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WJM on Subjectivist Equivocations

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The following is from William J. Murray:

The problem inherent in arguments for subjective morality is often that those arguing for subjectivism employ terminology that is unavailable to their argument, such as X “is wrong” or “is immoral”. That phrasing obfuscates what the subjectivist must mean as opposed to what an objectivist means when they say the same thing.

Normally, especially in a debate like this, one would use terms and phrasings that distinguish between personal preference and an implied reference to an objective ruling/measurement. In regular conversation, there would be a situational understanding, like: “No, that’s the wrong color shoes to go with your outfit.” where the term “wrong” would be understood as a strong expression of personal aesthetics.
Usually, the line is drawn more distinctly: “It’s not the right choice for me, but it might be for you.” In a debate about morality, leaving off the qualifying terminology undermines the clarity of the argument and the capacity to recognize logical errors.
What does it mean when a supposed moral subjectivist says, “It’s wrong for others to do X”? Since “doing X” cannot actually in itself “be wrong” under moral subjectivism, in the sense that 2+2=25 is “wrong”, or in the sense that “red + blue = green” is wrong, it must be meant in either a personal or a perceived social sensibility manner, like, “Serving guacamole with halibut is so wrong” or “voting for Romney is wrong”.

When it comes to moral subjectivists, “it’s wrong to rape” or “it’s wrong to torture” cannot be anything more than statements of subjective personal or social-sensibility preference, even if they are very strongly felt and believed; the onus is on the individual to recognize that their preference is just that – a personal preference (even if writ large to a social sensibility).
The question for so-called moral subjectivists is: outside of morality and ethics, would you feel comfortable forcing others to adhere to your personal preferences or your social sensibilities? Are you comfortable forcing people to not serve guacamole with halibut, or forcing them to not vote for Romney?

Now, are you comfortable intervening and forcing someone to stop raping or toturing another person?
This is the line where the obfuscating phrasing cannot go beyond, and it is where supporters of moral subjectivism cast their gaze away from the obvious distinction; even the moral subjectivist agrees that forcing personal preferences or social sensibilities upon others is itself immoral. They will fight against such things as a negative social sensibility against various minorities and certainly against individuals forcing their personal preferences on others.

Hypocritically, though, that’s all that morality is in their worldview; they are guilty of doing the very thing they deem immoral in the first place; in fact, their entire moral mechanism of forcing others to abide their personal preferences or social sensibilities is one they see as immoral everywhere else. They would force a freedom from religion, as if forcing religion on others was in principle different. They would force others to treat minorities equally, but enslaving them is using the exact same in-principle rationale.
Moral subjectivists want there to be some kind of distinction between “morality” and other personal preferences and social sensibilities to purchase a rationale for imposing their views on others, and will refer to moral views as “really strong” feelings; but, no matter how strong those feelings are, unless they posit morality as something else in principle than subjective feelings or social sensibilities, their behavior is the in-principle equivalent of any other moral view.

But, they certainly do not behave that way; they behave (like any moral objectivist) as if they have some authority and obligation beyond what can be accounted for by personal preference and social sensibility, no matter how strong such feelings are. There is an operational boundary between what one is willing to do for what one recognizes as matters of subjective personal taste and social sensibility, and what one is willing to do in cases where an objective, necessary and self-evident boundary is being crossed.
No amount of equivocation can hide the difference in how one behaves when it comes to serious moral matters and matters of personal preference/social sensibility.

Here ends WJM’s comment.

WJM’s interlocutor at this time was a buffoon who styles himself “hrun0815.” Said buffoon responded to the comment as follows:

“Yes, yes, WJM. TL;DR about your whole diatribe.” I take it that “TL;DR” is internet shorthand for “too long; didn’t read.” If that is the case, hrun0815 has proven himself unworthy of being taken seriously on these pages, and I would encourage our readers and posters simply to ignore him.

Comments
fg,
What I said, ages ago at the start of my involvement in this thread, is that a person’s moral compass is an intensely personal combination of a number of things: their evolutionary heritage, their unique personality, their culture, their upbringing, their social environment, their life’s experiences. This does not reduce to ‘just because I feel like it’. There is plenty of room for reasoning and logic in the formation of a subjective moral framework and in making subjective judgements, and most thinking people put a lot of thought in deciding whether certain actions are moral or not.
ID-ers don't care. To them, morality either comes from Allah or comes from "because I feel like it." You may as well just use "Allah" as shorthand for the nuanced picture you give; it's what the theists do anyway.LarTanner
January 21, 2015
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WJM, I am going to wrap this up because we are clearly going round in circles. Just a couple of comments on your last post and I will leave it at that. This does not mean that I concede my position, merely that I see no point in continuing to bang my head against a brick wall. - Objectiveness means independent of the mind, in other words an objective entity has properties that do not depend on whoever is studying it. Therefore it stands to reason that most, if not all, observers will arrive at the same conclusions regarding the properties of an objective entity. Indeed this is what we see anywhere else in the world of objective entities. It can't be otherwise without 'objectiveness' losing its meaning. This stands in stark contrast to moral questions where a great many topics cause extreme disagreement between people. - Your extreme example of torturing children for gratuitous pleasure is just that - extreme. This discussion would be far more interesting if you would show how your presumed objective morality informs your moral choices on less extreme issues such as gay marriage, abortion and such like. I notice that you stay clear of such debates that are far less extreme yet in clear dispute between many people. Could it be that your 'objective moral landscape' is so vague and distant here that you can't discern it very clearly at all, and that you use subjective judgement to decide on your positions? Your explicit implication that some moral issues are trivial and some or[sic] not has no basis in subjective morality. This is nonsense and shows that you still don't even understand what you are arguing against. Moreover, pray tell how you can decide which of your assumed objective moral issues are trivial and others not. Don't handwave, show your work. Note above, where you say that I do what any “moral subjectvist” does. Where have you made a case about what behaviors and perspectives moral subjectivism logically entails/produces? Nowhere that I can see. So what are you referring to when you make claims about what “any moral subjectivist does”? Failure of reading comprehension on your part, I'm afraid. I said you use your personal judgement to declare your views valid and theirs not, and you can’t back it up with any objective evidence. This is what a moral subjectivist does. If morality was objective you would simply study the evidence and arrive at your conclusion, which would also be arrived at (within narrow margins) by everyone else who studies it, without a need for personal judgement and without everybody disagreeing along the full spectrum from totally moral to totally immoral. This is what happens when people study objective entities. Clearly, morality does not work that way. Most logical conclusion: it isn't objective. I’d like to add that I appreciate your honest admission that moral subjectivism boils down to “because I feel like it”. What? I have not admitted this, and in fact I disagree with it. What I said, ages ago at the start of my involvement in this thread, is that a person's moral compass is an intensely personal combination of a number of things: their evolutionary heritage, their unique personality, their culture, their upbringing, their social environment, their life's experiences. This does not reduce to 'just because I feel like it'. There is plenty of room for reasoning and logic in the formation of a subjective moral framework and in making subjective judgements, and most thinking people put a lot of thought in deciding whether certain actions are moral or not. Except torturing children for gratuitous pleasure - considering that one immoral seems pretty hard wired into almost everybody. Did you really have to reason your way to the conclusion that it is immoral? Scary stuff. fGfaded_Glory
January 21, 2015
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As you very well know, when different people take measurements on objective entities, they arrive at pretty much the same values. This is a direct consequence of the principle of objectiveness, heck, it comes petty close to being the very meaning of the word ‘objective’.
No. Objective doesn't mean consensus or agreement. It means that if the object is X in length then it is X in length even if everyone who measures it, measures it to be Y in length.
Nobody uses their ‘personal judgement’ to determine the length of a piece of string.
You're apparently confusing "personal judgement" with "conscience". They are not the same thing in my argument. Conscience is the sensory capacity by which we all attempt to measure the string. Interpretation and personal judgement are what we employ to examine the results of that sensory measurement (an estimation of its length) and determine what to do with afterward.
Your point might be valid if differences on moral issues between people were trivially small compared to the importance of the issues. In a lot of cases they are not.
Knowing whether or not the difference are "trivially" small would require knowing what morality actually is, and which issues are actually "trivially small" and which are not. Your explicit implication that some moral issues are trivial and some or not has no basis in subjective morality. Even as you argue against moral objectivism, you explicitly implicate it and utilize it in an attempt to make a point. Because moral theory cannot produce scientifically exact moral measurements does not support the argument that morality is actually subjective in nature unless one also assumes scientism is true. I'm not sure how one would reconcile scientism with moral objectivism, so requiring the capacity to scientifically measure moralness before it it can be considered an objectively existent phenomena is either assuming your conclusion or an unnecessary, convenient precondition.
You say that physicists have different ideas about the interpretations of QM phenomena. Indeed they do. However, what they do not differ about are the measurements of the QM phenomena. It is the phenomena themselves that are the objective entities, not the physicists interpretations. The phenomena can and are reproduced routinely, independent of whatever personal view the practising physicist holds of them.
Just as the measurement of some phenomena, as you say, can be reproduced in universal agreement with all sane physicists, the measurement of the moral wrongness of some things can be reproduced in all sane people: such as, it is wrong to gratuitously torture children. No sane person disagrees with that statement, and the measurement of wrongness involved is as universal as measuring a string; it's pretty much as wrong as wrong gets. At this point I'd like to warn you about taking the moral objectivism / scientific objectivism comparison too far. Moral objectivism is comparable to, but not the same as, scientific objectivism. Scientific objectivism measures and describes physical commodities; morality is not posited as a physical commodity. I have been making a comparison, not drawing a 1 to 1 equivalence.
Not so with moral values. All we have is the personal views.
Assuming your conclusion. However, if conscience is a sensory capacity experiencing an objectively real phenomena that is subject to logical analysis, we have more than personal view; we have a basis for the development of an objective moral theory, not to be confused with a scientific theory, but which may be comparable to a scientific theory and may be in some ways testable.
Nobody has ever observed or measured anything underlying these views.
Please support this assertion.
In the complete absence of any observable and measurable phenomena it is quite unreasonable to assume that anything objective actually exists behind the subjective views of people.
As I have said repeatedly, I'm not making an argument that objective morality actually exists; my argument is that we all behave as if it does, and must behave as if it does. Your explicit implication about a difference between trivial and non-trivial moral issues demonstrates that you cannot argue as if moral subjectivism is true even while you are making that argument.
The conundrum with your position is not the disagreement over moral values itself. The conundrum is that when there is such disagreement, the only way to resolve it is by subjective judgement because there is nothing objective you can study and measure.
The conundrum, then only exists in your assumption that "there is nothing objective you can study and measure". I have repeatedly offered my theoretical objective object of study: the actual moral landscape, using the measuring instrument (sensory apparatus) of our conscience and employing the self-regulatory methodology of logic aided by good judgement.
So, you still have not given an adequate response to my challenge that when you declare your own moral interpretation to be better than someone else’s, say on Radical Islam, you are doing anything different from what a moral subjectivist does – you use your personal judgement to declare your views valid and theirs not, and you can’t back it up with any objective evidence.
I don't require objective evidence for a logical argument stemming from assumed premises. You seem to be cognitively unable to grasp certain things I've repeated over and over - I'm not saying you're unable to believe them, but just that you're unable to grasp the concept. Note above, where you say that I do what any "moral subjectvist" does. Where have you made a case about what behaviors and perspectives moral subjectivism logically entails/produces? Nowhere that I can see. So what are you referring to when you make claims about what "any moral subjectivist does"? You are describing, I suppose, what you would be doing in making a moral decision and using that as a model of what a logically consistent moral subjectivist would do, even though my argument is that how you and all other sane people behave is according to moral objectivism; you're using the very behavior under dispute as assumed evidence for your position without even presenting a case that the behavior/perspective you are describing is actualy rationally consistent with moral subjectivism. You're just assuming that it is because you're assuming you are an example of a rationally consistent moral subjectivist.
This is as subjective as anything can be. Welcome to the worldwide club of sociopaths.
Another indication that you simply cannot grasp the nature of the argument. Logically consistent moral subjectivists do not use "personal judgement" to determine "what is right and wrong"; personal preference and morality are the same thing under moral subjectivism. There is no "judgement" beyond "how one feels about it"; and any equivocation using the term "judgement" is a question-begging mask that leads back to personal preference. Under logically consistent subjective morality, conscience is nothing more than an internal feeling; it is not in contact with any "real" moral commodity that requires interpretation, judgement and logical examination/argument/introspection. Feelings are essentially irrational; there is no need to make judgements on them, rationalize them, justify them, and if you were to try, what would you ultimately be rationalizing or justifying or judging them by? As you yourself have asserted, in your opinion, it all boils down to personal, subjective feelings. The logically consistent moral subjectivist simply accepts that very thing - their feelings = what is moral and what is not, their feelings = what moral rights they have, and they intervene in the lives of others in whatever way they feel like. IOW, for the moral subjectivist, there is nothing left but "morality = whatever I feel like".
Anyway, the crux of our disagreement is that you think that the position ( c) that ‘because nobody is objectively right or wrong, we ought to tolerate the behavior of others even when we disagree about the morality of it’ follows logically from the position (b) that ‘in such (moral) disagreements, nobody is objectively right or wrong’.
I've already corrected this erroneous extrapolation from moral relativism and pointed out that actual moral subjectivists need not tolerate anything as long as they admit their actual moral authority is "because I feel like it". I'd like to add that I appreciate your honest admission that moral subjectivism boils down to "because I feel like it". I think any honest, sane person capable of relatively unbiased perspective knows that "because I feel like it" is not, and cannot ever be a valid moral authority, but is pretty much the antithesis of morality.William J Murray
January 21, 2015
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WJM: I don't accept your equation of accessing objective moral values through your sense with accepting other objective entities through your senses. As you very well know, when different people take measurements on objective entities, they arrive at pretty much the same values. This is a direct consequence of the principle of objectiveness, heck, it comes petty close to being the very meaning of the word 'objective'. Nobody uses their 'personal judgement' to determine the length of a piece of string. They use a ruler which displays a commonly agreed standard and read off the value that corresponds to the length of the string. You ask 1000 people to do this and they will arrive at the same value, with a small error bar caused by trivial issues such as the accuracy of their eyesight or temperature variations between measurements. This is what happens when we study objective entities. It is not what happens when we study divisive moral issues such as gay marriage or abortion. Take 1000 random people, ask them if such issues are morally right, and their views will be distributed all over the compass from totally agree to totally disagree. Your point might be valid if differences on moral issues between people were trivially small compared to the importance of the issues. In a lot of cases they are not. You say that physicists have different ideas about the interpretations of QM phenomena. Indeed they do. However, what they do not differ about are the measurements of the QM phenomena. It is the phenomena themselves that are the objective entities, not the physicists interpretations. The phenomena can and are reproduced routinely, independent of whatever personal view the practising physicist holds of them. Not so with moral values. All we have is the personal views. Nobody has ever observed or measured anything underlying these views. In the complete absence of any observable and measurable phenomena it is quite unreasonable to assume that anything objective actually exists behind the subjective views of people. The conundrum with your position is not the disagreement over moral values itself. The conundrum is that when there is such disagreement, the only way to resolve it is by subjective judgement because there is nothing objective you can study and measure. So, you still have not given an adequate response to my challenge that when you declare your own moral interpretation to be better than someone else's, say on Radical Islam, you are doing anything different from what a moral subjectivist does - you use your personal judgement to declare your views valid and theirs not, and you can't back it up with any objective evidence. This is as subjective as anything can be. Welcome to the worldwide club of sociopaths. Anyway, the crux of our disagreement is that you think that the position ( c) that 'because nobody is objectively right or wrong, we ought to tolerate the behavior of others even when we disagree about the morality of it' follows logically from the position (b) that 'in such (moral) disagreements, nobody is objectively right or wrong'. I don't think it does. And if I'm right, your claim that subjectivists - who accept (b) but not ( c) - live as though objectivism is true, is false. fGfaded_Glory
January 21, 2015
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faded_glory said:
You still haven’t addressed the conundrum that rises from your assertion that morality is an objective commodity: if someone disagrees with you on a particular tenet of this objective morality, what do you do?
I've already answered this. Its baffling to me why you consider a simple disagreement over the proper interpretation of a presumed objective phenomena represents a "conundrum". Humans do it all the time. Many physicists are still in disagreement about how to interpret various quantum phenomena. Those are not "conundrums" in any sense of the term; they are interpretive disagreements. Also, how many times do I have to tell you that it is my argument that every non-sociopath already acts like a moral objectivist? Non-sociopaths do all sorts of things when attempting to solve moral disagreements - use logic, find common-ground agreements and work from there, compromise, go to war, etc.
You don’t have direct access to the objective standard, as you admit, so on what basis do you conclude that your view is better than theirs?
I don't have direct access to any phenomena I sense with any of my senses. So? It's not a matter of whether or not my interpretation of the moral landscape is "better" than anyone else's; I don't know if it is or not. I confidently hold (but do not "know")that it is obviously better than some, just as I'm sure you do - better than radical Islam, for example. Moral subjectivists, however, cannot logically consider their moral perspective "better" (in any substantive sense) than anyone else's. The argument is about the logical consistency of competing moral worldviews. Regardless of what people do to resolve their moral disagreements, the only logically consistent moral worldview (outside of that which demands one become a sociopath) is moral objectivism.
It cannot be anything else than your personal interpretation of what the correct position is. In other words, when choosing between conflicting moral positions you use your subjective judgement just like everybody else.
Of course I do. When choosing what to do about anything in the presumed objectively existent world your senses reveal, you use your personal interpretation of that sensory data to develop behaviors that reflect what you are observing to the best of your personal judgement. You're stating the trivially true observation that with regard to all things one experiences, we experience and then interpret that experience subjectively as if it somehow causes a problem for my argument. This is one of the places where your cognitive bias is, IMO, causing you to make absurd arguments, as if "no direct access", "personal judgement" and "personal interpretations" are not limiting qualities also true of our interaction with all presumed objective phenomena.
Does that make you a sociopath too?
Since we all personally interpret and use personal judgement on the information our other senses bring us about a presumed objectively existent world, does that make us all solipsists? Of course not. Nobody except the insane can actually act like solipsists (physical experience subjectivists) or moral subjectivists.William J Murray
January 21, 2015
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WJM: You still haven't addressed the conundrum that rises from your assertion that morality is an objective commodity: if someone disagrees with you on a particular tenet of this objective morality, what do you do? You don't have direct access to the objective standard, as you admit, so on what basis do you conclude that your view is better than theirs? It cannot be anything else than your personal interpretation of what the correct position is. In other words, when choosing between conflicting moral positions you use your subjective judgement just like everybody else. Does that make you a sociopath too? fGfaded_Glory
January 21, 2015
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#301 WJM
You don’t know that morality is subjective and conscience a purely internal feeling any more than I know morality is objective and the conscience is a sensory capacity.
Interesting. This suggests that the nature of morality is in some way hidden from us. This is strange as we use morality every day so confidentally. It is part of subjectivism (at least my interpretation) that morality is not at all mysterious or hidden. It is just part of human nature which we participate in and observe all the time. The only reason we are confused and have this debate at all is our intelligence is bewitched by the language. In particular, moral statements are of the form X is Y (e.g. abortion is evil) and this makes us think there is a property corresponding to Y when Y is an actually prescriptive not descriptive (a bit like "ties are mandatory" is not a description of a property of ties).Mark Frank
January 20, 2015
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LH said:
Given that objectivists must access any objective moral code by feeling it (or feeling the values underlying any attempt to reason it out), this accomplishes exactly nothing.
Incorrect, it allows one to live in rational correspondence with one's moral premises without being a sociopath. Whether morality is rooted in an objective or subjective source, and whether conscience is limited to being an internal feeling or is a sensory capacity that can sense the moral landscape, both are moral theories. You don't know that morality is subjective and conscience a purely internal feeling any more than I know morality is objective and the conscience is a sensory capacity. The question is, which theory best describes how we actually live? The subjectivist theory inexorably leads to a "because I feel like it" morality. The objectivist theory, which posits conscience as sensory capacity, provides a theoretical objective framework that would provide a sound alternative explanation for our behavior that does not end up in an immoral moral principle (because I feel like it).
Ultimately it all boils down to feelings.
Only if you assume that's all there is when it comes to morality; but that's all you're doing - assuming your conclusion that the conscience is nothing but an internal feeling like other internal feelings. However, if you truly believe it all boils down to feelings, then your moral principle is "because I feel like it". Unless you are a sociopath, you simply cannot live that way, even if you assert that you do.William J Murray
January 20, 2015
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Rather, I argued that the only principle available for not tolerating the moralities of others is “because I feel like it”. Given that objectivists must access any objective moral code by feeling it (or feeling the values underlying any attempt to reason it out), this accomplishes exactly nothing. Why should an objectivist prefer good to evil? "Because I feel like it." Or perhaps because God commands it--but then, of course, why should you obey God? "Because I feel like it." Or perhaps because God will punish us if we don't--but then, of course, why should we work to avoid punishment? "Because I feel like it." Ultimately it all boils down to feelings.Learned Hand
January 20, 2015
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faded_glory said:
There may be be some confusion about terminology.
Considering I used the correct terms repeatedly, and spelled out what I meant by those terms throughout, I'd say any confusion that exists is entirely on your end.
a. Descriptive moral relativism holds only that some people do in fact disagree about what is moral.
This is a trivial statement. Even people that adhere to the same source of objective morality can disagree about what is moral.
b. Meta-ethical moral relativism holds that in such disagreements, nobody is objectively right or wrong. A corrollary of this is that moral concepts reside in the minds of people and nowhere else.
Not exactly. From: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-relativism/#ForArg
Metaethical Moral Relativism (MMR). The truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of persons.
Under moral relativism, a moral statement can be true and not not be mind-dependent, even though it is not held as absolutely or universally true.
On the other hand, when I refer to objective morality I am talking about the existence of a moral standard ‘somewhere’ (without a specified location) independent of human minds.
Moral Objectivism holds that at least some moral truths are factually, universally true.
If you mean something different with these terms we may have been talking at cross-purpose.
I'm not sure how I can be more explicit that actually using the correct terms multiple times and also explaining what I mean throughout the debate. Let's look at your challenge, though:
Normative moral relativism holds that because nobody is right or wrong, we ought to tolerate the behavior of others even when we disagree about the morality of it. So now I challenge you to demonstrate why normative moral relativism ( c) has to follow logically from meta-ethical moral relativism (b). Can you do that?
Only, I haven't argued that a moral subjectivist (whose morals exist only in his/her head) ought tolerate moralities other than their own. Rather, I argued that the only principle available for not tolerating the moralities of others is "because I feel like it". If a moral subjectivist agrees that the principle that empowers their moral views is "because I feel like it", then not tolerating the moralities of others because they don't feel like tolerating them is logically consistent. The descriptive term for such people is "sociopaths". Let's say a moral subjectivist or relativist argues that "because I feel like it" is not their empowering moral principle - is not their moral authority, or that which legitimizes their behaviors and judgements. What, then, can a subjectivist or relativist point to? Social mores? Majority? Law? Some list of moral oughts and rights and obligations printed down somewhere? If the moral subjectivist/relativist disagrees strongly enough with any of these, they will abandon that so-called authority, meaning that something else must be the actual authority that guides their moral behavior, because it can overrule any majority, social, or written rule. For any non-objectivist that is willing to defy/work to change any exterior moral rule or tradition they disagree with strongly enough, the only possible principle of moral authority available is "because I feel like it". Feel free to offer up another that does not question-beg back into "because I feel like it". You may feel really, really strongly about it, but that's still the only principle available. So, the only rationally coherent way of being a true moral subjectivist and not tolerating what you consider sufficiently "wrong" behavior in others is by living by the moral code: because I feel like it. Everything else is an equivocation or an obfuscation, consciously offered or not. But, you're not sociopaths; you're just people that have an ideological bias against moral objectivism because you think it means admitting god must exist, and so cognitive bias has you running in circles. You behave like moral objectivists while telling yourselves and arguing with others that you are not.William J Murray
January 20, 2015
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Andre: Perhaps you are mistaken about something. I am not anti-evolution. Let us clear that up. There is such a thing as evolution, but is not the blind watchmaker one. I would say that I’m aligned with Alfred Wallace. Hope that helps before you assume incorrectly again. Lol. Alfred Wallace himself came up with the idea of natural selection. You say you are aligned with him but you don't think natural selection is effective. Come again? fGfaded_Glory
January 20, 2015
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faded glory..... Every word the "plagiarist" (another tactic used by the Darwinists)said is true..... Natural selection is an assumption and it has no observable or verifiable evidence, indirect yes but that's about it......Andre
January 20, 2015
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faded_glory I have read it and I'm telling you know it has not been observed it is assumed..... If a guy that builds molecular machines for a living tells you he does not know how it works, perhaps you should hear him out? If papers today question the dogma you should hear them out.... I told you I'm a recovering Darwinist.Andre
January 20, 2015
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Andre, It is too funny, really. I present a chapter of a well known modern textbook on behavioural ecology that lists several well documented examples of natural selection at work on animal behaviours, a textbook that has had a glowing review in Nature. To counter that, you link to some internet forum post by an anonymous poster called Thermopylae, who cuts and pastes a number of assertions straight from the creationist play book, without any shred of evidence that he actually works in the field or has produced any peer reviewed academic work. And you expect us to take this seriously? Who do you think you are kidding? fGfaded_Glory
January 20, 2015
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Andre, You make a lot of assertions, but the reality is that the very book I linked you to gives several examples of observed natural selection at work on animal behaviours. Why don't you actually read it for comprehension, instead of counting the number of words you think indicate that the authors don't know what they are talking about? fGfaded_Glory
January 20, 2015
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Zachriel you should know better by now, no doubt your chemical reactions from goo via the zoo to you are not fit for truth....... only survival. Its 2007 so lets see..... 2007 - 1859 = 148 years Ater 148 years of research still an assumption. Because the theory itself is weak and there is no observational evidence for its assumptions.
Apart from the theoretical weaknesses mentioned above, the theory of evolution by natural selection comes up against a fundamental impasse when faced with concrete scientific findings. The scientific value of a theory must be assessed according to its success or failure in experiment and observation. Evolution by natural selection fails on both counts.
http://www.biology-online.org/biology-forum/about9882.html?hilit=Banner But let me tell you about a really cool proverb...... Assumption is the mother of all......Andre
January 20, 2015
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Andre: How about this one? http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ajpa.1330230504/abstract The paper is more than thirty years old and primarily concerns human evolution. From the paper,
Many other indirect kinds of evidence have been used to detect, if not measure, selection... Although these correlations are good evidence for selection, there seems to be no method to estimate directly its magnitude or effect.
Since then, there have been many studies that directly measure natural selection in natural populations. Andre: Natural selection is based on the assumption that in nature there is a constant struggle for survival. Is that not a reasonable assumption? Andre: On the Origin of Species, Chapter 1: Variation under domestication Assume used 4 times Suppose used 9 times Imagine used 1 time Believe used 23 times You do understand that a scientific hypothesis is an assumption, meaning that virtually every scientific paper ever written starts with an assumption?Zachriel
January 20, 2015
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faded_glory Did you read the paper? Did you spot it? If not I highlighted the issue...... It says;
Natural selection is based on the assumption that in nature there is a constant struggle for survival. It favours organisms with traits that best enable them to cope with pressures exerted by the environment. At the end of this struggle, the strongest ones, the ones most suited to natural conditions, survive. For example, in a herd of deer under threat from predators, those individuals that can run fastest will naturally survive. As a consequence, the herd of deer will eventually consist of only fast-running individuals.
If you think these guys are just making a mistake..... How about this one? http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ajpa.1330230504/abstract
Natural selection has always been assumed to be the major force of evolution, but its presence has been difficult to demonstrate. A review of the evidence for selective differences among genotypes for most human genetic polymorphisms indicates there is little of a direct nature. Indirect theoretical evidence, however, seems to support a major role for natural selection, and it does not seem to support the hypothesis that most amino acid substitutions within the human species are neutral.
So faded_glory before you come here and make statements on the truthfulness of Natural selection and behaviour maybe you like Darwin should stop assuming things, rather give us testable and verifiable evidence that supports your assumptions. PleaseAndre
January 20, 2015
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Mark
I like to think that as a good Christian you have the humility to share the blame for that failure. I certainly recognise my share – I struggle to communicate my ideas clearly and concisely and I often fail to understand yours.
OK. Let us part in peace.StephenB
January 20, 2015
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Why it is not resolved! http://www.biology-online.org/biology-forum/about9882.html?hilit=BannerAndre
January 20, 2015
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It is not resolved. In the old days natural selection was deemed so powerful it even replaced God. We are now in the 21st century and our view about what natural selection can do is waning. Perhaps it's time for you to do some reading on the subject?Andre
January 20, 2015
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faded_glory Perhaps you are mistaken about something. I am not anti-evolution. Let us clear that up. There is such a thing as evolution, but is not the blind watchmaker one. I would say that I'm aligned with Alfred Wallace. Hope that helps before you assume incorrectly again. Natural selection is not the force you hope it to be. It is capable of some changes but tends to break things more than it builds.Andre
January 20, 2015
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William J Murray, There may be be some confusion about terminology. In this discussion when I use the term 'Subjective Morality' I pretty much mean a combination of what the Wikipedia page calls 'descriptive moral relativism' and 'meta-ethical moral relativism': a. Descriptive moral relativism holds only that some people do in fact disagree about what is moral. b. Meta-ethical moral relativism holds that in such disagreements, nobody is objectively right or wrong. A corrollary of this is that moral concepts reside in the minds of people and nowhere else. On the other hand, when I refer to objective morality I am talking about the existence of a moral standard 'somewhere' (without a specified location) independent of human minds. If you mean something different with these terms we may have been talking at cross-purpose. fGfaded_Glory
January 20, 2015
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Andre, Let's remind ourselves where this conversation started. You claimed in post 135: If you make such outlandish claims you need to back it up with evidence. Non morality can not evolve into morality. Natural selection can not act on anything immaterial. to counter my statement that animal behaviour can evolve, and potentially be a factor in the development of morality, or at least some elements of it, over the course of evolutionary history. To back up my statement I then pointed you to a biology textbook that contains real examples of how at least some animal behaviours are genetically controlled. Therefore, natural selection can, and does, indeed affect behaviours through elimination or reinforcement of genes that contribute to animal behaviour. I take it that this subject is now satisfactorily resolved. fGfaded_Glory
January 20, 2015
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faded_glory said:
So now I challenge you to demonstrate why normative moral relativism ( c) has to follow logically from meta-ethical moral relativism (b). Can you do that?
Well, if we're going to start employing some technical terminology, you might start out by getting the terminology right; my argument is about moral subjectivism vs moral objectivism. The only tangential thing it has to do with moral relativism is that I consider all moral relativists to be, when it comes down to it, moral subjectivists. More on this later.William J Murray
January 20, 2015
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faded_glory And atheist regimes are the beacons of hope for the world right?Andre
January 20, 2015
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MF Shame on you for playing the you are a bad Christian card......Andre
January 20, 2015
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faded_glory Different genes is not a evolutionary or Darwinian truth claim. It is a biological observation.Andre
January 20, 2015
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#278 SB
Mark, I don’t think it is possible to have a rational discussion with you. It is a waste of time to try. Adios.
That is fair enough and will stop me being distracted from my job. I like to think that as a good Christian you have the humility to share the blame for that failure. I certainly recognise my share - I struggle to communicate my ideas clearly and concisely and I often fail to understand yours.Mark Frank
January 20, 2015
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Andre: Seriously neither you nor anybody else in the existence of the universe can read or control thought…….. Indeed, that appears to be the case. This has never stopped authoritarian institutions from trying to outlaw dissenting thought, though. History is rife with examples such as the Church, Islamic authorities, fascist dictatorships, communist regimes and others telling people what they are and are not allowed to think on pain of serious sanction, including death. If only everybody would agree that thoughts cannot be controlled and it is therefore futile to introduce rules and laws that try to do just that, the world would be a better place. Don't you think so? fGfaded_Glory
January 20, 2015
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