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Refuting Coyne’s myth: Science progresses but theology doesn’t

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In a recent post over at Why Evolution Is True, Professor Jerry Coyne repeats the tired old canard that science progresses but theology doesn’t:

When lecturing on their incompatibility, I always mention that although science has progressed enormously in the past few hundred years, theology has not. That is, we know no more about the nature or existence of God than we did in, say, 800 C.E. Hell, theologians aren’t sure whether there’s one god or many gods (as Hindus believe), or a red-horned devil, not to mention more trivial issues like whether the wine and crackers at communion are wholly Jesus’s blood and body (“transubstantiation”) or only partly Jesus’s blood and body (“consubstantiation”). The only “progress” theology has made has been forced upon it by science, which made it abandon time-honored tenets of belief like Adam and Eve, Noah’s Flood, and the Exodus. Theology is like postmodern lit-crit: it wobbles from pole to pole but never arrives anywhere…

One need consider only this: if theology has arrived at “some truth concerning the world,” then that “truth” is flatly denied by adherents of other faiths. There is in fact no unanimity among religions about how many Gods there are, what God is like, what God’s commands are, whether there’s a hell or an after life of any sort, how you get saved, whether you’re reincarnated, and so on. There are, for example, more than 34,000 denominations of Christianity alone, and that doesn’t include all those other religions. And all of them differ not only in claims about the nature of God and how one is saved, but about things like divorce, sex, gay rights, and birth control…

There is, of course, no schism like this in science, which would be pretty much a straight line. There is no Hindu science, no Muslim science, no Catholic science — there’s just science, which does apprehend real truths (albeit, of course, provisional ones), and ones agreed on by scientists of all stripes, faiths, and ethnicities.

First, Coyne is making an apples-and-oranges comparison here. Certain rules of exclusion apply within the scientific community: to borrow one of Coyne’s examples, if you question the scientific truth that the chemical formula for benzene is C6H6, you will be treated as a crank or an ignoramus, and shunned by any self-respecting scientist. The term “theology,” by contrast, is used by Coyne to include religions of all stripes. No-one can get kicked out of Coyne’s “theology” – except by becoming an atheist! So it is hardly surprising that absurd and bizarre opinions continue to proliferate within the field of “theology,” as defined by Coyne.

Second, it would have been fairer of Coyne to compare the scientific enterprise with a religion that possesses (and sometimes wields) the power to excommunicate people whose views are deemed unacceptable – because that is, after all, what the scientific establishment does. Within any given religion, one usually finds that over time, teachings do progress. To see what I mean, try comparing what the Nicene Creed defined about God in 325 A.D. with what the Fourth Lateran Council decreed in 1215 A.D., or for that matter, what the Westminster Confession declared in 1647. Within Judaism, Moses Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles of Faith, which were drawn up in the 12th century, are now widely accepted by Jews today as a fundamental statement of Jewish belief. One thousand years ago, there was no such common statement.

Third, if one looks at the world’s major religious groups, one finds that the about two-thirds of the 85% of the world’s people belong to one of the three Abrahamic faiths: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Another 15% or so of the world’s religious adherents are Hindus, most of whom believe in one ultimate Divinity, Brahman. (Coyne’s claim that Hindus are polytheists is sheer nonsense.) So if one looks at the consensus view of the majority of the world’s religious adherents, once can discern major shifts in religious opinions over the course of time.

As an example of progress in theology, I’d like to list the following propositions, which are currently accepted by a solid majority of the world’s religious adherents, but which were accepted only by a tiny minority 2,000 years ago, and by almost nobody 3,000 years ago. I invite readers to add to the list as they see fit.

1. There is one God.

2. God does not have a body or bodily passions. God is a spirit.

3. God is omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent and omnipresent. That is, God can do anything within reason; God knows everything in the past, present and future; God is compassionate and all-merciful; and God’s power extends throughout the cosmos.

4. God is infinite.

5. God is immutable. God does not change.

6. God is not capricious.

7. God is the sole Creator and Sustainer of the universe. Everything in the cosmos is upheld by God’s command.

8. God is not a blind force, but a personal Deity. God has a personal relationship with each and every individual.

9. God is just. God rewards the good and punishes the wicked.

10. God is merciful. God is always ready to pardon a repentant sinner.

11. God is impartial. Distinctions of rank, race, sex, color or creed mean nothing to God. All individuals are equal in God’s sight.

12. God disapproves of the deliberate killing of innocent people.

13. God disapproves of infanticide.

14. God disapproves of killing girls.

15. God disapproves of euthanasia. In particular, God disapproves of killing the sick and elderly.

16. God disapproves of suicide.

17. God disapproves of ritual human sacrifices.

18. God disapproves of slavery.

19. God disapproves of domestic violence.

20. God disapproves of child abuse.

21. God disapproves of cruelty to animals.

22. God disapproves of compulsion in matters of religion.

23. God expects us to treat others as we would like them to treat us.

24. God expects us to bury our dead, instead of leaving their corpses lying in the street to be eaten by animals.

25. God expects us to not only be faithful to our spouses, but to love them as well.

26. God expects us to educate our children, both boys and girls.

27. God expects us to be honest and truthful in our dealings with friend and foe alike.

28. God expects us to be kind to strangers.

29. God expects us to help the poor, sick and needy.

30. God expects us to donate money to charity.

31. People who die in a state of friendship with God will enjoy happiness in Heaven with God for all eternity.

32. There will be a future resurrection of the dead and judgment will be pronounced on every human being.

33. God has at various times spoken to the human race through various prophets. God has communicated messages to these prophets, not only about God’s nature, but also about our duties to others.

=================================================

Most of the world’s religious people living today believe in the above propositions. The proportion of people who believed in these propositions 3,000, 2,000 or even 1,000 years ago was much smaller than it is now. I’d call that progress. Wouldn’t you?

And now, four questions for Professor Coyne.

First, can you name even ONE scientist who was instrumental in getting large numbers of people to accept any of the ethical propositions listed above?

Second, do scientists have an agreed position on things like “divorce, sex, gay rights, and birth control,” to quote from your own list?

Third, is there a scientific method for reaching agreement on ethical matters?

Fourth, are there any ethical facts? (If I understand Coyne correctly, his answer to the last question is negative.)

Comments
KN:
What I find intriguing here isn’t just that one could endorse this alongside everything in evolutionary theory...
I think it would make more sense than writing a book on the origin of species while denying that there is any such thing as a species. :)
...but also that one could endorse this without anything like theism.
One has to wonder whether Aristotelianism would be more acceptable if it were divorced from theism. While I obviously accept theism, that's one idea I am trying to explore. By the way, your earlier comment about an unpulled puller has obvious parallels in Christianity. There are a number of Christian authors who write on this. God as a "puller." But from Scripture alone we have the obvious: "Author and Finisher of our faith." "Alpha and Omega, the Beginning and the End"Mung
January 29, 2013
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Teleology is not an ideology, a superstition, a fallacy, a faith, or a projection, but a fact. We observe that every visible thing in nature acts for an end (final causality) and according to its essence or distinctive nature (formal causality). Birds grow wings and fly; fish grow fins and swim. Even chemicals act for ends: water freezes at 32F. If there were no end-directed, end-determined action, things would act randomly. They do not. Therefore there is. Kreeft, Peter. Summa Philosophica
Mung
January 29, 2013
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This is interesting:
As to the suggestion that “there is no static 'Form', because life is constantly and mindlessly changing,” this sort of talk, though also very common, is just muddleheaded. If species A gives rise to species B, that does not entail that the form of an A somehow morphed into the form of a B -- whatever that could mean -- but rather that organisms that had the form of A gave rise to organisms with a different form. The form itself doesn’t change, any more than erasing a triangle from a blackboard changes the form of triangularity. What happens in that case is that the matter which had the form of a triangle now has the form of a pile of dust particles -- not that the form of triangularity has itself changed, so that the geometry textbooks would have to be rewritten to make reference to dust particles instead!
What I find intriguing here isn't just that one could endorse this alongside everything in evolutionary theory, but also that one could endorse this without anything like theism. For the question between theism and naturalism could be phrased as, "given that there are substantial forms, where do they come from?" In Aristotelian metaphysics, of course, the forms have no origins; they are eternal. But there's a coherent view somewhere around these parts, I think, that goes along with this much of the Aristotelian story but then veers off by developing an account of morphogenesis: the origins of form.Kantian Naturalist
January 29, 2013
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TLS and Formal CausesMung
January 29, 2013
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Timaeus, The way I understand what you have been saying is that my application of teleology to inanimate objects is illegitimate. Or perhaps you are saying that the application is not illegitimate but the way in which I am attempting to do so is illegitimate. Am I just not correctly grasping your point? Or is it just a matter of timing? In the past I might have been correct to raise this argument, but now, after the advent of modern science, I cannot argue in this manner. Or is it just a matter of communication? I cannot speak this way, because people will not understand me. re: Feser. I find this quote: "...there can be no satisfying explanation of almost anything that doesn't make reference to final causes. (TLS 135)"Mung
January 29, 2013
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In re: Timaeus @ 59, yes, that sounds about right to me as well -- both about the general vocabulary and about how to re-conceptualize the argument for teleology in response to anti-teleological, mechanistic physics -- in effect, "scale up" to the laws of physics as a whole. Slightly off-topic, last night I found this: "The Fine-Tuning of the Universe for Intelligent Life". It's a critique of Victor Stenger's critique of the fine-tuning argument. Apparently Stenger doesn't think there really is any fine-tuning. (I don't know if this is really what Stenger claims. I haven't read his book and don't plan to.)Kantian Naturalist
January 29, 2013
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It seems to me that "natural law" (as it is used today) is just a way of whitewashing the obvious teleology found in nature. Why should objects have predictable patterns of behavior when the "matter" they are comprised of has no intrinsic form other than a field of quantum potential? Why should any clump of quantum potentials do anything at all, much less anything in a predictable pattern that can be used towards an end? It's easy to divorce "natural law" from "teleology" if you don't have to explain what the heck "natural law" is, or why it should exist at all.William J Murray
January 29, 2013
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Mung,
What’s a functionalist?
A philosophy of mind position.nullasalus
January 29, 2013
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Hi, Mung. Perhaps I need to state my main point more simply. I've spent about 35 years now studying the likes of Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Bacon, Descartes, etc. in the primary sources, and studying major secondary sources -- commentaries on these thinkers and books by historians of philosophy/science/ideas such as Burtt, Oakley, Collingwood, etc. In all that time, I have not come across the notion that mere "obedience to natural laws" or "behavior in accord with natural properties" is in itself "teleological" behavior. I'm not making a point about the correctness or incorrectness of anyone's philosophical analysis here. I'm making a point about *vocabulary*. Scholars don't (or didn't -- if something has happened in the past few years, I may be behind the times) usually use "teleological" in that sense. Indeed, modern science is generally regarded as having purged teleology from its account of nature, denying that natural things pursue any "natural ends" or have any "final causes." So if a chlorine atom strips an electron from a sodium atom, that would be, in normal modern parlance, "non-teleogical" causation; there is no "final cause" directing electrons of sodium atoms to join up with electrons of potassium atoms. There is a general tendency for metallic atoms to lose electrons, and a general tendency for halogens to acquire them, but those do not belong to "sodium-as-such" or "chlorine-as-such"; they are not properties of particular "substances" (to use Aristotle's term temporarily) such as the sodium atom and the chlorine atom; they are properties belonging to electrons in the electronic configurations of atoms generally. Again, in modern science (I'm speaking of 17th C + science, and bracketing out quantum and relativity considerations for the sake of the point I'm making), the world of causation is describe as "matter" being directed by "laws," rather than "substances" achieving "ends." Now if you want to argue that the phenomena we describe in terms of "laws of nature" are, in a deep way, "end-driven" and thus are, in a sense "teleological," and therefore different only in kind, not in essence, from the kind of teleological phenomena Aristotle and the ancients were talking about -- go ahead. But be aware that even as you try to show the "sameness" of these two descriptions, others are going to object to you by pointing out the "differentness" of them. You are going to have to show that there is something corresponding to the ancient notion of "end" even in the modern analysis. You are going to have to provide some exposition. Still, if you really believe the oak-acorn and oxidation-reduction exhibit fundamentally the same reality of end-driven behavior, you have the right to make the case for a new usage, and to try to persuade others to adopt it, too. I just want to make sure that you know that many people will misunderstand you -- notice that Kantian Naturalist had similar puzzlement about your use of the term, and there was no collusion in our replies -- and that some of those who will misunderstand you are quite well-versed in the subject-matter. If you realize this, and are willing to engage in the effort to translate your language into that of most people, that's fine. But simply to drop one-liners, or offer very brief suggestions, that materialism implies teleology, is not going to communicate what you mean very effectively to the people you presumably want to reach. If I were to use a "natural regularities imply teleology" line of argument, I would use one quite different from yours. I would not argue that obedience of particles and masses to laws, per se, implies teleology. I would argue that *the particular set of properties* of atoms and elementary particles, and *the particular set of laws and constants* seem set up to produce a particular end -- intelligent, humanlike life. That is, not the presence of regularity *as such*, but the peculiar "contents" of the regularity that the universe in fact displays, would be my focus. See, e.g., the work of Michael Denton, *Nature's Destiny*. And if this sounds too "Paleyite" and not "Thomistic" enough for Feser's taste, well then, he can shoot me.Timaeus
January 29, 2013
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nullasalus:
He explains why he rejects, say, “the fifth way as a proto-view of Paley” and “Aristotle as a functionalist” and so on.
What's a functionalist? "Everything is defined with respect to its function: the function of each thing - what it is able to do - is what it truly is..." (Meteor iv 12, 390a 10-16)Mung
January 28, 2013
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Timaeus, I should have provided more context to my comment in 48 but didn't want to type it all out at the time. But rainfall isn't a substance. Water is. My point was you were making a category error, as was KN with his ball and slope. RE: 47 I thought it would be more clear than it apparently is.
I will say more abut substance later, but for the moment we need only note that typical substances are animals, plants, human beings, lumps of matter such as gold, wood, rock, as well as atomic and subatomic particles, molecules, drops of water, clouds of gas, and so on. - Oderberg, p. 66
Are you aware of any atomic or subatomic particles that have no natural tendencies? Please visit my #45. See any error in logic?Mung
January 28, 2013
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Although relatively little on this subject survives from Epicurus's own pen, we are fortunate to find many of his arguments eloquently expounded in the Latin verses of his follower Lucretius. I shall shortly turn to a selection of them. The main target of attack is clearly the Timaeus...
ACK! Sedley, David. Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity.Mung
January 28, 2013
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T, Good to hear from you as well.
But in Aristotle the operation of the four causes are intimately connected with *the kind of thing that the object is*, not with some generic property common to all things, such as “mass.”
Sure, but even with Aristotle (given my understanding) you don't get intrinsic properties with artifacts like planes. Hence his comparison between a bed made of straw and a tree, and how the two are dissimilar. So even there, whatever the mechanical operations of the plane may be, the intrinsic properties are going to have more to do with the fundamental plane components. Extrinsic ones are another matter.
Does Feser simply *use* the term “teleology” in this extended sense, to cover any rule-bound behavior in nature, without justifying the usage? Or does he show awareness that some of his readers might be puzzled by his broader usage, and *explain* why (in his view) the extension is warranted?
He does get into that, yes. Of course, he also is going to call foul on popular historical readings of Aquinas and Aristotle, etc, if they're coming from a modernist viewpoint. He explains why he rejects, say, "the fifth way as a proto-view of Paley" and "Aristotle as a functionalist" and so on. So - and of course I haven't justified or even explained his view here - I think his reply would be that he's not extending anything. He's going back to the original concept of these words, that modern thinkers have typically, intentionally or not, warped. Also, I think Feser would reject 'law talk'. It's not that he says 'Newton's laws are all just formal/final causes!' per se. I think he sees intrinsic natures as an alternative to that.nullasalus
January 28, 2013
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Aristotle found teleology so evident in nature that he asked himself how his predecessors had been able to avoid seeing it there, or, still worse, had denied its presence. He explained their error on the grounds that they were deceived on the notions of matter and substance. The subsequent history of philosophy ought to confirm the correctness of his diagnosis, for insofar as the Aristotelian notion of substance as a unity of matter and form survived, the notion of teleology remained indisputable; but as early as the seventeenth century Bacon and Descartes deny the notion of substantial form (a form which constitutes a substance by its union with a given matter) and the notion of final cause becomes inconceivable. - Gilson, Etienne. From Aristotle to Darwin and Back Again
Mung
January 28, 2013
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As I was taught to think about Aristotelian physics, the "four causes" aren't distinct types of cause but different ways of thinking about cause. For example, if we want to know why a bronze sphere is as it is, we can talk about the shape of the sphere, or the material out of which it is shaped, or the process of shaping it, or the reason why it has the shape that it does. Each of those will have some importance, but it is the for-the-sake-of-which which yields the deepest insight into why this particular piece of material underwent the process of being shaped into the shape that it is. I don't know if this is quite correct, but here's one way of thinking about the difference between Epicureanism and Aristotelianism. In Epicurean physics, all causation involves "pushing" -- one piece of matter pushing against another piece of matter. In Aristotelian physics, there are not only "pushings" but also "pullings". (Actually, I'm not so sure there really are "pushings" in Aristotle's physics!) But what is pulled is not the material (hule) alone but the form-plus-matter, the unified substance -- that's what's pulled. The 'actualization' of 'potentiality' is basically something like a pulling of the morphe into concrete embodiment. Different kinds of things are pulled in different ways because of the specific differences in their forms, so Aristotelian physics doesn't allow for a conception of homogeneous matter that everywhere obeys the exact same laws. And what does the pulling, ultimately, is the god, the unmoved mover. (Maybe "unpulled puller" would be more apt!) For whatever it's worth, my understanding of Aristotle is primarily indebted to the outstanding translations of Physics and Metaphysics by Joe Sachs, and also Jonathan Lear's nice book on Aristotle. I've read several books on the origins of modernity, but the two that made the deepest impact on me is Theology and the Scientific Imagination by Amos Funkenstein and Passage to Modernity by Louis Dupre.Kantian Naturalist
January 28, 2013
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Mung: Your vocabulary in 47 and 48 above needs some explanation. The last word in 48, "substance," makes no sense as a response to my analysis of the falling rock, and it's unclear in 47 whether you are using the Aristotelian or modern meaning of "substance." I don't know how much Aristotle various people here have studied, so I apologize for redundancy if I state what they already know: for Aristotle the basic unit which undergoes change is the *ousia*, a word generally translated as "substance" but which could also be rendered by "entity." The problem with the translation "substance" is that in modern usage "substance" means "material stuff" such as wax, salt, grease, wood, metal, etc. But anyone who has that meaning in mind won't understand Aristotle. For Aristotle, a horse is a "substance." Its "causes" (aitia) are material, formal, efficient, and final. The efficient cause would be the act of siring by the stallion father upon the mare mother; the formal and final causes would lie in the seed which gives the horse its form and "strives" to become a grown horse, and the material cause would be the matter out of which the horse's body is made. But if a horse falls out of a plane, and plunges to the ground, nothing of its nature as "horse" is involved. How Aristotle would have calculated the speed of its fall, I have no idea, but the modern way of doing it abstracts from all "horseness" and considers only the mass. (The shape of the horse would be involved due to air friction, but in a vacuum the shape would be irrelevant, so ideally the "horseness" has no bearing on what happens. The particular material composition of the horse would also be irrelevant, though its mass would be relevant; but an ox might have the same mass, so again horse-nature is not involved.) The point is that modern physics abstracts from the concrete reality that Aristotle had in mind when he spoke of "causes" of "substances." And "teleology" in most histories of ideas and histories of science etc. is connected with one in particular of Aristotle's causes -- the final cause. So when one uses a word that was originally associated with "final cause" and an analysis in terms of "substances" in a radically new context in which reality is seen as masses in motion, one is just inviting intellectual confusion. UNLESS one explains why the extension of meaning of "teleology" is warranted. I'm not accustomed to hearing scholars describe all events that occur via "natural laws" as "teleological," and so I've raised the question whether this extension of meaning does more harm than good, i.e., makes things muddier rather than clearer. On the example of the rock rolling down the hill -- no, crushing cars is not an intrinsic property of the rock -- but it is a property of any mass set free to fall toward the surface of the planet. That is a regular tendency. Therefore, apparently, you and Feser would both call the downward motion of the rock "teleological." And actually, I would agree in that particular case, because in the ancient cosmology, "down" was the natural place of "earth" -- where rocks would naturally congregate. But for modern physics there is no natural tendency of "earth" different from the natural tendency of "air" and "fire" and "water" (the other three ancient elements) and there is no natural "down" direction, and rocks have no tendency to go "down" but only to be attracted to other masses -- such as the earth. If Saturn suddenly materialized a foot above the freed rock, the rock would fall "up" to Saturn, not "down" to earth. So the whole teleological language of "natural place" and "down" has been abandoned by modern physics. The most you could say is that bodies are "naturally" drawn to each other. If you want to call that "teleology" -- fine. But it's a teleology radically transformed from that of the ancient Greeks, and that needs to be explained, in order to avoid confusion -- *especially* when it comes from Feser, who is championing Aquinas, whose physics comes from Aristotle, and from Feser, the critic of *modern* thought (and certainly it was modern thought that abolished the physics of Aquinas and Aristotle). It appears that Feser is trying to "rescue" something of the Aristotelian notion of causality so that it still applies to modern physics -- but it's not clear that this can be done, just as it's not clear that one can have a reverent Church service where the music is ragtime.Timaeus
January 28, 2013
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My concern was that Mung was using an ancient/medieval vocabulary (teleology, final causes) in a context that wasn’t necessarily congenial to it.
That's the idea! Though KN was the one who brought up Lucretius. ;)Mung
January 28, 2013
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"To put it in ontological terms: were there no for the sake of which, there would be no powers, potentials, or mechanisms." - Monte Ransome Johnson Timaeus:
Or does he show awareness that some of his readers might be puzzled by his broader usage, and *explain* why (in his view) the extension is warranted?
I think he does, though when I first read it I hardly understood it, it was all so new to me. I've posted the relevant quote from Feser before, but it basically mirrors the above quote. The other causes make no sense in the absence of the final cause.Mung
January 28, 2013
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Hi, null. Good to hear from you again. On a small point, you seem to have misread me. You wrote: "I think Feser would disagree on this front, and argue that it wasn’t the ‘specific nature of the plane’ per se, but of intrinsic powers of matter in such and such a situation." If that's what Feser would say, it wouldn't be in disagreement with me -- it was the exact point I was making: the specific nature of planes has nothing to do with why the damaged plane falls, or how fast it falls (in a vacuum); the cause is the plane's *mass*. But in Aristotle the operation of the four causes are intimately connected with *the kind of thing that the object is*, not with some generic property common to all things, such as "mass." So there is a problem with simply transferring notions such as final cause or teleology from the original Aristotelian context to a new context (17th-century physics) where many of the working assumptions are radically changed. My concern was that Mung was using an ancient/medieval vocabulary (teleology, final causes) in a context that wasn't necessarily congenial to it. I was wondering how far "teleology" can be stretched in meaning before it becomes so different that it would be better to use a different word. Anyhow, you seem to be confirming that Feser uses "teleology" to cover any "natural intrinsic regularities." In other words, he uses it more broadly than many historians of philosophy and historians of science would. That's why I was asking: Does Feser simply *use* the term "teleology" in this extended sense, to cover any rule-bound behavior in nature, without justifying the usage? Or does he show awareness that some of his readers might be puzzled by his broader usage, and *explain* why (in his view) the extension is warranted?Timaeus
January 28, 2013
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Timaeus:
... that any natural law or regular property is, by its very nature, teleological. So if a rock, under the influence of gravity, rolls down a mountainside and crushes a car, that is an example of final causation, not just of efficient causation.
How is a rock rolling down a mountainside and crushing a car a natural law or a regular property of the rock? So, no. Briefly, and perhaps I can post more on this later, a rock rolling down a mountainside and crushing a car is not a substance.Mung
January 28, 2013
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It is central to real essentialism that historical origin and essence are separate notions. This is explained by means of the fourfold distinction of causes. We have already noted that essence has a material cause, in the sense that all material substances are compounds of form and matter. For substances that have a natural goal or purpose (paradigmatically, living things), there is also a final cause - that to which substances with teleology naturally tend. Substances have in addition, and as I have already explained at length, a formal cause - the substantial form that makes them what they are. But they also have an efficient cause - that by which they come into existence. - Oderberg, David S. Real Essentialism
So a substance has a material, formal and efficient cause, but may or may not have a final cause? How so? What natural substance has no natural goal or purpose? What natural substance has no natural tendency?Mung
January 28, 2013
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Further to the discussion of Aristotle, Feser and teleology: I outlined some of the issues here in a blog post Final Causes: Needed, or Always Present?. An extract --- The issue between Feser and the mechanists is whether the final causes are those of only the parts, or of a being as a whole. The two options are: 1. Maybe the final causes are those that depend on the final causes of the microscopic parts. This is the mechanistic or reductionist explanation. 2. Or maybe the organism's final causes are more global or macroscopic aims, such as eating, growth, reproduction, or even mental desires for pleasure or satisfaction. These are the 'organismic' or 'wholistic' final causes. In contrast to Feser's claim, we see that it is not the absence of final causes which leads to the reductionist account. Rather, it is the choice of specific final causes as the source of the observed behavior. Are the important final causes those related to the organism (and its desires) as a whole, or only those of its microscopic parts? The modern predilection is to choose the microscopic final causes. Hence the desire to read books about brain cells, neurons, and genes. It is the reason why the idea of a selfish gene has become popular. This choice (between microscopic and macroscopic final causes) is the important choice to be made when trying to understand living creatures. We do not automatically understand them better by trying to postulate the existence of final causes, because (in fact) final causes never really went away. The question is whether they are (in modern language) local or global.Ian Thompson
January 28, 2013
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"Form is that by which a particular thing actually exists." - David S. Oderberg quoting Aquinas. Here's one basic line of my thinking. Whatever it is that the materialist thinks exists, that which they call upon to cobble everything else together by sheer number of attempts and finding things that can be plugged together to make other things, has form, else it does not exist. Anything that has form has a formal cause. Anything that has a formal cause, has a final cause. Anything that has a final cause, is teleological. Is that impeccable, or what, lol.Mung
January 28, 2013
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Hi Timaeus. This is a question we're not likely to settle here. :) Chapter 5: Teleology and Elements
There is a dispute about which sciences Aristotle actually countenanced and provided teleological explanations for. A case in point is the elements - simple bodies like earth, air, water, and fire. Are they teleologically explicable? One might think that on an issue this fundamental there would be consensus. But although all are agreed that it is an issue with far-reaching implications, scholars are divided on the point. - Johnson, Monte Ransome. Aristotle on Teleology
Don't blame Feser for my views, he merely got me interested. I'm blazing my own trail here and hopefully not in a tinder-dry forest. But it seems inconceivable to me that Aristotle would abandon any of his four causes. Don't they all operate together? cheersMung
January 28, 2013
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I will say that I've not seen Feser say that 'anti-teleological materialism is a contradiction'. I have seen him argue that materialism tends to collapse either into unworkable/incoherent systems (eliminative materialism) or unknowingly slides right back into Aristotilean and anti-materialistic positions. (In TLS he makes some remarks about the attempt to make computationalism coherent only really working if you go right back to something akin to an A-T metaphysic without realizing it.)nullasalus
January 28, 2013
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Timaeus,
Has Feser anywhere provided such a justification?
Feser develops his argument in TLS and Aquinas primarily, along with some blog posts (no links onhand, sorry.) His argument on that front primarily focuses on the Fifth Way and what he argues was meant by formal/final causes.
A crippled plane falls, not because it is “trying” to hit the ground, but because it is attracted to the ground by a universal law, a law which has nothing to do with the specific nature of either the ground or of crippled planes.
I think Feser would disagree on this front, and argue that it wasn't the 'specific nature of the plane' per se, but of intrinsic powers of matter in such and such a situation.
things move because of collisions of blind matter (efficient cause), and things move (or change) with a definite end in mind (final cause), is a major confusion.
Again, I'm pretty sure Feser's view of final causes (which he contends is Aquinas' and others' view) is not that of definite ends per se, but natural intrinsic regularities. He maintains that formal/final causes are at work even in the most banal operations of nature - rock rolling down a hill, etc - and thus teleology is present. I'm not doing his argument justice here, but I'm trying to explain where Feser is coming from on this topic. And one of his themes is that the Aristotilean/intrinsic powers/teleological talk is supposed to be stripped from the naturalist/materialist understanding of nature, but nevertheless keeps showing up and may well be rationally unavoidable. "Special affinities" or "definite ends" talk, I'm almost certain he'd reject as misunderstandings, or regarding teleology as extrinsic rather than intrinsic.nullasalus
January 28, 2013
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Mung: "Matter itself has specific properties and behaves in predictable ways, else nothing could be made from matter. "That very aspect of matter makes it teleological." If I understand your claim here, it seems to be the same as the claim I have seen elsewhere in the past several months on the internet, i.e., that any natural law or regular property is, by its very nature, teleological. So if a rock, under the influence of gravity, rolls down a mountainside and crushes a car, that is an example of final causation, not just of efficient causation. The first thing to be said about this use of "teleology" is that it is non-standard. No one in the history of ideas, to my knowledge, has used "teleological" in this way until very recently. As far as I can tell, this sudden change in usage in recent months comes from Edward Feser. It is unclear to me whether he himself endorses it, or whether it is an application of his ideas that he himself has not made (and might disagree with), but at least one person has acknowledged getting it from Feser. Now I'm not going to claim that I know as much about Aquinas, or even about Aristotle, as Ed Feser, but I do know that this understanding of "teleology" is not standard. Normally, teleology refers to the direction of actions by ends, purposes, or goals, rather than by mere pushes and pulls. Thus, teleology is expressive of "final cause" (from Latin finis, end, goal) as opposed to "efficient cause" (from Latin efficio, effect, get something done, move something someplace). As Kantian points out above, the standard anti-teleological account of the West is beautifully expressed in Lucretius, De Rerum Natura. Opposing accounts in the ancient world included those of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. The language of ends and purposes in natural action came into the West in a big way through Scholasticism, which was based on the new translations of Aristotle into Latin. Feser must know all of this, and he must know that Lucretius's idea of what makes things move is quite different from Aristotle's (and since Aquinas adopted Aristotle's philosophy of nature, from Aquinas's as well). To lump together two such different ideas -- things move because of collisions of blind matter (efficient cause), and things move (or change) with a definite end in mind (final cause), is a major confusion. I suspect that Feser may have in mind the fact that "natural law" as conceived since the 17th century is different from the Lucretian notion of nature. And so it is. But that still does not make it teleological in the Classical sense of Aristotle or Plato. A crippled plane falls, not because it is "trying" to hit the ground, but because it is attracted to the ground by a universal law, a law which has nothing to do with the specific nature of either the ground or of crippled planes. It has to do with masses and distance. A wounded bird would also fall, and would fall (neglecting air friction) at the same rate as any other object of the same mass. And the wounded bird would just as soon hit the ocean as hit land; it is indifferent what sort of massy object awaits it at the other end. And if the falling object were positioned between Jupiter and earth, and fell to Jupiter rather than the earth, it would not be because the object "chose" or "had a natural inclination to" find Jupiter specifically rather than the earth specifically; it would always move toward the object with greater gravitational attraction, indifferent to *what* the object was. Placed halfway between Saturn and Mercury, it would fall to Saturn; but placed halfway between Saturn and Jupiter, it would fall to Jupiter. This proves that the falling object has no special affinity for Saturn, or the earth, or any other planet. It is not being guided by "ends" or "goals" in the normal sense of the word; it is being guided by a *rule*. Now, if Feser wants to say that rules are inherently "teleological", well, he can use words any way that he wants to. But then the discussion becomes confusing, because historically people have used "teleology" to mean guidance toward specific ends -- ends tied to the nature of the object in question (acorns tend to become oak trees), or determined by an outside intelligence, e.g., God or a human artificer. Such a broadening of the meaning of "teleological" would need justification -- it would have to be shown that more is gained, intellectually, by including a wider set of phenomena under "teleology" than is lost by abandoning the precision and historical familiarity of the older meaning. Has Feser anywhere provided such a justification?Timaeus
January 28, 2013
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Hmmm. I can see where you're coming from, but that's a much more generous construal of 'teleology' then what I'm comfortable with. That basically reads "teleological" as a synonym for "predictable," and I'd want to make some further distinctions here. Consider a ball rolling down a slope. In one sense, that ball has a 'goal': the end of the slope at which it will come to a rest. But that goal need not figure in the explanation of why the ball has the velocity that it has. The laws of physics are both necessary and sufficient to explain the ball's velocity. Whereas teleological explanations are explanations where the laws of physics are necessary but not sufficient, where instead the goal or end of the action plays an essential role in an intellectually satisfying explanation. In those terms, the view of the anti-teleologists, from Democritus through Epicurus to Spinoza and well beyond, is that teleological explanations are pseudo-explanations, and that they seem to provide intellectual satisfaction only because we are ignorant of the underlying efficient causation. (Spinoza is completely clear on this point, in Ethics I, Appendix; I'm reading his critique of teleology back into Epicurus and Democritus. It's been too long since I've read Lucretius to know for sure that he would put the point as Spinoza does.) I just finished read A Revolution of the Mind by Jonathan Israel. In doing so, I was struck by -- among other things -- how the critics of Spinoza, Bayle, d'Hollbach, D'Alembert, Diderot, Priestly, and Paine would talk about how dangerous their materialism was: that it would unleash chaos, unchain the passions, destroy morality, etc. -- all the same allegations that one sees leveled against "atheists", "materialists," "naturalists" nowadays. Very little changes under the sun.Kantian Naturalist
January 28, 2013
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Matter itself has specific properties and behaves in predictable ways, else nothing could be made from matter. That very aspect of matter makes it teleological. A materialism that denies teleology is incoherent, because teleology is required for materialism. :)Mung
January 28, 2013
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Anti-teleological materialism is a contradiction in terms.
What? Why? And given that you clearly understand the family of views I was trying to indicate with that term, what would you have recommended I use instead?Kantian Naturalist
January 28, 2013
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