Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

On “seeing” — credibly knowing about — the invisible in science

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Yesterday, following up from recent comment exchanges, I posted about the electron as an example of how we routinely deal with the invisible in science, and on how inductive — believe it or not that is now a fighting word — inference on sign is vital to science.

This morning, I followed up on a remark by Joe in the UB thread that extends the same theme.

I think this should be headlined, so let me clip (quickly, as I do have a draft to follow up on):

____________

>>I have a draft speech to follow up on, but could not resist this:

[Joe:] the [Darwinist/Evolutionary Materialist] response is always “Eons of time cannot be reproduced in a lab and all we have is eons of time to hide behind. Oh and a bunch of promissory notes”

This brings to front-centre, the issue of the unobservable in science I headlined yesterday with the classic Tek 465 CRO as an illustration of how we infer to the unobserved in science per inductive warrant. (Which surfaces the pivotal importance of that syllabus of 18 Q’s.)

Electronics is built on the electron, which is accepted as very real, even a fact of day to day life, though unobserved or even unobservable. We simply see too many convergent effects that cry out for the electron as common cause.

Oil Drop Expt: the drops take charges that are multiples of e, warranting inference to a “lump” of negative charge, the electron

 

We are as a result morally certain of its reality, though what we actually see are things like little drops of oil in a Millikan oil drop exercise, drifting up/down as we try to balance the voltage against gravity. (I well recall my own frustrations working with a lab set for replicating that classic exercise!)

Or, we may see curlicues of bubbles in a bubble chamber or droplets of cloud in a cloud chamber, or of course the trace on a CRO’s phosphor screen.

The inferred, convergent, best explanation is the electron.

Never yet directly seen, and probably never will be, but an accepted fact of life from its effects.

Let’s clip someone politically incorrect on that sort of thinking:

Jn 3:3 Now there was a man of the Pharisees named Nicodemus, a member of the Jewish ruling council. 2 He came to Jesus at night and said, “Rabbi, we know you are a teacher who has come from God. For no one could perform the miraculous signs you are doing if God were not with him.”

3 In reply Jesus declared, “I tell you the truth, no one can see the kingdom of God unless he is born again.[a]”

4 “How can a man be born when he is old?” Nicodemus asked. “Surely he cannot enter a second time into his mother’s womb to be born!”

5 Jesus answered, “I tell you the truth, no one can enter the kingdom of God unless he is born of water and the Spirit. 6 Flesh gives birth to flesh, but the Spirit[b] gives birth to spirit. 7 You should not be surprised at my saying, ‘You[c] must be born again.’ 8 The wind blows wherever it pleases. You hear its sound, but you cannot tell where it comes from or where it is going. So it is with everyone born of the Spirit.”

9 “How can this be?” Nicodemus asked.

10 “You are Israel’s teacher,” said Jesus, “and do you not understand these things? 11 I tell you the truth, we speak of what we know, and we testify to what we have seen, but still you people do not accept our testimony. 12 I have spoken to you of earthly things and you do not believe; how then will you believe if I speak of heavenly things? 13 No one has ever gone into heaven except the one who came from heaven—the Son of Man.[d] 14 Just as Moses lifted up the snake in the desert, so the Son of Man must be lifted up, 15 that everyone who believes in him may have eternal life.[e]

16 “For God so loved the world that he gave his one and only Son,[f] that whoever believes in him shall not perish but have eternal life. 17 For God did not send his Son into the world to condemn the world, but to save the world through him . . . 19 This is the verdict: Light has come into the world, but men loved darkness instead of light because their deeds were evil. 20 Everyone who does evil hates the light, and will not come into the light for fear that his deeds will be exposed. 21 But whoever lives by the truth comes into the light, so that it may be seen plainly that what he has done has been done through God.”[h][NIV, cf here on in context and here on in context for a 101 look at some of the warranting context]

Uh huh, believing in the invisible can make a lot of good sense, to those willing to be docile — teachable — before the evidence. No promises for the willfully defiant who will resort to selectively hyperskeptical objections and cling to any absurdity to protect a cherished materialism proudly flying the false flag of science. (And denizens of TSZ et al, that is an exercise of the right of fair comment on responsible investigation.)

In science, too, we often need to assess the reality of the unobserved.

As I have repeatedly pointed out, where that addresses something like origins, that is done by inference to best current explanation in light of traces of the unobserved and cause-effect patterns and characteristic signs we can and do observe in the present. Where, if we know that per repeated experiment a certain causal factor reliably leaves certain characteristic signs, then it is reasonable to infer from sign to associated cause per that body of investigation. I have long used the case of inferring deer from deer tracks as an illustrative case on the logic involved.

What happens, as was already discussed, is that the living cell is full of FSCO/I, which is a characteristic trace of IDOW — intelligently directed organising work, i.e. design. So, if we see FSCO/I, we are properly entitled to infer to design as cause, given what we observe and what we can see on the needle in the haystack analysis.

The verbal stunts and rhetorical gymnastics we have seen for years from those disinclined to accept so simple a pattern of thought, and the number of spurious counter-examples put forth tell us that the inference is obviously cogent and well warranted.

Why it is controversial is not because it is well warranted, but because it is cutting clean across an entrenched ideology that likes to dress up in a lab coat and loves to fly the flag of science, evolutionary materialism, for descriptive convenience. (And yes, TSZ, that is just a descriptive term, and accurate one.)

So, it is time for some serious rethinking that requires leaving the materialist cave of shadow shows and clearing he mind from the poisonous influences of the smoke of burning ad hominem laced strawmen.>>

_____________

So, in science, we can learn to see the invisible, and to have well-warranted high confidence in its reality. Which is of course another way of saying, knowledge, in the weaker sense: well warranted, credibly true belief.

So, we see here inference to best current explanation on observed evidence giving us scientific knowledge regarding what we did not actually see.

So, it is quite reasonable to infer in science to the invisible but warranted, on empirical traces and an observed pattern of characteristic signs.

All that we design thinkers are asking for, then is willingness to be consistent on the observation that FSCO/I is observed to be a characteristic sign of IDOW as key causal factor. Design, in one word.

Is that too much to ask? END

Comments
Here's a beautiful example to add to the collection of non-human intelligent designers: Mystery Behind Deep-Sea Crop Circles off the Coast of Japan Solved | Yahoo! News Good, clear photos here.Jammer
September 20, 2012
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I'd like to press the point against Kairosfocus from a somewhat different direction -- which is to say, I have no qualms about "induction," because I think Peirce's theory of "abduction" gives us a serviceable alternative to both Hume and Popper. Two objections: (1) When we postulate the existence of unobservable entities, we need to be able to ascribe to them certain kinds of causal powers. These powers seem to fall into two classes: (a) the powers to generate the observed regularities that prompted us to posit them in the first place; (b) the powers to generate non-observed but observable regularities which could be looked for in subsequent experiments. So merely postulating unobservables isn't enough; we've got to specify their properties well enough to treat future experiments as confirming, or disconfirming, the postulation. (2) In general, the distinction between observables and posits is, I think, best treated as a methodological distinction rather than as an ontological one. (I suspect that treating it ontologically, if taken consistently, would leave us with no response to Hume's 'Academic' skepticism.) What is posited but not observed will vary over time, based on, say, our level of technology. Mendel posited genes, and had no way of observing them -- geneticits today can observe genes directly. And particle physicists can observe electrons, whereas they were posits for Millikan. So I think it would be a bad idea to treat this distinction as adequate for any ontological work, for or against naturalism or theism, etc.Kantian Naturalist
September 20, 2012
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KF: You are again resorting to strawman distortions. The Glasgow Coma scale tests rely on inferring conscious intelligence from in part behaviour that emits FSCI, in the form of speech. This in turn relies on inference to best explanation and is inductive. First, it seems you are still unable to grasp the difference I keep pointing out. If it was inductive, then you should be able to fill in the step I've identified at missing in induction. But you have not. Nor is merely using observations at some point in the process induction. This is your misrepresentation of my comments and references. Second, we know speech is intentional because the individual being assessed is asked specific questions about their name, location, marital status, etc., which are specifically tailored based on our explanations about how the brain works, such as how it is effected when impaired, etc. IOW, we can tell it's specified because we know what the answers should be due to the species, gender, etc. However, this is *not* the case in regards to the biosphere. Now, you might believe that the particular forms organisms, and the knowledge used to build, them were "specified" by a designer, but that is part of the framework you are using to extrapolate observations, rather than using induction. Again, observations cannot tell us anything, one way or the other, without first conjecturing an explanation. KF: You have tried to evade this, by raising issues of a genuine problem with empirical investigations, ballpark thinking. That is an evasion. That experiments may have a bias problem is acknowledged, it is part of the provisionality of empirical warrant. I'm evading? Still waiting for a response to the following..
Substituting “true” for “probable” doesn’t’ solve the problem of induction. Specifically, if past observations do not imply anything about future observations, they no more imply probability than truth.
So, I'll ask yet again. Do past observations imply anything about future observations? Yes or No? KF: Similarly, you refuse to accept that warrant, credible truth and acceptance with due degree of confidence are components of what we commonly understand to be knowledge. But not even complex mathematics, post Godel, delivers absolute certainty beyond future correction. Strawman. I accept that a great number of people think knowledge is warranted, justified true belief, However, I've presented and referenced arguments that indicate otherwise. KF: Your attempt to pretend that falsifiability is some sort of criterion of merit on something like the truth expressed in 2 + 3 = 5, is similarly indicative of something very wrong with your thinking. So, is that a "No", in that you do not think 2 + 3 = 5 is not subject to falsification? Is there a particular reason why you keep avoiding direct questions, then go on to paint me as if I have an absurd world view? Again, my point isn't that science doesn't work. It's that science doesn't' work the way you think it does. If anyone keeps presenting a strawman, it appears to be you. KF: Similarly, your problem with the proper criticism of your view, that in fact corroboration is a case of unacknowledged inference on best explanation per testing, is that you confuse rebuttal talking points with successful refutation. If you cannot even recognize the problem, then it's unclear how you can conclude what has or has not been refuted. Again, we start out with a problem. You, on the other had start out with "observations". The problem is your inability to recognize problems as the starting point, rather than observations.critical rationalist
September 20, 2012
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Axel: What else do they have, Michael Servetus? As you point out, they are photophobic, so they must rely on donning the emperor’s suit, and holler their own sartorial elegance for all they’re worth and, alas, a whole lot more. Axel, From the following essay on Hayek, Bartley and Popper: Justificationism and the Abuse of Reason
3. Responses to the dilemma of the infinite regress versus dogmatism In the light of the dilemma of the infinite regress versus dogmatism, we can discern three attitudes towards positions: relativism, “true belief” and critical rationalism [Note 3] Relativists tend to be disappointed justificationists who realise that positive justification cannot be achieved. From this premise they proceed to the conclusion that all positions are pretty much the same and none can really claim to be better than any other. There is no such thing as the truth, no way to get nearer to the truth and there is no such thing as a rational position. True believers embrace justificationism. They insist that some positions are better than others though they accept that there is no logical way to establish a positive justification for an belief. They accept that we make our choice regardless of reason: “Here I stand!”. Most forms of rationalism up to date have, at rock bottom, shared this attitude with the irrationalists and other dogmatists because they share the theory of justificationism. According to the critical rationalists, the exponents of critical preference, no position can be positively justified but it is quite likely that one (or more) will turn out to be better than others in the light of critical discussion and tests. This type of rationality holds all its positions and propositions open to criticism and a standard objection to this stance is that it is empty; just holding our positions open to criticism provides no guidance as to what position we should adopt in any particular situation. This criticism misses its mark for two reasons. First, critical rationalism is not a position. It is not directed at solving the kind of problems that are solved by fixing on a position. It is concerned with the way that such positions are adopted, criticised, defended and relinquished. Second, Bartley did provide guidance on adopting positions; we may adopt the position that to this moment has stood up to criticism most effectively. Of course this is no help for people who seek stronger reasons for belief, but that is a problem for them, and it does not undermine the logic of critical preference.
The latter is not a "emperors suit" just because you cannot recognize your own conception of human knowledge as an idea that would be subject to criticism.critical rationalist
September 19, 2012
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Axel: Indeed, it may be that an easy-to-vary postulation is generally less propitious than a hard-to-vary one. However, to take that as ipso facto disqualication of the merit of a particular easy-to-vary postulation is naive in the extreme. It is not a ‘bad explanation’ if it happens to be true, no matter how ‘bad’ it might be, according to Mr Deutsche’s canons. First, as with many here, you seem to be having difficulty grasping the argument being made. Critical rationalism rejects justificationism and embraces fallibilism. This even include accepting that Critical Rationalism is an idea that may be mistaken, as could any other theory of human knowledge. We might live in a universe were bad explanations are true, but this wouldn't make them any less of a bad explanation as defined above. But, I invite you to actually think about that for a moment. If we take that seriously, as if it were true for the purpose of criticism, then how could we know anything?
That the truth consists of hard to vary assertions about reality is the most important fact about the physical world. It's a fact that is, itself, unseen, yet impossible to vary.
If the above explanation is false, how else do you explain our relatively recent and rapid increase in the growth of knowledge? Why does knowledge come to us in the form of long, hard to vary chains of explanations? So, it would seem your own "easy to vary postulations" is a bad explanation for what we observe. However, justification *is* naive in the sense you're referring to. From the Wikipeedia entry on Critical Rationalism…
William Warren Bartley compared critical rationalism to the very general philosophical approach to knowledge which he called "justificationism". Most justificationists do not know that they are justificationists. Justificationism is what Popper called a "subjectivist" view of truth, in which the question of whether some statement is true, is confused with the question of whether it can be justified (established, proven, verified, warranted, made well-founded, made reliable, grounded, supported, legitimated, based on evidence) in some way.</b
So, as you pointed out, whether something is true or false is irrelevant to it being "probable." Axel: The fact is, as I wrote initially, the former would already have performed their observations, the recreational drug merely allowing the right side of their intelligence to operate optimally, as sometimes occurs in dreams. Being a justificationist, I realize this might be difficult for you to recognize. But there is a step that inductivism simply does not provide guidance for. In the absence of this step, Inductivism isn't possible. Nor was Popper necessary speaking of recreational drug or cigarettes. As for the rest. I'm not suggesting that modern science is evil. I'm suggest that inductivists are confused about how they reach conclusions.critical rationalist
September 19, 2012
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CR: You are again resorting to strawman distortions. The Glasgow Coma scale tests rely on inferring conscious intelligence from in part behaviour that emits FSCI, in the form of speech. This in turn relies on inference to best explanation and is inductive. That is, we see a routine case of inductive reasoning. On the wider subject of the role of induction in science, this thread has -- appropriately -- posed a concrete, Nobel Prize winning case of induction in action, Milikan's oil drop experiment(s) that established to moral certainty, the existence, charge and so also mass of the electron. Of course within experimental error. You have tried to evade this, by raising issues of a genuine problem with empirical investigations, ballpark thinking. That is an evasion. That experiments may have a bias problem is acknowledged, it is part of the provisionality of empirical warrant. Similarly, you refuse to accept that warrant, credible truth and acceptance with due degree of confidence are components of what we commonly understand to be knowledge. But not even complex mathematics, post Godel, delivers absolute certainty beyond future correction. Your attempt to pretend that falsifiability is some sort of criterion of merit on something like the truth expressed in 2 + 3 = 5, is similarly indicative of something very wrong with your thinking. As you know or should know, this is a simple result that on understanding it is seen as true and as what must be so, on pain of obvious absurdity. Such self evident truths are foundational to reason, which is not science but the foundation thereof. Indeed, it is by the light of such that we discern truth from falsity and that something is identifiable as one or the other but not both. Your very system requires implicit acceptance of such. Similarly, your problem with the proper criticism of your view, that in fact corroboration is a case of unacknowledged inference on best explanation per testing, is that you confuse rebuttal talking points with successful refutation. Let me go further [for record for onlookers, it is long since evident that you are unlikely to do more than push up further talking points], as already pointed out, the reason why the electron is a "hard to vary" explanation, is that it is the best warranted one. And so forth. Enough has been said to show for the open-minded onlooker to see the balance on merits. KFkairosfocus
September 19, 2012
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CR: Mere intelligence does not stick it’s neck out in a way that allows us to make progress via this valid form of deduction. KF: Have you taken time to see even a snippet of what has been put forward as to why Functionally Specific complex organisation and/or associated information [FSCO/I] is held to be an empirically reliable, trusted sign of intelligence? (The linked case includes a discussion of how this is so used in a literally life or death situation, on a routine basis.)
So, if we ran across the designer of the biosphere, we could tell if it was was in danger depending on its steps listed there, such as eye movements or asking it questions? But an abstract designer with no defined limitations doesn't necessary have a body, let alone eyes or any desire to do thinks like answer questions assuming, it had a way to speak to us or even wanted to. In fact, it's unclear an abstract designer with no defined limitations could even have a medical condition in the first place that needs treatment. None of which are part of your definition. KF: Can you not see that part of the very reason why I speak of knowledge as warranted, credibly true belief is that I am aware of this limitation, and of the range in degree of warrant that attaches to knowledge claims as a result? Again, Substituting “true” for “probable” doesn’t’ solve the problem of induction. Specifically, if past observations do not imply anything about future observations, they no more imply probability than truth. Is this something you're simply not reading? If not, it still appears you do think past observations imply something about the future, which is the problem of induction. KF: In short, are you even aware that scientific knowledge claims at explanatory level are inherently weaker than say those of a self-evident truth like 2 + 3 = 5? Would you saying 2 + 3 = 5 is or is not falsifiable? KF: Do you not see that this is indeed a principle of induction, that experience based knowledge claims — and if we are to access specific facts of external reality and integrate them in our knowledge, we must access such — face the issues of the limitations of inductive reasoning? No, I'm unable to see it. This is because you're missing the step I pointed out above. Did you read it? KF: It sure looks like you have set up yet another strawman, a demand that induction provide an equivalent degree of warrant as can be so of deduction. But, so soon as deduction tries to engage external reality, it too runs into the limitations of induction. No, it doesn't Apparently, you still working from a misconception of Critical Rationalism, or you cannot recognize your own conception of human knowledge as an idea that would be subject to criticism. KF: That is why I have looked carefully at the generally accepted modern understanding of induction: it is the form of argument that addresses evidence that supports its conclusions, but is not held to demonstrate them. Such warrant comes in degrees, and can amount to moral certainty in important cases. I know that's what you, and others may think, but that doesn't mean it actually happened that way. Being open to criticism, please fill in the missing step. In addition, your link to Salmon’s criticism has been addressed. KF: Milikan’s establishment of the reality, charge and mass of the electron is a case in point. A Nobel Prize winning one, as it turns out, cf. 24 above from Sept 15. What we look for are inconstancies to our theories, not confirmations. Feynman even pointed out the problem with this…
We have learned a lot from experience about how to handle some of the ways we fool ourselves. One example: Millikan measured the charge on an electron by an experiment with falling oil drops, and got an answer which we now know not to be quite right. It's a little bit off because he had the incorrect value for the viscosity of air. It's interesting to look at the history of measurements of the charge of an electron, after Millikan. If you plot them as a function of time, you find that one is a little bit bigger than Millikan's, and the next one's a little bit bigger than that, and the next one's a little bit bigger than that, until finally they settle down to a number which is higher. Why didn't they discover the new number was higher right away? It's a thing that scientists are ashamed of - this history - because it's apparent that people did things like this: When they got a number that was too high above Millikan's, they thought something must be wrong - and they would look for and find a reason why something might be wrong. When they got a number close to Millikan's value they didn't look so hard. And so they eliminated the numbers that were too far off, and did other things like that…[6][7]
So, they were looking for confirmations, not inconsistencies, which is the problem I keep pointing out over and over again. Regardless of how many links you post which uncritically accept inductivism, you still haven't address the criticism in #34.
So, KF is saying science “does it” using a type of inference he has yet to define or explain, which does not solve any problems and would require us to abandon deductive logic. (which *is* well defined and can be used to solve problems in practice) Just saying “that’s the way it’s done” is not the same as actually explaining how it works, in practice.
As a critical rationalist, I realize human conceptions of knowledge are ideas that are subject to criticism and would be open to inductivism should you fill in this missing step. But as of so far, your response is that "everyone knows science uses inductivism", which represents uncritical acceptance and does not refute Popper's argument.critical rationalist
September 19, 2012
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TA: why do you insist on dragging in barbed and poisonous canards that have long since been adequately answered? [Cf specific response here.] That sort of behaviour bespeaks one coming here full of arrogant contempt and standing on his assumed moral and intellectual superiority, only here to smirk and sneer, distract and disrupt, not to actually engage in genuine dialogue. But then, you may think a web forum is not like barging into someone's living room and carrying on rudely and slandering one's host then and there with barbed, thinly veiled remarks. Then, on being asked to leave, walking off in a huff sniffing about your right to say obnoxious things anywhere you please. In short, I am calling you to THINK about how you are behaving, and to realise that there are real human beings on the other side with real feelings and with a genuine sense that the design theory view has a serious point; people who in many cases have advanced relevant degrees to make a judgement like that. So, kindly, learn a modicum of respect and good manners such as you would use while sitting in someone's living room. KFkairosfocus
September 19, 2012
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All that nonsense about 'piling up entities....' For crying out loud!Axel
September 19, 2012
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'It is the facts of nature that are as they are – including the invariant speed of light.' There you go again, timmy. You're in an endless loop, simply because your aptitude for reasoning is just not up to snuff, for a board like this. You're out of your depth. 'I take ID at its word when it says that it makes no predictions about the nature of the designer. In burking the issue it fails the test of science.' It doesn't burk the issue and it doesn't fail the test of science. Your 'naturalism' fails the test of science. https://docs.google.com/document/edit?id=1c54Y5O4Uc7T_-spOgXQCI_Zru7dHyk5coIOapNYxDTg&pli=1 Don't thank me for enlightening you. Thank bornagain. Oh, is it you he's stopped exchanges with? I see no future in our wee exchanges either, tim.Axel
September 19, 2012
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Axel posted this:
You can’t just say, ‘Them thar’s the laws of nature.’
I didn't. You are, once again, barking up the wrong epistemological tree. It is the facts of nature that are as they are - including the invariant speed of light. Relativity's spacetime is a geometry that successfully integrates the behaviour of matter and energy at large scales. Supernatural entities are superfluous to the explanation (they add nothing to the accuracy or precision of the results derived from the theory. And then:
While light interacts with and in our space-time universe, it is clearly not proper to it, since it does not defer to relativity.
What does this mean? If "deferring" to relativity means "exhibiting relativistic effects", then light certainly "defers" to gravity. In fact it was precisely one of these instances that so neatly confirmed Einstein's theory in 1919. And further:
Indeed, is that not the case with all of the most elementary particles, that they issued from the Singularity at the Big Bang; so far from being natural, they are supernatural or, if you prefer, supra natural or praeternatural.
No it is not the case. That is just airy persiflage, and involves piling up more entities. You really should see someone about that. And:
Of course, you would love Meyer to have opted to forthrightly extrapolate a theistic provenance for the myriad designs of the natural universe, because it would suit the obscurantist purposes of your good self and your ‘innombrables confreres’.
You mean he does actually think the designer is a god, but refuses to say so? I had often thought so. But that misses the point. I take ID at its word when it says that it makes no predictions about the nature of the designer. In burking the issue it fails the test of science. And then:
How you all manage to ignore the actual, empirical science that has been adduced in support of the design inference just on this site, will, I expect be a matter for wonderment to future generations; . . .
Would that be all of the evidence that convinced a non-scientist judge that cdesign propensists were peddling a religion. Don't make me laugh.timothya
September 19, 2012
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'In other words, that’s how matter and energy behave in this particular universe. To add a requirement for an omniscient, omnipotent agency to the explanation would be to pile up entities unnecessarily. I wouldn’t postulate such an agency, since none is required to explain the fact of nature (formalised in the laws of physics).' timothya Explaining the facts of nature, its forms and the laws (recurrent patterns of behaviour) it observes, are precisely what empirical science is supposed to be about, timothya. This is so elementary that enlightening you seems brutal enough to invite litigation. You can't just say, 'Them thar's the laws of nature.' Unfortunately, you have just made another gross error. While light interacts with and in our space-time universe, it is clearly not proper to it, since it does not defer to relativity. Indeed, is that not the case with all of the most elementary particles, that they issued from the Singularity at the Big Bang; so far from being natural, they are supernatural or, if you prefer, supra natural or praeternatural. No. I shouldn't encourage your evasions from what is staring you in the face. You quote from Stephen Meyer's book, Signature in the Cell: 'The theory of intelligent design does not claim to be able to determine the identity or any other attributes of that intelligence, even if philosophical deliberation or additional evidence from other disciplines may provide reasons to consider, for example, a specifically theistic design hypothesis.' To which, by way of response, you have the temerity to intone: 'If ID is unable to provide any insight into how (or in some cases why) a designer pursued a particular course, or even of the nature (or intentions) of that designer, then its project reduces to saying “it is designed, well, because it is designed”. This is one of the reasons why scientists say that ID doesn’t actually explain anything, and also why it is an unscientific activity.' That, 'mon cher ami', is simply a bizarre non-sequitur – though, if I remember correctly, you have a marked propensity for uttering non sequiturs – and even doing so with a certain triumphalist flourish (dare I say, 'panache'?). Of course, you would love Meyer to have opted to forthrightly extrapolate a theistic provenance for the myriad designs of the natural universe, because it would suit the obscurantist purposes of your good self and your 'innombrables confreres'. Although it cries out from the roof-tops, they, have, however, astutely preferred to belabour you about (upsides?) the head on your own turf, or what you claim to be your own turf, though that, i.e. true science, is very far from being the case. How you all manage to ignore the actual, empirical science that has been adduced in support of the design inference just on this site, will, I expect be a matter for wonderment to future generations; not unlike the reluctance for eminent scientists to let go of 'phlogiston', or the eponymous disease said by the medical profession of the day to afflict runaway slaves; or the slowness of the medical profession to accept the antiseptic role of cleanliness, notably on the part of surgeons while carrying out operations. 'I can’t resist asking why you used the term “innombrables” in your contribution. Is it because “we” are members of an uncountably large community , or because you can’t count? Not judging, just asking. (hmmm, maybe we are doing something right)' Indeed, in the eyes of the corporate funders of modern scientific research, undoubtedly so. However, my reason for favouring 'innombrables' was much simpler; I had already favoured 'confreres', which seems to me to apply to a larger catchment than simple, 'colleagues'. Plus, there is a certain polysyllabic humour, not unmixed with – to our ears, at least, a certain Mayor of Clochemerle-style pomposity in such French words, particularly in what seems a concatenation of them, even though they number only two. 'Mesdames et Messieurs j'ai le grand honneur de vous inviter a cet evenement historique' sort of thing. Not verbatim, though I think the first clause is.Axel
September 19, 2012
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'As I see it the foundation error in Critical Rationalist’s ideas–made clear in thru first few posts– is one of presumptuousness. CR implies in his statements that the side he is on is the side of critical thinking and science in essence trying to lord over science and take ownership of it and relegate believers in god to a straw man version of “supernaturalism”, and this obviously without justification or regard to history when it comes to many great figures of science and their private beliefs.' What else do they have, Michael Servetus? As you point out, they are photophobic, so they must rely on donning the emperor's suit, and holler their own sartorial elegance for all they're worth and, alas, a whole lot more.Axel
September 19, 2012
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'An abstract designer with no limitations is a bad explanation because it’s shallow and easily varied. Such a designer can be easily varied to predict anything because it’s only related to the biosphere by the myth itself.' Unfortunately, there, you have made a false analogy. Or rather been taken in by a shallow, in fact, vapid, by David Deutsch. Indeed, it may be that an easy-to-vary postulation is generally less propitious than a hard-to-vary one. However, to take that as ipso facto disqualication of the merit of a particular easy-to-vary postulation is naive in the extreme. It is not a 'bad explanation' if it happens to be true, no matter how 'bad' it might be, according to Mr Deutsche's canons. The all-knowing, all-powerful, personal agency regulating the speed of light in our world to the individual Observer would hardly have to conform to the strictures or the orthodoxies of Mr Deutsch or Mr Popper in his ideas or his actions. 'Some scientists find, or so it seems, that they get their best ideas when smoking; others by drinking coffee or whisky. Thus there is no reason why I should not admit that some may get their ideas by observing, or by repeating observations.' - KP: Realism and the Aim of Science A disappointingly facile, vapid remark from Popper, which the supercilious tone does nothing to attenuate, but perhaps only made in idle conversation. The fact is, as I wrote initially, the former would already have performed their observations, the recreational drug merely allowing the right side of their intelligence to operate optimally, as sometimes occurs in dreams. 'Mung’s claim made no such specificity as to what element I was criticizing. He implied that my criticism was of “modern science”.' No explicit specificity, but you were evidently discussing an element or aspect of science; of course, you had not been holding forth on the evils of modern science generally. So, Mung would, I should think, have been extrapolating the latter because it constitued what he considered a sufficiently significant element or aspect of modern science for your disquisition to have represented an attack on it.Axel
September 18, 2012
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lit·er·al·ly? ?/?l?t?r?li/ lit-er-uh-lee] adverb 1. in the literal or strict sense 2. in a literal manner; word for word 3. actually; without exaggeration or inaccuracy
There is literally no sense in carrying on a conversation with you.Upright BiPed
September 18, 2012
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Typical CR,
UB: Now, support your implied comment that some form of intelligence is not the only known source of iterative code.
CR: Huh? Beings with complex material brains, such as human beings, are the “only known source” of intelligence. What does that tell us about the origin of biosphere?
I did not ask you of about the source of intelligence, and I did not ask you about the origin of the biosphere. You implied there was another known source of iterative code other than some form of intelligence. I therefore asked you to support your claim. As has become completely evident in your modus operandi, you immediately move by deception in order to protect your views.Upright BiPed
September 18, 2012
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Joe:
What makes them “good ideas”? And how did we arrive at those “good ideas”? My bet is exactly how I said.
If you mean considering all the evidence then I agree. Which is how we know quite a bit about the people who built Stonehenge an what it was built for.
Umm those people could have just happened upon Stonehenge.
Um .. . why would you think so? There's clear evidence about who and when and how and why.
That is what I said- we find out about the designers by studying what they left behind. But nice of you to selectively quote me and ignore all the rest of what I posted in the same comment.
My main disagreement with you was regarding your assertion that we don't know much about how or why or by whom Stonehenge was built. I think there is good evidence that addresses all those points. And it comes from studying Stonehenge itself and all the other cultural evidence left behind by the people around at the time as I'm sure you'd agree. Consider all the evidence. I think the problem is that you want to use Stonehenge as an example of an artefact that is clearly designed but one that can't tell us much about the designers in an attempt to bolster your opinion about why ID can't ponder the nature of it's hypothsised designer. I think you'd better pick another example. One with less contraflow. Maybe the Nazca lines? Clearly designed but with much less evidence regarding how or why.Jerad
September 18, 2012
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'...there are an infinite number of un-conceived theories that would also be consistent with the evidence.' Where do you get that from, CR. On you on a Multiverse 'trip'? 'Great Scientists… are men of bold ideas, but highly critical of their own ideas: they try to find whether their ideas are right by trying first to find whether they are not perhaps wrong. They work with bold conjectures and severe attempts at refuting their own conjectures. - KP :’Replies to my Critics’, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Popper (1974), Book 2, 977-8.' There are bold ideas and bold ideas, CR.... and then there is the anihilation of reason, writ large, such as the Multiverse. You can do better than that.Axel
September 18, 2012
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@michael#37 MS: As I see it the foundation error in Critical Rationalist’s ideas–made clear in thru first few posts– is one of presumptuousness. CR implies in his statements that the side he is on is the side of critical thinking and science in essence trying to lord over science and take ownership of it…. Again, see #34. Do you have any criticism of it? If so, please share it with us. MS: … and relegate believers in god to a straw man version of “supernaturalism”, and this obviously without justification or regard to history when it comes to many great figures of science and their private beliefs. From a comment on another thread….
Theism assumes there is some inexplicable realm in which inexplicable beings reach in to effect us. However… … if we really do reside in a finite bubble of explicably, which exists as an island in a sea of inexplicability, the inside of this bubble cannot be explicable either. This is because the inside is supposedly dependent what occurs in this inexplicable realm. Any assumption that the world is inexplicable leads to bad explanations. That is, no theory about what exists beyond this bubble can be any better than “Zeus rules” there. And, given the dependency above (this realm supposedly effects us), this also means there can be no better expiation that “Zeus rules” inside this bubble as well. In other words, our everyday experience in this bubble would only appear explicable if we carefully refrain from asking specific questions. Note this bares a strong resemblance to a pre-scientific perspective with its distinction between an Earth designed for human beings and a heaven that is beyond human comprehension. Yet, you seem to think that our everyday experience is explicable. This is a contradiction.
Do you have any criticism of the above? Please be specific. In the absence of such criticism, it seems you are merely offended that your conception of human knowledge is an idea that would be subject to criticism.critical rationalist
September 18, 2012
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Axel: A person might attack modern science – indeed this forum is precisely designed to do so – by attacking major elements within it: primarily, the totalitarian protectionism of the religious zealots of scientism. Mung's claim made no such specificity as to what element I was criticizing. He implied that my criticism was of "modern science". I think I see what’s going on here. You’re attacking modern science, and KF is saying this is the way it’s done, deal with it. My criticism isn't of modern science. My criticism is of how inductivists *think* modern science makes progress. This is in contrast to thinking modern science doesn't actually make progress, therefore attacking the results of that progress. Your in the latter, in that you're suggesting modern science cannot make progress in the case of the biosphere, therefore attacking the specific results of that progress.critical rationalist
September 18, 2012
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Axel: No. No. No. No. No, C.R. Successful, scientific hypotheses, to the degree that they are ground-breaking, will always be the culmination of innumerable observations, some perhaps of a quite generalised nature, perhaps going back many years and/or not in areas of experience readily identifiable as germane. Observation has to be joined up, like joined-up writing. Axel, See #34. Background knowledge (uncontroversial and widely accepted theories about observations) culminate into new problems to solve. While you cannot have problems in the absence of observations, you cannot then use observations to tell us *which* specific theory to induce to solve that problem. Again, being consistent with a theory does not get us anywhere because there are an infinite number of un-conceived theories that would also be consistent with the evidence. So, how do you “induce” one theory among them? To quote Popper….
Some scientists find, or so it seems, that they get their best ideas when smoking; others by drinking coffee or whisky. Thus there is no reason why I should not admit that some may get their ideas by observing, or by repeating observations. - KP: Realism and the Aim of Science
IOW, ideas are constrained not observations but by wither they propose to solve the problem identified by observations. No one had ever observed an electron. Nor did electrons resemble the observations that led to the problem at hand. We can say the same about the curvature of space-time. The unseen does not resemble the scene. Axel: Indeed, successful hypotheses are not guesses, not wild stabs, but informed, indeed, indeed, to the layman, very esoterically informed, conjectures. Occasionally, some of our current scientific luminaries embark upon an intellectual ‘walkabout’, however, such as our multiverse proponents. I’ll say no more. Again, from Popper…
Great Scientists... are men of bold ideas, but highly critical of their own ideas: they try to find whether their ideas are right by trying first to find whether they are not perhaps wrong. They work with bold conjectures and severe attempts at refuting their own conjectures. - KP :'Replies to my Critics', in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Popper (1974), Book 2, 977-8.
Almost everyone... seems to be quite sure that the differences between the methodologies of history and of the natural sciences are vast. For, we are assured, it is well known that in the natural sciences we start from observation and proceed by induction to theory. And is it not obvious that in history we proceed very differently? Yes, I agree that we proceed very differently. But we do so in the natural sciences as well. In both we start from myths—from traditional prejudices, beset with error—and from these we proceed by criticism: by the critical elimination of errors. In both the role of evidence is, in the main, to correct our mistakes, our prejudices, our tentative theories—that is, to play a part in the critical discussion, in the elimination of error. By correcting our mistakes, we raise new problems. And in order to solve these problems, we invent conjectures, that is, tentative theories, which we submit to critical discussion, directed towards the elimination of error. - KP : The Myth of the Framework: In Defence of Science and Rationality (1993)
But I shall certainly admit a system as empirical or scientific only if it is capable of being tested by experience. These considerations suggest that not the verifiability but the falsifiability of a system is to be taken as a criterion of demarcation. In other words: I shall not require of a scientific system that it shall be capable of being singled out, once and for all, in a positive sense; but I shall require that its logical form shall be such that it can be singled out, by means of empirical tests, in a negative sense: it must be possible for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience. (1959) - KP : The Logic of Scientific Discovery
So, the key difference here is that we know our conjectures will contain errors. We expect this from the very start. So, our primary goal is to search of errors in those theirs, rather than search for support. And even Popper can be improved upon, as they are no myths in sense we think of they today. Deutsch has also introduced the criteria of a bad explanation, which is shallow and easily varied. This is in contrast to a long chain of independently formed explanations.
Consider the ancient Greek myth explaining seasons. Hades, God of the Underworld, kidnaps Persephone, the Goddess of Spring, and negotiates a forced marriage contract, requiring her to return regularly, and lets her go. And each year, she is magically compelled to return. And her mother, Demeter, Goddess of the Earth, is sad, and makes it cold and barren. That myth is testable. If winter is caused by Demeter's sadness, then it must happen everywhere on Earth simultaneously. So if the ancient Greeks had only known that Australia is at its warmest when Demeter is at her saddest, they'd have known that their theory is false. So what was wrong with that myth, and with all pre-scientific thinking, and what, then, made that momentous difference? I think there is one thing you have to care about. And that implies testability, the scientific method, the Enlightenment, and everything. And here is the crucial thing. There is such a thing as a defect in a story. I don't just mean a logical defect. I mean a bad explanation. What does that mean? Well, explanation is an assertion about what's there, unseen, that accounts for what's seen. Because the explanatory role of Persephone's marriage contract could be played equally well by infinitely many other ad hoc entities. Why a marriage contract and not any other reason for regular annual action? Here is one. Persephone wasn't released. She escaped, and returns every spring to take revenge on Hades, with her Spring powers. She cools his domain with Spring air, venting heat up to the surface, creating summer. That accounts for the same phenomena as the original myth. It's equally testable. Yet what it asserts about reality is, in many ways, the opposite. And that is possible because the details of the original myth are unrelated to seasons, except via the myth itself. This easy variability is the sign of a bad explanation, because, without a functional reason to prefer one of countless variants, advocating one of them, in preference to the others, is irrational. So, for the essence of what makes the difference to enable progress, seek good explanations, the ones that can't be easily varied, while still explaining the phenomena. Now, our current explanation of seasons is that the Earth's axis is tilted like that, so each hemisphere tilts toward the sun for half the year, and away for the other half. Better put that (not to scale) up. (Laughter) That's a good explanation: hard to vary, because every detail plays a functional role. For instance, we know, independently of seasons, that surfaces tilted away from radiant heat are heated less, and that a spinning sphere, in space, points in a constant direction. And the tilt also explains the sun's angle of elevation at different times of year, and predicts that the seasons will be out of phase in the two hemispheres. If they'd been observed in phase, the theory would have been refuted. But now, the fact that it's also a good explanation, hard to vary, makes the crucial difference. If the ancient Greeks had found out about seasons in Australia, they could have easily varied their myth to predict that. For instance, when Demeter is upset, she banishes heat from her vicinity, into the other hemisphere, where it makes summer. So, being proved wrong by observation, and changing their theory accordingly, still wouldn't have got the ancient Greeks one jot closer to understanding seasons, because their explanation was bad: easy to vary. And it's only when an explanation is good that it even matters whether it's testable. If the axis-tilt theory had been refuted, its defenders would have had nowhere to go. No easily implemented change could make that tilt cause the same seasons in both hemispheres.
- David Deutsch: A new way to explain explanation, 2009 TED talk An abstract designer with no limitations is a bad explanation because it's shallow and easily varied. Such a designer can be easily varied to predict anything because it's only related to the biosphere by the myth itself. Axel: Compare Einstein’s ‘humble admiration of the illimitable superior spirit who reveals himself in the slight details we are able to perceive with our frail and feeble mind,’ with the atheist myrmidons’ ‘promissory note’!
My view of the matter, for what it is worth, is that there is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas, or a logical reconstruction of this process. My view may be expressed by saying that every discovery contains an 'irrational element,' or 'a creative intuition,' in Bergson's sense. In a similar way Einstein speaks of the 'search for those highly universal laws ... from which a picture of the world can be obtained by pure deduction. There is no logical path.' he says, 'leading to these ... laws. They can only be reached by intuition, based upon something like an intellectual love (Einfühlung) of the objects of experience.' (1959)
- KP: The Logic of Scientific Discoverycritical rationalist
September 18, 2012
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CR:
[A] Being “the only known”, as in observed, would be an argument from ignorance, even if it were the case. [B] if you mean intelligence as an explanation, then how is it hard to vary? Please be specific. Nor do I see the difference between an “abstract intelligence with no defined limitations” and an “abstract designer with no limitations”. Neither have much in the way of informational content to be found in error.
UB:
1. Intelligence is the only known source of iterative code. You now can either support your comment or retract it. (…of course, you will do neither)
Should I take that as [A] or [B]? Honestly, I cannot tell. UB:
2. Under your view, anything that science observes as a ‘regularity’ is an argument from ignorance. Our universal common experince of phenomena becomes meaningless. As an example; the idea that the Earth orbits the Sun is therefore a faulty explanation. Just because it’s the only explanation that can integrate all observations, it is nontheless based upon observations, and as such, we may observe something else tomorrow which may contradict it.
No, it's not. When you say "regularity" you seem to be suggesting the following…
A is q, b is q, c is q, […] |= every x is q
Therefore you think we can can, in a sense, "get a theory " by induction or that a theory can be a conclusion. However, the evidence always looks like….
a is o or p or q or r … b is o or p or q or r … C is o or p or q or r … etc.
For induction to be a knowledge creating method we can actually use in practice, it has to offer a way to pick between o, p, q, r, etc. It needs to provide guidance for that step of the process. This is the part that is missing. A regularity in nature isn't "obvious", just a Newton's connection between falling apples and orbiting planets were not obvious. His theory may appear obvious to us in hind site, but the background knowledge (uncontroversial and widely accepted knowledge itself based on explanations) that served as his starting point had existed for quite some time beforehand. His theory was tested by observations, not derived from it. Again, When we take a critical approach, we look at what evidence is inconsistent with our theories, not consistent. Being consistent with a theory does not get us anywhere because there are an infinite number of un-conceived theories that would also be consistent with the evidence. And one of the ways we look for inconsistent is using observations. UB.
This line of reasoning by you is precisely what I was talking about. When universal observation creates a “hard-to-vary” explanation which suits you, your happily integrate it. Yet when is creates a hard-to-vary explanation which you dislike, then it becomes an “argument from ignorance”. You equivocate.
So, it's hard to vary because we only know of one source? But that's an argument from ignorance. See my comment #xxx to Axel where I present an example of a hard to vary explanation. UB
Now, support your implied comment that some form of intelligence is not the only known source of iterative code.
Huh? Beings with complex material brains, such as human beings, are the "only known source" of intelligence. What does that tell us about the origin of biosphere?critical rationalist
September 18, 2012
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Mung: Has TA looked seriously at what beavers do, yet? (before moving up to looking at cosmological design evidence, that points to an intelligent designer capable of planning a cosmos and building it, implying a lot of both wisdom and power. And, we know a lot on how designers work, there are entire professions on that subject, try as well TRIZ. KFkairosfocus
September 18, 2012
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timothya:
ID claims that (non-human) design exists in nature.
Isn't it obvious?
ID cannot explain the nature of the putative designer.
So?
ID cannot explain the origin of the putative designer.
So?
ID cannot explain how the putative designer carries out its actions.
So?Mung
September 18, 2012
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timothya:
Actually, I think of ID as the old-fashioned lift attendant.
I appreciate the utter lack of pretense of objectivity re ID. It's refreshing.Mung
September 18, 2012
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We don’t know who built Stonehenge, nor why, nor how. We don’t know where the alleged designer(s) came from.
We have good ideas about how and why.
What makes them "good ideas"? And how did we arrive at those "good ideas"? My bet is exactly how I said.
And the people in Britain at the time left lots of other physical evidence of their presence and life style.
Umm those people could have just happened upon Stonehenge.
And studying artefacts like Stonehenge we can make good guesses about the designers.
That is what I said- we find out about the designers by studying what they left behind. But nice of you to selectively quote me and ignore all the rest of what I posted in the same comment.Joe
September 18, 2012
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Joe,
We don’t know who built Stonehenge, nor why, nor how. We don’t know where the alleged designer(s) came from.
We have good ideas about how and why. And the people in Britain at the time left lots of other physical evidence of their presence and life style. We know where they came from as well 'cause of the pattern of emigration apparent from the temporal dispersions of their pottery and other goods. And studying artefacts like Stonehenge we can make good guesses about the designers. Clearly they thought having a 'calendar' like Stonehenge was important, they wanted to know what time of year it was. They must have used the stone circles (for there are hundreds) for rituals as well or they wouldn't have made them so elaborate and permanent. There are no gods or figures associated with the sites (that I know of) so they may not have had any theological associations. They clearly had very good organising skills! And they were obviously skilled rock carvers. Until ID can make some conjectures at least about the reasons, timings, etc of design implementation it can't claim to be a better explanation of the data than evolutionary theory. It can't really claim to be an explanation at all until it explains things.Jerad
September 18, 2012
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timothya- We don't know who built Stonehenge, nor why, nor how. We don't know where the alleged designer(s) came from. However we still say that Stonehenge was in fact designed and we study it in that light- because it makes a difference. Everything we do know came from investigating all of the evidence. THAT is how science operates. And seeing that the design ID is concerned with is far more advanced than anything archaeology has uncovered it is gong to take us more time to figure it out.Joe
September 18, 2012
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PS: TA, contrary to your confident manner assertions above, that we have good warrant to conclude per inference to best empirically grounded explanation that many things in our world and even the observed cosmos were designed, is momentous, even without direct evidence beyond that. Indeed, it decisively shifts the balance on what worldviews are credible, and in particular it is a further reason beyond its inescapable self referential incoherence (which many are tempted to disregard), to reject the evolutionary materialist ideology that now seems to have a stranglehold on science and science education. That tweredun is a serious thing to have found beyond REASONABLE dispute, per empirical investigation. The ongoing meltdown of design objectors where they are now attacking inductive reasoning and knowledge, speaks volumes, loudest volumes, on the impact of that finding.kairosfocus
September 18, 2012
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Here is Joe's excellent summary of ID:
ID is NOT about the designer(s) and we don’t know who the designer(s) were. No one knows if the designer had nor needed an origin I already covered that. Do you think your ignorance means something? How is that relevant?
So, to summarise without the gratuitous insults: ID claims that (non-human) design exists in nature. ID cannot explain the nature of the putative designer. ID cannot explain the origin of the putative designer. ID cannot explain how the putative designer carries out its actions. ID cannot explain the purpose or intention of the putative designer. And this ID business is a scientific argument exactly how? [TA, you have developed a habit of strawman snipping and dismissive sniping. Kindly, stop it. There are endless articles here at UD that survey the relevant evidence and lay out the arguments, including the foundation series that I just linked no 6 on cosmological design. I suggest that you scroll up to the top of this or any UD page and work your way through the resources tab, including the definition of ID and the weak argument responses. In addition, you may find the online enc article on ID here helpful in gaining a basic understanding. And my own presentation here on will probably be helpful, if you truly want to learn what the case for the design inference is. Failing doing your homework and seriously responding on the merits, you will show yourself to be an irresponsible objector, to be regarded as little better than a slightly improved troll. KF.]timothya
September 18, 2012
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