What is knowledge?
|November 26, 2017||Posted by kairosfocus under Food for thought, Logic and First Principles of right reason, Philosophy, Science, Mathematics, Philosophy and (Natural) Theology, Selective Hyperskepticism, warrant, knowledge, science and belief|
Sometimes, exchanges at UD come down to truly basic (and hard) issues.
This is one such time, where Origenes has challenged prolific objector Critical Rationalist in the Personal Incredulity thread:
I have thought this worthy of responding to and of headlining:
KF, 106: >> Origines,
Generally, I would argue that “knowledge” is used in a weak form sense: warranted, credibly true (and reliable) belief.
Drawing out, slightly:
there is an available account (as opposed to internal to the given knower, who may simply accept a message from reliable sources . . . ) that, properly understood, would justify accepting or treating belief x as true in serious contexts.
Credibly true —
the warrant for and circumstances of belief x are such that we can have good confidence that the belief is likely to be true or capture enough truth that we are entitled to trust it.
the warrant for x is such that if we act on the belief that-x in a consequential situation, we are unlikely to be let down.
that which is accepted, perceived, or held to be so; often in this context, for good reason.
Of course in today’s day and age, “faith” and “belief” are often despised and dismissively contrasted with “science,” “reason/rationality” and “knowledge,” etc. as though acknowledged faith/trust/belief is invariably ill-warranted.
Such reflects dominance of radical secularism and evolutionary materialistic scientism, which, ironically are not well warranted, are not trustworthy (being fallaciously rooted, esp. through self-referential incoherence and/or the fostering of ill-advised cognitive biases) and should not be permitted to act as gate-keepers on what we regard as knowledge.>>
So, arguably, knowledge is well-warranted, credibly true (and reliable) belief.
Many will find that unpalatable, but I confidently predict that they will have difficulty proposing another succinct account that answers to issues ranging from the classical “justified, true belief” definition of epistemology, to the fact that scientific knowledge is not utterly certain, to the challenge of Gettier counter-examples, to the Grue issue, to the Agrippa trilemma challenge and more. END