Intelligent Design Mind

Have neuroscientists been on the wrong track about the brain for centuries?

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Well, how about this: Would another hundred and fifty articles offering brand new theories of consciousness, each newer than the last, cause you to consider that possibility? Or will you just say, a decade from now, “That’s how science progresses!”

From neuroscientist Henrik Jörntell at the Conversation:

Understanding the human brain is arguably the greatest challenge of modern science. The leading approach for most of the past 200 years has been to link its functions to different brain regions or even individual neurons (brain cells). But recent research increasingly suggests that we may be taking completely the wrong path if we are to ever understand the human mind.

But what if we instead considered the possibility that all brain functions are distributed across the brain and that all parts of the brain contribute to all functions? If that is the case, correlations found so far may be a perfect trap of the intellect. We then have to solve the problem of how the region or the neuron type with the specific function interacts with other parts of the brain to generate meaningful, integrated behaviour. So far, there is no general solution to this problem – just hypotheses in specific cases, such as for recognising people.

Some researchers now believe the brain and its diseases in general can only be understood as an interplay between tremendous numbers of neurons distributed across the central nervous system. The function of any one neuron is dependent on the functions of all the thousands of neurons it is connected to. These, in turn, are dependent on those of others. The same region or the same neuron may be used across a huge number of contexts, but have different specific functions depending on the context. More.

Consciousness would require at least that and much more, but the search for modules will continue unabated. People like to read about it.

See also: Physicist: Regrettably, materialism can’t explain mind

Split brain does NOT lead to split consciousness? What? After all the naturalist pop psych lectures we paid good money for at the U? Well, suckers r’ us.

Does the ability to “split” our brains help us understand consciousness? (Apparently not.)

What great physicists have said about immateriality and consciousness

Or else: Consciousness as a state of matter

Rocks have minds?

Researcher: Never mind the “hard problem of consciousness”: The real one is… “Our experiences of being and having a body are ‘controlled hallucinations’ of a very distinctive kind”

Searle on Consciousness “Emerging” from a Computer: “Miracles are always possible.”

Psychology Today: Latest new theory of consciousness A different one from the above.

Evolution bred a sense of reality out of us

Claim: Science is afraid of animal consciousness. Why? Won’t crackpot theories work as well as they do for human consciousness?

So then: Question: Would we give up naturalism to solve the hard problem of consciousness?

Neuroscience tried wholly embracing naturalism, but then the brain got away

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4 Replies to “Have neuroscientists been on the wrong track about the brain for centuries?

  1. 1
    J-Mac says:

    Have neuroscientist been on the wrong track about the brain for centuries?

    What track are you talking about? Do you know that out of all scienceses, neurology or more specifically the study of the human brain has the list progress out of all the fields of medicine? I seem to recall the speaker at the last conference I’ve attended that neurology, but specifically the human brain field and psychiatry, are at loss…while still making baby steps…comparing to some other sciences…

    Elizabeth Liddle should know something about that…

  2. 2
    Dionisio says:

    J-Mac

    What does “list progress” mean?
    Just curious. Thanks.

  3. 3
    kairosfocus says:

    typo for least, I think

  4. 4
    J-Mac says:

    typo “list progress” = the least of progress

    Sorry

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