Moral Subjectivism = Nazis Were Doing Good and We Shouldn’t Have Stopped Them

_{William Murray

November 17, 2013

Intelligent Design}

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Under moral subjectivism, good and bad are entirely subjective commodities. This means that if I think a thing is right, it is as right as is possible for moral right to exist. The principle of subjective morality authorizes an act as “morally good” if the person that performed the act believed it to be the right thing to do; that is the only framework available to moral subjectivism for an evaluation of “moral” and “immoral”. It is strictly a relationship between the actor/believer and the act.
Therefore, as long as Hitler believed his actions right, and those who carried out his orders believed similarly, then to the full extent that the principle of moral subjectivism has to authorize anything as “moral” or “good”, the holocaust was a good and moral event, and moral subjectivists must (rationally speaking) admit this. (I doubt they will, though.)

The way that moral relativists attempt to wiggle out of this is by saying that in their opinion, Hitler was behaving immorally. Unfortunately, they have no rational basis for making this statement. It is a category error, a non-sequitur under moral subjectivism, offered as if there was some means by which to pass judgement on what others consider to be right. Their principle necessarily endorses the actions of the Nazis as morally good as long as they (the Nazis) believed what they were doing was right; what anyone else thought or thinks is entirely irrelevant. The most that the principle of moral subjectivism logically allows subjectivists to say is that gassing the Jews would not be morally good for them personally to do, but that it was morally good for the Nazis to do.

Furthermore, since the principle of moral subjectivism offers no valid reason to intervene in the moral affairs of others (since it is entirely subjective and there is no objective obligation or authority to do so), and since moral relativists must admit that nothing morally wrong was occurring in the first place (in fact, only moral good was likely happening, since the Nazis believed what they were doing was right), they must hold that we should not have interfered with the Nazis.

Thus, moral subjectivism necessary means that the Nazis were doing good and we shouldn’t have stopped them.

Comments

WJM, Thanks, these questions may be helpful in fleshing out our positions. I appreciate your making the effort.
1. What principle gives you the authority/right to intervene in the moral affairs of others?
You are assuming a default position in which I need authority to intervene in the moral affairs of others. Let’s start from a neutral position and ask whether that’s true. As it happens, I think it is true, but the reason why it’s true is relevant. I believe that the sovereignty of others is a moral good. (I believe that largely because I value people who aren’t myself. Many people refuse to believe that about atheists, which frankly makes me sad.) So for me to believe that I have the right to interfere with another’s sovereignty, some principle I value more highly has to be at stake. The analysis would depend on the magnitude of the intervention and the magnitude of the other principle at stake. I would interfere with my neighbor’s sovereignty by calling the police if he was beating his wife, but not if he was downloading music illegally.
2. If you feel you have moral obligations, why are you so obligated, and to whom or what?
I do feel that I have moral obligations. I’ve never considered “to whom or what.” I’m not sure that I perceive any such external subject. I would characterize those obligations as a sense of “This thing must/must not be done,” rather than, “X demands that this thing must/must not be done.” Those obligations arise largely from my upbringing and social context. But I don't think of these as obligations to my cultural context.
3. What happens if you do not meet your moral obligations?
It depends on the obligation and the circumstances. I would feel guilty to some extent, and responsible for some extent for whatever harm resulted. I might be held accountable by some external force—society, friends, family, whatever—to some degree. It might be that there would be no, or negligible consequences. I feel that I have a moral obligation to pick up after my dog when she poops on the neighbor’s lawn during a walk. But if that neighbor was a horrible bigot or had kicked my dog on another day, I might not feel any consequences if I failed to meet that obligation.
4. By what criteria do you judge the moral behavior of others?
I’ve answered this question many times—Brent was very helpful in fleshing this out. By my own, subjective criteria.Pro Hac Vice_{November 19, 2013
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So, my questions to PHV or an moral relativist are: 1. What principle gives you the authority/right to intervene in the moral affairs of others? 2. If you feel you have moral obligations, why are you so obligated, and to whom or what? 3. What happens if you do not meet your moral obligations? 4. By what criteria do you judge the moral behavior of others?William J Murray_{November 18, 2013
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I responded here: https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/wjm-sums-it-up-nicely/#comment-480422Brent_{November 18, 2013
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Alan responds,
Not sure that there was a genuine consensus among a majority of the German population for routine industrial disposal of people, all of whom deserved the universal right to life.
you might try reading a history book sometime. World War II was a war of propaganda. The Jews were demonized by the Nazis. Don't try moving the goalposts, Alan. You said consensus was a good foundation for morality. I presented an example to the contrary and you duck and weave.
No it was horrendous, barbaric, deserving of the strongest condemnation. It should have been vigorously opposed. Anyone complicit, let alone active in genocide, deserves condemnation and incarceration.
And, therefore, Alan's point about consensus being a sound foundation for morality is proven wrong.
I’m amazed that you think anyone with a vestige of human empathy would think otherwise?
Spoken to any racists lately? You'd be surprised at how many people are sympathetic to the ideals of the Nazis. Personally, I prefer Indiana Jones's philosophy: "Nazis. I hate these guys."Barb_{November 18, 2013
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Just one quick note, because I have poor impulse control:
Once again, these are two different statements: A. Everyone has their own moral beliefs. B. Everyone’s moral beliefs are equivalent. A is not, and does not logically entail, B. I hold to A, but not B.

If you don’t believe everyone’s moral beliefs are equivalent, then you necessarily need an arbiter.
Yes!
You are only left with your “arbiter within”, though, just like me and everyone else.
Yes!
So, yes, you must believe everyone’s moral beliefs are either equivalent (because our “arbiters” are equal), or there actually is a real objective right or wrong.
No! Why do you think this? What's the link you're relying on? Our arbiters aren't equal. I think my beliefs are better than other peoples'. This is almost a tautology--if I thought their beliefs were better than mine, I'd adopt them. (Not excepting people who embody better beliefs than I am willing to enact, such as monks who serve their community selflessly and millionaires who give every dime away. The fact that I admire their actions means I share their moral beliefs, but lack the willpower/drive/whatever to put them to such extreme practice.)
A only ceases to entail B if you accept an objective moral standard.
No, A only entails B if you are so utterly selfless that you cannot prefer your own beliefs over others'. And, once again, that's the boat we're all in. No matter how fervently you believe in objective criteria, we keep asking for something that's actually objective. "I feel it, and I feel that you feel it too" isn't actually objective. It's a subjective report of a subjective feeling.Pro Hac Vice_{November 18, 2013
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Hi, I have a conference call coming up. I'd love to respond further, but may not be able to until later today. Some of what would have been responses here got moved to B Arrington's new threads, though, if you feel I'm failing to respond to something that matters to you. (If you think I'm missing something crucial, please let me know. WJM, thanks for your clarification. I responded in some haste in one of the later threads, will try to do so in more detail here later.)Pro Hac Vice_{November 18, 2013
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Perceptive analysis by Pro Hac Vice at 87.
It’s interesting to me how much of this conversation is objectivists telling relativists, “Here is what you believe,” without bothering to ask questions. When you tell someone else what they believe, you are probably wrong.
Indeed, listening is a skill that is in short supply in these comment threads. One feels it almost doesn't matter or register with William, what one actually writes. He is just going to plough blithely on in his perceptual bubble, unperturbed by reality. I love mixing my metaphors!Alan Fox_{November 18, 2013
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It’s interesting to me how much of this conversation is objectivists telling relativists, “Here is what you believe,” without bothering to ask questions. When you tell someone else what they believe, you are probably wrong.
We're telling you what the logical ramifications of your premises are, not what your beliefs are. In other words, if you hold premise A, then you must rationally also commit to B. That doesn't mean you actually believe B; it just means that if you do not, you're being logically inconsistent with regards to your stated premise. We're actually, for the most part, assuming you do not believe B, even though it is logically implied by your premise. It's our hope that once you realize that B is logically irreconcilable with your premise, you'll question your premise.William J Murray_{November 18, 2013
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KF, Sorry - I missed an edit there.William J Murray_{November 18, 2013
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You can boil it down to “feel a certain way” if you like, but at that point we’re all in the same boat.
No. Your actions, under moral relativism, boil down to "doing what you feel like doing" because your premise is that morality is nothing more, essentially, than personal feelings. My actions do not boil down to "doing what I feel like doing" because my premise is that morality is not fundamentally a "feeling", but rather an objective commodity that is producing the sensations I experience through conscience, and that what I feel like doing could be in conflict with what I should be doing. Under moral relativism, there is no difference between "what I feel like doing" and "what I should be doing", while under moral objectivism, "what I feel like doing" should be overruled by "what I should be doing".
You “feel a certain way” (that moral truths are self-evident). Isn’t that the logical justification for your actions?
In the first place I never said "that moral truths are self-evident". I said there exists at least one self-evidently true moral statement. I didn't imply that all or most moral truths are self-evident. Secondly, that we begin our explanations of what morality is by "feeling" moral duties and authority is irrelevant to the debate and doesn't change the fact that morality is either a subjective commodity or an objective one. We can either believe those feelings are entirely subjective, or we can believe that those feelings are produced in response to an objective moral commodity. Neither position enjoys a true-by-default position. The pertinent questions under debate is not "can we use our feelings to determine if morality refers to an objective or a subjective commodity", but rather which premise leads to rationally sound conclusions, a rationally sound moral framework that justifies moral obligation and authority, which we actually experience? Which premise actually logically jsutifies our behavior and reactions in the real world?
When you point to “self-evidence,” all you’re doing is putting another name to the same thing: I feel this is right, and I’m going to act consistently with that feeling. ”
You have assumed your conclusion here - that there is no objective commodity that is producing those feelings. You are apparently making the case that even though we both feel something we refer to as a sense of morality, and even though we report largely similar experiences, because what we are feeling differs in many respects necessarily means that what we are experiencing is entirely subjective, and that all we have at the root of figuring out morality are those subjectively-produced feelings. There is an alternative - that what we are experiencing is not just a feeling, but is a sensation produced by an objective commodity for which we have a corresponding sensory capacity - our conscience.
The difference between us seems to be that I acknowledge that different people have different feelings, which are largely down to how they’re raised and educated.
This is exactly where your argument goes off the rails. How people are raised and educated not only translates into variant feelings, experiences and interpretations of subjective matters, but also results in widely variant feelings, experiences and interpretations of objectively-existent commodities and phenomena. If you have looked over any psychology, or are familiar with crime & law enforcement, you will know that empirical, first-hand experiences widely vary even when they are of the same phenomena/event. Witnesses will offer completely different, contradictory details of events. Upbringing, culture, education, etc. have been shown to be major factors in how people perceive/interpret actual, physical events and report them. Two people can be in exactly the same physical situation and report entirely different feelings and sensations. This is a trivially true fact of human nature; whether they are experiencing the subjective or the objective, two humans rarely have the same experience of a thing, even when that thing is an objectively existent suspect right in front of them; their descriptions will often be conflicting. Does that mean that the thing they are describing is necessarily subjective in nature? Of course not. That people's descriptions of an experience varies is not conclusive evidence that what they experience is entirely subjective in nature, any more than agreements of experience is conclusive that they are experiencing an objective commodity. It is up to us to choose which premise we should hold about morality, which is what this argument is about.William J Murray_{November 18, 2013
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F/N: Let us understand how this speaks to not only behaviour of the individual but the foundations of just law that were used by Locke in his c 1690 2nd essay on civil govt, when he set out to ground what would become modern liberty and democracy. For in so doing he cited "the judicious [Anglican Canon Richard] Hooker" writing in his 1594+ Ecclesiastical Polity:
. . . if I cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man's hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire which is undoubtedly in other men . . . my desire, therefore, to be loved of my equals in Nature, as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to themward fully the like affection. From which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn for direction of life no man is ignorant . . . [[Hooker then continues, citing Aristotle in The Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 8:] as namely, That because we would take no harm, we must therefore do none; That since we would not be in any thing extremely dealt with, we must ourselves avoid all extremity in our dealings; That from all violence and wrong we are utterly to abstain, with such-like . . . ] [[Eccl. Polity,preface, Bk I, "ch." 8, p.80]
We know where this leads, and where it has led. We also -- on even longer history -- know where evolutionary materialist radically amoral relativist or subjectivist secularism, "the highest right is might" nihilism and their fellow travellers go. Do we really, really want to go there again as a civilisation? Do we so chafe to be rid of Him who made us in his image, gave us minds and consciences and the precept stamped in our hearts of neighbour-love? Are we mad? KFkairosfocus_{November 18, 2013
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PHV: In a great many highly relevant case4s, yes, though of course there are cases where there are objective grounds for saying that certain people are disqualified. You gave a case of racial discrimination: X -- blatantly otherwise qualified -- is not to get a job because X is black or X is Jewish, or the like. Come back to me on why there is no objective ground -- e.g. the fundamental equality, dignity and worth of the human being made in God's image -- on which such can be seen. That is a case where disagreement is not a matter of tastes and preferences the order of, I like or don't like rum and raisin ice cream. KFkairosfocus_{November 18, 2013
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PHV,
Once again, these are two different statements: A. Everyone has their own moral beliefs. B. Everyone’s moral beliefs are equivalent. A is not, and does not logically entail, B. I hold to A, but not B.
If you don't believe everyone's moral beliefs are equivalent, then you necessarily need an arbiter. You are only left with your "arbiter within", though, just like me and everyone else. So, yes, you must believe everyone's moral beliefs are either equivalent (because our "arbiters" are equal), or there actually is a real objective right or wrong. A only ceases to entail B if you accept an objective moral standard.Brent_{November 18, 2013
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WJM: pardon, language. KFkairosfocus_{November 18, 2013
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KF, No, I disagree that there is a contradiction. I believe employment discrimination is wrong. I know there are people who disagree with me. I cannot identify any objective moral standard for resolving that dispute. Can you propose one? BA seems to suggest that "I feel it" is such a standard. But I don't understand how "I feel it" is an objective standard, especially if someone else says they feel something different.
Mere disagreement does not constitute grounds to conclude that there is no objective basis for morality. Not, so long as it is possible for us to be in error.
I agree. But that does not entail the existence of objective morality, either. I keep asking, what is the objective moral standard? Where do I find it? What happens if yours is different from mine--how do we objectively discriminate between the two?Pro Hac Vice_{November 18, 2013
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PHV: Re
A: I believe employment discrimination is wrong. B: Allan believes it is not only acceptable, but morally good. C: I don’t believe there’s any ultimate objective standard for resolving the moral dispute
Do you not see the contradiction between A and C? Do you not see how C leads to the undermining of A, turning it into a psychological evaluation of a state of mind, without grounds? Do you see the absurdity that results? Mere disagreement does not constitute grounds to conclude that there is no objective basis for morality. Not, so long as it is possible for us to be in error. Where also, so long as we do have genuine rights, we have binding moral principles. Hence the force of the point that it is self evident that to kidnap, torture, rape and murder a child is self-evidently wrong. KFkairosfocus_{November 18, 2013
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It's interesting to me how much of this conversation is objectivists telling relativists, "Here is what you believe," without bothering to ask questions. When you tell someone else what they believe, you are probably wrong. It's not easy to get inside someone else's head. If someone else tells you, consistently, "You don't really understand what I believe," you might rethink your strategy of dictating to them and consider asking some questions. This conversation is useless if it's about WJM and Brent persuading me that I'm logically inconsistent, or me persuading them that their intuition might not be truly objective. Realistically minds aren't going to change. But it's potentially very useful as a way to learn more about how other people think. Slandering relativists with the Nazi label is pleasing to the core audience here, but it's a very inefficient way of getting to the useful part of this conversation. (That assumes that WJM, Arrington, et al don't see the conversation as useful primarily as fan service.)Pro Hac Vice_{November 18, 2013
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Mark Frank,
I don’t agree. It is a subjective judgement that dog shit smells awful – but such is the strength of common subjective judgement that we would instantly feel authorised and obligated to remove it from the sitting room even if someone disagreed with us.
If we were at someone else's house and they had stinky dog shit in the living room, and we got up to remove the dog shit but the owner said - "do not remove that, I love that smell! If you can't stand it, then leave!" - we would feel morally obligated to leave the man to his own uncommon sensibilities and either endure the stink or leave the house. We would not restrain the man and forcibly remove the dog shit from his living room (unless there was an objective standard involved, like a health code). If we found a small child chained up in the living room crawling around in that same dog poop and the man said "if you don't like it, leave", we would immediately forcibly restrain the man and remove the child from the situation. You've been skewered by your own example.
Are you saying it is irrational to do what you really want to do?
No, I'm saying "because I want to" is not a rational justification/explanation for any behavior. It may be an acceptable justification, depending on the act, but because it is acceptable in certain situations doesn't mean it is rationally justifiable. If I bust the windshield on your new car with a tire iron and you ask me why, is "because I felt like it" an acceptably rational justification for my act? By "justified", I mean that after my explanation, do you find my action rationally justifiable? However, if I say "your toddler was unconscious, I couldn't find you, it was a hot day and the window was rolled up and I couldn't find anyone else to help, so I busted your windshield with my tire iron to get the kid out", is that a rational justification for my act? If you ask me "why did you pick the cherry pie over the apple", and I say "because I wanted to", is that a "rationally justifiable" response? Or is it just an acceptable response for an obviously trivial, subjective choice?
How can be wrong about your own emotions? Your knowledge of your own emotions is what Wittgenstein would call incorrigible.
Typical Mark Frank obfuscation technique. I didn't claim you could be wrong "about your emotions", and you know this; I said that relying on your emotions for guiding your behavior can lead you to make wildly bad and erroneous decisions. This kind of blatant deception is why I don't respond to much of what you write except to expose you.William J Murray_{November 18, 2013
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Brent, I'm still not sure that I understand you. I don't see what you think is the contradictory position on my part. I think you're saying that two people have conflicting moral beliefs, and I would say both people may be compelled to act on them. Sure. That's not contradictory; my position is that different people can have different--even diametrically opposed--moral beliefs. Are you suggesting that I should say both people are right to act on their beliefs? That's the same kind of logical error WJM is making. No, I asses the rightness of their beliefs and actions through the lens of my own moral standards. Just like everyone else. "He has a moral precept that compels him to act" is not the same statement as "He has a moral precept that is correct because he holds it, and therefore he is right to act on it." One is a factual observation, the other is a moral conclusion.
The whole point here is that it is senseless, misleading, and downright lying (to yourself I mean) to say you are not really simply putting a costume on mere preferences and calling them morals.
You can call them "preferences" if you like. My point above is that they are categorically different from a preference from pie flavors, but you can still call them preferences. As I wrote above, though, we can say the same thing about everyone, even objectivists.
If they really are morals, you are committed to saying that someone ought to kill you and someone else ought not to kill you. I.E., I ought to be killed, and, I ought not to be killed.
No. I'm repeating myself, but it's an important point. I'm committed to saying that other people may hold beliefs that differ from mine, even that they should kill me. I'm not committed to saying those beliefs are good or right. I assess their goodness and rightness myself, with my own morals, as everyone else does. Once again, these are two different statements: A. Everyone has their own moral beliefs. B. Everyone's moral beliefs are equivalent. A is not, and does not logically entail, B. I hold to A, but not B.Pro Hac Vice_{November 18, 2013
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You didn't answer the question. You are committed to saying both are bound by their "moral compass" to do something which is contradictory. When you realize your understanding requires you to affirm two contradictory positions it would seem prudent to rethink your own position. The whole point here is that it is senseless, misleading, and downright lying (to yourself I mean) to say you are not really simply putting a costume on mere preferences and calling them morals. If they really are morals, you are committed to saying that someone ought to kill you and someone else ought not to kill you. I.E., I ought to be killed, and, I ought not to be killed. You should reject any view that puts you in such a position.Brent_{November 18, 2013
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I believe I ought not kill you. Is that a real ought? My buddy believes he ought to kill you. Is that a real ought?
That’s a tautology. You both believe you ought to take or refrain from an action.
If you say yes to both, which it seems you are committed to, then how can you possibly be referring to morals, or, so to speak, something “out there”? neither one’s preference or mere taste, but some other standard, which you imply by using the term “moral”.
I honestly don’t understand this statement. I’m not referring to something “out there.” As a subjectivist, I think my moral principles are internally rooted. (Although they’re strongly shaped by external influences, as I’ve said previously—family, friends, culture, etc.)Pro Hac Vice_{November 18, 2013
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You keep asserting that because you feel a certain way (strongly that discrimination is wrong), that is all the logical justification you require for your actions.
You can boil it down to “feel a certain way” if you like, but at that point we’re all in the same boat. You “feel a certain way” (that moral truths are self-evident). Isn’t that the logical justification for your actions? When you point to “self-evidence,” all you’re doing is putting another name to the same thing: I feel this is right, and I’m going to act consistently with that feeling. The difference between us seems to be that I acknowledge that different people have different feelings, which are largely down to how they’re raised and educated.Pro Hac Vice_{November 18, 2013
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PHV, I believe I ought not kill you. Is that a real ought? My buddy believes he ought to kill you. Is that a real ought? If you say yes to both, which it seems you are committed to, then how can you possibly be referring to morals, or, so to speak, something "out there"? neither one's preference or mere taste, but some other standard, which you imply by using the term "moral".Brent_{November 18, 2013
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Pro Hac Vice, You keep asserting that because you feel a certain way (strongly that discrimination is wrong), that is all the logical justification you require for your actions. "Because I felt like it" or "because it is important to me" is not a rational justification for any behavior. Essentially, I get the same answer from you and Allan, in the example, if I ask you why each of you did what you did: "Because I felt like it." There is no rationally arguable distinction between the two.William J Murray_{November 18, 2013
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WJM #74
I think that many atheists are afraid of what belief in god can result in, and are afraid of the responsibility we would have on us if we were actually to see ourselves as being in the service of a divine purpose that obligates and authorizes us to act and intervene.
You are making up stories about what atheists think and why they act in certain ways. That is an empirical enquiry best conducted by psychologists or sociologists - not an individual who has deeply held feelings about them. Speaking personally I would be delighted if there were a God along the lines of the Christian God. Given an average lifespan for a Western male I have about 20 years left and it would be great if there was something else afterwards. Regrettably I have decided the evidence doesn't stack up and I can't fool myself.Mark Frank_{November 18, 2013
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I don’t agree. It is a subjective judgement that dog shit smells awful – but such is the strength of common subjective judgement that we would instantly feel authorised and obligated to remove it from the sitting room even if someone disagreed with us.
That's a very simple but compelling example. I like it.Pro Hac Vice_{November 18, 2013
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#68 WJM
Reiterating the already accepted fact that anyone could and probably would act on their emotional preferences doesn’t answer the challenge for a rational justification from premise to act.
Are you saying it is irrational to do what you really want to do? You will have to help me here. What would a rational justification look like? Give me an example.
Your caution against using logic is that humans can err using logic; you seem to believe that they cannot err if they act on their emotions. I think most people would agree that it is much more likely to err when one simply gives in to emotion rather than looking the situation over logically.
How can be wrong about your own emotions? Your knowledge of your own emotions is what Wittgenstein would call incorrigible.
I didn’t say that acting in such a case should be “deduced” from premise, but rather that the act should be rationally reconcilable with the premise. Those are two different things.
I am confused. Explain to me the relationship between a moral judgement and the objective reality that justifies it – if it is not a case of deducible from objective moral principles.
Some moral situations simply do not require “deduction”; that’s why I use the examplesI do, because they right moral decision can be instantly recognized by any sane person, and we would immediately feel authorized and obligated to act even if someone disagreed with us. This is evidence that what we are talking about is an objective commodity, because we do not react to such situations in the same manner that we react to anything else we consider to be an entirely subjective “personal preference”.
I don’t agree. It is a subjective judgement that dog shit smells awful – but such is the strength of common subjective judgement that we would instantly feel authorised and obligated to remove it from the sitting room even if someone disagreed with us.
Though this situation doesn’t require a deduction from premise, it does require a premise that rationally accounts for (1) the immediate and certain recognition of a moral wrong that one finds binding on everyone else, (2) the sense of obligation to act even putting oneself in risk, (3) the sense of authority to act even in conflict with law or social consensus.
Give me an example of how a moral premise “accounts” for these things – other than deducing it from a premise.
As far as compassion or empathy being the root of morality; what if I disagree? Am I bound to accept compassion or empathy as being the root of morality? I don’t see that definition listed anywhere.
No you are not bound to – that’s why its subjective! – but most people actually feel compelled by compassion. It is not the only “moral motive” – duty, fairness are others. Conscience is a summary of the demands of all of them i.e. compassion contributes to conscience.Mark Frank_{November 18, 2013
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I will respond to your questions as I demonstrate that your answer to my question was wrong. Here is a self-evident moral truth: “It is evil to torture an infant for personal pleasure.” What makes it objective? The fact that it is self-evident. My answer is not subjective. Anyone who says they disagree with me is wrong (and probably also a liar).
This is just a fiat declaration, which is ultimately subjective. What if two people decide that opposing truths are “self-evident”? Perhaps both are correct, and the truths are different for different people. Perhaps both are wrong, and there are no “self-evident” truths. There’s no way to tell by resorting to external criteria. We only have your internal sense of what’s “self-evident” to go on, which is subjective as far as the rest of humanity is concerned.Pro Hac Vice_{November 18, 2013
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WJM, I think you’re still making a huge (and convenient) logical leap and calling it logical necessity. My belief that morals aren’t objective does not require me to give other peoples’ morals the same weight as my own, whether or not you characterize them as “preferences.” Let’s use a hypo: My partner Allan tells me that he’s going to deny a promotion to our subordinate, Barry, because Barry is Jewish and Allan is secretly an anti-Semite. I am a moral relativist. My choices are to do nothing, which will cost me nothing, or to report Allan to the partnership, which will result in him losing his position. Here are some things I know as I do my moral calculus: A: I believe employment discrimination is wrong. B: Allan believes it is not only acceptable, but morally good. C: I don’t believe there’s any ultimate objective standard for resolving the moral dispute A is a very important fact for me. I start there. You seem to be saying that I have to give B equal weight, because of C. That logically I should say, “He doesn’t agree with me! I should decline to take any action.” But that’s not a logical consequence of these facts at all. My moral beliefs are my moral beliefs—I think they’re superior to his. The fact that he disagrees is interesting, but doesn’t affect my calculation. I actually start with A and end with A. Because I believe that employment discrimination is wrong, I logically feel compelled to take action to stop it. There’s some calculation beyond that—would Allan starve without his position? Would his kids? Etc. But we’re still considering the consequences under my own moral lens, not Allan’s. You keep falling back on “pie,” and pretending that my moral beliefs are indistinguishable from my preference for flavors. But that’s an assumption you’re making. It’s untrue. A preference for flavor is an “is,” a moral preference is an “ought.” You can call my morals preferences if you like, but that does not make them logically equivalent to pie flavors. They are categorically different.Pro Hac Vice_{November 18, 2013
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Brent, Moral relativism is an intellectual hiding place, nothing more. Atheist/materialists are afraid of/outraged by the idea of objective moral authority and obligation because of its potential for abuse. What they don't realize is that their hiding place is far, far worse. They don't have to face the nihilistic ramifications of their views because they can hold the subjectivist view superficially (intellectually) while still behaving as if morality is an objective, universally binding commodity. They're afraid they might abuse it or err; they're afraid others might abuse it or err; and so they engage in this elaborate, hyperskeptical self-deception that cannot survive even the most cursory logical evaluation. On a broader scale, I think that many atheists are afraid of what belief in god can result in, and are afraid of the responsibility we would have on us if we were actually to see ourselves as being in the service of a divine purpose that obligates and authorizes us to act and intervene.William J Murray_{November 18, 2013
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