What is knowledge?

@KF

KF: There are no actual Turing Machines due to involvement of infinities.

This was already addressed in the paper...

In order to evaluate a computable function of a particular input, a computer needs enough working memory to store the intermediate results. Since, in reversible computations, those results are erased by the time the output is delivered, that memory is not depleted by the computation and can be re-used, so it is both a substrate and a constructor. We may call non-programmable constructors that are used as substrates of other constructors ancillas, generalising the existing use of the term in the theory of computation. For many programmable computers, including every universal one, the memory requirement of computations in the computer’s repertoire has no upper bound. Therefore such a computer cannot be defined as including all its ancillas, and the repertoire of a programmable computer must be defined as the set of computations it can be programmed to perform if it is given an unlimited supply of additional memory . Another reason for not counting ancillas among the resource requirements of computations is that if one does count them, there are no universal computers. Let C be a computer capable of performing a computational task {} i?? A=? i? f(i) , (11) using b(i) memory-ancillas of a given capacity and in t(i) steps when the input is i. Then a universal computer programmed to simulate C may require up to p(t(i)) steps and up to q(b(i)) ancillas, where p and q are polynomial functions, every time it performs A with input i. Since no computer architecture optimises the memory and time requirements of every computational task, there would be no universal computer if limits on time and memory, and hence on ancillas, were included in the definitions of computational tasks. In constructor theory a stricter conception of universality is possible, because when a programmable constructor is programmed to mimic another constructor C, it may begin by constructing an instance of C, to which it directs subsequent inputs, so that from then on it performs C’s task using much the same resources that C would. Hence the repertoire of a programmable constructor P can be defined as the set of tasks that P can be programmed to be capable of performing, up to a constant amount of naturally-occurring resources. More precisely, the overhead of programming P to be capable of performing A is a constant c(P,A), independent of how often P will then be called upon to perform A , and which inputs for A it is given.

Furthermore, you do not use a dedicated device to read Facebook, check your email and post on UB, right? This emergent property isn't present in "more or less refined rock" either.

Material computing substrates do not account for actual reasoning, though they can effect useful algorithms or analogues of systems or make pattern based responses etc.

Again, here you are assuming the unseen explanation we use to explain the seen will resemble the scene. That is inductivism. Of course, human beings are conscious, rational, free agents. So, if the unseen resembles the seen, then why can't we create conscious and reasoning beings as well? And if it's not, then you're referring to some philosophical position that reasoning, etc must be grounded in something. I.E. you are referring to a job description that is parochial in nature, in that it's dependent a specific philosophical view. I don't know how else to explain this. It's unclear why I should feel constrained by your specific philosophical view as the only possible option. critical rationalist

CR, I spoke to the range of known architectures and substrates. There are no actual Turing Machines due to involvement of infinities. Just as, there never could have been Newtonian point particles . . . infinite density. Microprocessors are flexible and useful but they are not universal computing substrates in the Turing sense. All of this is tangential to the point that such are blindly mechanical, GIGO limited, cause-effect chaining devices, not reasoning entities that actually use insight to infer from ground to consequent. Material computing substrates do not account for actual reasoning, though they can effect useful algorithms or analogues of systems or make pattern based responses etc. Likewise they are not a shown ground of either consciousness nor understanding as a rational conscious experience nor for conscience and the awareness of being under moral government. And, to suggest that consciusness, reasoning, conscience, understanding etc are effectively delusions is self referentially incoherent and self-falsifying -- actually, it is implying grand delusion, an ultimate absurdity. KF PS: Consciousness on our part is patently contingent, thus not self-explanatory. Nor can you try to suggest it needs not be taken as requiring more than acceptance of a brute mysteriously emergent fact. We can translate that: you have no sound basis for conscious minded enconscienced agency and wish this taken off the table. Conscious agency FYI is our first fact, the fact through which we address all others and through which we reason and communicate. We have every right to ponder it and its significance, including how we could come to be embodied creatures with such an awareness. Arguably, this base fact raises the question that we are far more than material, bio-cybernetic automata. kairosfocus

Empiricism was the idea that anything that wasn't scientific was meaningless. Yet, that very claim itself had no empirical or scientific basis. It deemed itself meaningless. In the same sense....The idea that consciousness must be "grounded" in by something - How have you grounded that idea? How have you justified it? critical rationalist

CR, FYI, the first microprocessors were created to implement calculators and today that is what is often done.

They are used today because they are universal. It is cheaper to use a mass produced, off the shelf microprocessors, that cost pennies, and program it to be a calculator, than to design and manufacture a dedicated logic to implement a dedicated calculator. Before we stumbled upon the university of computation, that was not an option. It's not that we thought this universality was unlikely or improbable. We simply did not conceive of it at all.

Besides, I am speaking to first the hardware technology to make the point that a computational substrate is more or less refined rock, arranged so that cause effect chains carry out computations.

So am I. I'm trying to take your argument seriously, for the purpose of criticism, by assuming it is true in reality, and that all observations should conform to it. The universality of computation (any Turing machine can run any algorithm that an other Turing machine can run, including one that does not exist yet) is not found in "more or less refined rock". It's not there, either. So, according to your argument, we shouldn't expect that universality to emerge either because "more or less refined rock" would not qualify as a source for it.

As for oh those technologies don’t get us to Turing machines, trivially, hardware is exactly what means a real computer is not a Turing machine.

What I said is that the explanation for universality of computation is not present there. It is an emergent phenomena. This is not the vague statement that "those technologies don’t get us to Turing machines." Lets not forget this gem from Barry....

CR: “You forgot the universality of computation . . .” BA: Nonsense. No one has suggested that computation is an emergent property of physical components. You might want to read that again. Apparently, you can’t even quote mine well? You forgot the universality of computation, which emerges from a specific repertoire of computations That’s not the same as mere “computation”. Furthermore, apparently Stanford University is “no one”. From this presentation…

Emergent Properties – An emergent property of a system is a property that arises out of smaller pieces that doesn’t seem to exist in any of the individual pieces. – Examples: — Individual neurons work by firing in response to particular combinations of inputs. Somehow, this leads to thought and consciousness. — Individual atoms obey the laws of quantum mechanics and just interact with other atoms. Somehow, it’s possible to combine them together to make iPhones.

And…

Emergent Properties of Computation – All computing systems equal to Turing machines exhibit several surprising emergent properties. – If we believe the Church-Turing thesis, these emergent properties are, in a sense, “inherent” to computation. You can’t have computation without these properties. – These emergent properties are what ultimately make computation so interesting and so powerful. As we’ll see, though, they’re also computation’s Achilles heel – they’re how we find concrete examples of impossible problems.

And…

Two Emergent Properties – There are two key emergent properties of computation that we will discuss: — Universality: There is a single computing device capable of performing any computation. — Self-Reference: Computing devices can ask questions about their own behavior.

As you’ll see, the combination of these properties leads to simple examples of impossible problems and elegant proofs of impossibility.

So, a sufficiently powerful machine can allow one device to emulate another [as was done by Apple back in the 90’s], which was never in dispute; this is tangential.

Again, I'm trying to take your claim seriously, as if it was true in reality, and that all observations, including your own objections, should conform to it. You want to be taken seriously, right? What is in dispute is whether our unseen explanations for the seen must resemble the seen. In the case of the universality of computation, this is not the case. So, it's unclear why you think conciseness is an exception. You keep saying I'm making a straw man argument, yet the idea that our unseen explanations that explain the seen must resemble the seen This is inductivism. The future will resemble the past is just one variation of it.

The material, focal point, you have not answered: computational substrates work by blind mechanical cause-effect chains and/or equally blind stochastic processes. They are not the ground of reasoned, insightful inference from premises accepted on a warrant to conclusions that are entailed or supported. KF

I have answered, KF. You just do not like the answer. They, nor anything else, is the "ground" of conciseness. You've invented a problem to solve. Apparently, we're talking past each other. I'm saying that knowledge isn't justified, true belief. There is no ground to our knowledge. It doesn't grow the way you think it does. I'm suggesting you are mistaken about that. I've presented criticism of that idea that has yet to be refuted. On the other hand, you seem to be saying: since (based on a dictionary definition?) knowledge is justified true belief, there must be something to justify it. And that any unseen explanation that explains the seen (must resemble that which we are explaining.) "blind mechanical cause-effect chains and/or equally blind stochastic processes." do not resemble the seen, so that rejection is based on inductivism. I would again point out that our explanation of universality of computation (the unseen) does not resemble the seen (universal computers), either. UTMs can be constructed from vacuum tubes or even cogs. This is a concrete example to the contrary. critical rationalist

CR, FYI, the first microprocessors were created to implement calculators and today that is what is often done. Besides, I am speaking to first the hardware technology to make the point that a computational substrate is more or less refined rock, arranged so that cause effect chains carry out computations. I exemplify architectures: digital, analogue, neural networks, to point out a key in-common fact. Namely, that such entities invariably work by blind mechanical cause-effect linkages, not by insightful understanding expressed in ground-consequent reasoned inferences. I did not attempt to define computing in general and the three architectures taken together -- as you should know just from analogue computers based on integrators -- are not covered by Turing Machine abstractions. Algorithms come about by of course, intelligent and knowledgeable design, just as do designs for analogue computers and the patching required to solve a given differential equation by actual integration (as opposed to simulation), for example. Your discussion is off on a tangent. As for oh those technologies don't get us to Turing machines, trivially, hardware is exactly what means a real computer is not a Turing machine. No infinite tape or memory, for one instance. Of course finite stores that are big enough are good enough for practical purposes and the model gives a useful analytical context. So, a sufficiently powerful machine can allow one device to emulate another [as was done by Apple back in the 90's], which was never in dispute; this is tangential. But, a Turing machine is an abstraction -- a thought-world entity arrived at by rational insightful, creative inference per the logic of structure and quantity not blindly mechanical calculations. The material, focal point, you have not answered: computational substrates work by blind mechanical cause-effect chains and/or equally blind stochastic processes. They are not the ground of reasoned, insightful inference from premises accepted on a warrant to conclusions that are entailed or supported. KF kairosfocus

Gate logic and cross-coupled gates with feedback are wholly mechanical devices based on more or less amplifiers using transistors of various types run between cut-off and saturation — and I say more or less because of esp. good old emitter coupled logic.

Again, the aspect of computers you are referring to could equally be applied to a dedicated old school calculator, and ignores what is unique to universal Turing machines: the the ability to run any algorithm that any other Turing machines can run, including those that have not been developed yet. Based on your argument, we should never have universality, because the explanation for it is not found in "Gate logic and cross-coupled gates with feedback", either. Yet, that ability emerges from transistors, vacuum tubes and even cogs and refers to deep laws of computation. See #220

(Have you designed a computer system or at least had to study such, digital or analogue?)

I was a computer repair technician for several years and currently develop commercial applicators for iPhones, iPads and the Mac platform. Apple exploited this universality to run software for IBM PPC processors on Intel processor Macs during the transition. critical rationalist

CR, in 220 above, you seem to overlook that digital computational devices are programmed machines, which mechanically and blindly carry out instructions assembled in accord with algorithms using linguistic codes. Though they are more active than obviously mechanical devices like the old fashioned movie film projector or phonograph player, they have no insight or common-sense. Gate logic and cross-coupled gates with feedback are wholly mechanical devices based on more or less amplifiers using transistors of various types run between cut-off and saturation -- and I say more or less because of esp. good old emitter coupled logic. Analogue devices are similarly mechanical, whether electrical (e.g. op amps) or mechanical . . . ball and disk, etc. Neural networks are also mechanical. Computational substrates are mechanical entities. None of the "intelligent" behaviour emerges from insights of such machines, the issue is the functional hardware organisation, the programming and underlying signal processing strategy. These entities and their functionality come from the work of knowledgeable designers. Long ago I pointed you here on, for a 102 level look at these and a great many other points that you keep raising. Did you go down to the point where computing substrates are discussed? (Have you designed a computer system or at least had to study such, digital or analogue?) KF kairosfocus

CR, on

A material designer would be well adapted for the purpose of designing things. Being well adapted for a purpose (designing things) cannot be the explanation for being well adapted to serve a purpose.

This confuses inference to design on a given sign with inference to designer, then compounds this by involving oh designing the designer. I do not know how many times it has been pointed out to you that the evidence of FSCO/I etc points to design as process, not to a designer or a specific case of a designer. next, you cite something that tries to dismiss complexity, from SETI:

the credibility of the evidence is not predicated on its complexity. If SETI were to announce that we’re not alone because it had detected a signal, it would be on the basis of artificiality. An endless, sinusoidal signal – a dead simple tone – is not complex; it’s artificial.

I can only presume that the author of this has never had to design and build a clean sinusoidal oscillator. Such involves a gated power source, with feedback from output to input to the gate actuation process -- which must be an amplifier -- that has to be highly specifically frequency-selective, and also a means of stopping growth that prevents saturation and clipping or the like. The signal is of simple, highly specific mathematical form, the generation of such is anything but simple. And it is highly specific. BTW, this would also hold for finding a geometrical figure such as a sphere or cuboid that are clearly not the result of crystallisation. Or a ditch that follows such a figure. And so forth. KF kairosfocus

CR, While I am not a gung-ho all-Bayesian myself [I think Fisher's work has some validity and that the issue of rejection zones is relevant to the design inference], I do not think you have fairly presented Bayesian inference and analysis as developed. It first speaks to relevant alternatives held by subjects who are presumed reasonably informed enough to make sensible inferences regarding scaling probabilities towards a decision to be made. Every relevant hyp will have some finite, non-zero probability of being correct, because of that context. Thus, we speak of expert elicitation and the like, and I actually had to study techniques to make things come out from intuitive perceptions by making comparisons to dice, coins, decks of cards etc. Formal expert elicitation such as is now done routinely here in evaluating likely onward behaviour of our big bad boy friend down South, involves calibrating the knowledge base of the panel and weighting estimates i/l/o calibration. The revision of estimates is then evaluated on the premise of bounded error-prone rationality (necessarily involving a degree of ignorance) and the issue of cost to learn more is a factor in decisions. BTW, estimating probability from observed, perhaps somewhat idealised -- as in, noise or fluctuations etc -- frequency of occurrence is a classic example of inductive study. The idea is there is a stable identity which will manifest in a stable pattern, affected by noise and fluctuations etc. KF kairosfocus

https://smbc-comics.com/index.php?id=4127 Why Bayesianism is false.

[Speaker] According to Bayesianism, every theory, no matter how ridiculous, has some probability of being true. But the sum of all theories multiplied by their probability must still be one. Therefore, I've created a new device: the Bayesian overloader. Start with some very probable. theory that nobody likes. for example, "i will die someday" Now, we set the overloader to generate opposing theories, like "everyone living will not die" or "only pumpkins die" or "nobody has as ever died - theyre all just sleeping" Because all of these theories get some slice of the probability pie, so long as we generate theories fast enough, the undesirable theory becomes less and less true. The overloader creates hundreds of-trillions of theories every second. We wait about thirty seconds, then BAM! The initial theory is now vanishingly unlikely! And thus I am immortal! [Speaker stabs himself] [Dies] [Audience member] See, that's why I'm a frequentist.

critical rationalist

@UB

You won’t have to, you’ve already been told multiple times that concluding a material designer is a valid conclusion from biological ID. So what is your problem?

A material designer would be well adapted for the purpose of designing things. Being well adapted for a purpose (designing things) cannot be the explanation for being well adapted to serve a purpose. Also, why SETI isn't like intelligent design... http://www.space.com/searchforlife/seti_intelligentdesign_051201.html

Well, it's because the credibility of the evidence is not predicated on its complexity. If SETI were to announce that we're not alone because it had detected a signal, it would be on the basis of artificiality. An endless, sinusoidal signal - a dead simple tone - is not complex; it's artificial. Such a tone just doesn't seem to be generated by natural astrophysical processes. In addition, and unlike other radio emissions produced by the cosmos, such a signal is devoid of the appendages and inefficiencies nature always seems to add - for example, DNA's junk and redundancy.

There's another hallmark of artificiality we consider in SETI, and it's context. Where is the signal found? Our searches often concentrate on nearby Sun-like star systems - the very type of astronomical locale we believe most likely to harbor Earth-size planets awash in liquid water. That's where we hope to find a signal. The physics of solar systems is that of hot plasmas (stars), cool hydrocarbon gasses (big planets), and cold rock (small planets). These do not produce, so far as we can either theorize or observe, monochromatic radio signals belched into space with powers of ten billion watts or more--the type of signal we look for in SETI experiments. It's hard to imagine how they would do this, and observations confirm that it just doesn't seem to be their thing. Context is important, crucially important. Imagine that we should espy a giant, green square in one of these neighboring solar systems. That would surely meet our criteria for artificiality. But a square is not overly complex. Only in the context of finding it in someone's solar system does its minimum complexity become indicative of intelligence.

critical rationalist

Answer to Mung Headlined: https://uncommondescent.com/ethics/science-worldview-issues-and-society/do-we-have-sufficient-in-hand-to-decide-what-knowledge-is-not/ kairosfocus

Mung, we have both criteria anchored in experience and insight to define knowledge in a weaker and by extension a stronger sense. Given how science is a major cultural enterprise, we see the importance of the weaker sense: knowledge is warranted, credibly true (and -- for emphasis -- reliable) belief. Knowing is a key function of knowers, who must believe . . . accept sufficiently to rely on . . . what they know. But beliefs may be false or irrational. We need a particular subset. That subset has to be such that an individual may know per accepting credible authority (e.g. a dictionary, a qualified teacher, an expert) on perhaps simplified explanation or demonstration but authorities are no better than their facts, reasoning and assumptions. Thus, collectively at cultural level there must be adequate warrant of credible truth (and so also, reliability). This is fallibilist, and progressive: if warrant fails sufficiently for some X, it should be corrected and surrendered as claimed knowledge even as knowledge on the subject advances to include that X is not known. Some replacement, Y may or may not succeed X. In a strong sense, some few things may be incorrigibly, undeniably or more broadly self-evidently known, e.g. if one is conscious and so self-aware, that generic direct fact is infallibly known. Similarly, that error exists is undeniable. Something like 2 + 3 = 5 is self evident, known on understanding the claim i/l/o adequate experience of reality, known to be so necessarily, and that necessity is so on pain of patent, instant absurdity on the attempted denial. First principles of right reason pivoting on distinct identity [A vs ~A] are self-evident and foundational to reason, starting with LOI, LNC, LEM. Other more abstruse claims may be shown to be necessarily true on adequate experience, observation and logical, insightful reasoning per grounds and entailed consequents, e.g. much of mathematics short of imposing comprehensive axiomatic systems which are of complexity sufficient for Godel's findings to apply: inherently incomplete and prone to possible incoherence. Where, on even the fallibilist model, facts of empirical observation in science hold superior warrant to integrative theoretical constructs in general, which are prone to correction on fresh observation, so should generally be seen as aiming at being empirically reliable and possibly true models of some aspects of reality. In some cases, theoretical entities not subject to direct observation (e.g. the electron) may be sufficiently warranted from multiple converging but essentially independent lines of evidence that they are taken as real. Thus, degree of warrant, reliability and fallibility must be reckoned with in pondering degree of certainty regarding truth of knowledge claims. Reliability mainly comes from a sufficiently strong track record of successful prediction and/or fresh explanatory integration that moral certainty is achieved that one can and should trust the claim enough to confidently act on it in momentous circumstances. Mere claimed consensus of community or of experts is not sufficient to warrant something as credible truth. Nor are computer simulations to be regarded as though they were or are empirical observations of fact. Likewise, there is no one THE scientific method that uniquely qualifies Science as a superior knowledge claim, as good methods vary across and beyond the sciences as conventionally so labelled. Inductive reasoning per adequate support of a conclusion, often on experience, observation, record and testimony, can in many cases deliver knowledge up to moral certainty, but in general it is necessarily fallibilist and provisional. Hence the rise of sciences and other disciplines as collective cultural enterprises targetting credible, reliable, growing bodies of knowledge and best praxis; thus providing expertise. However, all such enterprises fall under the aegis of philosophical analysis, especially logic, epistemology, ontology, metaphysics and ethics. Indeed, reason inextricably involves responsibilities towards truth and right and therefore so also -- it involves rational, responsible warrant -- epistemology. Truth, we can take per Ari: saying of what is, that it is; and of what is not, that it is not. Things that fail of adequate warrant to give responsible, reasonable confidence of credible truth (and so, reliability) will fail of being knowledge. Yes, a mouthful. But there are too many subtleties to be dealt with and there has been too much controversy to go for what is more simplistic, e.g. Gettier counter examples and the grue/bleen challenge, etc. KF kairosfocus

Do we have a sufficient number of examples yet to decide what knowledge is not? Mung

CR @ 220: We know what material computing substrates are like on a base of 170+ years of experience with digital, analogue and neural network architectures. We further know from technological systems theory how components interact per cause-effect chains, using their energy and information/control inflows to process energy, signal and/or material inputs, using intermediate storage, feedback and more, generating outputs. By was it 1640, Leibniz spotted the key point on inspecting a mill in action: gears grinding one against the other blindly neither know nor care where they are nor what a system architecture and organisation as a whole are doing. GIGO -- garbage in, garbage out, hence the world of system development, troubleshooting, debugging and more. Blindly mechanical cause-effect and/or stochastic processes are ontologically, categorically distinct from insight-led understanding of grounds and inferring their entailed consequents. We have not begun to touch on, understanding of moral worth, honour, duty, integrity and more, leading to moral inference and responsible action. That you ignore or refuse to reckon with such massively, readily accessible knowledge on systems of generally cybernetic character but wish to play the dismissive hyperskeptic speaks telling volumes. Volumes, sad volumes on where you do not wish to go so want to wave away inconvenient evidence on. What is indicated here is metanoia and linked healing of the soul. And DV, going forward, that is what I will increasingly focus. I am thinking, for a start, that we need to look to the cries of eternity set in your heart, yearning for what a purblind materialistic world-picture tries to insist cannot be there: a whole, rich, satisfying world that is the soul's true homeland . . . a fulfillment that transcends and transforms but does not despise the material, one in which cybernetic systems including embodied responsibly rational biologically grounded creatures are a bridge to eternity. KF kairosfocus

And if it’s Ok with that, will the definition of ID’s designer become more specific to include a complex material nervous system? I won’t be holding my breath.

You won't have to, you've already been told multiple times that concluding a material designer is a valid conclusion from biological ID. So what is your problem?

But then you’ve just pushed the problem up a level as we still have to explain the knowledge needed to transform raw materials into complex material nervous systems of those aliens. What is the origin of that knowledge, etc. ?

Totally incorrect -- the origin of intelligence does not have to be explained in order to detect an act of intelligence. If that were the case, then SETI would be out of business. Instead, it's methodology (using an operational definition of intelligence, validated by universal experience) is explicitly endorsed by NASA, the National Academy of Sciences, the National Science Foundation, the British Royal Society, and university science departments around the world. Is SETI out of business? No? Does SETI methodology for detecting an act of intelligent include verifying the origin of the actor? No? This is just another example of you stubbornly holding on to objections with a deliberate indifference to the logic. Repeatedly using the rhetorical value of an illogical objection makes you look like a fraud. You should consider not doing it. Upright BiPed

@Origenes

Correlation is not causation CR.

Nor does correlation imply there isn't other critical factors at play beyond “freedom, choice, purpose and intelligence” as argued in #215.

However, I can grant you this and there would still be no problem for ID. You should know by now that ID is neutral on the identity of the designer(s) of earthly life. This means that the designer(s) can also be “intelligent agents with material nervous systems”. Yes, ID is okay with that. ID can easily accommodate the hypothesis that aliens designed life on earth.

But then you've just pushed the problem up a level as we still have to explain the knowledge needed to transform raw materials into complex material nervous systems of those aliens. What is the origin of that knowledge, etc. ? And if it's Ok with that, will the definition of ID's designer become more specific to include a complex material nervous system? I won't be holding my breath.

BTW how do you know this; without any empirical proof? Where is Homer’s ‘complex material nervous system’?

So, how did Homer, or anyone else for that matter, put characters on the manuscript? From this TED talk....

Think about it. Movement is the only way you have of affecting the world around you. Now that's not quite true. There's one other way, and that's through sweating. But apart from that, everything else goes through contractions of muscles.

The best explanation is a complex, material nervous system. Or it would be one of those supposed "the trillions of observed cases" that show that written words on paper is a "reliable sign" of complex material nervous systems "as cause", as we've never seen anyone move something with their mind. Again, apparently, reliable signs are reliable, except when they are not. Good explanations are good, except when they are not.

critical rationalist

CR, we already know that a computational substrate — which includes neural networks — is a signal processor on cause-effect chains and the particular organisation of the substrate. It is a mechanical process, categorically distinct from actual ground and consequent reasoning. That is, understand the meaning of a ground and what it entails, then inferring the consequent as sufficiently warranted by that ground, e.g.

How do we know? The universality of computation is an emergent property of Turing machines. The explanation for this universality is not present in the individual atoms. Nor is it present in silicon, cogs, vacuum tubes, etc. Yet, there are no non-phyiscal computers. That's what an emergent explanation is. So, the absence of a reductionist explanation at level you're referring to isn't unusual or even unexpected. Before we had a theory of computation, one could just as made the same kind of argument against that same university being possible. And it would have been false for the fact that future expectations are not based on repetition or the past, but hard to vary explanations. You do not have a device for posting to UD, and another device to check your email. And another device for word processing, etc. Right? The explanation of how one device can do all of those things, and even future things that have yet to be devised, is nowhere in a "a signal processor on cause-effect chains and the particular organisation of the substrate". The very argument you made equally argues "computers" do not exhibit sufficient warrant for that university. Yet, your ability to post the previous comment depends on it. critical rationalist

CR, we already know that a computational substrate -- which includes neural networks -- is a signal processor on cause-effect chains and the particular organisation of the substrate. It is a mechanical process, categorically distinct from actual ground and consequent reasoning. That is, understand the meaning of a ground and what it entails, then inferring the consequent as sufficiently warranted by that ground, e.g. Socrates is a man, men are mortal, Socrates is mortal. Similarly, to have colour something must be extended in space, so as X is coloured it is extended in space.Or, error exists is undeniably true. Or, one cannot be deceived concerning his own consciousness, though he may well err on specific aspects of his conscious existence. Or, if you want to reduce rationality to such mechanisms, reasoned discussion collapses, i.e. self referential incoherence yet again. We know intelligence, reasoning and moral government exist as we experience these as key to our conscious mindedness. We know the limitations of computational substrates. The latter cannot credibly account for the former, and magic poofery "emergence" is a non-starter. So, we have no good reason to lock down possible intelligences to such computational substrates. However, that is all tangential in any case: the design inference is to signs of intelligently directed configuration as causal process. It is not an inference to designers or to the ontology and metaphysics of designers. The strawman caricature of inductive reasoning you tried to use fails on factual adequacy, fails on coherence and is a simplistic procrustean bed game -- stretch or cut to fit regardless of consequences. Your proposal fails to fit with requisites of a good inference to best explanation. And that is after it is already a strawman caricature of the focus of the design inference on sign. KF PS: You obviously cannot show a credible counter-example to the trillions of observed cases that show that FSCO/I is a reliable sign of design as cause, nor can you show a good answer to the blind search of a config space challenge that anchors it on essentially the same reasoning as say the 2nd law of thermodynamics. That context is more than enough to indicate moral certainty. Trying to blow up dismissive rhetoric to make reliable signs seem dubious simply shows desperation to resist an overwhelming weight of evidence all around us on a key but obviously utterly unwelcome point. Duly noted. kairosfocus

CR @215

CR: I pointed out that there is no empirical evidence for intelligence without complex material nervous systems. Furthermore, we have trillions of observations of intelligent agents with material nervous systems designing things.

Correlation is not causation CR. However, I can grant you this and there would still be no problem for ID. You should know by now that ID is neutral on the identity of the designer(s) of earthly life. This means that the designer(s) can also be "intelligent agents with material nervous systems". Yes, ID is okay with that. ID can easily accommodate the hypothesis that aliens designed life on earth. IOWs there exists no compelling rational reason to ignore the findings of ID and to assume that life on earth must somehow be the result of "no-design-laws" and "replicators–constructors" or whatever blind process.

Cr: Homer would have been yet another example of them.

BTW how do you know this; without any empirical proof? Where is Homer's 'complex material nervous system'? Origenes

And it represents an example of commutation. One which is written in a language that is common in that period and designed to be easily consumed by and is directly targeted at other intelligent agents

critical rationalist

And we can look at the content in question. Poems contain concepts like love, hate, fear bravery, loss, pain, feeling helplessness, etc. And they refer to other intelligent agents directly, who experience those things. They refer to struggle of limited beings. That represents significant reach. Only people can create explanatory ideas, even if they are not scientific or even if they are wrong. And it represents an example of commutation. One which is written in a language that is common in that period and designed to be easily consumed. So, even if Homer didn't write it, some other human being the same region at the same time is best explains those poems. The genome, on the other hand, consist of non-explanatory knowledge, which is basically useful rules of thumb with limited reach. And cells are self replicating. critical rationalist

@Origines

There is also no empirical evidence of Homer, who allegedly wrote two epic poems, the Iliad and the Odyssey. Does that imply that we should assume that these two epic poems only have the “appearance of design”? If not, why not?

What does one have to do with the other? That's a non-sequitur. I pointed out that there is no empirical evidence for intelligence without complex material nervous systems. Furthermore, we have trillions of observations of intelligent agents with material nervous systems designing things. Homer would have been yet another example of them. @KF Why can't we just swap out your "designer" with "complex material nervous system"? Would that be any less obvious? Let try it?

the insistent strawman caricature attempt to twist inference to complex material nervous systems as process per tested reliable sign into inference to a complex material nervous system is what leads you to miss the simple point, evidence of sign –> signified causal process, intelligently directed configuration –> such intelligence is evidence that a complex material nervous system was present at the right time and place. In short, you have failed to follow the logic.

I mean, obviously, the intelligence needed to bring about all that complexity clearly points to a complex material nervous system? Right? Any other conclusion would represent a failure to follow the logic! Apparently, any tested reliable sign is reliable, except when it's not. The logic is sound, except when it isn't. Again, the problem I've pointed out at least a dozen times is that freedom, choice, purpose and intelligence is insufficient. Example? The medical community consists of free, intelligent, purposeful agents with the intent to cure cancer, right? IOW, if we take that ideas seriously, as if it is true in reality, and all observations should confirm to it, the we should have a cure for cancer by now. Right? They should be to use their freedom, choice intelligence, etc. and specify a series of bits on a flash drive that contains the cure for cancer. So, why don't we? Can they not experience cancer cells? Are they unable to perform repeated experiments on cancer cells? Are they just there for a paycheck and not really trying? Is there some big conspiracy, in that a cure has already exists, and only the wealthy getting it? IOW, it seems that you must add something to "freedom, choice, purpose and intelligence" which isn't explicit in current crop of ID, because we have those things, in abundance, yet there are things we cannot currently design, like a drug to cure cancer. So, my question is, what is the delta? What will make the crucial difference to actually causing cancer cells to die? We will be able to kill cancer cells without killing the patient (a transformation of matter) when the requisite knowledge is present there. That's the key difference. So you have to add something to ID, like the designer is all knowing. Or can somehow spontaneously cause the requisite knowledge to appear, etc. Furthermore all, the original manuscripts Homer would have wrote were not self-replicating. So, in constructor theoretic terms , they must be constructed by their environment. So must cars, planes, and every other macro sized human designed thing we've observed. Nor do they contain the instructions of which transformations of matter that would have been required to reproduce themselves. So, those things must have been constructed by something in it's environment, as opposed to being created over time though a feedback system. It exhibits the appearance of design and is not a self-replicator. For example, Homer, having written two epic poems, would have been one of those designers with a complex material nervous system. That's the explanation for well, you know, communicating their contents by writing things on a page. People have have motivation to write things down. need quills and paper and critical rationalist

CR, BTW, Newtonian dynamics is the cornerstone of much of the engineering used to design, build, launch and move to orbit, GPS satellites. Yes, relativistic effects come out in the timing due to the precision of the required clocks, but that use of the two in tandem is a reflection of the status of the balance between the two dynamics. Similarly, solid state electronics is based on quantum phenomena. Newtonian dynamics is widely used and taught because it has a zone of proved validity, greatly reducing the intensity of calculations. Within that zone, it is still a highly valid theory; it has not been abandoned as say Phlogiston theory was, or Brahe's theory of planetary orbits, or the Ptolemaic theory (which BTW is actually built in to the works of many planetariums as it is a sufficiently good approximation to the effects of elliptical orbits). KF PS: This is a failed turnabout:

no one suggests any point in cellular development consisted of cells with the current level of high-fidelity replication (and necessary aspects described above to enable them) but with the translation machinery removed. That’s simply false. Is there no one willing to actually address the arguments actually being presented, as opposed to a straw man?

No-one has presented such a hybrid cell, instead we have challenged on the subject that the concept of low fidelity replication will predictably fail (due to high noise leading to cumulative loss of information), and that there is a need for solid empirical warrant to get the currently imagined initial state and to then account for the relevant claimed transition. FYI, RNA world and the like, are without empirical warrant adequate to rely on them. That's why there are no Nobel prizes for having solved the OoL on blind chance and mechanical necessity via the thermodynamics of Darwin's warm little pond or the like scenarios. It is you who have erected straw models and treated them as well warranted. The ONLY actually empirically anchored architecture for biological life is the living cell as observed. Until you can provide an empirically warranted, real world credible account for its origin and how we got to the present system of a von Neumann kinematic self replicator coupled to a metabolic automaton, you are putting up just so stories. kairosfocus

#212 I bet those IDiots have never ever heard of Dawkins' "METHINKS IT IS LIKE A WEASEL"! Chance and Necessity have them poems for breakfast! /snark Origenes

#211 You silly IDist! Ya'll think that just because you found a poem, there must be a poet. Ya'll always argue in the negative -- "Chance and Necessity could never create this poem" Never any evidence! /snark Upright BiPed

CR @209

CR: And there is no empirical evidence of a hypothesized designer....

There is also no empirical evidence of Homer, who allegedly wrote two epic poems, the Iliad and the Odyssey. Does that imply that we should assume that these two epic poems only have the “appearance of design”? If not, why not? Origenes

CR, the insistent strawman caricature attempt to twist inference to design as process per tested reliable sign into inference to a designer is what leads you to miss the simple point, evidence of sign --> signified causal process, intelligently directed configuration --> such design is evidence that a capable designer was present at the right time and place. In short, you have failed to follow the logic. Try: accelerant --> arson --> arsonist KF kairosfocus

There is no existing empirical evidence of the hypothesised low fidelity replication prior cell, relevant to any reasonable real world conditions.

And there is no empirical evidence of a hypothesized designer without a complex material brain. Should we throw that out as new explanation as well? You selectively make objections like this when they suit your purpose. When I point this out, you ignore it, only to bring it up again on some other thread. This is like a game of wack-a-mole. critical rationalist

CR:

The system we are trying to explain is the relatively recent, cell, which is capable of high-fidelity replication.

There is no existing empirical evidence of the hypothesised low fidelity replication prior cell, relevant to any reasonable real world conditions. What is to be explained, in any case is exactly that cell. Which is what is chock full of FSCO/I, involving alphabetic code and code processing systems that effect accurate, error correcting processes. KF kairosfocus