Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

Please Take the Time to Understand Our Arguments Before You Attack Them

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The comments our Darwinist friends put up on this site never cease to amaze.  Consider, as a for instance, Kantian Naturalist’s comment that appears as comment 9 to kairosfocus’ Infographic: The science of ID post.  The post sets forth a simple summary of the case for ID, and KN responds: 

What I like about this infographic is that it makes really clear where the problem with intelligent design lies.

Here’s the argument:

(1) We observe that all As are caused by Bs. (2) Cs are similar to As in relevant respects. (3) Therefore, it is highly probable that Cs are also caused by Bs.

But this is invalid, because the conclusion does not follow from the premises.

KN has been posting on this site for years.  He is obviously an intelligent man.  He is obviously a man of good will.  I will assume, therefore, that he is attacking ID as he believes it to be and not a straw man caricature of his own making.  And that is what is so amazing.  How can an intelligent person of good will follow this site for several years and still not understand the basics of ID?  It beggars belief. 

Maybe it will help if I explain ID using the same formal structure KN has used. 

KN:

(1) We observe that all As are caused by Bs.

ID as it really is:

(1)  For all As whose provenance is actually known, the cause of A was B. 

Here “A” could be complex specified information or irreducible complexity.

B, of course, stands for “the act of an intelligent agent.”

In step 1 KN is actually not far off the mark.  I have reworded it slightly, because ID does not posit there is no possible explanation for A other than B.  ID posits that in our universal experience of A where its provenance has been actually observed, it has always arisen from B.  Now, there may be some other cause of A (Neo-Darwinian evolution – NDE – for instance), but the conclusion that NDE causes A arises from an inference not an observation.  “NDE caused A” is not just any old inference.  We would argue that it is an inference skewed by an a priori commitment to metaphysical materialism and not necessarily an unbiased evaluation of the data.  

KN:

(2) Cs are similar to As in relevant respects.

ID as it really is:

(2)  We observe A to exist within living systems. 

In (2) KN starts to go off the rails in a serious way.  Here we have the tired old “ID is nothing by an argument from analogy” argument.  KN is saying that the complex specified information in a cell is “similar in relevant respects” to the complex specified information found, for example, in a language or a code.  He is saying that the irreducible complexity of any number of biological systems is “similar in relevant respects” to the irreducible complexity of machines. 

No sir.  That is not what ID posits at all, not even close.  ID posits that the complex specified information in a cell is identical to the complex specified information of a computer code.  The DNA code is not “like” a computer code.  The DNA code and a computer code are two manifestations of the same thing.  The irreducible complexity of the bacterial flagellum is identical to (not similar to) the irreducible complexity of an outboard motor.  

ID proponents obviously have the burden of demonstrating their claims.  For example, they have the burden of demonstrating that the DNA code and a computer code are identical in relevant respects.  And if you disagree with their conclusions that is fair enough.  Tell us why.  But it is not fair to attempt to refute ID by attacking a claim ID proponents do not make.

KN:

(3) Therefore, it is highly probable that Cs are also caused by Bs. 

ID as it really is:

(3)  Therefore, abductive reasoning leads to the conclusion that B is the best explanation of A. 

The Wikipedia article on abductive reasoning is quite good.  [I have changed the symbols to correspond with our discussion]: 

to abduce a hypothetical explanation “B” from an observed surprising circumstance “A” is to surmise that “B” may be true because then “A” would be a matter of course. Thus, to abduce B from A involves determining that B is sufficient (or nearly sufficient), but not necessary, for A.

For example, the lawn is wet. But if it rained last night, then it would be unsurprising that the lawn is wet. Therefore, by abductive reasoning, the possibility that it rained last night is reasonable. . . . abducing rain last night from the observation of the wet lawn can lead to a false conclusion. In this example, dew, lawn sprinklers, or some other process may have resulted in the wet lawn, even in the absence of rain.

[Philosopher Charles Sanders] Peirce argues that good abductive reasoning from A to B involves not simply a determination that, e.g., B is sufficient for A, but also that B is among the most economical explanations for A. Simplification and economy call for the ‘leap’ of abduction.

For what seems like the ten thousandth time:  ID does not posit that the existence of complex specified information and irreducibly complex structures within living systems compels “act of an intelligent agent” as a matter of logical necessity.  ID posits that given our universal experience concerning complex specified information and irreducibly complex structures where the provenance of such has been actually observed, the best explanation of the existence of these same things in living structures is “act of intelligent agent.” 

KN, I hope this helps.  If you disagree with any of the premises or the abuction that we say follows from the premises, by all means attack them with abandon.  But please don’t attack an argument we do not make.  That just wastes everyone’s time. 

 

 

 

Comments
Hi Box,
RDFish #129, if I understand you correctly you take an agnostic stand on the mind-body problem.
Yes.
However you seem to reject out of hand a purely naturalistic explanation (fermions and bosons) for intelligence...
First, we have no explanation of consciousness at all - we have no idea what the sufficient conditions for conscious experience might be, and we don't have a principled understanding of the necessary conditions either. One of my points in this thread has been that we do have empirical reason to believe that at minimum, some sort of physical mechanism which can store and process information seems to be necessary for thought to occur. Second, "fermions and bosons" don't really even explain matter, much less mind. These "particles" are not particles in any way we understand the word - they are not solid things, they do exist in a particular time and place, how they behave can depend on things that might happen in some other time and place in a way that is entirely mysterious, and so on. So the characterization of materialism (or "naturalistic" explanations) as fermions and bosons banging into one another is 100 years out of date: Physicists do not believe that reality emerges from little pieces of matter in motion, and so nobody else should either. Physical reality is much, much weirder than that.
...and you distinguish between people and their brains. Correct?
I should think that it is obvious to everyone, really - how could people be their brains? First of all, we have lots of other body parts obviously (and we even know that other parts of our bodies are involved in thinking processes and emotional processing, such as the entelic nervous system). But more importantly (and more to your concerns, I believe), describing a person by describing only their body misses a great deal - it would be like describing the parts of a light bulb without mentioning that when you flip the switch it lights up. Conscious experience is a hard problem for which we have not even the beginning of an explanation, and can't even imagine what an explanation might look like. This problem is not limited to "materialism"; dualism does not explain consciousness either, it simply posits that it is irreducible, inexplicable, and is somehow (in a way nobody understands) associated with our brains. That really doesn't help. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
October 5, 2013
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RDFish #129, if I understand you correctly you take an agnostic stand on the mind-body problem. However you seem to reject out of hand a purely naturalistic explanation (fermions and bosons) for intelligence and you distinguish between people and their brains. Correct?Box
October 5, 2013
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Hi RD Miksa, Before we go on, let's just make sure we are using terminology consistently. I propose the following: 1) "designer" - conscious, sentient agent 2) "design inference" - inference that something was produced by a designer 3) "intelligent" - able to learn and solve novel problems (consciously or not) 4) "csi box" - something that produces CSI without intelligence or consciousness 5) "zombie" - something that is intelligent but not conscious I take the meanings of "conscious" and "sentient" to be self-evident. Note by the definitions above, Darwinian evolutionary processes are zombies - they are intelligent but not conscious.
Because in the ID debate, the designer is not necessarily unembodied but could actually be an embodied designer.
I think this is confused. If ID says that the cause of life might be a disembodied entity, that is one hypothesis. If it says the cause of life was some other life form, that is another hypothesis. Each hypothesis needs to be evaluated independently. The former is a weak hypothesis because of both low prior probability of disembodied minds and lack of specific evidence. The latter is hypothesis has much higher prior probability, but also lacks evidence, and also represents a very poor explanation in that (1) it fails to explain the origin of biological CSI and (2) once we accept prior existence of complex life forms, we might as well assume that we are their descendants rather than the products of their bio-engineering. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
October 5, 2013
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Dear KN, The reason my whole discussion applies to the actual ID debate is because if my reasoning is sound, then it shows that we can infer design from CSI even if that CSI is found in biological systems. And note that the inference to design in the actual ID debate is a much easier one to make then the one I have been arguing for. Why? Because in the ID debate, the designer is not necessarily unembodied but could actually be an embodied designer. Take care, RD MiksaRD Miksa
October 5, 2013
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Dear RDFish, With your last comment I can see that we are finally getting somewhere, which is excellent. This is a good discussion. Now, I beg your patience because I will not be able to answer your post via my cellphone but I will have to wait till I get back to my computer tonight. Take care, RD MiksaRD Miksa
October 5, 2013
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I thought RDFish's complaint was two-fold: (a) the design hypothesis, as applied to biochemical systems, requires that the designer be a non-physical agent; (b) non-physical agency conflicts with all of our observations about agents, so the prior probability of the design hypothesis is low or inscrutable. On a related note, a paper by Elliot Sober, "Intelligent Design Theory and the Supernatural: The 'God or Extraterrestrials' Reply". Here's the abstract:
When proponents of Intelligent Design (ID) theory deny that their theory is religious, the minimalistic theory they have in mind (the mini-ID theory) is the claim that the irreducibly complex adaptations found in nature were made by one or more intelligent designers. The denial that this theory is religious rests on the fact that it does not specify the identity of the designer -- a supernatural God or a team of extra-terrestrials could have done the work. The present paper attempts to show that this reply underestimates the commitments of the mini-ID Theory. The mini-ID theory, when supplemented with four independently plausible further assumptions, entails the existence of a supernatural intelligent designer. It is further argued that scientific theories, such as the Darwinian theory of evolution, are neutral on the question of whether supernatural designers exist.
Kantian Naturalist
October 5, 2013
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Hi RD Miksa, Sorry I missed @113.
Consider again our scenario. We know, with absolute certainty, that we (human beings) are the only embodied intelligent beings in all of existence. Next, we know, with absolute certainty, that are minds are sound and that we are not delusional, crazy, hallucinating, etc. Next, we know, with absolute certainty, that we have no ability to affect, or move, or change stars. Now, we all this knowledge, you, RDFish—as well as millions of other people—look up at the night sky and see stars literally (not a trick of any type) move around and form the following pattern: “RDFISH! IT IS I, YOUR DESIGNER. I HAVE DESIGNED YOU AND I AM PROVIDING YOU WITH THIS MESSAGE SO THAT YOU CAN KNOW THAT I DESIGNED YOU. YOU CAN THINK WHAT YOU WANT ABOUT ME, BUT KNOW THAT I DESIGNED YOU.” Now, seeing this, what is your conclusion about it? What is your thought process and your reasoning about this? What would YOU infer is the cause of this obvious event?
Given that all of the more likely explanations are ruled out as you say, I would consider this an "interaction", and I would absolutely believe that something with linguistic abilities and the sort of general cognitive abilities that humans have was responsible. I would be surprised that this Entity would use my UD handle "RDFish" instead of my real name, but it would certaintly convince me that something very well outside of my understanding was calling me out!
- What reasoning process do you use to determine that other people are actually conscious intelligent agents rather just advanced CSI Boxes?
As far as "intelligence" goes, because I can interact with other human beings it is simple to ascertain that they are intelligent (they can learn, solve novel problems that are presented to them, understand and generate natural language, and so on). As far as consciousness goes, the problem of other minds is solved by a comfortably strong inference, I believe: I know that I am conscious, and I see that you very much like me in very many critical respects, and so I conclude that you are conscious too. In particular, all of the physical correlates of consciousness that appear in my brain appear in other people's brains, too. Likewise, because I know that I reliably lose consciousness under certain conditions when my brain function is interfered with, I would conclude that you would also lose consciousness when your brain is similarly interfered with.
And note that interacting with people and them answering your questions provides is quite compatible with them just being advanced CSI Boxes?
No, that's not what I meant by "CSI Box". A CSI box is not a philosophical zombie - not something that is intelligent but not conscious. Rather, a CSI Box is something that produces CSI without intelligence - it cannot learn or solve novel problems. My point is that for all we can tell, not only might the Designer of Life be a zombie, but it might even be a CSI Box - neither conscious nor intelligent.
Furthermore, what reasoning process did you use to determine that I am an intelligent human being? You have never met me or seen me.
Obviously I have excellent reasons based on my experience to believe that you are a human, since neither I nor anyone else has ever seen anything except a human demonstrate linguistic abilities. If I was just watching sentences appear that were not responsive to our discussion I would not be so sure (I would think perhaps an unintelligent program was simply generating sentences), but since your sentences are responsive I have no doubt that you are understanding what I'm saying.
What has given you the grounds to rationally conclude that I am not an unconscious supercomputer just responding to you?
Because my field of expertise is natural language understanding, and I'm well aware that the state of the art in artificial intelligence is nowhere near the point where a computer system can engage in discourse like this. Many people are often fooled into thinking that the computer they interact with actually understands what they are saying of course, but currently computer systems' "understanding" of language is so unlike human understanding that it is misleading to even use that word.
Given your claim that you believe that CSI Boxes could do so, why have you inferrsd that I am a conscious agent rather than an unconscious one?
Again, a CSI Box is neither intelligent nor conscious - it simply produces CSI. A zombie is intelligent but not conscious - it produces CSI, and can answer questions about how and why, and learn new things, and solve new problems, but lacks conscious awareness. I know you are not a CSI box because of our conversation. I know you are not a zombie because I have good reason to believe that you are human, and I also have good reason to think that other humans are conscious.
And RDFish…here is the million dollar question: What would you conclude about me if you suddenly knew, with absolute certainty, that I was not a material or embodied being?
That's your million dollar question? I have had the chance to interact with you, see that you understand the things that I say, and generate appropriate responses, and so I know that your cognitive attributes are like mine and other humans. Obviously if I knew you were not embodied, then I would I would revise my understanding of the sorts of things that could have minds similar to human minds! Without the ability to interact with you, I would make no such conclusion of course. Just like the termites, or the CSI box, you might be producing CSI without any understanding at all. This is the case in the context of ID. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
October 5, 2013
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Hi Box,
RDFish #98: “all intelligent action arises by means of complex mechanism.” [my emphasis] I notice that you have worded this phrase rather carefully. What you are not saying is ‘all intelligent action arises from complex mechanism’. What you are not saying is that unintelligent blind fermions and bosons are doing the thinking.
Correct, I do not believe that fermions and bosons think. People think, using their brains.
However, since you claim that mind and brain are inseparable, I believe that you need to address the issue. So let me ask you: what is the nature of the relation between mind and brain?
I feel certain that nobody knows the answer to that question. My point here is only that we have good reason to believe (although it is not absolutely certain of course) that complex physical mechanism is required for thought. Humans certainly can't design anything without a properly functioning brain, and everything we know about information processing indicates that complex physical state systems are necessary.
If we know that we are the only embodied intelligent beings, not capable of moving stars and hallucination, then the rearrangement of stars into a English sentence (see RDMiksa #113) constitutes a clear breach in our alleged uniform and repeated experience that intelligence is being totally embodied. In which case it makes no sense to object to the inference of design by claiming that there is still an unbreached uniform experience of embodied intelligence.
Well, if someday the stars are rearranged into sentences we might have another talk :-) But as I explained to RDMiksa, what is required to establish intelligence is not CSI, but rather interaction with something that produces CSI. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
October 5, 2013
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Dear KN, The design inference may not be in question for you, but it does seem to be in question for RDFish.RD Miksa
October 5, 2013
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KN, for you the design inference may not be in question. However RDFish seems hell-bent to deny the possibility of design inference unless it is applied to embodied (human?) intelligence. RD Miksa is trying his utmost to make him change his ways, hence the 'million dollar question' in #122.Box
October 5, 2013
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Dear KN, Yes, but my point is that you would indeed conclude precisely that I was an immaterial intelligent being capable of intelligent thought and of affecting the material world. By contrast, what you would not do is suddenly conclude that I am not intelligent or that I am just an unconscious CSI box or that you have no answer to what I am. And this fact--that you would indeed conclude that I am an intelligent thinking agent, albeit an immaterial one--demonstrates the very points that I have been trying to get across to RDFish. First, it would show that there is indeed a clear logical distinction between inferring a general intelligent agent and inferring the type of agent that it specifically is. Second, it would show that a desigb inference can be evidence, in and of itself, of a sufficiently strong nature to overcome our--for the sake of argument--repeated and uniform experience of only material designing agents. Third, it shows that CSI is indeed how we detect intelligence. For the only evidence that you have of me is that I know English (meaning a specificed pattern) and that I know a lot of it (complexity). You have no other information about my abilities except for the fact that I exhibit CSI andyet from that you have concluded that I am an intelligent thinking agent. And that same inference would hold--as you admit--even if I was an immaterial thing. That is the whole point: CSI is how we detect intelligence, and the evidence of CSI can be so powerful as to overcome our (alleged) repeated and uniform experience. RD MiksaRD Miksa
October 5, 2013
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I don't understand the relevance of the question. The design inference as such is not in question. What is in question is whether the design inference, as applied to biochemical systems, is precisely formulated enough to be subjected to empirical confirmation.Kantian Naturalist
October 5, 2013
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RD Miksa #122: What would you conclude about me if you suddenly knew, with absolute certainty, that I was not a material or embodied being?
KN #123: It looks as though I would have the unshakeable and unalterable conviction that RD Miksa is an immaterial being, (..)
Yes, of course. But the million dollar question is: do you infer design - intelligence - from RD Miksa's sentences - even though you know with absolute certainty that RD Miksa is no embodied being? So, what this is all about is, to establish the validity of design inference.Box
October 5, 2013
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Interesting question, RD Miksa. I know it was addressed to RDFish but I'd like to take a stab at it:
What would you conclude about me if you suddenly knew, with absolute certainty, that I was not a material or embodied being?
The way this is phrased, it is as if I've received a jolt of intuition or instantaneous revelation rather than a worked-out explanation or justification for the claim. And since this is supposedly something I "suddenly know with absolute certainty," it would seem that I lack the resources to convince anyone else -- I wouldn't have anything to say besides, "look, I just know, ok?" And then the question arises, why should I believe something that I can't convince anyone else to believe? But if I cannot justify what I know, then how could I be said to really know it? It looks as though I would have the unshakeable and unalterable conviction that RD Miksa is an immaterial being, but be unable to justify this claim to anyone or explain how I know this to be the case. Since, in this scenario, you are an immaterial being able to affect the physical world (e.g. by causing words to appear on my screen), there must be causal regularities that pertain to immaterial beings, which means that causal closure of the physical is false. And that greatly increases the likelihood that dualism and libertarian freedom are true. (It might also revise upwards the likelihood that Platonism about mathematical objects is true.)Kantian Naturalist
October 5, 2013
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And RDFish...here is the million dollar question: What would you conclude about me if you suddenly knew, with absolute certainty, that I was not a material or embodied being?RD Miksa
October 5, 2013
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Dear RDFish, Given your talk about CSI Boxes and the lack of our ability to inference intelligence and consciousness from a design inference, let me ask you this question: - What reasoning process do you use to determine that other people are actually conscious intelligent agents rather just advanced CSI Boxes? What evidence do you think makes the inference that people are conscious and intelligent being rather than CSI boxes reasonable and rational? And note that interacting with people and them answering your questions provides is quite compatible with them just being advanced CSI Boxes? Furthermore, what reasoning process did you use to determine that I am an intelligent human being? You have never met me or seen me. What has given you the grounds to rationally conclude that I am not an unconscious supercomputer just responding to you? Given your claim that you believe that CSI Boxes could do so, why have you inferrsd that I am a conscious agent rather than an unconscious one? RD Miksa (Sent from mobile phone)RD Miksa
October 5, 2013
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And RDFish...if you have a moment, I would be very interested to hear your answer to my question/scenario at Comment 113. Thank you. RD MiksaRD Miksa
October 5, 2013
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Currently at work...will reply this evening. RD MiksaRD Miksa
October 5, 2013
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RDFish, If we know that we are the only embodied intelligent beings, not capable of moving stars and hallucination, then the rearrangement of stars into a English sentence (see RDMiksa #113) constitutes a clear breach in our alleged uniform and repeated experience that intelligence is being totally embodied. In which case it makes no sense to object to the inference of design by claiming that there is still an unbreached uniform experience of embodied intelligence.Box
October 5, 2013
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RDFish #98: "all intelligent action arises by means of complex mechanism." [my emphasis]
I notice that you have worded this phrase rather carefully. What you are not saying is ‘all intelligent action arises from complex mechanism’. What you are not saying is that unintelligent blind fermions and bosons are doing the thinking. However, since you claim that mind and brain are inseparable, I believe that you need to address the issue. So let me ask you: what is the nature of the relation between mind and brain?Box
October 5, 2013
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Hi RD Miska,
The question that comes to my mind when reading this paragraph is: so what? If all I can infer from my example is that it can spell out particular sentences, and thus that it is intelligent, knows the English language, etc., than that is informative in and of itself.
Imagine a system that could spell out these particular sentences, as you say. However, the system has no conscious awareness, and cannot understand what it is saying. Would you say this entity is intelligent? In order for us to have a productive debate, we will have to agree on exactly what we mean when we say something is "intelligent". Here are a couple of suggestions: 1) "able to produce complex specified information" 2) "able to consciously deliberate about beliefs, desires, and plans" Would you like to use one of these? Or suggest your own definition for "intelligent"?
Furthermore, your claim that intentionality by itself uninformative is just wrong. If I am examining a corpse, and I infer that the person was murdered (an intentional act) rather than just dying naturally, then that fact is extremely informative. And it is still informative even if I have no information as to who the murderer was, how he murdered, why he murdered, when he murdered, etc. So again, knowing that something was done intentionally is very informative in and of itself.
But you have found out far more than simply something is "intentional"! You have found out that a human being was responsible! We know a vast amount about human beings, and that is where the additional information comes from. You failed to respond to my point: Again, simply tell me one thing that "intentional" actually tells us about the observable properties, characteristics, or abilities of something.
Solving problems in your sleep only happens because you first consciously thought about the problems; same as solutions just “coming to you.”
Really? How do you know that? In any case, whether or not the question was posed to a conscious mind, the solution is derived unconsciously! Moreover, just because a human is intelligent and conscious does not mean that something that could solve design problems but in all other respects is very different from a human being (like, for example, something with no brain!) would necessarily be conscious. There is simply no understanding that we have of how minds work that would allow us to answer these questions.
And I could never catch the flyball without being conscious that it was coming at me.
You are quite mistaken to think all visual processing is conscious, or indeed all complex mental processing. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blindsight for one interesting sort of example. Just because humans are conscious of catching balls doesn't mean that something very radically different from a human would necessarily be conscious of it.
Furthermore, given that you place such weight on our uniform and repeated experience, I should tell you that all of our uniform and repeated experience shows such that only conscious, thinking, intelligent agents are capable of designing things.
That is correct, but our experience does not tell us that consciousness is a requisite attribute! Our experience also tells us that only things with neurons are capable of designing things, but that doesn't tell us that neurons are requisite, right?
RDF: “It is quite obvious that our experience confirms that (1) all complex mechanisms arise only by means of intelligent action and (2) all intelligent action arises by means of complex mechanism. ID relies on (1), but tries to ignore (2). Yet both statements are confirmed by exactly the same set of observations.” RDM: Incorrect. ID specifically does not ignore 2, because ID itself says nothing about the designer.
This option goes nowhere for ID. For one thing, if ID posits that the CSI we observe in biology comes from something else with CSI, but fails to account for where that CSI came from, ID has told us nothing about the origin of CSI. We might as well just theorize that life on Earth are descendants of life someplace else and be done with it.
What I am saying is that is if a design inference is of a certain weight, it could override our experience of 2. Remember my quadriplegic example. It was might to show that uniform and repeated experience can be overridden if the design inference is strong enough.
It is not a "design inference" that you need to "override" our experience - it is evidence of course. There is insufficient evidence for the existence of intelligent behavior emanating from something - anything - that is not itself a complex physical mechanism, and all of our understanding of how intelligent behavior occurs is based on complex physical mechanisms.
So, a design inference is the following: To conclude from evidence that something had in mind something to be done or brought about and does did do this.
Imagine the following: You observe a box attached to bins containing various raw materials (metals, plastic, etc). Out of the box comes all sorts of complex machines. Is this box (call it a "CSI Box") intelligent? We have no way of knowing. Perhaps, for example, the CSI Box was programmed by somebody to do produce these machines, but the CSI Box is not intelligent itself. So, just because something outputs complex designs doesn't mean it is intelligent. In order to ascertain that the CSI Box is intelligent, you would have to interact with it. For example, you could ask it to produce some novel machine to solve a problem that you describe, to see if it could do that. By interacting with the CSI box, you could figure out what sort of abilities it had (or lacked) to plan, reason, solve problems, learn, and so on. And yes, I know your response: If the CSI Box was programmed by somebody to output these complex machines, then even if the CSI Box itself is not intelligent, the programmer of the box must have been!! But you are falling down the rabbit hole with that one. Just like asking ID "Who designed the designer?", asking "Who programmed the CSI Box?" will get you nowhere. Perhaps this CSI Box was created by another CSI Box, which was also unintelligent. How did that CSI Box come to exist? Maybe it exists outside of space and time, and is a necessary CSI Box (rather than a contingent one), and there is no other explanation for it. Sound familiar? You can start with mind, or you can start with mechanism, but we can't ever really know where the chain really started without evidence.
And thus, a design inference tells us that we have a thinking thing that has purposes, goals, and aims that it wishes to achieve.
CSI Boxes don't have conscious beliefs and desires; they simply output CSI. Maybe first life was produced by a conscious, sentient being, or maybe it was produced by something like a CSI box. We can't know unless we can interact with it. To understand this better, think of a complex termite mound. If a human designed and built such a thing, they would plan it ahead of time, maybe make some drawings, figure out how the ventilation shafts should be incorporated, how to design the irrigated compartments where the termites will grow fungus, and so on. But termites build these things without any of that conscious planning - they just do it. You will (I believe) say that the reason termites can do this is not because they are intelligent per se, but that they were designed by a something intelligent. Well you can say that if you want, but again, you can't provide any evidence that it is true. It may be that it's termites all the way down, so to speak.
RDF: “I would infer that it was designed by a human being. For you to fail to make that specific inference would be irrational, since human beings are the one and only thing that can write an English paragraph (except for of course human-programmed computers or the like).” RDM: Really? So aliens could not learn to write English? God, if He exists, could not cause English to appear on paper? Really? You are implicitly assuming materialism here all the while thinking that you are not.
Another miscommunication: I am not offering some proof of the impossibility of aliens or gods. I am saying that no rational person would look at a piece of paper with English writing on it and assume that an alien or a god wrote it, rather than a living human being.
And what if you knew, with absolute certainty, that no human being wrote the paragraph in English on the paper? Would you suddenly conclude that they just magically appeared?
No, I don't think there is any evidence for "magic" (and I'm not sure what it is supposed to be anyway).
Or that no one wrote them? Or that they wrote themselves? No, of course not!
I would say that we have no idea how those words got there.
Even if you knew that no other human being wrote the words, you would still conclude that an intelligent agent did, which just proves my point: the inference to intelligence is separate and distinct from the inference to the type of intelligence.
Since grammatical language is unique to human beings, and we know a good deal about what sorts of brain structures are involved in speech generation and understanding, one good hypothesis would be that some other animal exists on Earth that we have never discovered, but has similar linguistic faculties as humans. In order to confirm that (or any hypothesis) we would need actual evidence of such a thing, of course.
Except, of course, that if we had an artifact that was unmistakably designed, and yet we knew that no human designed it, then we would immediately posit other type of designers rather than simply claiming that the artifact was not designed.
When you say "designers", your category is underspecified. If any of these things (for example) are supposed to be true about a "designer", then you have no warrant to infer them: 1) they have conscious beliefs and desires 2) they have free will 3) they can solve novel problems Now if you'd like to concede that a "designer" does not necessarily have any of these attributes, then sure, we agree that some sort of "designer" is responsible for first life. Otherwise, you need to show evidence of these attributes.
How can they search for a signal if they don’t know how to infer which signals would be from an ET or not?
They look for narrow-band EM signals, which are not produced by other known phenomena in the universe.
You have to know what you are searching for (something that would point to intelligence) before you can rationally begin your search.
They are looking for extra-terrestrial life forms who are capable of transmitting signals.
RDF: “The data for whatever SETI might find would have to be analyzed to see what sort of life form was responsible.” RDM: EXACTLY! Which is why I keep talking about doing a conceptual analysis from the data.
If a SETI signal was found to emanate from a temperate planet with liquid water, we would likely infer that life as we know it (something we would recognize as a living organism on Earth) was responsible. If we found the signal came from inside a neutron star, however, we would have no idea whatsoever what caused it! CSI in biology is like the second case - we have no idea what causes it.
But highly unlikely explanations can be shown to be true if the evidence is strong enough.
Absolutely true. However, there is precisely zero evidence that ID provides which indicates a disembodied mind was responsbile for biological CSI. ID hasn't even provided any evidence that disembodied minds exist at all (although there is some weak, unreplicable evidence from paranormal research).
You said: “Where there are mysteries that we have not solved, it is not rational to pick some explanation we dream up and without any actual evidence go ahead and claim that it it the “best” explanation we have and pretend that this gives it scientific support, just because we think the rest of the candidate explanations are even worse! The intellectually honest response is to say “We do not (yet) know the answer”.” No, its not. Best explanations are by definition comparative. And so, an explanation can be the best of its group even it is not a good explanation.
Ok, we simply disagree about this. It's hard for me to take your position seriously. Judge: I find the defendent guilty of strangling the victim! Defense Lawyer: But your honor! My client was sitting in the police station downstairs when the crime was committed, and I have 120 police officers and 10 nuns testifying to that fact, plus videotape evidence, and my client is a quadriplegic and confined to an iron lung! Judge: I don't care! There was a motive (he didn't seem to like the victim) and I don't have any other suspects! Now, would you think that the judge's best explanation of the crime should really be considered to be a justified conclusion? Of course not. The intellectually honest response in these cases is "I DO NOT KNOW". I understand that most people are uncomfortable admitting ignorance, but I believe it is a very important thing to be able to do.
Let me come back, for a moment, to idealism. The reason that I bring that up is because you keep saying that disembodied minds are not part of our uniform and repeated experience. But if Berkeley’s subjective idealism is true, then all we are are disembodied minds, and thus our uniform and repeated experience would only be of disembodied minds which appear embodied but really are not. And in such a case, inferring a disembodied mind of a non-human designer would conform closely, though not perfectly, with our repeated and uniform experience.
You say under idealism that our experience of minds would be that they are embodied, but in reality they would be disembodied. Yes, we agree. Now read that again: Whether or not idealism is true, our experience of minds is that they are embodied. Whatever is true of metaphysics, that is our uniform and repeated experience, period. And when we try to justify our beliefs against our uniform and repeated experience (as scientists claim to do, and as ID claims to do), then we do just that: Consult our experience and not our metaphysical beliefs.
And thus, to show that our repeated and uniform experience is not of this sort of Berkeley-style subjective idealism, then you would need to disprove this possibility first.
Again, I am not attempting to prove anything to be impossible! What I am saying over and over again is this: Our uniform and repeated experience confirms that complex mechanism arises only by means of intelligence, and the same experience confirms that intelligence arises only by means of complex mechanism. This has nothing to do with metaphysical ontologies. You cannot refute my statement by suggesting idealism might be true. Rather, you can only refute it by reporting replicable evidence of something that displays intelligent behavior but does not have a corporeal body.
What I am saying is that it is, in principle, possible that the evidence (like stars rearranging themselves to spell words in the sky that we would know could not be caused by any embodied intelligent agent), would be so powerful that it would override point 2. I am not saying that has happened yet (necessarily); what I am saying is that it is in principle possible.
I completely agree!!!!! There is nothing that, in principle, precludes that from being true. What I am saying is that the evidence that we need to make that conclusion is not to be found in CSI, for all the reasons I've given. What we need is actual evidence of the entity ID is positing, or something similar (like some form of disembodied intelligence). Cheers, RDFish p.s. RD Miska it is a pleasure to debate with you - you are smart and argue in good faith. Thanks.RDFish
October 5, 2013
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Dear KN, I will try to get to your points tomorrow. RD MiksaRD Miksa
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Dear RDFish, You said: “First, stating that something was or was not designed by “something intentional” is not informative in a scientific sense, since nothing observable follows from that statement. Not one single additional piece of information can be gleaned by labelling something “intentional”. If you disagree, simply tell me one thing that label actually tells us about the observable properties, characteristics, or abilities of an intentional cause. Can it write a poem? Understand a joke? Play the piano? Could it do anything whatsoever besides spelling out those particular sentences?” The question that comes to my mind when reading this paragraph is: so what? If all I can infer from my example is that it can spell out particular sentences, and thus that it is intelligent, knows the English language, etc., than that is informative in and of itself. Furthermore, your claim that intentionality by itself uninformative is just wrong. If I am examining a corpse, and I infer that the person was murdered (an intentional act) rather than just dying naturally, then that fact is extremely informative. And it is still informative even if I have no information as to who the murderer was, how he murdered, why he murdered, when he murdered, etc. So again, knowing that something was done intentionally is very informative in and of itself. You said: “Second, we have no reason to assume that conscious thought is required for design. I have often had the experience of coming up with solutions to difficult technical problems (e.g. envisioning a complex algorithm) in my sleep, or while consciously thinking about other things. It is not unusual – lots of people report this experience, where the solution just “comes to you” when you aren’t consciously thinking about it. Our brain continuously generates complex plans without conscious involvement. Imagine if you attempted to compute the trajectory of a fly ball given the images projected on your retinas. You would have to be a very competent mathematician to do that, but we can all do these calculations without thinking about it when we play baseball.” All your examples fail, because in every one of them, at some point, requires consciousness. Solving problems in your sleep only happens because you first consciously thought about the problems; same as solutions just “coming to you.” And I could never catch the flyball without being conscious that it was coming at me. Furthermore, given that you place such weight on our uniform and repeated experience, I should tell you that all of our uniform and repeated experience shows such that only conscious, thinking, intelligent agents are capable of designing things. You said: “It is quite obvious that our experience confirms that (1) all complex mechanisms arise only by means of intelligent action and (2) all intelligent action arises by means of complex mechanism. ID relies on (1), but tries to ignore (2). Yet both statements are confirmed by exactly the same set of observations.” Incorrect. ID specifically does not ignore 2, because ID itself says nothing about the designer. What I am saying is that is if a design inference is of a certain weight, it could override our experience of 2. Remember my quadriplegic example. It was might to show that uniform and repeated experience can be overridden if the design inference is strong enough. You said: “Again, you are missing the point regarding “design inference”. You need to tell me exactly what it means.” A dictionary would suffice. Designed: made or done intentionally; intended; planned. Infer: to derive by reasoning; conclude or judge from premises or evidence. Thus, a design inference means: to derive by reasoning / conclude from evidence that something was made or done intentionally (meaning intended / planned). Next, intended: knowing what one wishes to do and setting this as a goal. To intend is to have in mind something to be done or brought about. So, a design inference is the following: To conclude from evidence that something had in mind something to be done or brought about and does did do this. And if something has something in mind, then it must think about what it intends and aims to bring about. And thus, a design inference tells us that we have a thinking thing that has purposes, goals, and aims that it wishes to achieve. “If it means that a conscious, sentient being is responsible, then sorry, you simply have no warrant for it. Whatever might be able to move stars around the galaxy is so radically foreign to our understanding that we can’t possibly be justified in attributing particular human-like attributes to it! Again, if this thing actually conversed with us, that would be a different story.” First off, it is not so foreign to our understanding. We smartly move things around all the time. Moving stars around would just take more smarts and power. Second, even it was foreign to our experience, so what? I can still rationally determine that it is intelligent, and then do a conceptual analysis to determine at least some of its attributes. And again, just like my quadriplegic example showed: even if something is extremely foreign to us, a design inference can be so powerful as to override our lack of experience with it. You said: “I would infer that it was designed by a human being. For you to fail to make that specific inference would be irrational, since human beings are the one and only thing that can write an English paragraph (except for of course human-programmed computers or the like).” Really? So aliens could not learn to write English? God, if He exists, could not cause English to appear on paper? Really? You are implicitly assuming materialism here all the while thinking that you are not. You said: “Really??? Would you sit there and go down some list of all the intelligent agents you know of and try to decide which was responsible? Hmmm…was it a space alien? A ghost? A poltergeist? A fairy? An elf? A god? No, I’d say it was a human being!!!!” And what if you knew, with absolute certainty, that no human being wrote the paragraph in English on the paper? Would you suddenly conclude that they just magically appeared? Or that no one wrote them? Or that they wrote themselves? No, of course not! Even if you knew that no other human being wrote the words, you would still conclude that an intelligent agent did, which just proves my point: the inference to intelligence is separate and distinct from the inference to the type of intelligence. You said: “Sorry, but only the most credulous of people would actually consider anything but a human being when they find some English writing on a piece of paper. We do not make “design inferences” that consider a general class of “intelligent agents” in forensics or archeology – that’s just nonsense.” Sorry, your point is what is foolish and credulous. Again, consider, if we knew that no human being had ever designed Mount Rushmore, for example, would it be more rational to conclude that it was not designed or that it was designed by something other than humans. Obviously the latter, and yet the evidence from Mount Rushmore remains the same. You said: “As my definition showed, archeologists study human artifacts, and do not entertain hypotheses that ghosts or fairies were responsible.” Except, of course, that if we had an artifact that was unmistakably designed, and yet we knew that no human designed it, then we would immediately posit other type of designers rather than simply claiming that the artifact was not designed. You said: “As I’ve already explained, SETI is not a theory, nor an inference – it is a search for signals that extra-terrestrial life forms might send out into space.” How can they search for a signal if they don’t know how to infer which signals would be from an ET or not? You have to know what you are searching for (something that would point to intelligence) before you can rationally begin your search. You said: “The data for whatever SETI might find would have to be analyzed to see what sort of life form was responsible.” EXACTLY! Which is why I keep talking about doing a conceptual analysis from the data. You said: “It means that as far as we know, “design inferences” point to complex physical beings. Other sorts of hypotheses would be a priori highly unlikely.” Sure. But highly unlikely explanations can be shown to be true if the evidence is strong enough. You said: “Where there are mysteries that we have not solved, it is not rational to pick some explanation we dream up and without any actual evidence go ahead and claim that it it the “best” explanation we have and pretend that this gives it scientific support, just because we think the rest of the candidate explanations are even worse! The intellectually honest response is to say “We do not (yet) know the answer”.” No, its not. Best explanations are by definition comparative. And so, an explanation can be the best of its group even it is not a good explanation. And we don’t “dream up” some explanation, we can a design inference and then do a conceptual analysis to determine what type of attributes we can deduce that the designer has. You said: Again, I do not say that are not possible. I say we do not have good reason to imagine they exist, and that it appears complex mechanism is required to process information. In any event, disembodied minds are most certainly not part of our uniform and repeated experience. Let me come back, for a moment, to idealism. The reason that I bring that up is because you keep saying that disembodied minds are not part of our uniform and repeated experience. But if Berkeley’s subjective idealism is true, then all we are are disembodied minds, and thus our uniform and repeated experience would only be of disembodied minds which appear embodied but really are not. And in such a case, inferring a disembodied mind of a non-human designer would conform closely, though not perfectly, with our repeated and uniform experience. And thus, to show that our repeated and uniform experience is not of this sort of Berkeley-style subjective idealism, then you would need to disprove this possibility first. So the onus is on you—given that you are the one claiming that all our uniform and repeated experience point to minds being totally embodied—to demonstrate your claim. You said: “And yet again (please read this carefully): The question is not whether or not it is impossible for conscious thought to occur absent complex mechanism. Rather, the question is whether or not we have warrant to believe such a thing exists. Again, the confusion arises because it may be that the nature of conscious thought turns out to be such that complex mechanism is necessary for it to occur, which would make disembodied minds impossible. But nobody knows the necessary and sufficient conditions for conscious thought, so we cannot conclude that impossibility at this time. Still and yet, the totality of our experience confirms two things: (1) Complex mechanism does not arise absent intelligent, and (2) intelligence does not arise absent complex mechanism.” I understand what you are saying here. But now please note this. What I am saying is that it is, in principle, possible that the evidence (like stars rearranging themselves to spell words in the sky that we would know could not be caused by any embodied intelligent agent), would be so powerful that it would override point 2. I am not saying that has happened yet (necessarily); what I am saying is that it is in principle possible. Anyway, time for bed. RD MiksaRD Miksa
October 4, 2013
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Dear RDFish: I will be seeking to address your other points shortly, but before I do, I just want to pose, once and for all, a scenario to you and get your response (if you have the time or inclination). Consider again our scenario. We know, with absolute certainty, that we (human beings) are the only embodied intelligent beings in all of existence. Next, we know, with absolute certainty, that are minds are sound and that we are not delusional, crazy, hallucinating, etc. Next, we know, with absolute certainty, that we have no ability to affect, or move, or change stars. Now, we all this knowledge, you, RDFish—as well as millions of other people—look up at the night sky and see stars literally (not a trick of any type) move around and form the following pattern: “RDFISH! IT IS I, YOUR DESIGNER. I HAVE DESIGNED YOU AND I AM PROVIDING YOU WITH THIS MESSAGE SO THAT YOU CAN KNOW THAT I DESIGNED YOU. YOU CAN THINK WHAT YOU WANT ABOUT ME, BUT KNOW THAT I DESIGNED YOU.” Now, seeing this, what is your conclusion about it? What is your thought process and your reasoning about this? What would YOU infer is the cause of this obvious event? RD MiksaRD Miksa
October 4, 2013
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Hi Axel, Yes of course I've read all about Dr. van Lommel; his name comes up very frequently in NDE discussions. What I haven't heard, however, is any response to the criticisms of his interpretations. For example, it seems quite likely that the memories reported by ND patients are generated during the time the brain is functioning, rather than during flatline. Others have suggested that there is some brain function undetected by EEG. There are experiments meant to eliminate these possibilities (for example, where the ND patient is able to describe objects only viewable from above the operating table, where those who experience OOB often report looking down from). I have not, however, seen any results from such experiments. A simple anasthetic, or even a bump on the head, can makes one's consciousness disappear. This is a reliable, demonstrable fact that provides very strong evidence that conscious awareness is dependent on a well-functioning brain. If interference with the functioning of the brain in this way can destroy conscious awareness, it seems highly probable that the absence of a brain (or interference with the functioning of the brain due to death) would have the same effect. In any case, it's not remotely accurate to call this NDE evidence "experimental proof of dualism" that is "irrefragably certain". Much, much more research would be needed to overcome the vast amount of evidence that consciousness is dependent on brain function. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
October 4, 2013
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Hi Box, The first reference shows that very small brains can still be very functional. The second reference described Aristotle's incorrect understanding of brain function (I take it you know that the brain processes information and generates heat, and it does not cool the blood). I guess I don't see the point you're trying to make. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
October 4, 2013
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Hi Phinehas,
So is the following true or not? It is quite obvious that our experience confirms that … all complex mechanisms arise only by means of intelligent action
Yes, I believe that is true.
As to… It depends on how they define “intelligent action”. If, like most people, they mean that intelligent action entails “conscious, rational thought” then no, Darwinists would be bound to disagree with that statement. If they take a more general meaning for “intelligence” – something like “capable of learning and solving problems”, then some Darwinists may consider evolutionary mechanisms (or algorithms) to be intelligent per se. If you are saying that Darwinists equivocate from time to time, then I’d have to agree. Would you make the same equivocation? Or would you accept that we are talking about what most people mean by intelligent action?
Since this is merely a matter of definition, rather than a matter of fact, there is no "correct" answer. We simply have to qualify the meaning of our terms, as in any productive technical discussion. I think the meanings of "consciousness" and "sentience" are clear. The meaning of "intelligent" is quite varied, though, and needs to be carefully defined in technical discussions.
RDFish: As I’ve made clear, what we are justified in saying is that the probability that disembodied minds can exist is low a priori, given our uniform and repeated experience of conscious minds and their dependence upon brain function. I’m confused on what you mean here. When we talk about uniform and repeated experience, aren’t we talking about a posteriori knowledge and not a priori knowledge?
Yes, that's right. As I've been saying, the a posteriori evidence for the existence of disembodied mind (e.g. from paranormal research) is far too weak to justify a belief in it, especially when combined with a low a priori estimate, which is based on how we understand the operation of intelligent systems (humans, other animals, computers), which critically relies on complex physical state machines. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
October 4, 2013
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Do we need a brain?(PDF)
"There's a young student at this university," says [professor] Lorber, "who has an IQ of 126, has gained a first-class honors degree in mathematics, and is socially completely normal. And yet the boy has virtually no brain. (..) "I can't say whether the mathematics student has a brain weighing 50 grams or 150 grams, but it's clear that it is nowhere near the normal 1.5 kilograms," asserts Lorber, "and much of the brain he does have is in the more primitve deep structures that are relatively spared in hydrocephalus." (SCIENCE, VOL. 210, 12 DECEMBER 1980)
stanford.edu:: In the fourth century B. C., Aristotle considered the brain to be a secondary organ that served as a cooling agent for the heart and a place in which spirit circulated freely. He designated the space in which all the spirits came together as the sensus communis -- the origins of our much more metaphorical term, "common sense."
Box
October 4, 2013
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#95 RDF: You should find these interesting, RDF: 'In acute myocardial infarction the duration of cardiac arrest (VF) on the CCU is usually 60-120 seconds, on the cardiac ward 2-5 minutes, and in out-of-hospital arrest it usually exceeds 5-10 minutes. Only during threshold testing of internal defibrillators or during electro physiologic stimulation studies will the duration of cardiac arrest hardly exceed 30-60 seconds. From these studies we know that in our prospective study of patients that have been clinically dead (VF on the ECG) no electric activity of the cortex of the brain (flat EEG) must have been possible, but also the abolition of brain stem activity like the loss of the corneareflex, fixed dilated pupils and the loss of the gag reflex is a clinical finding in those patients. However, patients with an NDE can report a clear consciousness, in which cognitive functioning, emotion, sense of identity, and memory from early childhood was possible, as well as perception from a position out and above their “dead” body. Because of the sometimes reported and verifiable out-of -body experiences, like the case of the dentures reported in our study, we know that the NDE must happen during the period of unconsciousness, and not in the first or last second of this period. So we have to conclude that NDE in our study was experienced during a transient functional loss of all functions of the cortex and of the brainstem. It is important to mention that there is a well documented report of a patient with constant registration of the EEG during cerebral surgery for an gigantic cerebral aneurysm at the base of the brain, operated with a body temperature between 10 and 15 degrees, she was put on the heart-lung machine, with VF, with all blood drained from her head, with a flat line EEG, with clicking devices in both ears, with eyes taped shut, and this patient experienced an NDE with an out-of-body experience, and all details she perceived and heard could later be verified.' The above excerpt is from the second article in the blog linked below, by Pim van Lommel, I believe, a heart specialist: http://science-spirituality.blogspot.co.uk/search/label/Mysticism You may also be interested in the site linked below, of a gentleman who appears to be the doyen of these 'NDE specialists', at least in the UK, Consultant Neuropsychiatrist, Dr Peter Fenwick. http://iands.org/research/important-research-articles/42-dr-peter-fenwick-md-science-and-spirituality.html?start=2Axel
October 4, 2013
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RDFish:
As I’ve made clear, what we are justified in saying is that the probability that disembodied minds can exist is low a priori, given our uniform and repeated experience of conscious minds and their dependence upon brain function.
I'm confused on what you mean here. When we talk about uniform and repeated experience, aren't we talking about a posteriori knowledge and not a priori knowledge? To speak of a priori knowledge "given our uniform and repeated experience" doesn't compute for me, but maybe I just don't understand what you mean by a priori.Phinehas
October 4, 2013
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