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More Insane Denial

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If a man tells you he cannot know the truth, you can be sure he will probably act as if he has no obligation to tell the truth.

At this point our readers may be asking, why is Barry so focused on the issue of the materialist tactic of insane denial? It is a fair question. And the answer is I have a (possibly perverse) curiosity about whether there is any limit to how many times they will deny a truth in bad faith all the while knowing that everyone knows exactly what they are doing. Is there any limit to the earth they are willing to scorch? Will they go on saying the red pen is a flower pot forever?

I have to admit that I find the spectacle simultaneously revolting and fascinating. Like a train wreck one just can’t look away from. Here is yet another example:

For weeks Learned Hand insisted on a radical falliblism that denied the possibility of certainty about even the most basic truths. Finally, under the crushing weight of rationality, he budged just a tiny bit. Whereas, before he said, “I cannot therefore be logically, absolutely certain of anything—not even that A=A,” he finally had to admit that was not true. He grudgingly conceded, “Defining A as equal to A is defining A as equal to A; the proposition is not fallible if the only metric is its own definition.”

Amazingly, LH, Carpathian and eigenstate immediately turned around and said that LH had been right all along! They said the second statement was not a change in position but a clarification of his initial position. HeKS responded:

It’s plain as day that first holding the position that there is absolutely nothing we can know for certain and then holding the position that there’s at least one thing we can know for certain, however supposedly trivial, constitutes a change of position.

In response they went into full bore “insane denial” mode.

LH:

To take one sentence, cut it out of context and hold it up as a complete and total summary of my position is absurd.

Notice what LH is doing here. He is suggesting that HeKS misrepresented his prior argument by quoting him out of context when he previously denied that he could be certain A=A. The truth, of course, is exactly the opposite. Far from being a distortion of LH’s argument, the radical falliblism on display in that quote WAS HIS ARGUMENT for weeks, as is easily demonstrated by several more quotes:

I think that in practice I’m perfectly safe making some assumptions, and that I can’t really do much of anything without making assumptions like “A=A.” But I don’t know how I can be infallibly certain in the abstract.

And I have no way to check whether a slice can be greater than the whole other than by testing it, which can never prove absolutely as a logical matter that the proposition is true.

I cannot therefore be logically, absolutely certain of anything—not even that A=A.

I think the trickiest question here is whether I can be certain that “I think, therefore I am.” But even there, is the fact that I cannot imagine any reason to doubt it because it’s perfectly true, or because I have an imperfect and limited mind?

I reiterate that in practice I’d never doubt the basic mathematical principles at issue. The possibility of error is a logical formality

I cannot be certain about anything other than uncertainty.

I was sloppy when I wrote “I’m perfectly comfortable agreeing…”, because that can be read as a statement that I agree that I can be absolutely certain that p/slice can’t exceed p/whole. I didn’t mean that

That doesn’t mean that I expect future physicists to upset the “A=A” cart. But what’s the objective, infallible principle dividing “A=A” from “particle=particle”

I take the formal position that one cannot be logically certain of anything without an infallible perspective from which to assess it

This presupposes, for example, that the law of identity would be broken on a human scale if it weren’t absolute. It could be violated in ways that aren’t apparent to you, and thus not absurd.

You can’t measure all cases, to see whether A is literally always A

What we’re really talking about here are whether things like “A=A” are proven concepts or axioms that we just assume are true. I think most people take the latter approach, stymied by the obvious impossibility of a human being logically proving themselves to be infallible

I’ve never doubted that A=A in the real world, and I would never expect to find (nor can I conceive of) a counter-example. But to say that I’m infallibly certain would require taking the position that I’m infallible, and I can’t do that.

[LOI, LNC and LEM] are very effective axioms. . . .we assume they are true because we cannot imagine any way in which they could be false. But to say that our failure to imagine a counterexample means there cannot be a counterexample is to arrogate to ourselves infallibility.

Now that we’ve dispensed with that attempted misdirection, on to LH’s change of position. After all of the above, he finally grudgingly admitted:

Defining A as equal to A is defining A as equal to A; the proposition is not fallible if the only metric is its own definition.

The bottom line is that HeKS’s summary is perfectly apt. There really is no debate. That the speaker changed his position is not in question. The only issue is whether they will continue their insane denial indefinitely.

In response Carpathian wrote:

Barry Arrington:
There really is no debate. That the speaker changed his position is not in question.

Of course it’s in question.

Are you taking the position that I haven’t been arguing with you about it?

I don’t think I have ever seen a more pristine example of the phenomenon Robert L. Kocher described when he wrote:

But, observable basic reality does not make a dent in countering the psychotic arguments underwriting the chaotic consequences which are occurring. No matter how airtight the refutation, the talk continues. No matter how inane the talk, the issue is still considered unresolved. Capacity to continue speaking has become looked upon as a form of refutation of absolute real-world evidence.

Earth to Carpathian: The ability to keep typing is NOT the same as the ability to make a rational argument.

UPDATE

In comment 72 below, HeKS makes a very cogent observation:

Barry & LH,

The thing I don’t get about this conflict is expressed in my original comment in the other thread, partially quoted in this OP. I went on to say:

LH should be commended for simply recognizing that he had overlooked something in his initial formulation of his position. The problem stems from the subsequent fact that everyone wants to insist that the positions are identical

Again, it’s plain as day that there was an adjustment to LH’s position, and precisely the one Barry has identified. As far as I can tell, Barry highlighted it simply because it took so long to get LH to recognize that the adjustment, however minor some may think it is, was quite obviously necessary. But the fact is, sometimes obvious stuff can elude us. It could elude us just because we don’t understand the ultimate point the other person is making and when we do, then it becomes obvious. It’s not shameful to adjust or reformulate your position when you realize it’s necessary, and LH could have just been commended for making the adjustment if the issue had been left there so the overall discussion could continue. The big problem is that it wasn’t left there. Instead, there has been a push from those more or less on LH’s side of the debate to insist that the two formulations of LH’s position are identical, when they quite plainly are not. This is made all the more noteworthy by the fact that the people claiming the formulations are identical are precisely the people who insist we don’t know that the Laws of Identity or Non-Contradiction actually apply to the external world. On the one hand, then, they are merely being consistent by refusing to acknowledge the distinct identities of the formulations. On the other hand, however, they are showing precisely what happens to rational discussion in the real world once you refuse to accept that it is necessarily consistent with the Laws of Identity, Non-Contradiction and the Excluded Middle.

Comments
Carpathian: "The tautology, by definition , is true." StephenB: "Are you absolutely certain of that?" Carpathian
The context of A here..:
That is irrelevant to my question, which you went out of your way to evade. You have conceded that a tautology is true by definition--and that we can be certain about it. That is all that is needed to refute everything LH, you, and all the other hyperskeptics have been claiming. We now all agree that the statement, "We can be absolutely certain of nothing," is a false claim and cannot be rationally justified. It's over, Carpathian. LH knows it. Even Popperian knows it. That is why neither have responded. You need to catch up to the reality.StephenB
September 23, 2015
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StephenB:
Carpathian: The tautology, by definition , is true StephenB: Are you absolutely certain of that?
The context of A here..: #define A 1 ..is different than it's context here: if (A == 1) {}; In the first case, A is defined by the statement. In the second, A is analyzed by running code. LH's statement contains a conditional that relates to the context of a statement. The second statement is in a different context than the first, unless you ignore the conditional.Carpathian
September 23, 2015
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Popperian, to further object you again were forced to implicitly rely on distinct identity starting with letters and keys on your keyboard. Crying but that requires "justificationism" (which you try to reject) simply underscores that you are relying on what you wish to deny. KFkairosfocus
September 23, 2015
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From http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-evolutionary/
Traditional epistemology has its roots in Plato and the ancient skeptics. One strand emerges from Plato's interest in the problem of distinguishing between knowledge and true belief. His solution was to suggest that knowledge differs from true belief in being justified. Ancient skeptics complained that all attempts to provide any such justification were hopelessly flawed. Another strand emerges from the attempt to provide a reconstruction of human knowledge showing how the pieces of human knowledge fit together in a structure of mutual support. This project got its modern stamp from Descartes and comes in empiricist as well as rationalist versions which in turn can be given either a foundational or coherentist twist. The two strands are woven together by a common theme. The bonds that hold the reconstruction of human knowledge together are the justificational and evidential relations which enable us to distinguish knowledge from true belief. The traditional approach is predicated on the assumption that epistemological questions have to be answered in ways which do not presuppose any particular knowledge. The argument is that any such appeal would obviously be question begging. Such approaches may be appropriately labeled “transcendental.”
Popperian
September 23, 2015
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Popperian, your problem starts with, in order to communicate you must rely on the existence of distinct identity, which shows that LOI, LNC and LEM are self-evidently, undeniably true. This extends to ontology as for distinct identity to exist there have to be coherent core characteristics. Once you continually duck, dodge, slip and slide past that all else is commentary.
The mistake you keep making is in what you mean by "rely" on. Implicit in that statement is justificationism, in that the LOI must be a source that will not lead me into error. Nor is a tautology is a source of knowledge, as it refers to itself.
Further to this, I have shown by concrete example that a major first reference current discussion of epistemology in presenting the matter starts from issues of knowledge as justified true belief and onward adjustments on Gettier leading to internal vs external issues thence warrant as providing objective but in many cases in principle defeasible but not defeated grounds for knowledge.
Alternate views have been around just as long as the true justified belief position, such as those held by Xenophanes. See my quote above and the lecture for details.
That is sufficient to show that something has long been seriously wrong-headed in your continual attempts at UD to undermine the concept of knowledge as well warranted credibly true belief by using Popper, and generally suggesting that epistemology and linked issues of worldviews analysis should orbit Popper as the planets orbit the Sun.
First, when presented with concrete examples in regards to Evolution, are you suggesting you would defer to those as well, in that UD itself would be wrong headed in undermining Darwinism? Second, you’re trying to downplay specific criticism presented above as the vague notion that “worldviews analysis should orbit Popper as the planets orbit the Sun.”, which again is unclear what that means. More chalk and cheese?Popperian
September 23, 2015
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Useful discussion: http://www.iep.utm.edu/found-ep/ -- again, do a page search for "Popper."kairosfocus
September 23, 2015
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Popperian, what you seem unable to acknowledge is the implication of the existence of warrant and chains of warrant. Namely, the alternatives, infinite regress, circularity and finitely remote first plausibles, which as 2 is pointless and 1 infeasible means that our worldviews will always stand on finitely remote first plausibles sustained on comparative difficulties, with plumb-line SETs as key tests, known rationally compelling, undeniable truths and particularly those at the base of reasoning and communication connected to distinct identity. Which you imply but refuse to squarely face every time you begin to type a post. KF PS: Overturning of a line of thought by exposure of absurdity is not a fallacious appeal to mere bad consequences.kairosfocus
September 23, 2015
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PS: On foundations and plumb-line truths, with a dash of insight from Aquinas: https://uncommondescent.com/atheism/understanding-self-evidence-with-a-bit-of-help-from-aquinas/kairosfocus
September 23, 2015
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Popperian, “unless Barry, or anyone else, can infallibly identify a infallible source of moral principles then interpret that source infallibly . . .” then I can do whatever the hell I want.
Note how Barry still hasn't explained how this is possible. How is this not an example of what Barry himself indicated, where he just keeps typing? Where is the refutation? Apparently, this is an argument from perceived undesired consequence based on Barry's particularity view of epistemology? Or has he attacking my motivation, as if it's a sort of conspiracy? From the lecture....
But I do not think that Bacon and Descartes succeeded in freeing their epistemologies from authority; not so much because they appealed to religious authority-to Nature or to God-but for an even deeper reason. In spite of their individualistic tendencies, they did not dare to appeal to our critical judgment-to your judgment, or to mine; perhaps because they felt that this might lead to subjectivism and to arbitrariness. Yet whatever the reason may have been, they certainly were unable to give up thinking in terms of authority, much as they wanted to do so. They could only replace one authority-that of Aristotle and the Bible-by another. Each of them appealed to a new authority; the one to the authority of the senses, and the other to the authority of the intellect. This means that they failed to solve the great problem: How can we admit that our knowledge is a human-an all too human-affair, without at the same time implying that it is all individual whim and arbitrariness? Yet this problem had been seen and solved long before; first, it appears, by Xenophanes, and then by Democritus, and by Socrates (the Socrates of the Apology rather than of the Meno). The solution lies in the realization that all of us may and often do err, singly and collectively, but that this very idea of error and human fallibility involves another one-the idea of objective truth: the standard which we may fall short of. Thus the doctrine of fallibility should not be regarded as part of a pessimistic epistemology. This doctrine implies that we may seek for truth, for objective truth, though more often than not we may miss it by a wide margin. And it implies that if we respect truth, we must search for it by persistently searching for our errors: by indefatigable rational criticism, and self-criticism.
AFAIK, Barry hasn't even acknowledge the criticism, that he uses his own human reason to determine when to differ to the supposedly infallible source, at all. Rather, he has played the motivation card over and over again. Again, the infallible objective source he is appealing to fails as an explanation for an objective morality that we could use, in practice. Then again, it's not clear that Barry thinks there really are moral problems, in practice. Barry, are there moral problem to solve? It's a simple question.Popperian
September 23, 2015
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Popperian, your problem starts with, in order to communicate you must rely on the existence of distinct identity, which shows that LOI, LNC and LEM are self-evidently, undeniably true. This extends to ontology as for distinct identity to exist there have to be coherent core characteristics. Once you continually duck, dodge, slip and slide past that all else is commentary. Further to this, I have shown by concrete example that a major first reference current discussion of epistemology in presenting the matter starts from issues of knowledge as justified true belief and onward adjustments on Gettier leading to internal vs external issues thence warrant as providing objective but in many cases in principle defeasible but not defeated grounds for knowledge. Where, Popper simply does not come up for mention. That is sufficient to show that something has long been seriously wrong-headed in your continual attempts at UD to undermine the concept of knowledge as well warranted credibly true belief by using Popper, and generally suggesting that epistemology and linked issues of worldviews analysis should orbit Popper as the planets orbit the Sun. Until you cogently address this, irrelevancies on other subjects are just that, irrelevant. KFkairosfocus
September 23, 2015
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I wrote:
So, you’ll also be deferring to [Stanford] in respect to biological evolution?
KF
Popperian, chalk and cheese.
If they are different, then it's the content you're evaluating, not the source. However, the page you referenced to is more of a definition of knowledge, not an explanation.
I have pointed out that in a major first reference on epistemology, Popper is simply not present, on YOUR side of the fence if anything but the discussion pivots on the classic justified true belief formulation and how it is to be adjusted especially under impact of Gettier.
It's unclear why you would expect Popper to be present at that page since it refers to the classic definition of justified true belief, sources of knowledge and is limited to knowing subjects. Popper’s epistemology is broader and deeper than that and is in direct opposition to sources, as the lecture indicates. Popper’s epistemology was only partialy adopted because it was commonly misunderstood.
That should give pause.
I should defer to a source, because a entry on the Stanford website says epistemology is about sources?
In due course I will take a bit to speak to some of the themes further, I am simply highlighting here that epistemology in representative contexts C21 does not orbit around Popper. KF
It’s unclear what “does not orbit around Popper” even means. I’m not appearing to Popper as a source. I’m referring to the content of his epistemology in comparison to other epistemologies. Had I ignored the classic definition I could not have considered one to had better withstood criticism than the other in respect to unification, explaining more phenomena, etc. “Popper is not listed on the main epistemology page on the Stanford website” is not a good criticism. Nor is quibbling over definitions beyond what is necessary for the problem at hand. What we call it is unimportant as long as we both agree on terms. Antically limiting the scope of the problem merely because all of our definitions are too limited artificially limits the progress we can make.Popperian
September 23, 2015
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Learned Hand @65. How about a little intellectual honesty. Are you absolutely certain that a tautology is a true proposition? You have been conveniently absent since I started asking that question.StephenB
September 22, 2015
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Carpathian
Does a conditional part of a statement need to be considered when performing logic?
Yes. LH's condition was that he is absolutely certain only about the tautological element bracketed away from the rest of the statement; and that is enough to be absolutely certain about something.
The tautology, by definition , is true
. Are you absolutely certain of that?StephenB
September 22, 2015
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Carpathian, The more you try to argue that when LH said he could be infallibly certain about something (even if conditionally), he meant the same thing as when he said he could not be infallibly certain about anything, the more you demonstrate the point of the OP -- i.e., your side engages in insane denial. You will notice that LH himself has pretty much abandoned the fight with his parting "Barry is a poopyhead for catching me in a lie" shot at 65. If your purpose is to continue to serve as an example of insane denial, by all means continue.Barry Arrington
September 22, 2015
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Popperian, chalk and cheese. I have pointed out that in a major first reference on epistemology, Popper is simply not present, on YOUR side of the fence if anything but the discussion pivots on the classic justified true belief formulation and how it is to be adjusted especially under impact of Gettier. That should give pause. In due course I will take a bit to speak to some of the themes further, I am simply highlighting here that epistemology in representative contexts C21 does not orbit around Popper. KFkairosfocus
September 22, 2015
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Popperian said:
Human reason and criticism always comes first.
Reason and criticism cannot come first. What necessarily comes first is something - some proposition - to reason from or about, and an assumed valid method of reasoning. To have any cogent proposition to evaluate at all, one requires the basic laws of logic a priori (say, distinguishing a moral problem from a moral non-problem). To be able to criticize the reasoning, the reasoning method must first be considered valid or else there's no reason or ability to criticize in any meaningful way other than rhetoric. How does one recognize a "moral problem" in the first place, Popperian? Why is it a moral problem (A) and not just a thing that occurs (not-A)? The proposition "A is a moral problem" is meaningless without a foundation that precedes and establishes it as such.William J Murray
September 22, 2015
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StephenB:
The only metric in a tautology is its own definition, but that doesn’t change the fact that we can be certain about it as a truthful proposition.
In a tautology, the reader's opinion is irrelevant. The tautology, by definition , is true. Whether someone reads it or not, it is true when it is written. The conditional part of LH's statement was to inform of the limited scope of the statement. You instead, ignored that scope. You also didn't quote it.Carpathian
September 22, 2015
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StephenB, Does a conditional part of a statement need to be considered when performing logic?Carpathian
September 22, 2015
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Carpathiam
Are you still of the opinion that any conditional part of a statement does not need to be considered in logic?
I don't think you understand. Even if LH includes the condition in his analysis, he has still contradicted himself. The only metric in a tautology is its own definition, but that doesn't change the fact that we can be certain about it as a truthful proposition. So, I ask LH once again (He did not answer the first time). Are you absolutely certain that a tautology is a truthful proposition? LH has already indicated that this is the case, contradicting his earlier claim that he cannot be certain about anything.StephenB
September 22, 2015
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StephenB:
First, let’s bury this dishonest attempt to rewrite history. Clearly, the old position (“I cannot be absolutely certain about anything,”) is different from the new position, (“I can be absolutely certain that A = A”). There is no possibility that it cannot be the case.
First, there is no dishonesty by LH. I see however, an attempt to win a rhetorical point, and you're even failing to do that. The second state had a conditional attached to it which is missing from your quote.
“Defining A as equal to A is defining A as equal to A; the proposition is not fallible if the only metric is its own definition .”
Here is an example of your faulty logic: 1) "You can have a car." 2) "You can't have a car if you don't graduate high school" . According to you, the speaker must be dishonest since in one case he said, "You can have a car" and in the second statement says, "You cannot have a car". Are you still of the opinion that any conditional part of a statement does not need to be considered in logic?Carpathian
September 22, 2015
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KF, So, you'll also be deferring to Standford in respect to biological evolution?Popperian
September 22, 2015
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Barry & LH, The thing I don't get about this conflict is expressed in my original comment in the other thread, partially quoted in this OP. I went on to say:
LH should be commended for simply recognizing that he had overlooked something in his initial formulation of his position. The problem stems from the subsequent fact that everyone wants to insist that the positions are identical
Again, it's plain as day that there was an adjustment to LH's position, and precisely the one Barry has identified. As far as I can tell, Barry highlighted it simply because it took so long to get LH to recognize that the adjustment, however minor some may think it is, was quite obviously necessary. But the fact is, sometimes obvious stuff can elude us. It could elude us just because we don't understand the ultimate point the other person is making and when we do, then it becomes obvious. It's not shameful to adjust or reformulate your position when you realize it's necessary, and LH could have just been commended for making the adjustment if the issue had been left there so the overall discussion could continue. The big problem is that it wasn't left there. Instead, there has been a push from those more or less on LH's side of the debate to insist that the two formulations of LH's position are identical, when they quite plainly are not. This is made all the more noteworthy by the fact that the people claiming the formulations are identical are precisely the people who insist we don't know that the Laws of Identity or Non-Contradiction actually apply to the external world. On the one hand, then, they are merely being consistent by refusing to acknowledge the distinct identities of the formulations. On the other hand, however, they are showing precisely what happens to rational discussion in the real world once you refuse to accept that it is necessarily consistent with the Laws of Identity, Non-Contradiction and the Excluded Middle.HeKS
September 22, 2015
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Popperian, nope the issue is not, did you read Popper's lecture. The question is, did you P observe what is happening with the SEP discussion of Epistemology? Where SEP is a widely respected first reference on phil. Where does it begin, knowledge as justified true belief with issues connected thereto with particular note on Gettier. How many times does Popper show up? Nil, do the search. Message, epistemology -- of which phil of sci is in large part a subset, does not orbit around Popper. Then, contrast the foci of your discussions with those you have ever so often sought to side-track here at UD when epistemology is in the remotest tangential degree present. Then, I suggest to you, think again about holding things in due proportion. KFkairosfocus
September 22, 2015
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KF:
But what we need to realise is that serious discussion of epistemology can proceed without orbiting around Popper, and even using the classic formulation on justified, true belief with some reservation for weak forms and distinction between being subjectively and objectively warranted.
First, you’re referring to sources of knowledge, which is precisely what’s in question and a key point in the referenced lecture. Have you read it? Second, Popper’s theory of knowledge explains significantly more phenomena that the classical formulation. It is universal, so it unifies existing explanations in many different fields. And the classical definition of knowledge isn’t as much of an explanation, but a definition of what would constitute knowledge in the case of knowing subjects, which is lacking. For example, most of our knowledge contains errors to some degree. And it’s independent of anyone’s belief. So, I would say that I’m not ignoring the classic definition. I’ve adopted Popper’s based on critical discussion of them both.Popperian
September 22, 2015
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Learned Hand @ 65: If you want to call exposing a liar "attacking the messenger" then yes, that is what I have done.
Is it an inconsistency? I don’t think so.
Why, yes, when you say inconsistent things as summarized by HeKS in the OP, it is an inconsistency. LH, if you had any integrity whatsoever, you would say "Yes, I changed my position. I apologize for attempting to mislead on that issue. I should not have done that, and I regret it." But then if you had any integrity we wouldn't have to work to expose your lies to begin with. Barry Arrington
September 22, 2015
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Popperian, "unless Barry, or anyone else, can infallibly identify a infallible source of moral principles then interpret that source infallibly . . ." then I can do whatever the hell I want.Barry Arrington
September 22, 2015
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What is the point of dispensing with justificationism in the first place?
Why retain something that, when critically evaluated, doesn’t actually add to the explanation? Again, unless Barry, or anyone else, can infallibly identify a infallible source of moral principles then interpreted that source infallibly, in practice, it’s unclear how they have any other recourse that to conjecture solutions to moral problems, then criticize them. That is, they would use their own reason to determine when to defer to the infallible source, which is what someone would have done had they not believed in that infallible source. Human reason and criticism always comes first. Note that Barry simply still as not provide an explanation for how he could do this, in practice. Does Barry think there are no real moral problems?Popperian
September 22, 2015
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LH, it is clear that the core issue is at foundational level, and that your presentation of generalities and personalities or complaints in dismissal does not answer. Again, to post a comment in reply you have used letters etc, relying implicitly on distinct identity. Do you or do you not acknowledge that once distinct identity A obtains (immediately, letters and/or phonemes are in view but this is an illustrative example of a pattern that obtains for Jupiter in the sky or the ground underfoot, or the PC you are using etc),
I: A is itself (with all that is implied for A to be, and to have its distinct nature/identity that allows us to give it a relevant name or label), II: A is not at the same time and in the same sense its opposite ~A, and III: that anything x in the world is going to be either A or else ~A?
If you acknowledge such, you have acknowledged the infallible self-evident and foundational certainty of LOI, LNC and LEM. And no, it's a tautology that only has inner world significance does not obtain once we see that the concept that there is an ugly gulch barring knowledge of the external world collapses in self-referential incoherence. So soon as you argued with others, using text and pc's etc you conceded that by direct implication. If you do not, you are absurdly self-referentially incoherent and that emerges so soon as you post or posted a comment that relies on distinct identity to work. KFkairosfocus
September 22, 2015
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A lot of work excerpting little sentences, but no work at all reading the comments or responding to the arguments I’ve made. It’s very much like BA has nothing to say other than attacking the messenger. As I said in another thread:
BA needs to win the conversation. Every conversation. He will do it by banning–I mean, moderating–or by insulting or by any other method, except perhaps engaging with the ideas on the table. But points must be awarded, and awarded only to BA. Blog rules.
And interesting, no effort at all into quoting or responding to my explanation of this supposed inconsistency. Is it an inconsistency? I don’t think so. I think BA revised his position downwards, to assert that he is infallible at least (or only) when the proposition is purely tautological. That limitation wasn’t on my mind when I wrote many comments; I was thinking of earlier times, in which BA asserted infallible knowledge about the physical, non-tautological world, such as Jupiter and abortion. But no explanation can suffice. Points must be awarded, and awarded only to BA. Blog rules. And any conversation that challenges his assumptions or beliefs must be squelched, buried under insults and sophistry to escape the implicit pressure on those beliefs. BA, how do you determine when you are infallible? What questions can you answer infallibly? As I said before, being Chesterton doesn’t mean making sophomoric insults. At some point, you’re going to need ideas of your own. (Well, not here. As long as Uncommon Descent is your palace of the mind, insults will probably suffice.)Learned Hand
September 21, 2015
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WJM, understood. It will be interesting to hear P's view, though I think the outline is that -- on long interactions -- s/he believes that justification is a hopeless failure as is the concept of foundations of knowledge. That is part of the reason why I have stressed the significance of self-evident truths, first principles of reason, distinct identity and the natural and unavoidable structure of successive stages of warrant. KFkairosfocus
September 21, 2015
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