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Eigenstate: The Facts Are Inconsistent With My Metaphysics? Well, so Much the Worse For the Facts.

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David Bentley Hart calls subjective self-awareness the “primordial datum.” It is a fact that cannot not be known. It follows that everyone knows it to be a fact. Denying that it is a fact immediately descends into absurdity. Consider “I deny that I am subjectively self-aware.” Here is a chart of the chemicals that make up the human body:

201_Elements_of_the_Human_Body-01

A group of oxygen atoms do not have the capacity to deny a truth claim. I am sure you would agree that the sentence “the oxygen atoms denied truth claim X” is absurd, no matter what X is. What is true for oxygen is also true for the atoms of the other elements of the body, i.e., carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, calcium, phosphorus, etc.

Suppose one gathers together all of the various elements that compose a human body (i.e., oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, etc.) and mixes those chemicals up in exactly the same quantities and proportions that are found in a human body and puts it all in a bag. Does that bag of chemicals have any more capacity to deny a truth claim that a rock? Of course not.

A materialist must say that the human body is nothing but a bag of chemicals. At the basic levels of ontological analysis, the bag of chemicals that we call “human body” is, for the materialist, not in principle different from any other bag of chemicals in terms of its capacity to deny truth claims. Therefore, a materialist must agree with everyone else that the sentence “this bag of chemicals denies that it is really subjectively self-aware,” is absurd.

But all the time materialists say the sense we have that we are subjectively self-aware is an illusion. This, of course, is equivalent to saying “I deny that I am really subjectively self-aware.” And, for the materialist, this sentence is equivalent to the sentence “this bag of chemicals denies that it is really subjectively self-aware,” which, as we have just seen, is absurd.

Summary: Subjective self-awareness is a fact. Indeed, in a sense, it is “the ultimate fact,” from which all other facts can be perceived. It is a fact everyone knows. It is literally undeniable. Any attempt to deny it is incoherent, absurd and false.

In light of this, let us examine another one of eigenstate claims in my “driving a stake” thread:

Something similar is at work with “folk psychology”. There is no “disembodied I”, in the dualist/supernatural/superstitious sense. But such a conclusion based on scientific analysis does not “remove the ‘I’”. Our understanding is just upgraded to something that is consonant with the data and knowledge available about how brains operate. Just like there’s no “impetus”, but motion, acceleration, and gravity remain (and are more clearly and fully understood), there’s no “dualist ‘I’” that is needed or adds any value to our understanding of consciousness, perception, meta-representation, etc.

All of which is to say, Barry, that your “sky-is-falling” dramatics are much too broad in their concerns. The science available is deeply problematic for many of your particular intuitions, but what’s at stake is just a refinement and re-organizing of the models we may use to understand brains and their activities. Beliefs as “disembodied top-down convictions of a ghost-like homunculus” are judged to be misconceptions, or “illusions” for you, if you suppose this is a kind of fundamental perception you have. But beliefs as physical phenomena, discrete characteristics of the brain that map to very complex, but nevertheless concrete states and patterns of brain activity, remain, and not only remain, but are illuminated by the science.

Eigenstate claims that truth claims such as “I am subjectively self-aware” are true and false depending on the sense in which one uses the phrase. To avoid confusion, let us very carefully describe the two senses.

Sense A: The phrase “subjectively self-aware” in the everyday meaning of the phrase speaks of an “agent that perceives his own awareness.” The everyday understanding of the phrase is infused with philosophical “intentionality,” which means the phrase is a mental state that is “about” or “directed at” something. Intentionality is inherently agent-object oriented. In this case, the agent “I” perceives an object “self-awareness.”

Sense B: Eigenstate claims the eliminative materialist believes the phenomenon “subjectively self-aware” is a complex, but nevertheless concrete state and pattern of brain activity, the kind of phenomenon you could observe and measure with an fMRI, or some more advanced instrument yet to be developed.

Eigenstate claims that the sentence “I am subjectively self-aware” is false if the phrase “subjectively self-aware” is used in Sense A and true if the phrase “subjectively self-aware” is used in Sense B.

And how does eigenstate know this? Why, he says that science has demonstrated it.

Lunacy. Sheer lunacy. Science has demonstrated no such thing. I hereby call eigenstate’s bluff. Kindly point to the scientific experience that solved the hard problem of consciousness.

Let me save us some time. No such experiment exists. Materialist do not rule out Sense A subjective self-awareness based upon the findings of science (though they say or imply that incessantly). They rule out Sense A subjective self-awareness because ruling it out is absolutely required by their metaphysics.

But we have just demonstrated that Sense A subjective self-awareness is a fact. It is more than a fact. It is “the fact.” We have even demonstrated that any attempt to deny Sense A subjective self-awareness is absurd.

Yet materialist deny it anyway. Why? Richard Lewontin tells us why:

[W]e have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism. It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door.

For purposes of our discussion today, set aside that last phrase about the Divine Foot. Dualism does not necessarily entail a divinity, and in this post I want to focus on whether materialism is coherent, not on whether theism is a coherent replacement (I believe it is; but that is a topic for another day).

The key to the passage is, of course, the unwavering a priori commitment to materialism. For materialists it is always “materialism first; facts second.” This means that they must absolutely affirm incoherent and absurd statements like “Sense A subjective self-awareness is false.”

In other words, for a materialist, if the facts don’t fit with materialism, so much the worse for the facts.

If I were wearing metaphysical blinders that required me to deny undeniable facts and affirm incoherent and absurd statements, I hope I would reexamine my metaphysics. Otherwise, I am afraid I would be like this guy:

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Comments
Zachriel:
In any case, a computer algorithm doesn’t have to know how an actuator works.
The programmer has to know. The program traces back to the programmer.Joe
April 25, 2015
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My last response seems to have gone ignored. Which is fine because I wasn't satisfied with it anyway. Here's a better response on that note. Eigenstate, "If 1 and 2 were true premises*, the logic is valid. 2 sinks the argument as unsound, though." Since premise two is the hinge-point of your rejection of my syllogism, let's focus on that. You said: “No. Emergent properties of the brain like conscious don’t “interact with the brain”, they are the activity of the brain. That is, conscious is not something the brain “interacts with”. Consciousness is the brain function as a brain!” Here's the problem with that. You're equivocating "the brain" with "properties of the brain". That is akin to saying that the mineral magnetite "is" magnetism (obviously false). "As being that are capable of meta-representational thought, and thus introspection, we can be “aware of our awareness”. This is still the brain perform the activities of the brain, though. There’s no “something separate” to interact with." Firstly, absent consciousness, there is no "aware", no matter how much an object "responds" to it's environment, it will never be "aware" of it or anything for that matter. Secondly, the Law of Identity sort of creates a problem for you when you argue like this. Neurons have weight. The color of orange doesn't. Orange is one thing. An objective lump of neurons another. If you don't agree, then how much does orange weigh? That is an incoherent/absurd question, but when you don't deny that subjective self awareness is a lump of neurons, that question shouldn't be incoherent/absurd.Yarrgonaut
April 25, 2015
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Box: Under emergentism specifically, we are talking about qualia as irreducible emergent proprieties That doesn't mean qualia aren't a result of material processes. William J Murray: Under materialism, the self is nothing more than a set of illusory qualia entirely produced and directed by law and probability, existing as nothing more than a kind of happenstance-generated internal hologram that is along for the ride, so to speak, as the interacting matter (that is producing the local hologram of self) does whatever it does anyway. As we have already pointed out, the experience of self is not illusory, but sensory. In materialism, there is no reason why the "I" can't interact with the rest of mind and body. Box: I’m highlighting the fact that the alleged cooperation between consciousness—as we know it—with matter poses a “translational problem" Sure, but science is not completely ignorant of the process involved. In any case, a computer algorithm doesn't have to know how an actuator works. It just has to send the signal to the actuator, and receive a feedback signal. Similarly, the consciousness of the brain doesn't have to know how it is wired to the rest of the body.Zachriel
April 25, 2015
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Zach #83,
Zach: Under materialism, the self is the interaction of the entire neural system including its interface with the world.
Under emergentism specifically, we are talking about qualia as irreducible emergent proprieties—distinct from the "entire neural system".
Zach: Huh? No more than you have to be an electrician to send a signal to your arm to raise it. You don’t.
We know first hand what consciousness is. We can all testify that we have no idea how consciousness steers thoughts or the body. I'm highlighting the fact that the alleged cooperation between consciousness—as we know it—with matter poses a "translational problem": (1) they speak different languages. (2) how do we translate chemistry into thoughts, because what is sound chemically does not have to be sound logically.
Zach: The consciousness says “arm move”, and the signal is sent by a subsystem,(...).
You gloss over the problem that “arm move” must be translated in order to instruct neurons—and vice versa.Box
April 25, 2015
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Box: (1) W J Murray: Under materialism, the self is nothing more than a set of illusory qualia entirely produced and directed by law and probability, existing as nothing more than a kind of happenstance-generated internal hologram that is along for the ride, so to speak, as the interacting matter (that is producing the local hologram of self) does whatever it does anyway. No. Under materialism, the self is the interaction of the entire neural system including its interface with the world. W J Murray is trying to fit his preconceptions onto another metaphysics. Box: (2) Emergentism proposes that a mental phenomenon (consciousness) emerges as an irreducible property of the brain. But how can this consciousness overview, understand and command what is basically electrochemical interactions—must we also assume that consciousness is a brilliant chemist? Huh? No more than you have to be an electrician to send a signal to your arm to raise it. You don't. Box: Intuitively we picture consciousness dealing with thoughts and feelings—phenomena it can understand—, but under emergentism there is this isolated consciousness who has to deal with what it cannot understand: matter. Huh? No more than a computer controller has to understand the physical mechanism of the actuators it controls. It doesn't. Box: Or must we also assume that matter presents itself “translated” in thoughts and feelings towards the emergent consciousness? How does that work? The producer says more cowbell, and the signal is sent to the band to produce more cowbell. The producer doesn't have to know how the cowbell is produced. The conscious mind interfaces with the rest of the mind's subsystems. The consciousness says "arm move", and the signal is sent by a subsystem, and you get more cowbell. http://www.hulu.com/watch/536145Zachriel
April 24, 2015
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Zach: There is nothing inconsistent with emergentism and the notion of conscious control.
There are at least two inconsistencies: (1)
W J Murray: Under materialism, the self is nothing more than a set of illusory qualia entirely produced and directed by law and probability, existing as nothing more than a kind of happenstance-generated internal hologram that is along for the ride, so to speak, as the interacting matter (that is producing the local hologram of self) does whatever it does anyway.
(2) Emergentism proposes that a mental phenomenon (consciousness) emerges as an irreducible property of the brain. But how can this consciousness overview, understand and command what is basically electrochemical interactions—must we also assume that consciousness is a brilliant chemist? Intuitively we picture consciousness dealing with thoughts and feelings—phenomena it can understand—, but under emergentism there is this isolated consciousness who has to deal with what it cannot understand: matter. Or must we also assume that matter presents itself "translated" in thoughts and feelings towards the emergent consciousness? How does that work? And how does it work coherently—because what is sound chemically does not have to be sound logically.Box
April 24, 2015
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'fact that our empirical science must, imperatively, always be understood to refer to a subordinate order of reality.' I meant to be more explicit, adverting to mind, consciousness, as the primary order of reality. It won't bring science, indeed, progress in physics, today is only being made in quantum mechanics and fields in which it is involved, astrophysical conjectures, even its theories, are being revised too regularly for comfort. And there are too many scientismificists singing 'Wild Thang', as they twiddle and embellish Multiworlds and Many-worlds.Axel
April 24, 2015
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Box: Emergentism doesn’t offer consciousness such a dominant position. There is nothing inconsistent with emergentism and the notion of conscious control. Box: Soon at al (see #51) who have attempted to prove that “choices” bypass consciousness—they are made before consciousness is even aware of them. You can think of the mind as a bureaucracy of sorts. The CEO or Board of Directors may not be aware of everything that is occurring in the bureaucracy, and some decisions are made without the CEO even being aware of it, or only tangentially aware of it, or the result of a request made at some previous time, then made aware of the result after the fact. There's nothing incoherent with considering the acts of a bureaucracy or with a hierarchical structure or of a system of overview. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=djQ7WZlb140Zachriel
April 24, 2015
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The more general point I'm trying to make here is that thinking, understanding, choosing are all top-down processes. I'm trying to get that message across by using a term like "overview". Emergentism doesn't offer consciousness such a dominant position. In fact Eigenstate referenced to Soon at al (see #51) who have attempted to prove that "choices" bypass consciousness—they are made before consciousness is even aware of them. Now clearly this leads to "choosing", "thinking" and even "understanding" without overview. As I have argued before this must lead to total irrationality.Box
April 24, 2015
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Box: However no subsystem has overview over all subsystems. The consciousness has the role of overview, even though its overview is not absolute. In any case, your claim about lack of hierarchy was unjustified.Zachriel
April 24, 2015
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Zach, I bet there are many more subsystems. However no subsystem has overview over all subsystems. There is no subsystem in charge. There is no replacement for consciousness.
Zach: (...) some form the little voice associated with the conscious mind.
Without overview, understanding and control this little voice is just blabbering—adding to the chaos. As per usual, materialists simply assume coherency without giving it a second thought.Box
April 24, 2015
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Box: Nothing has overview on NN. So if the activity of NN is indeed thinking then this thinking is without anything having overview, without hierarchy, anyone in charge—utterly blind chaos. The brain is a hierarchical system with many subsystems. Some subsystems create images, some recall memories, and some form the little voice associated with the conscious mind.Zachriel
April 24, 2015
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Eigenstate, Under emergentism consciousness—the “I”—is a mere onlooker, without the capacity to think, choose, understand or intervene in any way; see posts #30 and #50. Understandably Eigenstate doesn’t like this logical consequence of his position:
Eigenstate: Naturalist versions of emergentism do not and cannot make that distinction. There’s no distinction to make. It’s all brain activity, one system, which must be connected to a functional body, that as a whole thinks. The mind is what the brain does, and the self is the brain and the rest of the body. This distinction you are making is the dualist folk psychology error.
Let’s say, for the sake of argument, that the “I”—the state of awareness—is produced by neural networks—from here NN—, and so NN and the “I” are one thing. The two are in fact one and the same thing. Does this idea solve Eigenstate’s problem, because now the emergent “I” can think, choose and so forth? The problem with this view is that one thing cannot think, understand or choose. Allow me to explain. There must be at least two things: a thinker and a thought. Moreover in order to have understanding the thinker needs overview of what is to be understood. IOW reason needs a distinction between the thinker and his thoughts. Moreover the thinker needs to hoover above the thoughts, so to speak. A hierarchal relationship, which places the thinker in a position from which he can select from subordinate thoughts. // BTW I expect Eigenstate to discard this analysis as “ dualist folk psychology error”, but I challenge him to offer an alternative explanation of reason. // Materialism in general fails to account for this hierarchal relationship demanded by reason. Nothing has overview on NN. So if the activity of NN is indeed thinking then this thinking is without anything having overview, without hierarchy, anyone in charge—utterly blind chaos. Even a bunch of thoughts cannot think, understand or choose and neither can a bunch of neurons—logic demands a separate thinker with overview and command. To sum up: what Eigenstate and emergentism need, in order to accommodate reason, is a separate thinker. His latest attempt increases his problems. One thing is for certain: according to Eigenstate the ‘separate thinker’ is not the “I”.Box
April 24, 2015
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BA77, thanks for the cite to Pearcey. It proves once again that no sane person actually acts as if materialism is true. That includes eigenstate, who seems to think that if he chants "dualist folk psychology error" enough, he will disappear like the Cheshire Cat. It really is a hoot. Someone ought to sell tickets.Barry Arrington
April 23, 2015
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Box: Do you distinguish between “I” and “self”? We did above, but the usage varies in philosophy. Perhaps you will provide a working definition of each term. Box: (1) The state of awareness; the direct experience of “I”. (2) Neural networks. Under naturalism, (1) is the activity of (2).Zachriel
April 23, 2015
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Eigenstate,
Eigenstate: Naturalist versions of emergentism do not and cannot make that distinction. There’s no distinction to make.
What I'm asking you to do—in order to follow my argument—is to make a distinction between: (1) The state of awareness; the direct experience of "I". (2) Neural networks. Can you honestly say that you cannot distinguish these two phenomena? Soon et al can. Everybody else can. I'm well aware that emergentism holds that (1) is a emergent property of (2), but that doesn't mean that emergentists cannot distinguish (1) and (2)
Eigenstate: This distinction you are making is the dualist folk psychology error.
DON"T BE RIDICULOUS!Box
April 23, 2015
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Is there anything unclear about this text? Is it not clear that a distinction can be made between “I” (awareness) and “brain activity”? Is it not clear what is doing the thinking and making the decisions? Is the passivity of the “I” not spelled out—never mind that Soon et al are debunked; see 51?
You are stuck in the Homunculus Fallacy. We can distinguish visual processing from, say, language processing, but they are both organic to thinking, elements of cognition. It's all brain activity, as it is with awareness or any self-introspective concepts the brain may focus on. There is no "little guy" that is separate from your brain doing the thinking, being the "true self". Your thought processes *are* the self. When you experience awareness, you are experiencing neuronal activity in your brain. Do you suppose Soon, et al are suggesting that the processes that "discover" their choice after the subconscious factors tip the selection one way or another are somehow "not of the brain"? Lol. They are measuring feedback from the brain that shows selection happening in subconscious processes before the subject becomes conscious of their choice. It's measuring the change in activity from one set of brain processes to another, but it's all brain activity -- read the article, they are doing BOLD measurements with fMRI for the whole thing. As for debunking, that's a laugh. Take a look at the citations -- over 900 citations to this article, and citations continue to be registered. If you're not familiar with this process, that is HUGE number of citations. If this paper had been debunked, it would have made big news, as it appears in a prestigious journal (Nature Neuroscience) as well having all the citations.
It is this distinction between “I” and brain activity that is foundational to my criticism of emergentism. You cannot defend emergentism by backpedaling and denying the existence of this distinction.
Naturalist versions of emergentism do not and cannot make that distinction. There's no distinction to make. It's all brain activity, one system, which must be connected to a functional body, that as a whole thinks. The mind is what the brain does, and the self is the brain and the rest of the body. This distinction you are making is the dualist folk psychology error. Materialists do not have any basis for separating any phenomenon called "I" from the natural function of the brain, and thus do not do so. Again, it maybe helpful to remember the Composition Fallacy, here. An atom does not walk, but a collection of atoms we call a "human" does walk. A neuron cannot see, but a collection of neurons we call a "human brain" can see. A neuron also can't contemplate its surroundings, but a collection of neurons we call a "human brain" can do that.eigenstate
April 23, 2015
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' The Facts Are Inconsistent With My Metaphysics? Wow! That is truly strange, I expected to have difficulty in airing a matter that haunts me whenever I turn to this site. I mean that there is a farcical dimension to IDers arguing against materialists, without repeatedly rubbing their noses in the incontrovertible fact that our empirical science must, imperatively, always be understood to refer to a subordinate order of reality. Without that thoroughly abject admission that their primordial hypothesis, materialism, the madness that you folk are having to contend with from Stanley 'Gibbons'finest' on a daily basis, is inevitable. As Keynes said concerning a book of Hayek he reviewed, the most perfect logic, after a false premise, can only lead to Bedlam. And materialists are not known for their logic, are they? Maybe randomosity has its merits, after all. Imagine reverse engineering on the basis of their cerebral outputs. Not a tentative finding, but a multiply mathematically proven, hence, 'a priori', fact. Not a factoid. Not a putatively scientific factoid. A fact. A scientific fact. Which will not be superseded, if they could be consistent and still make a living. Which they can't. Oops. Forgot maths is woo-woo....Axel
April 23, 2015
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Eigenstate,
Eigenstate: You asked what the illusion was for the “I”, then. Well, you’re struggling with it right here. There is no “I” that is not the brain and its function.
I'm struggling? You are the one who is backpedaling after being shown the irrational consequences of your position. Let's take look here:
Soon et al.: There has been a long controversy as to whether subjectively ‘free’ decisions are determined by brain activity ahead of time. We found that the outcome of a decision can be encoded in brain activity of prefrontal and parietal cortex up to 10 s before it enters awareness. This delay presumably reflects the operation of a network of high-level control areas that begin to prepare an upcoming decision long before it enters awareness.
Is there anything unclear about this text? Is it not clear that a distinction can be made between "I" (awareness) and "brain activity"? Is it not clear what is doing the thinking and making the decisions? Is the passivity of the "I" not spelled out—never mind that Soon et al are debunked; see 51? It is this distinction between "I" and brain activity that is foundational to my criticism of emergentism. You cannot defend emergentism by backpedaling and denying the existence of this distinction.Box
April 23, 2015
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Assuming that by “minds” you are referring to consciousness,
No, consciousness is a property of the mind (the mind is just the functional brain). Visual processing is not "mind", but a property of the mind, a function our brains have as a component.
you are firmly contradicting yourself. According to you, under emergentism, the “I” has no capabilities. As you have explained many times before, it is not the “I” that discovers and determines what is going on in the brains. It is the brains that do all that. The brains think, discovers and makes decisions. The “I” is just an emergent *something* along for the ride—a powerless, unthinking onlooker/bystander at best. Remember that you referenced to Libet and Soon et al (see #51)?
The brain refers to the physical structure in our skulls and all its interconnections to the rest of the body. The mind is just the functioning of the brain. Think computer/computing. "Computer" points at the physical structure and components of the machine, "computing" refers to what those components *do* when working as a system. You asked what the illusion was for the "I", then. Well, you're struggling with it right here. There is no "I" that is not the brain and its function.eigenstate
April 23, 2015
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Eigenstate: Analogously, it’s only because of the capabilities of our minds to discover and determine what is going on in our brains that we can say “[some folk concept of] consciousness is illusory”.
Assuming that by "minds" you are referring to consciousness, you are firmly contradicting yourself. According to you, under emergentism, the "I" has no capabilities. As you have explained many times before, it is not the "I" that discovers and determines what is going on in the brains. It is the brains that do all that. The brains think, discovers and makes decisions. The "I" is just an emergent *something* along for the ride—a powerless, unthinking onlooker/bystander at best. Remember that you referenced to Libet and Soon et al (see #51)?
Eigenstate: That we can determine that folk psychological intuitions are misconceived is a credential for the brain/mind.
After deceiving us for thousands of years? And still going strong? What's up with the "mind" thing?Box
April 23, 2015
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(1) Consciousness is a mere onlooker: According to emergentism, neural networks—from here on NN—trick us into believing that we are in control—as illustrated by the old “folk psychology”. In fact we are not the ones doing the choosing and the thinking, something other than us is in charge. We merely “discover” what has been thought and what has been chosen. Here consciousness is an utterly passive bystander of the “mental” activities of the brain, deplete of any power to intervene—like being forced to watch a movie. By means of presenting the theory of emergentism to us, NN reveal themselves, as the real master-controllers. Meanwhile NN also keep tricking us into believing that we are in control—an incoherent signal. It follows that NN cannot be trusted.
If the "passivity" of consciousness is illusory, it *doesn't* follow that we cannot trust our minds, but rather the opposite. If you see a stick coming out of the water at the edge of a pond and it looks "bent" at the water line, your mind is being "tricked" by the optical illusion of refraction of light in the water. The stick is not actually bent. Should we not trust our senses because of this? No, as it is our senses that enable us to determine that the "bent" stick is, in fact, an illusion. Analogously, it's only because of the capabilities of our minds to discover and determine what is going on in our brains that we can say "[some folk concept of] consciousness is illusory". In order for you to suggest we be wary of illusions like this, you must necessarily affirm the general ability of our minds to discover and understand, as that how an illusion is determined to be an illusion. Your observation has the opposite implication from what you've said. If not, you should not trust your lyin' eyes!
(2) Without understanding (or any rational capacity): If I’m a passive onlooker, do I, at least, understand anything? Do I understand the “movie” I’m watching? If I’m unthinking how can I possibly understand the “choices” and “thoughts” forced upon me by NN? Am I a rational being? The answer must be a resounding “NO”. NN tricks me into believing that I understand—that I ground—choices that are not actually mine. My thoughts, choices, beliefs and my understanding of them are—in fact—not mine.
As I said in a previous post, whether your choices are "pulled from the ether", or are synthesized from external (and internal, but deterministic) internal factors, your choices are yours, regardless. They are made in your brain, they govern your future thinking and actions. They belong to you, and can't be located anywhere else. As for the illusory nature of your folk psychological concepts, see above; such insights validate the capabilities of our minds, rather than undermine them. That we can determine that folk psychological intuitions are misconceived is a credential for the brain/mind.
(3) Rationality cannot be grounded on NN. It has already been shown that NN cannot be trusted (see (1) above). Moreover emergentism shares all the problems that eliminative materialism has. One of those problems has been pointed out by Reppert: . . . let us suppose that brain state A, which is token identical to the thought that all men are mortal, and brain state B, which is token identical to the thought that Socrates is a man, together cause the belief that Socrates is mortal. It isn’t enough for rational inference that these events be those beliefs, it is also necessary that the causal transaction be in virtue of the content of those thoughts . . . [But] if naturalism is true, then the propositional content is irrelevant to the causal transaction that produces the conclusion, and [so] we do not have a case of rational inference. In rational inference, as [C S] Lewis puts it, one thought causes another thought not by being, but by being seen to be, the ground for it. But causal transactions in the brain occur in virtue of the brain’s being in a particular type of state that is relevant to physical causal transactions. (4) Conclusion: emergentism does not provide a basis for rationality and is incoherent. Therfor emergentism must be rejected.
See my comments above. ETA: fixed blockquoteseigenstate
April 23, 2015
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B.Arrington: You are, after all, dealing with someone who denies the undeniable, the primordial datum, i.e., subjective dualistic self-awareness. Such as he are deeply irrational; almost literally insane.
Whenever I try to project myself into the 'inner world' of these ppl I get shocked. Whatever they are doing I'm sure there will be severe consequences. "Primordial datum", that's a very fitting term! This time I must remember it. - - - - Zach, Do you distinguish between "I" and "self"? If so, in which 'category' does a toe belong? Do you hold that your "I" is somehow diminished after losing a toenail? Or even an entire toe? Or even all of your toes?Box
April 23, 2015
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Barry Arrington: the primordial datum, i.e., subjective dualistic self-awareness. We haven't rejected subjective self-awareness, but it's clear that some people don't experience dualism. In any case, as that is the topic of the thread, we are not derailing the thread by discussing it.Zachriel
April 23, 2015
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Mr. Arrington, you especially may enjoy this excerpt from Pearcey's new book, that was just published on ENV, immensely: Darwin's Robots: When Evolutionary Materialists Admit that Their Own Worldview Fails - Nancy Pearcey - April 23, 2015 Excerpt: This is an amazing case of Orwellian doublethink. Minsky says people are "forced to maintain" the conviction of free will, even when their own worldview tells them that "it's false." When I teach these concepts in the classroom, an example my students find especially poignant is Flesh and Machines by Rodney Brooks, professor emeritus at MIT. Brooks writes that a human being is nothing but a machine -- a "big bag of skin full of biomolecules" interacting by the laws of physics and chemistry. In ordinary life, of course, it is difficult to actually see people that way. But, he says, "When I look at my children, I can, when I force myself, ... see that they are machines." Is that how he treats them, though? Of course not: "That is not how I treat them.... I interact with them on an entirely different level. They have my unconditional love, the furthest one might be able to get from rational analysis." Certainly if what counts as "rational" is a materialist worldview in which humans are machines, then loving your children is irrational. It has no basis within Brooks's worldview. It sticks out of his box. How does he reconcile such a heart-wrenching cognitive dissonance? He doesn't. Brooks ends by saying, "I maintain two sets of inconsistent beliefs." He has given up on any attempt to reconcile his theory with his experience. He has abandoned all hope for a unified, logically consistent worldview. (read a bit longer excerpt here) http://www.evolutionnews.org/2015/04/when_evolutiona095451.htmlbornagain77
April 23, 2015
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Box: A toenail is not a conscious agent. No, but some people see the "I" as just part of the self, a sensation of the brain. Box: *Can you please stop derailing this thread by constantly inserting irrelevancies?* It seems relevant, and you haven't shown otherwise. From the original post: Barry Arrington: But all the time materialists say the sense we have that we are subjectively self-aware is an illusion. Self-awareness is not an illusion; however, a belief in a disembodied "I" is not entailed in the experience of self-awareness.Zachriel
April 23, 2015
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Box,
*Can you please stop derailing this thread by constantly inserting irrelevancies?*
Good luck with that Box. You are, after all, dealing with someone who denies the undeniable, the primordial datum, i.e., subjective dualistic self-awareness. Such as he are deeply irrational; almost literally insane. Irrelevancies, like suggesting that one's consciousness is analogous to a toe (Seriously?; beware people; they walk among us) is all they have. They have no shame and therefore are impervious to efforts to shame them into doing better. God knows I've tried.Barry Arrington
April 23, 2015
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Zach: You’ve learned to associate your toe with your self.
True. However I have been over that with Eigenstate as well. The "self" is not the "I". IOW we can have an experience of a toenail as (belonging to our) "self", but have no experience of a toenail as an "I". A toenail is not a conscious agent. *Can you please stop derailing this thread by constantly inserting irrelevancies?*Box
April 23, 2015
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Box: We have a direct experience of “I”. We do not have a direct experience of ourselves as neural networks. Sure there's a direct experience of consciousness. You also have a direct experience of your stubbed toe, but you don't think it is separate from the rest of you. You've learned to associate your toe with your self.Zachriel
April 23, 2015
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Zach, we experience ourselves as conscious agents. We have a direct experience of "I". We do not have a direct experience of ourselves as neural networks. Unlike you, emergentists respect and attempt to accommodate our direct experience of consciousness.Box
April 23, 2015
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