Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

Logic & First Principles, 17: Pondering the Hyperreals *R with Prof Carol Wood (including Infinitesimals)

Share
Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Flipboard
Print
Email

Dr Carol Wood of Wesleyan University (a student of Abraham Robinson who pioneered non-standard analysis 50+ years ago) has discussed the hyperreals in two Numberphile videos:

First:

Extended:

Wenmackers may also be helpful:

In effect, using Model Theory (thus a fair amount of protective hedging!) or other approaches, one may propose an “extension” of the Naturals and the Reals, often N* or R* — but we will use *N and *R as that is more conveniently “hyper-“.

Such a new logic model world — the hyperreals — gives us a way to handle transfinites in a way that is intimately connected to the Reals (with Naturals as regular “mileposts”). As one effect, we here circumvent the question, are there infinitely many naturals, all of which are finite by extending the zone. So now, which version of the counting numbers are we “really” speaking of, N or *N? In the latter, we may freely discuss a K that exceeds any particular k in N reached stepwise from 0. That is, some k = 1 + 1 + . . . 1, k times added and is followed by k+1 etc.

And BTW, the question of what a countable infinite means thus surfaces: beyond any finite bound. That is, for any finite k we represent in N, no matter how large, we may succeed it, k+1, k+2 etc, and in effect we may shift a tape starting 0,1,2 etc up to k, k+1, k+2 etc and see that the two “tapes” continue without end in 1:1 correspondence:

Extending, in a quasi-Peano universe, we can identify some K > any n in N approached by stepwise progression from 0. Where of course Q and R are interwoven with N, giving us the familiar reals as a continuum. What we will do is summarise how we may extend the idea of a continuum in interesting and useful ways — especially once we get to infinitesimals.

Clipping from the videos:

Pausing, let us refresh our memory on the structure and meaning of N considered as ordinals, courtesy the von Neumann construction:

  • {} –> 0
  • {0} –> 1
  • {0,1} –> 2
  • . . .
  • {0,1,2 . . . } –> w, omega the first transfinite ordinal

Popping over to the surreals for a moment, we may see how to build a whole interconnected world of numbers great and small (and yes the hyperreals fit in there . . . from Ehrlich, as Wiki summarises: “[i]t has also been shown (in Von Neumann–Bernays–Gödel set theory) that the maximal class hyperreal field is isomorphic to the maximal class surreal field”):

Now, we may also see in the extended R, *R, that 1/K = m, a newly minted number closer to zero than we can get by inverting any k in N or r in R, that is m is less than 1/k for any k in N and is less than 1/r for any r in R (as the reals are interwoven with the naturals):

and that as we have a range around K, K+1 etc and K-1 etc, even K/2 (an integer if K is even) m has company, forming an ultra-near cloud of similar infinitesimals in the extra-near neighbourhood of 0.

Of course, the reciprocal function is here serving as a catapult, capable of leaping over the bulk of the reals in *R, back and forth between transfinite hyperreals such as K and kin and infinitesimals such as m and kin, ultra-near to 0.

Using the additive inverse approach, this extends to the negative side also.

Further, by extending addition, 0 plus its cloud (often called a Monad — we can represent *0*) can be added to any r in R or indeed K in *R, i.e. we may vector-shift the cloud near 0 anywhere in *R. That is, every number on the extended line has its own ultra-near cloud. We note, reals are vectors with +/- directionality and a magnitude |r|.

Where does all of this lead? First, to Calculus foundations, then to implications of a transfinite zone with stepwise succession, among other things; besides, we need concept space to think and reason about matters of relevance to ID, however remotely (or not so remotely). So, let me now clip a comment I made in the ongoing calculus notation thread of discussion:

KF, 86: >>Money shot comment by JB:

JB, 74: we have Arbogast’s D() notation that we could use, but we don’t. Why not? Because we want people to look at this like a fraction. If we didn’t, there are a ton of other ways to write the derivative. That we do it as a fraction is hugely suggestive, especially, as I mentioned, there exists a correct way to write it as a fraction.

This is pivotal: WHY do we want that ratio, that fraction?
WHY do we think in terms of a function y = f(x), which is continuous and “smooth” in a relevant domain, then for some h that somehow trends to 0 but never quite gets there — we cannot divide by zero — then evaluate:

dy/dx is
lim h –> 0
of
[f(x + h) – f(x)]/[(x + h) – x]

. . . save that, we are looking at the tangent value for the angle the tangent-line of the f(x) curve makes with the horizontal, taken as itself a function of x, f'(x) in Newton’s fluxion notation.

We may then consider f-prime, f'(x) as itself a function and seek its tangent-angle behaviour, getting to f”(x), the second order flow function. Then onwards.

But in all of this, we are spewing forth a veritable spate of infinitesimals and higher order infinitesimals, thus we need something that allows us to responsibly and reliably conceive of and handle them.

I suspect, the epsilon delta limits concept is more of a kludge work-around than we like to admit, a scaffolding that keeps us on safe grounds among the reals. After all, isn’t there no one closest real to any given real, i.e. there is a continuum

But then, is that not in turn something that implies infinitesimal, all but zero differences? Thus, numbers that are all but zero different from zero itself considered as a real? Or, should we be going all vector and considering a ring of the close in C?

In that context, I can see that it makes sense to consider some K that somehow “continues on” from the finite specific reals we can represent, let’s use lower case k, and confine ourselves to the counting numbers as mileposts on the line:

0 – 1 – 2 . . . k – k+1 – k+2 – . . . . – K – K+1 – K+2 . . .
{I used the four dot ellipsis to indicate specifically transfinite span}

We may then postulate a catapult function so 1/K –> m, where m is closer to 0 than ANY finite real or natural we can represent by any k can give.
Notice, K is preceded by a dash, meaning there is a continuum back to say K/2 (–> considering K as even) and beyond, descending and passing mileposts as we go:

K-> K-1 –> K-2 . . . K/2 – [K/2 – 1] etc,

but we cannot in finite successive steps bridge down to k thence to 1 and 0.

Where, of course, we can reflect in the 0 point, through posing additive inverses and we may do the rotation i*[k] to get the complex span.

Of course, all of this is to be hedged about with the usual non standard restrictions, but here is a rough first pass look at the hyperreals, with catapult between the transfinite and the infinitesimals that are all but zero. Where the latter clearly have a hierarchy such that m^2 is far closer to 0 than m.

And, this is also very close to the surreals pincer game, where after w steps we can constrict a continuum through in effect implying that a real is a power series sum that converges to a particular value, pi or e etc. then, go beyond, we are already in the domain of supertasks so just continue the logic to the transfinitely large domain, ending up with that grand class.

Coming back, DS we are here revisiting issues of three years past was it: step along mile posts back to the singularity as the zeroth stage, then beyond as conceived as a quasi-physical temporal causal domain with prior stages giving rise to successors. We may succeed in finite steps from any finitely remote -k to -1 to 0 and to some now n, but we have no warrant for descent from some [transefinite] hyperreal remote past stage – K as the descent in finite steps, unit steps, from there will never span to -k. That is, there is no warrant for a proposed transfinite quasi-physical, causal-temporal successive past of our observed cosmos and its causal antecedents.

Going back to the focus, if 0 is surrounded by an infinitesimal cloud closer than any k in R can give by taking 1/k, but which we may attain to by taking 1/K in *R, the hyperreals, then by simple vector transfer along the line, any real, r, will be similarly surrounded by such a cloud. For, (r + m) is in the extended continuum, but is closer than any (r + 1/k) can give where k is in R.

The concept, continuum is strange indeed, stranger than we can conceive of.

So, now, we may come back up to ponder the derivative.

If a valid, all but zero number or quantity exists, then — I am here exploring the logic of structure and quantity, I am not decreeing some imagined absolute conclusion as though I were omniscient and free of possibility of error — we may conceive of taking a ratio of two such quantities, called dy and dx, where this further implies an operation of approach to zero increment. The ratio dy/dx then is much as conceived and h = [(x +h) – x] is numerically dx.

But dx is at the same time a matter of an operation of difference as difference trends to zero, so it is not conceptually identical

Going to the numerator, with f(x), the difference dy is again an operation but is constrained by being bound to x, we must take the increment h in x to identify the increment in f(x), i.e. the functional relationship is thus bound into the expression. This is not a free procedure.

Going to a yet higher operation, we have now identified that a flow-function f ‘(x) is bound to the function f(x) and to x, all playing continuum games as we move in and out by some infinitesimal order increment h as h trends to zero. Obviously, f ‘(x) and f ”(x) can and do take definite values as f(x) also does, when x varies. So, we see operations as one aspect and we see functions as another, all bound together.

And of course the D-notation as extended also allows us to remember that operations accept pre-image functions and yield image functions. Down that road lies a different perspective on arithmetical, algebraic, analytical and many other operations including of course the vector-differential operations and energy-potential operations [Hamiltonian] that are so powerful in electromagnetism, fluid dynamics, q-mech etc.

Coming back, JB seems to be suggesting, that under x, y and other quasi-spatial variables lies another, tied to the temporal-causal domain, time. Classically, viewed as flowing somehow uniformly at a steady rate accessible all at once everywhere. dt/dt = 1 by definition. From this, we may conceive of a state space trajectory for some entity of interest p, p(x,y,z . . . t). At any given locus in the domain, we have a state and as t varies there is a trajectory. x and y etc are now dependent.

This brings out the force of JB’s onward remark to H:

if x *is* the independent variable, and there is no possibility of x being dependent on something else, then d^2x (i.e., d(d(x))) IS zero

Our simple picture breaks if x is no longer lord of all it surveys.

Ooooopsie . . .

Trouble.

As, going further, we now must reckon with spacetime and with warped spacetime due to presence of massive objects, indeed up to outright tearing the fabric at the event horizon of a black hole. Spacetime is complicated.

A space variable is now locked into a cluster of very hairy issues, with a classical limiting case. >>

The world just got a lot more complicated than hitherto we may have thought. END

F/N: I add (Apr 15) a link (HT: Wiki) on Faa di Bruno’s formula for the nth order derivative of a function of a function, which extends the well-known chain rule:

HT: Wikipedia

Hat tip MathWorld, here are the first few results:

NB, this is referenced by JB in his discussion.

PS: As one implication, let us go to Davies and Walker:

In physics, particularly in statistical mechanics, we base many of our calculations on the assumption of metric transitivity, which asserts that a system’s trajectory will eventually [–> given “enough time and search resources”] explore the entirety of its state space – thus everything that is phys-ically possible will eventually happen. It should then be trivially true that one could choose an arbitrary “final state” (e.g., a living organism) and “explain” it by evolving the system backwards in time choosing an appropriate state at some ’start’ time t_0 (fine-tuning the initial state). In the case of a chaotic system the initial state must be specified to arbitrarily high precision. But this account amounts to no more than saying that the world is as it is because it was as it was, and our current narrative therefore scarcely constitutes an explanation in the true scientific sense. We are left in a bit of a conundrum with respect to the problem of specifying the initial conditions necessary to explain our world. A key point is that if we require specialness in our initial state (such that we observe the current state of the world and not any other state) metric transitivity cannot hold true, as it blurs any dependency on initial conditions – that is, it makes little sense for us to single out any particular state as special by calling it the ’initial’ state. If we instead relax the assumption of metric transitivity (which seems more realistic for many real world physical systems – including life), then our phase space will consist of isolated pocket regions and it is not necessarily possible to get to any other physically possible state (see e.g. Fig. 1 for a cellular automata example).

[–> or, there may not be “enough” time and/or resources for the relevant exploration, i.e. we see the 500 – 1,000 bit complexity threshold at work vs 10^57 – 10^80 atoms with fast rxn rates at about 10^-13 to 10^-15 s leading to inability to explore more than a vanishingly small fraction on the gamut of Sol system or observed cosmos . . . the only actually, credibly observed cosmos]

Thus the initial state must be tuned to be in the region of phase space in which we find ourselves [–> notice, fine tuning], and there are regions of the configuration space our physical universe would be excluded from accessing, even if those states may be equally consistent and permissible under the microscopic laws of physics (starting from a different initial state). Thus according to the standard picture, we require special initial conditions to explain the complexity of the world, but also have a sense that we should not be on a particularly special trajectory to get here (or anywhere else) as it would be a sign of fine–tuning of the initial conditions. [ –> notice, the “loading”] Stated most simply, a potential problem with the way we currently formulate physics is that you can’t necessarily get everywhere from anywhere (see Walker [31] for discussion).

[“The “Hard Problem” of Life,” June 23, 2016, a discussion by Sara Imari Walker and Paul C.W. Davies at Arxiv.]

Yes, cosmological fine-tuning lurks under these considerations, given where statistical mechanics points.

F/N: J P Moreland comments:

U/D April, 2022: As this topic was brought back up three years later, I add as follows:

KF, 221: >> . . .

I think some basics of structure and quantity need to be made explicitly clear. So, I note as below.

First, von Neumann’s construction:

{} –> 0
{0} –> 1
{0,1} –> 2

. . . [ellipsis]

{0,1,2 . . . } –> w

That is w [omega] is the order type of the naturals constructed as ordinals, and N has cardinality, aleph-null.

Now, let us do a comma separated value construction of a wx3 matrix, pardon limitations of Word Press:

{0: , 0 –>1 , 1 –> -1
1: , 2 –> 2 , 3 –> -2
2: , 4 –> 4, 5 –> -3
. . . , . . . , . . .
w: , w , w’}

Where clearly w + w’ = 0, as can be seen by decimation of the rows.

We here see next, that the naturals, the integers, the evens and the odds as well as the negatives all have order type w. Where, a basic definition of a transfinite set is that a proper subset can be placed in 1:1 correspondence with the whole. Thus, [by demonstration] the integers and particularly the negative integers can be seen to be transfinite, with the counting numbers as a metric. [Order type is w.]

Therefore, to claim that past finite stages of time that cumulate to now are without beginning, thus can be mapped to the set of the negative integers exhaustively, is to imply that the traverse from the remote pass to now is transfinite. Implicitly, transfinite.

That such a span cannot be traversed in cumulative, finite stage steps should be obvious and should be acknowledged. However, given the open or veiled acerbity that has generated a toxic climate surrounding origins in general and UD in particular, let us note for the simple case of counting onward from some k and its complement k’, again using a matrix:

0: , k+0 , k’-0
1: , k+1 , k’-1
2: , k+2 , k’-2
. . . , . . . , . . .
w: , k+w , k’ – w}

That is, counting on beyond any k we state or represent in N, with k’ in Z-, will continue transfinitely of order type w, just as for the col 1 case k = 0. This of course reflects the same transfiniteness. It also means that at any finite stage k, or k’ we may go on from there as though we had just begun.

A labour of Sisyphus.

This is how the futile supertask I have often spoken of arises.

And if counting in Z- L-ward, counting down is transfinite, the same members will be just as transfinite were we to start somehow from L-ward and try to proceed in R-ward steps to 0 and beyond. [Or even to some finite k’.]

We may therefore freely conclude that past time cannot have been transfinite, regardless of side debates as to how the difference between any two specific integers in Z we identify, state or represent, z1 and z2, will be finite as the two can be bounded by finite onward values. That is, the ellipsis is part of the structure of such sets and in part tells us that we can only execute stepwise a potential but not complete transfinite, and we use the ellipses to represent the actual main body of work, where the transfinite lives.

So, again, using hyperreals only emphasises and makes this plainer for someone first seeing such a strange domain.

We are only warranted to speak of a finitely remote past that has succeeded itself by finite stages to now. In principle, we may succeed onward in a potential infinity but at no particular stage will we exhaust such.>>

Comments
KF,
DS, an abstract logical alternative fails to come to grips with need for actuality and causal temporal stepwise succession to now. The issue is not directly, is there a first stage, but can we have an actual stage Q with stepwise succession to N, now, where that succession Q –> N is not a finite duration process?
Hm, I didn't ask about whether there is a first stage or not (and there wouldn't be, in an infinite past, so I don't know what to make of this.) The question is: Is my characterization of an infinite past in #66 correct or not? I'm simply trying to apply the logic of structure and quantity to the problem.daveS
April 18, 2019
April
04
Apr
18
18
2019
03:07 PM
3
03
07
PM
PDT
DS, an abstract logical alternative fails to come to grips with need for actuality and causal temporal stepwise succession to now. The issue is not directly, is there a first stage, but can we have an actual stage Q with stepwise succession to N, now, where that succession Q --> N is not a finite duration process? (That is the number of links exceeds any given finite n in N.) Every actual past stage Q must chain stepwise to now. Can that chain be transfinite? Or, are we only warranted to speak of finite durations. KFkairosfocus
April 18, 2019
April
04
Apr
18
18
2019
02:18 PM
2
02
18
PM
PDT
H, time is not a mathematical abstraction but a physical entity, connected to energy flows, dissipation of energy concentrations and more. To retain accuracy to reality, that nature of time is a factor. KFkairosfocus
April 18, 2019
April
04
Apr
18
18
2019
02:12 PM
2
02
12
PM
PDT
I see that post 62 has some duplicated lines. That's my fault. Here's a clean version: =========== Here is a proof. Please point out any flaws. The past (as modeled here in the mathematical sense by the real numbers) is either finite or infinite. Claim: it is infinite Proof by contradiction. Assume the past is finite Then there is some farthest point k in the past that can be considered the beginning of the past However, for any k, k-1 is farther from the present than k Therefore, k is not the beginning. Therefore, this contradiction shows that our assumption that the past is finite is wrong That is, therefore the past has no beginning Therefore the past is infinite.hazel
April 18, 2019
April
04
Apr
18
18
2019
02:10 PM
2
02
10
PM
PDT
kf writes,
, you inserted the bare, question-begging assertion of a prior stage k-1 for any given past stage k. That is decidedly not a given nor a necessity of being for physical entities as opposed to mathematical sets where succession extends without limit; we are specifically dealing with a contingent, causally sucessive physical cosmos, ...
kf, I have made it perfectly clear (see posts 6 and 16), as well as the disclaimer at line 2 of post 62 that I am NOT, repeat NOT, talking about "physical entities", but a purely mathematical understanding of the number line. You may be "specifically dealing with a contingent, causally successive physical cosmos”, but we we are not. If you don’t want to respond to the purely mathematical arguments, fine, but when addressing me, please show some awareness that you are talking about different things than I am talking about. So what do you think about my argument at 62, from a mathematical point of view?hazel
April 18, 2019
April
04
Apr
18
18
2019
01:53 PM
1
01
53
PM
PDT
KF, Consider the family of propositions {P_n}. For each n > 0, P_n states that the universe existed prior to n stages ago. Each P_n is either true or false. Then the past is infinite iff every P_n is true. Is this incorrect?daveS
April 18, 2019
April
04
Apr
18
18
2019
01:47 PM
1
01
47
PM
PDT
AS, correct, we are dealing with temporal-causal succession of physical systems, with accompanying energy concentration dissipation. Stars use up H, He, etc down to when they get to Fe, then they die one way or another based on size. Relatively small ones give white dwarfs which then cool down over v. long but finite times. Bigger ones, we are looking at neutron stars and maybe black holes etc. The observed cosmos lacks the density to re-collapse, and more. We can have multiple generations of stars, but not forever, heat death is an issue. Abstracta such as numbers, don't have that sort of constraint. KFkairosfocus
April 18, 2019
April
04
Apr
18
18
2019
01:27 PM
1
01
27
PM
PDT
H, you inserted the bare, question-begging assertion of a prior stage k-1 for any given past stage k. That is decidedly not a given nor a necessity of being for physical entities as opposed to mathematical sets where succession extends without limit; we are specifically dealing with a contingent, causally sucessive physical cosmos, where the act of succession of stages dissipates energy concentrations in stage Q giving rise to Q+1; e.g. this is why oscillating universe models run out of steam after about 100 cycles IIRC. A past-infinite physical cosmos requires infinite energy concentrations if it is not to go to exhaustion of energy concentrations, heat death. IIRC 10^25 y is estimated for white dwarfs to cool down -- and they don't have the sort of distribution (they are dead small stars cooling down) that marks a very old cosmos. The issue is NOT whether we can assert transfinite spans of negative numbers but that consonant with heat death not being yet, every particular actual past stage must give rise to a chain of successors spanned to reach now. Where, it is generally accepted that this cannot involve stepwise spanning of a transfinite range. We do not have a warrant to speak of a transfinite span from any stage in the chain Q to now. KFkairosfocus
April 18, 2019
April
04
Apr
18
18
2019
01:21 PM
1
01
21
PM
PDT
Hazel, your flaw is right in here: "Then there is some farthest point k in the past that can be considered the beginning of the past" The nature of math is that you can always perform operations because you are working in abstraction. The nature of time is not the nature of math. Andrewasauber
April 18, 2019
April
04
Apr
18
18
2019
01:12 PM
1
01
12
PM
PDT
Here is a proof. Please point out any flaws. The past (as modeled here in the mathematical sense by the real numbers) is either finite or infinite. Claim: it is infiniteHere is a proof. Please point out any flaws. The past (as modeled here in the mathematical sense by the real numbers) is either finite or infinite. Claim: it is infinite Proof by contradiction. Assume the past is finite Then there is some farthest point k in the past that can be considered the beginning of the past However, for any k, k-1 is farther from the present than k Therefore, k is not the beginning. Therefore, this contradiction shows that our assumption that the past is finite is wrong That is, therefore the past has no beginning Therefore the past is infinite.hazel
April 18, 2019
April
04
Apr
18
18
2019
12:59 PM
12
12
59
PM
PDT
H, the past never started is a bald assertion. What is clear is that [a] every actual past stage had to once be the "now" [b] such temporally, causally gave rise to its successor stage [c] this cumulatively, in finite stage steps gave rise to now. [d] thus, the span from EVERY actual past event to now must be spanned in successive steps to now. [e] where, making a transfinite span is impossible, a supertask [f] the process of causal succession dissipates energy concentrations towards what is called heat death (which for the observed cosmos is to occur in finite time) [g] thus, too, we have no warrant for claiming a succession that is transfinite. KFkairosfocus
April 18, 2019
April
04
Apr
18
18
2019
12:47 PM
12
12
47
PM
PDT
KF,
DS, so long as the duration for any particular Q to N is definite and finite, we have no warrant to claim it is non-finite;
Note we're talking about ontology here, not epistemology. The past, if correctly modeled by (−∞, 0], is objectively either finite or infinite. So the question is which, correct?daveS
April 18, 2019
April
04
Apr
18
18
2019
12:10 PM
12
12
10
PM
PDT
Can one say that the "past started" at some point? No, because there is always a point previous to any other point. Therefore, the past didn't start. If the past didn't start, then we say it is infinite, just as we say the future has no end. No one is claiming that an infinite numbers of steps have been traversed. We (or at least me) are just claiming that it is perfectly correct to say the past had no beginning.hazel
April 18, 2019
April
04
Apr
18
18
2019
11:45 AM
11
11
45
AM
PDT
DS, so long as the duration for any particular Q to N is definite and finite, we have no warrant to claim it is non-finite; where we speak of actual past events proceeding stepwise to now -- a process that for each given event Q is potentially infinite (given that now is itself being succeeded) but yields q - n as finite at any given now-time N. We have constraints on the actual past and sucession to now driving the dynamics; we are not dealing with an abstraction but the path of cosmological history that has causal-temporal succession in steps from the past to now. We may not definitively know the number of cases Q as a matter of fact, but we know the characteristic of every case: a finite span to now. This is one case where an in common property counts. KFkairosfocus
April 18, 2019
April
04
Apr
18
18
2019
11:25 AM
11
11
25
AM
PDT
KF, Take a look at the definition of the diameter of a subset of a metric space. That illustrates how the infinite past proponents are thinking. In particular, calculate the diameter of the set (−∞, 0] in the real numbers.daveS
April 18, 2019
April
04
Apr
18
18
2019
10:01 AM
10
10
01
AM
PDT
DS and H, I have repeatedly pointed out per distinct identity, that duration since any event Q at say q to now, N at say n, will be specific to the lapse between those particular events, one that can be "milestoned" and counted to give a countable quantity. This means that if for every particular Q, the gap q - n is finite, so we have no warrant at all to speak of a net overall transfinite lapse between any finitely remote particular Q and N. Repeat, we are warranted to speak of a finite lapse but not a transfinite one. Sure, the natural counting numbers [our mileposts] are such that they form a structured set where for any k there is a k+1 etc which can be readily extended to the integers and used to milepost the reals, but all this does is it says that we have a structure that is indefinitely large and beyond our ability to reckon, which we give the cardinality aleph null to the milestones considered as a collective. This is a transfinite value, building in the structure of endless continuation. The problem of those who insist that we have an infinite span of duration within the reals is that duration since to now is always between definite specific points Q and N, where if Q is such that q is a particular natural it can be bounded by q+1 and is invariably finite. Therefore, we have no warrant here to discuss a transfinite cumulative lapse, absent some particular actual past point say S, that is itself transfinitely remote so that the span from s down to q is then involved with a transfinite span. Which we all agree cannot be bridged in finite step, cumulative stages. It thus seems to me that those who speak of an infinite past imply a transfinite past. They do not want or mean or intend it to be so, but that is immaterial. We do not have a span to the ellipsis in { . . ., - k, . . . -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, . . . n} as the ellipsis is not a particular value but a set property of continuation. I think what we see is that we are not warranted to assert an actual transfinitely remote past that has succeeded in causal temporal,. finite steps, to now. KF PS: I am not AVOIDING discussion of negative integers or reals, I am pointing out, yet again, that there is always a span between definite stages to get a duration Q to N, and that so long as Q is at a finite past point, it will be only finitely remote. So, we have no warrant to claim a transfinite span to any given Q in the integers or reals. Duration is, repeat, between particular specific points Q and N, not to the ellipsis which is not a stage.kairosfocus
April 18, 2019
April
04
Apr
18
18
2019
09:00 AM
9
09
00
AM
PDT
Dave, the answer to your question to kf is that if you include *R, then there is no way the "past" (in the purely mathematical sense) could have started at some K because it is separated from the real numbers by an unbridgeable gap. This allows kf to avoid discussing the arguments you and I and others are making about the finite nature of any negative number k in the reals.hazel
April 18, 2019
April
04
Apr
18
18
2019
07:05 AM
7
07
05
AM
PDT
KF,
That is part of why we need to bear in mind *R not just R.
I don't understand your rationale. The models that infinite-past proponents put forward never include time/stage coordinates which are infinite. I guess you're free to propose any model you choose, but then you're talking about something different than what WLC, the infinite-past proponents, and myself are talking about.daveS
April 18, 2019
April
04
Apr
18
18
2019
06:47 AM
6
06
47
AM
PDT
DS, length of a line is in this case transfinite (in terms of cardinality -- with naturals as mile-posts, looks to be aleph null), and that is tied to its unlimited nature leftwards as is symbolised by the open transfinite side of the interval -- the L-ward line extends beyond any finite value we may symbolise, - k. That is the precise problem, the ellipsis implies unlimited duration and that is additional to how when we identify or represent particular finite values (e.g. x and y) the difference x - y is unsurprisingly, finite. That is part of why we need to bear in mind *R not just R. In R*, k - 0 is finite but K - 0 is not. k to 0 can be traversed in successive unit steps, K to 0 cannot. KFkairosfocus
April 18, 2019
April
04
Apr
18
18
2019
05:59 AM
5
05
59
AM
PDT
KF,
In that context, I put on the table that if we can only ever have duration as between specific events, then if all durations are finite, the overall past is finite as it is the maximum span of durations to now. Surely, durations can be ranked and we can conceive of a maximum, or at least of a case where every duration is finite, thus implying that there are no transfinite durations therefore there is no room for a transfinite past. the overall duration may be indefinite to us, but it would be finite.
Consider the interval S = (−∞, 0] in the set of real numbers. For any two elements x and y of S, we can calculate the distance between them, d(x, y) = |x - y|. Note this is always a finite number. Does this function d have a maximum value? No. Given any positive integer n, we can find two real numbers in S such that |x - y| > n. Does S have finite length?daveS
April 18, 2019
April
04
Apr
18
18
2019
05:12 AM
5
05
12
AM
PDT
DS, I haven't been arbitrarily importing an extraneous issue, I have been taking an opportunity to discuss a key context relating to foundational issues of logic and first principles. In that context, I pointed to Calculus and the infinitesimals and to the issue of the hyperreals which then leads to the question of time. Where, the structure of quantities dealing with time as suggested infinite logically fits into the structure of the transfinite that has been developed. In that context, I am simply not satisfied that the claim that at any -k we already have completed the transfinite past settles the matter and it seems to me that we do have to face the issue of what duration from the past to now means, other than having a span from an actual past stage to now as the present stage. That is, duration is not relative to an ellipsis but to specific actual stages of time, which if they are only finitely removed from one another, points to a finite duration. In that context, if the only durations we can warrant are finite, then we face the issue that there is no warrant to speak of a transfinite (and of course unobserved, untraced) past. Where, were we to propose that the actual past is transfinite, then it is at least a serious question that there will be actual specific past events at transfinite remove from now. Such are best represented using hyperreals, here, -K. On such a remove being on the table, we then see the challenge to span the transfinite in finite stage steps. Indeed the attempt to suggest that there is an infinity of finitely removed past events, each of only finite duration to now but jointly constituting a transfinite past, is precisely because of the implications of that supertask. So no, the hyperreals do belong in the discussion as the way we can represent a claimed duration from past to now events that is transfinite. In that context, I put on the table that if we can only ever have duration as between specific events, then if all durations are finite, the overall past is finite as it is the maximum span of durations to now. Surely, durations can be ranked and we can conceive of a maximum, or at least of a case where every duration is finite, thus implying that there are no transfinite durations therefore there is no room for a transfinite past. the overall duration may be indefinite to us, but it would be finite. This is then multiplied by the issue (on physicalist views) of energy concentrations to drive change thus temporal-causal succession and so also time as we may measure or count it. Time is a dynamic that is coming from somewhere and that where is causal and thermodynamic. KFkairosfocus
April 18, 2019
April
04
Apr
18
18
2019
04:10 AM
4
04
10
AM
PDT
PPS: I should note on the "arrow of time" view, the thermodynamic, temporal-causal view of what temporal succession implies or at least requires. Here, an event requires a change and some transfer of energy (which in the typical case will render the energy in the cosmos less available or at least constant, i.e. energy is always gradually dissipated from its concentrations). That is, temporal-causal succession is an energy-driven transaction that on the whole gradually deteriorates the available energy to do work, impose forced ordered motion so dW = F*dx, F being the acting force which moves or affects some entity through dx along its line of action. This is the physical concept of work and is connected to thermal energy conceived as random molecular level motions. The famous second law boils down to, energy cannot spontaneously be wholly reduced from random to ordered motion. This extends to, succession of stages and lapse of time through caused change, are rooted in energy flows and degradation. Successive stages are stages unfolding as events play out cumulatively. Where, as certain events seem quite regular (e.g. oscillatory cycles in certain masers) we may designate certain structures and linked regular, countable or continuous processes as clocks, then reckon time from their cumulative change, taking some zero-point as a reference start. Time and energetic processes are inextricably intertwined, now compounded through Einstein's energy-time form of uncertainty and the effects of relativity including mass concentrations and distortions of the spacetime fabric. In this sense, time has a ratchet, forcing a direction of natural progress, ultimately headed for heat death it seems, if left to itself. On this, the claim, no first event, is a claim that effectively implies infinite concentrations of energy in some quasi-physical domain, presumably with our observed cosmos as a temporary bubble that will end in local ultimate degradation thus no energy available to drive clocks. Of such a quasi-physical, effectively infinite energy reservoir grand cosmos, we have no observational evidence. This is philosophy (with mathematical apparatus) not science. At that level of discourse, it is reasonable to posit the eternal deity as the infinite behind the finite that we see.kairosfocus
April 18, 2019
April
04
Apr
18
18
2019
01:00 AM
1
01
00
AM
PDT
PS: He notes in another answer (having pointed to the Blackwell book on Natural Theology) How:
https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/muslim-appreciation-of-the-kalam-argument/ . . . I published a paper a few years ago entitled “Why Is It Now?” Ratio 18 (2000): 115-122, in which I argued the same thing! If the universe is past-eternal, then why out of all the moments in time is 2012 now? Why not some earlier or later moment? I was intrigued that in his response to my recent lecture at the Sheldonian Theatre in Oxford, the philosopher Stephen Priest was struggling to articulate this same question, calling it one of the most profound philosophical questions. He misstated the question, I think, by asking, “Why is it now now?” That question is trivial, for when else could it be now than now? Of course, it is now now! But the question is really, “Why is 2012 now?” Postulating a beginning to time at least enables us to answer that it is now 2012 because that is how much time has elapsed since the beginning, an answer not available if the universe is past-eternal.
kairosfocus
April 18, 2019
April
04
Apr
18
18
2019
12:22 AM
12
12
22
AM
PDT
F/N: The core issue being raised to WLC, which he is answering:
(P) IF (i) the temporal series of all past events is actually infinite in its duration (as measured by equal temporal intervals), THEN (ii) there COULD be some mind/clock/counting machine/computer/angel/god which would SUCCESSIVELY pair all the past equal intervals (say, seconds) to all negative whole numbers in the corresponding order.
Notice, this would imply that the past countable stages are of order w, where any particular definite stage -k will be a corresponding count of magnitude k in the past. Where of course, { . . . -k, . . . -2, -1, 0} is transfinite leftwards. Consequently, it is implied that at any -k finitely removed from us, the transfinite causal-temporal succession of stages up to -k in the past has already happened; as can be seen by taking a leftward mirror of the pink vs blue ribbon tapes in the OP. Craig goes on to summarise:
The only hope for proponents of the infinite past is to insist that the series of past events has the order type ?* so that every event lies at only a finite distance from the present. In that way, forming an infinite past by successive addition doesn't involve, they claim, traversing an infinite distance.
Now, let us note his comment on a related question:
https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/is-a-beginningless-past-actually-infinite/ . . . It might be said that at least there have been past events, and so they can be numbered. But by the same token there will be future events, so why can they not be numbered? Accordingly, one might be tempted to say that in an endless future there will be an actually infinite number of events, just as in a beginningless past there have been an actually infinite number of events. But in a sense that assertion is false; for there never will be an actually infinite number of events, since it is impossible to count to infinity. The only sense in which there will be an infinite number of events is that the series of events will go toward infinity as a limit. But that is the concept of a potential infinite, not an actual infinite. Here the objectivity of temporal becoming makes itself felt. For as a result of the arrow of time, the series of events later than any arbitrarily selected past event is properly to be regarded as potentially infinite, that is to say, finite but indefinitely increasing toward infinity as a limit. The situation, significantly, is not symmetrical: as we have seen, the series of events earlier than any arbitrarily selected future event cannot properly be regarded as potentially infinite. So when we say that the number of past events is infinite, we mean that prior to today ?0 events have elapsed. But when we say that the number of future events is infinite, we do not mean that ?0 events will elapse, for that is false. [emphasis mine]
Similarly, another question poses:
https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/forming-an-actual-infinite-by-successive-addition/ . . . I have a question concerning one of the philosophical arguments you offer in support of the view that the universe began to exist, namely the argument from the impossibility of forming an actual infinite by successive addition. You set up the argument as follows: 1. A collection formed by successive addition cannot be actually infinite. 2. The temporal series of past events is a collection formed by successive addition. 3. Therefore, the temporal series of past events cannot be actually infinite. This argument exposes a feature in the notion of an infinite series of events that I find bewildering. To set the situation up, we’ll assume the past is infinite. By virtue of a tensed conception of time, every event in the infinite past up to the present was a real event that had to be “lived” through. But, if that’s the case, how could all those events have been lived through, one by one, up till now? Just how, exactly, could we reach the end of that beginningless series? How could the present event arrive if, before it could arrive, an infinite number of previous events had to arrive first? Like I said, this seems very puzzling. But I can’t quite put my finger on why. Is it simply that, on an intuitive level, I find the idea of traversing a beginningless series absurd? As you wrote in your reply to John Taylor, “The question is whether an infinite series of events, having no beginning and having an ending in the present, is metaphysically possible given a tensed view of time. Intuitively, this does not seem possible, for it seems that the present event could not arrive if its arrival had to be preceded by the successive arrival of an infinite number of prior events.” [“A Swift and Simple Refutation of the Kalam Cosmological Argument?” Religious Studies 35 (1999): 57-72. Footnote 26] This is exactly what impels me to accept the argument. But is there a way to analyze our intuition more deeply to find out exactly why such a traversal is impossible? Or is it somehow non-analyzable? The “traditional objection” to this argument is that it is only impossible to traverse infinity if one begins at some point. But, whatever this reply manages to do, it doesn’t seem to rebut our intuition or reduce the apparent absurdity engendered by the situation; after considering the objection, I’m still genuinely perplexed as to how such a traversal could happen.
In his answer we find:
. . . In the case of beginning with some finite quantity and adding finite quantities to it we can pinpoint the problem clearly: since any finite quantity plus another finite quantity is always a finite quantity, we shall never arrive at infinity even if we keep on adding forever. Infinity in this case serves merely as a limit which we never attain. What becomes truly puzzling, even mind-boggling, is the suggestion that we can, by adding only finite quantities, form an infinite quantity or collection--say, a certain collection of baseball cards--by never beginning but ending at some time! Here the impossibility cannot be analyzed as due to the impossibility of adding finite quantities to finite quantities and getting an infinite quantity, for in this case the quantity to which finite additions are being made is always and already infinite. We are successively adding finite quantities to an already infinite quantity, so of course the sum is an infinite quantity. Here infinity is not functioning as a mere limit but as a collection of concrete elements. Now notice that one still hasn’t explained how we are able to form our infinite collection of baseball cards by successive addition. For at any time in the past the collection is already infinite, and yet the total collection has not yet been formed . . . . Here’s the problem, it seems to me: in order for the collection [of an infinite number of successively added baseball cards] to be completed, we must have already enumerated, one at a time, an infinite number of previous cards. But before the final card could be added, the card immediately prior to it would have to be added; and before that card could be added, the card immediately prior to it would have to be added; and so on ad infinitum. So one gets driven back and back into the infinite past, making it impossible for any card to be added to the collection . . . . About the best that the critic of the argument can do at this point, I think, is to say that if one adds cards at a rate of, say, one card per second, then the collection can be completed because there has been an infinite number of seconds in the beginningless past. But clearly this response only pushes the problem back a notch: for the question then is, how can the infinite collection of past seconds be formed by successive addition? For before the present second could elapse, the one before it would have to elapse, and so on, as before. Because the problem is applicable to time itself, it cannot be resolved by appealing to infinite past time. Of course, proponents of a static or tenseless theory of time will deny that moments of time really do elapse, but then their objection is actually to premiss (2), not premiss (1). If one is not yet convinced by this argument, then I would offer a further defense of premiss (1) by arguing that if an actual infinite could be formed by succesive addition, then various absurditites would result . . . . Suppose we meet a man who claims to have been counting down from infinity and who is now finishing: . . ., -3, -2, -1, 0. We could ask, why didn’t he finish counting yesterday or the day before or the year before? By then an infinite time had already elapsed, so that he should already have finished. Thus, at no point in the infinite past could we ever find the man finishing his countdown, for by that point he should already be done! In fact, no matter how far back into the past we go, we can never find the man counting at all, for at any point we reach he will already have finished. But if at no point in the past do we find him counting, this contradicts the hypothesis that he has been counting from eternity. This shows again that the formation of an actual infinite by never beginning but reaching an end is as impossible as beginning at a point and trying to reach infinity.
Thus, we see in effect a begging of the question by inferring that at any -k prior no now (set that n = 0), the succession involving the transfinite has already occurred. But, that was the problem, how is that so, how could it be feasible without a duration between some past actual stage Q and n being itself transfinite thus IMPLICITLY -- as opposed to explicitly -- requiring traversing a transfinite in successive steps? Saying that there is an infinity of finite succession, with the duration between any two events or stages t1 and t2 being finite only, seems to be dubious, even contradictory. I think instead, it is first reasonable to argue that we have no warrant to claim a transfinite actual past that would not involve an actually transfinite duration to now. Where, that would imply precisely the spanning the transfinite duration in successive stages that is a supertask. Instead, it seems to me, we are only warranted to speak of a finite span of succession between any two stages t1 and t2. This, implying that we are warranted only to speak of a finite actual past, and of course of a potentially infinite future (ignoring for the moment the heat death issue). KFkairosfocus
April 18, 2019
April
04
Apr
18
18
2019
12:11 AM
12
12
11
AM
PDT
KF, If I understand your question, no.daveS
April 17, 2019
April
04
Apr
17
17
2019
05:52 PM
5
05
52
PM
PDT
Not interested in the real world hypothesis, kf. Please see 6 and 16.hazel
April 17, 2019
April
04
Apr
17
17
2019
05:43 PM
5
05
43
PM
PDT
DS, do they instead IMPLY such despite their denial, given that the span of time between ANY two definite finitely separated stages is finite? KFkairosfocus
April 17, 2019
April
04
Apr
17
17
2019
05:41 PM
5
05
41
PM
PDT
H,
just as all positive numbers in the future are a finite distance from now, even though the future is infinite, all negative numbers in the past are a finite distance away, even though the past is infinite
This is the precise problem. Going forward from now (or even since the singularity) actual future stages are always, ever, finite. The "infinity" in view has to do with an open, continuous future, one that is strictly potentially infinite not actualised infinite. Why is that? Because precisely a finite stepwise causal-temporal accumulation never actually completes a transfinite span or duration. (And in fact, the heat death thesis would suggest an effective cessation of time; thermodynamically connected matter in an isolated cosmos faces ultimate degradation of energy until the reserves of a universe are used up. A potentially infinite future points to an open universe with an eternal source. But we may set that aside for now.) That such a traverse is not completed going forward from now also strongly indicates that it has not been up to now. Which is before we get to observationally supported physics which points to a finitely remote singularity as start for the only universe we actually observe. Going further, the actual (not conceptual) past is a causally connected cumulative causal chain. The once present gives rise to its successor down to now. Duration in time is only ever the span as measured between successive stages. This is what brings up the asymmetry that breaks your just as A, B argument. The past had to be actually completed stage by stage in the forward direction, and holds duration between stages measurable as the time between them. Were there a transfinite actual past, a transfinite span was obviously spanned, save, it cannot. What is left is to suggest that negative integers never have a transfinitely remote particular value. So, perhaps, the past infinity lies in an indefinite, limitless prior succession up to any given stage. The problem is, this must address actually completed stepwise successive stages and where duration to now from any particular stage will be finite. There is no warrant for a transfinite duration of the past succeeded in stages that are everywhere finitely remote. The warranted conclusion is that the traversed past to now is of finite duration and arguably the future is potentially infinite. Where, reminder, the actual observational base for an indefinitely expended past beyond the singularity is nil. KFkairosfocus
April 17, 2019
April
04
Apr
17
17
2019
05:39 PM
5
05
39
PM
PDT
KF, Yes, but you've been importing the hyperreals into the infinite past discussion. The 'proponents' of an infinite past do not speak of time coordinates/stages with infinite separation. Therefore if you want to critique their position, you should stick with a system where all coordinates/stages have finite separation. Such as the real number system, for example.daveS
April 17, 2019
April
04
Apr
17
17
2019
04:19 PM
4
04
19
PM
PDT
Good quote, Dave. I am absolutely not interested in whether this has anything to do with the real world (see posts 6 and 16), (nor with the hyperreals in this context), but the two sentences you quoted express my view, I think: just as all positive numbers in the future are a finite distance from now, even though the future is infinite, all negative numbers in the past are a finite distance away, even though the past is infinite. Above I wrote, “Every possible point Q in the past is a finite distance from 0, so no matter where you start, you only have to traverse a finite number of steps to get to the present.” Kf replied by bolding the word “start”, and said “See the problem?” But that misses the “no matter where” part. Since the starting point can always be moved back, the possible starting place for the past is infinite in that it can always be placed further back than any particular distance. If someone says, did the past start at k, one can say, “no it started at k -1”. Since the start of the past can’t be assigned to any particular number, and can also be considered further in the past than any particular number, it makes sense to say the past is infinite. It really boils down to the statement that there are an infinite number of integers, in either direction, and each one of them is a finite number.hazel
April 17, 2019
April
04
Apr
17
17
2019
04:09 PM
4
04
09
PM
PDT
1 5 6 7 8 9

Leave a Reply