Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

Three Simple Syllogisms

Share
Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Flipboard
Print
Email

In the comment thread to a prior post gpuccio, markf and I had a little debate about whether functional complex specified information can be generated by random (stochastic) processes.  BTW, before going on let me say that I truly appreciate markf and our other opponents who appear regularly on these pages.  How boring it would be if this blog were merely an echo chamber.  Now to the debate.

Gpuccio started it off with the following challenge to markf:  Can you name one example of a functional incredibly improbable random digital string.

After some waffling, markf finally admitted:  “The short answer is that I think it is most unlikely that there exists a digital string which is functional and complex and we have no reason to suppose it is designed – other than in living things.”

Back to gpuccio:  “The strings in protein coding genes are strings which are interpreted according to a quaternary code.  They are digital, complex and functional.  The code is not my invention or yours, it is regularly decoded by the translation system in the cells, and we have simply learned it from the cells themselves.  It is the code which allows us to read the meaning in protein coding genes.  Nucleotides in themselves are not digital.  They are just of four different types.  It is the specific sequence they have in the gene, which in no way depends on biochemical laws, which, correctly translated, reveals their function.”

Just so.

Now here is the next question for markf:  You all but admit that it is impossible to name a single example of a functional incredibly improbable random digital string – OTHER THAN IN LIVING THINGS.  Why the exception?  The burden is on your to demonstrate the exception is valid.

 The ID position can be summarized in a series of simple syllogisms: 

 Syllogism 1:  

Major premise:  Functional incredibly improbable random digital strings do not occur.

Minor premise:  DNA contains a functional incredibly improbable digital string.

Conclusion:  The digital string in DNA is not random.

Syllogism 2:  

Major premise:  Functional incredibly improbable digital strings do not occur as a result of mechanical necessity (i.e. physical law).

Minor premise:  DNA contains a functional incredibly improbable digital string.

Conclusion:  The digital string in DNA did not arise through mechanical necessity. 

Syllogism 3:

Major premise:  Since Aristotle we have known that all events are caused by random processes, mechanical necessity (i.e., physical law) or agency (i.e., design) or a combination of these three.

Minor premise:  We have just established that the digital string in DNA was not caused by a random processes or physical necessity.

Conclusion:  The digital string in DNA was caused by agency.

Corollary:

All functional incredibly improbable digital strings for which we can adduce their provenance by direct observation (as opposed to inference from secondary data) are the result of agency.  In other words, our overwhelming experience is that functional incredibly improbable digital strings come from one and only one source.  They are the product of intelligent design. 

markf you say that DNA is a digital string which is functional and complex and we have no reason to suppose it is designed.  For your conclusion to be true and my conclusions to be false it must be shown that my premises or false or that my conclusions do not follow from my premises as a matter of logic (or both).  Please explain in detail why you think my premises or false or my logic is faulty.

 PS:  You have posed your own challenge to me:  “Describe any possible outcome that falsifies ID without making any assumptions about the designer.”  Easy.  If someone can demonstrate any functional incredibly improbable digital strings that was developed by in a stochastic system, that would probably falsify ID.

Comments
mark, Do you ever wonder at the mental gymnastics you managed over the years? A double back with a full gainer. Nice.Upright BiPed
October 17, 2010
October
10
Oct
17
17
2010
03:10 AM
3
03
10
AM
PDT
@Barry Let me rephrase my question" When you speak of ” Functional incredibly improbable random digital strings” are you referring to FSCI? It's the first time I've heard the term ” Functional incredibly improbable random digital strings” and want to make sure I get it right.above
October 17, 2010
October
10
Oct
17
17
2010
02:32 AM
2
02
32
AM
PDT
Barry Just realised that the response to your syllogisms appears rather easy. So I will try rise to it. The major premise of syllogism 1 is false. Functional incredibly improbable random digital strings do occur - in living things. The reason they do not occur in non-living things is to do with "functional" and "digital" - there are plenty of incredibly improbable events out there - and some of them can be described as strings.markf
October 17, 2010
October
10
Oct
17
17
2010
02:02 AM
2
02
02
AM
PDT
CannuckianYankee, What is your criteria for the purification standard of science? Does it come from science itself, or are there metaphysical assumptions involved? No, it doesn't come from science itself. I won't pretend science can be completely purified of metaphysics, and have tried to maintain that there's a certain minimal amount of metaphysics necessary to do science to begin with. Nor do I think I have a cut and dry solution - the demarcation problem is real, after all. But I do know that when someone tells me 'X happened randomly/unguided/without purpose/by chance', they are - regardless of what X is - either speaking loosely (talking about models rather than reality, talking about for all practical purposes from our perspective), or they are importing metaphysics. They are no longer talking about something science can know or prove. Many materialists today mistakenly believe that they can separate their humanity from science, and that this is what makes science what it is. I think many materialists tend to mistake their metaphysics for science as well. Maybe some of them think they're not really doing metaphysics at all. Maybe some of them know, and don't care. This is an issue that tends to be avoided these days. I think the majority of scientists nowadays tend to side with Carnap as opposed to Einstein in their view of science and metaphysics. I like this Mary Midgley quote I vaguely recall: Those who will have nothing to do with metaphysics become enslaved to outdated forms of it. So my own view differs - the problem isn't just that so many think science can be divorced from philosophy, but that they often present their philosophically loaded positions as science itself, knowingly or unknowingly.nullasalus
October 17, 2010
October
10
Oct
17
17
2010
01:26 AM
1
01
26
AM
PDT
nullasalus, "In fact, it’s my belief! I just don’t think science purified of extraneous metaphysics can settle the issue, ever. And science so purified is the standard I think is best for science." Thanks. I think this very statement really emphasizes my point. What is your criteria for the purification standard of science? Does it come from science itself, or are there metaphysical assumptions involved? You think science so purified is best for science, and I (and I gather others here) disagree. Which of us is more scientifically accurate in that regard? I don't think anyone could make that determination. I refer you back to Einstein's quote at 17. "Not to knock your greater point, but Einstein did make some mistakes on that front too." Yes, I fully agree, but one thing Einstein got right is in reagard to his metaphysical musings, and his contention that such musings cannot be completely divorced from science. He wasn't completely right in all that he believed or assumed, but where he was right allowed him to make one of the most significant scientific discoveries of the 20th Century. What I appreciate about Einstein is his humanity. He made no attempt to separate his humanity from his doing science - he was as comfortable with bringing his violin to Christian prayer meetings as a means of experiencing the divine (even though he was not himself a Christian), as he was with discussing philosophy with some of the great minds of his day. Many materialists today mistakenly believe that they can separate their humanity from science, and that this is what makes science what it is. And all this leads back to Barry's very poignant question in the op - "why the exception?" Well I sense that the exception is made out of an arbitrary criteria for design as being only valid outside living things - even though it is living things (namely humans) designing other things. If we try to divorce science from philosophy and metaphysics, we are left with these questions unanswered and unanswerable, and this to me is a complete denial of our own humanity for the sake of "science." It's really not science then, but "scientism," which dismisses these things. I will direct you to another consideration though, which gpuccio already mentioned - that there is the possibility of good and bad philosophy. This is an issue that tends to be avoided these days. I think the majority of scientists nowadays tend to side with Carnap as opposed to Einstein in their view of science and metaphysics. Carnap was pretty much anti-metaphysics, while he did make some adjustments to this view out of necessity later on in his life. Perhaps this can be attributed to his friendship with Einstein.CannuckianYankee
October 17, 2010
October
10
Oct
17
17
2010
12:46 AM
12
12
46
AM
PDT
markf, Thanks for your response. "It would equally be unfalsifiable to say we dismiss design therefore chance did it." I'm sorry, Mark, but I just don't accept that as valid for many reasons, but mainly I fail to see how ID argues the flip side of this - "Darwinism can't explain it, therefore, a designer did it." As gpuccio pointed out, a designer is not invoked a priori. The IDist reasonably asks the question: "could what appears designed actually be designed, and if so, what would be the reasonable criteria for detecting whether something is designed?" Only then is a designer reasonably invoked as an implication of the criterially met inference of design, based on other reasonable design inferences, which many materialists themselves have postulated. 2ndly, "They rarely discuss design, and never how specific examples can or cannot be explained by it. That’s because there isn’t a design theory to discuss." No, I haven't noticed this. If anything, the ID theory has been well articulated in this forum, and much of the discussion is centered around this theory. Part of the theory is a counter to Darwinism, as part of Darwinian theory is a counter to design arguments. Furthermore, since this is an open forum where people such as yourself are free to make counter arguments - thus, much time is spent here defending ID from those counter arguments, which predominantly come from committed Darwinists - I think it is to be reasonably expected that there should be much discussion as to the inadequacies of Darwinian theory. Personally, I'm happy to be part of the discussion.CannuckianYankee
October 17, 2010
October
10
Oct
17
17
2010
12:03 AM
12
12
03
AM
PDT
CannuckianYankee, No argument there, but I don’t really see where it is relevant to your apparent initial contention that we should divorce metaphysical considerations from science initially – (that’s if I’m understanding you correctly – perhaps not?) I don't think science can proceed utterly divorced from metaphysical speculations. I think they can be minimized, and I think science and metaphysics can be (and for rational people, ultimately must) be joined. I don't think that conjunction is necessarily "science" (whether it's a materialist or someone else doing it), but then again what does it matter what it's called? I don’t have a problem with the first sentence, but I can’t seem to tie that to why you are an ID skeptic. It would appear to me that such a realization would open up some sympathies with ID, since ID does not invoke teleology without first detecting design by reasonable measures. I don’t think “invoke,” though, is an adequate term with regard to ID and a designer, I think recognition by implication is more precise. I have zero problem with teleology and design - I think design is evident throughout nature (included in selection and mutation), as is teleology. I'm an ID skeptic because I don't think that the identification of design (or lack of it) in nature is 'science', which always strikes me as being an important part of ID. If merely arguing that design is evident on philosophical or metaphysical grounds suffices to make one an ID proponent, go ahead, call me that. But I've had it put to me otherwise. Then again, if it's "science" to make declarations about the lack of design in nature (which are necessarily borne out of metaphysical and philosophical argument, rather than our being able to check to see if some agent is ultimately letting nature unfold according to a plan, or intervenes the way a programmer would with a program), then the opposite is science too. But really, my inclination is to have science be science, stripped of metaphysics. That harms darwinists a lot more than it harms ID proponents anyway. It seems to me that if Einstein had merely accepted, as many of his philosophical counterparts (Rudolf Carnap being one of them) did at the time, that science had already mastered what can be known about time, relativity would not have been postulated nor confirmed. On the other hand, where would we be if we all accepted Einstein's attitude re: quantum physics? He wasn't a fan. Not to knock your greater point, but Einstein did make some mistakes on that front too. I want to stress that I have no problem concluding a designer is responsible for nature. In fact, it's my belief! I just don't think science purified of extraneous metaphysics can settle the issue, ever. And science so purified is the standard I think is best for science. (But, as I always follow it up, if science isn't so purified, then the hell with it - it's open season.)nullasalus
October 16, 2010
October
10
Oct
16
16
2010
11:44 PM
11
11
44
PM
PDT
gpuccio, "Thank you for the beautiful Einstein quote." You're welcome. I forgot to cite the reference. You can find it here: http://www.spaceandmotion.com/Albert-Einstein-Quotes.htm under: "Albert Einstein on Metaphysics and Philosophy Remarks on Bertrand Russell’s Theory of Knowledge"CannuckianYankee
October 16, 2010
October
10
Oct
16
16
2010
11:39 PM
11
11
39
PM
PDT
Gpuccio You write: So, as you can see, we are not hypothesizing a designer “of unspecified powers and motives”. We are making the reasonable, scientific and appropriate hypothesis that a designer with conscious processes and purposes of the kind we observe in us humans, operating in a real context with specific limitations, like humans do, can explain biological information So what are those purposes and limitations? CY writes in #9: Well materialism doesn’t escape this by suggesting chance and necessity a prior to explain everything This is absolutely correct. It would equally be unfalsifiable to say we dismiss design therefore chance did it. Evolutionary theory doesn't do that. It hypothesises how chance does it (in many different ways). You may disagree - but there is something to debate and (with difficulty) test. It is not only falsifiable - but in many cases has been show to be false and been modified as a result. To leave the explanation at the level of "chance", "design" or "necessity" - is not to offer an explanation at all. Notice that when people on this forum discuss the development of life (because much of the conversation is about other things altogether) they discuss evolutionary theory and how specific examples can or cannot be explained by it. They rarely discuss design, and never how specific examples can or cannot be explained by it. That's because there isn't a design theory to discuss. Now if we can start to make some assumptions about the designer's purposes and limitations ...markf
October 16, 2010
October
10
Oct
16
16
2010
11:37 PM
11
11
37
PM
PDT
"Sure, but you yourself said that materialists can – and I pointed out, some of them do – deny ‘agency’, just as they deny ‘belief’. They don’t like to parade that around as publicly, but there you have it." No argument there, but I don't really see where it is relevant to your apparent initial contention that we should divorce metaphysical considerations from science initially - (that's if I'm understanding you correctly - perhaps not?) I think that metaphysics again are important - as you seem to agree with to a certain extent. Obviously the materialists who dismiss even human agency - and there have been discussions of a few of them in this blog - are completely out the door as far as rationality, but I think this emphasizes my point - they are taking materialism to it's ultimate conclusion that there is no meaning - and the very metaphysic from which they base such an "inquiry" goes out the door with it. Agency if anything suggests purpose and meaning. It seems clear that if you can somehow do away with purpose and meaning, you do away with agency, but to what end? Where does this leave science? I think it leaves science out the back door somewhere, and we are left with nihilism. I guess my disagreement - if there is one, is with this: "There would be no ‘natural selection’ or ‘random mutation’ as far as science is concerned – just selection and mutation, with questions of their guidance, purpose, teleology, etc left unasked and unanswered by science. Sounds fair to me. But then, I’m an ID skeptic around here." I don't have a problem with the first sentence, but I can't seem to tie that to why you are an ID skeptic. It would appear to me that such a realization would open up some sympathies with ID, since ID does not invoke teleology without first detecting design by reasonable measures. I don't think "invoke," though, is an adequate term with regard to ID and a designer, I think recognition by implication is more precise. As I pointed out later in the thread in agreement with much of what you stated before this quote in post # 6, and as articulated by Peter Williams, the flip side of invoking design is invoking unlimited probability resources. I think we're in agreement there. Where we seem to be in disagreement is that this renders metaphysical considerations to be out the door as far as doing science. While I agree that this might certainly be a good place to start, I don't think we can rationally divorce metaphysical considerations from science, for the very fact that the universe may not be as we sensually perceive it, and in fact, has shown not to be so, based on certain initial metaphysical assumptions (or more precisely - questions), which were later confirmed by science. The reason I mentioned Einstein in a particular post, is that he formed his theory of relativity initially out of a metaphysical problem with time. It wasn't a scientific observation, but a deep held problem with our sensual concept or experience of time, or as Einstein initially termed it, "the now." It seems to me that if Einstein had merely accepted, as many of his philosophical counterparts (Rudolf Carnap being one of them) did at the time, that science had already mastered what can be known about time, relativity would not have been postulated nor confirmed. I would agree with gpuccio's well articulated point that ID needs to counter Darwinism for its survival, (and I would add) simply because of the two possible invocations involved in the implications of each theory - the invocation of unlimited probability resources, vs the invocation of a designer. One does not escape one's metaphysical assumptions either way here, but it seems that the invocation of a designer following an initial reasonable detection of design is far more parsimonious than invoking unlimited probability resources, which would ultimately require an infinite universe.CannuckianYankee
October 16, 2010
October
10
Oct
16
16
2010
10:59 PM
10
10
59
PM
PDT
CannuckianYankee, Pardon me, btw, for skipping over a lot of what you're saying. I'd say a lot more, but I'm trying to keep my responses short. Otherwise I'll go off at length. Well, the very fact that humans design things – if design is to have any meaning at all, demonstrates that design IS present in nature, and this very fact leads one to ask a very important metaphysical question – namely; from whence comes agency? Sure, but you yourself said that materialists can - and I pointed out, some of them do - deny 'agency', just as they deny 'belief'. They don't like to parade that around as publicly, but there you have it. You say "the very fact that humans design things..", but some people will deny that. Philosophers, gotta love 'em. I realize that you don’t put much weight to Dawkins’ philosophy, but this is in a nutshell the overwhelming philosophy of Darwinism – not just Dawkins’ version of it. Whaddya know - I don't think much of Darwin either. You don't have to convince me that Darwinism comes laced with metaphysical presumptions that the science can't justify, and can never justify. Someone else got to me on that years ago, and I reversed myself the moment they convinced me that Darwin, in his own theory, was positively committed to the denial of purpose, design, guidance etc in evolution, such that stripping the theory of that denial is to eliminate Darwinism itself.nullasalus
October 16, 2010
October
10
Oct
16
16
2010
09:23 PM
9
09
23
PM
PDT
nullasalus, "I’m not sure it’s so clear." I think it's clear with respect to human agency. Darwin did not appear to object to Paley's watchmaker analogy as far as it pertains to human agency. Where he disagreed is in relation to it's application to biology. This is the crucial area where Darwinists seem to beg the question. Again, there's no criteria for the demarkation between what is designed and what is not. This does not mean that Darwinists do not recognize that some things are designed, and some things are not. They clearly do, but they arbitrarily render design as only a human endeavor, totally dismissing that design can be anywhere present in nature. As I've continually argued, this position comes from an a priori metaphysical position of materialism, and not from the evidence at hand. Well, the very fact that humans design things - if design is to have any meaning at all, demonstrates that design IS present in nature, and this very fact leads one to ask a very important metaphysical question - namely; from whence comes agency? Again, where's the demarkation criteria for a committed Darwinist? For Dawkins, biological agency is an illusion. Why then is human agency not an illusion? I realize that you don't put much weight to Dawkins' philosophy, but this is in a nutshell the overwhelming philosophy of Darwinism - not just Dawkins' version of it.CannuckianYankee
October 16, 2010
October
10
Oct
16
16
2010
09:14 PM
9
09
14
PM
PDT
gpuccio, I essentially agree. I do believe that we cannot really separate science from philosophy of science. Philosophy of science is as necessary as science. I agree that some metaphysics is necessary for science to even get off the ground. The problem is that there are multiple metaphysics compatible with the science you get if you appropriately minimize the metaphysics you bring in. Compatibility comes easily when we're talking about science and metaphysics - even the idealists and panpsychists can join in. To put it another way: Science (to anthropomorphize a bit) on its own doesn't mandate a person what metaphysical lens to view the data through. It doesn't even mandate whether you should be a scientific realist or anti-realist, or whether science is merely descriptive when it comes to things like physical law or if there's some immaterial law-'thing' determining what we see. I will admit, this worries me: So, for me a 500 bit string expressing function, come out of a truly random system, for which I could not be able to suggest any reasonable design intervention, Truly random system? There's no way for us to ever determine that. What if our universe is simulated, or in a situation analogous to a simulation (which meshes easily with many theistic concepts)? We know for a fact that the assumed random can in fact be rigged - and that's just on our mere human level! There's 'random, for all practical purposes' or 'modeled as random' and that's about all science can get us to. This goes back to my problem with natural selection. Sure, it's a useful concept - but we don't need the 'natural' in natural selection, and we don't need the 'random' in random mutation. Science can't show us either the lack of guidance if it can't show us the presence of it, and the 'truly random' remains beyond the scope as well. On the flipside, if it's "science" for one party to smuggle in their assumptions and just assume the "truly random", the truly unguided, etc.. then it's "science" for another party to bring in their own perspective, and reject the random and unguided claims altogether.nullasalus
October 16, 2010
October
10
Oct
16
16
2010
09:02 PM
9
09
02
PM
PDT
CannuckianYankee: Thank you for the beautiful Einstein quote.gpuccio
October 16, 2010
October
10
Oct
16
16
2010
08:49 PM
8
08
49
PM
PDT
nullasalus: You say: "Either way, I agree with much of what you say. Where we may differ is that I think some kind of a priori cannot be eluded when evaluating nature, and that we shouldn’t convince ourselves that otherwise is possible (or more crazily, that materialism is ‘the default’). Maybe bringing philosophy into science, at least when talk of ‘design’ surfaces, is unavoidable. And if so, maybe the sort of philosophy ID proponents brings to the table is just as valid as the kind materialists bring. Maybe moreso." I essentially agree. I do believe that we cannot really separate science from philosophy of science. Philosophy of science is as necessary as science. But both scienc and its philosophy can be good or bad. For me, good science is science which really tries to explain reality, according to some reasonable, but not absolute, philosophy of science. Good philosophy of science is any reasonable model of science which does not attempt to be dogmatic and universally shared (that is, imposed). IOWs, I don't believe that any universal "scientific method" exists (see Feyerabend). IOWs, I don't believe that any philosophical conception (including falsifiability or methodological naturalism) should ever be proclaimed as "universally necessary", and a priori capable of distinguishing between science and not science. IOWs, I do believe that the only trait which can in some way help distinguish good science from bad science is the capacity to explain observable reality.gpuccio
October 16, 2010
October
10
Oct
16
16
2010
08:46 PM
8
08
46
PM
PDT
Mark: I think that UB at 10 has probably caught the essential problem. We at ID have an empirical approach, not a philosophical or religious one. You say: "Nothing can falsify ID if you make no assumptions about the designer – because a designer of unspecified powers and motives can produce anything.". Correct. But the point is that nobody has ever suggested a designer "of unspecified powers and motives". That would not be a scientific hypothesis becasue, as you say, would not be falsifiable. But we have never made such an hypothesis. ID is empirical, and it derives from empirical observations: the acknowledgement of objective properties in biological information (dFSCI) which by an inference based on analogy points to a process similar to human design for its generation. So, as you can see, we are not hypothesizing a designer "of unspecified powers and motives". We are making the reasonable, scientific and appropriate hypothesis that a designer with conscious processes and purposes of the kind we observe in us humans, operating in a real context with specific limitations, like humans do, can explain biological information. As we have already discussed, that hypopthesis can be falsified (that is, its scientific motivations can be rendered non existent) in two ways: a) Demonstrating that dFSCI is not a marker of design: that could be simply made as I have shown, with the 500 coin tosses expressing function model, renouncing to the non scientific extreme possibility (non falsifiable) of a designer "of unspecified powers and motives" whi could for strange reasons be involved in any possible experimental system. Indeed, we are not renouncing anything, because we never included such a non scientific approach in our theory. So, for me a 500 bit string expressing function, come out of a truly random system, for which I could not be able to suggest any reasonable design intervention, would definitely falsify ID as a scientific theory. I am not interested to a blind faith in a designer "of unspecified powers and motives": I would leave that to others, and I would be the first who would call that faith unscientific. The problem if that both you and me know in our heart that such an empirical falsification of a) will never take place. Because a) is simply the necessary consequence of some general assumprions about empirical causes which are very unlikely to be shown false: in particular, that all observed empirical causes can be classified as necessity, chance or design. That is a general assumption which should be easily made, but materialists have learned that it is better not to concede that simple point to ID, because the consequences could be terrible (for them). That's the real motivation behind their (doomed) attempts to falsify a), or at least to suggest that it is not falsifiable, including yours, which I must say are among the most sincere and honest I have met. But the point remains that a) is both falsifiable (with the specifications we have in some way agreed upon) and unfalsified. I would remind anyway that a possibility remains for the materialists: to falsify b). b) Demonstrating that what we observe in biological information is not true dFSCI, because it is certainly complex and functional (I would not advice anybody to attempt to deny that, although many have desperately tried even such an extreme avenue), but it can explain though some reasonable model involving chance and necessity. Indeed, such a model exists, and it is the darwinian theory. The problem is that it is in no way reasonable. So, now we have come to the point where ID and darwinisn are really opposite scientific views. The situation could be described as follows: 1) From the point of view of ID, darwinism, if scientifically credible, is a falsification of ID. I state that in very clear letters: If the darwinian theory is shown to be scientifically credible, than ID is completely falsified (rendered non necessary) as a scientific theory. If that were the case, I would never spend another word in favour of ID. We in ID do believe that darwinism is not a credible scientific theory. I personally firmly believe that. And we try to show why. 2) From the point of view of the darwinian theory, ID is simply scientifically non motivated. And they are right, if they were right. IDS would really be scientifically non motivated, if darwinism were credible, which is what darwinists seem to believe. So, as you can see, while ID is in no way a purely negative alternative to darwinism, for merely technical reasons, being darwinism practically the only existing theory which explicitly attempts to explain biological information through a more or less defined chance + necessity model, the final judgment about the scientific credibility of darwinism becomes naturally a crucial point for ID's scientific survival. That's why, I believe, we are here. To discuss point b), to try to arrive at a credible scientific judgement about darwinian theory. All the rest is not truly important. a) will never be empirically faslified, and it will never be shown to be empirically non falsifiable. Those lines of defence are doomed. It's on b) that we really must confront ourselves.gpuccio
October 16, 2010
October
10
Oct
16
16
2010
08:33 PM
8
08
33
PM
PDT
nullasalus, others Fist of all, sorry for the many posts. I haven't posted here for a while, but I have been lurking. "Unfortunately, this slices ID out of science at the cost of kicking Darwinism out of science too. There would be no ‘natural selection’ or ‘random mutation’ as far as science is concerned – just selection and mutation, with questions of their guidance, purpose, teleology, etc left unasked and unanswered by science." Yes, that would seem to be a very reasonable avenue upon which to start. However, I can't get passed what seems to me an assumption - that science can't ask nor answer philosophical or metaphysical questions. Science to me does not rest in a vacuum of physical evidence, but needs guidance from our metaphysics. Einstein understood this, apparently. He understood the scientific tendency to dismiss metaphysics as too subjective and abstract to be applied to questions of reality. However, he recognized that without certain metaphysical assumptions, it would be difficult for humans to even immagine anything that isn't sensually apparent - hence, we would not have even approached theories of relativity and quantum mechanics without some prior metaphysical reasoning. I think an important difference between the sort of thinking Einstein engaged in, and the thinking of modern materialistic scientists, is that (while not perfectly), he was prepared to abandon his own metaphysical assumptions when a propensity of evidence warranted such. I think metaphysics and science go hand in hand. Religion is basically formed from certain metaphysical assumptions. Scientific methodology is also formed out of certain (sometimes converging with religion) metaphysical assumptions. So while we can begin with your sort of neutrality, such neutrality ultimately doesn't answer some very important questions, who's answers we seem driven to seek. Somewhere certain metaphysical commitments must be made, if we are to progress in science. What most of us are arguing here is that materialistic metaphysical assumptions are highly inadequate to that task, for the very important reason that if carried to their ultimate conclusions, they answer precisely nothing. If the universe is essentially meaningless, then so is anything we can glean through scientific investigation. I personally don't think such a universe exists. The universe is full of meaning, and our very ability to do science is reflective of that meaning. So I don't think that Darwinism nor ID are necessarily "kicked out of the equation." Parts of Darwinism so far as they address the evidence at hand without appealing to a priori materialistic assumptions (which lead to meaninglessness) would remain in the equation. After all, natural selection does offer us some explanatory power. The same would apply to ID. I think where we differ on this issue is precisely in our worldview commitments. It's quite apparent that a scientist can do good science with either a materialistic metaphysic or with a theistic metaphysic, or something in-between if such a thing exists. Thus, science is in some way separated from metaphysical assumptions. However, as I explained, the very questions, which science attempts to answer are driven by those very same assumptions. The question we have to ask ourselves is: which metaphysical assumptions if continually carried out, will lead us to increased scientific knowledge, and which will ultimately lead to nihilism? I think it's safe to say that we've experienced a longevity with science operating under theistic assumptions more so than we've experienced with science operating under materialism. I think materialism will ultimately lead to the death of science, because nobody will be interested in ultimate meaning. IOW, nobody will be asking the kinds of metaphysical questions, which drive our inquiry into doing science. We're very quickly approaching that point even as we post here. Part of the evidence for us approaching that point is how materialists attempt to completely divorce metaphysics from science without much success. Einstein warned against this: "By his clear critique Hume did not only advance philosophy in a decisive way but also- though through no fault of his- created a danger for philosophy in that, following his critique, a fateful 'fear of metaphysics' arose which has come to be a malady of contemporary empiricist philosophising; this malady is the counterpart to that earlier philosophising in the clouds, which thought it could neglect and dispense with what was given by the senses. ... It finally turns out that one can, after all, not get along without metaphysics." (Ideas and Opinions - 1944)CannuckianYankee
October 16, 2010
October
10
Oct
16
16
2010
08:31 PM
8
08
31
PM
PDT
CannuckianYankee, It is quite clear by both materialists and non-materialists that design can be falsified. If design can be determined, it can also be falsified. Even Dawkins recognizes this in his Mt. Rushmore analogy. I'm not sure it's so clear. And as for Dawkins, I admit I have little respect for his thinking. The man has consistency problems, particularly when it comes to philosophical issues. And the lack of consistency among ID-opponents (the tendency to say 'design can't be falsified!', and then 'design was falsified as an explanation!' or 'we've shown design didn't take place!') is one reason my ID sympathies remain high. Keep in mind who number themselves as ID opponents. You can say it's just common sense to believe Mount Rushmore was designed. Then realize that there are materialists (well-respected ones) who say that there are no such things as 'beliefs'. Pre-existing philosophical/metaphysical commitments are some powerful stuff. Either way, I agree with much of what you say. Where we may differ is that I think some kind of a priori cannot be eluded when evaluating nature, and that we shouldn't convince ourselves that otherwise is possible (or more crazily, that materialism is 'the default'). Maybe bringing philosophy into science, at least when talk of 'design' surfaces, is unavoidable. And if so, maybe the sort of philosophy ID proponents brings to the table is just as valid as the kind materialists bring. Maybe moreso.nullasalus
October 16, 2010
October
10
Oct
16
16
2010
08:29 PM
8
08
29
PM
PDT
nullasalus, "I’d just like to point out that while ‘design’ is asserted to be unfalsifiable, so too is ‘non-design’." Very true. I think you're getting something here. But I think the important word above is "asserted." It is quite clear by both materialists and non-materialists that design can be falsified. If design can be determined, it can also be falsified. Even Dawkins recognizes this in his Mt. Rushmore analogy. The assertion, however is only applied to design in nature. We can determine design as the product of human agency, and that's where such a determination ends. This assertion is an obvious instance of begging the question. If we follow materialistic assumptions to their ultimate conclusions, nothing is designed - not even human artifacts - they are all the result of random undetermined and non-purposeful natural processes. This is where design begins to appear meaningless in all aspects of the natural world (and humans are after all, part of the natural world); but it is based on an a priori materialistic assumption. Somewhere there has to be a demarkation between what is in fact designed, and what is not. If we make the assumption that design is only applicable as a product of human agency, then we have failed to distinguish that demarkation based on any evidential criteria. It is merely an assertion.CannuckianYankee
October 16, 2010
October
10
Oct
16
16
2010
07:25 PM
7
07
25
PM
PDT
markf, I should add that (in reference to my last post) ID is a more synchronistic approach to the matter at hand. It doesn't summarily dismiss all instances of chance and necessity, but it does permit design as an alternative to inflating the probabilistic resources when what we are dealing with appears to resist Dawkins' designoid category. IOW, it's much more parsimonious with regard to the actual evidence. There's a huge difference between actually invoking a designer, and detecting evidence, which implies a designer. When an archeologist finds an object, which appears to be designed, but could be explained by natural processes, he/she does not automatically assume that there is a designer; rather, she/he applies some sort of design filter to the object, which either leads to design or to natural processes. I think it's safe to assume that the (good) archeologist applies very strict criteria in his/her design filter, so as not to come to false conclusions. When such a filter leads more to design than natural process, only then is the question of a designer legitimately invoked by the implications. I gather there are instances when the archeological design filter gives a false positive. Such an instance would not render the filter illegitimate, rather incomplete. As such, filters can be improved to prevent future false positives.CannuckianYankee
October 16, 2010
October
10
Oct
16
16
2010
07:03 PM
7
07
03
PM
PDT
markf, if that's all you've got, OK. I can understand why you would duck the challenge of the OP. Good evening.Barry Arrington
October 16, 2010
October
10
Oct
16
16
2010
06:55 PM
6
06
55
PM
PDT
Sorry above. I do not understand your question at [7].Barry Arrington
October 16, 2010
October
10
Oct
16
16
2010
06:53 PM
6
06
53
PM
PDT
At some point reason must take hold. Biological systems are based on the most sophisticated computational algorithms ever devised, written, and implemented. How can this not be obvious?GilDodgen
October 16, 2010
October
10
Oct
16
16
2010
06:03 PM
6
06
03
PM
PDT
hi mark, ID is not about what an unknown designer could do. It's about what is observed in nature. Note the difference.Upright BiPed
October 16, 2010
October
10
Oct
16
16
2010
05:52 PM
5
05
52
PM
PDT
markf, "Nothing can falsify ID if you make no assumptions about the designer – a designer of unspecified powers and motives can produce anything." I gather you're implying that anything can then be explained by design, which doesn't explain anything in particular, and that a design argument can't escape invoking a designer a priori. Well materialism doesn't escape this by suggesting chance and necessity a prior to explain everything. I refer you to the article I cited in my last post, where Peter Williams states: "Limiting the explanatory capacity of ‘chance’ is crucial to the integrity of science: ‘If we allow ourselves too many “wildcard” bits of information. . . we can explain anything be reference to chance.’[25] Allowing ourselves too many ‘wildcard bits of information’ commits the inflationary fallacy: ‘the problem inherent in the inflationary fallacy is always that it multiplies probabilistic resources in the absence of independent evidence that such resources exist.’[26] Postulating unlimited probabilistic resources makes it impossible to warrant attributing anything to design." In other words, I can always postulate chance by "inflating the probabilistic resources," which itself explains precisely nothing. So the materialistic substitute for invoking a designer is to invoke unlimited probabilistic resources. One thing you're getting incorrect here is that design proponents apply design criteria to all physical phenomenon. Such is not the case. Demski's explanatory filter does allow for the designbot, but when the probability factor appears beyond the limits of mere chance and necessity, the explanatory filter allows for agency as the best explanation. In other words, we can use the explanatory filter for Mt. Rushmore, as a purposefully designed object, but we can't apply the same criteria to Pike's Peak. So I don't think your argument is at all warranted. I would also argue that you would use the exact same criteria for falsifying ID as you would use to falsify Dawkins' criteria for the design of Mt. Rushmore. Demonstrate how wind erosion could produce the 4 heads on Mt. Rushmore. This does not involve making any assumptions about the designer. All you are really concerned with here is the materialistic processes the probability factor and the appearance of design, not the designer.CannuckianYankee
October 16, 2010
October
10
Oct
16
16
2010
05:07 PM
5
05
07
PM
PDT
@Cannuck -"And as I’ve discovered over the years, many of those assumptions are not consciously formed, but appear to be a product of social conditioning, that we only really become aware of when we experience a major paradigm shift in our worldview" That is so true! And I speak for myself here. Many unconscious assumptions I've held in the past, I have abandoned once I started reflecting on them.above
October 16, 2010
October
10
Oct
16
16
2010
04:57 PM
4
04
57
PM
PDT
First I would like to say that it's always a pleasant experience to converse with Mark, even though we disagree on most things. I'm interested in this issue myself as I have been trying (by playing the devil's advocate) to come up with an example where chance alone can create FSCI. @Barry When you speak of " Functional incredibly improbable random digital strings" is that what you are referring to?above
October 16, 2010
October
10
Oct
16
16
2010
04:54 PM
4
04
54
PM
PDT
I'd just like to point out that while 'design' is asserted to be unfalsifiable, so too is 'non-design'. Any given artifact or event could be regarded as a pure chance, unintended outcome. The flipside of our being unable to determine if a designer is ever orchestrating events is that we're unable to determine if a designer is not orchestrating such events. In principle, each and every event could be designed, and every material thing (no matter how common and mundane) an artifact, and there's never been an appropriately 'stochastic' event or process in the history of the universe. The cost of recognizing this is to render all talk of life or biological organisms - or really, much anything else - coming about by unguided, stochastic (in the relevant sense), purposeless processes meaningless to science. It's simply beyond the field's purview. Unfortunately, this slices ID out of science at the cost of kicking Darwinism out of science too. There would be no 'natural selection' or 'random mutation' as far as science is concerned - just selection and mutation, with questions of their guidance, purpose, teleology, etc left unasked and unanswered by science. Sounds fair to me. But then, I'm an ID skeptic around here.nullasalus
October 16, 2010
October
10
Oct
16
16
2010
04:52 PM
4
04
52
PM
PDT
Barry, Excellent effort here. I think it's going to be quite difficult to reach a materialist with this very sound argument simply due to his/her a priori assumptions. And as I've discovered over the years, many of those assumptions are not consciously formed, but appear to be a product of social conditioning, that we only really become aware of when we experience a major paradigm shift in our worldview. I.e, we have some sort of epiphany regarding the ways in which we have been thinking all along, and we realize that there is another way that is more rational and objective. Here's what I sense as the subconscious social conditioning framework committed to by materialists, and how it forms: From the time of birth, we begin to observe many physical phenomena, and we form certain assumptions as to why and how they occur. Many times we are correct, that there are certain phenomena that will always occur in a certain way - the Gerber falls to the floor when we flick it with our spoon. Later we go to school, and the only assumptions by which we are permitted to explore are those, which contain some element of necessity (physical law). We are only taught about agency in the non-scientific curriculum - the arts, literature, humanities, etc. All these disciplines are separated out from one another as some sort of speciality, which have nothing to do with each other. Eventually a completely materialistic frame of thinking becomes ingrained. Now if we look at biology from this perspective, we can only explain any physical phenomenon by the same framework. Agency isn't science. It fits only in the "humanities," and is highly relative to our emotions, and is taught as something important in a democracy where we value "human expression." So the materialist has this disconnect between any notion that agency can be something that can be studied scientifically, and the ingrained assumptions regarding necessity and physical reality. DNA must be explained within this paradigm, or it can't be explained. It's as simple as that. Any attempt to explain it outside of this framework is viewed as perhaps interesting, but like the humanities, highly relative and subjective. I don't know how many times I've heard a materialist say something like: "well, if we're going to accept agency (God), who's god are we going to accept? In other words, agency can't be objective, because it's formed out of "faith," for which there are unlimited varieties in the human collective imagination. Now I have to be fair and grant that agency is something that is studied scientifically. However, it seems that much of that study operates on the same materialistic assumptions. So it's limited to human agency as opposed to all other phenomenon, which must be interpreted according to physical necessity. And because of these assumptions, we've even begun to deny that there is human agency applicable to the idea of free will. In other words, we do what we do because of some as yet unexplained and highly intricate and complex process of physical laws, which do not ultimately involve our free will. So now we have this DNA, which seems to defy necessity. Lest we think the materialist is going to stop there and accept such an assumption, let's remember the "designoid" fallacy found in Richard Dawkins' own words: "biology is the study of complicated things, which give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose." Now the problem with Dawkins' designoid, according to his own definition, is that the appearance of design is superficial. I doubt very much that he could validly apply this definition to DNA, so he avoids doing so. He simply asserts that natural processes are capable of developing CSI through a process of non-random and cumulative natural selection. IOW, he simply applies his a priori materialistic assumptions to explain (away) DNA. Dawkins makes an exception to his own criteria here. If things look "non-superficially" designed, we can still explain their "non-designed" development through natural selection. Hence, Dawkins completely contradicts his own argument, and DNA is an example of something, which more than superficially appears designed - it is not a designoid. In "Climbing Mount Improbable" Dawkins gives criteria for determining that something is designed as opposed to being the result of random material processes, and he uses Mt. Rushmore as his example. His design filter is simply that the amount of complex detail in the four heads of Mt. Rushmore are highly improbable as the result of random processes, like wind erosion. I sense another obvious disconnect here between this criteria and his apparent ignorance of design arguments for DNA. Dawkins should apply the very same criteria to DNA, but he refuses to do so. See the following article: http://www.arn.org/docs/williams/pw_purposeoflife.htm All this leads to an important statement by William Dembski in this regard (which is found in the above cited article): ‘the filter asks three questions in the following order: (1) Does a law explain it? (2) does chance explain it? (3) does design explain it?’[21] If something can reasonably be explained by chance and/or necessity, then (by Occam’s razor) it should be so explained (it is, at most, designoid); but if such an explanation is inadequate, then an inference to the more complex but more adequate hypothesis of design is warranted. Intelligence easily accomplishes what unintelligent causes find all but impossible, the creation of specified complexity; hence the detection of specified complexity, while it does not prove design beyond all possibility of doubt, does prove design beyond all reasonable doubt." (Dembski - The Explanatory Filter). So with what I sense you're attempting to accomplish here with markf, I would have to absolutely agree with you when you ask: "Why the exception?" I would highly recommend that markf read the entire article. And here's a hint, markf: if your going to attempt to meet Barry's challenge: "demonstrate any incredibly improbable digital strings that was developed by in a stochastic system," you really can't base such an argument on any criteria presented by Dawkins, because he clearly contradicts those criteria. DNA does not appear "superficially" designed. It fits more with Dawkins' Mt. Rushmmore criteria. But the challenge is to demonstrate, and not simply to explain, so I guess it's a moot point.CannuckianYankee
October 16, 2010
October
10
Oct
16
16
2010
04:32 PM
4
04
32
PM
PDT
Barry I already responded to this challenge when you first raised it. Gpuccio and I had a most constructive, polite and interesting exchange of comments based on mutual respect (there were no remarks about waffling; no accusations of being evasive). Do I have to do it all over again? With respect to my challenge. I was asking for an actual example of an event or outcome that would falsify ID without making any assumptions about the designer. Gpuccio raised the example of 500 coins tosses that when interpreted as a code spelled out some meaningful message. I guess this is as about as near as you could come to an "incredibly improbable digital string that was developed in a stochastic system". However, after some debate he bravely conceded that there was an underlying assumption that there was no designer manipulating the coin tosses to make it happen that way. We differed on the importance of that assumption. But it is an assumption. Nothing can falsify ID if you make no assumptions about the designer - because a designer of unspecified powers and motives can produce anything.markf
October 16, 2010
October
10
Oct
16
16
2010
03:44 PM
3
03
44
PM
PDT
1 2 3

Leave a Reply