Quotes of the Day: Atheists Are VERY Religious

_{Barry Arrington

September 1, 2016

Intelligent Design}

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This exchange between Phinehas and HeKS brings it out as succinctly as anything I’ve ever seen:

Phinehas says:

The thing that fascinates me is how atheists are shown to have prodigious faith in something eternal with god-like creative powers [i.e., the multiverse]. It’s almost like they have no issues whatsoever believing in a god, just so long as it doesn’t bear that particular label.

HeKS replies:

I tend to think that it’s because they don’t want that eternal thing with god-like creative powers to also be personal and have the ability to ground and impose moral values and duties on humans.

As the multiverse has demonstrated, atheists have no problem at all with faith in something that is unseen, intangible, outside of the physical universe, eternal, capable of bringing about unlikely effects we can’t fully understand, and that cannot be falsified through any conceivable scientific experiment.

The only thing they insist on stopping short of is something that is intelligent and that can ground moral values and duties … and probably they stop short of the former only because of the latter, as suggested by the willingness of some to accept the idea that we’re living in an intelligently designed simulation created by other contingent physical beings based largely on the same scientific evidence theists point to as suggestive of God’s existence, which they had denied suggested design until the simulation hypothesis came along. Neil deGrasse Tyson is one such example.

Comments

F/N: On possible vs actualised worlds and contingent beings. The first two differ and this affects the last. It is for argument possible that in all worlds God may will that some x exist, but it is also possible that he wills that in at least one, x does not exist providing x is contingent. God, presumably being free to so decide in respect of a contingent being. I think that a being that God wills to exist in all worlds that are possible [as opposed to actualised] is in reality another rather roundabout way of saying a necessary being. But, I confess to being rather busy locally now. KF PS: I have pointed to the necessary contingency of anything made up of assembled components down to atoms, i.e. not being assembled implies not existing. And it is obvious that if something is formed form such parts, it is possible for parts to be either assembled or not assembled. PPS: A possible world is probably best conceived of as a reasonably complete in principle coherent description of a feasible state of affairs in a world. Whether the world is in thought or computer simulation or on the ground is immaterial to what such talk enables. NBs will be in all possible worlds, being connected to the framework for any world to exist. CB's will exist in some but not in other "neighbouring" ones. Recall, some possible worlds are radically different from our familiar one.kairosfocus_{September 8, 2016
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HeKS,
Ok, but then we need to define what you actually mean by “some physical object”. Do you merely mean that it is possible that there is some macro description of a particular object that could be actualized in every possible world? If that is the only requirement, then the identification of the object across possible worlds would be purely superficial. It would not be the same object as it would not be made of exactly the same particles in every possible world. If it is made of the very same particles in every possible world then that could not happen by chance but would require some agent capable of choosing to identify a particular set of particles that will come into existence and using those particular particles to make a particular object at some point in the history of the world it creates regardless of what else happens to be true in the world. So, yes, a physical object could conceivably exist in every possible world, but only as the creative product of a being like God.
I don't have a good answer to this now. Obviously I would want the "configurations" of all these instances of the "same" object to be as similar as possible. So much so that identical measurements of each pen (say) would yield the exact same result. In principle of course, since all but one don't actually exist. On the other hand, we were talking about possible worlds in which Obama lost, served one term, and served two terms, so I assume we are able to identify the three Obamas in those three possible worlds as the "same" somehow.daveS_{September 8, 2016
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HeKS,
Ok, we have to clarify something here. What do you mean when you say (or think I say) that “a particular possible world exists”. I hope you realize that nobody is saying these other “possible worlds” actually exist out there somewhere.
Yes, I take it nobody here holds that view.
A “possible world” is merely a logically coherent description of how the world could be/have been, with only one “possible world” describing the actual world that exists. So, for example, there is a possible world in which Obama was never elected President.
The key words are "logically coherent". If Obama were never elected, then that sets in motion a whole cascade of changes if you will, and it's not clear to me it's possible to make all these changes to arrive at this possible world without running into contradictions. How do we know that this possible world is not self-contradictory? I would ask the same about any other possible world which is not the actual world.
BTW, if you need to postulate the existence of God in order avoid the possibility of falsifying the idea that your pen might be a necessary being, how does that help you?
Well, it might be the truth (although I the chances are slim I believe).daveS_{September 8, 2016
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daveS,
I do concede this; however I made up this scenario purely as an attempt to show how some physical object may exist in every possible world.
Ok, but then we need to define what you actually mean by "some physical object". Do you merely mean that it is possible that there is some macro description of a particular object that could be actualized in every possible world? If that is the only requirement, then the identification of the object across possible worlds would be purely superficial. It would not be the same object as it would not be made of exactly the same particles in every possible world. If it is made of the very same particles in every possible world then that could not happen by chance but would require some agent capable of choosing to identify a particular set of particles that will come into existence and using those particular particles to make a particular object at some point in the history of the world it creates regardless of what else happens to be true in the world. So, yes, a physical object could conceivably exist in every possible world, but only as the creative product of a being like God.HeKS_{September 8, 2016
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daveS,
If you say that a particular possible world exists, can you prove so?
Ok, we have to clarify something here. What do you mean when you say (or think I say) that "a particular possible world exists". I hope you realize that nobody is saying these other "possible worlds" actually exist out there somewhere. A "possible world" is merely a logically coherent description of how the world could be/have been, with only one "possible world" describing the actual world that exists. So, for example, there is a possible world in which Obama was never elected President. There is another possible world in which he was only elected for one term. There is another possible world in which he was elected for two terms. The third of these possible worlds corresponds to the actual world that exists. The other two are logically possible ways the world might have turned out. That, however, is not a claim there exists an actual world out there somewhere in which Obama was never elected president. So I really don't know what you mean when you seem to think that I'm "asserting that this or that possible world definitely exists, without some support". The only support I need to establish that some particular possible world exists is the fact that that possible world is not logically incoherent. This does not mean that the particular possible world is actualized out there somewhere. It only means that it is a logically coherent description of how a "world" could conceivably be. The existence of a universe that is the size of a single atom at some point in its history is logically possible and so there is a "possible world" in which the universe is the size of a single atom at some point in its history. The mere fact that this is logically coherent rules out the possibility of something like a pen being a necessary being like God, because there's a logically possible description of reality that does not even allow for the existence of a pen, much less require the existence of a pen for the possibility of its own existence. BTW, if you need to postulate the existence of God in order avoid the possibility of falsifying the idea that your pen might be a necessary being, how does that help you?HeKS_{September 8, 2016
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PS:
In any case, you want a proof that your pen is not a necessary being in the same sense as God?
I do concede this; however I made up this scenario purely as an attempt to show how some physical object may exist in every possible world.daveS_{September 8, 2016
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HeKS,
I’m growing ever more confused about what you’re trying to achieve here. All you’re saying here is that you don’t accept the basis and the business of modal logic. If you want to proceed on the premise that the actual world, in its descriptions at all possible times, is the only possible world then there is no point talking about possible worlds or beings that exist in or are necessary to every possible world. Instead you have moved into the realm of nomological determinism and/or neccessitarianism.
Eh? I don't reject modal logic at all. It could be the case that the actual world is the only possible world, correct? Some people hold that view. What I'm questioning is the practice of asserting that this or that possible world definitely exists, without some support (or proof, really, since this whole discussion I was having with KF concerns things that can be proved). If you say that a particular possible world exists, can you prove so?
Of course, under this view, your pen would not simply be an unobtrusive object that for some utterly unknown reason might be necessary to the existence of reality while being surrounded by other mundane and contingent objects. Instead, everything would be “necessary” in the sense that it would be impossible for anything to have turned out any other way than it has. Of course, your pen would still be contingent in the sense that its existence would be impossible in the absence of its larger physical context.
I would agree up to the last sentence. Now regarding that last sentence, the absence of the larger physical context would itself be impossible, so the pen could not not exist (both "nots" intended there), so I think some would still call it a necessary being. I understand that you and many others would not.
In any case, you want a proof that your pen is not a necessary being in the same sense as God? It’s actually quite simple. Pick it up and try to break or cut it in half. If you succeed in breaking it, altering it or damaging it in any way and reality does not come to an end then you have proved conclusively that it is not a necessary being, since you will have proved that the existence of reality does not depend on your pen existing in its intact state and that logic does not require the pen to exist in a constant state of being.
An instant before I break it, God transports the pen to some other location in the universe, leaving me to break an exact duplicate. I'm sure you will say this is absurd, but can you actually disprove it? Note that I cannot use these admittedly ridiculous (but possible, given a sufficiently powerful God) scenarios to "unprove" a mathematical theorem. The Borde-Guth-Vilenkin singularity theorem has (I trust) been proved, and that's the end of the story. I can't postulate some bizarre physical happening and defeat it.daveS_{September 8, 2016
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daveS,
Specifically, how do we know that there are any possible worlds aside from the actual one? Obviously I can conceive of a possible world in which a particular pen on my desk is blue rather than black, but how do I really know that world is possible? It might be that the only possible way the world could unfold is to have a black pen on my desk at this particular point in its history.
I'm growing ever more confused about what you're trying to achieve here. All you're saying here is that you don't accept the basis and the business of modal logic. If you want to proceed on the premise that the actual world, in its descriptions at all possible times, is the only possible world then there is no point talking about possible worlds or beings that exist in or are necessary to every possible world. Instead you have moved into the realm of nomological determinism and/or neccessitarianism. Of course, under this view, your pen would not simply be an unobtrusive object that for some utterly unknown reason might be necessary to the existence of reality while being surrounded by other mundane and contingent objects. Instead, everything would be "necessary" in the sense that it would be impossible for anything to have turned out any other way than it has. Of course, your pen would still be contingent in the sense that its existence would be impossible in the absence of its larger physical context. In any case, you want a proof that your pen is not a necessary being in the same sense as God? It's actually quite simple. Pick it up and try to break or cut it in half. If you succeed in breaking it, altering it or damaging it in any way and reality does not come to an end then you have proved conclusively that it is not a necessary being, since you will have proved that the existence of reality does not depend on your pen existing in its intact state and that logic does not require the pen to exist in a constant state of being.HeKS_{September 8, 2016
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HeKS,
Our universe is constantly expanding. A second ago it was quite a bit smaller than it is now. A second from now it will be quite a bit bigger. The size has changed significantly since the expansion of the universe was discovered. This tells us that there is no specific size that a universe must be in order for a possible world to exist. There is also no physical law that would require a universe to be larger than, say, an atom, in order for a physical reality to exist. A universe that is no larger than an atom does not entail any logical contradictions. As such, there is a possible world (and our actual world seems to be such a world) in which the universe is no larger than an atom at some point in time. This means there is a possible world in which there is a point in time during which a pen could not exist. Therefore, a pen cannot be a necessary being.
I would call that a convincing argument based on the available empirical evidence and current knowledge of the laws of physics. I would not call that a proof, but people in the empirical sciences are not in the business of proving statements about the physical world (although they can certainly prove mathematical theorems as part of their work). Does that seem reasonable to you? Regarding the last three paragraphs, there are a number of assertions there which I think can be (and are) debated. For example, how do we know this is true:
Any physical object composed of physical components need not be composed exactly as it is, especially at the micro scale. An object that might look identical at the macro scale could be composed of different atoms in different possible worlds. Also, no particular assembly of specific atoms or physical parts is logically necessary for a world to exist. As such, there will be some logically possible world in which that object either doesn’t exist at all or is at least composed of different particles.
Specifically, how do we know that there are any possible worlds aside from the actual one? Obviously I can conceive of a possible world in which a particular pen on my desk is blue rather than black, but how do I really know that world is possible? It might be that the only possible way the world could unfold is to have a black pen on my desk at this particular point in its history. I do think how we define a particular physical being could cause trouble for me (is the pen on my desk really a being, as it changes over time?). Perhaps I would have to resort to saying that there is only one being (the actual world in totality, over all time). That would dispose of my pen illustration, I suppose. Anyway, it seems to me there are quite a few questions that your argument raises.daveS_{September 8, 2016
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daveS,
So physicists have these models, which are known to be flawed. Can they really claim to “prove” anything about what the universe looked like in the first milliseconds after the Big Bang?
Fine, let's set aside the theorem for the moment and consider the logical outcome of currently observable empirical facts. Our universe is constantly expanding. A second ago it was quite a bit smaller than it is now. A second from now it will be quite a bit bigger. The size has changed significantly since the expansion of the universe was discovered. This tells us that there is no specific size that a universe must be in order for a possible world to exist. There is also no physical law that would require a universe to be larger than, say, an atom, in order for a physical reality to exist. A universe that is no larger than an atom does not entail any logical contradictions. As such, there is a possible world (and our actual world seems to be such a world) in which the universe is no larger than an atom at some point in time. This means there is a possible world in which there is a point in time during which a pen could not exist. Therefore, a pen cannot be a necessary being.
I will say that if KF agrees with you in that a contingent being could still exist in all possible worlds, then the line I was pursuing with the pen is moot. However, reading KF’s #106 above:
By definition, contingent beings are possible but not necessary so they will be in at least one world, Wn, but not in at least a “neighbouring” one, Wm.
it looks like he’s using the same definition as me? Perhaps KF and I stand together on this one? :-)
We can wait and see what KF says, but I suspect that KF was merely not accounting for the type of scenario I described, as his statement would generally be true in a practical sense. Any physical object composed of physical components need not be composed exactly as it is, especially at the micro scale. An object that might look identical at the macro scale could be composed of different atoms in different possible worlds. Also, no particular assembly of specific atoms or physical parts is logically necessary for a world to exist. As such, there will be some logically possible world in which that object either doesn't exist at all or is at least composed of different particles. The only exception is if an actually necessary being responsible for the creation of any possible world 1) makes the choice that it will create some particular physical object in any world it creates and will do so out of some particular selection of particles, and 2) has the ability to select and bring together that particular set of particles in any possible world. Such an object would exist in every possible world, but it would be contingent upon the choice of an actually necessary being, as well as upon its own larger physical context (space, time, physical laws, etc.). And so, interestingly, the existence of a physical object composed of identical particles in every possible world would point to the existence of a personal (and seemingly omniscient and omnipotent) necessary being at the root of all possible realities, as nothing else could guarantee the existence in every possible world of something that is not required by logic to exist in every possible world.HeKS_{September 8, 2016
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HeKS,
With respect to your last point about Carroll, please note that I did not use the BGV Theorem in this case to prove that the universe had an absolute beginning (which is something that Carroll would very much like not to be true). Rather, I used it simply to prove that our universe necessarily reduces to a singularity at some point in the past, and not even Carroll would disagree with this. Carroll would simply appeal to a prior quantum regime.
Yes, sorry, I got that mixed up.
As a further point of interest, the Wall Theorem shows that even a quantum regime would have a beginning, and is therefore essentially to Quantum Physics what the BGV is to Classical Physics. You can read a post by Wall here where he explains why Carroll’s appeals to an eternal quantum regime are really unfounded and continue into the comments to see where he mentions his Theorem. With respect to theorems, they are considered to be proofs. If you don’t want to accept that they are proofs, fine, but then what are you even talking about when you ask for a proof? You’re rejecting theorems as a proof and you’re rejecting logical and definitional proofs, so really, what on earth can you be looking for?
Theorems are indeed things that have been proved, but in these cases, they are statements about mathematical models which are provisional and in fact believed to be imperfect. The models are approximations only. That's all I'm saying. So physicists have these models, which are known to be flawed. Can they really claim to "prove" anything about what the universe looked like in the first milliseconds after the Big Bang?
With respect to the meaning of “necessary being”, it doesn’t matter if some people define the term simply as something that exists in all possible worlds. That is a lazy and incomplete definition, regardless of the source. Any definition of “necessary being” that fails to account for the necessity of the being is an obviously incomplete and unhelpful definition. If you want to use that definition because you find it helpful to your cause, you are free to do that, but then you are speaking of a different and lesser kind of “necessary” being than God is said to be, so I’m not sure why anyone should care whether or not it’s possible for your pen to be a Nezasary Being™ that might exist contingently in every possible world. Maybe yes, maybe no, but what does that have to do with anything and why should I care?
I will say that if KF agrees with you in that a contingent being could still exist in all possible worlds, then the line I was pursuing with the pen is moot. However, reading KF's #106 above:
By definition, contingent beings are possible but not necessary so they will be in at least one world, Wn, but not in at least a “neighbouring” one, Wm.
it looks like he's using the same definition as me? Perhaps KF and I stand together on this one? :-)daveS_{September 8, 2016
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Looking beyond space and time to cope with quantum theory – 29 October 2012 Excerpt: “Our result gives weight to the idea that quantum correlations somehow arise from outside spacetime, in the sense that no story in space and time can describe them,” http://www.quantumlah.org/highlight/121029_hidden_influences.php Quantum correlations do not imply instant causation – August 12, 2016 Excerpt: A research team led by a Heriot-Watt scientist has shown that the universe is even weirder than had previously been thought. In 2015 the universe was officially proven to be weird. After many decades of research, a series of experiments showed that distant, entangled objects can seemingly interact with each other through what Albert Einstein famously dismissed as “Spooky action at a distance”. A new experiment by an international team led by Heriot-Watt’s Dr Alessandro Fedrizzi has now found that the universe is even weirder than that: entangled objects do not cause each other to behave the way they do. http://phys.org/news/2016-08-quantum-imply-instant-causation.html Experimental test of nonlocal causality – August 10, 2016 DISCUSSION Previous work on causal explanations beyond local hidden-variable models focused on testing Leggett’s crypto-nonlocality (7, 42, 43), a class of models with a very specific choice of hidden variable that is unrelated to Bell’s local causality (44). In contrast, we make no assumptions on the form of the hidden variable and test all models ,,, Our results demonstrate that a causal influence from one measurement outcome to the other, which may be subluminal, superluminal, or even instantaneous, cannot explain the observed correlations.,,, http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/2/8/e1600162.full Physicists find extreme violation of local realism in quantum hypergraph states - Lisa Zyga - March 4, 2016 Excerpt: Many quantum technologies rely on quantum states that violate local realism, which means that they either violate locality (such as when entangled particles influence each other from far away) or realism (the assumption that quantum states have well-defined properties, independent of measurement), or possibly both. Violation of local realism is one of the many counterintuitive, yet experimentally supported, characteristics of the quantum world. Determining whether or not multiparticle quantum states violate local realism can be challenging. Now in a new paper, physicists have shown that a large family of multiparticle quantum states called hypergraph states violates local realism in many ways. The results suggest that these states may serve as useful resources for quantum technologies, such as quantum computers and detecting gravitational waves.,,, The physicists also showed that the greater the number of particles in a quantum hypergraph state, the more strongly it violates local realism, with the strength increasing exponentially with the number of particles. In addition, even if a quantum hypergraph state loses one of its particles, it continues to violate local realism. This robustness to particle loss is in stark contrast to other types of quantum states, which no longer violate local realism if they lose a particle. This property is particularly appealing for applications, since it might allow for more noise in experiments. http://phys.org/news/2016-03-physicists-extreme-violation-local-realism.html
bornagain77_{September 8, 2016
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HeKS thanks for the Wall cite. This may interest you as well:
The Universe Is Not Eternal - Johanan Raatz - March 1, 2014 Excerpt: Carroll pointed out that the BVG theorem only works within relativity but does not take quantum effects into account. Given a lack of a complete theory of quantum gravity, he argued that Craig can not claim that the universe began to exist. Though this is partly true, it turns out we are not completely in the dark. One thing known for certain about quantum gravity is something called the holographic principle. Precisely put, the holographic principle tells us that the entropy of a region of space (measured in terms of information) is directly proportional to a quarter of its surface area. The volume of this region is then actually a hologram of this information on its surface. Except this tells us something interesting about the universe as well. Entropy, or the amount of disorder present, always increases with time. In fact not only is this law inviolate, it is also how the flow of time is defined. Without entropy, there is no way to discern forwards and backwards in time. But if the holographic principle links the universe’s entropy and its horizon area then going back in time, all of space-time eventually vanishes to nothing at zero entropy. Thus Carroll’s argument is unsound. We already have enough knowledge about what happens beyond the BVG theorem that Craig cites. The universe is not eternal but created. It is interesting to note that this also undermines claims made by atheists like Hawking and Krauss that the universe could have fluctuated into existence from nothing. Their argument rests on the assumption that there was a pre-existent zero-point field or ZPF. The only trouble is that the physics of a ZPF requires a space-time to exist in. No space-time means no zero-point field, and without a zero-point field, the universe can not spontaneously fluctuate into existence. http://blog.proof.directory/2014/03/01/universe-not-eternal/
Personally, I find it rather strange that atheists would even appeal to quantum mechanics in the first place to try to save their Nihilism from a beginning for the universe. Quantum Mechanics has certainly not been very friendly to the overriding reductive materialistic presuppositions of atheists in the past and is almost certainly not going to be kind to their atheistic materialistic druthers in the future.
Quantum Physics Debunks Materialism https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4C5pq7W5yRM&list=PL1mr9ZTZb3TViAqtowpvZy5PZpn-MoSK_&index=2 Niels Bohr, who was awarded the 1922 Nobel Prize in physics for his application of quantum theory to atomic and molecular structure, expressed it this way: “Everything we call real is made up of things that cannot be regarded as real. If quantum mechanics hasn’t profoundly shocked you, you haven’t understood it yet.” The key here is the realization that when we simply observe light, electrons, even small molecules or viruses in the double-slit experiment, it determines whether you get a particulate or a wave pattern. This scientifically falsifies • Materialism – All that exists is matter and energy and the rearrangements of it. (extreme realism) • Realism – A physical reality exists independent of observation. • Naïve Realism — Reality exists independent of observation, just that our perceptions are just a representation of something actually there. (Falsified by QM experiments in 2011, 2012) And it leaves us with only two other options: • Idealism – Reality is a mental construct, and doesn’t exist independent of observation. • Solipsism – The extreme skeptical version of idealism, which claims that only your mind exists and anything outside of it is an illusion. Take your pick! - UD blogger Molecular Biology - 19th Century Materialism meets 21st Century Quantum Mechanics https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rCs3WXHqOv8
bornagain77_{September 8, 2016
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daveS,
KF: Do you agree with HeKS that a being can exist in all possible worlds yet not be necessary?
Simple logic establishes this to be true and I've already shown that. An actually necessary being like God could decide that at some point in time in the world it creates it will also create a particular object regardless of what other facts obtain in the world. In such a case, the object would exist in every possible world but would be contingent as it would exist as a result of God's will rather than because no world could exist without out. It would also further be contingent upon matter, space, time, physical laws, etc. There is nothing about the mere fact of existing in every possible world, in and of itself, that makes something's existence necessary.HeKS_{September 8, 2016
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daveS, With respect to your last point about Carroll, please note that I did not use the BGV Theorem in this case to prove that the universe had an absolute beginning (which is something that Carroll would very much like not to be true). Rather, I used it simply to prove that our universe necessarily reduces to a singularity at some point in the past, and not even Carroll would disagree with this. Carroll would simply appeal to a prior quantum regime. As a further point of interest, the Wall Theorem shows that even a quantum regime would have a beginning, and is therefore essentially to Quantum Physics what the BGV is to Classical Physics. You can read a post by Wall here where he explains why Carroll's appeals to an eternal quantum regime are really unfounded and continue into the comments to see where he mentions his Theorem. With respect to theorems, they are considered to be proofs. If you don't want to accept that they are proofs, fine, but then what are you even talking about when you ask for a proof? You're rejecting theorems as a proof and you're rejecting logical and definitional proofs, so really, what on earth can you be looking for? With respect to the meaning of "necessary being", it doesn't matter if some people define the term simply as something that exists in all possible worlds. That is a lazy and incomplete definition, regardless of the source. Any definition of "necessary being" that fails to account for the necessity of the being is an obviously incomplete and unhelpful definition. If you want to use that definition because you find it helpful to your cause, you are free to do that, but then you are speaking of a different and lesser kind of "necessary" being than God is said to be, so I'm not sure why anyone should care whether or not it's possible for your pen to be a Nezasary Being™ that might exist contingently in every possible world. Maybe yes, maybe no, but what does that have to do with anything and why should I care?HeKS_{September 8, 2016
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KF: Do you agree with HeKS that a being can exist in all possible worlds yet not be necessary?daveS_{September 8, 2016
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HeKS,
Well, a theorem is a result that has been proved to be true on the basis of other facts already known to be true.
Theorems are proved on the basis of axioms; whether those axioms are true or not is a separate issue. This theorem concerns a mathematical model of the universe, and not necessarily the actual universe itself.
If you’re going to reject sound argument and even discount a proof then I’m not sure what I can do to help you here.
I don't doubt that as a mathematical theorem, it is correct. But as I said above, it's a proof about a mathematical model, in fact one which is believed to be incomplete.
Notice the “therefore”? The primary characteristic that defines a necessary being is the reason that it exists in all possible worlds, which is its logical necessity. Merely existing in all possible worlds says nothing about necessity.
Some use the definition I referred to, for example Peter van Inwagen in Metaphysics, page 138:
A necessary being is simply a being that possesses necessary existence. But we may define this concept very simply in terms of the concept of a possible world: a necessary being is a being that exists in all possible worlds (and necessary existence is the property of existing in all possible worlds).
I now understand that some (e.g., Michael Griffin in Leibniz, God and Necessity) disagree this is the correct definition, but it is used: :
In contemporary philosophy of religion, versions of the ontological argument that appeal to modal notions, and make use of the semantic apparatus of possible worlds, are seen to hold the most promise. In particular, the possible worlds apparatus is seen as elucidating the concept of a necessary being, which is central to the ontological arguments of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz. The latter idea can be expressed by saying that a necessary being is one which exists in all possible worlds. One of the results of my study is that the modal semantics used in contemporary ontological arguments does not adequately capture the reasoning of early modern philosophers, nor can it adequately express what they meant by saying that God is a necessary being. This is because the modal semantics used in contemporary ontological arguments is mute with respect to the question of what makes a necessary being necessary. Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz all hold that something can exist in all possible worlds without being a necessary being, in the sense of the ontological argument.
HeKS:
I have to insist that you are mistaken. The term “necessary being” actually means something. There is nothing about the definition of a pen that permits identification as necessary being. Nothing that exists within a larger context can even possibly be a necessary being as it is necessarily contingent upon its context. This is true whether the context is space, or time, or constraining laws, or variable motion, or probabilistic outcomes, or creative agency, or anything else. If you want to continue saying that none of this serves as a legitimate proof that your pen is not a necessary being then all you’re really saying is that you’re using an idiosyncratic definition of “necessary being” that is ultimately irrelevant to the actual concept of necessary being. You’re free to do that if you like, but then what is the point of this discussion?
Whether it's idiosyncratic or not, I don't know. I suppose I should ask KF his opinion, since our discussion is where this issue arose. In any case, the point as I see it, is to be clear on whether we are talking about actual proofs or "just" convincing arguments. Edit: From Sean Carroll's blog (not exactly a disinterested party, I know):
Craig quotes (misleadingly) a recent paper by Audrey Mithani and Alex Vilenkin, which concludes by saying “Did the universe have a beginning? At this point, it seems that the answer to this question is probably yes.”
Note the "probably".daveS_{September 8, 2016
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Hi KF, I'm getting the sense from this discussion that daveS is having a hard time wrapping his head around the concept of what a necessary being actually is, because the proposition that a pen might be a necessary being is not just implausible, it is incoherent.HeKS_{September 8, 2016
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HeKS, Thanks. I have pointed out how NBs are independent of on/off enabling causal factors [possible beings subject to such are contingent], and that they will be framework entities for a world -- any feasible/ possible world -- to exist. This is of course tantamount to, once a world exists then a NB exists; indeed the set of NBs. This world exists, so the suite of NBs exists. A serious candidate NB will be either logically impossible (square circle stuff) or actual. A pen, by definition is material and composite. Considering that a possible world is a logically possible and in principle elaborated descriptions of feasible states of affairs for a world, once something comprises components down to atoms etc, it is possible in world Wa for it to be assembled, and in world Wb for it to be not. Wb does not have to be instantiated, just feasible of instantiation. By definition, contingent beings are possible but not necessary so they will be in at least one world, Wn, but not in at least a "neighbouring" one, Wm. The simplest contrast is, assembly vs non-assembly of the components. As a direct result, no material entity is necessary. Serious NB candidates are things like critical, necessarily so abstract phenomena, quantities, propositions and minds. These entities will be without beginning or possibility of end. God, notoriously, is a serious candidate, and is either impossible [as a square circle is] or actual. And we can rest assured there is no serious argument that God as understood under generic ethical theism, is impossible as a square circle is impossible. Atheists have a major challenge of warrant, which is unmet and has no serious prospects of ever being met. We can take this as in effect some of the meat behind say, the declaration in Rom 1 that from our inner constitution and that of our world the reality of an Eternal, Divine Creator and Good Moral Governor is so patent that it requires suppression to deny it. That in-a-nutshell was penned by one of the top 20 minds of our civilisation, indeed the often unacknowledged synthesiser of the heritage of Jerusalem, Athens and Rome that created Western Civilisation as we have known it. KFkairosfocus_{September 8, 2016
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daveS,
But of course it’s derived based on certain premises, which may or may not be true.
Well, a theorem is a result that has been proved to be true on the basis of other facts already known to be true. Your characterization of a theorem seems to recast it as a theory, but they are not the same thing. If you don't want to consider a theorem to be a proof when that is precisely what a theorem, in a strict sense, is considered to be, then there really is no point in you asking for a proof. Interestingly, Vilenkin himself made the following statement:
"It is said that an argument is what convinces reasonable men and a proof is what it takes to convince even an unreasonable man."
If you're going to reject sound argument and even discount a proof then I'm not sure what I can do to help you here.
HeKS: With this whole pen thing, it seems like you have confused necessary with ubiquitous. Even if we allow for the sake of argument that your pen exists in all possible worlds, that doesn’t make it a necessary being. Something could happen to exist in every possible world and still be contingent.
Well, I think at least some people define “necessary being” that way. A little googling reveals several instances of that usage. On the other hand, perhaps there are good reasons not to insist that beings which exist in every possible world are necessary.
Google "necessary being" and this is what comes up as the definition:
logical necessity: a logically necessary being is a being whose non-existence is a logical impossibility, and which therefore exists either timeless or eternally in all possible worlds.
Notice the "therefore"? The primary characteristic that defines a necessary being is the reason that it exists in all possible worlds, which is its logical necessity. Merely existing in all possible worlds says nothing about necessity. For example, say your pen exists in every possible world because God chooses (for some unknown reason) to create your pen in every possible world. The pen, in spite of existing in every possible world, would be contingent, not necessary. It would exist because God chooses to create it, even if he decides he would do so in every possible world. There is nothing about the pen that makes its existence logically necessary, so that it would be logically impossible for any possible world to exist without the pen existing.
HeKS: You haven’t offered any coherent reason (or actually any reason at all that I’ve seen) for why a particular pen might be necessary in every possible world. Simply postulating a hypothetical object that happens to exist in every possible world doesn’t magically make the hypothetical object a necessary being.
I agree, but that’s because I don’t think the burden is on me to do so. I’m merely saying that there is as yet no proof on the table that my pen is not a necessary being.
I have to insist that you are mistaken. The term "necessary being" actually means something. There is nothing about the definition of a pen that permits identification as necessary being. Nothing that exists within a larger context can even possibly be a necessary being as it is necessarily contingent upon its context. This is true whether the context is space, or time, or constraining laws, or variable motion, or probabilistic outcomes, or creative agency, or anything else. If you want to continue saying that none of this serves as a legitimate proof that your pen is not a necessary being then all you're really saying is that you're using an idiosyncratic definition of "necessary being" that is ultimately irrelevant to the actual concept of necessary being. You're free to do that if you like, but then what is the point of this discussion?HeKS_{September 7, 2016
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HeKS, Thanks for bringing the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin singularity theorem to my attention. I'd never heard of it before. But of course it's derived based on certain premises, which may or may not be true. Furthermore, in that whole series of threads on an infinite past, I was only debating arguments dealing with pure mathematics, not those based on empirical science. I have not yet seen a convincing mathematical proof that the past is finite.
With this whole pen thing, it seems like you have confused necessary with ubiquitous. Even if we allow for the sake of argument that your pen exists in all possible worlds, that doesn’t make it a necessary being. Something could happen to exist in every possible world and still be contingent.
Well, I think at least some people define "necessary being" that way. A little googling reveals several instances of that usage. On the other hand, perhaps there are good reasons not to insist that beings which exist in every possible world are necessary.
You haven’t offered any coherent reason (or actually any reason at all that I’ve seen) for why a particular pen might be necessary in every possible world. Simply postulating a hypothetical object that happens to exist in every possible world doesn’t magically make the hypothetical object a necessary being.
I agree, but that's because I don't think the burden is on me to do so. I'm merely saying that there is as yet no proof on the table that my pen is not a necessary being.daveS_{September 7, 2016
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daveS, I'm not sure if I've missed something here, but I'm I don't really know what your point is with respect to this pen, or what you're looking for exactly, but let me address your comments to me:
I agree with this, but I’m talking about an alleged proof that my pen is not a necessary being, and once we start including steps such as “there seems to be no reason to think” such and such, we’re now engaging in a plausibility argument. I fully accept that it’s plausible (and I think very likely) that my pen is actually not a necessary being, so I don’t have any disagreement with this. Now if it had merely been claimed that we have an argument, convincing beyond any reasonable doubt, that my pen is not a necessary being, I would have agreed. I hope I’ve been clear here that I’m interpreting the word “proof” strictly.
I structured my last response to you in a way that tried to respect certain things that I know, from past conversations, you do not necessarily accept, such as the impossibility of an infinite temporal past. That said, I consider it an obvious and logically necessary conclusion that it is impossible for there to have been an infinite temporal past, and I consider your failure to accept that as an incomprehensible failure of logic on your part. As such, if we set aside your failure to accept the impossibility of an infinite temporal past then that same impossibility constitutes a proof that a pen cannot be a necessary being. But even absent the logical impossibility of an infinite past, there's another proof based on what we currently observe to be happening in our universe, which is that it is expanding. This is an empirical fact, not simply a theory. With this empirical fact in hand we can turn to the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin Theorem, which tells us that any universe that, on average, is expanding must be geodesically incomplete. A theorem, as I'm sure you know (and perhaps better than I, since as I've said here many times, I'm not a math person), is a legitimate proof and not simply a theory. Now, even if one wants to try to avoid the conclusion that the universe had an absolute beginning or that it was preceded by some quantum regime, they still cannot avoid the conclusion that our very own universe necessarily reduces to a singularity as we move backwards into the past, as per the BGV Theorem. This fact alone serves as a proof that a pen cannot be a necessary being because there was definitely a time in our own universe where a pen could not have existed, and so we know that no pen could exist at all times in all possible worlds. All that having been said, I made a point that you didn't address at all. I said:
Theists deduce the existence of God as a logically necessary being that must exist in order to ground observed physical reality, objective moral values and duties, and actual (as opposed to illusory) mental consciousness. Theists consider God to be the ultimate and necessary explanation for existence who must exist in all possible worlds.... [Y]ou haven’t offered any reason why we would be forced to deduce that [your pen] must exist in every possible world and therefore be a necessary being.
With this whole pen thing, it seems like you have confused necessary with ubiquitous. Even if we allow for the sake of argument that your pen exists in all possible worlds, that doesn't make it a necessary being. Something could happen to exist in every possible world and still be contingent. You haven't offered any coherent reason (or actually any reason at all that I've seen) for why a particular pen might be necessary in every possible world. Simply postulating a hypothetical object that happens to exist in every possible world doesn't magically make the hypothetical object a necessary being. Take care, HeKSHeKS_{September 7, 2016
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DS, no, it is a propositional statement closely tied to the concepts of possible worlds and contingent beings. KFkairosfocus_{September 6, 2016
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KF,
DS, observe, component parts of a composite entity — where, atoms count as components, not just sub assemblies — patently may not be assembled. That is feasible. They may also be assembled. That too is feasible.
This is an assertion. One which I would accept as being true beyond a reasonable doubt (at least in instances such as pens), but an assertion nonetheless.daveS_{September 6, 2016
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DS, observe, component parts of a composite entity -- where, atoms count as components, not just sub assemblies -- patently may not be assembled. That is feasible. They may also be assembled. That too is feasible. This also shows what a contingent being is, in at least one possible world it is, in at least one other it is not. At this point the issues you are suggesting sound increasingly strained. KFkairosfocus_{September 6, 2016
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HeKS, I'll respond to the first and last paragraph first:
But think about it for second. Surely our actual world, which seems to be accurately described by the Big Bang Theory, is a possible world. And if by some crazy chance the Big Bang doesn’t describe our actual world, there seems to be no reason to think that it doesn’t describe a possible world.

So, at this point, it seems to me that we have no reason to deduce that such a necessary pen must (or even might) exist, and we can think of at least one possible world in which there is a point when the pen would not and could not exist.
I agree with this, but I'm talking about an alleged proof that my pen is not a necessary being, and once we start including steps such as "there seems to be no reason to think" such and such, we're now engaging in a plausibility argument. I fully accept that it's plausible (and I think very likely) that my pen is actually not a necessary being, so I don't have any disagreement with this. Now if it had merely been claimed that we have an argument, convincing beyond any reasonable doubt, that my pen is not a necessary being, I would have agreed. I hope I've been clear here that I'm interpreting the word "proof" strictly.
Well, we’ve been round this block before, but let me just ask you this: Is there a possible world where time and space had a beginning? Or how about even just a possible world in which space was condensed to a singularity at some time in the past?
Maybe, but I can't say for sure. Perhaps a beginning to space and time invariably leads to a logical contradiction. I really have no idea.
Well, here’s the problem: What you’re doing here is what atheists wrongly accuse theists of doing, which is simply proposing the existence of a hypothetical entity out of thin air for no apparent reason and asking others to disprove its existence and/or necessity.
I do plead guilty of proposing the existence of a hypothetical entity. But if this claimed proof actually existed, wouldn't it rule out my proposition?daveS_{September 6, 2016
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daveS,
HeKS, Those are some serious objections, but I think there are responses to at least some of them. My understanding is that we are discussing disproving that this pen is a necessary being by logic, without bringing our provisional understanding of the Big Bang, etc, into the picture.
But think about it for second. Surely our actual world, which seems to be accurately described by the Big Bang Theory, is a possible world. And if by some crazy chance the Big Bang doesn't describe our actual world, there seems to be no reason to think that it doesn't describe a possible world. That means we know of at least one possible world (which seems to be this actual world) in which there would be a point that an exhaustive description of that possible world would not and could not include the candidate pen. As such, the pen cannot be a necessary being.
Do I dare bring up the possibility that time and space do not have a beginning?
Well, we've been round this block before, but let me just ask you this: Is there a possible world where time and space had a beginning? Or how about even just a possible world in which space was condensed to a singularity at some time in the past? If so, then there was a point in a possible world when the pen could not have been in existence.
And that this pen has always been in God’s possession, and was created “outside of time”? Some believe that there is only one possible world, I take it, and it could simply be a brute fact that this pen has always existed along with God in this world.
Well, here's the problem: What you're doing here is what atheists wrongly accuse theists of doing, which is simply proposing the existence of a hypothetical entity out of thin air for no apparent reason and asking others to disprove its existence and/or necessity. Theists deduce the existence of God as a logically necessary being that must exist in order to ground observed physical reality, objective moral values and duties, and actual (as opposed to illusory) mental consciousness. Theists consider God to be the ultimate and necessary explanation for existence who must exist in all possible worlds. What you're doing is simply postulating a hypothetical object (a particular pen) that does or might exist in every possible world, but unless I've missed something you haven't offered any reason why we would be forced to deduce that it must exist in every possible world and therefore be a necessary being. So, at this point, it seems to me that we have no reason to deduce that such a necessary pen must (or even might) exist, and we can think of at least one possible world in which there is a point when the pen would not and could not exist.HeKS_{September 6, 2016
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KF, How can you be sure what is feasible and what is not? It could be that some configurations of matter which appear to be feasible to us humans actually would entail a physical impossibility in the past or future. I suspect that a world without any instances of my pen is possible, but can I prove that? I don't see how. And yes, if we consider abstract concepts to be beings, I would agree that twoness is a reasonable candidate for a necessary being.daveS_{September 6, 2016
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DS, by definition, if a candidate possible state of affairs is feasible, it exists in a possible world; at least, were that world instantiated. So, if something is made of material components from atoms upwards, there are possible worlds in which the entity is not assembled. The given possible world does not have to actually exist, all that is needed is it is feasible of existence. A necessary being, by contrast is one that no world could exist without, I have given the example of two-ness, which is connected to A vs ~A, thus first and necessary principles of reason, as well as to the wider framework of the logic of structure and quantity, aka mathematics. There is no feasible world in which two-ness will not be essentially and inextricably present. KFkairosfocus_{September 6, 2016
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HeKS, Those are some serious objections, but I think there are responses to at least some of them. My understanding is that we are discussing disproving that this pen is a necessary being by logic, without bringing our provisional understanding of the Big Bang, etc, into the picture. Do I dare bring up the possibility that time and space do not have a beginning? And that this pen has always been in God's possession, and was created "outside of time"? Some believe that there is only one possible world, I take it, and it could simply be a brute fact that this pen has always existed along with God in this world. Let me reiterate that I don't believe that this pen is a likely candidate for a necessary being. It's just that I suspect it's going to be impossible to disprove this proposition without bringing in assumptions about physics (or perhaps theology) beyond the basic definitions.daveS_{September 6, 2016
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