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Methodological naturalism: If that’s the way forward, … let’s go sideways

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Having connected the dots of the vast conspiracy run by the Discovery Institute so as to include non-materialist neuroscience, Steven Novella goes on to cheerlead, for methodological naturalism – about which I will say only this:

Methodological naturalism is usually described as meaning that science can consider only natural causes. But by itself that doesn’t mean anything because we don’t know everything that is in nature. For example, if – as Rupert Sheldrake thinks – some animals can demonstrate telepathy, then telepathy is a natural cause. And so?

And so Richard Dawkins goes to a great deal of trouble to attempt to discredit Sheldrake because the hidden assumption is that nature mustn’t include telepathy.

In practice, methodological naturalism frequently becomes a method of defending bad – and often ridiculously bad.- ideas in order to save naturalism. Think of the persistent efforts to “prove” that humans don’t “really” behave altruistically. In fact, we sometimes do. Here’s a recent story, for example, about a Texas woman named Marilyn Mock who went to an auction of foreclosed homes, ran into Tracey Orr – an unemployed woman she had never met – who had come to endure the sale of her home, and …

Orr couldn’t hold it in. The tears flowed. She pointed to the auction brochure at a home that didn’t have a picture. “That’s my house,” she said.

Within moments, the four-bedroom, two-bath home in Pottsboro, Texas, went up for sale. People up front began casting their bids. The home that Orr purchased in September 2004 was slipping away.

She stood and moved toward the crowd. Behind her, Mock got into the action.

“She didn’t know I was doing it,” Mock says. “I just kept asking her if [her home] was worth it, and she just kept crying. She probably thought I was crazy, ‘Why does this woman keep asking me that?’ “

Mock says she bought the home for about $30,000. That’s when Mock did what most bidders at a foreclosure auction never do.

“She said, ‘I did this for you. I’m doing this for you,’ ” Orr says. “When it was all done, I was just in shock.”

But it was true. Mock bought the house for her and said she would accept as repayment only what Orr can afford. Why?

“If it was you, you’d want somebody to stop and help you.”

Now, a “methodological naturalist” would

(1) try to find a chimpanzee who does something similar and make up a story that explains how that behaviour was naturally selected for in primates

or (since that might take a while)

(2) assign a selfish motive for Mock that is consistent with survival of the fittest.

One might at first be tempted to conclude that methodological naturalism is methodological idiocy. But no, let’s look a bit more carefully. Notice what is not a permitted assumption: We can’t assume that some people just think they should help others – even at considerable cost. In other words, the plain evidence of human behavior cannot be accepted at face value.

Now, there is nothing especially scientific about that belief. “Scientific” means “dealing with the evidence from nature,” which includes a fair sprinkling of unselfish or not-very-selfish humans (as well as of the other type). Indeed, superior human intelligence probably explains the tendency to imagine another’s feelings (= “If it was you, you’d want somebody to stop and help you”). So we can account scientifically for why humans can behave as Mock did.

The problem is that such an account, while useful, fails to support a key false belief underlying methodological naturalism: That humans are really the 98% chimpanzee and cannot in principle have motives absent in chimpanzees. Apart from that false belief, no one would bother trying to find an exotic explanation for Mock’s behaviour.

The principle role that methodological naturalism plays right now is to enable false beliefs to pose as science and to prevent them being discredited by evidence.

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Comments
1) If you agree that science has shown the earth to be billions of years old, and Can you falsify the claim that the earth is billions of years old? :-)tribune7
November 22, 2008
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nullasalus, You wrote:
I said outright that science is entirely capable of investigating YEC claims insofar as they are claims about the natural world. Claiming that this proves the YEC God doesn’t exist is what’s inane, for reasons I’ve demonstrated.
I must have missed the demonstration. Look -- here's the reasoning, spelled out explicitly: 1) If you agree that science has shown the earth to be billions of years old, and 2) if a YEC insists that his God created the world just a few thousand years ago, over a period of six days, formed a man named Adam out of the dust, formed a woman named Eve out of Adam's rib, and so on; then 3) the God he has in mind does not exist. A different God -- one who created the universe billions of years ago, and is fond of beetles and tsunamis, for example -- might exist. That is a separate question. But the God envisioned by the YEC does not exist. A hypothesis concerning the supernatural -- the existence of a God with certain characteristics -- is presented by the YEC. This hypothesis has testable consequences. Science shows that the consequences do not obtain. The supernatural hypothesis is falsified by science.ribczynski
November 22, 2008
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What is the difference between methodological naturalism and monism? The former is a modern repackaging of the latter. It seems the only difference is that monists quote Goethe more frequently than their modern counterparts.Vladimir Krondan
November 22, 2008
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Just a reminder to people, the terms science, life, intelligence and species all have no commonly accepted definitions. So when we get into long assertions of what is and what is not science it may be a meaningless discussion as we talk past each other. Also the term evolution is one that has a problem with definition but here there are more solid attempts to define it. Some person a few years ago on another site defined science simply as inferences based on facts. Then one can examine that inference in more detail by generating new facts to see if they are consistent with that inference. Let's take two inferences for evolutionary biology. 1. Darwinian processes as currently defined lead to macro evolution (and by the way macro evolution is not currently defined but for purposes here we will call macro evolution the origin of novel complex functional capabilities in a population.) 2. Darwinian processes as currently defined cannot lead to macro evolution 1 is the current paradigm in biological science and 2 is an ID inference. If one examines the evidence for each, 2 is completely supported while 1 is not. A lot of Behe's work has been to examine the evidence for 1 and 2 and all his finding come down as supporting 2 while the entire evolutionary biology community devotes a good portion of its efforts on 1 so far with no joy. Inference 2 is a black swan hypothesis, that is trying to prove a negative by more and more information until possibly a black swan is discovered (I recently saw the black swan while in New Zealand where they were imported from Australia.) It is also subject to a God of the Gaps argument but in no way is it not good science. Do not confuse the two ideas. ID and evolutionary biology accept a third innference as having lots of evidence to support it. 3. Darwinian processes as currently defined lead to micro evolution where micro evolution is just a change in the population gene pool over time to form new characteristics, none of which are novel complex functional capabilities but often lead to new species or variants given that definition for species is problematic. Nearly all of what is published in evolutionary biology is about 3 which most of the people who support ID have no problem. So as far as I am concerned ID is very much science, uses the tools of science as well as logic to support inference 2. So to say that ID is not science is childish and just a repeat of a template we have seen used here several times over the last few years. And by the way ID is more than just inference 2 but 2 is clearly an example of the scientific nature of ID and the lack of scientific process as seen by the fact that there is no evidence for 1 has not disqualified 1 as a major part of evolutionary biology., Dare I say double standard. We often use the criticism of evolutionary biology as the only science where one's imagination counts as evidence. Ernst Mayer was a big proponent of this as he highly encouraged researchers to think of scenarios that would support the Darwinian paradigm. Darwin himself was very guilty of the same approach as he created various scenarios to support his thesis in OOS. Yes, one's imagination is one of the most prolific tools of evolutionary biology as they continually beg the question of how something actually happened by using the all purpose explanation "it evolved." It is so scientific. So people who criticize ID as not science may be using a restricted definition of the term then over look its lack of use other places. How it has been used on this thread is just a tiresome repeat of the cliché arguments used to put ID down. It is interesting how often the same irrelevant arguments keep showing up. It is because they appear elsewhere and are automatically accepted without any critical thinking and then brought here like someone is inventing the wheel. That is one of the reasons the moderation policy was so tough on this site. Why continue to rehash the same old non sequiturs each time someone comes here who thinks they can enlighten us. It would invariably deteriorate into something not fruitful and essentially not add much to what we know and understand here. Well the moderation policy has been changed so we can be assured to see a steady diet of non sequiturs in the future but this time presented in a polite manner, hopefully. Maybe in the process we will learn something because of the new policy.jerry
November 22, 2008
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StephenB - if you're reading this, please note I'd love to see you engage Tom. I know you have your hands full with Hazel in another thread (and doing a great job of proving your points, in my view), but what we have here is a prime example of why I view redefining science to be a confusing enterprise. We've amiably duelled on this issue in the past - now maybe you'll see just where I'm coming from.nullasalus
November 22, 2008
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Tom, "Stenger, myself, Yonatan Fishman and some others think that science can indeed weigh in on the question of god’s existence, not that claims for his existence go beyond science. Stenger’s standard for scientific investigation, and mine, is simply to look at the evidence for a claim, irrespective of whether the phenomena involved are called natural or supernatural. So we reject the MN restriction on science, and thus disagree with the Kitzmiller plaintiffs and Judge Jones’ decision in this regard, which appealed to MN. The reason ID, etc. shouldn’t be taught in school, except as examples of failed hypotheses, is because they are *bad* science, not because they go *beyond* science." You can repeat until you're blue in the face that you think science should be able to test claims regardless of whether they are natural or supernatural. The fact will remain that the only things amenable to scientific testing are things that are natural. If you think that by changing the definition of science to include subjective proclamations on metaphysical and supernatural entities by, frankly, very angry and emotionally involved partisans, hey - more power to you. Do keep in mind that once you're playing that highly subjective game, your '*bad* science' becomes another's '*good* science' - they'll have free reign to change what counts as scientific evidence and reasonable conclusions as well. Lysenko already played the game you're trying to play. Philosophically inconvenient viewpoints on genetics were denounced and excluded. It didn't make the crops grow any better. And Victor Stenger's cringe-worthy desire to redefine scientific boundaries so he can abuse the field to pursue personal social and political goals won't make his proclamations true. He'll just be ensuring that science becomes even more politicized than it already is. Once again - why do the people who make the loudest noise about respecting science so frequently turn out to be the ones taking a dump on the practice? "I’m of course not saying that ID explanations and theories are scientific, only that they can be evaluated on the basis of empirical evidence (to the extent they have testable content)." Naturally. After all, what's the point in changing the rules other than to awkwardly rig them? So ID explanations and theories suddenly fall into the realm of science, but only if they're utterly ruled out by this 'new definition'. They can't even have the status of a minority viewpoint under the new rule - otherwise, why change the scope of science? "Moreover, if science by definition or fiat isn’t allowed to evaluate creationism and ID, and discard them as failed hypotheses, then one wonders what discipline of investigation, what mode of knowing, *does* have jurisdiction to evaluate supernatural claims? If only religion and other non-empirical domains of discourse are permitted to pronounce on the reality of god and the supernatural, then their existence is a fait accompli, but only by declaration, not by proof anyone should trust. This is why IDers and some other religionists understandably want to get science on their side: only science and other forms of intersubjective empiricism give us convincing evidence for existence claims. Unfortunately, however, science rules against them." 'Science rules against them' only using the hilarious biased, socio-politically motivated 'new definition' you want to use, and that frankly has even a smaller number of adherents in the scientific field than YECs themselves. Again, you're envisioning the Lysenko solution to unfortunate worldviews all over again - why, if we just change the standards for science to make them subject to our primary philosophical commitments, everything will work out fine! And 'what *does* have the jurisdiction to evaluate supernatural claims'? I don't know, Tom. What has the jurisdiction to evaluate moral claims? Philosophical claims? Can science disprove solipsism now? Can science demonstrate that racism is immoral? Here's your answer: Supernatural, metaphysical, and philosophical questions in the vast majority do not get settled or falsified, period. People investigate these questions on their own, consider arguments, reflect, and decide - or sometimes, they don't even do that. They don't become any more settled just because you've changed the definition of science, any more than you can make us all fly by changing the definition of 'fly' to 'walk'. "The claims that Christians and others make about god and the supernatural are factual claims about the nature of reality, claims that science can test to the extent they have testable content (many don’t, in which case they are safe from science, but also barred from the sort of evidential support most folks think really counts and would love to have for their religion)." Yes, Tom, you keep repeating that line about how people who believe in God and/or the supernatural are making claims about reality that science can investigate, so long as - well - science can investigate them. Great observation. Now you're conceding that plenty of claims about the supernatural just don't qualify for scientific testing - but you want to change the definition of science so you and others can say science ruled on those things anyway, of course. "To admit that science isn’t restricted to MN seemingly plays into the hands of ID proponents, because they imagine science done properly would lend them support. But of course it doesn’t. Science done properly thus far shows supernatural hypotheses to be vacuous, lacking in evidential backing, unfalsifiable, and for other reasons untenable." You don't get it. Either by choice, or by accident. The moment you say you want to change the definition and scope of science - and you've stated outright that yes, you are after a change of definition here - you're screwed. You seem to forget that you and the people you favor are not the only ones capable of dreaming up new definitions and scopes of science - or, for that matter, what qualifies as a tenable belief, evidential backing, vacuity, or otherwise. "Science" can easily, very easily, be changed such that the existence of God or a fundamental deity is taken as axiomatic. Atheism can immediately be ruled out as a perspective not worth thinking about in the same way solipsism currently is regarded in science and philosophy both. Philosophical theistic arguments can suddenly be called scientific laws. You can disagree and argue that none of these conclusions are right or correct, but guess what? There's a good chance no one will care. Your personal and, frankly, ungrounded convictions don't determine either the truth of the evidence, or the outcome of poorly-thought-through political disputes. But I have to thank you for so clearly confirming the minority hypocrisy I've detected in the atheist/naturalistic community for quite some time. Around here, I'm a TE with ID sympathies - now people can see exactly why I have those sympathies. And hearing this kind of - frankly - vile intellectual abuse of science for expressly philosophical and political ends only reassures me that my conditional support is well-placed, lone anonymous individual though I am.nullasalus
November 22, 2008
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ribczynski, "You misquoted me as saying that science had ‘proved’ that the YEC God does not exist, when I had carefully used the word ’shown’ instead. How convenient. Science does not deal in certainties, and it only ‘proves’ things if ‘to prove’ is understood to mean ‘to show to be very highly probable.’ When I claim that science shows that the YEC God does not exist, I mean precisely that. You attempt to conflate this with a “penny-ante” claim that “science disproves God” in general, but that is not my claim." The equivocation and nitpicking here is hilarious and obvious. You didn't say prove, you said shown! And by shown the YEC God doesn't exist, you meant it's improbable! You meant precisely what you wrote, so long as what you wrote is understood to be other than what you wrote! All in the service of awkward phrasing, such that when police investigate a suspect for a crime, they're trying to determine whether the suspect exists. Wonderful. "The YEC God is falsified by science, but not all conceptions of God are falsifiable." And if we're going to engage in such tortuous language, atheistic claims have been falsified by science time and again for decades. "Cling to an untestable idea of God if you like, but don’t pretend that science has nothing to say about a falsifiable conception of God such as the YEC God." 'Cling to'? There's no clinging. There's no choice in the matter, period. God's existence is unfalsifiable, along with a suite of other metaphysical and philosophical claims. You may as well argue naturalists cling to their unfalsifiable worldview - gee, it sounds like naturalists are all cowardly if I shoehorn that word 'cling' in there, doesn't it? Further, I said outright that science is entirely capable of investigating YEC claims insofar as they are claims about the natural world. Claiming that this proves the YEC God doesn't exist is what's inane, for reasons I've demonstrated. Your response is to complain that 'proven the YEC God does not exist' does not reasonably mean 'shown the YEC God does not exist' - though why you're complaining about it, I don't know. After all, at worst I was just quoting a ribczynski that doesn't exist. I'm sure he doesn't mind.nullasalus
November 22, 2008
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Tom: Sorry to be so late in joining this very interesting debate. I appreciate many of the things you say, and completely disagree on others. I will try to detail my thought: Let's start from the beginning: You say: "I agree that science shouldn’t be identified with methodological naturalism. Science can evaluate any hypothesis, natural or supernatural, monistic or dualistic, so long as it has some testable content." I perfectly agree with you. I will add later some thoughts about the word "testable", anyway. You say: "For instance, scientists have evaluated young earth creationism and found the evidence for it lacking, same for ID." One good example (probably, I must admit that I have never taken time to correctly evaluate that debate, being not personally interested in it) and one very bad one. Tom, I really think that, while many of the things you say are reasonable, you have completely misunderstood ID. But for simplicity I will try to group together all my arguments for ID later. "Science should also not be identified with materialism, since there might turn out to be categorically mental entities according to some empirically testable specification." Here we are. That's probably the important point which I agree and disagree at the same time. I agree with the basic assumption: science should not be identified with materialism. And I agree also with the rest. And I need to spend some thought on two important aspects: 1) Science, as conceived today, is not the only instrument of cognition. 2) The word "empirically" is ambiguous. The word "testable" implies some assumed methodological pattern. To make me understood, I will try a slightly different sentence, which well conveys my point: Cognition should also not be identified with science, since there might turn out to be categorically existing entities according to some objectively satisfying specification. What I am trying to say is rather trivial, or at least it should be. There are a lot of contents in reality, objectively existing, which at present are not addressed by science. Consciousness, with all its functions and manifestations is the single most important one. And consciousness is "very" common in nature. The objective existence of subjectivity is a problem about which present science has very little to say (although scientists love just the same to say a lot of arrogant and irritating things about it). That's the "hard problem of consciousness", and if you like you can check the ongoing debate on the "Horrid doubt file" thread for further inputs. So, what is the meaning you give to the word "empirically"? There are observables which are cognized by the senses, and are at present the basis for scientific theories. There are observables which are cognized in other ways (so called "subjective ways"), and yet do objectively exist (you cannot a priori conflate the concept of "observable by the senses" with the concept of "existing"). Our personal consciousness being the first, and most important, of all. Besides, the concepts of empirical, and especially testable, imply a lot of philosophical and methodological assumptions, which must not a priori be shared by all, and which can generate dangerous self-references. I am not denying any validity to them, just recommending caution. "If he’s right, and materialism is proven false, that doesn’t get us to supernaturalism, since it’s still a theory about the natural world and what it contains." I agree, but again I have some unease with the terms you use. If we agree about the dangers of the concepts of natural and supernatural, why use them? I think the final purpose of all cognition is to understand what is real, what really exists. So, why not say that: "If he’s right, and materialism is proven false, it’s still a theory about reality and what it contains." So, we avoid any unnecessary, even unconscious, restrictions about what reality can contain. In that way, just to make an extreme example, even if we had reasonable assurance of the existence of a god, we would have no reason to call that "natural" or "supernatural": we could just state that god is real, which is a perfectly legit cognitive statement, about a god or anything else. "To get supernaturalism into the picture, you’d have to use something other than science to establish truth claims about the world, since what science confirms to exist is what we call nature. Thus far, it doesn’t seem science has much competition when it comes to mapping reality reliably." Here is where I disagree with you more strongly. Indeed, you take a leap here. To state that "what science confirms to exist is what we call nature" is really an unwarranted assumption. You can certainly say that what science confirms to exist is what "you" call nature, but extending that concept to everyone is rather bold. I would never use "nature" in that sense, If ever I decided to use the term "nature" at all. As it should be clear by now, it really has no sense. Now, it is obvious that if you define "nature" as "what science confirms to exist", then your sentence is correct, but is obviously a tautology. So, what are you saying here? IMO, you are trying to say, without arguing for it, that science is the main, or the only, way to affirm that something exists. On that, I definitely don't agree, and you may perhaps agree with me that it is a very strong assumption, which can be discussed, but should not a priori be accepted. Indeed, you reinforce that concept when you say that "Thus far, it doesn’t seem science has much competition when it comes to mapping reality reliably." Can you see that here, where your real thought is more explicit, you had to use the word "reality"? At last we agree on the term, but certainly not on the statement. You may be or not be a methodological naturalist or a materialist, but it seems that you definitely are a methodological, or maybe philosophical, scientist. I have all the possible admiration and respect for good science, but he best way to transform good science into bad science is to force on it an epistemological status that it does not really own. Cognition is vastly broader than scientific cognition. You cannot even have a concept of science itself, unless you have already done a lot of work at other cognitive levels. That's why science must always and necessarily be "molded" and critically evaluated by philosophy of science, an obvious concept which many seem to forget. So, your same concept that "it doesn’t seem science has much competition when it comes to mapping reality reliably" brings us to the strange conclusion that science has never been mapped into reality reliably. In other words, science, however you define it, is not complete and self-sustaining. Like many scientists, methodological or philosophical, you seem to give great consideration to problems of methodology. I agree, but provided we remember that they are just that: problems. There is no real consensus about method, if not among dogmatic scientists. Just to be extreme, what about Polanyi or Feyerabend? Were they completely deluded about what science is? So, long live good science, but: no a priori commitment to it as the main, or only, way to ascertain what is real, no a priori commitment to a specific method, and let's remember the mportance of philosophy of science in debating what science is and can or cannot do. And above all, let's remember that the purpose of all cognition is to ascertain what is real, what really exists. That's the method I love. That's my only a priori commitment. And finally, and in brief, my comments about your position on ID. I am really disappointed by what you say about ID, because it in no way corresponds to the clarity of thought in the rest of your posts. I hope you are only misinformed about that. "ID is a logically possible scenario: that the Earth and its denizens were created by some sort of super-intelligence. The hypothesis fails not because it involves what people often think of as a supernatural agency, but because there’s as yet no evidence for it." That's obviously completely false. There are a lot of evidences, according to ID proponents, and that's exactly the content of the ID theory. Yous affirmation is totally gratuitous, unless you substantiate it. Let's see if you have done it. I can find no argument about that in your post #23. in your post #29, you say: "Re falsifying testable claims of ID, isn’t the issue that such claims on the part of ID are nearly non-existent?" No, it isn't. I give you one of the strongest examples. ID (see Dembski) strongly state thatv there exists a special kind of information, CSI, which can be strictly defined in its formal properties, which can never be produced outside a design scenario. That's a very clear and testable statement. It is detailed, empirical, and can easily be falsified: it would be enough to reasonably show that CSI can come out outside of a design scenario, that is without any intelligent designer as its source. That falsification has never been made. You say: "Possible example: I think it’s Behe that argues the flagellum couldn’t have been the result of natural selection, but there are eminently plausible accounts of how it could be." Again, I can't understand why easy critics of ID (see Adam Rutherford on another thread, whose response I am still waiting for) simply ignore CSI, which is the strongest argument of ID, and promptly "escape" to IC and the flagellum. The reason is apparently simple, but sad: it's because folks like Miller and Matzke have argued against the IC of the flagellum, and everybody feels free to consider the issue as settled, apparently an an authority basis. Well, that's exactly what bad science and bad method are. Tom, have you thoroughly evaluated those arguments? Are you ready to discuss them with me here? I am. Believe me, those are not arguments. Those are only very bad interpretations of both Behe and facts, and a good example of blind dogmatism in science. It is perfectly right to try to discuss arguments against IC. That's exactly what science is. But it's all another thing to affirm from authority that the issue is settled: it isn't at all, it doesn't matter how many times Miller goes on fixing his tie with a mousetrap. You say: "But the main problem with ID/creationism is that it doesn’t specify a mechanism for how the designer/creator did it, or any independent evidence for the existence of a designer/creator apart from the fact that things might seem designed/created (although that’s debatable too, given all the functionally sub-optimal forms and processes in nature)." Well, first of all, let's leave creationism alone, will you? We are debating ID here, and it is the least courtesy to accept that we are not creationists. So your statement becomes: "the main problem with ID is that it doesn’t specify a mechanism for how the designer did it" That's correct, but is not a problem. It can certainly be the object of further research and/or reflection, but it is not a problem. Why should it be? Again, you are projecting your own prejudices on the concept of science. I think you are familiar with the debate about dark energy in astrophysics. It has important similarities with the supposed "problems" of ID. There, too, we have definite facts (the acceleration of the expansion of the universe) for which no possible mechanism is really known. But theories are built just the same, and the prevailing one (dark energy) even uses a name which means really nothing, just to say that we have no idea about the cause, but we know that a cause different from all that we know "must" be there. The interesting thing is that, while this is at present the position of the majority, not all agree neither about the "facts" (not that they don't exist, but that their immediate meaning is the one we think) nor about the theory, however generic it may be. Other theories exist, as generic as the main one. That's science. Physicists still know how science should be done. They are not "methodological scientists", thanks God! The lack of a mechanism is no problem at all. ID is affirming two things: 1) The existence of CSI "only" in human artifacts and biological information. 2) The similarity of the two scenarios, and the plausibility of a similar cause (intelligent designs). Please, notice that even for human artifacts we have really no clue of how the intelligent designer (us) generates the new CSI. That's a point that many forget. No real mechanism is known. What shall we do? Shall we say that designing things is not scientific? Must reality follow human prejudices? A mechanism can always be investigated, if the correct scenario is applied. And again: "or any independent evidence for the existence of a designer apart from the fact that things might seem designed" Let's drop the "might". Biological things "do" seem designed, even Dawkins admits that. And it's not only that: biological thins do exhibit CSI, and there is no theoretical model nor any scientific evidence that CSI can be achieved without design. Isn't that a perfectly scientific reason to assume design as a likely cause of what cannot be explained in any other way? That's not the only argument of ID, but it's one of the best. Please, debate it, instead of denying it from authority. You say: "although that’s debatable too, given all the functionally sub-optimal forms and processes in nature" I really don't understand what you mean. Please, clarify. If it's debatable, let's debate it. "Unexplained and unevidenced explainers that are tailored to fill explanatory gaps don’t survive in science since they don’t add to our understanding." That's only bad philosophy of science. New scientific hypotheses are always tailored to fill explanatory gaps. That's the accepted scientific method, if one exists. Later, you say: "At the moment, however, there’s no evidence, independent of what seems (to some) like the appearance of intentional design in organic forms, that establishes the existence of a designer, or anything about its characteristics or modes of operation." The appearance of intentional design in organic forms "is" evidence of a designer. You may disagree that such an appearance exists, or find another explanation for it, but to do one of these two things you must correctly debate the ID specific arguments. It is true, instead, that that kind of evidence does not tell us "anything about its characteristics or modes of operation". That's exactly what ID has always affirmed. But you cannot conflate the two points. And the second point is not a problem, as I have already argued. "This is what I would take to be adequate evidence of ID" What? The first point, or the second. For the first point a lot of evidence exists. You cannot dismiss the first point only because, in your opinion, without the second it has no value. That's false reasoning. You are entitled to your personal preferences about evidence, but we need not follow you. You say: "Until such evidence surfaces, the ID hypothesis is empty of content and thus a scientific non-starter." Again, that's only bad philosophy of science, and I would say bad propaganda. "This is what explains its notable absence in established scientific theory - not any conspiracy to suppress it on the part of nefarious Darwinists, nor a bias on the part of science that rules out consideration of supernatural hypotheses (the MN rule you rightly object to)." I think exactly the opposite is true. If your ideas about theoretical science prevent you from seeing what is happening in practical science culture, then there must be some problem. And if you think that most scientific powers and scientists are not dogmatically committed to MN, well, then you just don't hear or read what they say or write. You say: "So we reject the MN restriction on science, and thus disagree with the Kitzmiller plaintiffs and Judge Jones’ decision in this regard, which appealed to MN." Ah, no! I apologize! You hear and read them. "The reason ID, etc. shouldn’t be taught in school, except as examples of failed hypotheses, is because they are *bad* science, not because they go *beyond* science." I am not interested in the school problem, but again you say one correct thing (ID is not beyond science) and one incorrect, or at least unsubstantiated, thing. Maybe ID is bad science. Please, show why. But not on the basis of an ideological prejudices (I can't accept it as science unless it gives me details of the designer) which have no real methodological foundation, but please show that the specific arguments of ID (CSI, IC, and others) are bad science. That's why we are here: to debate those things. Have you reasons, personal, sharable reasons, to believe that the concept of CSI is wrong? Have you reasons to believe that CSI can be generated outside of intelligent design? Please, argue. You say: "I’m of course not saying that ID explanations and theories are scientific, only that they can be evaluated on the basis of empirical evidence (to the extent they have testable content)" That's true. And all the affirmations of ID have testable content. You say: "As I said earlier, they are good examples of *failed* science, of *failed* hypotheses" Again, propaganda. Why? I am as sure as you are, indeed I believe much more sure, that all "darwinian" theories are failed hypotheses. And I am ready to argue about that. Indeed, do that here daily. "The proper definition of science gives it latitude to evaluate any hypothesis with testable content since that’s exactly what it does in practice:" True. "it has evaluated both YEC and ID and found them fatally wanting" False (I am speaking for ID). I am afraid your habit of conflating is becoming something of a problem... "If only religion and other non-empirical domains of discourse are permitted to pronounce on the reality of god and the supernatural, then their existence is a fait accompli, but only by declaration, not by proof anyone should trust. This is why IDers and some other religionists understandably want to get science on their side: only science and other forms of intersubjective empiricism give us convincing evidence for existence claims. Unfortunately, however, science rules against them" Here you are really conflating too much. Science has all the rights to give scientific opinions on any aspect of reality, and in the same way philosophy has all the rights to give philosophical opinions abou any aspect of reality, including the opinions of science. "only science and other forms of intersubjective empiricism give us convincing evidence for existence claims" is plain dogma, as already discussed. Unless you include philosophy and other things (maybe even religion) in the "other forms of intersubjective empiricism". I definitely would. "Unfortunately, however, science rules against them" is, again, propaganda. "I don’t think that science, in evaluating any and all factual claims, whether termed natural or supernatural, necessarily entails any commitments beyond its method." Right. Indeed, as I have argued, I don't even think science can afford to commit to a specific, fixed method. "The commitment comes when one decides to stick with science as one’s only mode of deciding existence claims, which as you properly point out leads directly to metaphysical naturalism. People are free to commit to other modes of deciding what exists" I agree. And why not recognize that many different modes can contribute and effectively interact? You say: "The claims that Christians and others make about god and the supernatural are factual claims about the nature of reality, claims that science can test to the extent they have testable content" True. "People are of course free to define science however they like, but in practice the existence of the supernatural is perfectly open to scientific investigation" True. "and indeed is currently being investigated to the extent that scientists bother to consider such things as (creationism and) ID" How kind of them! (I am speaking for ID). "most don’t waste their time, unless it’s to keep these from being confused with good science" How dogmatic of them! That's sadly very, very true. "To admit that science isn’t restricted to MN seemingly plays into the hands of ID proponents, because they imagine science done properly would lend them support" It does. "But of course it doesn’t" That's what you say. Please, argue (not from authority, please. We can do without that). "Science done properly thus far shows supernatural hypotheses to be vacuous, lacking in evidential backing, unfalsifiable, and for other reasons untenable." Again with natural and supernatural... don't you think that's a bad way to finish a good post? Waiting for an answer...gpuccio
November 22, 2008
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nullasalus comments on my claims regarding science and the YEC God:
And again - ’science has proven the YEC God does not exist’ is a tortured way of describing the situation even among people who accept the scientific data in question, done apparently to get that little penny ante ’science disproved God’ quip in there. But if we’re going to abuse language that much, then hey - science has demonstrated that an atheist eternal universe does not exist by way of the Big Bang. Science has demonstrated that atheist neurology is invalid by way of rejecting Skinner’s behaviorism. Science has been disproving atheistic ideas about the universe left and right for centuries. How convenient.
nullasalus, You misquoted me as saying that science had 'proved' that the YEC God does not exist, when I had carefully used the word 'shown' instead. How convenient. Science does not deal in certainties, and it only 'proves' things if 'to prove' is understood to mean 'to show to be very highly probable.' When I claim that science shows that the YEC God does not exist, I mean precisely that. You attempt to conflate this with a "penny-ante" claim that "science disproves God" in general, but that is not my claim. You're right that this constitutes an abuse of language, but the abuse is yours, not mine. The YEC God is falsified by science, but not all conceptions of God are falsifiable. Cling to an untestable idea of God if you like, but don't pretend that science has nothing to say about a falsifiable conception of God such as the YEC God.ribczynski
November 21, 2008
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It looks like Tribune7 and I had the same thought at the same time.jerry
November 21, 2008
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"As I said earlier, they are good examples of *failed* science, of *failed* hypotheses. The proper definition of science gives it latitude to evaluate any hypothesis with testable content since that’s exactly what it does in practice: " By this criteria, Darwinian macro evolution should be removed from all science textbooks and from science classes. There is not one example of it ever having worked. Don't you agree?jerry
November 21, 2008
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And how would you falsify macroevolution?tribune7
November 21, 2008
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Re falsifying testable claims of ID, isn’t the issue that such claims on the part of ID are nearly non-existent? Not really. Take something of known non-design and show that an ID methodology declares it to be designed and you have falsified ID.tribune7
November 21, 2008
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Thanks for all the feedback everyone. Here are some responses, necessarily incomplete given the volume of discourse. Hazel: thanks for the kind words. Patrick: Sorry about the conflation of various ID/creationism hypotheses, I was merely adverting to a generalized “god did it” hypothesis and saying that science could weigh in on it if it has testable content. Re falsifying testable claims of ID, isn’t the issue that such claims on the part of ID are nearly non-existent? Possible example: I think it’s Behe that argues the flagellum couldn’t have been the result of natural selection, but there are eminently plausible accounts of how it could be. But the main problem with ID/creationism is that it doesn’t specify a mechanism for how the designer/creator did it, or any independent evidence for the existence of a designer/creator apart from the fact that things might seem designed/created (although that’s debatable too, given all the functionally sub-optimal forms and processes in nature). Unexplained and unevidenced explainers that are tailored to fill explanatory gaps don’t survive in science since they don’t add to our understanding. Re Naturalism.Org: You’re quite right – it isn’t intended as an unbiased informational site about naturalism in all its varieties. As a production of the Center for Naturalism, it’s intended to present and promote a particular version of naturalism as a worldview. As it says at the top of the home page: “For background and FAQs on *this understanding of naturalism*, please see…” That said, I think the version of naturalism presented is broadly consistent with many currents of philosophical naturalism as it’s developed over the last century, in particular the naturalistic turn of philosophy in taking science as an epistemological resource. So Naturalism.Org is on board with Quine’s statement you quoted. Entities and processes gain existential support - that is, we start believing they’re real - if they provide explanatory benefit in science (and, I would add, aren’t merely posited to fill an explanatory gap: there has to be independent evidence for them). This isn’t the case for an intelligent designer. Once entities gain existential support from science they are of course no longer considered supernatural (if indeed they were in the first place) - they are perforce naturalized. I agree with you about MN. I think it’s a total distraction and red herring, used by science-promoting organizations in an effort to reassure religionists that science won’t encroach on their turf (but of course it does, see “Reality and its rivals” at Naturalism.Org). Science should be characterized by it’s actual method, which in practice makes no reference to the natural/supernatural distinction, see for instance here. Donald M: You make some good points about evidence, e.g., “the observer (i.e. the scientist) assigns evidential value to the data based on other considerations and background knowledge.” No one can rule out that evidence might eventually surface that we are indeed the creations of a super-intelligence. At the moment, however, there’s no evidence, independent of what seems (to some) like the appearance of intentional design in organic forms, that establishes the existence of a designer, or anything about its characteristics or modes of operation. This is what I would take to be adequate evidence of ID. Until such evidence surfaces, the ID hypothesis is empty of content and thus a scientific non-starter. This is what explains its notable absence in established scientific theory - not any conspiracy to suppress it on the part of nefarious Darwinists, nor a bias on the part of science that rules out consideration of supernatural hypotheses (the MN rule you rightly object to). PaulN: The way I see it, whatever science discovers to exist ends up included in what we call the natural world, so if it discovers an intelligent designer, the characteristics and operations of which can be specified and observed (instead of merely posited), then that designer ends up within nature. ID claims to detect the existence of intelligence, but that claim is based simply on the appearance (to some) of the intentional design of organisms; there’s no independent evidence for the existence or characteristics or mode of operation of the designer. These are the things that would need to be detected for mainstream scientists to accept ID. nullasalus: "Stenger’s book is a blatant example of the sort of double-standard hypocrisy that goes on with regards to ID. When it’s argued by ID proponents that there is evidence or inference of design in nature (whether biological, geological, cosmological, or otherwise) the response is that such claims go beyond science, are the stuff of religion and philosophy, and therefore are not appropriate to teach in a school setting. When Stenger argues the opposite - that science proves that there is no God - he’s either ignored or celebrated. Somehow, it’s only an abuse when the conclusion is not atheistic." Stenger, myself, Yonatan Fishman and some others think that science can indeed weigh in on the question of god’s existence, not that claims for his existence go beyond science. Stenger’s standard for scientific investigation, and mine, is simply to look at the evidence for a claim, irrespective of whether the phenomena involved are called natural or supernatural. So we reject the MN restriction on science, and thus disagree with the Kitzmiller plaintiffs and Judge Jones’ decision in this regard, which appealed to MN. The reason ID, etc. shouldn't be taught in school, except as examples of failed hypotheses, is because they are *bad* science, not because they go *beyond* science. "If you want to argue that ID explanations and theories are themselves scientific, you’re the one who should be careful what you wish for. The price of making ID scientific is not that you get to disprove God on the cheap a la Stenger - you make design (and by way of inference, God) a scientific argument, even if it’s a minority viewpoint. This sort of hijacking of science to pursue desired social and political ends always turns out to spoil." I’m of course not saying that ID explanations and theories are scientific, only that they can be evaluated on the basis of empirical evidence (to the extent they have testable content). As I said earlier, they are good examples of *failed* science, of *failed* hypotheses. The proper definition of science gives it latitude to evaluate any hypothesis with testable content since that’s exactly what it does in practice: it has evaluated both YEC and ID and found them fatally wanting. This isn’t to hijack science in service to social and political ends, but simply to adjudicate factual claims about reality using our best available tool. Moreover, if science by definition or fiat isn’t allowed to evaluate creationism and ID, and discard them as failed hypotheses, then one wonders what discipline of investigation, what mode of knowing, *does* have jurisdiction to evaluate supernatural claims? If only religion and other non-empirical domains of discourse are permitted to pronounce on the reality of god and the supernatural, then their existence is a fait accompli, but only by declaration, not by proof anyone should trust. This is why IDers and some other religionists understandably want to get science on their side: only science and other forms of intersubjective empiricism give us convincing evidence for existence claims. Unfortunately, however, science rules against them. Re science and naturalization, you said that “It goes without saying that anything science can investigate is natural - that’s part of the package of methodological naturalism.” It isn’t the case that science can only investigate what is natural (as per MN) since it can investigate the existence of what are claimed to be, or called, supernatural phenomena, should there be any testable content to the claim. But should these so-called supernatural phenomena actually be shown to exist as demonstrated by science, then of course they end up being natural phenomena – they get naturalized. This could conceivably happen with ID (see Dembski, Naturalist?). If it turns out there’s no scientific evidence for them, the naturalist (who sticks with science in deciding what’s real) concludes they likely don’t exist. The supernaturalist still might claim they exist on the basis of non-scientific modes of knowing. "Science under methodological naturalism is utterly incapable of providing evidence in favor of or against God by the very ground rules it operates under. Science redefined to be outside the scope of methodological naturalism necessarily entails metaphysical, philosophical, and theological commitments and additional ground rules that explode the possibility to evaluate these questions within science, because the evaluation changes depending on the metaphysical and philosophical assumptions you’re now including (and which will surely change from person to person, or group to group)." I don’t think that science, in evaluating any and all factual claims, whether termed natural or supernatural, necessarily entails any commitments beyond its method. The commitment comes when one decides to stick with science as one’s only mode of deciding existence claims, which as you properly point out leads directly to metaphysical naturalism. People are free to commit to other modes of deciding what exists. "When ‘Christians and others make empirical claims about the supernatural’, they are making naturalistic claims by default. But the claims that ‘Christians and others’ make regarding the supernatural are far and away hardly ever empirical in nature, and with the possible exception of YEC almost never fundamental to their faith. The ‘existence’ of the supernatural is forever walled off to the investigation of science (unless the mainstream definition of science in changed, in which case congratulations for doing exactly what some ID proponents have been asking for for some time)..." The claims that Christians and others make about god and the supernatural are factual claims about the nature of reality, claims that science can test to the extent they have testable content (many don’t, in which case they are safe from science, but also barred from the sort of evidential support most folks think really counts and would love to have for their religion). People are of course free to define science however they like, but in practice the existence of the supernatural is perfectly open to scientific investigation, and indeed is currently being investigated to the extent that scientists bother to consider such things as creationism and ID (most don’t waste their time, unless it’s to keep these from being confused with good science). To admit that science isn’t restricted to MN seemingly plays into the hands of ID proponents, because they imagine science done properly would lend them support. But of course it doesn’t. Science done properly thus far shows supernatural hypotheses to be vacuous, lacking in evidential backing, unfalsifiable, and for other reasons untenable. Again, see Yonatan Fishman’s paper on this, and “Some criteria for good scientific explanations,” both linked at www.naturalism.org/science.htm .twclark
November 21, 2008
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DonaldM, I like your post but think it needs a few emendations, as below, (with a few minor typos also corrected).
Well, if I can twist a phrase, Methodological Naturalism (MN) is Philosophical Naturalism (PN) in a cheap tuxedo! MN places a completely arbitrary restriction on the practice of science and the category of explanatory resources to which science can turn to explain data. If the real explanation is something outside the restriction, then science must pretend to be blind to it for the sake of “doing science.” The only way MN makes sense is if we [assume that PN is true and therefore] know [have faith] a priori that [what PNers think constitutes] nature is a completely closed system of [what PNers think constitutes] natural cause and effect. But since no one has ever established that [PN is true] scientifically, philosophically, metaphysically or any other way, then MN is an a priori restriction on the practice of science guarantees that if nature is NOT a completely closed system of [what PNers think constitutes] natural cause and effect, then if the true explanations fall outside the restriction of MN, then science will not see any explanatory possibility beyond that. That’s powerfully close to importing PN into the heart of science by disguising [it] as MN. Science is NOT a collorary of PN and no one has ever provided an argument as to why it should be.
What do you think of that?Janice
November 21, 2008
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Methodological naturalism is nothing but political correctness in a lab coat—an arbitrary rule established by bureaucrats to protect other bureaucrats who have nothing new to say. No one ever heard of such a thing until the 1980’s, and it just happened to rear its ugly head at the very same time that the ID movement began to define itself. That alone should tell us something. It is beyond presumptuous for one group of scientists to establish an “acceptable” methodology for another group of scientists or to insist that only those who agree with that methodology are really doing science. In fact, only the individual scientist can decide which methods he should use, because only the individual scientist knows which problem he is trying to solve. That is why the 20/80 rule applies to most scientific progress. It is the vital few scientists, the minority, that drive most of the new discoveries. The others are just dutiful little worker bees that cling to the status quo and use the power of inert institutions to justify their existence. They need the academy to help them plug in to the established technology, secure grants, and inform us about such mind bending truths as the fact that men are different than women, or that self control may help people to stop smoking. Meanwhile, the geniuses are persecuted for breaking away from the herd and trying to say something interesting and useful. It hasn’t been that long, after all, since the astronomers caught all kinds of hell for doing that very thing----discovering evidence for the big bang. And who was it that gave them all that hell? Why it was the herd, of course. And what was their rationale? Well, it seems that they were fearful that [hide the kids now and pull down the shades] someone might think that God created the universe. To suggest that this same herd should now be telling innovators like Dembski and Behe how to do their business is beyond unconscionable. It is also a rather curious fact that, for some unknown reason, advocates for methodological naturalism always just happen to conflate creation science with intelligent design. For those who continue to blur that distinction, either through ignorance or malice, I can only offer the following exhortation: Please learn the difference between a religious presupposition, which is faith based, and a design inference, which is empirically based. Your capacity for dialogue will improve immeasurably.StephenB
November 21, 2008
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Tom, "ID and creationism could usefully be mentioned in science class as examples of failed hypotheses – students could read Victor Stenger’s book, God: The Failed Hypothesis. ID is a logically possible scenario: that the Earth and its denizens were created by some sort of super-intelligence. The hypothesis fails not because it involves what people often think of as a supernatural agency, but because there’s as yet no evidence for it." There's plenty of evidence for design - and Stenger's book is a blatant example of the sort of double-standard hypocrisy that goes on with regards to ID. When it's argued by ID proponents that there is evidence or inference of design in nature (whether biological, geological, cosmological, or otherwise) the response is that such claims go beyond science, are the stuff of religion and philosophy, and therefore are not appropriate to teach in a school setting. When Stenger argues the opposite - that science proves that there is no God - he's either ignored or celebrated. Somehow, it's only an abuse when the conclusion is not atheistic. Methodological naturalism is the standard for scientific investigation, argued by the plaintiffs (among whom were some major scientific organizations and representatives) - and methodological naturalism, even conceded ribczynski, cannot investigate supernatural claims. For Stenger to make the move he does, he has to adopt a new standard for scientific investigation - in which case, one has to decide whether he's doing exactly that (Which means he's making the same move most ID proponents are) or he's being dishonest (By arguing 'science' diisproves something which it rules out from the beginning.) "To say that science only investigates natural effects is simply to say that whatever science shows to exist is what we call nature. Science can study creationism and ID (and has done so), and were evidence found of a designer, its characteristics, and the mechanisms of its operations, that designer would perforce be incorporated into nature. If something is certified to exist by science, it gets naturalized. This is why those wanting to use science to confirm ID should be careful what they wish for." No, Tom. Methodological naturalism and mainstream science operate with a starting ground rule that all it can and will investigate is nature itself, and 'natural things' are all it is capable of proposing as explanations. Further, science does not 'certify to exist' anything - all science is capable of doing is falsifying proposed natural explanations, and shaping theories as a result. Further, ID proponents do not want science 'to confirm ID'. They believe a proper definition of science would include ID explanations and proposals. Big difference. The argument at Kitzmiller was not that 'science proves ID'. It was that 'ID theories and explanations are scientific'. If you want to argue that ID explanations and theories are themselves scientific, you're the one who should be careful what you wish for. The price of making ID scientific is not that you get to disprove God on the cheap a la Stenger - you make design (and by way of inference, God) a scientific argument, even if it's a minority viewpoint. This sort of hijacking of science to pursue desired social and political ends always turns out to spoil. "So I’d say science isn’t “philosophically bounded in such a way that it’s only capable of investigating the natural.” The scientific method as actually practiced doesn’t invoke the natural/supernatural distinction, it only invokes methods of investigation and criteria of explanatory adequacy that certify whether phenomena reliably exist or not. Science gets to weigh in on the existence of purportedly supernatural phenomena if they have any testable characteristics." Are you even reading what you're writing here? You already said that whatever science 'shows to exist' is naturalized. It goes without saying that anything science can investigate is natural - that's part of the package of methodological naturalism. The point was that a supernatural phenomena amenable to investigation and testing by science is - guess what? - not supernatural. It's natural. "The claim that only the natural exists isn’t part of science, but rather the conclusion you reach if you stick with science as your mode of knowing about the world (and no student is forced to do this). So science isn’t biased toward naturalism as proponents of ID often suggest. It’s only that what science shows to exist is what we call nature." Methodological naturalism does not make the claim that only the natural exists. Methodological naturalism makes no claims in and of itself - it's a method, a standard of investigation for the scientific field. Further, if you 'stick with science as your mode of knowing the world', you do not 'arrive at' naturalism. You're already there the moment you make that intellectual commitment, because science as defined in the mainstream only does - and only can - concern itself with naturalistic explanations. Committing yourself to only (under the methodological naturalism standard) scientific explanations for anything does not lead to metaphysical naturalism - it IS metaphysical naturalism. "Re YEC: if its proponents make testable claims about the actions of their god, and those claims are disproven (as they have been), that lowers the probability of the claim that their god exists." No, Tom, it doesn't. Any more than making a claim about Abraham Lincoln that is later disproven would in and of itself lower the probability that Lincoln existed. It indicates that, if anything, they have a wrong belief about God. Science is incapable of estimating probabilities of God - or even investigating the existence of God, certainly God as classically imagined in western theism. "Likewise for claims about anonymous intercessory prayer. The studies showing zero or negative effects of such prayer can’t help but reflect badly on the god hypothesis. Of course science can’t prove god doesn’t exist, but by providing no support for claims about god’s action in the world, it lowers the probability of god’s existence, if you take intersubjective evidence as dispositive about what exists." Science under methodological naturalism is utterly incapable of providing evidence in favor of or against God by the very ground rules it operates under. Science redefined to be outside the scope of methodological naturalism necessarily entails metaphysical, philosophical, and theological commitments and additional ground rules that explode the possibility to evaluate these questions within science, because the evaluation changes depending on the metaphysical and philosophical assumptions you're now including (and which will surely change from person to person, or group to group). Further, controlled 'anonymous intercessory prayer' is utterly foreign to the western theistic tradition (as is the idea that you can use prayer to test God - this idea is closer to blasphemy in tradition than anything else), nor has it ever been viewed as a surefire miracle-making method. Prayer was first and foremost between person and God, focused centrally on 'thy will be done'. Which is why Christians ministered to the poor and sick, rather than tried to pray themselves up some ministration. When they wanted to help people, they didn't pray and make sure to do so anonymously - they built hospitals. Meanwhile, if we're going to play this game, atheistic psychology and neuroscience argued for decades that the 'mind' had no causal role on the brain, and that behavior was the only thing that needed to be studied. Now that view has been jettisoned (after doing quite a lot of damage to the mental health of many people unfortunate enough to be treated under that paradigm), the placebo effect is a widely-recognized reality, and people's minds are viewed as instrumental to mental health. Surprising, I know. "When Christians and others make empirical claims about the existence of the supernatural, they are making claims about reality, period. Science, kept honest by philosophy and critical thinking, is by far our most reliable method of deciding what’s the case about reality, so it seems to me it can, and should, weigh in on such claims. The purported existence of the supernatural is too important a question to be left to religion." You are equivocating here to such a degree that I can't help but think it's purposeful. When 'Christians and others make empirical claims about the supernatural', they are making naturalistic claims by default. But the claims that 'Christians and others' make regarding the supernatural are far and away hardly ever empirical in nature, and with the possible exception of YEC almost never fundamental to their faith. The 'existence' of the supernatural is forever walled off to the investigation of science (unless the mainstream definition of science in changed, in which case congratulations for doing exactly what some ID proponents have been asking for for some time), and the fact that you think science has been 'kept honest' - by philosophy, no less - indicates that either your understanding of science and naturalism is woefully inadequate, or that you're willing to misrepresent both to further social and political aims. Why are the people who praise science the loudest inevitably the ones abusing it the most?nullasalus
November 21, 2008
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Also, I checked out naturalism.org and found it wanting. There are multiple variants of naturalism but this not even elaborated upon. For example, pragmatic naturalism is relegated to a sidenote:
Writing in the earlier half of the 20th century, John Dewey—a widely read philosopher, theorist of education, cultural critic, and public intellectual—inspired generations of philosophers in the United States with a system he called “pragmatic naturalism.”
That's the only page I found it mentioned based upon a google site search. Some variants of naturalism are not mentioned at all. Essentially the whole site seems to be biased toward branding naturalism as a whole as BEING a particular/preferred variant. Never mind the blatant references to humanism (what is that even doing on there?). It's not an unbiased informational site, it's a site intended to convert! Further the same paragraph asserts:
Here, at last, naturalism took its place as an explicit worldview (albeit with many variations), based in a broadly empirical, scientific epistemological commitment, but going beyond science by making that very commitment the basis for ontological claims about the world – namely, the denial of the supernatural.
oookay. The philosopher Willard Quine was a pragmatic naturalist: "If I saw indirect explanatory benefit in positing sensibilia, possibilia, spirits, a Creator, I would joyfully accord them scientific status too, on a par with such avowedly scientific posits as quarks black holes.’” How does that square with naturalism.org's assertion? Personally I get slightly annoyed when a relative newcomer like methodological naturalism, which was not even coined as term until 1983, is claimed to represent science. Gee, was science not being done properly until 25 years ago? (Yes, that's hyperbole...I realize the generalized concept of MN was around for quite a while before being formalized recently.) As I've been saying for a while, philosophies of science are good working models, not necessarily a hard and fast rule, so equating a single philosophy to BEING science seems a dodge more than anything else. As in, they all have their pros and cons and I don't have a personal preference when it comes to how people choose to actively pursue their work. If you find that MN works for you, then so be it...just don't claim others are not doing science. (Although I should note that I see nothing wrong with trying to convince people they would be better served by adopting your preferred philosophy. Just be honest about it.)Patrick
November 21, 2008
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Tom, quick question. According to your long elaboration on how science "naturalizes" what it observes, would this mean that you would consider intelligence to be natural? How about design? If so, then why can't they be under the consideration of scientific observation? Basically what you're saying is anything that science doesn't deal with isn't "natural." Therefore concepts such as design and intelligence wouldn't be "natural." Yet the search for intelligence in outer space remains a "scientific pursuit." It seems your assessment of how science naturalizes what it observes has more than one standard. You can try and explain it however you like, but ultimately you're going to end up contradicting something that's already been established (i.e. detecting intelligence in outer space). I'm sorry but you'll have to come up with something new or explain more specifics on how IDers can't detect intelligence but "mainstream scientists" can...PaulN
November 21, 2008
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Tom writes:
ID and creationism could usefully be mentioned in science class as examples of failed hypotheses – students could read Victor Stenger’s book, God: The Failed Hypothesis. ID is a logically possible scenario: that the Earth and its denizens were created by some sort of super-intelligence. The hypothesis fails not because it involves what people often think of as a supernatural agency, but because there’s as yet no evidence for it.
I have take issue with this statement, especially that last sentence. The claim of "no evidence" is often used to dismiss ID. But what does that claim really mean? As commonly used, it seems to mean that science doesn't know of or see any connection between some data set and the possibility that the data set is the way it is because of the actions of a supernatural intelligence. Put another way, science views all data through the lens of MN. But data isn't data per se. That is to say, data in the form of some observed phenomenon doesn't come with a little label attached telling the observer what it is evidence for. Rather, the observer (i.e. the scientist) assigns evidential value to the data based on other considerations and background knowledge. An example I've seen elsewhere. Suppose it is sometime before 1900 and two physicists are talking and one says "you know, I think that atoms are mutable and can be either split apart or mashed together." The other physicist would have sniffed "Hogwash, you have no evidence for that." And at that time, the second scientist would have been right because the relevent discoveries that would connect the concept of the mutability of atoms to the data had not yet been made. On the other hand, the was overpowering evidence for the claim of the first scientist that the entire world experienced that rose every morning and set every night: Sunshine! If not for the mutability of atoms, there would be no sun. But, no one knew that prior to (or about) 1900. But the evidence for it was there all along. Why couldn't ID be in the same category? It seems to me that there's all sorts of evidence...that is to say data, observed phenomenon, for ID across all of Nature. What the ID critic means with the claim "no evidence" is that there isn't any data set that she takes to be evidence for ID, which is a very different sort of claim. That claim usually implies that no one knows of any relevent data or background knowledge that legimately connects certain data sets with ID. And, usually the ID critic goes one step further and claims that no such connection will be forthcoming ever...that is the gist of taking MN seriously into the heart of scientific practice. The relevant and obvious question to put to any ID critic claiming there's "no evidence" for ID is "what would you take to be evidence for ID?" That's a question I've asked repeatedly in forums like this, but have to receive an answer that doesn't betray the a priori assumption of MN. When one understands the role of evidence in science and when and how evidentiary status is actually ascribed to a specific data set by a scientist, a lot of the starch of saying "no evidence" goes out the window.DonaldM
November 21, 2008
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Wow! Back the train way, way up.
students could read Victor Stenger’s book, God: The Failed Hypothesis. ID is a logically possible scenario: that the Earth and its denizens were created by some sort of super-intelligence.
First you reference a book about God and then automatically conflate core ID theory with a Creationist scenario. There are multiple competing ID-compatible hypotheses. Yet the one you choose to highlight is an ID-compatible hypothesis made by Creationists where not only is life created directly (instead of seeding, front-loading, etc.) but so is the entire planet. Then it gets worse.
Science can study creationism and ID (and has done so), and were evidence found of a designer, its characteristics, and the mechanisms of its operations, that designer would perforce be incorporated into nature.
You insist that core ID theory must identify a specific Designer or Designers in order to be valid...something core ID theory does not even do! These are two huge misunderstandings about ID theory right from the start. With these basic misconceptions about ID how can you even comment on it? Can you even list a single testable claim of core ID theory that has been falsified? Or even how about a prediction that turned out to be false?Patrick
November 21, 2008
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Some excellent and well-stated thoughts, Tom.hazel
November 21, 2008
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Hazel: "Science deals with what is empirically testable - that’s the crucial distinction. Do I understand you correctly, Tom?" Exactly. In response to nullasalus: It’s true that the main argument against teaching ID has been its religious motivation, but the issue of its testability and truth is independent of its motivation. As a naturalist, I might be motivated to find altruistic behavior in other species, but that doesn’t bear on the truth of that claim, which has to be evaluated on its evidential basis. ID and creationism could usefully be mentioned in science class as examples of failed hypotheses – students could read Victor Stenger’s book, God: The Failed Hypothesis. ID is a logically possible scenario: that the Earth and its denizens were created by some sort of super-intelligence. The hypothesis fails not because it involves what people often think of as a supernatural agency, but because there’s as yet no evidence for it. To say that science only investigates natural effects is simply to say that whatever science shows to exist is what we call nature. Science can study creationism and ID (and has done so), and were evidence found of a designer, its characteristics, and the mechanisms of its operations, that designer would perforce be incorporated into nature. If something is certified to exist by science, it gets naturalized. This is why those wanting to use science to confirm ID should be careful what they wish for. So I’d say science isn’t “philosophically bounded in such a way that it’s only capable of investigating the natural.” The scientific method as actually practiced doesn’t invoke the natural/supernatural distinction, it only invokes methods of investigation and criteria of explanatory adequacy that certify whether phenomena reliably exist or not. Science gets to weigh in on the existence of purportedly supernatural phenomena if they have any testable characteristics. For more on this, see www.naturalism.org/science.htm , especially "Some criteria for good scientific explanations." The claim that only the natural exists isn’t part of science, but rather the conclusion you reach if you stick with science as your mode of knowing about the world (and no student is forced to do this). So science isn’t biased toward naturalism as proponents of ID often suggest. It’s only that what science shows to exist is what we call nature. Re YEC: if its proponents make testable claims about the actions of their god, and those claims are disproven (as they have been), that lowers the probability of the claim that their god exists. Likewise for claims about anonymous intercessory prayer. The studies showing zero or negative effects of such prayer can’t help but reflect badly on the god hypothesis. Of course science can’t prove god doesn’t exist, but by providing no support for claims about god’s action in the world, it lowers the probability of god’s existence, if you take intersubjective evidence as dispositive about what exists. See Yonatan Fishman’s paper on this, "Can science test supernatural worldviews?" linked at www.naturalism.org/science.htm , especially section 2 starting on page 8. When Christians and others make empirical claims about the existence of the supernatural, they are making claims about reality, period. Science, kept honest by philosophy and critical thinking, is by far our most reliable method of deciding what’s the case about reality, so it seems to me it can, and should, weigh in on such claims. The purported existence of the supernatural is too important a question to be left to religion. This gets discussed in "Reality and its rivals" at www.naturalism.org/epistemology.htm .twclark
November 21, 2008
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ribczynski, "I think you need to read Tom’s comment again. He does not claim that YEC = ID, and he does not assert that methodological naturalism can be used to investigate supernatural hypotheses (of course it can’t, since it rules them out a priori)." I think you should read Tom's again, as well as my own. Here's the first from Tom. "For instance, scientists have evaluated young earth creationism and found the evidence for it lacking, same for ID. This is why neither have thus far found a place in public school science classrooms." So right away, he's making the claim that ID = YEC without qualification - certainly insofar as why they aren't allowed in a public school curriculum, and how their claims are judged by the scientific community. If you go read Judge Jones' decision on ID, this simply is not the case. Questions of scientific evidence hardly applied - the question was whether ID was primarily a religious / philosophical / theological project. It was on those grounds that ID was ruled out - ID was overwhelmingly viewed as 'not scientific theory/theories' in the court decision, not 'a scientific claim that is wrong'. Questions of scientific evidence for ID claims barely registered on the legal radar. Between that and the fact that ID and YEC are two vastly distinct paradigms (though technically YEC may be under ID's 'big tent'), arguing they're rejected for the same reasons is either due to a lack of understanding, or otherwise. Contrast that response to ID with YEC. Do scientists believe the claim that the earth is several thousands of years old is 'not testable' or 'not a scientific claim'? As for whether methodological naturalism can be used to investigate a supernatural hypotheses, here's Tom again. "I agree that science shouldn’t be identified with methodological naturalism. Science can evaluate any hypothesis, natural or supernatural, monistic or dualistic, so long as it has some testable content." Sounds nice, until you realize that 'having some testable content' entails methodological naturalism by the current mainstream standards of science. Again, go back to the Kitzmiller decision where you can see Judge Jones, citing claims from the NAS and others (along with, supposedly, nearly photocopying the ACLU's papers to write his verdict) the the effect that "Methodological naturalism is a 'ground rule' of science today." If there's another standard of science in play, then it's an alternative definition compared to what was laid down in Kitzmiller. Guess which side was arguing that? Be aware of what is involved with arguing that science need not be committed to methodological naturalism. The price you pay in order to argue that science directly disproves the supernatural is that you justify any person in arguing that science proves the universe (and anything in it) was designed and therefore God exists. Many ID proponents would love such a standard, especially when so many ID opponents try to have it both ways by dabbling in this little game. "Regarding your final point, I agree that the existence of a deceptive God is not a testable claim. However, most Christians (including most YECs) claim that God is honest. When I said that “science shows us that the YEC God does not exist”, I was referring to an honest God." Are you aware that some YECs claim that the devil, not God, is doing the deceiving? Or that scientists are flat out wrong and will eventually realize their error ('promissory supernaturalism' perhaps)? They have no need of positing a dishonest God to explain false appearances - not when the options of 'powerful but lesser being' and 'the data we have is simply incorrect or inconclusive' is on the table. And again - 'science has proven the YEC God does not exist' is a tortured way of describing the situation even among people who accept the scientific data in question, done apparently to get that little penny ante 'science disproved God' quip in there. But if we're going to abuse language that much, then hey - science has demonstrated that an atheist eternal universe does not exist by way of the Big Bang. Science has demonstrated that atheist neurology is invalid by way of rejecting Skinner's behaviorism. Science has been disproving atheistic ideas about the universe left and right for centuries. How convenient.nullasalus
November 21, 2008
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Well, if I can twist a phrase, Methodological Naturalism (MN) is Philosophical Naturalism (PN) in a cheap tuxedo! MN places a completely arbitrary restriction on the practice of science and the category of explanatory resources to which science can turn to explain data. If the real explanation is something outside the restriction, then science must pretend to be blind to it for the sake of "doing science." The only way MN makes sense is if we know a priori that nature is a completely closed system of natural cause and effect. But since no one has ever established that scientifically, philosophically, metaphysically or any other way, then MN as an a priori restriction on the practice of science guarantees that if nature is NOT a completely closed system of natural cause and effect, then if the true explanations fall outside the restriction of MN, then science will not see any explanatory possibility beyond that. That's powerfully close to importing PN into the heart of science by disguising at MN. Science is NOT a collorary of PN and no one has ever provided an argument as to why it should be.DonaldM
November 21, 2008
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"But I’ll bet you many people would describe his beliefs on the subject as supernatural - and that quite a lot of the reason would be because they think those claims are false. If Sheldrake ever provided overwhelming evidence of his claims’ truth, I have no doubt said claims would be labeled ‘naturalistic’ upon the instant." So true, so true.tragicmishap
November 21, 2008
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Oops. Sorry Denyse. :Dtragicmishap
November 21, 2008
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Hazel, The problem is that the only things 'empirically testable' are within nature. I think even ID proponents would typically agree with this. The YEC example illustrates that YEC claims can be investigated by science - but only insofar as YEC claims are claims about the natural world. 'The world is 6000 years old' can be investigated by scientific methods in various ways. 'The world is 6000 years old, and all current mainstream scientific attempts to investigate this are either mistaken or are false results from a malevolent entity' cannot be. Even if the world were verified to be 6000 years old, you would not have verified a supernatural claim - verifying the earth's age does not verify the existence of God, though some would certainly take that as a launching point for an argument. So the only way science can deal with 'supernatural' (in the common sense of above or behind nature) claims is indirectly. This point gets confused due to how sloppily 'supernatural' topics are handled. Look at Sheldrake's contentions - he believes telepathy may well be real. To him, telepathy would simply be natural. Hell, he believes it would have been developed via evolutionary methods. But I'll bet you many people would describe his beliefs on the subject as supernatural - and that quite a lot of the reason would be because they think those claims are false. If Sheldrake ever provided overwhelming evidence of his claims' truth, I have no doubt said claims would be labeled 'naturalistic' upon the instant.nullasalus
November 21, 2008
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nullasalus, I think you need to read Tom's comment again. He does not claim that YEC = ID, and he does not assert that methodological naturalism can be used to investigate supernatural hypotheses (of course it can't, since it rules them out a priori). Regarding your final point, I agree that the existence of a deceptive God is not a testable claim. However, most Christians (including most YECs) claim that God is honest. When I said that "science shows us that the YEC God does not exist", I was referring to an honest God.ribczynski
November 21, 2008
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Sure thing Denise. I think it's valuable to offer alternative explanations for the same thing though.tragicmishap
November 21, 2008
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