akin to “this car is in a good mood today”, which doesn’t merit a serious response.
My point was that when we describe the causal chain that results in the page being printed, we use a "top-down" explanation that refers to programs that cause drivers to do things, and drivers that cause printers to do things, and so on. We don't use a "bottom-up" explanation that would always be "well, the page got printed because there was a flow of electrons in these various semiconductor materials..." etc. Similarly, a materialist uses top-down causal explanations for human behavior ("his conscience caused him to reconsider...") instead of simply saying "his neurons made him do" this or that. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 21, 2015
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RDFish @ 24 You end with... "Well that was a marathon exchange. I appreciate your sincerity and civility, rare in these discussions. I think you’re wrong about most everything, but I still enjoy the chat." Likewise, it has been fun...but don't go running off...don't say goodbye Mr. Chips...I mean Mr Fish or Mr Fish & Chips;-) We are just getting started. I think we are getting somewhere. You are like trying to pick up a drop of mercury but I think I would like to keep trying. Hey that was pretty funny above. There was a movie "Goodbye Mr Chips" about an English smarty pants. I saw it in grade school when I was learning that natural selection was a tautology;-) So my physical brain made this connection and pun spontaneously. Really cool! Let's see you invent an AI that can do that - not the text alone...the actual thoughts;-) I suppose we could hold out hope that there is some mysterious cause in the universe (besides an immaterial mind) that could cobble that pun together spontaneously but my money is on a mind.nkendall
May 21, 2015
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RDFish,
“Saying that Deep Blue can’t think about chess is like saying bicycles can’t make a cake”.
That's funny, I was trying to think of a nonsensical non-sequitur metaphor that made as little sense as your friend's - this one's better than the one I came up with but didn't use :).
Deep Blue was made to think about chess, and it does, although it does it very differently from the way humans do.
The only way this is true, is if you redefine "thinking" to mean the same thing that an airplane does to fly. Deep Blue doesn't "think" about chess. Deep Blue/Airplane takes a set of data representing initial conditions, a set of inputs and outputs, a set of data representing current state, a set of functions defining how to update current state data and outputs based on the inputs, and sets its outputs accordingly. By this generic a definition of "thinking", a pushbutton and motor relay "think" about starting a motor. A video game "thinks" about shooting people. In the world of biology, your liver "thinks" about cleaning your blood. Deep Blue is a control system with an output that simulates the results of thought - it isn't thought. Strong AI is alchemy, not science. I suspect we'll have to agree to disagree, but there is an enormous, qualitative difference between AI, which is an engineered simulation of "thinking", and actual "thinking".drc466
May 21, 2015
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RDFish:
Anyway, I really hate this argument by Plantinga
I'm sure you do. Do you think you've refuted it?Mung
May 21, 2015
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RDFish #26,
Box: It is my understanding that compatibilist descriptions merely attempt to explain the illusion of freedom, the illusion of personhood and so forth.
RDFish: Not so in my understanding. People do speak of the illusion of free will, because it does seem to us that our consciousness causes our actions.
Hence the term “illusion”, so as to why you disagree with my statement is not clear.
RDFish: But many (most) of our actions proceed without conscious awareness, and many of our thoughts are also inaccessible to conscious awareness. Furthermore, experiments suggest decisions which we perceive as being made freely have already been determined in the brain by the time we become consciously aware of what we’ve decided!
Again we seem to be in agreement, since you are making my argument (see post #17) for me here. If we are to conclude, based on these experiments, that many (or all) of ‘our’ rational decisions are made without involvement of consciousness—if not consciousness but brain chemicals are behind the steering wheel of reason—then our axiomatic concept of rationality is in need of radical revision. BTW in this post I briefly address the questionable experiments you may allude to.
RDFish: Feser’s quote merely states that we are qualitatively like billiard balls and soap suds; it doesn’t deny that rationality as we understand it is incompatible with deterministic mechanism.
I’m not sure I understand what you are saying here. Can we agree that although a deterministic mechanism might be compatible with the illusion of freedom, it can never be compatible with the real thing?
RDFish: Again, what is illusory under compatibilism is the feeling that our behavior is not determined by antecedent states, not that we are incapable of choice.
Can you elaborate on this thought? What do you mean by “choice” if our behavior is determined by antecedent brain states?
RDFish: Compatibilism treats “top-down” control as a valid explanation. In my (deterministic) computer system, my word processor causes the print driver to cause the printer to print a page; that is a top-down explanation. That doesn’t mean that at bottom it isn’t all electrons flying around in semiconductors.
If you mean to say that a word processor is in control of the printer, similarly to a person in control of his thoughts (consistent with our axiomatic concept of rationality), then you are saying something akin to “this car is in a good mood today”, which doesn’t merit a serious response.Box
May 21, 2015
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Hi Box,
It is my understanding that compatibilist descriptions merely attempt to explain the illusion of freedom, the illusion of personhood and so forth.
Not so in my understanding. Rather, determinists, libertarians, and compatibilists each argue that these concepts refer to different sorts of things. People do speak of the illusion of free will, because it does seem to us that our consciousness causes our actions. But many (most) of our actions proceed without conscious awareness, and many of our thoughts are also inaccessible to conscious awareness. Furthermore, experiments suggest decisions which we perceive as being made freely have already been determined in the brain by the time we become consciously aware of what we've decided!
Due to its commitment to materialism, compatibilism must redefine freedom so that it is compatible with determinism.
Due to its commitment to dualism, libertarianism must redefine freedom so that it entails indeterminism. :-)
It should be obvious that if freedom is in reality a deterministic process, that—despite appearance—this entails a radical revision of our initial understanding of freedom.
Well yes, as I mentioned above, we aren't conscious of the antecdent neural events that determine (at least some of) our decisions.
And so it is with rationality. Irrespective of whatever compatibilist account of rationality; if rationality is a bottom-up physical process then it entails a radical revision of our initial understanding of rationality. Edward Feser puts it like this:...
Feser's quote merely states that we are qualitatively like billiard balls and soap suds; it doesn't deny that rationality as we understand it is incompatible with deterministic mechanism. And I'd certainly take exception to this goofy charcterization! The fact that we contain complex internal states and can process information according to logico-mathematical rules seems to qualitatively distinguish us from those things even if we are not imbued with immaterial spirit.
I like to believe that I share your firm stance for freedom and rationality. However, you should note that any compatibilist account of freedom will suggest that your notion of freedom has practical use, but in reality is a mere illusion.
Again, what is illusory under compatibilism is the feeling that our behavior is not determined by antecedent states, not that we are incapable of choice. And then there's this problem for libertarianism: If your decision is free in the libertarian sense, then it is not random, and it is not caused by antecedent states and physical law. In that case, what is it caused by? Mind of course! And what causes your mind to decide one thing vs another? Nothing of course - we are free!. So, what is "free" about making decisions that are caused by nothing at all?
Any compatibalist account must respect the assumption that psychological states are effects of physical states and ‘no effect can control its cause’. IOW a compatibilist account can only attempt to offer an explanation of our (alleged) illusion of top-down control.
Compatibilism treats "top-down" control as a valid explanation. In my (deterministic) computer system, my word processor causes the print driver to cause the printer to print a page; that is a top-down explanation. That doesn't mean that at bottom it isn't all electrons flying around in semiconductors. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 21, 2015
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RDFish: There are compatibilist descriptions of all of these concepts of course, but you have not provided any indication of why you think they are inconsistent, incoherent, or invalid for any other reason.
It is my understanding that compatibilist descriptions merely attempt to explain the illusion of freedom, the illusion of personhood and so forth. Due to its commitment to materialism, compatibilism must redefine freedom so that it is compatible with determinism. It should be obvious that if freedom is in reality a deterministic process, that—despite appearance—this entails a radical revision of our initial understanding of freedom. And so it is with rationality. Irrespective of whatever compatibilist account of rationality; if rationality is a bottom-up physical process then it entails a radical revision of our initial understanding of rationality. Edward Feser puts it like this:
To take the materialist route entails more or less denying free will outright, unless it is simply redefined so that any action that flows from our desires counts as “free,” even if those desires were themselves determined by forces outside our control (a theory known as “compatibilism” since it alleges that free will and determinism are compatible). Intellect and will are no longer formal and final causes (given that there are no such things) but rather efficient causes, reducible, like everything else (so it is claimed), to arrangements of material elements operating according to impersonal laws of nature. Hence human behavior differs in degree but not in kind from the behavior of billiard balls and soap suds. It is more complicated, but no less determined by blind physical forces. In how he acts as well as in what he is made of, man becomes, for the moderns, a machine, a “robot” like the pseudo-Francine of Cartesian legend, made of flesh and blood rather than steel and plastic but still every bit as material and mechanical. [E.Feser, 'The Last Superstition', ch.5]
RDFish: I think and make free choices whether or not there exists some ontologically distinct mental substance or property.
I like to believe that I share your firm stance for freedom and rationality. However, you should note that any compatibalist account of freedom will suggest that your notion of freedom has practical use, but in reality is a mere illusion.
RDFish: And my psychological states affect my physical states (“top-down”) whether or not the former is ontologically distinct from the latter.
Any compatibalist account must respect the assumption that psychological states are effects of physical states and 'no effect can control its cause'. IOW a compatibalist account can only attempt to offer an explanation of our (alleged) illusion of top-down control.Box
May 21, 2015
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Hi nkendall,
You seldom seem to take a position. Maybe I have not had enough of an exchange.
There are two reasons you have trouble understanding my position: 1) You (and most other people) see this debate as two-sided, with two well-defined and mutually exclusive positions: IDist/theist/dualist/metaphysical libertarian vs. Evolutionist/atheist/materialist/determinist. These positions do not necessarily break down that way, and they do not all mutually entail each other. 2) You (and most other people) are loathe to admit when the answer to some profound question is unknown. It seems to most people that it is perverse to answer some question "nobody knows" - even when nobody knows!
You are skeptical of everything...
No, I'm not. I am not skeptical of the existence of CSI nor of the existence of subjective consciousness. I simply hold that both of these things remain unexplained by any current empirical theory.
...except that Intelligent Design is ridiculous. Oddly, about that you are emphatic.
Yes - as a scientific theory, ID is either (depending on who's version you're talking about) completely vacuous, metaphysical (untestable), or scientific but without any evidence.
I suppose when it comes right down to it, how do we know anything especially from a materialists perspective?
How do we know anything from any perspective? When you've solved epistemology, make sure to let us know :-)
From that perspective we have a brain which is purported to have been cobbled together by material processes; why would that be reliable?
And why would a brain - or mind - which is purported to have been cobbled together by non-material processes be reliable? Anyway, I really hate this argument by Plantinga - it is so specious. Think of it this way: 1) Either our minds are reliable or they are not 2) If our minds are reliable, then they are reliable no matter how minds came to exist, and no matter what is true of ontology 3) Otherwise, if our minds are unreliable, then we can't rely on anything we think, including this very argument. 4) Therefore, we cannot use the reliability of minds to argue for or against materialism.
But if you take skepticism to an extreme, which you might appear to, then any discussion is pointless.
Not in the least. There are countless scientific results and logic-mathematical results that are accepted as well-justified by rational people from all over the world, and beyond that there are countless common-sense beliefs that are likewise beyond reasonable doubt. However, there remain a set of questions that we simply have not been able to answer, and it is not being overly skeptical to simply accept this. Among those questions are the origin of life, the origin of the universe, the mind/body problem, and the problem of free will.
I made the assumption you were a materialist since you branded yourself as the “AIGuy” and made other comments which I often associate with materialism. Honest mistake. So I now understand that you are in the “undecided camp.” What aspects of nature do you feel might involve immaterial causes?
Neither "material" nor "immaterial" are useful concepts. I assume you'd say that a magnetic field is "material". Why? It isn't made of matter. And matter itself, of course, is not actually made up of tiny bits of real "stuff". Hopefully you are aquainted with the concepts of modern physics - that at the turn of the 20th century we discovered that fundamental aspects of reality were nothing like our sensory experience tells us - that the concepts of mass, energy, time, and space that we intuitively understand are not usable when describing and predicting what happens on a subatomic scale, near super-massive objects, or near the speed of light, and that deeply mysterious phenomena such as quantum entanglement defy our normal understanding of locality, realism, and causality. Is quantum entanglement a "material" phenomenon? Why? Now, let's say we discover some other new, bizarre feature of reality that somehow explains how brains manage to think. Roger Penrose, for example, describes a "Platonic logic realm" (whatever that is) that somehow enables brains to solve uncomputable problems. The question is: Would this be a "material" or an "immaterial" thing?
There are two broad categories proposed: 1) Teleology (Design),
One of the worst confusions in ID is that "teleology/design" is usually assumed to entail all sorts of specific anthropomorphic characteristics. What else does a "teleological cause" entail (aside from the tautological claim that it whatever causes CSI must be capable of causing CSI)? Does "design" imply a conscious cause? (Different ID authors disagree about this!) Does "design" imply a sort of being that can use natural languages like English or Greek? Does it imply a being that can solve novel problems in different domains - could it take an IQ test?
...2) Material or naturalistic causes.
I've just argued that "material" (and likewise "naturalistic") are not useful terms, because they don't characterize a set of causes in any definite way. Rather, there are only "currently understood" and "currently unknown" causes.
If there were gaps in my consciousness and thoughts, I would notice them and remember them and I would notice them in other people during interactions and observation especially for example musicians and race car drivers, etc.
I don't mean to be insulting, but you really have no idea what you are talking about, and you should refrain from these sorts of statements until you have researched at least a little bit about it. Normal people remain conscious and alert of course. But that does not imply that we are continuously experiencing conscious thoughts. I already explained a bit about temporal synchrony in the brain: Your experience of sequences of sensory events does not reflect reality, because your memory of these events are continuously being rearranged to fit your expectations. Here's a discussion by David Chalmers, a dualist philosopher (or a neutral monist, which is how I describe myself), regarding perception, memory, and consciousness that gives a flavor of the sort of research that would change your mind about what you think you know about mental states: http://consc.net/notes/hardcastle-comments.html
I used an example that once one sets out to think about a problem, after a few false starts and nudging, the mind brings forth a continuous stream of related thoughts. Do you deny this?
Yes of course we can experience a stream of related conscious thoughts, that these thoughts are intentional (meaning not "on purpose" but rather "about something"), and that our ability to think AND our conscious experience of our thoughts are both deeply mysterious problems.
Generally two things need to be explained: 1) Whether or not the phenomena of coherent, continuous thought streams can be explained purely through material causes,
Again: This question should read "purely through currently understood processes", and the answer is clearly no.
2) Could this capability of the mind have arisen through neo-Darwinian (naturalistic) processes.
We both agree the answer to this is also no. How do you believe we can explain our ability to think? How do we play a game of chess for example? How do you explain why we experience consciousness?
Regarding the the first of these, i.e. the possibility that the phenomena of continuous streams of complex, coherent thoughts can be explained purely through material causes, it seems one could either propose that the molecular interactions in the brain are entirely determined by physics and chemistry and follow strict local causation which just happen by chance to produce these marvelous qualities of mind.
Again, the question is not that simple. First, even our current understanding of physics does NOT say that causation is local; non-local causation is a well-established aspect of physical reality in the quantum realm, and there are plenty of people (like Penrose, or Stapp, etc) who think quantum phenomena play a central role in cognitive function. Second, there may be other unimagined sorts of aspects of reality that account for cognition, but it makes no difference if we call these "material" or "immaterial"! Third, nobody thinks that our brains operate "by chance".
Or the molecular interactions in the brain are following some programmatic top-down set of material causes while still adhering to the local causal forces of physics and chemistry–the emergent model. Do you agree that these are the two material causal possibilities? If so which one do you advocate? If neither then please present an alternative.
My position is that how we think, and the nature of consciousness, are unanswered questions. That is a valid position, and I believe it is the only intellectually honest position. We know all sorts of things, but we don't know this. It could even be that we are not smart enough to understand how we think (see cognitive closure). Maybe us trying to understand how we think is like a mouse trying to understand quantum physics.
Are you suggesting that by typing out a string of characters to a monitor that my point is negated? Be specific; what are you saying?
No, I'm saying that computers can generate novel, meaningful, appropriate linguistic responses to novel input, even though computers operate deterministically.
Are you saying that those functions you list that computers cannot current do, will some day be supported? Which ones?
My point was that even things we intuitively feel cannot be done by deterministic machines can often be done by them (beat everybody at Jeopardy or chess, design novel mechanisms, invent and prove mathematical theorems, diagnose diseases...). The idea that computers do only what they are programmed to do is true only in a trivial sense of "programming". I have written programs that can solve math and engineering problems that I myself am unable to solve. Now, does that computer system do only what it is programmed to do? In one sense sure, because it is using the algorithm I gave it to solve these novel problems. But I don't tell it how to actually solve these problems, because I don't know the answer, and I can't perform that particular algorithm in my own head! When you solve a problem are you doing only what you are programmed to do, because you went to school and learned how to solve problems?
Incredulous arguments are usually correct.
Oh come on. Man can never fly in a heavier-than-air machine! It is unthinkable that atom can be split! It's ridiculous to think a computer could ever beat a grandmaster at chess! And of course this one: "How, sir, would you make a ship sail against the wind and currents by lighting a bonfire under her deck? I pray you, excuse me, I have not the time to listen to such nonsense.” — Napoleon Bonaparte, when told of Robert Fulton’s steamboat, 1800s
My guess is that for every prediction made by AI skeptics as to the limits of computer achievement that have been achieved by AI, there is at least one case where AI predictions have not come to pass and probably never will.
Incredulity and goalpost moving. These are not arguments.
Aside from all that, any AI achievement is actually a human achievement.
By that logic, a theist is incapable of any personal achievement.
You seem to deny that science only deals with material causes...
I said a priori. I mean that science can deal with any sort of cause that can be reliably detected by independent researchers, whether or not you call that cause "material".
I am guessing that you believe that Intelligent Design is not science.
That is correct.
But the scientific method requires falsification.
Yes.
Intelligent Design among other things seeks to falsify neo-Darwinism using mathematical probabilities and knowledge of biochemistry.
Uh no, you misunderstand that concept of "falsification" here. It means that in order for a scientific theory to be accepted, there must be some way(s) to falisfy it, and attempts to falsify it have failed. It doesn't mean that you have falisified some other theory. For example, evolutionary theory is falsifiable: If we discover that mutations are correlated with reproductive needs of organisms, then evolutionary theory would be falsified. Or if it could be shown that random mutations fixed by natural selection can't possibly give rise to the sorts of complex mechanisms we observe in the time and populations available, then evolutionary theory is falsified. (I believe evolutionary theory has indeed been falsified by the latter test). ID, in contrast, cannot be falsified. Since ID provides no description of what it means by "intelligent cause", then we have no way of telling what is or is not possible under ID. An "intelligent cause" might make lots of different types of beetles, or only a few; might make new types of organisms in few hours or it might take billions of years to do it; might make perfectly optimized designs or might make suboptimal ones; and so on. ID is not falsifiable.
But natural selection is a tautology and cannot be falsified.
Oh good grief, seriously? May I please ask, without meaning offense, if you learned this in grade school, or in church? Has nobody actually explained to you why the evolution by natural selection is a perfectly meaningful and non-circular description of a mechanism, and that only the ambiguous phrase of "survival of the fittest" is interpreted as a tautology because of the equivocation on the word 'survival'?
When talking about thoughts you seem to be implying that Deep Blue thinks.
My point was that it depends on what you mean by "thinks".
Then you compare birds and airplanes in the context of flight. What are you saying? Are you saying that Deep Blue thinks in the same way humans do?
No, just the opposite!! Deep Blue does NOT think in the same way people do, just as airplanes do not fly in the same way birds do. But airplanes do indeed fly, and Deep Blue does indeed think about chess.
They [cog sci experiments] do not demonstrate that the top down causation is material.
That is correct. They do, however, demonstrate that much of our cognition - even abstract problem-solving - occurs without conscious awareness.
In fact it seems impossible that they could be material.
There's that old incredulity!
I did not say dualism denied physical causation.
Right. You said that evolutionary theory is not compatible with dualism. You are mistaken.
“Theistic” evolutionists, typically do not believe in the dualism in the sense that an immaterial mind interacts with the physical brain which is what I am advocating.
Huh? These are simply orthogonal issues. One deals with metaphysical ontology (dualism vs. monism), and the other deals with the origin of complexity (evolutionary theory).
If you are referring to property dualism then, yes, neo-Darwinism would be compatible with that.
It is a simple fact that one can believe both of the following propositions without contradiction: 1) There exists two ontologically distinct substances: The mental and the physical. 2) The origin of living things and development of complex organisms is due to purely physical processes.
One of the important points of Nagel’s book is that if consciousness cannot be explained through material causes then the entire Darwinian edifice collapses and with it materialism. By inference then some other category of cause would have to be invoked–dualism would be one such inference.
You've made a fallacious argument (denying the antecedent): 1) If I believe evolutionary theory is false, then I might believe dualism is true 2) Therefore if I believe evolutionary theory is true, then I must believe dualism is false.
A single verified near death experience with an out of body experience would disprove materialism and confirm dualism. There are hundreds if not thousands of such cases. Have they been verified? Hard to tell.
Verifying that near death patients can obtain information that would be unobtainable without floating out of body would certainly suggest some sort of dualism. But it's easy to tell that this hasn't been scientifically verified.
But there are many of them, and these folks are not crackpots; it is worth the investigation.
Sure, I agree. There are thousands of not-crackpots who believe they have been abducted and studied by aliens. Do you accept their testimony? I don't - I would need replicable proof.
The hallucination theory does not seem to wash and even if they are hallucinations (some cannot be) they go a long way toward disproving materialism for the same reason dreams do.
Dreams don't suggest anything against materialism of course!
You have a point here; I should not have included that last clause. But I am certain that my thoughts are continuous. Have you ever experienced any gaps in your thoughts?
Not that I remember :-)
Do you believe we have free will?
Yes, of a sort: I also believe that my behavior may be fully determined by antecedent events.
Waiter: What would you like to order? Philosopher: I'm a determinist. Let's just wait and see what happens! :-)
Well that was a marathon exchange. I appreciate your sincerity and civility, rare in these discussions. I think you're wrong about most everything, but I still enjoy the chat. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 21, 2015
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Hi drc466,
“Saying that Deep Blue can’t think about chess is like saying airplanes can’t think about flying.”
No, that is like saying: “Saying that Deep Blue can’t think about chess is like saying bicycles can't make a cake”. Airplanes are made to fly, and they do, even though they do it very differently than birds do. Deep Blue was made to think about chess, and it does, although it does it very differently from the way humans do.RDFish
May 21, 2015
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Hi Box,
Please note that “free person”, “thoughts” and “top-down control” are non-materialistic concepts.
This is a very naive take on a very complex set of philosophical problems, and it is also merely question-begging: You are doing nothing but assuming your conclusion. There are compatibilist descriptions of all of these concepts of course, but you have not provided any indication of why you think they are inconsistent, incoherent, or invalid for any other reason. You haven't even given any indication that you are aware of them. I think and make free choices whether or not there exists some ontologically distinct mental substance or property. And my psychological states affect my physical states ("top-down") whether or not the former is ontologically distinct from the latter. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
May 21, 2015
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RDFish @15
As my friend Drew McDermott famously said, “Saying that [the chess-playing computer] Deep Blue can’t think about chess is like saying airplanes can’t fly because they don’t flap their wings”.
This is an excellent summation of the opposing views on consciousness. Because, of course, the correct metaphor is not your friend Drew's (rather horribly non sequitur) formulation, but rather: "Saying that Deep Blue can't think about chess is like saying airplanes can't think about flying." Which is absolutely true.drc466
May 21, 2015
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