Quotes of the Day: Atheists Are VERY Religious

_{Barry Arrington

September 1, 2016

Intelligent Design

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Intelligent Design}

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This exchange between Phinehas and HeKS brings it out as succinctly as anything I’ve ever seen:

Phinehas says:

The thing that fascinates me is how atheists are shown to have prodigious faith in something eternal with god-like creative powers [i.e., the multiverse]. It’s almost like they have no issues whatsoever believing in a god, just so long as it doesn’t bear that particular label.

HeKS replies:

I tend to think that it’s because they don’t want that eternal thing with god-like creative powers to also be personal and have the ability to ground and impose moral values and duties on humans.

As the multiverse has demonstrated, atheists have no problem at all with faith in something that is unseen, intangible, outside of the physical universe, eternal, capable of bringing about unlikely effects we can’t fully understand, and that cannot be falsified through any conceivable scientific experiment.

The only thing they insist on stopping short of is something that is intelligent and that can ground moral values and duties … and probably they stop short of the former only because of the latter, as suggested by the willingness of some to accept the idea that we’re living in an intelligently designed simulation created by other contingent physical beings based largely on the same scientific evidence theists point to as suggestive of God’s existence, which they had denied suggested design until the simulation hypothesis came along. Neil deGrasse Tyson is one such example.

Comments

Thanks, HeKS.daveS_{September 11, 2016
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daveS, I'll respond as soon as I can (probably tonight). I have some work I have to get done this afternoon. Take care, HeKSHeKS_{September 11, 2016
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KF,
DS, again, we are not dealing with actualised worlds but possible ones. If in actualised worlds God chooses x, as God is free in any world, God could have chosen y where y != x.
Yes, I understand we are talking about possible worlds. I'm not sure where I've indicated otherwise, but I've been clear throughout that the topic is possible worlds. And there is at least one possible world (namely the actual world). Some think there is exactly one possible world, and although that seems wrong to me, I don't think I can knock that hypothesis down. Tbh, I would use the same arguments you are using: material objects "obviously" could have been configured differently, God could have acted differently at some juncture, Bill Buckner could have fielded the ball successfully in Game 6, and so on. But again, we're trapped in this actual world, and if there is just one possible world, the God could not have chosen y. Furthemore, if it's not logically possible to extend the single proposition "God chose y" to a complete possible world, then it's not the case that God could have chosen y.daveS_{September 11, 2016
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DS, again, we are not dealing with actualised worlds but possible ones. If in actualised worlds God chooses x, as God is free in any world, God could have chosen y where y != x. This means, under circumstances as discussed, there are for example neighbouring possible worlds Wa and Wb in which say the pens disassembled are A and B respectively. That a Bic-style pen can be disassembled is obvious [I used to routinely do just that, esp when ink ran low and there was a tendency to form blobs of ink, to blow into the open end of the ink refill, or sometimes to swap colours, etc . . . and nowadays to get the tubes for angling or similar purposes], and that it is A or B can even be directed by tossing a fair coin, showing that there is an obvious distribution of possible worlds. I assume the world description in principle issue is already sufficiently addressed on in effect start with our observed world and look in its neighbourhood. The bottom-line again is that possible and actualised are not equal, and the freedom of God and of other agents is critical. Where, without that freedom, we ourselves become irrational, as reasoning and communicating meaningfully critically depend on responsible, rational freedom to choose to follow an argument's logic [as opposed to blindly execute a GIGO-limited process on cause-effect chains in some computational substrate] and to then express one's own meaningful case freely, rationally and responsibly. Absent that, the very discussion we have here would utterly break down into irrational blind chance and mechanical necessity under control of GIGO in computing substrates themselves shaped by non-rational forces. (This is of course a key failing of the evolutionary materialistic paradigm that is a dominant but fatally flawed school of thought -- and so the issue comes back to the self-refuting nature of evolutionary materialistic scientism and/or of any species of utter determinism or schemes that reduce mind to blind computation on chance and/or mechanical necessity acting in GIGO-limited computational substrates. Until such self falsification by self contradiction is faced and turned away from, essentially anything that is about rationality will trace back to that failure and deadlock on refusal to rethink.) KFkairosfocus_{September 11, 2016
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HeKS, Revisiting this:
The problem is that what we’re talking about with respect to possible worlds is logical possibility. As such it wouldn’t even matter if God actually always chooses to protect the pen, because it is still logically possible that he could have made a different choice, which means there are possible worlds in which he doesn’t protect the pen.
Perhaps I'm mixing up different kinds of possibility? I can see how it could be a problem proposing or assuming that it's logically impossible for God to let the pen be disassembled. Perhaps even if he would never allow that to happen (so it would be impossible in some other subjective sense). An example, from Deuteronomy:
Be strong and courageous. Do not be afraid or terrified because of them, for the Lord your God goes with you; he will never leave you nor forsake you.
On the other hand, perhaps it is logically possible for God to leave or forsake you? If I am talking about something other than logical possible worlds, then my line of argument won't work.daveS_{September 10, 2016
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HeKS, Responding to your second point first:
You’re also ignoring a very important point here, which is that if the pen is prevented form disassembly because God chooses to supernaturally protect it from disassembly then that tells us something about the nature of God, but it tells us nothing about the nature of the pen.
Yes, admittedly so. I'm only interested in whether the pen is "Nezesary" here.
The problem is that what we’re talking about with respect to possible worlds is logical possibility. As such it wouldn’t even matter if God actually always chooses to protect the pen, because it is still logically possible that he could have made a different choice, which means there are possible worlds in which he doesn’t protect the pen.
I'll have to think more about this. In my post I meant to assume that God will protect pen A under any circumstances, meaning in every possible world---that's just how He operates---pen A must be kept immutable (for some reason known to Him).daveS_{September 10, 2016
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daveS,
It might be the case that God always chooses to protect pen A. Do we know otherwise?
The problem is that what we're talking about with respect to possible worlds is logical possibility. As such it wouldn't even matter if God actually always chooses to protect the pen, because it is still logically possible that he could have made a different choice, which means there are possible worlds in which he doesn't protect the pen. You're also ignoring a very important point here, which is that if the pen is prevented form disassembly because God chooses to supernaturally protect it from disassembly then that tells us something about the nature of God, but it tells us nothing about the nature of the pen. If that is how disassembly of the pen is prevented then there need be nothing special or "necessary" about the pen. God could choose to protect any normal contingent pen like that. To claim that some object is a necessary being is to claim something about the inherent nature of the thing, that by it own nature it needs to exist. If some object needs to be protected by God in order to maintain its being and, in the absence of God's protection, could be unmade then it is, by definition, contingent.HeKS_{September 10, 2016
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Edit to second sentence of second paragraph: "But to sum up, I suspect if you propose that some not-actual world is indeed possible,"daveS_{September 10, 2016
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KF,
DS, God is a free agent in any world. So, a world in which pen A is disassembled is possible... (snip)
It might be the case that God always chooses to protect pen A. Do we know otherwise?
Just to bring out the point suppose the pen to be disassembled is chosen by tossing a fair coin. If H, A, if T, B. In short, the real problem is refusal to accept that choice is real, which directly undermines reasoned discussion.
Ok, but I don't think that changes anything. It could be that God chooses to protect pen A from disassembly regardless of the outcome of the coin flip. If tails comes up, He doesn't have to do anything. I don't think this particular line of discussion is going to be productive. But to sum up, I suspect if you propose that some world is indeed possible, I can come up with some (perhaps far-fetched) reason to doubt it. And there's no way to verify the existence of this candidate possible world, of course, so I don't think you can prove I'm wrong.daveS_{September 10, 2016
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DS, God is a free agent in any world. So, a world in which pen A is disassembled is possible and distinct from another possible world in which pen B is disassembled. Or for that matter another neighbouring world in which neither is disassembled by our choice . . . we too have responsible freedom. That we have access to a world in which we choose to disassemble A, does not mean that prior to that choice we could never have disassembled B. That possibility means the A world and the B world are possible worlds, where obviously ability to disassemble one pen implies ability to disassemble the other. Just to bring out the point suppose the pen to be disassembled is chosen by tossing a fair coin. If H, A, if T, B. In short, the real problem is refusal to accept that choice is real, which directly undermines reasoned discussion. If we are just flapping mouths and moving fingers driven by blind chance and/or mechanical necessity, then rationality has been lost. Of course, this goes to the heart of too many debates over the design inference. In so going, the fundamental irrationality of rejecting responsible rational freedom to act intelligently and by real choice is brought out. KFkairosfocus_{September 10, 2016
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KF, In your pen illustration, if I attempt to disassemble pen A, God could instantly switch the pens, causing me to disassemble pen B. In that manner, pen A would be protected from disassembly. Obviously such examples dealing with pens are trivial (by design), but I think the question of exactly what and how many possible worlds "exist" is important. Is there just 1? Some finite number? Infinitely many? It's easy to say that such-and-such a possible world exists, but can we really back that up? It "seems" as though the two worlds where the pen is alternately whole and in pieces are sufficiently close so that if one world is possible, so is the other, but could we be wrong? Again, we always have access only to the actual world, and claims about what's happening in other "forks" are untestable.daveS_{September 10, 2016
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DS, go get two cheap pens like the old fashioned Bics used in school days. Disassemble one, leave the other intact. Is it really that difficult that the "fork" between pen A or pen B being the one disassembled is some great leap of issues? That there is some grand dark myster about the possible worlds in which pen A is the one disassembled and one where pen B is? That smacks of falling into the selectively hyperskeptical by way of mountain out of mole hill. But then, a lot of contemporary atheism is about denial of responsible, reasonable freedom, blind to the consequence that at that point they have undermined reasoned discussion and the point of a discussion. KFkairosfocus_{September 10, 2016
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KF, Well, I don't expect to be able to take this debate much further, tbh. The discussion in Jacquette's book is hard going. Nevertheless, I think it's an interesting question, and maybe more difficult than it seems at first, given that we only have access to the actual world, and can't examine what's happening at each "fork".daveS_{September 10, 2016
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DS, no you are saying simply that a composite contingent being is an entity made up of assembled parts. Such a being, x, is possible when its composition does not entail the sort of inherent contradictions that make square circles impossible of being. That is x is WITHIN a possible world, where there is at least one such, our familiar world. All that we need is to start from this world, which is in principle describable. Then contemplate states of affairs where components x1, x2 . . . xn are assembled to give x, and the alternate possibility that they are not assembled. These are two neighbouring credibly possible futures, which are such that in one x is, in the other it is not. Indeed, we may assemble x then dis-assemble it in some cases. There is no camel's nose under the tent of oh for a contingent being to be we have a SUPPRESSED grand description of a whole world -- and we have gone nowhere but the near neighbourhood of our familiar world. At least one world is and is in principle describable and for simple cases we can see cases x and not-x, where the components x1, x2 . . . xn exist on both possible forks. There is utterly no need to project grand debates on suggested highly contentious issues when something so simple as this is there and something so accessible as this is there. Remember, we are in effect looking at a pen factory here!With all due respect to those looking for grand debates and putting up hyperskeptical objections, someone is patently making mountains out of mole-hills when we have a clear and obvious illustration of the point close at hand. KF PS: It should be obvious why I speak of in principle complete descriptions of world-level states of affairs. We can sufficiently describe to make the concept useful though we cannot execute the full descriptive task in practice.kairosfocus_{September 10, 2016
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KF,
Much of the above is simply going back over what has already been said and/or is readily accessible. On possible world, I suggest: in principle complete description of a possible state of affairs, which is feasible (which requires, coherent).
Great. That sounds very close to the definition I posted.
A contingent being is commonly described as being in at least one PW, and absent in at least one other. In the case of a composite entity made up from parts, the latter would trivially be a closely similar world in which the parts are not assembled.
Maybe, maybe not. There is an "implicit axiom" being invoked here which states that you can complete the proposition concerning this unassembled composite entity to a full possible world consistently. I finally found a reference which addresses this issue in the book Ontology (bottom of page 288, starting at note #17) by Dale Jacquette. It's quite technical, and I haven't fully grasped it yet, but it does indicate there is a serious issue here.daveS_{September 10, 2016
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DS, Much of the above is simply going back over what has already been said and/or is readily accessible. On possible world, I suggest: in principle complete description of a possible state of affairs, which is feasible (which requires, coherent). A contingent being is commonly described as being in at least one PW, and absent in at least one other. In the case of a composite entity made up from parts, the latter would trivially be a closely similar world in which the parts are not assembled. A necessary being would be in any PW, and the simplest way to see this is that NB's are embedded in the framework for any world to exist. A serious candidate NB will be either impossible [as a square circle is impossible] or it will be in at least one PW and by universality in all including our familiar world. Typically, to propose that a given NB does not exist will end in contradictions; which may or may not be easy to find and/or acknowledge. I find approaching from the framework of reality point of view allows us to see the point of NBs more clearly. As does a case like two-ness . . . try to imagine a PW without distinction leading to dichotomy A vs ~A thus two-ness. Impossible. 2-ness never began, cannot end, is not assembled from material parts etc. NBs are going to be things like numbers, necessarily true propositions, and minds. Indeed theists have classically suggested that the abstractions have been eternally contemplated by God. And, on pain of reducing our own responsible rational freedom to absurdity, we are morally governed, requiring a First Sufficient Cause at world-root level capable of bearing the weight of ought. It is significant that repeatedly when it has been pointed out that there is only one serious candidate . . . the inherently good creator God, a necessary and maximally great being worthy of loyalty and the reasonable service of doing the good in accord with our evident nature . . . and alternatives have been invited to sit at the table of comparative difficulties, there has typically been a studious silence in a context where ever so many objectors are all too eager to find something to pounce on. This brings us full circle to the point of the thread. Evolutionary materialistic scientism and fellow travellers are in the same general class of worldview entities as the range of traditional religions. Likewise, it is relatively easy to show that generic ethical theism and the Judaeo-Christian tradition within it are responsible worldview stances. Despite, the talking points too many radical secularists and fellow travellers today try to use to dismiss this view. KFkairosfocus_{September 10, 2016
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BTW, are we all agreed that this is a good definition of "possible world"?
A possible world is a complete description of the way reality could be, down to the last detail, encompassing every proposition’s truth or falsehood in a consistent manner.
daveS_{September 10, 2016
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HeKS,
With respect to that bold statement, I assume you’re referring to this recent comment by KF:
I think that a being that God wills to exist in all worlds that are possible [as opposed to actualised] is in reality another rather roundabout way of saying a necessary being.
That is certainly relevant to our discussion,, but I specifically have in mind the statements KF has made to the effect that any contingent being fails to exist in at least one possible world. If I'm misreading his comments, of course any correction is welcome.
This would mean that even if God actually decided from time zero that some particular selection of matter would form a particular physical object regardless of what other facts obtained in the world, it is logically possible that he could have decided otherwise, and so even under these circumstances the object would not exist in all possible worlds, since the collection of possible worlds would include those that would have proceeded in the absence of God making that decision, which means no physical object could even have Nezesary Being (i.e. exist in all possible worlds in spite of its existence not being logically necessary).
Perhaps. But I will say again that it might be the case that there is, for whatever reason, just one possible world (a minority view, but not a crazy one, as fair as I can tell).daveS_{September 10, 2016
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HeKS, Given that God is a free agent, what He wills to create, He does so contingently. Thus, there is a possible world wherein God creates nothing at all.Autodidaktos_{September 10, 2016
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KF,
HeKS & DS, I am still a bit taken up locally, but my general observation is that no composite entity made up from assembled parts can be anything but contingent. This specifically involves material entities such as a pen. That a given pen [?] may conceivably exist in all actualised worlds does not mean that it would exist in all possible worlds. The obvious and repeatedly stated point is, if parts are assembled to create an entity P, in possible world Wm, then there is a neighbouring possible world Wn in which the relevant parts are simply not assembled. Statements about in all worlds God creates P, boil down to ether being about all actualised worlds [“likely” 1, possibly more than 1], or else fail to address that God would be sovereign and free to choose whether or not P will be assembled. That is, for a composite entity P, there must be possible worlds in which it is not assembled, on theism. On general terms, the neighbouring worlds Wm and Wn suffice to make the same point. KF
Yes, Ultimately I agree, though my thoughts on this are expressed more fully in 132 and 133 in terms of understanding the thinking behind a certain pragmatic limitation on what is meant by "possible world", even if I don't personally agree with that limitation and think possible worlds more appropriately include worlds where God made different choices. This eliminates the only conceivable grounds for a contingent object existing in all possible worlds.HeKS_{September 10, 2016
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HeKS & DS, I am still a bit taken up locally, but my general observation is that no composite entity made up from assembled parts can be anything but contingent. This specifically involves material entities such as a pen. That a given pen [?] may conceivably exist in all actualised worlds does not mean that it would exist in all possible worlds. The obvious and repeatedly stated point is, if parts are assembled to create an entity P, in possible world Wm, then there is a neighbouring possible world Wn in which the relevant parts are simply not assembled. Statements about in all worlds God creates P, boil down to ether being about all actualised worlds ["likely" 1, possibly more than 1], or else fail to address that God would be sovereign and free to choose whether or not P will be assembled. That is, for a composite entity P, there must be possible worlds in which it is not assembled, on theism. On general terms, the neighbouring worlds Wm and Wn suffice to make the same point. KF PS: All of this is functioning as a tangential and even distractive discussion that in my view is not particularly productive, the matter at stake having been reasonably addressed long since.kairosfocus_{September 10, 2016
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Autodidaktos,
I’m afraid I disagree, though being but an amateur, I could very well be wrong. But from what I have understood, the relation between necessity and existence in all possible worlds is a biconditional i.e.
As per my comment at #132, this depends on precisely where we draw the cut-off line for what it means for a world to be "logically possible". If we mean it pragmatically, we might be inclined to say that it is logically impossible for a world to exist that contradicts a definite decision made about the world by God. If we take that view then it would be logically possible for an object to have precisely the same identity in all possible worlds even though the object is contingent on many levels, but this could only be the case if it were the express decision of God that it be so. On the other hand, if we take the purely logical approach in defining what constitutes a possible world then the collection of possible worlds will also include all those worlds in which God had not made the decision in question, and in this case it would then be logically impossible for anything to exist in all possible worlds unless it has true necessary being in the sense that no possible world could exist in its absence. In this case there would be a one-to-one correspondence between necessary beings and things that exist in all possible worlds, such that by knowing one condition was true you would know the other condition was true as well. This latter approach is the one I personally favor, but I can at least understand the thinking behind the more limited pragmatic approach.HeKS_{September 10, 2016
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daveS,
Maybe I should use the term “Nezesary” instead. That’s what kicked off this entire discussion (with KF), whether a physical object could exist in all possible worlds, and that’s the issue I’m specifically interested in. Now apparently KF believes that Nezesary -> Necessary, but I won’t attempt to argue directly that the pen is a necessary being in the sense you are using. I think you’ve shown that’s going to be very difficult (perhaps impossible).
With respect to that bold statement, I assume you're referring to this recent comment by KF:
I think that a being that God wills to exist in all worlds that are possible [as opposed to actualised] is in reality another rather roundabout way of saying a necessary being.
I would need KF to clarify his meaning here, because there's some ambiguity in what point exactly he's intending to convey, but I'd like to venture a guess here as it seems to me that there are two possible meanings to this statement that would be consistent with one of the points I made in my last comment. Here is what I said again:
It should be noted that when we allow for the possibility that a physical object might exist in all possible worlds with its precise identity due to the will and action of God, we are not really saying that the logical fact that its constituent parts can exist in a disassembled orientation ceases to be true, per se, but merely that it is impossible to override the will and action of God where he has decided that it will come to exist and never be disassembled. However, the objection could still be raised that it was logically possible for God not to have decided to ensure the precise existence of the object and so there are still possible worlds in which that object does not exist with its precise identity, but they would have been utterly inaccessible from the actual world at all times.
One possible meaning of what KF said is that God willing something to be the case makes it impossible for it not to be the case, which makes it necessarily true in any possible world. However, if this is what KF means, it would seem to relate more to a necessarily true proposition or state of affairs (or something of that general sort) derived from the power of God rather than relating to necessary being. In reality, what we're really doing in this case is limiting our collection of possible worlds down from the full set of logically possible worlds to only those that are practically or physically possible given the constraints that would be created by any actual and definite creative choices God might make prior to or at the moment of creation. I suspect this is not what KF meant. Instead, I'm inclined to think that he is saying something more in line with this portion of my comment:
the objection could still be raised that it was logically possible for God not to have decided to ensure the precise existence of the object [i.e. it was logically possible for him to have chosen differently] and so there are still possible worlds in which that object does not exist with its precise identity
This would mean that even if God actually decided from time zero that some particular selection of matter would form a particular physical object regardless of what other facts obtained in the world, it is logically possible that he could have decided otherwise, and so even under these circumstances the object would not exist in all possible worlds, since the collection of possible worlds would include those that would have proceeded in the absence of God making that decision, which means no physical object could even have Nezesary Being (i.e. exist in all possible worlds in spite of its existence not being logically necessary). This would lead us to the conclusion that the only things that God would truly will to exist in absolutely every possible world would be things that no world external to God could logically exist without, which would be immaterial abstract objects (like the number 2) and concepts (like "twoness"). It seems that these kinds of things would be logically necessary with respect to any possible world, but unlike a personal being such as God, they couldn't stand in any kind of causal relation to existence (or anything else). I ultimately think that this is the proper understanding once we follow the rabbit hole all the way down, which brings us back to the conclusion that no physical object can have either Necessary Being or even Nezesary Being.HeKS_{September 10, 2016
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HeKS, "The logic of necessary being does not flow in both directions as there are logically possible reasons why something could exist in all possible worlds without having necessary being..." I'm afraid I disagree, though being but an amateur, I could very well be wrong. But from what I have understood, the relation between necessity and existence in all possible worlds is a biconditional i.e., []X For all y such that y is a world, it is true that X exists in yAutodidaktos_{September 9, 2016
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HeKS, Maybe I should use the term "Nezesary" instead. That's what kicked off this entire discussion (with KF), whether a physical object could exist in all possible worlds, and that's the issue I'm specifically interested in. Now apparently KF believes that Nezesary -> Necessary, but I won't attempt to argue directly that the pen is a necessary being in the sense you are using. I think you've shown that's going to be very difficult (perhaps impossible).daveS_{September 9, 2016
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daveS,
Acknowledged, sorry I missed this earlier.
No problem.
Well, the claim was put forth (by someone who does believe in God) that it is impossible for a physical object to be a necessary being, whether God exists or not, presumably. I’m exploring whether that’s really the case. I hope to understand better whether it’s true. If that happens, I have accomplished something, IMHO, since I will then understand necessary beings (in this weak sense) better.
I agree with that person's claim. As I've said, your use of "necessary being" in a weak sense really just means something that exists in all possible worlds. But that fact, even if true, would not make something necessary. Something that is necessary will automatically exist in all possible worlds, but existing in all possible worlds does not automatically make something necessary. In other words, this works: 1) Any Necessary Being exists in all possible worlds. 2) God is a Necessary Being. 3) Therefore, God exists in all possible worlds. But this doesn't: 1) Any Necessary Being exists in all possible worlds. 2) My pen exists in all possible worlds. 3) Therefore, my pen is a Necessary Being The logic of necessary being does not flow in both directions as there are logically possible reasons why something could exist in all possible worlds without having necessary being, but it is logically impossible for a necessary being not to exist in all possible worlds. There are at least two reasons that this other person (was it KF?) said (quite rightly) that it is impossible for a physical object to be a necessary being (in the true sense of that term). First, there is no logical necessity for any given physical object to exist in an assembled state and be composed of (or have its being in) a specific subset of matter. On the contrary, any physical object is made up of constituent parts which logic dictates can be either in an orientation that corresponds to the assembled object or in an orientation that does not correspond to the assembled object, and this at both the macro and micro scale. This means there are possible worlds where that object does not have its assembled form or does not exist with its precise identity (in the sense of being composed of the same matter right down to the sub-atomic level). [1] Second, physical objects cannot exist independent of an external spacetime context and are therefore, by definition, contingent. So a physical object can never be a necessary being in the true sense of the term, and equivocating on the meaning to allow for a weaker sense really isn't very helpful to you if your purpose to properly understand this issue (as you've said is the case) rather than simply argue for a predetermined position. ------------------ [1] It should be noted that when we allow for the possibility that a physical object might exist in all possible worlds with its precise identity due to the will and action of God, we are not really saying that the logical fact that its constituent parts can exist in a disassembled orientation ceases to be true, per se, but merely that it is impossible to override the will and action of God where he has decided that it will come to exist and never be disassembled. However, the objection could still be raised that it was logically possible for God not to have decided to ensure the precise existence of the object and so there are still possible worlds in which that object does not exist with its precise identity, but they would have been utterly inaccessible from the actual world at all times.HeKS_{September 9, 2016
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HeKS,
Sure. Conceivably. As I’ve said a few times now, it would require a being like God in order to make that even potentially possible. This means that for your pen to exist with its precise current identity in all possible worlds as a “necessary being” in the weak sense you’ve been using the term would require that God exist as a necessary being in the true and strong sense of the term.
Acknowledged, sorry I missed this earlier.
But now I’m confused again, because if you recognize that in order for your proposition to even be possible God has to exist, then what is the point of your argument? What am I missing here? What is the purpose of this idea you’ve floated that a pen might be a necessary being? What are you hoping to accomplish by arguing a proposition that would require God’s existence?
Well, the claim was put forth (by someone who does believe in God) that it is impossible for a physical object to be a necessary being, whether God exists or not, presumably. I'm exploring whether that's really the case. I hope to understand better whether it's true. If that happens, I have accomplished something, IMHO, since I will then understand necessary beings (in this weak sense) better.
Having different interactions with humans in response to differing human behavior does not threaten God’s existence or identity as a necessary being, so I’m not sure that I’m following your point here.
I had in mind taking your statement about the pen:
To make that claim is to say that it is logically necessary that that particular pen exist exactly as it is, right down to the subatomic level, and could not possibly have existed differently in any way or to any degree.
and applying it to God (minus the party about the subatomic level), perhaps arguing that God "could have existed differently".daveS_{September 9, 2016
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daveS,
And I think it is conceivable that the pens in the various possible worlds could be identical down to the subatomic level. God could ensure that, couldn’t He?
Sure. Conceivably. As I've said a few times now, it would require a being like God in order to make that even potentially possible. This means that for your pen to exist with its precise current identity in all possible worlds as a "necessary being" in the weak sense you've been using the term would require that God exist as a necessary being in the true and strong sense of the term. But now I'm confused again, because if you recognize that in order for your proposition to even be possible God has to exist, then what is the point of your argument? What am I missing here? What is the purpose of this idea you've floated that a pen might be a necessary being? What are you hoping to accomplish by arguing a proposition that would require God's existence?
Now I do admit I have a problem here of the pen changing over time and being influenced by the different surroundings in the various possible worlds, so I still don’t know if I have a proper response to this. Now, can we apply the same reasoning to the Christian God (including Jesus)? Suppose Adam and Eve had obeyed God (which I assume you accept could have happened in a possible world), and God never appeared on Earth in human form as Jesus, there would be no need for the New Covenant, etc.
Well, as I've said here a few times (though you may have missed it), I'm not a Trinitarian, so I don't believe that Jesus is Almighty God, that Being that exists necessarily at the root of all reality, both possible and actual.
In that possible world, would God have “existed differently” than He has in the actual world? His interactions with humans would have been different.
Having different interactions with humans in response to differing human behavior does not threaten God's existence or identity as a necessary being, so I'm not sure that I'm following your point here.HeKS_{September 9, 2016
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HeKS,
Well, “similar as possible” won’t do here if the proposition is that the pen is a necessary being. To make that claim is to say that it is logically necessary that that particular pen exist exactly as it is, right down to the subatomic level, and could not possibly have existed differently in any way or to any degree.
And I think it is conceivable that the pens in the various possible worlds could be identical down to the subatomic level. God could ensure that, couldn't He?
Further, as KF has previously suggested, you would not be able to disassemble the pen into its component parts, as that would represent a different state of being. If the pen is a necessary being then it would be logically necessary for the pen to exist in its assembled form and be composed of the exact materials it is composed of right down to the subatomic level at all points in time, completely independent of any description of the rest of reality (such as the size and composition of the universe at any given moment) and it would have to be logically impossible for it to have not existed at any time or for it to have been composed of different matter to any degree.
Well, again, couldn't God prevent the pen from being disassembled, just as he prevents it from being broken? If I try and take it apart, he immediately transports it somewhere else, leaving me holding a duplicate. Now I do admit I have a problem here of the pen changing over time and being influenced by the different surroundings in the various possible worlds, so I still don't know if I have a proper response to this. Now, can we apply the same reasoning to the Christian God (including Jesus)? Suppose Adam and Eve had obeyed God (which I assume you accept could have happened in a possible world), and God never appeared on Earth in human form as Jesus, there would be no need for the New Covenant, etc. In that possible world, would God have "existed differently" than He has in the actual world? His interactions with humans would have been different. This is really the only question I have regarding the last three paragraphs.daveS_{September 9, 2016
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daveS,
I don’t have a good answer to this now. Obviously I would want the “configurations” of all these instances of the “same” object to be as similar as possible. So much so that identical measurements of each pen (say) would yield the exact same result. In principle of course, since all but one don’t actually exist.
Well, "similar as possible" won't do here if the proposition is that the pen is a necessary being. To make that claim is to say that it is logically necessary that that particular pen exist exactly as it is, right down to the subatomic level, and could not possibly have existed differently in any way or to any degree. Further, as KF has previously suggested, you would not be able to disassemble the pen into its component parts, as that would represent a different state of being. If the pen is a necessary being then it would be logically necessary for the pen to exist in its assembled form and be composed of the exact materials it is composed of right down to the subatomic level at all points in time, completely independent of any description of the rest of reality (such as the size and composition of the universe at any given moment) and it would have to be logically impossible for it to have not existed at any time or for it to have been composed of different matter to any degree.
On the other hand, we were talking about possible worlds in which Obama lost, served one term, and served two terms, so I assume we are able to identify the three Obamas in those three possible worlds as the “same” somehow.
Here you are raising some important points. Obama is a contingent being. Not only is there a possible world in which he only served one term and one in which he wasn't elected at all, but there is also a possible world in which he was never born and never existed. There is no logical necessity for any particular predetermined selection of matter to form any particular contingent being in any possible world. When we talk about possible worlds where Obama served one term or was never elected, we're talking about possible worlds that were accessible from our own world (in which he was born) up to the time of his first election and then his second. More generally we could say those possible worlds are accessible from any possible world in which he was born, with the 'only served one term' possible worlds accessible from worlds in which he was born and ran for president. But my point here is that our identification of "Obama" in these possible worlds is based on describing possible worlds that were accessible from a world in which he already existed and was identified, without there being any prior or eternal requirement for him to have existed and been composed of some specific selection of matter. We are simply picking up from after the point that some contingent being was born and named. As such, our identification of Obama across possible worlds is based on our identification of the contingent being actually existing in our own world at a time prior to the specified events that could have happened in the other possible worlds. (I'm not going to get into the possibility of his parents conceiving a different child but giving it the same name and of that child going on to run for president). Now, consider this issue of identification with respect to even a contingent being that exists in all possible worlds. That means that all possible worlds, no matter their description, must be accessible from some point at which the existence and identity of the necessary being is already a reality. This would mean that at time = 0 in all possible worlds, the necessary being must either already be in actual existence as a defined identity or else its defined identity must be fully determined, predestined and irrevocably and unalterably set on its course to actual existence in a way that is utterly independent of the rest of reality (hence the need for God to explain a contingent object that exists in all possible worlds). But note, I'm speaking here only of the issue of identity, even with respect to a contingent object that is said, in a strict sense, to exist in all possible worlds (as opposed to simply a ubiquitously actualized macro description). For a truly necessary being the requirements are far more strict, as I've already explained. Coming back to a contingent being like Obama, we can further consider the fact that cells in the body die and are replaced (for the most part) all the time. They can also lose limbs or have certain cells that die and are not replaced. This raises a question about the continuous locus of identity. If someone loses a leg, most of us wouldn't be inclined to say that he was literally a different person, would we? People might use that expression sometimes if someone's mood changes, especially over an extended period of time, but we typically acknowledge that, literally speaking, it is the same person. And certainly we don't walk around thinking some people are becoming completely different people with different identities on a constant basis as the matter in their body changes. So we acknowledge a certain locus of identity that remains continuous in spite of physical changes and losses. What is it? Many here would say it is the immortal soul. I don't believe there is an immortal soul that can consciously survive the death of the body, but I do believe there is an immaterial mind that both influences and is influenced (but neither reduced nor destroyed) by the physical brain and that serves as the continuous locus of identity. I believe God preserves this locus of identity in a static and unconscious state upon a person's death and can, if he wishes, restore it to a form of his choosing at a future time.HeKS_{September 9, 2016
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