Here’s an Example of Evolution’s Unavoidable Anti Realism

_{Cornelius Hunter

September 21, 2012

Intelligent Design}

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Though evolutionists think of themselves as realists—ruthlessly objective investigators interested only in truth—their naturalistic constraint ultimately leaves them with only anti realism. This is because any a priorirestriction of the answer might exclude the true answer. If I decide my math homework must contain only odd numbered answers, then I’ll be wrong on those problems whose correct answer is an even number. I can round up, approximate, truncate, contort or whatever to obtain an odd number, but I will be wrong. For such problems, the only way to be right is to remove the a priori restriction. But evolutionists cannot do this. Foundational to their thinking is that the world must have arisen by itself, strictly via natural laws and processes. What most evolutionists do not grasp is that their extreme rationalism leads at best to anti realism, and at worst to skepticism. Read more

Comments

@Joe#38 Your trivial objections are irrelevant as the substance of my comment still stands. You might as well have objected that that we cannot explain how to make tea unless we know exactly what each water molecule will do. The "untraceable" aspects of evolution you are referring to are not problems we are actually trying to solve, so they does not prevent us from making progress. Nor does not currently having all of the answers to the problems we do want to solve necessarily make the theory itself vague.
Joe: And Darwinism/ neo-darwinism can’t explain those switches.
Even if it couldn't, so what? Again...
So, some kinds of phenomena can be explained in terms of themselves alone – without direct reference to anything at the atomic level. In other words, they are quasi-autonomous (nearly self-contained). Resolution into explicably at a higher level is emergence.
Do you have any criticism of this?
CR: IOW, Darwinism is well defined in context of the problem we’re actually trying to solve. Joe: Alrighty then- tell us how to test the claim that any bacterial flagellum evolved via darwinian processes? Then tell us if that has ever been done before.
Your questions suggests you haven't grasped anything I've said since my arrival here or that you've willfully chosen to remain ignore to it. What we do is start out with a problem, conjecture theories as solutions for those problems, then look for evidence that is inconstant with those theories. yet, you seem to be asking me for is a test that *proves* any bacterial flagellum evolved via darwinian processes. Is this assessment correct? Why don't you start out with what problem proving "bacterial flagellum evolved via darwinian processes", if such a thing were possible, actually solves. IOW, this seems to be yet another example of you claiming we cannot make progress because you think there is some insurmountable obstacle regarding some problem we're not actually trying to solve, nor do we actually need to solve to make progress. While I realize you might find this hard to believe, science doesn't actually come grinding to a halt because you cannot comprehend how or refuse to accept that we actually *can* make progress. Denying that we can *and have* made progress is anti-realism.critical rationalist_{September 23, 2012
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I apologize for the barrage of comments, but I wanted to address KF's remarks in case they are accepted uncritically.
KF:For those who do not know, in recent days, after several corrections, CR indulged himself in yet another invidious association of ID and Creationism, against the backdrop of the creationism in a cheap tuxedo would be theocrats slander. I called him on it, giving evidence. CR refused to withdraw the remarks. Since in context this is tantamount to calling me a liar in my own living room in the teeth of clear evidence to the contrary, I invited him to withdraw such, or leave. He has refused to withdraw the slander. Now, he seems to be pretending that I have acted without cause.
First, note that KF took my comment out of context, rather than linking to it or actually expanding on the supposed infraction in good faith. As such, I'll do it for him.
CR: Resources are not scarce. What’s scarce is the knowledge of how to utilize them. Again, unless it’s prohibited by the laws of physics, the only think that would prevent us from using energy from the sun, the massive amounts of hydrogen in intergalactic space, or even an entire uninhabitable solar system is knowing how. For example, have you ever heard of a Dyson sphere? Not to mention, we cannot predict the impact new knowledge we will create will have in the future. For example, people in 1920 didn’t consider nuclear power or the internet unlikely. They didn’t conceive of them at all. As such, it’s unclear how they could factor them into how they will effect the future. This is why I keep pointing out the genuine creation of knowledge is the key point of conflict between creationism (and it’s variants, such as ID) and Darwinism.
In no way did I present an argument that ID was merely creationism in disguise. Rather, I group creationism with ID and inductivism due to their account, or lack there of, about how knowledge is created. knowledge is actually created rather than being already present in experience or mechanically derived from it. Any theory of an organism’s improvement raises the following question: how is the knowledge of how to make that improvement created? [...] Specifically, the fundamental flaw in creationism (and its variants) is the same fundamental flaw in pre-enlightenment, authoritative conceptions of human knowledge: its account of how the knowledge in adaptations could be created is either missing, supernatural or illogical. So, does ID belong in this group along with Creationism (and inductivism)? Again, any theory of an organism’s improvement raises the following question: how is the knowledge of how to make that improvement created? What are the responses? First Let's look at Creationism. Was the knowledge of how to make that improvement already present in some form at the beginning? Was it supernatural? Yes or No? Second, let's look at Intelligent Design. Biological adaptations are transformations of matter ranging from the constructions of proteins to features such as eyes. These transformations occur when the requisite knowledge of how to perform them are present. Does ID include an any sort of account for how the knowledge its abstract designer with no defined limitations supposedly used to perform these transformations, such as it was already present in some form at the beginning or created using some specific process? Yes or No? Finally, let's look at Inductivism: Substituting “true” for “probable” doesn’t solve the problem of induction. Specifically, if past observations do not imply anything about future observations, they no more imply probability than truth. Do past observations do not imply anything about future observations? Yes or No? To quote Popper,
Some scientists find, or so it seems, that they get their best ideas when smoking; others by drinking coffee or whisky. Thus there is no reason why I should not admit that some may get their ideas by observing, or by repeating observations.
If what you call "induction" refers to the metaphysical assumption of regularity of nature - which we may approximate if enough inductions of the system are collected - then you have retreated to the mere assertion that regularities exist, calling this assumption "induction". However, If this regularity should be found to be false, then this was either a mistaken induction or not induction at all. And if it is not induction, then it's unclear how this is anything more than merely a play on words which is materially indistinguishable from Popper's conjecture. IOW, in your retreat, you've clandestinely exchanged words in order to save "induction" - which is whatever conception of knowledge you are attempting to justify at the moment.
critical rationalist_{September 23, 2012
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For example no one knows how many mutations to get an upright biped from a knuckle walker/ quadraped.
No one is actually interested is solving this exact problem unless they are interested in replicating it exactly.
Strawman. No one is asking to replicate it exactly. No one knows if it could be replicated. And that means saying humans and chimps share a common ancestor is not science and doesn't help us in any way.
Nor does this prevent us from making the progress that we really are interested in, explaining the concrete biological adaptations we observe in the biosphere.
It all depends on what you call "progress" and "explaining". No one even knows what genes need to be mutated.
Again, while we are interested in which genes are responsible for body plans, features, etc. knowing exactly which switches were flipped at which time would only be useful for attempting to replicate it exactly. Nor would it prevent us from making progress.
Again this vague notion of switches being turned on/ off at different times, while amusing, just goes to prove my point. And Darwinism/ neo-darwinism can't explain those switches. And no one even knows if any amount of mutational accumulation can do it.
Surely, you can do better than this?
Shirley, I don't need to. As Hitchens said "That which can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence".
IOW, Darwinism is well defined in context of the problem we’re actually trying to solve.
Alrighty then- tell us how to test the claim that any bacterial flagellum evolved via darwinian processes? Then tell us if that has ever been done.Joe_{September 23, 2012
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CR: Furthermore, KF is moderating my comments despite the fact that I have not insulted anyone and he claims he has no control of moderation on UD here. Mung: You do understand, don’t you, that KF has control over certain threads and no control over others?
And those threads are *not* on UD? And Joe does not post on those threads?critical rationalist_{September 23, 2012
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Joe: CR, yes evolutionary biology is very vague. For example no one knows how many mutations to get an upright biped from a knuckle walker/ quadraped. No one even knows what genes need to be mutated. And no one even knows if any amount of mutational accumulation can do it. So yes that means it is very vague.
From an earlier response to you here.
For example, in terms of fundamental physics, we encounter events of extreme complexity on a daily basis. If you place a pot of water on a stove, every [current day supercomputer working for billions of years] could not solve the equations to predict exactly what all those water molecules will do. Even if they could, we’d need to determine their initial state, the state of all external influences, etc., which is also an intractable task. However, if what we really care about is making tea, enough of this complexly resolves itself into hight-level simplify that allows us to do just that. We can predict how long water will take to boil with reasonable accuracy by knowing it’s overall mass, the power of the heating element, etc. If we want more accuracy, we may need additional information. However this too exists in the form of relatively high-level phenomena which is also intractable. So, some kinds of phenomena can be explained in terms of themselves alone – without direct reference to anything at the atomic level. In other words, they are quasi-autonomous (nearly self-contained). Resolution into explicably at a higher level is emergence.
Continuing the analogy, if we were trying to solve the problem of exactly what each water molecule would do, then, yes, we would indeed find ourselves unable to currently to make progress. However, luckily for us in my analogy, the problem we actually want to solve is how to make tea. And we can solve it. Now, let's look at your objections in the case of Darwinism...
Joe: For example no one knows how many mutations to get an upright biped from a knuckle walker/ quadraped.
No one is actually interested is solving this exact problem unless they are interested in replicating it exactly. Nor does this prevent us from making the progress that we really are interested in, explaining the concrete biological adaptations we observe in the biosphere.
Joe: No one even knows what genes need to be mutated.
Again, while we are interested in which genes are responsible for body plans, features, etc. knowing exactly which switches were flipped at which time would only be useful for attempting to replicate it exactly. Nor would it prevent us from making progress.
Joe: And no one even knows if any amount of mutational accumulation can do it.
Surely, you can do better than this? Thats like saying the concept of a prime number is vague since there is no known useful formula that yields all of the prime numbers and no composites. IOW, Darwinism is well defined in context of the problem we're actually trying to solve.critical rationalist_{September 23, 2012
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Also, while not directed at KF specifically, but from a comment in the same thread.

UB: 2. Under your view, anything that science observes as a ‘regularity’ is an argument from ignorance. Our universal common experince of phenomena becomes meaningless. As an example; the idea that the Earth orbits the Sun is therefore a faulty explanation. Just because it’s the only explanation that can integrate all observations, it is nontheless based upon observations, and as such, we may observe something else tomorrow which may contradict it.
No, it’s not. When you say “regularity” you seem to be suggesting the following…
A is q, b is q, c is q, […] |= every x is q
Therefore you think we can can, in a sense, “get a theory ” by induction or that a theory can be a conclusion. However, the evidence always looks like….
a is o, or p, or q ,or r … b is o, or p, or q, or r … C is o, or p, or q, or r … etc.
For induction to be a knowledge creating method we can actually use in practice, it has to offer a way to pick between o, p, q, r, etc. It needs to provide guidance for that step of the process. This is the part that is missing. A regularity in nature isn’t “obvious”, just a Newton’s connection between falling apples and orbiting planets were not obvious. His theory may appear obvious to us in hind [sight], but the background knowledge (uncontroversial and widely accepted knowledge itself based on explanations) that served as his starting point had existed for quite some time beforehand. His theory was tested by observations, not derived from it. Again, When we take a critical approach, we look at what evidence is inconsistent with our theories, not consistent. Being consistent with a theory does not get us anywhere because there are an infinite number of un-conceived theories that would also be consistent with the evidence.
So, no, I'm not attacking a straman.critical rationalist_{September 23, 2012
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Here's an excerpt from a comment on another thread, where I start out with the naive problem of induction.
Nor have you directly responded to the idea that we derive theories from observations. Should I take this as acceptance or rejection? Your arguments seem to imply this is the case, but you can easily clear this up with an explicit response. For example, here’s an expanded version of Bertrand Russell’s story of the farmer and the chicken, which illustrates the above issue. A flock of anthropomorphic chickens has observed a farmer who fed them every day like clockwork since they were chicks. They extrapolate these observations to conclude the farmer will continue to feed them. One day the farmer starts feeding them even more corn that usual. This observation further reinforces their conclusion they will continue to be fed. However, not long after, the farmer puts them in cages and sends them off to slaughter. In other words, mere observations alone are inadequate to justify conclusions. This is the problem of induction.
.. but then I move beyond naive induction with additional criticism relevant to one of KF claims…
However, if we’re not careful we’ll miss (or knowingly accept) a more fundamental misconception [of induction] illustrated in this story. Specifically, that it’s even possible extrapolate observations without first placing them in a explanatory framework. Before these chickens could have induced a false prediction, they must first had in mind a false explanatory framework of the farmers behavior, such as thinking he had benevolent feelings towards chickens. However, had the chickens guessed a different explanation, such as the farmer was fattening them up for slaughter, they would have extrapolated observations of his actions differently. In other words, how we form predictions depends on our underlying explanation. According to the benevolent-farmer theory, observations of being fed even more corn suggested the chickens were more likely to continue being fed, while the fattening-up theory suggested this same observation was an omen of imminent slaughter. So, again, unless you can explain we can extrapolate observations without first putting them into an explanatory framework, then theories are not derived from observations. Again, AFAIK, this has yet to be addressed beyond "it's commonly accepted that we induce theories from observations" or "if you do not accept induction then you reject any kind of uniformity", etc., which are misrepresentations of critical rationalism.
critical rationalist_{September 23, 2012
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What is sad ius that CR starts from a strawman naive inductivist and despite correction again and again has refused to face the real discussion on inductive reasoning. When it comes to his caricatures of my argument and character, he seems to be willfully incorrigible.
Then I'd politely suggest that you are confused about, mistaken on or are having difficulty comprehending the finer points of the criticism I've presented. For example, from here.
KF: Start from the problem that ever since Newton in Opticks, Query 31, 1704, your “inductivist” is a made up strawman, not the real opponent.
Substituting “true” for “probable” doesn’t solve the problem of induction. Specifically, if past observations do not imply anything about future observations, they no more imply probability than truth. When we take a critical approach, we look at what evidence is inconsistent with our theories, not consistent. Being consistent with a theory does not get us anywhere because there are an infinite number of un-conceived theories that would also be consistent with the evidence. So, how do you “induce” one theory? Arbitrarily? According to your biases or intuition? What specific step does induction instruct us to employ? This is the missing step which induction has yet to address, which is missing in your Opticks quote as well.
Now, perhaps KF did provide reference of inductive guidance for this step. However, if if this is the case, he has not made an effort to point out exactly where this guidance is in the links he provided. Also, a comment from another thread….
KF, Thanks for your reply. I agree this is a productive discussion, which has been helpful for me to understand your position as well. In that spirit, I’ll attempt to further clarify the difference between these two forms of epistemology. Critical Rationalism - We notice a problem. - We propose solutions to the problem - Since proposed solutions are essentally guesses about what is out there in reality, we… - Criticize the theory for internal consistency. Solutions that are internally inconsistent are discarded. - Criticize the theory by taking it seriously, in that we assume it’s true in reality and that all (empirical) observations should conform to them, *for the purpose of rational criticism*. “All observations” reflects all of our current, best solutions to other problems, which are themselves conjecture that have survived criticism. - This process continues until only one proposed solution is left, rather than positively supporting one particular theory. - The process starts all over again we notice another problem, such as new observations that conflict with our remaining proposed solution. Observations are themselves based on theories. So, when a new observation conflicts with a deep, hard to vary explanation, one form of criticism is to criticize the theory behind the new observations by conjecturing a theory why those observations might be wrong, then criticizing that theory as well. An example of this is OPERA’s observations of faster than light neutrinos, which conflicted with Einstein’s special relativity (SR). These results didn’t tell us anything, one way or the other, as we had yet to devise a good explanation for the observations, such as we have for microscopes. In the absence of a good explanation, we had no way to criticize these observations. (For example, in the case of microscopes, the samples could have been prepared incorrectly or mislabeled. This is part of the hard to vary explanation as to why microscopes tell us something about reality.) So, observations are neutral (in the sense you’re referring to) without good explanations. As such, they could not falsify SR. Eventually OPERA did come up with an explanation for the observations: an improperly attached fiber optic cable and a clock oscillator ticking to fast. SR lives on to be criticized another day. If one assumes microscopes return accurate results merely because “some abstract designer with no defined limitations wants them to”, we have no way of criticizing the resulting observations, as the explanation for the results could be easily varied. For example, you might put the wrong sample under the lens or replace the lens with a penny, but an abstract designer with no limitations could still display the right sample because “thats what the designer wanted”. Nor is it clear how appending,”because some abstract designer with no defined limitations wanted them to play those roles” to our current, long chain of independently formed, hard to vary explanations as to why microscopes return accurate results, adds to the explanation or is even desirable in regards to actually solving the problem. For example, would you start discarding observations from microscopes if this addition was absent, but the long chain of independently formed, hard to vary explanations remained? Would this stop us from making progress. Inductivism - We start out with observations - We then use those observations to devise a theory - We then test those observations with additional observations to confirm the theory or make it more probable However, theories do not follow from evidence. At all. Scientific theories explain the seen using the seen. And the unseen doesn’t “resemble” the seen any more than falling apples and orbiting planets resemble the curvature of space-time. Are dinosaurs merely an interpretation of our best explanation of fossils? Or are they *the* explanation for fossils? After all, there are an infinite number of rival interpretations that accept the same empirical observations, yet suggest that dinosaurs never existed millions of years ago. For example, there is the rival interpretation that fossils only come into existence when they are consciously observed. Therefore, fossils are no older than human beings. As such, they are not evidence of dinosaurs, but evidence of acts of those particular observations. Another interpretation would be that dinosaurs are such weird animals that conventional logic simply doesn’t apply to them. One could suggests It’s meaningless to ask if dinosaurs were real or just a useful fiction to explain fossils – which is an example of instrumentalism. Not to mention the rival interpretation that an abstract designer with no limitations chose to create the world we observe 30 days ago. Therefore, dinosaurs couldn’t be the explanation for fossils because they didn’t exist at the time. Yet, we do not say that dinosaurs are merely an interpretation of our best explanation of fossils, they *are* the explanation for fossils. And this explanation is primarily about dinosaurs, not fossils. So, it’s in this sense that science isn’t primarily about “things you can see”. (I’d also note that the above “rival interpretations” represent general-purpose ways of denying anything, but I’ll save that for another comment.) We seem to agree observations cannot be used to [confirm] theories. However, you do seem think that observations can make a theory more probable. But this assumption is highly parochial, as it doesn’t take into account the different kinds of unknowability. The first kind of unknowability are scenarios where the outcome is completely random and all possible outcomes are known. An example of this is Russian Roulette. As long as you know all of the possible outcomes, we can use probability to make choices about it. For example, if for some horrible reason, one had to choose between different versions of Russian Roulette with specific yet variable number of chambers, bullets and trigger pulls, one could use game theory to determine which variation would be most favorable. On the other hand, any piece of evidence is compatible with many theories (see above) This includes an infinite number of theories that have yet to be proposed. You cannot assign probabilities to un-conceived theories, because those probabilities would be based on the details of a yet to be conceived theory. In addition, scenarios that depend on the creation of knowledge represent a different kind of unknowability, despite being deterministic. For example, people in 1900 didn’t consider nuclear power or the internet unlikely. They didn’t conceive of them at all. As such, it’s unclear how they could have factored their impact into some sort of probability calculation about the future. As such, in the face of this kind of unknowability, probability is invalid as a means of criticizing explanations, despite what our intuition might tell us. Furthermore, inductivism doesn’t tell us what we should observe or why those observations are relevant because all we have are observations at the outset. Until we devise a test, we do not know what observations to make. And without at least one theory, we have no way to devise a test that might result in observations that conflict with that particular theory. If initial observations did tell us what test would actually conflict with a theory, there would be no need to devise a test in the first place. For example, the evidence that collaborated Newton’s laws of motion has been falling on the earth’s surface for billions of years, which is far longer than the entirety of human inhabitance. Yet, we only got around to testing them about 300 years ago after Newton conjectured his theory. As such, it’s not evidence that is scarce, but good explanations for that evidence. And we can say the same about all other phenomena. So, we should look for explanations, not justification. Good explanations solve problems and allow us to make progress. When criticizing theories, we look for observations that can be better explained by one theory, rather than another. And we take into account all of our other current, best explanations for the purpose of criticism. Arguments that do not take them into account are parochial – which is narrow in scope. Most relevant in our discussion here, the objection that “idea X is not justified” is a bad criticism because it applies to all ideas.
AFAIK, none of these criticisms were sufficiently addressed where applicable, specifically the fact that we start out with problems, rather than observations, we do not derive theories from observations.critical rationalist_{September 23, 2012
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...no one knows how many mutations to get an upright biped from a knuckle walker/ quadraped. No one even knows what genes need to be mutated. And no one even knows if any amount of mutational accumulation can do it.
But we know it happened. And we know the process by which it happened was unguided and completely natural.Mung_{September 23, 2012
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CR, yes evolutionary biology is very vague. For example no one knows how many mutations to get an upright biped from a knuckle walker/ quadraped. No one even knows what genes need to be mutated. And no one even knows if any amount of mutational accumulation can do it. So yes that means it is very vague.Joe_{September 23, 2012
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Mung (& CR): Running on insomnia power at the moment, lights out in a minute. Joe has been warned and is making a best effort, which should be commended; he slips off the wagon from time to time but is visibly trying, and has made valuable contributions. "Are you daft" is in my opinion unfortunately not over the top at this point, where CR has evidently locked his mind against all evidence and reason. CR, wake up, man -- think about the discovery of the atom and its inner structure including the electron as has been brought to your attention. Who is it, again, that disputes patent facts? As to the nature of inductive argument, I (and others) have repeatedly pointed out the contemporary conclusion that it is a broad category, arguments where evidence supports but does not strictly prove conclusions. Thus, it INCLUDES inference to best explanation. similarly, inductive arguments have say established the reality of the atom and the electron beyond reasonable doubt -- a probability metric. And Popper's remarks on corroboration and how corroborated theories are to be preferred boils down to IBE by another name. Whether or no CR wants to accept that. What is sad ius that CR starts from a strawman naive inductivist and despite correction again and again has refused to face the real discussion on inductive reasoning. When it comes to his caricatures of my argument and character, he seems to be willfully incorrigible. I note, I was shutting off and happened to see the complaining in this thread, which I do not own. For those who do not know, in recent days, after several corrections, CR indulged himself in yet another invidious association of ID and Creationism, against the backdrop of the creationism in a cheap tuxedo would be theocrats slander. I called him on it, giving evidence. CR refused to withdraw the remarks. Since in context this is tantamount to calling me a liar in my own living room in the teeth of clear evidence to the contrary, I invited him to withdraw such, or leave. He has refused to withdraw the slander. Now, he seems to be pretending that I have acted without cause. Let CR think: would he sit in my physical living room and insistently directly imply that I am a liar, refusing to withdraw such in the teeth of evidence to the contrary? If so, a reasonable person would agree that I would be well within my rights to invite him to leave. And, that such actions would not constitute censorship. Since another commenter is likely to show up in 3, 2, 1 . . . to try to suggest much the same, let us just say for record that his own behaviour here is worse, derail attempts and accusations, backed up by the demand to barge into my living room and carry on with another as though he did not need to resolve his misbehaviour. Both CR and O know how they can return to threads I own, resolve their misbehaviour and cease from such conduct in future. Let this speak for record. KFkairosfocus_{September 23, 2012
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CR, You do understand, don't you, that KF has control over certain threads and no control over others?Mung_{September 22, 2012
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Joe: If humans had 48 chromosomes (ie the absence of a fusion) that would be evidence against human/ chimp common ancestry? Are you daft?
I'd also point out that demands for "civil discussion" are being being inconstantly applied, as indicated by the above insult by Joe: Furthermore, KF is moderating my comments despite the fact that I have not insulted anyone and he claims he has no control of moderation on UD here. KF: I did so to explain my disciplinary action in respect of CR. First, is "disciplinary action" not moderation? Second, the articles referenced did not refute the criticism I presented. Nor did they provide the missing step required for induction to provide guidance as to which theory to select. See this comment for details. To quote from one of KF's references….
[Newton] then notices the pale crescent of the New Moon in the sky, and a eureka moment happens: he “sees” that the same force that made the apple fall holds the moon in orbit around the earth.
Yet this is precisely the where inductivism fails as it provides no guidance for which theory to select. Given that this is not my blog, its moderators are free to moderate me for disagreeing with their conception of human knowledge. But let's call a spade a spade, rather than hide behind claims of being disrespectful or willfully ignoring corrections. Furthermore, as critical rationalist, I've conjectured the theory that objections to Darwinism presented here are based on holding the assumption that human knowledge is can only be justified by authoritative sources. And not just any objections to darwinism, but the specific objections that we see here and elsewhere? For example, If someone thought the knowledge of how to build the biosphere could only come from some ultimate authoritative source, would it come as a surprise they would conclude the biosphere cannot be explained without a designer? And if Darwinism were true would, would they not then conclude there could be no knowledge? Everything would simply be meaningless and random and astronomically unlikely, which is a commonly argued strawman of evolutionary theory. Finally, since everything is not random and meaningless, would they not conclude Darwinism must be false? Of course, as a critical rationalist, I realize observations cannot make prove a theory is true or even make it more probable. As such I'm putting my money where my mouth is and actually looking for evidence that is inconsistent with my own theory. What better inconsistent evidence could there be than UB, KF, et al. answering my direct question and explicitly denying they hold this conception?critical rationalist_{September 22, 2012
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And Cornelius claims we're anti-realists?
Joe: These models, which do NOT reflect reality, better help us understand reality? CR: All theories are contain errors to some degree and are incomplete. They help us better understand reality because they provide opportunities to find those errors, and thereby make progress, and leave us with better problems to solve. Joe: Evolutionism is too vague to even be considered a theory.
Next, will you tell us that entire evolutionary biology is to vague for there to be an entire field of study and books dedicated to them? Also, note how Joe selectively quoted my comment - ignoring the salient point and failing to actually address it.
CR: We do not look for evidence that is consistent with our theories, because no observations can *positively* support any theory. Rather we look for but evidence that would inconsistent with our theory. Joe: That is all evolutionists do.
"You need to do a better job than just saying so."
CR: The absence of the fusion in Human chromosome 2 would have been just such inconsistent evidence. Joe: If humans had 48 chromosomes (ie the absence of a fusion) that would be evidence against human/ chimp common ancestry? Are you daft?
Humans have 46 chromosomes. All other primates have 48 chromosome. Since we cannot use evidence to prove a theory is true or even then it's more probable to be true, the question becomes, "how can we use the above differences in the number of primate chromosomes to make progress?" We *can* do this by looking for evidence that is inconsistent with Darwinism, because using deduction *is* valid way of making progress. This is because a single statement that an event happened can contradict a universal theory. However, no finite collection of statements can entail such a theory. Using the generally accepted and uncontroversial background knowledge that the loss of an entire chromosome would be fatal, we could loot at the DNA of our closest primate relative and human beings to look for inconsistent evidence, which is precisely what we did. This is basic logic. Inconsistent evidence would be the lack of a chromosomal fusion that contained the contents of the missing primate genetic material. But no such inconsistent evidence was found. Human chromosome two represents a fusion of this genetic material in non-human primates. So this *is* an example of looking for evidence that is inconsistent with evolution, which refutes Joe's claim.critical rationalist_{September 22, 2012
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Nothing is inconsistent with evolutionism.
Truth is inconsistent with evolutionism.Mung_{September 22, 2012
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These models, which do NOT reflect reality, better help us understand reality?
All theories are contain errors to some degree and are incomplete.
Evolutionism is too vague to even be considered a theory. chromosome 2 is not a prediction of evolution and genetics says humans give rise to humans.
We do not look for evidence that is consistent with our theories
That is all evolutionists do.
Rather we look for but evidence that would inconsistent with our theory.
Nothing is inconsistent with evolutionism.
The absence of the fusion in Human chromosome 2 would have been just such inconsistent evidence.
If humans had 48 chromosomes (ie the absence of a fusion) that would be evidence against human/ chimp common ancestry? Are you daft?Joe_{September 22, 2012
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CR: Ironically, Cornelius has failed to grasp the impactions of assuming there is some inexplicable realm where inexplicable beings reach in to bubble of explicably in a way that can actually effect us. Mung: Maybe he just thinks the cosmos didn’t create itself.
Where did I suggest otherwise? My point is if, for the sake of criticism, we assume what Cornelius "thinks" is actually true it would have implications which apparently he hasn't considered. "the cosmos" would be the bubble of explicably that was supposed created. And it would have been created by some inexplicable means by some inexplicable being in some inexplicable realm. Furthermore, this inexplicable being is having an effect on inside of this bubble though the act of creation and supposedly does so repeatedly undetermined times using this same inexplicable means. So, we either live in a universe that is explicable, in principle, or our universe would only appear explicable if we carefully refrain from asking specific questions. Furthermore, theories are tested by observations, not derived from them. This means we use observations to look for errors in the theory's underlying explanation, rather than to assuming it's impossible because we have or have not experienced it before in a particular range of experiments. Scientific predictions are not prophecy. This is why do not look for evidence that positively supports a particular theory. Rather we look for evidence that shows errors in the underlying explanation a theory provides. And we know this is the case because we do this every day in science. For example, it's unlikely that anyone has performed research to determine if eating a square meter of grass each day for a week would cure the common cold. Why is this? Is it because it's logically impossible? No. Is it because it's unfalsifiable? No, this would be trivial to test. Is it because is "non-natural" or "non-material"? No. Why then is it unlikely to be the subject of research? Because we lack an explanation as to how and why eating a square meter of grass each day for a week would cure the common cold. As such, we discard it, a priori, before we even test it. If we use induction, then where is are the observations we used to discard this mere possibility? Without an explanation it's a theory-less, mere logical possibility, which we cannot test for errors using observations. As such we discard it. And we do this for a near infinite number of mere possibilities every day across every field of science. It's unclear why your designer is any different.critical rationalist_{September 22, 2012
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@Mung#20 Explanatory knowledge contains just that: explanations. This is in contrast to non-knowledge that we accidentally acquire and does not take the form of an explanation.
...there are two types of knowledge: explanatory and non-explanatory. While people can create both kinds of knowledge, only people can create explanatory knowledge in the form of explanatory theories. This is because, as universal explainers, only people can create explanations. People create explanatory knowledge when they intentionally conjecture an explanation for a specific problem, then test that explanation for errors. If the theory is found to be internally consistent, it can [then] be tested via empirical observations. So, I’d agree that only people can create explanatory knowledge. However, conjectures made in the absence of a specific problem result in non-explanatory knowledge. Specifically, it’s random in respect to any particular problem to solve. While my example is an imperfect analogy in the case of the genome (otherwise, it wouldn’t be an analogy) it illustrates how non-explanatory knowledge can be created independent of any specific conscious problem to solved. Furthermore, being non-explanatory in nature, its reach was significantly limited. This is in contrast to explanatory knowledge, which has significant and potentially infinite reach. Gpuccio: Your example is not clear. What do you mean by “rule of thumb”? For example, if I had a genetic condition, I wouldn’t want my doctor to base my treatment on the mere logical possibility that changing just any genes in my genome could improve my condition. Rather, I’d want my treatment based on an explanation that specific genes play a hard to vary, specific role in my symptoms and that changing them in a particular way would have a beneficial impact. The former is a useful rule of thumb. The latter is an explanatory theory. In the case of people, rules of thumb are not completely non-explanatory because they are based on uncontroversial background knowledge which is explanatory in nature. But this isn’t the case in regards to the biosphere.

For example, imagine I’ve been shipwrecked on a deserted island and I have partial amnesia due to the wreck. I remember that coconuts are edible so climb a tree to pick them. While attempting to pick a coconut, one falls, lands of a rock and splits open. Note that I did not intend for the coconut to fall, let alone plan for it to fall because I guessed coconuts that fall on rocks might crack open. The coconut falling was random in respect to the problem I hadn’t yet even tried to solve. Furthermore, due to my amnesia, I’ve hypothetically forgotten what I know about physics, including mass, inertia, etc. Specifically, I lack an explanation as to why the coconut landing on the rock causes it to open. As such, my knowledge of how to open coconuts is merely a useful rule of thumb, which is limited in reach. For example, in the absence of an explanation, I might collect coconuts picked from other trees, carry them to this same tree, climb it, then drop them on the rocks to open them. However, explanatory knowledge has significant reach. Specifically, if my explanatory knowledge of physics, including inertia, mass, etc. returned, I could use that explanation to strike coconut with any similar sized rock, rather than vice versa. Furthermore, I could exchange the rock with another object with Significant mass, such as an anchor and open objects other than coconuts, such as shells, use this knowledge to protect myself from attacking wildlife, etc. So, explanatory knowledge comes from intentional conjectures made by people and have significant reach. Non-explanatory knowledge (useful rules of thumb) represent unintentional conjectures and have limited reach. Knowledge can be created without intent in the form of useful rules of thumb. The knowledge of how to build biological adaptations isn’t explanatory in nature but non-explanatory and occasionally results in useful rule of thumb that improves biological adaptions.
critical rationalist_{September 22, 2012
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Joe: These models, which do NOT reflect reality, better help us understand reality? All theories are contain errors to some degree and are incomplete. They help us better understand reality because they provide opportunities to find those errors, and thereby make progress, and leave us with better problems to solve. Joe: …chromosome 2 is not a prediction of evolution and genetics says humans give rise to humans. We do not look for evidence that is consistent with our theories, because no observations can *positively* support any theory. Rather we look for but evidence that would inconsistent with our theory. The absence of the fusion in Human chromosome 2 would have been just such inconsistent evidence.critical rationalist_{September 22, 2012
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I'm with Neil here; I don't see a problem. Cornelius' complaint seems to be that evolutionists are using a model -- the phylogenetic tree -- that's only an idealization, not an exact representation of reality. But as Velasco says, "Modeling and idealizations are widespread throughout the sciences." As with most of Cornelius' complaints about evolution, this one seems to reduce to "there's something terribly wrong with evolutionary biology, because it's just like every other branch of science!" I'd argue that there's a good reason for the use of idealized models: pretty much any phenomenon is, if you look in enough detail, overwhelmingly complicated. If you try to understand it completely, you're going to be lost in details and never actually get anywhere. So you're better off taking a simplified view, and leaving out as much detail as you can get away with. For example, if you want to analyze the orbit of a planet, you start with a very simple approximation: planets follow elliptical orbits around the star. If that's not close enough (either because you need a more accurate result, or because you're analyzing something where that's a really bad approximation), you add more details to your model: you use Newtonian physics to include the influences of other planets and moons, maybe forces other than gravity, etc. If that's not good enough, you switch from Newtonian gravity to general relativity, and maybe even take into account the influence of other stars, etc. Take another simple example from physics: a lever. If you can get away with it, you'll treat the lever as a massless, rigid body that pivots around a fixed point. If that's not a close enough approximation, you have to add in complications: mass, elastic & inelastic deformations, friction, play, and mobility of the pivot, etc. If it moves fast enough, you might even need to add in relativistic corrections. If it's small enough, you might need to handle quantum effects. You pretty much always want to use the simplest model you can get away for analyzing any given situation. Knowing what you can get away with and what will cause trouble is, of course, a difficult problem in and of itself. One way to do it is to add complications until the answer stops changing, then realize that you didn't really need that last complication. Usually, though, you can do pretty well just by understanding the limits of the approximations you're using and watching out for situations in which they're likely to be problematic. (There's an old joke about a paper on milk production, written by a mathematical physicist. It begins "Assume a spherical cow radiating milk isotropically...") The phylogenetic tree is a lot like the massless, rigid, frictionless lever: it doesn't really exist, but it's often close enough that you can either get away with using it as is, or use as a base and then add in complications as needed. And (at least as far as I can see), that's exactly how biologists use phylogenetic trees. So where's the problem?Gordon Davisson_{September 21, 2012
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The problem is that you are treating evolution as somehow "special". Do you demand that Intelligent GeoDesign Theory be accepted? How about Intelligent Climatology? Or Intelligent Electroweak Theory? No, it is only evolution which raises your hackles, because it threatens your worldview.BioTurboNick_{September 21, 2012
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What is "non-explanatory knowledge" and why aren't our brains full of it if our DNA is?Mung_{September 21, 2012
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As usual, the waters here are considerably muddied by conflating a priori issues and a posteriori issues. The debate between naturalism and theism is, as I see it, a priori, in the sense that these are conceptual frameworks we employ to make sense of what is delivered by empirical knowledge. (That's not to say that one must be dogmatic about one's metaphysics, obviously, but to say that rational discourse about metaphysics is governed by different considerations than rational discourse about empirical knowledge.) By contrast, the debate between evolutionary theory and design theory is a debate about empirical knowledge-claims. Maybe here's a better way of putting it: scientific theories take as their object -- that to which they are answerable -- experiments and observations. They count as objective because they are answerable to how the world is. So what is metaphysics answerable to? Metaphysics is answerable to, not how the world is -- the task of science -- but answerable to our theories about how the world is. The job of the metaphysician differs from the job of the scientist because the metaphysician makes explicit, clarifies, systematizes, criticizes, and speculates about the categories implicitly used by the scientist. So the metaphysical debate between naturalism and theism (which are, of course, far from the only options, and there are sub-varieties of each too numerous to count) are governed by basically different considerations than the scientific debate between defenders of different scientific theories. To be sure, I don't think that scientists -- or anyone, really -- can do without metaphysics, and it seems fairly clear to me that metaphysical commitments lie in the background of all theories. Which is all well and good, I think -- metaphysics is essential to the creative and speculative dimension of scientific theorizing, and without which science would be no different from stamp collecting. But metaphysics and science, however continuous in some regards, are still distinct enterprises, and I worry that Hunter conflates them.Kantian Naturalist_{September 21, 2012
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Abduction or, as it is also often called, Inference to the Best Explanation is a type of inference that assigns special status to explanatory considerations. Most philosophers agree that this type of inference is frequently employed, in some form or other, both in everyday and in scientific reasoning. However, the exact form as well as the normative status of abduction are still matters of controversy.
SEPMung_{September 21, 2012
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UB, Neither you or Cornelius are under no obligation to *accept* that your conception of human knowledge is subject to criticism. In fact, what I've done is conjectured the specific objections to Darwinism we observe here are explained by just such a refusal to accept it. And, as a critical rationalist, I'm looking for evidence that would be inconsistent with that conjecture, rather than support it. What better inconsistent evidence could we have than your explicit denial that you think knowledge is justified by authoritative sources would be just such inconsistent evidence. Along with you or KF actually responding to the actual substance of Popper's criticism, rather than common misconceptions or repeating the claim that "everyone knows we use induction"critical rationalist_{September 21, 2012
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Science makes progress by conjecturing theories based on all of our current, best explanations, when observations are made rather than predictions made 150 years ago.
They don't call it Darwinism for no reason. It's still stuck in the 1800's.Mung_{September 21, 2012
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If bad explanations are indeed true, then how do you explain our ability to know anything?
I can think of many things I know that no one had to explain to me. Does knowledge arises only via explanation?
However if, on the other hand, Cornelius means that Darwinism is nothing more than veering atoms, rather than a process that genuinely creates knowledge via emergence, then he’s attacking a strawman via an outdated definition of materialism.
Which kind of knowledge are you talking about today? Do you have an explanation for emergence?Mung_{September 21, 2012
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Ironically, Cornelius has failed to grasp the impactions of assuming there is some inexplicable realm where inexplicable beings reach in to bubble of explicably in a way that can actually effect us.
Maybe he just thinks the cosmos didn't create itself.Mung_{September 21, 2012
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JLAfan:
Evolution predicted where to find the Tiktaalik fossil, they predicted the Chromosome 2 fusion and they predicted the ancestry to man which was later confirmed by genetics.
Tiktaalik was found in the wrong place and time, chromosome 2 is not a prediction of evolution and genetics says humans give rise to humans. Other than that, good job...Joe_{September 21, 2012
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Heh:
Instead, these trees are models which contain idealizations. These models are used to better understand the world.
These models, which do NOT reflect reality, better help us understand reality?Joe_{September 21, 2012
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