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L&FP 40: Thoughts on [neo-?] Reidian Common Sense Realism

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We live in a civilisation haunted by doubt and by hyperskepticism. One, where skepticism is deemed a virtue, inviting hyper forms in as champions of intellect. The result has gradually led to selective hyperskepticism that often uncritically takes the word of champions or publicists for Big-S Science, while doubting well founded but unfashionable analyses or even self-evident truths.

H’mm, just in case someone is unclear about or doubts that Self-Evident Truths exist, here is one . . . with an extra one for good measure:

(Of course, I also have argued that there are self-evident truths regarding duty; particularly, inescapable first duties of reason that actually govern responsible reason, argument and discussion, starting with duties to truth, right reason, warrant and wider prudence, etc. Thus, that there are MORAL SETs. For, example, not even the most ardent objector can avoid appealing to these principles to try to give his arguments rhetorical/persuasive traction. Inescapable, so true and self-evident. I just note that for the moment.)

How, then, can we exorcise the ghosts of acid doubt and restore a better balance regarding knowledge claims?

I think, Thomas Reid and other champions of “[refined] common sense” have some sound counsel. That is, I wish to champion a principle of responsible, common sense guided credulity:

PRINCIPLE OF “MODERATE” CREDULITY: It makes good sense to accept that our conscious self-awareness, sense of rational, responsible freedom (with first duties of reason) — “common sense,” so-called, and sense of being embodied as creatures in an objectively real physical world are generally warranted though they may err or have limitations or oddities in detail

Magenta (used in CMYK printing), violet and purple. Notice, Magenta seems a modified pinkish Red, Violet a modified Blue, Purple a reddened modified Blue

A case in point helps to clarify. Here, colour vision. There are two related but somehow distinct colours, violet and purple. The former is spectral [i.e. a “pure” colour coming from certain wavelengths of light], the latter is not. [Generally, purple is seen as a mix of red and blue, e.g. the Line of Purples on the CIE tongue of colour framework.] Why, then, the similarity, despite the difference?

The answer turns out to depend on our colour sensors and onward processing in our eyes and visual system. Simplifying, it turns out that our Red response system has a secondary peak towards the high frequency end of the visible spectrum, near Blue:

Colour response of our visual system, as modelled. Notice the secondary peak for “Red”
Blue Jeans are Indigo

The result is that at the Blue, short wavelength end, we distinguish Blue-Green [e.g. Cyan], Blue, Indigo [cf. dark Blue Jeans], Violet. And the relationship with Purple becomes obvious, Purple superposes Red and Blue colours, which is typically going to be significantly redder than Violet.

So, we see here how our perception of colours is shaped by our embodiment and specifics of our bodily tissues and cells, but corresponds to objective phenomena. Indeed, the colour screen you are most likely using to view this on, works by superposing tiny pixels with Red, Green and Blue. If you were to print off on a modern colour printer, it will most likely blend dots of Cyan, Magenta, Yellow and Black, with the paper providing White.

I add, on metamerism, so we can see how two closely similar colours can be composed in quite distinct ways:

Here we see two ways to a brassy amberish colour. One is spectral, with a suitably low light level that excites our LMS cones in a certain pattern. The other uses Red and Green light sources that yields a similar stimulation. So, a simple look at the objects might not tell the difference. This is of course part of how RGB displays work [HT Wikipedia]

There is no good reason to airily sweep such away as being beyond some ugly, impassable gulch between what we can access internally through consciousness and a dubious external world of appearances. That is why we can take the principle that yes, we may err on particular points or details but on the whole there is no good reason to dismiss our conscious awareness — we symbolise C:( ) — and what it immediately presents, the self [= I] embedded in the world [We].

Let us symbolise:

C:(I UNION We)

So, we notice that it is our consciousness that carries everything else and instantly presents us with our sense of ourselves embedded in the world beyond our bodies. Our bodies, of course, are part of the physical world. Where, our reasonings are part of that self-awareness and are inextricably entangled with perceptions and language describing what we are aware of and perceive. The union is used as our bodies are embedded in the world and we are somehow present within it.

I have often pointed to Eng Derek Smith’s two-tier controller, cybernetic loop model as a context for discussing how that can be, esp. with quantum influence:

The Eng Derek Smith Cybernetic Model

In this light, the Plato’s Cave type shadow-show world of grand doubts or delusions can be set aside as self-defeating:

Plato’s Cave of shadow shows projected before life-long prisoners and confused for reality. Once the concept of general delusion is introduced, it raises the question of an infinite regress of delusions. The sensible response is to see that this should lead us to doubt the doubter and insist that our senses be viewed as generally reliable unless they are specifically shown defective. (Source: University of Fort Hare, SA, Phil. Dept.)

For, there is no natural firewall, so to give a general challenge to our consciousness, self awareness, sense of the self or perception of the world is to undermine the whole process. That is as opposed to having errors in detail or to recognising processes and limitations of sensing, neural network computation etc and the quantum physical substructure associated with that awareness. As, Violet vs Purple indicates.

In short, the point is to recognise limitations without falling into hyperskepticism or reductionism. This is of course a part of the old philosophical problem of the one and the many. In a sense, there is nothing new under the Sun.

In this context, I find Michael Davidson helpful as he discusses what he terms Reid’s Razor, in effect a manifesto of defeasible but heuristically generally effective common good sense reasoning:

[Reidian Common good sense as definition and razor, 1785:] “that degree of judgement which is common to men with whom we can converse and transact business”

Davidson shrewdly points out, how the Razor shaves:

Take a philosophical or scientific principle that is being applied to a particular situation: ask yourself whether you would be able to converse rationally and transact business with that person assuming that principle governed the situation or persons involved. If not dismiss the principle as erroneous or at least deeply suspicious. For example, suppose someone proposes that things-as-they-appear-to-be are not things-as-they-really-are. I do not think I would buy a used car from this man.

That seems a fair enough test of habitual adherence to first duties of reason — or otherwise. Y’know: to truth, right reason, prudence, sound conscience, neighbour, fairness and justice, etc.

In that context, he abstracts from Thomas Reid, a list of defeatable, default rules of thumb for credulity vs skepticism:

REID’S RULES OF COMMON SENSE REALISM

1) Everything of which I am conscious really exists [–> at minimum as an object of conscious awareness, and often as a particular or abstract entity, the presumption is, if I perceive a world with entities, it is by and large real]
2) The thoughts of which I am conscious are the thoughts of a being which I call myself, my mind, my person.
3) Events that I clearly remember really did happen.
4) Our personal identity and continued existence extends as far back in time as we remember anything clearly.
5) Those things that we clearly perceive by our senses really exist and really are what we perceive them to be.
6) We have some power over our actions and over the decisions of our will.
7) The natural faculties by which we distinguish truth from error are not deceptive.
8) There is life and thought in our fellow-men with whom we converse.
9) Certain features of the face, tones of voice, and physical gestures indicate certain thoughts and dispositions of mind.
10) A certain respect should be accorded to human testimony in matters of fact, and even to human authority in matters of opinion.
11) For many outcomes that will depend on the will of man, there is a self-evident probability, greater or less according to circumstances.
12) In the phenomena of Nature, what happens will probably be like what has happened in similar circumstances.

Davidson comments:

According to Reid, anyone who doubts these principles will be incapable of rational discourse and those philosophers who profess to doubt them cannot do so sincerely and consistently. Each of these principles, if denied, can be turned back on the denier. For example, although it is not possible to justify the validity of memory (3) without reference to premises that rest on memory, to dispense with memory as usually unreliable is just not philosophically possible. Reid qualifies some of these principles as not applying in all cases, or as the assumptions that we presume to hold when we converse, which may be contradicted by subsequent experience. For instance with regard to (10) Reid believes that most men are more apt to over-rate testimony and authority than to under-rate them; which suggests to Reid that this principle retains some force even when it could be replaced by reasoning.

I endorse Reid’s principles as normally true and what we must assume to be true to engage in argument and discussion. But, as Reid acknowledges, not all may be true all the time. I thus see Reid’s principles as epistemological rather than metaphysical. Psychologists might point to such things as optical illusions, false memory, attentional blink, hallucinations and various other interesting phenomena which might throw some doubt over some of Reid’s assertions. But these are nonessential modifiers that if entertained as falsifications of these principles would lead to the collapse of all knowledge. Very few philosophers have not acknowledged that the senses can deceive us or that reason is fallible, but to say the senses consistently deceive or that reason is impotent is too big a sacrifice. That the senses can deceive and reason is fallible is good reason to be cautious in our conclusions but not a good reason to dispense with observation and reason all together.

That seems to me to be a useful backgrounder and 101, if not quite a Manifesto. I think it deserves a place in the ongoing UD series on Logic and First Principles of Reason. END

PS: It seems helpful to append on how on Opponent Processes, sensors and signal processing can use LMS sensors to generate four colour channels — Red, Yellow, Green, Blue — via suitably scaled subtraction:

Thus, we can see economising of types of sensors, enhancing resolution by keeping effective pixels in only three types and gaining enhanced colour sensitivity.

U/D Apr 17: For completeness, I add a view of the Munsell, colour spindle type colour model with gradation from Black to White as level, hue on a wheel model and saturation as a radius vector:

Where, we may envision one branch, at the hue that involves the classic artist’s earth pigment colour, Yellow-Ochre:

Further to such, observe the classic 1931 CIE tongue of colour model, with the line of purples bridging blue/violet and red along the spectrum locus arc, also with various colour gamuts for display or printing systems marked:

Such an approach, further allows us to understand how the visual system, with limitations and possibilities for error, exhibits high quality design giving us a veridical perception of an important dimension of the world, colours tied to chemical composition, chemical-physical interactions and linked quantum processes in a key octave of the electromagnetic spectrum associated with energy transitions of 1.65 – 3.10 eV, a bit short of the damaging actinic range starting with UV. Illustrating:

It seems further advisable to provide an overview of the visual system:

Such then allows us to use Reidian Common Sense to find safe sailing between the Charybdis of poor design fallacies and the Scylla of imagining ourselves into grand doubt/grand delusion on alleged ugly gulches regarding ourselves as conscious, minded, conscience guided, responsible, rational significantly free creatures credibly embodied and participating in a common physical world. (See here on the Mythological reference.)

Comments
This is a nice excerpt from the Wall Street Journal a couple of days ago:
Over a century ago, G.K. Chesterton was reportedly asked by a British journalist what is wrong with the world today. His reply? “I am.” I can change nothing in this world except myself, and that is plenty.
-QQuerius
May 8, 2021
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Kf, Here is a video that discusses the problems of today’s world. One of the best I’ve seen
Roots of the ‘Civilizational Crisis’ Facing the West—Dr Stephen Blackwood | American Thought Leaders
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aTDp0MLBGVM He’s got me interested in Boethius who I had never heard of before. One of the comments
The Consolation of Philosophy was written in AD 523 during a one-year imprisonment Boethius served while awaiting trial—and eventual execution–for the alleged crime of treason under the Ostrogothic King Theodoric the Great. Boethius was at the very heights of power in Rome, holding the prestigious office of magister officiorum, and was brought down by treachery. This experience inspired the text, which reflects on how evil can exist in a world governed by God (the problem of theodicy), and how happiness is still attainable amidst fickle fortune, while also considering the nature of happiness and God. It was described in 1891 as "by far the most interesting example of prison literature the world has ever seen." Wikipedia Funny how much this sound like what was done to our President Trump. Treachery brought him down too.
jerry
April 20, 2021
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JVL, I am using Plantinga, i/l/o context as discussed with particular recognition of the contribution of the late Mr Gettier. I noted from AmHD above, that his choice was not like Dada, by chance [reputedly], as highlighted there are usages that send some of the message. Obviously, the full force is developed at length. This is also part of why I used the case of colour vision, starting with violet vs purple. KFkairosfocus
April 19, 2021
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Kairosfocus: Which definition of warrant are you using? https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/warrantJVL
April 19, 2021
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Jerry, as noted: the record is there for those who wish to see. I have adequate warrant and I will continue to use this term, which is not unduly confusing or meaningless. KFkairosfocus
April 19, 2021
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Here’s my point:
I believe I have adequate warrant that use of the term “warrant” creates confusion.
But better
I believe I have adequate justification that use of the term “warrant” creates confusion.
But it’s by far not the only thing leading to confusion. It’s actually quite trivial. Opinion masquerading as fact is a much greater driver of confusion. False facts are even more deleterious. Our world is divided primarily by fake news which lead to false beliefs or opinions that have no basis in reality. I live on a cul de sac of 18 houses of which I bet the annual income for all is fairly high. Everyone is to a person very nice and well educated. I bet more than half of them voted Democratic based on false opinions they have about the world.jerry
April 19, 2021
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I will continue to use this term, which is not unduly confusing or meaningless.
I will continue to point out its use and similar approaches leads to confusion and thus to a lack of understanding. I continue to thank you for lots of good information. I’m glad that you referenced the Plantinga lecture. It solidified my understanding of belief which probably still has a long way to go and at the same time pointed out the futility of using the word “warrant.” Seems ironic!
So the materialist inserts the freedom of opinion, into the logic of fact, in order to get some emotional relief.
I like that except for the word “materialist.” I like this better.
So the skeptic inserts the freedom of opinion, into the logic of fact, in order to get some emotional relief.
It’s not just materialists who are prone to false beliefs and bad thinking but often the very religious. But also especially the very educated. Hans Rosling pointed out the better educated one was the more likely one was wrong on the state of the world. The invalidity of using opinions as equivalent to facts is one of the many seeds of confusion that persists in our current world. It’s one of the main drivers of confusion of the 1000 + comments on many threads.jerry
April 19, 2021
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The problem of arbitrary hyperskepticism is based on rejection of subjectivity. First the materialists throw out subjectivity. Because materialism only validates objectivity and fact. Then they get emotional problems, for having no room for subjectivity. So then they simulate a kind of subjectivity, where they are free to accept a fact or not, arbitrary hyperskepticism. Facts are forced by evidence, there is basically no freedom in the logic of fact. A fact is obtained by evidence of a creation, forcing to produce a 1 to 1 corresponding model of it, in the mind. Opinions on the other hand, are formed by spontaneous expression of emotion with free will, opinions are freely chosen. So the materialist inserts the freedom of opinion, into the logic of fact, in order to get some emotional relief. And the correct response to that is to separate matters of opinion from matters of fact, validating each in their own right, with the two fundamental categories of creator (subjective) and creation (objective). The creationist conceptual scheme. The creationist conceptual scheme can be taught in high school, to great benefit, because it is already an established education goal to teach the difference between fact and opinion. And only creationism explains that difference.mohammadnursyamsu
April 19, 2021
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Jerry, the record is there for those who wish to see. I have adequate warrant and I will continue to use this term, which is not unduly confusing or meaningless. KFkairosfocus
April 19, 2021
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As far as the term “knowledge” and the expression/term “justified true belief” (JTB) is concerned i am one of those people with a masters degree (actually two if I pressed it) who had never heard of the discussion but after seeing it for the first time believe it is trivial. Not the basis for belief, both true and false belief, which I view as essential for discussion but any argument over JTB. I hope this doesn’t generate a long involved OP with many philosophical references, contrived examples and intricate diagrams to prove me wrong. I believe discussions of it should remain as I said above simple.jerry
April 19, 2021
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Kf, I am going to disagree with you. I see no value in the word “warrant” in the discussion of belief. By saying that all words have multiple meanings and then substituting for well understood words an unfamiliar word with multiple meanings seems senseless. Then using extremely highly contrived situations that are so rare as not to have ever happened as justification for its use reinforces my point. You seem to have a fondness for Plantinga as you have used his ideas several times. However, after trying to digest his Gifford lecture which can best described as obtuse, I don’t have this fondness no matter how many books he wrote. The lecture starts out well and was very insightful but then quickly veers into all sorts of incoherence. I’m sure it’s coherent to Plantinga and a few others but I bet most people with masters degrees wouldn’t understand it. After the first few paragraphs I don’t have a clue what he is trying to say. I argue for simplicity and I believe all relevant arguments can be made coherent and simple if understood correctly. Yesterday while traveling the roads of New Hampshire, my wife and I were listening to Matt Ridley’s book on innovation. You like to cite the printing press as something that changed the world. Well it didn’t and was strictly a tool of the theocracy for quite awhile. That is till Luther then used it to provide simple understandable texts for the average German. It was simplicity of communication that made the printing press revolutionary. I believe that many of the long threads that have happened over the last six months are due to confusion and Ill will. The ill will should have been short circuited with clear but simple illustrations of the ill will. In other words confusion allows the ill will to survive. The best example of this is the thread on natural law.jerry
April 19, 2021
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PS: My longstanding comment here [revised from a course lecture note of 2003] may be useful. I excerpt:
2. Epistemology It has been classically said that knowledge is “justified, true belief” -- as the Oxford English Dictionary confirms. This leads to key questions: Can we know? Can beliefs be justified? Can we be confident that we know? This issue is subtler than one might think. For, over the past several decades, so-called Gettier counter-examples have been identified: cases [sometimes, somewhat contrived] in which one is subjectively justified in holding a belief that happens to be true, but in fact objectively one is not warranted to claim the belief as knowledge. An example discussed by Moreland and Craig in their Philosphical Foundations for a Christian Worldview [Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 2003], p. 75, is that of a man believing he is watching a live championship match, and concluding that a certain team has won. But, in fact this is the second time that the same two teams have met, and due to technical difficulties, he is in fact seeing a rerun of the previous match that just happens to have the same outcome. Now, he is [subjectively] justified and believes what just objectively happens to be true, but it obviously hardly counts as a case of knowledge. To resolve this, Plantinga has introduced a slightly different terminology [and a massive, 3-volume technical discussion to back it up!] for an objective justification, i.e. warrant. Warrant of course, comes in degrees, and is in at least some cases defeatable but credible at whatever level is appropriate. This is consistent with the implication of the above considerations on logic, explanation and proof, i.e. that there are at least some important cases where even confidently held knowledge is not absolutely certain. Indeed, that is also a longstanding conclusion of Simon Greenleaf, a father of the theory of evidence, as stated in his famous 1874 work, Testimony of the Evangelists -- of course, using less technical language: In the ordinary affairs of life we do not require nor expect demonstrative evidence, because it is inconsistent with the nature of matters of fact, and to insist on its production would be unreasonable and absurd . . . . In proceeding to weigh the evidence of any proposition of fact, the previous question to be determined is, when may it be said to be proved? The answer to this question is furnished by another rule of municipal law, which may be thus stated: A proposition of fact is proved, when its truth is established by competent and satisfactory evidence. By competent evidence, is meant such as the nature of the thing to be proved requires; and by satisfactory evidence, is meant that amount of proof, which ordinarily satisfies an unprejudiced mind, beyond any reasonable doubt . . . . If, therefore, the subject is a problem in mathematics, its truth is to be shown by the certainty of demonstrative evidence. But if it is a question of fact in human affairs, nothing more than moral evidence can be required, for this is the best evidence which, from the nature of the case, is attainable. [Testimony, Sections 26, 27, emphases added.]
See how Greenleaf has ably anticipated the whole matter and has given us an apt summary of what warrant does . . . proof, also being not particularly the right term. Though, it is commonplace.kairosfocus
April 19, 2021
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Jerry, justification, assessment and reliable all have multiple uses [see translations of Romans] and linked challenges. Such is first tied to an inherent aspect of language, ambiguity, which leads to context sensitive meaning. In particular, reliability to date is known to fail as an adequate criterion, and assessment though involved has to be successful, an issue for explanations and development rather than the central terms of a definition that reforms a 2400 year old classic result. The ideas history has used justified, true belief since Plato et al, and the Gettier counter examples rocked the professional philosophical world starting with 1963 and the resulting shaking has not settled down to date. It is in that context that Plantinga's strategy -- as noted already -- was to introduce a fresh term into the technical discourse as first a place holder for a bill of requisites. Notice, his first volume published by Oxford was Warrant, the current debate. He then went on to Warrant and Proper Function. Those are two book length technical philosophical discussions that are not targetted at intro to phil textbooks much less the general public. He followed with vol 3, on Warranted Christian Belief, which applied the results to what is a hot button issue. (It bears noting that Plantinga's career effort has turned the tide in Philosophy, so that professional philosophy is one of a very few domains in the academy where ethical theism in the Judaeo-Christian Tradition is sufficiently re-established as having gravitas that the sort of ingrained reflex hyperskeptical dismissiveness that has been common, is on the defensive. Philosophy, of course, in the long haul, is the very intellectual centre of the academy, senior to the Arts, Sciences, Mathematics etc. Let's just say that there is a very good reason why Newton's great work, in English translation, would be titled, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, and why Adam Smith was addressing Moral Philosophy, and much more.) My context is explicitly philosophical, and warrant is a proper term for what I have addressed. Knowledge, in the weak form commonly used [cf. the Natural Sciences], is warranted, credibly true (so, reliable) belief. Strictly, I do not need to add the explanatory phrase, and it could be expanded as tested, reliable to date etc, but all of that can be drawn out. The term is connected to the past sixty years of ferment and echoes the contribution of two revolutionary figures. BTW, I found it sadly amusing that the usual ideologues at Wikipedia could not bring themselves to allow warrant and Plantinga to remain in the opening remarks or main body with any significance, but relegated Plantinga to a footnote on sources. That tells us a lot. KFkairosfocus
April 19, 2021
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A salute is due to Gettier.kairosfocus
April 19, 2021
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Gettier just died a month ago. He was 94.jerry
April 18, 2021
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PS: I caught a tail, You just reminded me of Ginger who is head of a dept here and has very special computing machinery to help her deal with a technical, heavy reading dept.kairosfocus
April 18, 2021
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F/N: Just a marker for the moment, showing that Plantinga didn't just pluck a word out of the dictionary at random (unlike what was reputed to be the case with the Dada movement):
war·rant (wôr??nt, w?r?-) n. 1. An order that serves as authorization, especially: a. Law A judicial writ authorizing the search or seizure of property, arrest of a person, or the execution of a legal judgment. b. A voucher authorizing payment or receipt of money. c. An option to buy stock at a specified price from an issuing company. 2. a. Justification for an action or a belief; grounds: "The difficulty of predicting the future is no warrant to ignore it" (Brian Hayes). b. Something that provides assurance or confirmation; a guarantee or proof: "The kind of uncertainties and ambiguities ... which may damage [his] essays ... are often a warrant of authenticity in [his] fiction" (John Edward Hardy). 3. Authorization or certification; sanction, as given by a superior. 4. a. A warrant officer. b. A certificate of appointment given to a warrant officer. tr.v. war·rant·ed, war·rant·ing, war·rants 1. To provide adequate grounds for; justify or require: What could he have done that would warrant such a punishment? 2. a. To guarantee (a product). b. To guarantee (a purchaser) indemnification against damage or loss. 3. Law To guarantee clear title to (real property). [Middle English warant, from Old North French, of Germanic origin; see wer- in Indo-European roots.] war?rant·a·bil?i·ty n. war?rant·a·ble adj. war?rant·a·bly adv. war?rant·less adj. American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fifth Edition. Copyright © 2016 by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company. Published by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company. All rights reserved.
Sooo . . . a glance at normal dictionary senses would suggest that we are looking at a sign of reliability or trustworthiness or even a near-synonym for justification. In short, a reader could see the basic point even if s/he is not catching the issues surrounding Gettier counter examples, internalism, objectivity, defeat-ability of claims etc. (Notice, here I actually shy away from the technically more correct but abstruse defeasibility.) Recall, the phrase being challenged: warranted, credibly true (so, reliable) belief, as a definition for weak form, common usage knowledge. Where too, grounds, basis and foundation all have to be fought for as foundationalism, so called is under heavy skeptical attack. Note further, that I have taken time to excerpt the more extended development by Plantinga and have gone on to address as a paradigm case, our visual system. Which actually starts with looking at how we perceive violets and purples. Food for thought for the moment. Later. KFkairosfocus
April 18, 2021
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Kf, I have rewritten you comment above on vision. I have taken out the word “warrant” and replaced it with “justification,” “assessment” and “reliable.”
This system is likely our main sense, providing us with information on our surroundings. Also, through culture, it allows us to read, a key means of acquiring information. Can it provide us with knowledge? Yes, we routinely recognise and learn about our world through sight, trusting vision to give us accurate information as we walk, watch, drive, read etc. Where we have vision defects, this becomes limited but we routinely correct through using glasses. On colour, we can discern apparently ~ 10 million distinct values in our colour vision gamut. Defects are recognised and may limit our colour vision. Supportive glasses seem to make a difference. So here we have a cognitive faculty, that though limited credibly yields reasonably accurate information about our surroundings. We routinely trust its deliverances, which on the whole are objective and allow us to assess certain things as credibly true. In the case of reading, we come to directly know the text, images etc, and then may proceed to second order evaluation of the information which may in turn become knowledge. What we see on TV etc may, with help of hearing, be much the same. So, we are justified to take our vision system as a valid case of a knowledge creating, a reliable cognitive faculty. On examination, we see optical and neurological aspects. The eye is a full motion, pan tilt zoom camera with specialised cells as a sensor array sensitive to about an octave in the electromagnetic spectrum, a band that is photochemically active [note how photosynthesis uses red light], is above a thermal noisiness floor and below where seriously destructive actinic radiation begins. Not coincidentally, our O2-rich atmosphere filters off a good proportion of damaging UV. That seems to depend on terraforming by the biosphere across eons, especially photosynthesis. The neural network processes LMS cone data [and esp at low levels of light Rod data], apparently creating B/Y and R/G channels, i.e. four colour channels, and processes shape data. Facial recognition seems to have its own processing centre. The process uses neural networks, i.e. part of what we rely on is a computer architecture and linked built in signal processing. It is unknown how visual awareness arises as an aspect of subjective consciousness, but we do know that our vision system generates a 3-d picture with our embodied selves located in our visualised space. All of this, we intuitively trust and gives us a simple first paradigm of cognitive, knowledge producing faculties that reliably inform us of truth about our world and ourselves. This integrates with other senses in consciousness, involving embodiment. So strong is vision that a common saying is, seeing is believing. In that context, we can err, beyond defects of vision. We can have optical illusions, colour vision is prone to many challenges such as lighting conditions and surrounding colours distorting perceived colours etc. So, valid knowledge can come from processes and systems that are limited and error-prone, but which are trustworthy on the whole. We are drawing out a richer picture — telling word — of knowledge. Thus, we can see why assessment counts through reliable intuitive or reasoned grounds for taking information as credibly true and believing it. Where our means of acquiring assessment are trustworthy though perhaps limited and error prone. This immediately extends to how we reason itself. The significance of Reidian common good sense emerges, as allowing us to strike a responsible balance, trusting tested trustworthy means to knowledge on the whole while being open to correction in detail. Hyperskepticism is hereby exorcised, whether global or selective. Prudence and right reason take pride of place, with first duties of responsible reason starting with duty to truth. We have a reasonable basis for knowledge, thought, decision and action.
So I found others meanings for the word “warrant” as you use it. This is good reason to avoid this word as the multiple meanings will confuse. This does not mean that the Plantinga article is not valuable. It has been an eye opener in pointing to simple ways to analyze and assess arguments. Simplicity communicates much better when it is accurate. And it can often be made accurate. By the way my wife and I have a very good friend who is legally blind but has a master’s degree. She can see but is best corrected to 20/800 and has to use large magnification to read. So we are aware of the limitations of sight to one’s understanding of the world.jerry
April 18, 2021
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I will have to make time to address warrant, knowledge, logic and first duties of reason as a cluster
It sounds like you will prepare another dense indecipherable OP that no one will understandjerry
April 18, 2021
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Jerry, enough has been said and has emerged to show the true balance. There is responsible argument present from the OP on, and for example I just used just about the first thing you dismissed above as excess cryptic verbiage and the like as a key paradigm to clarify what knowledge and warrant are about, going on back to the value of Reidian common sense. Had you noted wider context, you would have seen that the visual system (and esp violet vs purple as an aspect) is allowing us to put flesh on the bones of why it is appropriate to take our self-aware, conscious sense of being embodied in a surrounding real external world seriously. I will make no attempt to get into a tiresome, personalities prone crocodile death roll on stylistics or the like [sadly, more prone to clouding than to resolving substantial issues], I just note that I will always seek to be as clear as I can while addressing a difficult matrix of complex and thorny issues prone to objection from multiple directions at the same time. For instance, on the strength of exchanges above, I will have to make time to address warrant, knowledge, logic and first duties of reason as a cluster, I suppose in part as due penance. I will never be able to satisfy everyone but I do believe there is something that needs to be contributed and in absence of others, here I stand, God help me. KFkairosfocus
April 18, 2021
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F/N: Let us observe regarding our visual system. This system is likely our main sense, providing us with information on our surroundings. Also, through culture, it allows us to read, a key means of acquiring information. Can it provide us with knowledge? Yes, we routinely recognise and learn about our world through sight, trusting vision to give us accurate information as we walk, watch, drive, read etc. Where we have vision defects, this becomes limited but we routinely correct through using glasses. On colour, we can discern apparently ~ 10 million distinct values in our colour vision gamut. Defects are recognised and may limit our colour vision. Supportive glasses seem to make a difference. So here we have a cognitive faculty, that though limited credibly yields reasonably accurate information about our surroundings. We routinely trust its deliverances, which on the whole are objective and allow us to warrant certain things as credibly true. In the case of reading, we come to directly know the text, images etc, and then may proceed to second order evaluation of the information which may in turn become knowledge. What we see on TV etc may, with help of hearing, be much the same. So, we are warranted to take our vision system as a valid case of a knowledge creating, warranting cognitive faculty. On examination, we see optical and neurological aspects. The eye is a full motion, pan tilt zoom camera with specialised cells as a sensor array sensitive to about an octave in the electromagnetic spectrum, a band that is photochemically active [note how photosynthesis uses red light], is above a thermal noisiness floor and below where seriously destructive actinic radiation begins. Not coincidentally, our O2-rich atmosphere filters off a good proportion of damaging UV. That seems to depend on terraforming by the biosphere across eons, especially photosynthesis. The neural network processes LMS cone data [and esp at low levels of light Rod data], apparently creating B/Y and R/G channels, i.e. four colour channels, and processes shape data. Facial recognition seems to have its own processing centre. The process uses neural networks, i.e. part of what we rely on is a computer architecture and linked built in signal processing. It is unknown how visual awareness arises as an aspect of subjective consciousness, but we do know that our vision system generates a 3-d picture with our embodied selves located in our visualised space. All of this, we intuitively trust and gives us a simple first paradigm of cognitive, knowledge producing faculties that reliably inform us of truth about our world and ourselves. This integrates with other senses in consciousness, involving embodiment. So strong is vision that a common saying is, seeing is believing. In that context, we can err, beyond defects of vision. We can have optical illusions, colour vision is prone to many challenges such as lighting conditions and surrounding colours distorting perceived colours etc. So, valid knowledge can come from processes and systems that are limited and error-prone, but which are trustworthy on the whole. We are drawing out a richer picture -- telling word -- of knowledge. Thus, we can see why warrant counts through reliable intuitive or reasoned grounds for taking information as credibly true and believing it. Where our means of acquiring warrant are trustworthy though perhaps limited and error prone. This immediately extends to how we reason itself. The significance of Reidian common good sense emerges, as allowing us to strike a responsible balance, trusting tested trustworthy means to knowledge on the whole while being open to correction in detail. Hyperskepticism is hereby exorcised, whether global or selective. Prudence and right reason take pride of place, with first duties of responsible reason starting with duty to truth. We have a reasonable basis for knowledge, thought, decision and action. KFkairosfocus
April 18, 2021
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Kf, Are you talking to yourself and no one else?
to provide objective reliability
Your previous comment seems to be doing just the opposite by saying that long dense cryptic discussions are the only way to communicate accurately when I personally find them uncommunicative. I have seen enough clear communication to know the difference. I will proceed with the analysis of the Plantinga article for my own benefit. At the moment I see little difference between the words “warrant” and “justification.” There are some very significant and useful ideas in the article. And I can see that very simple and straightforward sentences are all that are needed to communicate them. One of the interesting things is that it seems Plantinga invented the use of the meaning of “warrant” that you use so much.jerry
April 18, 2021
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Jerry, there are two independent uses of the term, gobbledygook. Beyond, Gettier is in fact eminently comprehensible and sensible, though he seemingly uses trivial examples. They have the advantage of undeniable focus, so distractive tangents were averted. Imagine, the frustration of side-tracking tangents, if he had embarked on say addressing how selectively hyperskeptical historical scholarship turning on crooked yardsticks tracing to ideologies had seriously warped ability to provide objective reliability for what was taken as knowledge in, say, NT scholarship or economic scholarship or the attempt to scientifically portray the remote past of origins. Or even, how our vision system allows us to obtain a reasonable access to our world, despite limitations etc. Plantinga's response recognised that a given key term had become too loaded to communicate effectively across what we used to call paradigms and he brought in a stand-in for that which fulfills a bill of requisites. Namely, "warrant." That's what his Gifford lecture excerpt from one of his books discusses. (Again, I used it for the purpose of showing that my usage was not idiosyncratic. I went on to dig up a further place in the series of books, where he lays out in summary resting on details of a multivolume series, how he has found a way to fill the bill of requisites. That summary gives important context and is itself only a summary. There is a major technical matter of core phil on the table and Oxford's university press found the series worth publishing given importance, substance, context and author.) He proceeded to explore that over several years, at multivolume world class professional philosophy level. In which context, I put up a summary from the last work in the series, above, made in the context of what he termed the Freud-Marx complaint. A complaint that in both cases BTW, is self-referentially incoherent and ruinous to the credibility of reason: if early life psycho-social circumstances and stresses determines us on a path of empty rationalisation, or class circumstances driven by dialectic materialism etc, then that implicitly indicts the theorists too. Hence, the relevance of the crooked yardstick question. In that context, we have a definition by way of task assignment, that tells us what we will have to fix to get objective grounds for credible [even if provisional] truth and for prudent belief, thus knowledge. Our intellectual faculties relevant to knowledge need to be reliable [and/or corrected or suitably augmented . . . prescription glasses, telescopes, microscopes etc are good cases in point with highly suggestive history -- the Galileo Debate], in appropriate macro and micro environments, exhibit signs of a reliably successful design aimed at obtaining the truth, need to be appropriately applied to produce a degree of support for the conclusion that rises above the gaps in an individual's [or group's] access to evidence and capability to think a matter through, etc. Which all makes good, suitably sobering sense. KF PS: We live in a Google world, with high quality dictionaries and encyclopedias a click or two away, as well as site search. Technical terms tracing to general history of ideas or wider debates can readily be further explored and the history of discussion here at UD. If such discussion is treated as TLDR, there will be gaps in following issues that should not be projected to the other. Especially when, on a specific case in use for a decade, just about every time I use an acronym that is essentially unique to me, FSCO/I, I have expanded and explained it. That habit should be a clue that for cause I believe certain terms are either established, accessible or already adequately discussed at responsible length. Prudence, Warrant and Right Reason are all cases in point that turned out to be far, far from vague, ill-defined buzzwords with incoherent or poorly worked through concepts or the like. The first and third, with translation, trace to classical times as standard vocabulary. The second is coming from the work of a major scholar I have repeatedly acknowledged debt to, and have discussed previously. I note this for record, there is no real point to having to repeatedly revisit much the same attempted dissection of claimed stylistic and substantial deficits, especially when you have repeatedly implied skimming rather than substantial engagement. I trust this is enough, given eg the issue VL raised early in the thread on comments 6 - 8.kairosfocus
April 18, 2021
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it is reasonably clear why I use warrant, why this is not a triviality, a vague notion or gobbledygook,
I didn’t say the use of the concept of warrant was gobbledygook. I said Gettler’s article was and gave the reasons. If it had some non trivial effect on life in this world what is it? Also if everyone does not understand how you are using a word, expression, abbreviation or acronym then it is vague and what follows is consequently vague. I certainly didn’t understand the meaning of warrant as defined in the Plantinga paper and so did another commenter. I’m sure we are not the only ones. I’m finding the Plantinga paper very informative in many ways but probably not in the way he intended for his audience. I find it insightful when used to fine tune our common sense. So far there is nothing I don’t recognize but now have a clearer frame for understanding and challenging others when they say their opinion is as good as yours. Most opinions are BS and warrant is a good way to break them down and expose this.jerry
April 17, 2021
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More from the Plantinga article on warrant. I am going to use the words warrant and justification interchangeably till I see where one is preferred over the other.
In the same way we may appraise the belief that all contemporary flora and fauna arose by way of random genetic mutation and natural selection from primitive forms of life, which in turn arose via similarly ateleological processes from inorganic material. And of course the less spectacular beliefs of everyday life are also subject to such evaluation and appraisal.
in other words we use the concept of warrant and justification all the times in our lives and couldn’t get along without it. But rarely use these specific words. This begs the question that many or even most things/beliefs in our everyday life may not be warranted but it doesn’t affect our everyday existence. For example, I can believe the galaxy is full of alien civilizations and it wouldn’t affect one thing I did in the next 10 years or longer.
We appraise a person's beliefs, but also her skepticisms or (to use another Chisholmian term) her withholdings, her refrainings from belief. An unduly credulous person may believe what she ought not; an unduly skeptical (or cynical) person may fail to believe what she ought.
A lot of people hold or withhold justified beliefs. Or all of us have some of each. So everyone can be challenged on their opinions for or against something. But again it may affect nothing in our daily lives.
Further, we may hold a belief more or less strongly, more or less firmly; we appraise not only the belief itself, but also the degree to which it is accepted. If I believe that Homer was born before 800 B.C. and believe this with as much fervor as that New York City is larger than Cleveland, then (given what are in fact my epistemic circumstances) my degree of confidence in the former proposition is excessive and unwarranted.
Important point is that some of our opinions are strongly held while some are weakly so. This is different from that there is strong justification or weak justification for holding an opinion which is next paragraph. Again may have little or no effect on everyday life.
Finally, warrant comes in degrees. Some of my beliefs have more by way of that quantity for me than others. Thus my belief that I live in Indiana has more by way of warrant, for me, than my belief that Shakespeare wrote the plays commonly attributed to him; my belief that 2 + 1 = 3 has more warrant than my belief that the Axiom of Choice is equivalent to the Hausdorff Maximal Principle. (This is not to say, of course, that I am not equally rational and equally justified in accepting these beliefs to the degrees to which I do in fact accept them; for I believe the latter member of each pair less firmly than the former.) But then we can distinguish degrees of positive epistemic status, at least for a given person. Initially, then, and to a first approximation, warrant is a normative, possibly complex quantity that comes in degrees, enough of which is what distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief.
still no understanding of the difference between knowledge and true belief. I know the sun will rise tomorrow morning and that’s knowledge as well as it rose this morning. But what is a true belief? My initial reading o Plantinga is that he does not define it clearly.
Interesting paper so far but there’s a good reason few trust philosophy and philosophers to explain the real world clearly. The first three paragraphs have been enlightening.
jerry
April 17, 2021
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Jerry, it is clear from the course of events since 1963 that Gettier's thought exercises I and II made the point and re-opened a major issue; beyond, others have multiplied cases and it seems there have been precursors for a long time. As I noted, the feathers have not settled yet. In any case, it is reasonably clear why I use warrant, why this is not a triviality, a vague notion or gobbledygook, and why it is reasonable for Plantinga to have stated a bill of requisites for a fresh term, then set out to fill it. In my opinion, with significant success. As you will also see, there is a reason why I think a weak form sense of knowledge is relevant, and in the general context why the Reidian, common sense approach makes good sense in the face of limitations of our senses etc, starting with vision, our dominant sense. KFkairosfocus
April 17, 2021
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I just read the Gettler paper. It’s gobbledygook. https://fitelson.org/proseminar/gettier.pdf The fact that he uses absurd examples means he didn’t have relevant ones. Why not pick an example from everyday life? The TV game example is another irrelevant example.jerry
April 17, 2021
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Jerry, the two teams case is a simple case in point of the Gettier problem, which blew up the justified, true belief account of what knowledge is, in 1963. That is by no means a triviality, and BTW it was not my voice or my real or perceived infelicities of expression etc, I was citing remarks at IEP on Gettier's key achievement. The point is, that one can be justified to believe what is actually true but fail to have knowledge. So, we need to find something else to fit the bill of requisites of moving reliably from justified true belief to knowledge. Warrant comes in first as a place holder then is filled in in detail through a theory as to what constitutes warrant. Your clip is the start-point, not the end point, as was my earlier clip from the Gifford Lectures; I did that in the main to show that the term warrant is not idiosyncratic, with intent to go fill in. I took time to later fill in and to excerpt IN THAT CONTEXT, where Plantinga went in seeking to fill in what warrant means. KF PS: For completeness, I further excerpt IEP on Gettier's actual test case I:
The case’s protagonist is Smith. He and Jones have applied for a particular job. But Smith has been told by the company president that Jones will win the job. Smith combines that testimony with his observational evidence of there being ten coins in Jones’s pocket. (He had counted them himself — an odd but imaginable circumstance.) And he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the job has ten coins in their pocket. (As the present article proceeds, we will refer to this belief several times more. For convenience, therefore, let us call it belief b.) Notice that Smith is not thereby guessing. On the contrary; his belief b enjoys a reasonable amount of justificatory support. There is the company president’s testimony; there is Smith’s observation of the coins in Jones’s pocket; and there is Smith’s proceeding to infer belief b carefully and sensibly from that other evidence. Belief b is thereby at least fairly well justified — supported by evidence which is good in a reasonably normal way. As it happens, too, belief b is true — although not in the way in which Smith was expecting it to be true. For it is Smith who will get the job, and Smith himself has ten coins in his pocket. These two facts combine to make his belief b true. Nevertheless, neither of those facts is something that, on its own, was known by Smith. Is his belief b therefore not knowledge? In other words, does Smith fail to know that the person who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket? Surely so (thought Gettier). That is Gettier’s Case I, as it was interpreted by him, and as it has subsequently been regarded by almost all other epistemologists. The immediately pertinent aspects of it are standardly claimed to be as follows. It contains a belief which is true and justified — but which is not knowledge. And if that is an accurate reading of the case, then JTB is false. Case I would show that it is possible for a belief to be true and justified without being knowledge. Case I would have established that the combination of truth, belief, and justification does not entail the presence of knowledge. In that sense, a belief’s being true and justified would not be sufficient for its being knowledge. But if JTB is false as it stands, with what should it be replaced?
kairosfocus
April 17, 2021
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See the problem?
As often the case I haven’t a clue what you are saying. Which is why I copied the first paragraph from Plantinga above and annotated it. To understand just what is being claimed. What this cries for is case studies and the two teams on TV is a trivial mostly irrelevant one. I will get the Gettler short paper to see what it says. Somehow this seems to be a distinction without much difference while other aspects represent great distinction. Conflating the two leads to complete confusion. At the present time I am failing to see much value in using the term warrant as opposed to justified. I could change my mind.jerry
April 17, 2021
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Jerry, no and that is the point. One may be justified to believe what is true but is not knowledge; that is the heart of the Gettier problem, something blocks a rationally desirable tie between the justification one has and the credible or actual truthfulness, undermining reliability. Plantinga goes on to tease out using cases, issues, considerations, history etc to draw out as I excerpted above. Compressing, warrant is objective good reason that makes a claim credibly true and so reliable enough to ground prudent belief. Much of this addresses relevant intellectual faculties and their fitness for purpose, which may be partly naturally evident. I will append a core summary from Plantinga. KF PS: The excerpt from the excerpt, and yes this is technical:
Put in a nutshell, then, a belief has warrant for a person S only if that belief is produced in S by cognitive faculties functioning properly (subject to no dysfunction) in a cognitive environment [both macro and micro . . . ] that is appropriate for S’s kind of cognitive faculties, according to a design plan that is successfully aimed at truth. We must add, furthermore, that when a belief meets these conditions and does enjoy warrant, the degree of warrant it enjoys depends on the strength of the belief, the firmness with which S holds it. This is intended as an account of the central core of our concept of warrant; there is a penumbral area surrounding the central core where there are many analogical extensions of that central core; and beyond the penumbral area, still another belt of vagueness and imprecision, a host of possible cases and circumstances where there is really no answer to the question whether a given case is or isn’t a case of warrant.41
PPS: IEP on Gettier:
Gettier problems or cases are named in honor of the American philosopher Edmund Gettier, who discovered them in 1963. They function as challenges to the philosophical tradition of defining knowledge of a proposition as justified true belief in that proposition. The problems are actual or possible situations in which someone has a belief that is both true and well supported by evidence, yet which — according to almost all epistemologists — fails to be knowledge. Gettier’s original article had a dramatic impact, as epistemologists began trying to ascertain afresh what knowledge is, with almost all agreeing that Gettier had refuted the traditional definition of knowledge. [--> jutified, true belief]
See the problem? And why Plantinga first gives a general requirement that whatever warrant can be substantiated to be it must meet the criterion of reliably transforming true belief into knowledge? The cat was set among the pigeons in 1963 and feathers have yet to settle down. As a Gettier example teams A and B meet in a televised championship match. Viewer W knows this is scheduled and watches, seeing that B wins. However, unbeknownst, difficulties led to rebroadcast of a previous match between the teams with the same result. B wins, W is justified by his lights to think so, and yet the connexion is broken. kairosfocus
April 17, 2021
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