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Is Atheism Rationally Justifiable?

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First, I’d like to thank Mr. Arrington for granting me posting privileges.  I consider it quite an honor, and I hope this post (and any future posts) warrants this trust.

Second, the following is an argument I think will help us to focus on a fundamental issue that lies behind ever so many of the debates here at Uncommon Descent, and elsewhere.  That is, is the sort of implicit or even explicit atheism that is so often built in on the ground floor of a “scientific” mindset truly rationally justifiable? Such cannot be assumed, it needs to be shown.

I’ll begin by defining some terms for the sake of this argument:

Definition of God (for the purpose of this thread): First cause, prime mover, root of being, objective source of human purpose (final cause) and resulting morality, source of free will, mind, consciousness; omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent inasmuch as principles of logic allow; an interventionist as necessary to facilitate movement towards final cause and also inasmuch as logical principles are not violated; source of logic — “reason itself.” (I am not talking in particular about any specifically defined religious interpretation of god, such as the Chrstian or Islamic God.)

Definition: Weak, or negative atheism is the lack of any belief that a god exists, and the position that a god probably doesn’t exist, and is not the positive belief that gods do not exist (strong atheism), and is not agnosticism (the lack of belief that god either does or does not exist and the further view that there is a lack of sufficient probability either way).  Strong atheism is the belief that no god or gods exist at all.

Definition: A worldview or mindset is rationally justified when it answers adequately to the facts of the real world as we experience or observe it, makes good sense and fits together logically, is simple but not simplistic, and honestly faces the issues and difficulties that all worldviews face.

Definition: Intellectual dishonesty occurs when (1) one deliberately mischaracterizes their position or view in order to avoid having to logically defend their actual views; and/or (2) when someone is arguing, or making statements against a position while remaining willfully ignorant about that position, and/or (3) when someone categorically and/or pejoratively dismisses all existent and/or potential evidence in favor of a conclusion they claim to be neutral about, whether they are familiar with that evidence or not.

These will be important as we consider:

Evidence in favor of God:  The following is a brief summary of the evidence that typically leads many people to make a general finding that a god (as described above) exists, even if variantly interpreted or culturally contextualized:

(1)
Anecdotal evidence for the apparently intelligently ordered anomalous, miraculous (defying expected natural processes and probabilities) events attributed to god, such as signs, supernatural events (e.g. Fatima, Guadeloupe, Paul’s Damascus Road Experience), or answers to prayers to god;

(2)
Testimonial evidence (first-hand accounts) of experience of such phenomena, including interactions with a god-like being or accounts of god-like interventions;  Also, the testimony of religious adherents of various specific gods can be counted as evidence of the god premised in this argument in the manner that various cultures can vary widely in their description of certain phenomena or experiences, and come up with widely variant “explanations”; what is interesting as evidence here, though, is the widespread crediting of similar kinds of phenomena and experience to a “god” of some sort (which might be the case of blind or ignorant people touching different parts of an elephant and thus describing “what the elephant is” in various ways). Such testimonial evidence can be counted in favor of the premise here, but cannot be held against it where it varies, because it is not testimony that such a god doesn’t exist.

(3)
The various Cosmological and Ontological Arguments for the existence of god;

(4)  The Strong Anthropic (or Fine Tuning) argument and other evidences for design of our world and of life in it;

(5) The empirical, scientific evidence assembled in support of the design arguments in #4 (such as recently persuaded Antony Flew — formerly the world’s leading philosophical atheist — that there is a god);

(6) The Moral arguments for the existence of god.

(7) Empirical and testimonial evidence of phenomena closely correlated to the existence of a god as described above, such as the survival of consciousness after death, and the existence of an afterlife realm; the evidence for interactions with correlated entities such as angels and demons (which seem to act to influence our free will towards or away from our human purpose), etc., gathered by various serious and scientific investigations into what is often referred to as the “paranormal”, including mediumship studies dating back to William Crooke and ongoing through the work at Pear Labs and the Scole Experiment, including consciousness-survival research published in the Lancet. While indirect, this evidence tends to support the proposition that god exists.

While the various arguments listed above have been subjected to counter-arguments and rebuttals of varying strengths and weaknesses across the ages, one must not lose sight that while there is much evidence of all sorts (as listed above) in favor of the existence of god; there is zero empirical evidence (to my knowledge) or and little in the way of rational argument that no such god exists.  In other words, decreasing the value of the arguments and evidence for god does not increase the value of the position that there is no god; it can only increase the reasonableness of the “weak atheist” (there isn’t enough evidence) or an agnostic position.

The commonly seen rebuttals to these argument are simply attempting to show weaknesses in or alternatives to the arguments themselves so that such arguments cannot be taken as demonstratively convincing (that god exists); such counter-arguments as a rule do not actually make the case that god (as described above) in fact does not exist.

The argument against weak atheism:

The above shows us that, ironically, strong atheism is a weak position. That is probably why atheism advocates seldom defend it in informed company. So, we must first focus on the “stronger” atheist position, the one they defend in public: “weak atheism,” generally described as absence of belief in god or gods. I will argue that it too is far weaker than is commonly recognized.

I know of no positive arguments for the strong “there is no god” position, other than the argument from evil which has been addressed by Boethius, Adams  and Platinga. Aside from that, there are only rebuttals/reactions to various “there is a god” arguments. This exemplifies how rebutting an argument does not eliminate it as evidence, it only offers an alternative perspective that one  can evaluate along with the original argument.   Depending on the strength of the rebuttal or alternative explanation, that particular positive evidence for god may be decreased in value, but there is no concurrent increase in the value of an argument against the existence of god (as described above).

If a “weak atheist” claims to “lack belief” because there is “no evidence for god,” he or she is necessarily being intellectually dishonest, because we certainly aren’t privy to all potential or available evidence. Are such atheists claiming to be omniscient? If not, then, a more modest and reasonable point would be that they are not aware of evidence for god. However, given what we have already seen, such “weak atheists” cannot genuinely claim to not know of “any” evidence for god after having perused any of the above evidence.  That is to say, there is evidence for god, just, they don’t accept it. But incredulity or hyper-skepticism on your part does not equate to “no evidence” on my part. Testimony from otherwise credible sources is not made “less credible” simply because the testimony is about something the listener personally finds to be in-credible; it is not intellectually honest to discredit the credibility of testimony only on the basis of the subject matter being debated.

Also, strong atheists often only refer to themselves as weak atheists because they have realized that the strong atheist position is an assertion they cannot support in informed company.  They do this to provide cover for their real view, which is an obvious form of intellectual dishonesty.  One can often discern when this is going on when the person ridicules belief in god or makes categorical dismissals about evidence they have never even seen; they believe there is no god, and so assume there can be no valid evidence for god, and advocate for that position rhetorically via ridicule.

Even if the “weak atheist” is not aware of any compelling evidence for god, he or she must know that we humans are quite limited in what we know, and may often be unaware of mistakes in what we think we know. That means that any categorical claim a “weak” atheist makes about the available evidence he or she is not privy to — that it is not credible or convincing — is again intellectually dishonest because you cannot justifiably make a categorical claim about something you have no knowledge of.

So, if we have a weak atheist who is aware of the existence of the above evidence and agrees that there might be more evidence they are not privy to; and who does not categorically assert problems with the evidence they have not yet seen; and who does not categorically dismiss the available evidence as “non-evidence” due to hyper-skeptical bias but rather states that the available evidence they have seen is not compelling towards a conclusion that god exists; then one must ask the following:

In the face of such overwhelming amounts of evidence — thousands of years of testimony and anecdotal stories; many serious arguments based on credible empirical evidence and apparently necessary logical premises and inferences; and, the complete lack of any generally successful attempt to make a sound argument that god in fact does not exist — one must ask: how can any intellectually honest person come to any conclusion other than that on the balance of the evidence, god probably existseven if god is poorly and diversely defined, and even if the experience of god is open to various interpretations and even to misunderstanding?

As an analogy: even if one has never personally experienced “love”; in the face of thousands of years of testimony and anecdotal stories that love exists, and empirical evidence supporting that certain physical states correspond to assertions of experiences of love, would it be intellectually honest to “lack belief” that love exists, or would it be intellectually honest to hold the view that even though one doesn’t experience love (or using the same argument, color, joy, dreams, etc.), that love probably exists – even if people are widely disparate in their explanation, description, or presentation of what love is?

Another analogy: because witnesses disagree in their description of a criminal suspect in a crime, or disagree about the particulars of the crime they witnessed, this doesn’t mean there is no criminal at all.  Depending on the testimony and evidence, one may hold that it is likely that a crime occurred, and so it is likely that a criminal exists, but that the arguments, testimony and evidence are  not enough reach a finding of “guilty” for any particular suspect.

As far as I am aware of there is no anecdotal or testimonial evidence that god does not exist (because lack of experience of a thing isn’t evidence the thing doesn’t exist), very little in the way of logical argument towards that conclusion, and there is a vast array of logical, anecdotal, testimonial and empirical evidence that god (at least as generally described above) does exist. Because a billion people did not witness a crime, and only a handful did, doesn’t tilt the scales in favor of no crime having been committed at all; imagine now a billion people that report witnessing a crime, and handful that did not, and you have something more comparable to the state of evidence concerning the existence of god.

Even if one doesn’t find that evidence compelling for for a final conclusion that god exists,  when one weighs the balance of the evidence for and against god, one should be willing to at least consider whether it is more probable that god (as described above) exists than that god does not exist.  Problematically (for the atheist), the view that it is more likely that god exists than not is not any sort of an atheistic position.

The argument against strong atheism:

Strong atheism is defined as the assertion that no god or gods exist whatsoever.

First, it is obvious that strong atheism cannot be logically supported, simply because it is impossible to prove (not in the absolute sense, but in the “sufficient evidence” sense). There may be evidence and good argument that certain gods, or kinds of gods, do not exist; but there is certainly no generally accepted evidence or successful argument that no significant, meaningful god or gods whatsoever exist, including the one as defined for this thread.

Instead of trying to actually support their own claim, strong atheists usually attempt to shift the burden of proof onto theists by essentially asking the theists to prove the atheist position wrong, implying or asserting that atheism must be held true by default.  That is, such try to argue that they have nothing to argue and can sit comfortably on their view as a default. However, that is not so; every worldview of consequence has a duty to show that it is factually adequate, coherent and explains reality powerfully and simply.  Strong atheism is not a default position; it is a positive assertion that no god or gods exist.  The default position is always “I don’t know” or true agnosticism.

Strong atheism is a sweeping, categorical assertion that something does not exist. As such, It has the job of proving a universal negative.  Perhaps this could be accomplished by showing the converse positive claim to be self-contradictory, and readers advocating strong atheism are invited to make their case based upon the definition of God at the top of this post.

Also, however unlikely it may seem to an atheist, it might be true that a god of some sort exists outside of the circle of what she or he knows or what the collective of atheists actually know. After all, we all know full well that “to err is human.” So, since the atheist could be mistaken or ignorant of the key fact or argument that would be decisive,  the strong atheist position unjustifiably excludes a potentially true explanation from consideration.  What is the rationally useful point of a metaphysical position that excludes a potentially true explanation from consideration?  Especially when it requires asserting an unsupportable universal negative? What, then, does strong atheism bring to the table of debate other than the potential for intractable error and denial of potential truth for the sake of a sweeping, unsupportable, universally negative assertion?

Conclusion: atheism is an untenable position for any intellectually honest, rational, and informed person. The belief that god (as described above, which is supported by the listed evidence) does not exist, or that it isn’t more likely that god exists than not, can only be a position based on ignorance of the available evidence and argument for god, or a hyper-skeptical, intellectually dishonest, ideologically biased, a priori dismissal of all of the evidence for the existence of god.

Comments
F/N: Without endorsing all that is therein, the exchange with the circle around Loftus et al here and here may help give some balance on the sort of issues and concerns on tone, substance and level I have with too much of today's common skepticism. My remarks here on, on what I have descriptively called selective hyperskepticism [cf. here on a more reasonable approach], may also help. And since the Christian Faith is specifically in the cross-hairs above, here on in context -- including this on, on an exchange between Ehrman and Craig -- may prove helpful. KFkairosfocus
January 24, 2013
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JLA: When one considers their choice to be between whatever experience and understanding they have of Christianity and atheism, then one is not choosing from reason, but rather from ignorance usually informed by emotion and rhetoric. This is relatively easy to spot when atheists cannot comprehend - much less respond to - the simplest and most basic logical criticism - such as that which KF provides on a regular basis.William J Murray
January 24, 2013
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JLA, Sorry, but the matters stand as shown and indicated above, and this would also be relevant to thinking worldviewishly at 101 level, as would be this as a first look on the problem of the New Atheists (and try here on for some specific issues on the wider circle). With all due respects, we live in an age of rhetoric, not on the whole one of serious and well informed thought -- and that is something that has been abundantly manifest not only in this thread but all over this site. KFkairosfocus
January 24, 2013
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KF I think that is a bit of an unfair statement. From what I’ve read on a few on the de-converted websites, they really struggled with the challenge and loss of their faith. I’m sure that was no different with the celebrity atheists. They lost faith because they couldn’t justify holding on to it anymore possibly due to evolution, old earth, problem of evil, Noah’s flood etc. To them atheism seemed more rational and true than theism did. I wouldn’t say that they lost their faith due to the pop culture and fashion of the day but because of what scientific and philosophical evidence against it. I sympathize with them because there are some things that I have trouble reconciling too. If Christianity is true, would there be a need to reconcile anything or would the truth be completely apparent as to be smooth and easy to see?JLAfan2001
January 24, 2013
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JLA: The soundness of a movement and its ability to attract a following or become fashionable or even dominant, too often have little or nothing to do with each other; behold the power of rhetoric. The issue is not whether many have hopped on the band wagon -- and the New Atheist movement in particular has been notorious for sophomoric stances as has been panned from across the board -- but how well warranted the view is. The above thread is showing serious gaps in the currently fashionable atheism. KFkairosfocus
January 24, 2013
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If atheism is not justifiable then why would former Christians like Dan Barker, John Loftus, Michael Shermer, Hector Avalos, Francisco Ayala and Bart Erhman become atheists? I know that some atheists have become Christians but that really isn’t the question. If atheism is poor why are so many people converting to it?JLAfan2001
January 24, 2013
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Well, that certainly is a lot of questions! Answering them carefully and adequately would take a book, at least, and I'm not going to write a book in the form of blog comments -- I just don't have that kind of time. If one is interested in Kantian ethics and doesn't have the time (or motivation!) to read much of or about Kant, there is one book I'm willing to: Moral Clarity: A Guide for Grown-Up Idealists by Susan Neiman. Neiman was a student of John Rawls, and for another really interesting and quite promising extension of Rawls' "Kantian liberalism", Martha Nussbaum's "capabilities approach" to global justice is, I think, one of the best approaches I've seen. (But global justice is not my field, so I'm speaking out of ignorance here.)Kantian Naturalist
January 24, 2013
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So when you say the pre-mortem consequence as dealt out by society, how is this not a simple case of might makes right? What if I don't happen to agree with whatever their version of the categorical imperative happens to be at the time? By what right - other than their might capacity to do so - do they impose their moral punishment upon me? Will I not be morally punished by those with might in some cultures for not allowing my daughter - or someone's daughter - to have their genitals mutilated? Will I not be morally punished by those with the might to do so for speaking up for women, for minorities, or for the lower caste? How are such "Moral" penalties any different from the coercion of the mighty as they impose their will on the weak or the few? By what principle do you call the structure of one culture moral, and another immoral, other than some arbitrary, vague decree of "abnormal", "uneducated", and "immature"? What meaningful standard is there to go by that has not served any conceivable interest - good or bad - in the history of mankind? What purpose does Kantian morality serve that I should endure a life of torture and misery in service to ... well ... no goal whatsoever. What consequence does it offer for ignoring its direction that is anything other than the mighty imposing it's will on the weak?William J Murray
January 23, 2013
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Why should I bother trying to do what is right? Am I trying to create an ideal society? Is that the goal? Ideal by what standard? Frankly, my ideal society is one where everyone serves my interests. Should I work towards that "ideal society"? Why should I avoid doing wrong, if it profits me to do so? Do people who do wrong not succeed in this world? Are they unhappy? Do they have less money? Or fame? Less food, or friends? Do they lack the love of their wife or children? Do you imagine they suffer from some missing quality that doesn't haunt the rest of us, just because they do wrong things? What about the people that were martyred for doing the right thing? Killed, boiled, heads cut off, tortured, etc. What the heck is the point in that under Kantian morality. If I live in a culture of slave-owners, should I turn mine free and advocate against slavery? Why? Do you think slave-holders considered themselves evil? Did they lose sleep, did they not love, did they not laugh?William J Murray
January 23, 2013
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Human administered and psychological consequence is not necessary consequence, so no, it is not "sufficient" to move morality beyond simple "might makes right" threat. Regardless of whether the consequence is post-mortem or pre-mortem, unless it is necessary - meaning, the consequence is utterly unavoidable - then .. so what? There's no reason to risk anything to do what is right, and no reason to avoid wrongs that carry no significant consequence.William J Murray
January 23, 2013
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Morality without necessary consequence is nothing more than rhetoric and sophistry.
Do you mean postmortem, divinely-administered consequence? Or are pre-mortem social and psychological consequences sufficient? If the former, why? If the latter, any reasonable humanism can easily accommodate it.Kantian Naturalist
January 23, 2013
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Kant doesn't think that anyone goes through their daily life with these formulas in mind as if they were slogans. He claims, rather, that idea of the categorical imperative explicates what is implicit in the actual practice of moral agency -- in particular, it explicates the tension between respect for the autonomy and dignity of others and the desires and urges we experience as animals. Granted, Kant is a bit too Stoic for my taste in this regard, and I prefer a more Aristotelian approach in which the rational and animal sides of our nature are not always locked in some perpetual conflict, but rather that with the right kinds of education or upbringing, they are brought into something like harmony most of the time.Kantian Naturalist
January 23, 2013
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Morality without necessary consequence is nothing more than rhetoric and sophistry.William J Murray
January 23, 2013
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KN: I have no reason to consider any of the formulas in any of my daily activities. In fact, I reject them. I guess then, by definition, I must be uneducated .. and/or abnormal ... and/or immature. Oh well ... so what?William J Murray
January 23, 2013
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So far as I can tell, Kant would treat the question, "who made the moral law?" as equivalent to "where did the moral law come from?". And that question has no answer. The moral law is just reason itself in its practical aspect, and reason is, in some sense I do not fully understand, supposed to be 'ultimate': that there is no account of the origins of reason, since any such account presupposes reason. Reason is the ratio cognoscendi; there isn't anything deeper or more fundamental than that. It's worth pointing out that, in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant tries to unify the mechanistic, physical world of nature and the rational, intellectual world of human freedom. He does so by arguing that we are entitled to conceive of God as "the author of nature" who created nature for the sake of rational agents. There at least, it becomes clear (as clear as things are in Kant!) that rational nature is an end-in-itself because of divine creativity. (Bearing in mind, of course, that we cannot know that this is so -- being rationally entitled to believe it is the most that Kant aims for.) It is true that Kant's entire account of judgment and experience is fundamentally anthropocentric. He rejected the theocentric approach of the Scholastics and the rationalists (but without abandoning their commitment to the a priori forms of logical inference). Fairly clearly, he did so under the influence of Hume and a few others. (Personally, I think that Kant still took Hume too seriously, and that really purging Kant's insights of the vestiges of empiricism was one of the big accomplishments of Hegel and Peirce. 20th-century analytic philosophy began with a return to Hume from which it has not yet recovered, despite occasional outbreaks of rationalist metaphysics.) Of course, to those who are still committed to the theocentric approach, Kant's anthropocentrism might seem -- I don't know? -- arrogant? hubristic? arbitrary? -- but I think of it as, to use Kant's words, "man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity".Kantian Naturalist
January 23, 2013
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According to Kant, the moral law is enacted by reason and demands obedience from mere respect for reason. That is what makes it subjective. Reason is its source. The reciprocal point is clear. The categorical imperative is not enacted buy a higher power. For Kant, necessity and universality cannot be derived from experience but from the mind alone. The categorical imperative is a law unto itself and is not, therefore, subject to the sanctions of any lawgiver. By its standards, we are to obey the testimony of our reason as opposed to anything on the order of a Divinely-enacted natural moral law. The assumption is that man is an end in himself and is not, therefore, morally obliged to seek his highest good, namely God. And yes, I would argue that this is a man-made law. If not man, then who else made the law? Kant has already ruled out God. These are, after all, only two candidates to be considered are they not? Ironically, the categorical imperative belongs to the intelligible world, and is, according to the "Critique of Pure Reason", absolutely unknowable. Even so, we are told in Kant’s ethics that we must obey the categorical imperative as a knowable principle. In that sense, Kant’s ethics completely contradict his anti-metaphysics, which is no small fault. In any case, if man is morally autonomous, he is, in that sense, emancipated from God and does not recognize God as the supreme good. So, in answer to WJM’s question, no—for Kant, there is no penalty for violating the categorical imperative since there this law is not inherent in nature [like the natural moral law] but only in the mind. It is impossible to know if Kant allows for a painful conscience since his thinking is so muddled in this area that one could argue either way.StephenB
January 23, 2013
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I think that, as Kant would see it, someone who acts contrary to the moral law has lost the right to respect him or herself as a rational and autonomous being. One has lost the right to belong to the moral community. At work here, though, are complex pictures of human psychology. What seems to me to be at work in Murray's conception of human psychology is something like this: human beings are like little children, who will act according to their selfish desires at any opportunity unless there is some sort of adult supervision to make sure that those who do the wrong thing are appropriately punished. I don't know -- I doubt I'm being fair to Murray, but that's the impression I get. And that's quite, quite different from the Kantian conception, and from mine. On my conception, which is not quite Kantian, a normal, mature human being who has had a decent education will care about other people, will care about helping them and not harming them, and will care about doing the right thing at the right time and in the right way. It is fundamentally to our animal nature that we have cares and concerns -- many animals do! -- and as rational animals, we can modify our cares and concerns, our animal side, so that we care about deliberating from the moral point of view. I mean, this just seems perfectly obvious to me -- what exactly am I missing here? (Now, it might be pointed out that in contemporary Western societies, we have a system of social, economic, cultural, and political rewards and sanctions that pretty much promotes sociopathic or nearly-sociopathic behaviors: narcissism, greed, short-sightedness, individualism, the desirability of slick charm over real substance, of image over reality, etc. In response, I would say that our real tendency to reward narcissism over decency is a feature of what barely-restricted capitalism, dependent on continuous overconsumption and overproduction, has done to our psyches, and offers little guidance for what might be concluded about "human nature.")Kantian Naturalist
January 23, 2013
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Yes, Kant has a list of "shoulds" .. but apparently never says why I should. Or should not.William J Murray
January 23, 2013
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If you can get away with it, and justify it to yourself, there are no negative consequences. Humans have "motivations" for doing both good and evil things. Humans can justify just about any behavior. In some cases, there is social ostracism and negative consequences for doing the right thing and behaving as a good person. In some peer groups, you are in danger if you do "the right thing". Why should I put my life at risk for doing the right thing, if there is no necessary consequence for my actions? Why should I ever put anyone else's interest above my own? Why shouldn't I just "fake" being a good person as long as it suits my interests? No necessary consequences = So what? I'll be moral when it is convenient, necessary (to avoid punishment), or suits my goals ... but wait, that's not really being moral .. err.. ethical, is it? I mean, according to Kant? Why would you have a serious quarrel with someone who considers that philosophy incomplete? What difference does it make to you?William J Murray
January 23, 2013
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So, in other words, there are no necessary, negative consequences for disobeying the categorical imperative. Which leads us to the only necessary rebuttal to the categorical imperative: If I can get away with it, so what?
I don't really understand where you're coming from here. Suppose there aren't any postmortem negative consequences, but all sorts of premortem negative consequences, both psychological (e.g. guilt, shame) and social (ostracism, disappointment, legal punishments). Are those not enough, somehow? If not, why not? Bearing in mind, though, I have no idea if Kant believed in divinely administered postmortem rewards or punishments. Maybe he did. I don't know, and I also don't care. It seems utterly absurd to me to think that divinely-administered postmortem rewards and punishments have any deep or essential connection to one's motivations for living a morally decent life. I know there are some deeply religious people for whom that does factor into their conception of themselves as moral beings, and I have no serious quarrel with that -- I do have serious quarrel with the thought that one's moral philosophy is somehow incomplete without that or some substitute for it.Kantian Naturalist
January 23, 2013
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632: So, in other words, there are no necessary, negative consequences for disobeying the categorical imperative. Which leads us to the only necessary rebuttal to the categorical imperative: If I can get away with it, so what?William J Murray
January 23, 2013
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In Kant’s view, is there a necessary, practical downside (penalty) for disobeying the categorical imperative? If not, why should I care about obeying the categorical imperative?
Kant develops his thoughts on this question most fully in Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Alone, which I have not yet read, where he develops his account of "radical evil." Radical evil occurs when we knowingly and deliberately act contrary to the categorical imperative. (As opposed to acting contrary to the categorical imperative out of impulse, lack of self-control, failure to deliberate adequately, etc.) But I think Kant would say that, as rational beings, we cannot avoid taking an interest in the moral point of view. We care about the moral law just because we are rational agents. On this, I think Kant has a very interesting point, though I'm not completely delighted with how he puts it: what Kant denies is that it's possible to suppose that a normal mature human being could have some intelligible point of view exterior to the moral point of view, such that the trick is get them inside morality from outside of it. (Hobbes, importantly, affirms this -- that's why he's able to generate morality through agreements between rational (but self-interested) individuals.) Rather, for Kant, a normal mature human necessarily cares about the moral point of view, because she is necessarily rational. (It's the "necessarily" there that I'm uneasy about; I would prefer, "is overwhelmingly likely to", or something close to that.) As for 'penalties': well, Kant doesn't think that there are postmortem penalties, if that's what you're asking. But there are plenty enough pre-mortem penalties for normal, mature human beings who act contrary to the moral law, if you ask me.) Interestingly, Kant does think that we should believe in immortality of the soul, but his argument for this claim is pretty intricate. Suffice it to say that if someone were to start off with a basically Kant ethical theory, and then take the existence of God and the immortality of the soul off the table, what one would be left with is a deeply tragic view of life: a view of life in which there is no guarantee that doing the right thing will lead to personal satisfaction or happiness, of any kind, ever. And that is indeed what I believe.Kantian Naturalist
January 23, 2013
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For Kant, the moral law does not come from God. It is a man-made law by which we decide to bind ourselves. It is a matter of subjective intention only. It is not a misrepresentation to say so. It is a misrepresentation to try to make it appear as anything other than that.
It's certainly true that Kant does not think that the moral law a decree of the divine will, but he clearly doesn't think that the moral law is "man-made", in the sense of being an product of our collective caprice or whim. Kant makes it perfectly clear that the moral law is intrinsic to the very nature of rationality agency as such: any rational being, if it is an agent, will be bound by the moral law and recognize itself as being thus bound. Kant is actually pretty clear that he thinks of normal mature human beings as rational animals. As animals, we have various inclinations that sometimes go against the requirements of the moral law. But as rational beings, we always have the duties that the moral law imposes upon us. We simply have the free will to act contrary to those duties, i.e. the free will to do wrong. Since, however, we are fundamentally rational beings as well as animals, to act contrary to the moral law is to rebel against our own rational nature. Importantly, the categorical imperative comes in three main "formulations", of which the relationships between them are of interest only to serious Kant scholars. I shall paraphrase, loosely but I hope to good effect: (1) the Formula of Universal Law: you should act only according to those intentions which you can simultaneously conceive of as, and desire that they be, how everyone acts. (2) the Formula of Humanity: always act so as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as having intrinsic dignity also and never as a mere instrument only. (3) the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends: always act as if through one's actions one could bring into being an ideal moral community in which everyone is friends with everyone else. (Personally, I'm more drawn to the 2nd formulation than the other two; I attribute that to having read Buber's I and Thou at the impressionable age of 19.) But as for the "formality" of the categorical imperative, I'm less concerned about this than others. Another way to think about this is to say that the categorical imperative is a procedure; it constrains our actions by telling us which desires it is morally permissible to act upon. (The first formula is clearly the most proceduralistic of the three.) But it is a procedure that does generate a kind of content of its own, as a "regulative ideal" of human conduct, what Kant calls "the kingdom of ends". Here's a way of thinking about it: the kingdom of ends is a society in which everyone is friends with everyone else. That functions as a regulative ideal for everyday human conduct in much the same way that a complete description of the physical universe functions as a regulative ideal for everyday scientific inquiry. Footnote: The moral law and the categorical imperative are not quite the same thing. The moral law holds for all rational agents, where a rational agent is any being that is able to act on the basis of reasons. The categorical imperative holds for all rational animals, because only animals, since they are affected by inclinations and desires, can experience the moral law as a constraint upon the will. So the divine will is bound by the moral law, but not by the categorial imperative, since God, lacking a physical side, has no inclinations or desires.Kantian Naturalist
January 23, 2013
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In Kant's view, is there a necessary, practical downside (penalty) for disobeying the categorical imperative? If not, why should I care about obeying the categorical imperative? (Pardon my ignorance of Kant's views on this.)William J Murray
January 23, 2013
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Kant’s views on the a priori grounding of the categorical imperative within pure practical reason itself are so subtle and complicated that it would be a serious misrepresentation to simply write him off as a “moral subjectivist.” For one thing, Kant clearly doesn’t think that the moral law is just what we happen to decide upon, as if it ultimately consists of our (contingent) psychological states.
For Kant, the moral law does not come from God. It is a man-made law by which we decide to bind ourselves. It is a matter of subjective intention only. It is not a misrepresentation to say so. It is a misrepresentation to try to make it appear as anything other than that.StephenB
January 23, 2013
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Everyone who discusses matter like these know of Occam and his razor.
To know of Occham and his razor is not to understand Occham and his razor nor how it is properly employed.Mung
January 23, 2013
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E: Namecalling and strawman tactics multiplied by trying to assert an unexamined metaphysics into being acceped, by rhetorical fiat. Does not work like you just tried. Just to start dealing with merits instead, address the issue of grounding morality objectively in the foundation of your worldview, or else frankly face the implications of radical relativisation of morals. KFkairosfocus
January 23, 2013
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Kant's views on the a priori grounding of the categorical imperative within pure practical reason itself are so subtle and complicated that it would be a serious misrepresentation to simply write him off as a "moral subjectivist." For one thing, Kant clearly doesn't think that the moral law is just what we happen to decide upon, as if it ultimately consists of our (contingent) psychological states.Kantian Naturalist
January 23, 2013
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kairosfocus 623; As I´ve said several times before; I can accept the idea of some sort of creator, but I cannot accept the idea of divine providence and divine moral codes. There are no such things! Everyone who discusses matter like these know of Occam and his razor. Why don´t you surrender to logic and simplicity instead of indulging into voluminous navel-gazing that leads to nothing?Elvis4708
January 23, 2013
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PS: In addition, you face the problem of providing a viable, necessary being foundation of the cosmos without at least a generic god of the philosophers. Nothing means non-being, and can have no causative power, pace Hawking's recent error. We live in a credibly contingent world, one shaped in such a way that it sits at a very precise operating point that facilitates life. Assuming you are interested in a physical world model, you then have to bridge the gap to a viable solar system, then OOL with the scope of FSCO/I we see, then bridge to origin of body plans on an empirically demonstrated causal mechanism -- note the 6,000 word challenge essay is 4 months no answer today -- and then ground the credibility of conscious mind as accurately perceiving, correctly warranting and credibly knowing. None of these has been adequately bridged. Then you will have to face the consequence outlined since Plato in The Laws, Bk X: radical relativisation of morality and a result that entails that might and manipulation make 'right.' AKA, amoral nihilism. Just remember, I am a descendant of slaves, and I know the pivotal importance of adequate grounds for justice, rights and duties of care to neighbour. Where also, Hume's guillotine highlights that the place where an adequate grounding of morality can enter the world, is its foundation. finally, I am very aware that nihilist factions would find it very convenient to get a critical mass to go along with their might and manipulation make 'right' notions. KFkairosfocus
January 23, 2013
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