Someone please send Barbara Forrest a thesaurus

_{February 9, 2009

Intelligent Design}

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Barbara Forrest responds to David DeWolf in The News Star.

Early in the article Forrest puts forth a false dichotomy which undermines all that follows. My emphasis:

DeWolf’s portrayal of ID as scientific is falsified by his defining it as involving the “actions of an intelligent agent as the cause of phenomena that natural processes are unlikely to produce.” If phenomena are not naturally caused, they are supernaturally caused. There is no other alternative.

Not only are there other alternatives but supernatural isn’t even an antonym for natural. If we go to a thesaurus and look up the word natural we find listed among the antonyms the words technological and artificial. Notably we do not find the word supernatural listed as an antonym.

Maybe Babs should spend more time improving her vocabulary and less time disproving the assertion that ID is science.

Of course there’s an alternative explanation here. Perhaps Forrest is well aware that natural/supernatural is a false dichotomy and she’s just an unapologetic liar. In fact that makes more sense as you usually can’t get a PhD without at least a college entrance-level vocabulary.

Comments

kairosfocus:
An interesting silence from those who were so busily saying that FSCI is an incoherent and non-quantifiable concept; especially now that they made open accusations of our assuming “metaphysical” designers. That allowed us to answer clearly and directly on the root issue.
As one of your fellow ID proponents remarked on another thread:
How you win a argument is if you have the last comment. Then the author of the last comment can say to himself that they have no answer to my latest mindless dribble so I have won this argument. They can go proudly off to where ever it is they proclaim their victory and celebrate.
As I said to StephenB, I'll gladly cede the victory to you in any blog-based debate, so feel free to celebrate. I'm here for the fun of it, and I move on when it gets boring. If I thought that debates on UD had any impact on the direction of scientific research and curricula, it would be a different story.R0b_{February 23, 2009
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Onlookers: An interesting silence from those who were so busily saying that FSCI is an incoherent and non-quantifiable concept; especially now that they made open accusations of our assuming "metaphysical" designers. That allowed us to answer clearly and directly on the root issue. Let us wait further for their answers. Now, too, we see just above from JT, 218:
I would say that all these sensations [i.e. our conscious, first person, "from the inside" awareness of experiences] are caused by the complex chemical stew of which we are comprised . . . . superimposing some abstract symbol system on a process and then theorizing how such a system works in terms of that symbol system, often does not clarify how the system is actually functioning.
1 --> It is our direct experience that we are conscious,a d that in so being conscious we are operating at a certain level of personhood; which BTW, embraces thinking and inferring and concluding and deciding. 2 --> Now, we have a fair degree of insight into the workings of molecules and chemistry, and underlying physics. JT is simply asserting the materialist view, ipso facto. Chalmers' still standing challenge has been that we have no good ability to move per detailed and credible explanations, from phys-chem to consciousness, assertions as above notwithstanding. JT's faith statement above is simply an implicit acknowledgement of the point. 3 --> It also begs a serious qn; as posed by Reppert. Namely, that physical-chemical causal chains are insufficient to ground rational thought or response; as phys=chem determinism is not demonstrably correlated to logical grounding or epistemic warrant. [Unless one wishes to assert or assume a sort of front-loading of physics and chemistry that would have astonishing implications.] 4 --> Further to this, per basic logic: sentences are not propositions. That is, an asserted/ implied/ assumed truth/falsehood claim or belief about a real or possible state of affairs, is not equivalent to the verbal language in which it is often phrased. 5 --> So, semantics does not REDUCE to syntax, though it is often expressed in some form of symbol and/or signal or other; and it is then often useful to process stgnals per rules imposed on machinery to carry out mechanical inference; e.g. in a PC or calculator or control system. 6 --> Which, precisely focuses the question posed by such FSCI and IC: origin, per experience-based inference to best explanation. In short, per massive experience, we know that a calculator, PC or control system [e.g. a robot] do not work from physics and chemistry back to logic, but from logic back to design and thence to physical implementation. 7 --> Thus, Reppert's challenge is not mere metaphysical assertion; as we LIVE as conscious reasoning creatures; so we know the difference between inference and physical cause-effect chains. And, per Plantinga and modeling theory, as well as much of the hisrtory of ideas, we know that adequacy of function does not correlate to accuracy of belief or reasoning process. 8 --> So, those who would reduce reasoning and rationality to matter and law and chance "swerves" are after 2,000 years, still facing the un resolved challenge of Lucretius' materialism: unable to account for the very first fact of all -- we are rational, conscious animals. [The phrase is adapted from Aristotle.] 9 --> Would it not be wiser, therefore, to start FROM our rational animality, and ask, what makes best sense of that, in light of our experience of what it takes to get to information-rich systems, in light of the radical divergence between physical cause-effect chains and rational ground-consequent ones? 10 --> And, would it not be simple justice to demand cessation of the current materialist censorship against such inference? (But then, per evolutionary materialism and "nature red in tooth and claw, do materialists have a god ground for justice, which is after all a rational-moral issue?] GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{February 21, 2009
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JayM, Again, I apologize for the delay. I have a rather demanding job at times. I'd say "day job" but it isn't really. In #168 you address my most fundamental question:
Can humans do things that nature without humans is for all practical purposes incapable of doing?
I'll try to condense your answer, and you can tell me if I got it mostly right. The obvious answer, as Abel noted, is "yes". You give two possible answers; “No.” and “I don’t know.” At first glance this would seem to be an evasion, but IIUC it actually is not. The reason you give is that there may be other forms of intelligence, or other "natural phenomena", that can do some of the same things that humans can. I'm glad you used the term "forms of intelligence", as it obviates the need to ask why humans can do things that nature without humans cannot, for practical purposes, do. In the case of humans, it is obviously somehow related to intelligence. I gather that you threw in the other natural phenomena as a hypothetical to be complete, as, in your words "we don’t know of any other natural phenomena that produce the same results as human intelligence". Thus your answer to your own question,
“Can we detect the results of human intelligence, even if that intelligence is purely a natural phenomena?”
should really be "I don't know" rather than "yes", as you actually answered it. Maybe an alien intelligence or an unknown force can make aircraft carriers or Honda Accords, to take two examples of Abel, or arrowheads, to take yours. But I would agree that this would be quibbling, It would appear that we can divide up nature (several ways, but in particular) into humans, non-human intelligences (of which we may not know any), unknown forces, and nature without any of these. And human activity can sometimes (although not always) be distinguished from nature without any of the others. I think that is what you meant when you said "yes". Do I have it right? You want me to just drop the "pseudo-Socratic approach" and state my case. But I stated that "intelligent human causes are qualitatively different from unintelligent natural phenomena" way back in #44, and it was what sounded like a denial of this that launched our present exchange, or at least that continued it. Now it looks like you recognize the difference between artifacts produced by humans and those produced by nature without humans, other intelligences (if any), and unknown forces. You already know how I characterize the differences, as qualitative. How would you characterize the differences? Qualitative? Quantitative? Some other adjective? Granted that we know that there is a difference, as we can tell at least some archaeological artifacts from ordinary dirt, how would you characterize that difference? We may find a surprising amount of agreement.Paul Giem_{February 21, 2009
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correction: "I’m having a hard time perceiving the process he’s describing from his mystical vantage point"JT_{February 21, 2009
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Well did David Chalmers has warn us: “”
The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought.

I would say that all these sensations are caused by the complex chemical stew of which we are comprised. IOW, I do not think you could create a robot out of metal that could have all of the above sensations. Of course, there is way that it feels like to hear a clarinet or whatever. If possible please limit all such observations regarding consciousness to animals, if indeed such observations apply to them as well. If they do not, then please explain why man is unique in the animal kingdom in his ability to experience bodily sensations, etc. Or if you think that animals as well have a nonmaterial intelligence, soul or some such which is necessary for them to function, please make that clear as well.
let us suppose that brain state A, which is token identical to the thought that all men are mortal, and brain state B, which is token identical to the thought that Socrates is a man, together cause the belief that Socrates is mortal. It isn’t enough for rational inference that these events be those beliefs, it is also necessary that the causal transaction be in virtue of the content of those thoughts . . . [But] if naturalism is true, then the propositional content is irrelevant to the causal transaction that produces the conclusion [my nb: e.g. NS is about behaviour not beliefs and known false belief scan give rise to effective action, cf. modelling which uses 'simplifications of reality" -- i.e strictly false and sometimes arbitrary constructs], and [so] we do not have a case of rational inference. In rational inference, as Lewis puts it, one thought causes another thought not by being, but by being seen to be, the ground for it. But causal transactions in the brain occur in virtue of the brain’s being in a particular type of state that is relevant to physical causal transactions. [Reppert, on Lewis' AFR]
Rational thought does not require a human language. And Octopus I believe would recognize that if A is behind B and B is behind C then A is behind C, even though he did not have an abstract symbol system to map such a thought to. Nor would he necssarily break it down or understand it as a logical deduction. In rational inference, as Lewis puts it, one thought causes another thought not by being, but by being seen to be, the ground for it. But causal transactions in the brain occur in virtue of the brain’s being in a particular type of state that is relevant to physical causal transactions. I'm having a hard perceiving the process he's describing from his mystical vantage point, e.g. "not by being, but by being seen to be", It seems to me that the objective in philosophy is often conundrum and obfuscation, not clarification, IMO. Furthermore, superimposing some abstract symbol system on a process and then theorizing how such a system works in terms of that symbol system, often does not clarify how the system is actually functioning. I'm more or less just acknowledging I read the above, we don't necessarly need to tack a completely unrelated discussion on to the end of this thread though. RegardsJT_{February 21, 2009
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PPS: to SB and JT -- the wonders that lucky noise can do! For, of course, it is often assumed that it creates minds from brains, and meaning from variability in milli-Volt action potentials triggered by ion flows in nerves. (As if the longstanding challenge ever since Lucretius has not been that neither blindly deterministic mechanical forces nor random swerves of the atomos are credibly rational as grounds for such reasoned thought and decision . . . ) Well did David Chalmers has warn us: ""
The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience.
Information may be processed through physical manipulation of symbols in organised and integrated IT entities, but whence cometh such organization? How do symbols take up meanings, and thus subjective understanding and inference? How can such become credible per materilaistic metaphysics,and even vitally important? Especially in light of . . .
. . . let us suppose that brain state A, which is token identical to the thought that all men are mortal, and brain state B, which is token identical to the thought that Socrates is a man, together cause the belief that Socrates is mortal. It isn’t enough for rational inference that these events be those beliefs, it is also necessary that the causal transaction be in virtue of the content of those thoughts . . . [But] if naturalism is true, then the propositional content is irrelevant to the causal transaction that produces the conclusion [my nb: e.g. NS is about behaviour not beliefs and known false belief scan give rise to effective action, cf. modelling which uses 'simplifications of reality" -- i.e strictly false and sometimes arbitrary constructs], and [so] we do not have a case of rational inference. In rational inference, as Lewis puts it, one thought causes another thought not by being, but by being seen to be, the ground for it. But causal transactions in the brain occur in virtue of the brain’s being in a particular type of state that is relevant to physical causal transactions. [Reppert, on Lewis' AFR]
GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{February 21, 2009
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9 --> As to whether the issue of the contrasts "natural vs supernatural" and "natural vs artificial" is a matter of "semantics," obviously -- and importantly -- it is:
se·man·tics (s-mntks) n. . . . 1. Linguistics The study or science of meaning in language. 2. Linguistics The study of relationships between signs and symbols and what they represent. Also called semasiology. 3. The meaning or the interpretation of a word, sentence, or other language form
10 --> So, if meaning and the relationship between symbols and what they represent are important, semantics is important. 11 --> In this case, the key point is that there is a false and uncharitable accusation championed by Ms Forrest et al, that spins off the fallacious false choice between only natural and supernatural into conspiracy theories over anti-science attacks and imposition of imagined theocracy; all done by an establishment that is demonstrably busily imposing an evo mat secularist establishment functionally equivalent to establishment of dogmatic denominational religion. Turnabout false accusation, again. 12 --> But in fact, as DS and others, including the undersigned have repeatedly pointed out and shown, ever since Plato, we have known that we are not locked up like that! 13 --> Per direct observation, we know that mechanical forces, chance and intelligence all act into our world, as a rule leaving characteristic traces. 14 --> So, we may quite properly make the distinction natural vs artificial instead, and do so without implying that the "art" -- techne -- in question is or is not supernatural (magic, miracle, demons, gods, god, etc . ..) or merely non-natural (e.g. human). 15 --> Such a "whodunit" question comes properly ATER it has first been reasonably shown that "twere dun." If no arson or murder is properly suspected, it makes no sense looking for suspects. 16 --> So, Rob, it seems that you have no good grounds for the accusations that lurk in the above cited words. ______________ Please, correct your misperceptions and address the real ID case, not a 'Creationism in a cheap tuxedo" strawman. GEM of TKI PS: Onlookers, over in the Message Theory thread, I have stated my reasons for inferring that much of what has been going on recently boils down to obfuscatory rhetoric, including on the FSCI is not measurable mantra; cf. from bFast's response to JayM at 132 on.kairosfocus_{February 21, 2009
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5 --> Now, whether or no you care about the imposition of evo mat as a metaphysical, a priori, the fact is, that the US NAS has so imposed,and is abusing its credibility to push this, so begging the world-view question at the outset; indeed, even short-circuiting the historical and phil work required to make a responsible decision on what is or is not science. And, the further fact is that both you and JayM strongly reflect that imposition in what you have said above. 6 --> You will see that I have spoken to "worldviews" just now. That is central, as whether or no we recognise it, we ALL have worldviews, the question being whether they have been critically examined on comparative difficulties, i.e the proper project of metaphysics as the hard core of philosophy. 7 --> That is why Socrates said that the unexamined life is not worth living, and that is why Plato in his parable of the cave, showed how conventional wisdoms are often grossly in error. IN OUR DAY, EVO MAT IS HE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM OF THE INSTITUTIONS OF SCIENCE, THUS IN MANY DOMINANT QUARTERS IN OUR CIVILISATION. (So, we should demand the right of critical examination, instead of meekly accepting the dogmatic rulings of today's materialistic magisterium.) 8 --> You have indulgesd in a turnabout, imomral equivalency false accusation when you have asserted: ID is premised on a specific metaphysic that it tries to pass off as science. I will substantiate:
a --> s has been repeatedly shown, Lewontinian a priori materialism is now the dogma imposed by the evo mat magisterium under false colours of science. thus, science, science education and public policy are being routinely subverted as we speak. b --> By sharpest contrast, the design inference is based on empirical observation that is a commonplace: causes tracing to chance and/or necessity and/or design. c --> And, equally routinely, we are able to isolate aspects of events and objects that trace to these factors. (For instance, a 1/2 inch bolt is designed, takes advantage of inter alia the natural regularities of an inclined plane [wrapped around a metal shaft], and has an unavoidable tolerance due to chance factors that cause variations in its dimensions and materials.) d --> Now, too, we instantiate intelligent agents who design and in so designing, make artifacts that show cahracteristic traces of that intelligent action. E.g. FSCI, functionally specific, complex information; of which this post is an example: ASCII digitally coded text in English that responds to a context and in so doing functions. e --> As onlookers can verify, we can easily find any number of examples of FSCI that are produced by intelligent agents; but not even the most ardent objectors have been able to put up a single counter instance of say ASCII ext of at least 143 haracters -- about 18 standard words in English -- that is similarly functional but is known to be caused by undirected stochastic contingency. f --> This is because of the needle in the haystack problem: islands of function on that scale of complexity are utterly sparse in the implied 1,000 bit config space; well beyond the reasonable reach of the entire observed universe acting as a search engine. g --> So, on scientific induction, we confidently conclude that FSCI -- and it is plainly measurable, starting with the simple cases just given -- is a reliable [as opposed to beyond correction] sign of intelligence. h --> hen, we simply look to a key case: DNA is a similar data string, coded with data and procedures, and is in life forms storign typically 600 kilo bits to 6 - 8 giga bits of info, well beyond the 1,000 bit threshold. i --> So, ID thinkers on empirical bases, scientifically infer DNA is designed. BUT THAT SAYS NOTHING ABOUT THE ONTOLOGICAL NATURE OF THE DESIGNERS -- as has been explicit ever since Thaxton et al in 1984. Whodunit is a question to be addressed after the first conclusion is that "something were dun." j --> So,the accusation by Rob above on metaphysical a prioris is false, and in the face of abundant, easily examined evidence to the contrary.[Even my online note as linked through my handle which Rob says he has read, is a case in point.] k --> So, the real issue is whether the false accusation is willful or based on utter misunderstanding and misperception based on what R et al "know" is "really" there; i.e utterly closed and improperly suspicious minds.
[ . . . ]kairosfocus_{February 21, 2009
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Oh well . . . Rob, @ 198: I really don’t care about Lewontin’s or Crick’s metaphysical opinions. Sorry. In fact, I don’t care much about metaphysics at all, other than the fact that ID is premised on a specific metaphysic that it tries to pass off as science. And the question of whether the term supernatural includes ID’s non-C+D characterization of intelligence is a one of semantics. 1 --> First, a little note on your need to responding to the real person addressing you: I am not speaking of WmA D's incomplete formulations of the Ef circa 1998. I am speaking of the one you find at the already linked [complete with a distinct flowchart], which in response to the sort of objections you make and in light of much experience with analysis of experimental data [signal vs noise due to errors of observation etc], focusses on the specfific ASPECTS [look up the meaning . . . ] of an entity or situation; and as is discussed in steps at WAC nos 29 - 31 as linked above. Did you even look at the flowchart and think about why it speaks to aspects then elaborates onward actions at each decision alternative? 2 --> Similarly, you have strawmanised me without good justification on the die example. I have long since shown that a dropped die (i) follows in part the lawlike regularity that makes it fall. On a second aspect, (ii) it tumbles to a contingent outcome. If it is fair, (iii) that aspect of the overall o/come is driven by chance in effect, i.e undirected, stochastic contingency [cf flowchart]. If it is loaded, (iv) the contingent aspect of the o/come is driven by intent not chance, i.e it is DESIGNED. And, any las Vegas Casino can tell you all about that set of distinctions. 3 --> So, in this present world, based on common and important experiences, we see good reason to distinguished [a] lawlike regularity tracing to blind mechanical forces, from [b] chance (credibly undirected, stochastic contingency) and from design (credibly directed contingency). 4 --> YOUR FIRST PROBLEM IS THAT YOU ARE BEING SELECTIVELY HYPERCRITICAL. The concepts of causal factors tracing to chance, necessity and design is not on trial, sir; YOU are. And, sadly, you are abjectly, even insistently failing. indeed, you come across to this observed as one who has long since made up his mind, composed his arguments and is simply spewing them forth yet again, regardless of the actual issues and evidence in play. (Again: did you even look at the revised Ef flowchart I composed? If so, why are you responding to an incomplete description of the logic of the EF process by Wm A D dating to a decade ago?) [ . . . ]kairosfocus_{February 21, 2009
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JT, you have been a good sport, but I fear something like this may happen again tomorrow with someone else. I have this terrible notion that several other bloggers will start claiming that I wrote posts that I didn't write. In fact, I am almost sure of it.StephenB_{February 20, 2009
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Hey no probs, bro. Sorry I was so slow on the uptake.JT_{February 20, 2009
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I agree. That may well be what happened. But please don't attribute the rudeness to me because I did not write the posts.StephenB_{February 20, 2009
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Incidentally, a computer would have no problem generating the responses you're making now - Random denials and expressions of incredulity.JT_{February 20, 2009
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JT: @207. What are you talking about? I didn't say anything or write anything, much less did I write "Screw you." Where do you get all this stuff?StephenB_{February 20, 2009
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I don't like the profanity there either now that I see it. Mods, please remove everything from 204 onwards. Thanks.JT_{February 20, 2009
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StephenB: At 202 I see a post with your name on it politely asking for clarification on Rob's 3 points. What are you seeing? Furthermore no one had responded for over three hours when I did. I thought you might say, "Thanks." not "Screw you."JT_{February 20, 2009
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JT at 205. I can't help it if it has my name on it. I didn't write it. Please don't be so presmumptuous.StephenB_{February 20, 2009
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StephenB [204]:
By the way, what are you responding to. I did not write that post at 202. Why are you suggesting that I did?
Because it has your name on it.JT_{February 20, 2009
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JT: You don't catch on too quickly do you. I no longer take Rob seriously, so I didn't bother to wade through his nonsense. So, your entire post was a total waste of time. By the way, what are you responding to. I did not write that post at 202. Why are you suggesting that I did?StephenB_{February 20, 2009
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StephenB [202]: 1) Necessity and chance is another way of saying 'law' and 'not law'. I.D. says intelligence is neither necessity nor chance. That's the same as saying intelligence its not law, and also not 'not law'. Does that make it clearer? 2) (TM Computability) Basically he's saying nature is a mechanism and that no one has shown why the mind isn't a mechanism either. Think about weather. Someone could say "here's how weather works", and then maybe spend a couple of minutes or so giving you a verbal description. Of course, any such description would be absurdly incomplete, but you would nevertheless presumably walk away with an understanding of nature better than you had before. In fact whereas any predictions you made about the weather previously might have been no better than random, with that two-minute overview, you might conceivably have enough knowledge to say on a certain day, "You know I think it might rain" and actually be correct (Who knows.) But someone could say "here's how weather works", and throw a 700 page textbook on the table in front of you. Both the two minute description and that 700 page textbook are examples of theories, in this case one more complete than the other. The worth of a theory is gauged by how accurately it predicts the future behavior of some phenomenon it is intended to characterize. As a final example, someone could say "here's how weather works" and throw a 500,000 line long program on the desk in front of you - the source code for the most accurate weather simulation program in existence. This would also be a theory, in precisely the same sense as the previous two were. It would also presumably be the most accurate of the three. Most people think of a program as a set of instructions to perform some task, but it can also be thought of as a description of something. A program is the most formalized and systematic notion of a description. And somewhat unintuitively a computer itself is a very simplisitic device. One expression of such a device is the Turing Machine but there are others equivalent to it such as the Unlimited Register Machine. A URM only understands 3 instructions "move zero into register N" "increment register N" and "if the values in register n and m are equal jump to instruction i". So you could have a program that very accurately described the weather with nothing but a very, very long sequence of nothing but the aforementioned three instructions. And the "computer" it ran on would be an absurdly simple little device that could just step from one line of the program to another (always only encountering one of those three instructions). But the point is to keep the actual computer simple so you don't have to imagine some complex machine like an IBM computer on which nature actually runs for example. Whenever you have a description or a theory to accurately describe something you simulatenously have a mechanism or program. IOW if someone says, "such and such thing can really be understood, and here's a description for you. However what I'm describing is not a mechanism" Essentially that is a lie.(Somewhat extreme, but tha'ts what came to me). I forgot where I was going from here but hopefully this helped you to understand the concept better. 3)THe result of a dice throw is usually taken to be reasonably illustrative of pure randomness (even though technically it isn't). I think that KF will sometimes (or maybe usually) present a dice throw as an example of randomness and necessity acting together. But it should represent pure randomness because the forces acting on the dice do not act in such a way to cause the sides to fall with any easily describable pattern. Here's the problem with using dice throws to represent nature: We know from Dembski that pure randomness will not generate compressible or describable patterns of any kind. Just to use coin flips as an example, we know with a thousand coin flips we wouldn't get a thousand heads, we wouldn't get a head-tail combination repeated 500 times sequentially, we wouldn't get a binary number representing the digits of pi, we would not get ANY sort of describable pattern to characterize those 1000 coin flips collectively. But in nature we see all sorts of patterns that could never be generated by pure randomness, and in fact they are not because they are generated, or describable, by laws - the movement of planets, the rings of saturn are just trivial examples. How can dice throws be used to illustrate nature when there are laws at work in nature that produce discernable patterns of the type that dice throws could never accomplish? So that's why dice rolls cannot be used to illustrate the workings of nature.JT_{February 20, 2009
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-----Rob: “ID proponents haven’t come up with scientifically or mathematically usable definitions for the categories of chance and necessity that leave room for anything else. If we interpret them to mean respectively non-deterministic and deterministic, then we’ve logically exhausted all of the possibilities. And immaterialism doesn’t provide an out, unless immaterial phenomena are unbeholden to logic” I am afraid that I cannot quite untangle the meaning of that paragraph. Can someone interpret if for me? ----Rob: “Nature is uncontroversially Turing equivalent (at least). Nobody has made a reasonable case that human mental activity is noncomputable, so there is no theoretical reason that a human-like thinking engine cannot be implemented with natural materials.” I seem to be struggling with the meaning of that comment as well. Could this be one of those paragraphs that Rob and JayM believe can occur spontaneously from law and chance alone? -----“We don’t have a good grasp of the limits of nature. JayM compares human activity to wind and waves, and kairosfocus compares it to dice rolls. “Case proved,” says kairosfocus, as if C+N consists of nothing more than simple processes like dice rolls. Even if we focus on strictly deterministic rules, we cannot in general predict the behavior of non-linear systems. And not all such systems are characterized by simple regularity or chaos — many interesting and surprising behaviors are found inbetween. Before computers came along, who would have guessed that the set of points in which z => z^2+C is bounded would be so complicated?” Alas, I have failed yet a third time to uncover the mystery. I am beginning to understand what Richard Dawkins means by the term, “climbing mount improbable.” Can anyone else perform the requisite exegesis?StephenB_{February 20, 2009
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We've hit the 200-mark, so I'm guessing that this thread will become passe' pretty soon. I just want to summarize the point that I've been trying to make about the supposed irreducibility of intelligence. (Note that I'm not talking about the origin of human intelligence.): Dembski's "specified complexity", which he claims is our sole means for detecting design, is premised on the belief that design is irreducible to C+N (chance+necessity). As far as I know, this premise is not taken seriously in science. Here are some problems that I see with it: 1) ID proponents haven't come up with scientifically or mathematically usable definitions for the categories of chance and necessity that leave room for anything else. If we interpret them to mean respectively non-deterministic and deterministic, then we've logically exhausted all of the possibilities. And immaterialism doesn't provide an out, unless immaterial phenomena are unbeholden to logic. 2) Nature is uncontroversially Turing equivalent (at least). Nobody has made a reasonable case that human mental activity is noncomputable, so there is no theoretical reason that a human-like thinking engine cannot be implemented with natural materials. 3) We don't have a good grasp of the limits of nature. JayM compares human activity to wind and waves, and kairosfocus compares it to dice rolls. "Case proved," says kairosfocus, as if C+N consists of nothing more than simple processes like dice rolls. Even if we focus on strictly deterministic rules, we cannot in general predict the behavior of non-linear systems. And not all such systems are characterized by simple regularity or chaos -- many interesting and surprising behaviors are found inbetween. Before computers came along, who would have guessed that the set of points in which z => z^2+C is bounded would be so complicated? Conclusion: Nobody has made a decent case for the intelligence/C+N dichotomy. If ID is to be taken seriously, then somebody needs to do so. And it needs to be published, not presented in blog comments.R0b_{February 20, 2009
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Upright BiPed:
There is nothing in any physical evidence supporting ID that anything happened outside of any natural law.
My understanding is that ID defines intelligence to operate outside of natural law. Can you help me out here, StephenB?R0b_{February 20, 2009
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Just a reminder.... There is nothing in any physical evidence supporting ID that anything happened outside of any natural law. Try to keep that in mind.Upright BiPed_{February 20, 2009
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kairosfocus, #187: I really don't care about Lewontin's or Crick's metaphysical opinions. Sorry. In fact, I don't care much about metaphysics at all, other than the fact that ID is premised on a specific metaphysic that it tries to pass off as science. And the question of whether the term supernatural includes ID's non-C+D characterization of intelligence is a one of semantics.
Kindly examine the logic of the explanatory filter.
Done. The problems with the EF are a whole other can of worms. But here's one of them: Dembski's EF logic is premised in the mutual exclusivity of regularity, chance, and design. (See TDI page 49). Dembski repeatedly and explicitly claimed that the three are mutually exclusive. Then, a few months ago, he did an about-face and explicitly said that they are not mutually exclusive, and that he had dispensed with the EF. If regularity, chance, and design are well-defined, then why can't we answer a simple question like whether they're mutually exclusive?
And, there are two known classes of non-deterministic processes, leading to [a] undirected contingncies [chance and resulting statistical distributions], and [b] directed contingency [design].
If undirected contingency and directed contingency are known classes of processes, please point me to the scientific literature that defines them.
If you want to argue in context that there are laws of nature that channel the chemistry of prebiotic environments towards origin of life, and onward towards the body-plan level biodiversity thereof, what you are saying is that nature is front-loaded and programmed on the grandest level. The best explanation for that is . . . design.
I share your awe, but you need to convert that to a scientific argument if you want it to be considered science.
Finally, while we have not seen the origin of life forms, we HAVE seen the origin of the parts of life forms that are of relevant interest — i.e. digital information systems and storage subsystems as are in the heart of the cell. They are — per massive observation — the known product of intelligence.
I'm having a hard time thinking of a physical system that can't be modeled as a "digital information system" or a "storage system". So you're going to have narrow your criteria for systems that are "known products of intelligence".R0b_{February 20, 2009
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StephenB:
1) Where did you get this definition? (Intelligence is “non-natural”) ID defines “natural causes” to mean law and chance. Over and above that, they refer to “agency” as the third possible kind of cause.
You didn't answer my question. Can you show me where in the ID literature "intelligence" is defined as being non-C+N. Note that I'm not asking where it is asserted to be non-C+N. I want to know if IDists generally define intelligence to be non-C+N.
So, I use the word “non-natural” to express that category for Darwinists who think that all non-natural causes must also be supernatural causes.
Whether "all non-natural causes must also be supernatural causes" depends on how one defines "supernatural". I'll ask you again, do you think that nobody uses the term as a complement for "natural"?R0b_{February 20, 2009
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No, I don’t think that Pinker and Dennett would deny their own definitions.
I didn't ask whether they denied their own definitions. I asked whether they deny the existence of minds as they define the term. The question still stands. I asked for quotes in which materialists do that, and you supposedly provided such quotes. Are you now backpedaling?
Do you understand the difference between the brain as a physical organ and the mind as an intellectual faculty?
Yes. Are you acknowledging the validity of defining the mind as an intellectual faculty? Are you willing to interpret the word "mind" that way when other people use it? You consider people who don't share your metaphysic to be irrational. Can you supply quotes that demonstrate their irrationality without applying your own metaphysical definitions to their words?R0b_{February 20, 2009
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----JayM: "If we reason from the methodological naturalist perspective"...... Why would an alleged sympathizer of ID want to reason from the anti-ID position of "methodological naturalism."StephenB_{February 20, 2009
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1) Where did you get this definition? (Intelligence is "non-natural") ID defines "natural causes" to mean law and chance. Over and above that, they refer to "agency" as the third possible kind of cause. I refer to human agency as "non-natural" to distinguish it from Divine agency, which some call "supernatural," and "natural," which refers to law and chance. ---- Do all ID proponents define human intelligence and non-natural this way? Most of them? Most in the ID community don't need the word "non-natural" to know that human intelligence is neither a "supernatural" cause nor a "natural" cause. So, I use the word "non-natural" to express that category for Darwinists who think that all non-natural causes must also be supernatural causes.StephenB_{February 20, 2009
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----Rob: "Are you seriously asserting that Dennett and Pinker are denying the existence of minds as they define the terms, not as you define them?" No, I don't think that Pinker and Dennett would deny their own definitions. Why would anyone define their terms and then proceed to negate that which they just defined. That is not a well-thought-out question. Originally, I wanted to spare you from that fact, but, since you insist, there it is. So, back to business. Do you understand the difference between the brain as a physical organ and the mind as an intellectual faculty?StephenB_{February 20, 2009
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