Putting the mind back on the table for discussion

_{kairosfocus

June 13, 2014

Artificial Intelligence, Computing, ID Foundations, mind and brain

3}_{Categories
Artificial Intelligence
Computing
ID Foundations
mind and brain}

Share: Facebook; Twitter/X; LinkedIn; Flipboard; Print; Email

Design theory infers to design on inductive inference on tested reliable empirical signs. While many are disinclined to accept such inferences on matters linked to origins, that says more about lab coat clad materialist ideological a prioris and their cultural influences than it does about the actual balance of evidence on the merits.

But also, design implies designer.

One who exhibits creative, purposeful, imaginative, skilled intelligence adequate to configure a functionally specific, complex organised information-rich entity. Ranging from the text of this contribution (well beyond the 500 – 1,000 bits of FSCO/I that are easily shown to be beyond the plausible reach of blind chance and mechanical necessity on the gamut of solar system or observed cosmos), to complex body plans, to the DNA code — code! — involved, to first cell-based life to the complex fine tuned cosmos that facilitates the possibility of such life.

But, it seems, genuinely independent, conscious, purposeful, creative designing mind is also under materialist interdict.

Never mind the still telling force of famed Evolutionist J B S Haldane’s apt turn of the 1930’s observation:

“It seems to me immensely unlikely that mind is a mere by-product of matter. For if my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true.They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically. And hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms. In order to escape from this necessity of sawing away the branch on which I am sitting, so to speak, I am compelled to believe that mind is not wholly conditioned by matter.” [“When I am dead,” in Possible Worlds: And Other Essays [1927], Chatto and Windus: London, 1932, reprint, p.209. (Highlight and emphases added.)]

So, I think it is time to put the mind back on the table.

Starting with the principle that rocks have no dreams:

Which, means that conscious mind is categorically distinct from blind mechanism based on cogs acting blindly on other cogs, or the substantial equivalent.

And continuing with the issue that blind mechanical processing is inherently limited by that blindness . . . a rock has no dreams, including “dust” reconfigured as neural network “gate” arrays:

A neural network is essentially a weighted sum interconnected gate array, it is not an exception to the GIGO principle

I do so here, as there is a video involved that I doubt can be embedded at UD.

So. now, let us ponder the GIGO principle. As wiki aptly summarises (inadvertently testifying against known ideological inclination):

Garbage in, garbage out (GIGO) in the field of computer science or information and communications technology refers to the fact that computers, since they operate by logical processes, will unquestioningly process unintended, even nonsensical, input data (“garbage in”) and produce undesired, often nonsensical, output (“garbage out”).

Yes, blind mechanisms do not ask un-programmed questions and if out of whack or inadequately debugged, will just as blindly spew out garbage. They are utterly unreasoning, glorified calculation devices.

So, I say: GIGO-limited computation is not contemplation.

Again, I say: contemplative, creative designing mind does not credibly emerge from blind chance and mechanical necessity.

Yet again, I say: contemplative mind is categorically different from blindly computing matter, as a rock has no dreams.

So, now, what do you say, why? END

Comments

R-Bill: First, the point I drew out from the common example of delusion is the overlooked point that the self awareness involved is a point of self evident truth. A point where even the deluded are not. In that context you went all over the world to try to undermine conscious self-awareness. And yet, it remains. Now, you try to reduce what I have pointed out to empty question begging. To do so, you set up and knock over a strawman. First, In reply to your challenge about rocks, I have shown that rocks give every indication of passive impacts of blind chance and mechanical necessity in action. Further to this, I showed that refined rocks are capable of being organised into computational entities by designers. Then, I directly showed that whether Thomson mechanical integrators, or digital processors or neural networks, we are dealing with blind mechanical cause-effect chains that manifest GIGO limited computation. In the case of the integrator there was a linked article and video. For the digital computer, I linked a survey article I did some time ago. For the neural net I used an infographic with a link to an extensive article. In short, I showed in detail how Liebnitz's analogy of the mill still obtains:
[P]erception, and that which depends upon it, are inexplicable by mechanical causes, that is to say, by figures and motions. Supposing that there were a machine whose structure produced thought, sensation, and perception, we could conceive of it as increased in size with the same proportions until one was able to enter into its interior, as he would into a mill. Now, on going into it he would find only pieces working upon one another, but never would he find anything to explain perception.
Rocks refined and organised into computational devices are STILL blind. They are not contemplating. A computational refinement and rearrangement of rocks STILL does not move beyond blind cause-effect chains. As Reppert pointed out:
. . . let us suppose that brain state A, which is token identical to the thought that all men are mortal, and brain state B, which is token identical to the thought that Socrates is a man, together cause the belief that Socrates is mortal. It isn’t enough for rational inference that these events be those beliefs, it is also necessary that the causal transaction be in virtue of the content of those thoughts . . . [[But] if naturalism is true, then the propositional content is irrelevant to the causal transaction that produces the conclusion, and [[so] we do not have a case of rational inference. In rational inference, as Lewis puts it, one thought causes another thought not by being, but by being seen to be, the ground for it. But causal transactions in the brain occur in virtue of the brain’s being in a particular type of state that is relevant to physical causal transactions.
I pointed out, again and again, that we do contemplate, exhibiting mindedness thereby; this can be seen through something like the Glasgow Coma test. This self-evident fact of contemplation is critically connected to self-aware, insightful reasoning and responsible choice. As Reppert put it: "It isn’t enough for rational inference that these events be those beliefs, it is also necessary that the causal transaction be in virtue of the content of those thoughts." When that is brought to bear, your strawman caricature collapses. And in the wake of that collapse, it is evident that you would reduce contemplation to computation. Which is blind and non-rational, as a cause-effect chain. What saves it is that a properly designed computational device will execute certain designed or programmed steps with more or less reliability, having been debugged. But still GIGO lurks. Where also, such entities as are adequate to perform any significant task, will invariably be well beyond the FSCO/I limit. They trace to design. And so, we see a design chain reflecting the principle that FSCO/I is not credibly explained on blind chance and necessity. In the end, that traces back, beyond the computational devices in the cell, to the FSCO/I embedded in the fine tuning of the observed cosmos. Thus, we see beyond. a cosmological design inference. Mind, ontologically before matter. KFkairosfocus_{June 19, 2014
June
06
Jun
19
19
2014
08:04 PM
8
08
04
PM
PDT}

KF:
We see in the thought exercise, ability to couple signals to the BIV, such that it experiences a virtual reality…So, there is no in=principle reason why Glasgow type tests could not be administered.
The essence of the envatted brain thought experiment is the brain’s isolation from genuine sensory input and genuine motor output. Even in your cartoon above, the brain is described as “in a state of self-delusion,” and in your comment above you describe it as experiencing “the requisite sensations in a virtual world.” The classic envatted brain in these senses would give responses to the Glasgow identical to those provided by a rock. Nor could the Glasgow distinguish between a brain in a vat in a coma an a conscious brain in a vat. Which all goes to the uselessness of your citation of the Glasgow in this context. Of course, you’re free to envision visual and motor interfaces between envatted brains and the world - brains wrapped in robots, etc. - but then you are envisioning something other than “a brain in a vat,” in the sense of the classic thought experiment. A meaningless move in this discussion. What I have stated is that the envatted brain as described your illustration above would give no responses to the Glasgow. That point stands. But you’re right, this is a side issue. The Glasgow question from which this is a detour: Given that I stated from the outset that rocks don’t dream (aren’t conscious, don’t contemplate, etc.), why do you think that results of administration of the Glasgow to a rock would present the least "challenge" to me?
A rock quite evidently has no dreams and manifests no signs of potential to do so.
Yes - in the sense that it exhibits the wrong physical structure for dreaming, and/or exhibits none of the dispositions that invariably reflect the presence of such structure. In contrast, we do find an example of the requisite structure in human beings - e.g., brains and nervous systems. But you entertain the notion that specific physical structures - brains and nervous systems - are not required for dreaming, so that reasoning is not available to you. So I ask again: why can’t that which dreams without a brain be a rock? Joe said, in response to the question “on what basis do claim that rocks don’t dream?”:
Rocks do not have a mind nor consciousness.
But throughout this discussion “dreaming” has obviously been a proxy for “contemplation, etc.,” i.e. for “mind and consciousness.” So Joe’s exchange reduces to, “Rocks don’t have a mind or consciousness because rocks don't have a mind or consciousness.” And that does prezactly capture your reasoning.Reciprocating Bill_{June 19, 2014
June
06
Jun
19
19
2014
07:19 PM
7
07
19
PM
PDT}

Mapou: Again, the matter is simple. Rock or dust can at most be a material cause for computation. Mind behaves at a different order and has a different identity. That we are formed of dust, i.e. are embodied also affects, but influence is not equal to determination. We are responsible to live above our feelings and appetites, for example we must manage or eating in interests of health, exercise level, sleeping patterns, saving and spending habits, alcohol consumption, sexual behaviour and more. And such ideological commitmrnt I have as I do is to the centrality of responsible liberty as opposed to licence and domination. That makes me a convinced, constitutional democrat. That is consistent with but does not determine my views on the pivotal centrality of self-aware, reasoning, intentional mindedness as fact no 1 of our existence. As I just clipped from Reppert as a useful summary, the effective reduction of that reasoning ability to blind computation is at once fatal to reason. But, it seems some pretty big matches are being recklessly played with in our day. And frankly, our civilisation is about to burn down flat because of our collective folly. KFkairosfocus_{June 19, 2014
June
06
Jun
19
19
2014
01:58 PM
1
01
58
PM
PDT}

kairosfocus, I am not a materialist but I will not for a second believe that matter is unimportant or irrelevant to consciousness/mind. The logic of your argument is weak, IMO. It leaves too much to interpretation. There is no doubt in my mind that the spirit controls the brain but only to an extent. Our genetic programming dictates a lot about how we behave (hunger, thirst, sex, etc.) and our spirit is subservient to those material instincts. Deny at your own detriment. Again, my argument is simple. The mind requires a knower and a known. The two are opposites. The opposite of spirit is matter. IMO, this is all that needs to be said. P.S. It is obvious to me that you are defending a strong personal ideology.Mapou_{June 19, 2014
June
06
Jun
19
19
2014
11:51 AM
11
11
51
AM
PDT}

F/N: Let me remind us of Reppert's analysis and implied warning on the significance of the difference between computing and contemplation, where the contemplation is not accounted for on blind computational cause effect chains so it must come from somewhere else, nor can it be viewed as simply an epiphenomenon riding on and controlled by that computation:
. . . let us suppose that brain state A, which is token identical to the thought that all men are mortal, and brain state B, which is token identical to the thought that Socrates is a man, together cause the belief that Socrates is mortal. It isn’t enough for rational inference that these events be those beliefs, it is also necessary that the causal transaction be in virtue of the content of those thoughts . . . [[But] if naturalism is true, then the propositional content is irrelevant to the causal transaction that produces the conclusion, and [[so] we do not have a case of rational inference. In rational inference, as Lewis puts it, one thought causes another thought not by being, but by being seen to be, the ground for it. But causal transactions in the brain occur in virtue of the brain’s being in a particular type of state that is relevant to physical causal transactions.
Let us think twice again before we strike the matches and set them to the dry grass. KFkairosfocus_{June 19, 2014
June
06
Jun
19
19
2014
11:28 AM
11
11
28
AM
PDT}

THOUGHT: What is at stake here, in the end is responsible freedom and thence, rights, freedoms and responsibilities in society. And science, falsely so called has been co-opted by dressing up a priori imposed materialism in the lab coat. Never mind the inescapable self referential incoherence that flows from it. Let us understand the matches we are playing with here before we burn down our civilisation. KFkairosfocus_{June 19, 2014
June
06
Jun
19
19
2014
11:21 AM
11
11
21
AM
PDT}

Mapou, Please read the post and onward linked. You will see why I freely say, computation is a mechanical, blind process . . . Liebnitz's mill wheels grinding. It is GIGO limited and does not exhibit reason, knowledge or insight. It is a blind cause effect chain in a designed system. Contemplation is self-aware and consiously rational. As we directly experience. We may reasonably infer its presence in others through the sort of process involved in say a Glasgow Coma type test. Indeed, if it were not so, we would undermine the credibility of reason, warrant, knowledge, choice and morality so also freedom . . . exactly what is so much under fire today. Indeed, I see where Texas Governor Perry was ridiculed and dismissed for pointing out on alcoholism that even where a genetic influence is strongly suspected or known in behaviour, it does not remove the issue of free responsible choice and disciplined behaviour in our own interest, that of family, and that of the public our behaviour may adversely affect. (Just think drunk driving. And jut think Alcoholics Anonymous 12-step recovery programme, based on spiritual disciplines.) Beyond, we see that fine tuning points decisively to mind beyond material cosmos. Indeed as its designer. We have no good reason to reject the possibility of mind beyond and independent of brain matter. Nor do we have good reason to demand that consciousness be based on embodiment. KFkairosfocus_{June 19, 2014
June
06
Jun
19
19
2014
11:16 AM
11
11
16
AM
PDT}

@125: I meant to write: You cannot separate the two and still have consciousness.Mapou_{June 19, 2014
June
06
Jun
19
19
2014
09:02 AM
9
09
02
AM
PDT}

kairosfocus:
Mapou: Please do not conflate that mind works with brain in an embodied entity, with the idea that brain is necessary for mind to exist or function. We have striking evidence of contemplation transcending possibilities of computation. We need to open our eyes to that evidence, which is pretty directly accessible to each of us, and which we can evaluate and analyse. KF
I have never seen this evidence you speak of. Consciousness requires a knower and a known. The two are complementary opposites. You can separate the two and still have consciousness.Mapou_{June 19, 2014
June
06
Jun
19
19
2014
09:01 AM
9
09
01
AM
PDT}

Joe: Prezactly. Contemplation is not computation. Rocks only get us to computation, and only as material cause. The purposeful, designing, actuating cause of computational devices is designers, who exhibit creative intelligence and purpose thus decision, skill, creative non-routinised non algorithmic oracular problem solving and more. Mind over and ontologically prior to matter. Mind as supervisor in cybernetic loops. Mind, as the basis for an ordered cosmos set up in many complex fine tuned ways for C-Chemistry, aqueous medium, cell-based life. Don't get me into the implications of the physics to get us to water and Carbon Chemistry, in a world where thanks to subtle forces and factors, H, He, O and C are the first four elements with N close by and 5th IIRC in our galaxy. That's a put-up job if I ever saw one, and Sir Fred Hoyle rightly said that a reasonable conclusion is there are no blind forces worth talking about in the physical world and the world of biological life. That Nobel equivalent prize holding Bible thumping fundy -- NOT.* KF * Onlookers, he was a life-long agnostic.kairosfocus_{June 19, 2014
June
06
Jun
19
19
2014
06:39 AM
6
06
39
AM
PDT}

PPPS: The existence of a complex, fine tuned observed cosmos is a solid roadblock in the path of all who would want to pretend that there is only evidence of a brain or similar computational substrate for any intelligent mind or self-aware agency. It reveals an underlying ideological a priori, evolutionary materialism or its influence. So long as there is a possible world in which mind is independent of matter, such a demand should not be accepted. If you wish to argue for a wholly material cosmos, show that is so. Otherwise, this demand dressed up in a lab coat and disguised under a radical redefinition of science and its methods is little more than implicit question begging. Which also runs into the self-referential incoherence of such materialism.kairosfocus_{June 19, 2014
June
06
Jun
19
19
2014
06:30 AM
6
06
30
AM
PDT}

PPS: How many times have I pointed out now, that we recognise contemplative intelligence in the end from its intelligent, self and situation aware creative and even purposeful, designing behavioural characteristics? Rocks show no evidence -- note the term already used, "evident" -- of being anything but passive objects acted on by blind forces of chance and necessity. I could pick up a stick of chalk and write and draw on the chalkboard. It will not complain of pain, and the complex glyph encoded information on the board is not reckoned as coming spontaneously from that bit of rock, but from its wielder. Likewise, with the computer keyboard and its FSCO/I rich text output. The chalk stick example is new, but the rest has been repeatedly pointed out, just diverted from. And the selectively hyperskeptical resistance to the patent is increasingly evident to those looking on.kairosfocus_{June 19, 2014
June
06
Jun
19
19
2014
06:23 AM
6
06
23
AM
PDT}

R-Bill: This is now obviously a red herring led away to a strawman. I will however note that we see in the thought exercise, ability to couple signals to the BIV, such that it experiences a virtual reality. This means ability to couple image, audio and similar info, presumably by feeding input neural channels. There is no in-principle reason why such a case could not enfold loudspeaker output and even textual output from typing on a virtual keyboard . . . we do that with tablets. Similarly, PTZ cams track and can be controlled, responding. So, there is no in=principle reason why Glasgow type tests could not be administered. And going to the next level, suggest the BIV is enfolded in a robotic -- or is that now cyborg -- entity. Glasgow type tests would be relevant. And, so would creativity tests that extend verbal responsiveness. And, for that matter, a robot without BIV could be similarly tested. I propose as a useful exercise, the game Go, which is a creative strategic game beyond the reach of blind chance and mechanical necessity . . . chessboards are, unfortunately, too small. Maybe a 3-d version 8 x 8 x 8 -- 2^9 positions -- might work. Or just simply put up a complex war game with the usual range of strategic, tactical and logistical as well as diplomatic and economic factors. Y'know, things that require genuine insight and creativity and are not vulnerable to brute force computation. The answer is, that computers are hopeless at Go. I would not bet on a computer vs an insightful strategist in a war game . . . or, a war. (And this includes strategic marketing.) So, we can see that the issue has not been successfully blunted. KF PS: A BIV in a coma would then not focus and track, would not speak coherently and situationally responsively, and would not text sensibly. It obviously would not be playing Go either. The Glasgow type test is still highly relevant. And BTW, this still is not addressing the actual seat of creative consciousness.kairosfocus_{June 19, 2014
June
06
Jun
19
19
2014
06:13 AM
6
06
13
AM
PDT}

By the way, KF, let's suppose that your envatted brain, still wired up, suffered a medical malady and lapsed into a coma. Describe assessing that coma by means of the Glasgow.Reciprocating Bill_{June 19, 2014
June
06
Jun
19
19
2014
05:11 AM
5
05
11
AM
PDT}

Again, given your non-physicalist framework – one within which dreaming may occur independent of brains and that posits mind behind and ontologically prior to material cosmos, on what basis do claim that rocks don’t dream?
Rocks do not have a mind nor consciousness.Joe_{June 19, 2014
June
06
Jun
19
19
2014
05:08 AM
5
05
08
AM
PDT}

KF:
The brain in vat there is hooked up to a PC that is feeding a vision of a person walking, presumably with the requisite sensations in a virtual world.
But Glasgow stimuli are administered in the real world, and would not present themselves within the stream of virtual experience supplied to the envatted brain. Nor would there be any Glasgow responses, which are observed and recorded in the real world.
Let us come back from this side-track and focus the main point.
Yes. That was this question, still unanswered: Given that I stated from the outset that rocks don’t dream (aren’t conscious, don’t contemplate, etc.), why do you think that results of administration of the Glasgow to a rock would present the least challenge to me? I take that as indicative of your incomprehension of the question I have posed to you.
I repeat
We both repeat.
a rock quite evidently has no dreams and manifests no signs of potential to do so.
It is evident to me because a rock lacks the requisite physical structure for dreaming, as exemplified by, for example, a mammalian brain (in the instance of literal dreaming) and higher cortical functioning (in the instance of human contemplation). But you entertain the idea that dreaming can occur in the absence of brains, so these facts, as obvious as they are, aren’t available to you. You think dreaming may occur absent a brain. Why can’t that which dreams without a brain be a rock?
This begs huge questions, implicitly imposes materialist a prioris in doing so…
Of course it does. And from within that framework it is obvious to that rocks don’t dream, as rocks lack the physical structures/functions we know are required for dreaming, as shown by 100 years of empirical neuroscience. My question to you is: given your non-physicalist framework - one within which dreaming may occur independent of brains - on what basis do claim as a first principle that rocks don’t dream?
and utterly fails to address evidence of mind behind and ontologically prior to material cosmos.
Nor have I addressed the price of eggs in China. Again, given your non-physicalist framework - one within which dreaming may occur independent of brains and that posits mind behind and ontologically prior to material cosmos, on what basis do claim that rocks don’t dream?Reciprocating Bill_{June 19, 2014
June
06
Jun
19
19
2014
05:05 AM
5
05
05
AM
PDT}

RB:
Given that you are willing to entertain the notion that brains are not necessary for dreaming (contemplation, subjectivity, etc.), what DO you think is necessary?
A conscious mind- that has been very clear, even to me. So what is your problem, RB?Joe_{June 19, 2014
June
06
Jun
19
19
2014
04:55 AM
4
04
55
AM
PDT}

D: Interesting, could you give us the link a bit better? Use angle brackets and the a = href and "" -- oops, STRAIGHT not smart double quotes -- tag surrounding text, an HTML standard for putting in a hyperlink. KFkairosfocus_{June 19, 2014
June
06
Jun
19
19
2014
04:06 AM
4
04
06
AM
PDT}

R-Bill:
there are no instances of intelligent, self- and situation-aware organisms that lack brains and nervous systems or their functional equivalents
This begs huge questions, implicitly imposes materialist a prioris in doing so, and utterly fails to address evidence of mind behind and ontologically prior to material cosmos. Please, re[think. KFkairosfocus_{June 19, 2014
June
06
Jun
19
19
2014
04:03 AM
4
04
03
AM
PDT}

Mapou: Please do not conflate that mind works with brain in an embodied entity, with the idea that brain is necessary for mind to exist or function. We have striking evidence of contemplation transcending possibilities of computation. We need to open our eyes to that evidence, which is pretty directly accessible to each of us, and which we can evaluate and analyse. KFkairosfocus_{June 19, 2014
June
06
Jun
19
19
2014
04:00 AM
4
04
00
AM
PDT}

Mung: A brain is a specially configured refined rock . . . or more broadly stardust. The neural network pattern of organisation it uses is a computational, signal processing one. Basically pulse frequency modulation on a 12-decade logging scale IIRC that last bit correctly. Hence BTW the Weber-Fechner log sensitivity law for sensation. And hence too the natural emergence of a log scale for stellar magnitude steps some 2000 years ago, and also the logging relationship for loudness of sounds. Computation is mechanical, blind and GIGO-limited. Hence the implications of Booze, mung bucket contents, ganja etc, and of things like Alzheimers to mess up the I/O part and doubtless confuse and impair the oracular supervisor. As a case that is very close to me exemplifies, under those circumstances when something comes through, it tends to reflect the heart. Caregivers report: "nothing but God." As well I know from a lifelong relationship. KFkairosfocus_{June 19, 2014
June
06
Jun
19
19
2014
03:56 AM
3
03
56
AM
PDT}

R-Bill: Please. Simply LOOK at the drawing you tried to use to make rhetorical points. The brain in vat there is hooked up to a PC that is feeding a vision of a person walking, presumably with the requisite sensations in a virtual world. Complete with cables to various attachment points or plugs, by my count four. While I would not expect detailed accuracy from such a cartoon, it is obvious that this is a brain hooked up to an i/o interface, and presumably with vat systems supporting the brain similar to one in a functioning body. Let us come back from this side-track and focus the main point. To do so, why don't you re-read the OP and go on to look at the linked wider discussion and also please watch the video that illustrates just how a mechanical integrator works by accumulating flows of change in a linear, controlled way. (Where of course analogue computers of fond memory work by rearranging differential equations to put the highest order on one side then setting up a cascade of integrators to carry out the requisite chain of integration on input functions with appropriate feedback. Mechanical couplings can do it, but by the time I came along, it was more usual to use op amps, which can do wonderful and astonishing feats of signal processing . . I remember being awed by what my first simple logging amp used to linearise an exponential signal did; amazing what a diode can do. These days, all that is simulated, but I think something is lost in that.] I repeat, a rock quite evidently has no dreams and manifests no signs of potential to do so. And, we are dealing with an empirical world, where observation rules over speculation -- so the rock needs to pass a Glasgow-type test of functional, creative, contemplative, appropriately responsive intelligence. A refined rock formed into a Thomson integrator is a mechanical blind device, computation not contemplation. Likewise, a digital computer and we can show, a neural network node also [cf the second infographic above]. Each of these is blindly mechanical, depending for success at computation upon separate correct FSCO/I rich design. So, what we have is that rocks (and more broadly bits of stardust) provide raw materials for computational devices. We have not even begun to address the source of ability to contemplate. Which we experience within, rely on for creative complex intelligent behaviour and can devise Glasgow-type tests to evaluate. As is done on a routine basis in a trauma centre. Self-aware, conscious creative, designing mind is not explained on clusters of computational devices and GIGO-limited processing or programming. I suggest you ponder the two-tier controller Smith cybernetic loop Model . . . with the point that an oracular supervisor can work with a computational I/O controller in the loop with also a two-port memory information store, and onwards the issue of an oracle machine not limited by GIGO and Turing algorithmic requisites. I suggest quantum influence interfaces and I further suggest that mindedness resides in the oracular supervisor that holds the self-aware in-the-world model. Where also impairment can affect performance dramatically. My basic point is, if we will but open our paradigms to see, there is abundant and easily accessible evidence that we have not fully grasped the world and its entities. In particular -- apart from self referential absurdities -- evolutionary materialism is forced to try to reduce mind to computational matter, and ends in further absurdities, If it tries instead to argue emergence, it ends in poof magic that boils down to, here, a miracle -- something of a new order enters. KFkairosfocus_{June 19, 2014
June
06
Jun
19
19
2014
03:40 AM
3
03
40
AM
PDT}

I completely disagree with the view that knowledge does not reside in the brain. Consciousness requires two complementary opposite entities, a knower and a known. If thinking did not occur in the brain, we would not need one.Mapou_{June 18, 2014
June
06
Jun
18
18
2014
07:31 PM
7
07
31
PM
PDT}

I have been working on a speech learning/recognition program that does dream (I'm assuming I understand the argument correctly). When it is not actively recognizing sounds, the program scans through random patterns and sequences in its memory looking for redundancies and contradictions. I believe this is what the brain does automatically when we dream while asleep. IMO, if our brains could not dream, we would go mad and stop functioning.Mapou_{June 18, 2014
June
06
Jun
18
18
2014
07:22 PM
7
07
22
PM
PDT}

Given the right configuration, a rock could be a brain. And thus it follows that a brain could be a rock. So why can't rocks dream? Well, apparently only properly configured rocks can be brains. But then, still, a brain could just be a properly configured rock. So why can't rocks dream?Mung_{June 18, 2014
June
06
Jun
18
18
2014
07:09 PM
7
07
09
PM
PDT}

KF:
Do you know that to be the case in regards to that brain in a vat? …As in, just as Dr Hawking’s voice now emanates from a computer but is his [though the interface is less sophisticated], an interface to a brain in a vat would be of a different order from your imagination. Remember, the coupling is sophisticated enough — as imagined — to have a screen image fed to the visual cortex.
A brain in a vat interfaced with the world by means of a multimedia, audio-visual, two way interface with the world wired directly into the visual cortex would no longer be the “brain in a vat” of your thought experiment. Brains in vats in the sense of the thought experiment would be no more responsive to the Glasgow than a rock. Point being: the Glasgow is irrelevant to the questions at hand. More important, given that I stated from the outset that rocks don’t dream (aren’t conscious, don’t contemplate, etc.), why do you think that results of administration of the Glasgow to a rock would present the least challenge to me? I take that as indicative of your incomprehension of the question I have posed to you.
So, I insist: absent good evidence of intelligent, self- and situation-aware interactions, we have good reason to accept that rocks have no dreams, which is where all of this started.
That’s because there are no instances of intelligent, self- and situation-aware organisms that lack brains and nervous systems or their functional equivalents, and rocks are devoid brains and nervous systems. In fact, a century of neuroscience shows that intelligent, self- and situation-aware interaction is reliable evidence of the presence of same. In short: what a rock’s lack of charisma discloses is the absence of the sort of physical and functional organization required for dreaming (contemplation, etc.) - organization that is present in human beings and sustains contemplative awareness, among other things - including (but not limited to) brains and nervous systems. So this is really a restatement of MY rationale for rejecting dreaming in rocks. I know that rocks don’t exhibit self- and situational awareness, and don’t dream, because they lack the physical organization required for dreaming - namely brains and nervous systems - upon which both dreaming and self- and situation-aware human interaction are contingent. As you entertain decoupling dreaming and brains (and the notion that brains aren’t necessary for dreaming) that argument isn’t available to you. You think dreaming may be present absent a brain. Why can’t that which dreams without a brain be a rock?Reciprocating Bill_{June 17, 2014
June
06
Jun
17
17
2014
01:56 PM
1
01
56
PM
PDT}

KF, Interesting OP and follow-up discussion. Thanks. Here's a comment copied from another thread:
The more we understand it, the more amazed we are by what we seem to understand. Every wow! seems to lead us to a newer WOW! in what looks like the unending revelation of the ultimate reality. Many outstanding questions that get answered lead to new unanswered questions. BTW, the “3rd. way” could use a little help from a friend. If you want to give them a hand, go to this thread: https://uncommondescent.com.....ent-503971 Note that the “2nd. way” seems ‘unofficially’ out of the discussion, while the “First Way” appears more interested in the serious research on how the biological systems work, in order to* improve medical treatments and healthcare in general. The First Way is -at least partially- related to those who were called ‘The Way’ in the first century of this age, because they followed the True Way, which is The Only Way. :)
(*) most importantly, in order to praise our Maker!Dionisio_{June 17, 2014
June
06
Jun
17
17
2014
11:13 AM
11
11
13
AM
PDT}

Mung: Thanks. A brain IS a rock, or more accurately, refined reorganised dust -- stardust. That is precisely why it is a GIGO-limited, blindly mechanical computational device and not the credible source of contemplation. It may be very important in processing and interfacing to the world [and the source of confusion where it is damaged or deranged, as in the mad are often very logical but disconnected from reality and a lot of senile dementia can be seen in terms of breakdown of ability to process i/o info flows leading to confusion about, frustration with and gradual isolation from the world* (e.g. losing ability to accurately perceive text** or be able to communicate verbally) . . . ], but that is very different from being the causal root of self-aware, contemplative mindedness. This is of course exactly the point that R-Bill et al struggle to see. KF *PS: Consider what happens when a cell phone is dropped repeatedly and gradually breaks down. It no longer functions properly and comes across as confused and non-functional, but all the while the signals are still there, just there is a breakdown in ability to carry out i/o functionality, isolating the other party to the conversation and perhaps confusing him or her. And, if the way it works is distorting what you say, the party on the other side may mis- perceive and respond inappropriately. Eventually, s/he may not be able to control aspects of the call as they appear through the increasingly broken phone, which may eventually fail altogether. GP's analogy here is useful, and points out that we need to focus on where the two paradigms critically differ, not where they are in-common. That point is not computation but contemplation. ** PPS: I suggest that neural networks with controllable feedback loops . . . trigger the loop by means of an enabling signal, whereupon the loop network triggers acquired performance [in effect a subroutine call and release] . . . can account for a lot of memory storage based learning, but not for the oracular insights that are needed for genuine creativeness of highly complex entities. Nor, do they account for responsible, rational freedom, which is pivotal to reason and to morality.kairosfocus_{June 17, 2014
June
06
Jun
17
17
2014
02:15 AM
2
02
15
AM
PDT}

Indium: If You and R-Bill were saying that a brain is one means of interfacing to the world, and so a rock lacks that and is not a credible dreamer, that would be one thing. What is happening here is that this is serving as a distractor from the pivotal matter that disorganisation is not adequate for computation much less contemplation. Multiplied by the distraction from the further point that computation is inherently a mechanical blind process dependent on GIGO-limited configurations of hard and software. Where, on neither of these cases have we even come close to addressing the root of contemplation. But, by imposing an ideological a priori materialist interdict, there is a blindness to where the evidence points, namely that self aware mindedness -- our fact of rational existence no 1 -- strongly indicates that we live in a more complex more surprising or even more astonishing world than we may be wont to believe. KF PS: You may wish to read Leibnitz, Monadology 17 as is in the onward linked from the OP. kairosfocus_{June 17, 2014
June
06
Jun
17
17
2014
02:08 AM
2
02
08
AM
PDT}

R-Bill:
if you administer the Glasgow to the conscious vat-bound brain in your illustration above (go ahead, they’re up there together in your OP), you’ll obtain the same result as from a rock. No less than rocks, brains in vats have no eyes, don’t verbalize and don’t engage in motor movements in response to painful stimulation, either. Where does that leave your challenge?
Do you know that to be the case in regards to that brain in a vat? As in, have you been around since the late 1990's, in which PCs have become multimedia audio-visual, two way interfaces? As in, just as Dr Hawking's voice now emanates from a computer but is his [though the interface is less sophisticated], an interface to a brain in a vat would be of a different order from your imagination. Remember, the coupling is sophisticated enough -- as imagined -- to have a screen image fed to the visual cortex. (And, I note how you have yet to acknowledge that the core point being made is self-evident: rocks have neither dreams nor beliefs and cannot be deluded that they do. By contrast, if you are self-aware, even if deluded or dreaming a fantasy, you cannot be mistaken that you are self-aware and have perceptions and beliefs.) Next, it seems to me that it is the a priori materialism driven failure to follow a paradigm shift that is underlying your further points. The reason I highlighted the Glasgow scale, is that it shows how we routinely infer to self-aware intelligence from interactions that manifest intelligence, especially through generating FSCO/I. A conscious person will do that, a carved statue or a rock in your backyard will not. Where, it is a commonplace of scientific thought, that we ought to have an empirical basis for our assertions and conclusions. So, I insist: absent good evidence of intelligent, self- and situation-aware interactions, we have good reason to accept that rocks have no dreams, which is where all of this started. Where also, I point out that I suggested the Glasgow test or a substantial equivalent. May I beg to remind, that while science routinely deals with "unobserveds" [electrons etc have never been directly "seen"], on an inference to best explanation basis, we can accept the reality of such based on a cluster of phenomena that point to such an underlying entity as best explanation. Whole fields of pure and applied science and large slices of the global economy now rest on the accepted reality of that unobserved electron. And, when I pointed out that I am not convinced something needs a brain to be minded, you missed the inner world, self-awareness point being made. Are we acting like Aristotelians, blinded by a paradigm and proverbially refusing to look through the telescope to see for ourselves? (Actually, it is worse, as we must use self-aware mindedness to interact with the world at all in the ways we are interested in. As in, what is that strange metal tube you have stuck to your eyes? Nothing! Really?) Have you taken time to look at the Smith model (and BTW, Derek Smith is an active researcher in the field)? If you do so, you will observe a distinction between the volitional etc supervisory controller and an in the loop controller that serves as an i/o interface for the first. I suggest we ponder the first as oracular. If you had suggested that a rock lacks the interface features for effective embodiment of such an oracular supervisory controller, that would be one thing. To demand a brain or the close like as a basis for such an oracle is another. One, that begs big worldviews questions while wearing a lab coat. And, where also, it is patent from details given that we look in vain to blind GIGO-limited computation for the seat of self-awareness. That is, we have an immediately and massively accessible fact -- fact no 1 of our minded existence, through which we access all other facts we are consciously aware of -- that cuts crossways against the notion of reduction of contemplation to computation. Where, too, this goes on to the issue that mindedness, reasoning, knowing, warranting, etc cannot be driven by blind chance and mechanical necessity, if they are to have any credibility. That is, if our scheme of thought implies chance and mechanical necessity working through accidents of genetics and conditioning etc, drive and control our thoughts, reasoning, attempts to warrant and ground knowledge, decide etc etc, we are in self referential incoherence. Evolutionary materialism, never mind the lab coats and boasting of cornering the market on rationality, is irretrievably intellectually bankrupt. Plantinga, in underscoring the relvance of his argument against naturalism based on reason, clips Churchland, P:
Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in . . . feeding, fleeing, fighting, and reproducing. The principal chore of nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive . . . . Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is advantageous so long as it is geared to the organism's way of life and enhances the organism's chances of survival [[Churchland's emphasis]. Truth, whatever that is [[ --> let's try, from Aristotle in Metaphysics, 1011b: "that which says of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not" . . . ], definitely takes the hindmost. (Plantinga also adds this from Darwin: "the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?")
See the dismissiveness of truth? Notice Darwin's horrid doubt? See the problem where the pragmatics of survival have no necessary connexion to the requisites of a seriously rational mind? See why there has been so much speculation about abracadabra, mind emerges, poof? Reppert's retort to all such is apt:
. . . let us suppose that brain state A, which is token identical to the thought that all men are mortal, and brain state B, which is token identical to the thought that Socrates is a man, together cause the belief that Socrates is mortal. It isn’t enough for rational inference that these events be those beliefs, it is also necessary that the causal transaction be in virtue of the content of those thoughts . . . [[But] if naturalism is true, then the propositional content is irrelevant to the causal transaction that produces the conclusion, and [[so] we do not have a case of rational inference. In rational inference, as Lewis puts it, one thought causes another thought not by being, but by being seen to be, the ground for it. But causal transactions in the brain occur in virtue of the brain’s being in a particular type of state that is relevant to physical causal transactions.
That , too, is why I took such pains to highlight just how analogue, digital and neural network computations are ALL inherently blind, non-rational mechanical processes. And the software that programs or configures such, is likewise GIGO-limited. Where also, the FSCO/I involved has but one empirically known and analytically credible source: contemplative, insightful mind. We have every reason to see that self-aware, contemplative mind is a fundamental reality, one that is not driven and controlled by blind mechanical forces, chance and the like. But, that is the challenge isn't it, such independence of mind points to a very different world than the one commonly painted for us by the materialists in lab coats, such as -- most recently -- Mr Tyson et al. KFkairosfocus_{June 17, 2014
June
06
Jun
17
17
2014
01:57 AM
1
01
57
AM
PDT}

1 2 3 … 5 Next

You must be logged in to post a comment.

Leave a Reply