What is knowledge?

_{kairosfocus

November 26, 2017

Food for thought, Logic and Reason, Philosophy, Sciences and Theology, Selective Hyperskepticism}

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Sometimes, exchanges at UD come down to truly basic (and hard) issues.

This is one such time, where Origenes has challenged prolific objector Critical Rationalist in the Personal Incredulity thread:

>>100 Origenes November 25, 2017 at 7:01 pm

CR

What is your definition of valid knowledge?>>

I have thought this worthy of responding to and of headlining:

KF, 106: >> Origines,

Generally, I would argue that “knowledge” is used in a weak form sense: warranted, credibly true (and reliable) belief.

Drawing out, slightly:

Warranted —

there is an available account (as opposed to internal to the given knower, who may simply accept a message from reliable sources . . . ) that, properly understood, would justify accepting or treating belief x as true in serious contexts.

Credibly true —

the warrant for and circumstances of belief x are such that we can have good confidence that the belief is likely to be true or capture enough truth that we are entitled to trust it.

Reliable —

the warrant for x is such that if we act on the belief that-x in a consequential situation, we are unlikely to be let down.

Belief —

that which is accepted, perceived, or held to be so; often in this context, for good reason.

Of course in today’s day and age, “faith” and “belief” are often despised and dismissively contrasted with “science,” “reason/rationality” and “knowledge,” etc. as though acknowledged faith/trust/belief is invariably ill-warranted.

Such reflects dominance of radical secularism and evolutionary materialistic scientism, which, ironically are not well warranted, are not trustworthy (being fallaciously rooted, esp. through self-referential incoherence and/or the fostering of ill-advised cognitive biases) and should not be permitted to act as gate-keepers on what we regard as knowledge.>>

So, arguably, knowledge is well-warranted, credibly true (and reliable) belief.

Many will find that unpalatable, but I confidently predict that they will have difficulty proposing another succinct account that answers to issues ranging from the classical “justified, true belief” definition of epistemology, to the fact that scientific knowledge is not utterly certain, to the challenge of Gettier counter-examples, to the Grue issue, to the Agrippa trilemma challenge and more. END

Comments

Origines, institutional dominance and being the shaping force of the spirit of the age. Imposing, a crooked yardstick as standard of straightness [being true as carpenters and builders put it], accuracy and being upright. KFkairosfocus_{December 1, 2017
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CR, typing is not arguing. This thread has been enough to identify the core failure you and your ilk have made with reasoning by induction, failure to recognise that things up to and including our world have a distinct identity that often has core, stable characteristics. Start with distinct identity and its instant corollaries, LOI, LNC, LEM, thus also numbers and properties of relationships among quantities and things that are quantifiable, which already imposes a huge degree of stable consistency on any possible world. No one would be well advised to imagine that the beach apples dropped by a Manchineel tree are sweet and safe to eat (and the tree is not a wise place to seek rain shelter under), per the experience of others. This is not even something that a wise person will be willing to further personally explore. Something with a distinct identity will often manifest its characteristics, even as a Manchineel tree tends to bear beach apples, aka death apples. (BTW, the latter is reportedly what a certain Cristobal Colon termed them 500 years ago.) Similarly, Kantian reasoning with its ugly gulch between the inner world and the outer one, with our inner world projecting an imagined order to the outer one fails the test of self-referential incoherence, leading to self-flsification on this point and what stems from it. In that context, your attempt just now to say:
Does anyone have any specific, detailed criticism of this that isn’t anything more than an inductive argument that induction works because it supposedly worked in the past, or that it’s necessary for us to know things (which basically is restating the definition that knowledge is true, justified belief)?
. . . is little more than a manifestation of stubborn repetition in hopes that drumbeat repetition helps to make a case seem plausible. You seem to have never paid the slightest attention to the point that there is a distinct identity, which strongly tends to have stable characteristics; which then grounds inferring the characteristics from patterns of experience or observation, even provisionally as we may and do err. Otherwise, across time and space, that identity would become meaningless. In that light, we are entitled to expect that our world is like that, having a distinct identity with a core of stable characteristics, which will in relevant parts manifest itself per our experience. The alternative is that we live in a chaos in which, say, beach apples will suddenly be great to eat. Maybe, after the year 2100. The hyperskpetic then triumphantly announces, oh you cannot tell the difference between beach apples are caustic and beach apples are sauce-tic, caustic up to midnight just before Jan 1 2100. So there! (And yes, this is a version of the so-called Grue paradox.) Oh yes we can, and by making reference to the point that induction is argument by support not by demonstration. So, we use the abductive form, contrasting the two hyps. Which is more reasonable per factual adequacy, coherence and balanced explanatory power? It is instantly apparent that the latter is an ad hoc hyperskpetical hypothesis -- artificially constructed to be not subject to reasonable empirical test and dubious relative to the issue of coherence -- pivoting on the notion that beach apples and their parent trees do not have a stable, distinct identity that grounds how they will behave across time. Where also, as Manchineel trees and their fruit are contingent beings, it is possible for changes to be effected by causal interventions. Through mutations, a less toxic variety may emerge, even as we have sweet cassava not just the cyanide-laced bitter one. Or, we may deliberately engineer or breed such a variety. The notion of chaotic world instability, then is highly suspect. Then, we look at the attempt to re-insert a strawman caricature of the OP, suggesting that it is little more than a rehashing of the old Justified, True belief model of knowledge. All this reflects is argument in bad faith, refusing to address the explicitly given reason why "justification" has been distinguished from warrant and the reason why there is recognition that we often use the term knowledge in a fallible sense in important contexts, such as science. Warrant -- including inductive warrant -- provides good cause in the world-community of the life of the mind, that there is credible truth in a claim. That warrant comes in degrees of certainty, in some few cases by self evidence, utterly and unalterably certain. In more, moral certainty that is such that one would be ill advised or irresponsible to treat some X warranted to this degree as if it were false. In many other cases, warrant is on the balance of the evidence leading to prudence, which includes many points of science. Thus, we are to one extent or another able to responsibly accept or view a relevant claim X as true and/or sufficiently reliable to act on it where it counts. Thus, the view that knowledge is (in the broader and weaker sense) warranted, credibly true (and reliable) belief. In the stronger sense, the degree of warrant for and confidence in truth and reliability is -- due to self evidence and the like -- utterly and irreducibly certain. Such points, starting with distinct identity and first principles of right reason, provide a plumbline test for other claims. But we know that we cannot construct a full-orbed worldview on such a small cluster of claims. In this light, you would be well advised to change your ways. As at now, it is evident that you have manifested a characteristic of argument in poor faith, seemingly here to push an agenda regardless of substantial challenges rather than seriously interact with questions and challenges. This view, I suggest to you, will find strong support from many who have tried to interact with you here at UD for a very long time. You come across as one who has taken up a crooked yardstick and made it the standard of accuracy, straightness and being upright. the only solution to such is to test against plumbline standards, and if your view then implies that there are no such, that is a big red warning sign of intellectual captivity to an utterly irrational ideology that locks its victims in and locks reasonable correction out. Where, error exists is one of the key self-evident, utterly certain, plumbline truths. Which then is a counter example to anything that implies that knowledge as understood even to utter certainty in some cases, is real. Including, knowledge of the inner and outer worlds -- consciousness is utterly certain knowledge too. And by knowing error exists, we have bridged the ugly gulch already, though in a humbling way. It is ill-advised to go over the cliff into ruin. I suggest, you should think again. KF PS: Appeal to instinct is not helpful in a Kantian ugly gulch world, especially when instinctual urges often clash and we must decide on a morally governed basis.kairosfocus_{December 1, 2017
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From this article...
Until there is a rival theory, the evidence goes unexplained and is called a problem or maybe a mystery or something like that. But if there is a rival theory then the evidence can be used to decide between the two theories - to decide which is better and which can be said to be false. Now here is the key: if we never created a new theory but simply made more and more precise measurements of the position of Mercury - then this would be a problem. We might think: our measurements are wrong. There are lots and lots of results like this all the time in science. This is what makes science great: the countless problems. At the moment we have questions in astronomy alone like: what is dark matter? What is dark energy? Are the laws of physics the same here as they are on the other side of the universe? In each of those cases it could always be the case that the measurements we have made contain errors.
Did you follow that? Even if our sense experiences matched our theory time and time again, to greater precision, that wouldn't necessarily mean our observations supported that theory. In fact, it would raise suspicion that our observations were wrong. We expect them to be wrong because our theories start out as conjectures.
But it also might be the case that our theories are wrong. So back to Newton: imagine yet another piece of evidence came along. Let’s say Newton’s Theory of Gravity does something like make a prediction that when light from a distant star passes by the Sun during a solar eclipse that it should only be bent by “x” amount. Now say we do the measurement. And say it’s not bent by x amount but by 2x amount. Double what is predicted. What then? Well the evidence would be mounting against Newton. Still we might think that our measurements are wrong. That we are missing something. But two, quite different, experiments that Newton’s theory cannot account for makes it harder for us to keep thinking that Newton’s theory is the final word on gravity. Initially, by the way - if you look at the actual history of this - there were no rivals. The evidence gathered about Mercury and the bending of starlight by the Sun constituted a problem. A mystery. So what was the role of the evidence? Well the role of evidence there is to cry out for an explanation. A creative explanation. In other words a new scientific theory. Eventually one did come. It was Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity. The General Theory of Relativity explained that Newton’s Law of Gravity was an approximation to something else far more - well “General”. The General Theory united ideas about light, and magnetism and electricity (from the special theory) with ideas about space and time (and so gravity). And, here’s the key: it fully accounted for the motion of Mercury and it predicted exactly where light should be when it passed by the Moon during a solar eclipse. It got all those things right. And what became the role of the evidence from Mercury and starlight then? The evidence that Mercury was here in position A (as predicted by Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity) and not there in position B (as predicted by Newton’s Theory of Gravity) - well the role of evidence there is simple. It’s to decide between those two theories. So at the moment of time in the past - in 1915 when Einstein first published his theory we had, briefly, two theories that purported to explain the nature of gravity. How to decide? Let the evidence decide. Now it’s not that the evidence “supported” Einstein. No. It simply rejected Newton. If the “support” idea was true - then what happened to all that support that Newton’s theory of gravity gained over the hundreds of years prior? How can we make sense of that? If it was being “supported” each and every day by observations of the planets in the sky, the tides going in and out, apples falling to the ground - then did all that support count for nothing? That all makes no sense because the entire philosophy of “evidence as support for a theory” is false. Newton’s theory explained all of that stuff about planets, tides and apples in a particular way. And one way of checking how good the explanation was, was to check the predictions. And for a long while they checked out. Until they didn’t. And once they didn’t we had a problem. And once we had another theory, we were able to decide which theory was better and show, definitively, which theory was false - and how. It is possible (indeed it is required) that General Relativity is not the final word on gravity. Indeed we know it cannot be the final word because General Relativity makes some predictions about the nature of reality that conflict with what quantum physics says. In other words, these two great theories disagree. So we know neither are the final word. So no evidence “supports” them. It is just that those two theories are the very best scientific theories we have. There is none better, and so no others we can rely on. If you want to build a GPS system, or explain what’s going on in a galaxy far far away - General Relativity is absolutely indispensable. Whatever the “ultimate truth” happens to be - General Relativity is closer to it than anything else we currently know about.
Does anyone have any specific, detailed criticism of this that isn't anything more than an inductive argument that induction works because it supposedly worked in the past, or that it's necessary for us to know things (which basically is restating the definition that knowledge is true, justified belief)?critical rationalist_{November 30, 2017
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@Barry
UB has discovered (actually he already knew) that CR believes that “ability to type” and “ability to argue” mean the same thing. But, to paraphrase Capote’s famous take down of Kerouac, “that’s not arguing; that’s typing.”
If you have a specific criticism, then present it. Otherwise, this is yet even more vague criticism because it's equally applicable to absolutely anything anyone might write. Do you think this strategy would fly at your day job? If not, then why do you think it would fly here? Apparently, you really have a very low of an option of your audience. UD Editors: "If you have a specific criticism, then present it." CR, you are missing (ignoring actually) the point. The point is that when you encounter criticism you invariably simply repeat the claim that was criticized, as if that were a rebuttal to the criticism. Thus, your invitation to criticize your argument is both superfluous (because you have all but ignored previous criticism) and useless (because there is no reason to believe you will respond to further criticism). As KF says, think again and do better.critical rationalist_{November 30, 2017
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KF, Your patience as you continue to correct CR in the face of his dogged determination to cling to his incoherence is a wonder to behold. Such as he do not deserve such as you. But we are glad to have you. Barry Arrington_{November 30, 2017
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CR, repeating failure does not convert it into success.
So you disagree with the above comment? You would expect the sun to rise tomorrow even if our best theory of how works indicated it was about to run out of fuel and blink out, because it has risen for the entirely of human experience?
The Kantian ugly gulch is clearly at work and leads straight to self-referential incoherence.
So, apparently, you're in Origines' camp, in that you're denying there is a difference between "I'm certain nothing can infallibly tell you what is infallible" and "this is a conjecture: nothing can infallibly tell you what is infallible" The former is indeed a self-referential contraction. However, the latter is not. Origines even explicitly puts words in Deutsch's mouth, when he argued...
When Deutsch writes “nothing can infallibly tell you what is infallible”, he does not seem to understand that he is being self-referentially incoherent: D: No one can tell you what is certain. Is that certain? D: Sure. So … you just told me what is certain? D: Yes, I sure did. But you said that no one can do this? D: Oops.
Except, "Oops", Deutsch never said he was "certain". When you have to resort to putting words in someone's mouth, the doesn't bode well for the strength of your argument. Furthermore, you are a concrete example of the very thing you deny. When presented the idea that no ideas are infallible, what did you do? You presented three examples of supposedly basic beliefs. And how did you select those examples as opposed to other ideas? You criticized them, in relation to all other ideas. The ones that were left were ideas that you lacked good criticism of. Of course, feel free to present a different explanation as to why having presented those specific ideas wasn't an arbitrary choice on your part. I won't be holding by breath. Note: I've asked you this question at least half a dozen times, and you have yet to respond. What gives?
Origines: In order to criticize fallibilism the fallibilist needs another chain of reasoning, another set of beliefs, by which he can judge fallibilism. What he cannot do is judge between truth and falsity based on the system (fallibilism) which is under doubt.
If the fallibilist were to judge between them infallibility, then yes. But I don't recall Deutsch saying that either. So, it seems this is yet another example of putting words in his mouth. In fact, Popper has said the opposite.
“There is no criterion of truth at our disposal, and this fact supports pessimism. But we do possess criteria which, if we are lucky, may allow us to recognize error and falsity. Clarity and distinctness are not criteria of truth, but such things as obscurity or confusion may indicate error. Similarly coherence cannot establish truth, but incoherence and inconsistency do establish falsehood. And, when they are recognized, our own errors provide the dim red lights which help us in groping our way out of the darkness of our cave.”
So, no, we're not guaranteed to find errors in our theories either. Is there no one willing to actually address the arguments actually being presented, as opposed to a straw man? Again, a common and highly flawed strategy to attack a theory one finds objectionable is to present a false version of it then point out how it is false.
Lastly, if you have to resort to a process of “criticism” when a car is bearing down on you instead of trusting your senses and the programming that says, get out of the way, you have less sense than some chickens and iguanas I have seen on the local roads — they run away from vehicles on the road. Sorry, to be that direct but it seems nothing else will hit home.
You mean instinct? Well, that knowledge came from variation and criticism as well in the form of natural selection. Again, you're presenting a cartoon character of criticism by limiting it to just intentional or even conscious criticism, as opposed to, say, unconscious criticism. Example? Regardless of how careful we are, it's always possible for others to misinterpret what we write. Specifically, it's possible to end up with several different interpretations from what someone wrote. However, more often than not, we end up with just one interpretation by the time we end up reading each sentence. How is that even possible? Because people subconsciously conjecture a number of possible interpretations and subconsciously criticize them until one is left, based on previous comments, the context of the topic of the post, earlier paragraphs, etc. And that process happens on the fly without us being consciously being aware of it. Otherwise, how else do we, more often than not, end up with a single interpretation without performing the time consuming process of explicit criticizing every sentence we read? So, again, it would seem that you yourself are an example of the very thing you deny.critical rationalist_{November 30, 2017
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KF, CR
Popper: Classical epistemology which takes our sense perceptions as 'given', as the 'data' from which our theories have to be constructed by some process of induction, can only be described as pre-Darwinian. It fails to take account of the fact that the alleged data are ... adaptive reactions ... and therefore ... there can be no pure perception, no pure datum..."
"Alleged data are adaptive reactions ...." says Popper, and this time he does not add self-defeating stuff like "no theory can be established neither as certainly true nor even as ‘probable'”. No, this time he wants us to uncritically accept Darwinism. Because of Darwinism "there can be no pure perception, no pure datum..." This is the basis of Darwinian epistemology guys. This is our rock solid starting point, at least if it is up to Popper. So, here is my question: how, in the blue blazes, is it possible that Darwinisme is granted to decide what epistemology should look like? How did evolutionary theory, of all theories, slip through the hypercritical mazes of Popper's mind? Why should we, on the one hand, uncritically accept a 'Darwinian epistemology' and, on the other hand, be expected to doubt everything else? What basis is there for Popper's uncritical surrender to Darwinism? Why is he so convinced? The galapagos finches, perhaps? Haeckel's embryo drawings? Does anyone know?Origenes_{November 30, 2017
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CR, repeating failure does not convert it into success. The Kantian ugly gulch is clearly at work and leads straight to self-referential incoherence. Indeed, it lies behind the several cases Origines laid out above. Similarly, for your dismissal of inductive learning about our situation, where you tried to lock us away from knowledge of that world through experiencing it. Even, as you count on the experience of seeing your arguments to create a new set of ideas you hope will dominate. Lastly, if you have to resort to a process of "criticism" when a car is bearing down on you instead of trusting your senses and the programming that says, get out of the way, you have less sense than some chickens and iguanas I have seen on the local roads -- they run away from vehicles on the road. Sorry, to be that direct but it seems nothing else will hit home. KFkairosfocus_{November 30, 2017
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Regardless of how weak or limited they are, it's our explanatory theories, not sense experience. Because it's simply not possible to interpret observations without first putting them in some kind of explanatory context. Nor are they out there for us to input from sense experience. But by all means, feel free to explain how the would work, in practice. For example, from another thread....
...our current explanation for how stars work indicates a star of the class and size of our sun would have burnt though roughly half of its hydrogen and has roughly 5 billion years remaining. As such, we expect it to rise tomorrow. However, if our explanation for how stars work indicates a star of the class and size of our sun would have burned all of it’s hydrogen in 4 billion years, and would completely wink out when exhausted, we wouldn’t expect it to rise tomorrow, despite the fact that it has risen every day for as long as human beings have been around to observe it.
critical rationalist_{November 30, 2017
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critical rationalist:
So, “no-design laws” cannot be the explanation...
Isn't that what I said? They serve no explanatory purpose. So we are in agreement then.
You might want to go back and read the paper again.
Why would I want to read a paper about "no-design laws" that serve no explanatory purpose?Mung_{November 30, 2017
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@KF
No, that fast moving car approaching is not something you sensed and can gain support for from hearing and seeing. Not even that blaring horn.
For the umteenth time. That very same process can be far better explained as the idea that you will die when hit by a car has survived significant criticism. Every inductive argument can be reformulated as a deductive argument. Even the example you just made. Apparently, you think induction will work in the future because you mistakenly think it worked in the past. Furthermore, you still haven’t answered my question.
For example, of all the trillions of designers we’ve observed, every one of them has had a complex material nervous system. So, would it be an inductive conclusion to say that all designers have complex material nervous systems? Furthermore, organisms have appeared in the order of least complex to most complex. So would it be an inductive conclusion to assume that new organisms more complex than humans will appear? Again, this is just what I came up with off the top of my head. Yet, I’m guessing you would disagree with each of these things. So, do you disagree because they are not inductive conclusions? If not, then why? So, if what you mean by an “inductive conclusion” is one of an infinite number of interpretations of sense information, which did not actually come from a “principle of induction” that could be used in practice, then what does “induction” have to do with anything? Why muddy the water?
critical rationalist_{November 30, 2017
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CR @160 wants to discuss self-defeating statements in a more general way. That may be a good idea.
Popper: "all knowledge is hypothetical" [OKN 30]
Does that go for your claim as well Popper? P: Sure. So, what does your claim mean?
Popper: "All knowledge remains... conjectural" [RASC xxxv]
[see above]
Popper: “In so far as scientific statements refer to the world of experience, they must be refutable ...” [OSE2 13].
Assuming that your claim is a scientific statement that refers to the world, I take that it must also be refutable. If so, what does it mean?
Popper: "The quest for certainty... is mistaken.... though we may seek for truth... we can never be quite certain that we have found it" [OSE2 375]
But, per your claim, you are not certain about that, so, what, in the blue blazes, is it that you are saying?
Popper: "No particular theory may ever be regarded as absolutely certain" [OKN 360]
Are you sure about that? Oh sorry, of course you are not sure. But … if you are not sure, what the !@#$ are you saying?
Popper: "Precision and certainty are false ideals. They are impossible to attain and therefore dangerously misleading..." [UNQ 24]
Absolutely “impossible” ….? Certain about that? Ah! Not certain! I see. Of course not! … As you say no theory "can be established neither as certainly true nor even as 'probable'". So, not only are you not sure about your claims, you cannot even confirm that they are probable. Then what is it that you are saying??
Popper: "We never know what we are talking about" [UNQ 27].
Are you completely bereft of all … Oh my god are there no limits?Origenes_{November 30, 2017
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CR, start with our self-awareness, reflecting our self-evident consciousness which is undeniable. One who attempts to deny -- the attempt being an act of conscious thought or speech -- is then facing the point: WHO is denying this? Self-referential incoherence. We can go on from there, to being aware of an external world that may have in it cars racing down streets we try to cross. KFkairosfocus_{November 30, 2017
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CR, 149:
Inductivism is the belief that there is a method called induction by which people can get new ideas from sense information and then confirm those ideas.
Strawman. Modern induction is argument by support (especially of empirical form). If you are unable to gain new information from things you sense and then seek to make sense of by internal processing that credibly and even reliably correlates to the realities behind the senses, then I have a busy road or two to respond to. No, that fast moving car approaching is not something you sensed and can gain support for from hearing and seeing. Not even that blaring horn. CRUNCH. As in, a notion of low survival value. What is hapening here is we find exactly the echo of the Kantian ugly gulch between the world of things in themselves and our inner world. this was already highlighted and corrected as failing to be coherent, above. Studiously dismissed or ignored. Let me again clip from 40, 100 comments back:
40 kairosfocus November 27, 2017 at 7:31 am F/N2: Let’s take up Dyke on Popper’s Kantian error:
Popper described himself as an “unorthodox Kantian” [UNQ 82]; i.e., he accepted part of Kant’s epistemology, but not all of it: “Kant was right that it is our intellect which imposes its laws – its ideas, its rules – upon the inarticulate mass of our ‘sensations’ and thereby brings order to them. Where he was wrong is that he did not see that we rarely succeed with our imposition” [OKN 68n31; c.f. OKN 328, C&R 48-9]. Popper’s Kantianism reveals itself most clearly in his view of our senses, which he saw as creative modifiers of incoming data, not as neutral ‘windows on the world’: “Classical epistemology which takes our sense perceptions as ‘given’, as the ‘data’ from which our theories have to be constructed by some process of induction, can only be described as pre-Darwinian. It fails to take account of the fact that the alleged data are … adaptive reactions, and therefore interpretations which incorporate theories and prejudices and which, like theories, are impregnated with conjectural expectations… there can be no pure perception, no pure datum…” [OKN 145].15 A Fundamental Difficulty Popper’s Kantian premise raises enough issues for a book. In this short paper, there is room only for a single objection. Namely, if it is true that our senses are pre-programmed; if it is true that “there is no sense organ in which anticipatory theories are not genetically incorporated” [OKN 72]; then what flows into our minds is determined and what flows out of them is subjective. If our senses are not neutral, if they organise incoming data using pre-set theories built into them by evolution, then they do not provide us with unalloyed information, but only with prescriptions, the content of which is determined by our genetic make up. Whatever is thereafter produced inside our heads – cut off as it is from any objective contact with reality – must be subjective. Popper’s Kantian premise thus deprives CR of universality. Since it is ultimately the product of the pre-programmed interpretation of the data which entered Popper’s mind, CR is a theory which can only be applied to Popper. According to his own view of his contact with reality, he would not be able to verify the relevance of CR to anybody else. Solipsism looms, yes, but that is a natural consequence of all theories of determinism. For if thought, or the basis of thought, is determined; whether by social class, or the subconscious, or whatever determinant is preferred; then the deterministic theory itself must be determined, according to the theory, and can only be relevant to the person who expounds it. Everybody else is determined by their class, subconscious, genes, material substrate, environment, or whatever it is that is supposed to do the determining. All theories of determinism are, to use Brand Blanshard’s term, ‘self-stultifying.’16 The objection is analogous to the one raised by Anthony Flew against those philosophers – e.g. Hume and Kant – who claim that we can only have knowledge of our own sense impressions. If sense data are all we can know, solipsism is the inevitable result: “mental images …. are (necessarily) private … and (logically) cannot be accessible to public observation.”17 Objectivity In Unended Quest Popper observed bluntly that “there is no such thing as an unprejudiced observation” [UNQ 51]. Although this appears to rule out the possibility of objectivity, that was not Popper’s intention. Rather, again following Kant perhaps, he thought the basis for objectivity lay elsewhere: “the objectivity of scientific statements lies in the fact that they can be inter-subjectively tested” [LSCD 44]. He later restated this slightly differently: “it is the public character of science… which preserves the objectivity of science” [POH 155-6]. Unfortunately, these assertions do not bear the weight placed upon them. For if Popper’s Kantian premise were true (i.e., if anticipatory theories are genetically incorporated into our sense organs and, therefore, there is no such thing as an unprejudiced observation) then senses would not cease to be prejudiced merely by being multiplied. The defective logic could hardly be more clear. One cannot offer as an universal affirmative proposition ‘all human senses are prejudiced, i.e. subjective’ then ask one’s readers to accept that pooling the senses of many persons yields objectivity. If senses are subjective individually they are subjective collectively.18 To conclude under this head, it is plain – even after only a very brief treatment – that Popper’s Kantian premise, far from providing CR with a secure footing, leads instead to insuperable problems . . .
Again, a fail. And when Kantianism is in the stakes, I will point to F H Bradley:
We may agree, perhaps, to understand by metaphysics an attempt to know reality as against mere appearance, or the study of first principles or ultimate truths, or again the effort to comprehend the universe, not simply piecemeal or by fragments, but somehow as a whole [–> i.e. the focus of Metaphysics is critical studies of worldviews] . . . . The man who is ready to prove that metaphysical knowledge is wholly impossible . . . himself has, perhaps unknowingly, entered the arena . . . To say the reality is such that our knowledge cannot reach it, is a claim to know reality ; to urge that our knowledge is of a kind which must fail to transcend appearance, itself implies that transcendence. For, if we had no idea of a beyond, we should assuredly not know how to talk about failure or success. And the test, by which we distinguish them, must obviously be some acquaintance with the nature of the goal. Nay, the would-be sceptic, who presses on us the contradictions of our thoughts, himself asserts dogmatically. For these contradictions might be ultimate and absolute truth, if the nature of the reality were not known to be otherwise . . . [such] objections . . . are themselves, however unwillingly, metaphysical views, and . . . a little acquaintance with the subject commonly serves to dispel [them]. [Appearance and Reality, 2nd Edn, 1897 (1916 printing), pp. 1 – 2; INTRODUCTION. At Web Archive.]
KF
When this was put up 100 comments back, you were sneeringly dismissive, and yet, you are clearly showing just how relevant these concerns and critiques are. When you go on to build on your favoured authority, this is what you say:
The thing is, we cannot get new ideas from sense information. This is because it is possible to conjecture an infinite number of “patterns” from sense information. So, the idea that there is a pattern comes *before* the sense information itself. Nor is it out there for us to obtain via sense information.
This is utterly, blatantly false. yes, itis possible to conjure up an endless variety of possible wild fancies on sense data, but we have filtering rules that allow us to make good and responsible sense, such as I see a speeding, out of control car coming down the street. there is no good reason that from the infinity of possile errors, we should not be able to infer a reasonable picture of the world. And, we routinely do so, indeed you assumed by writing as you did and posting, that we could observe the text, read it and gain new ideas from one certain CR. In short, your scheme is a case of selective hyperskepticism. Yes, error is possible, but so is truth, and the mere possibility of error does not entail its actuality. Especially, when you seemingly hope to slide in your own views as the implicit exception. Which was an error I pointed out with Deutsch also. The name for this manifestation of selective hyperskepticism joined to somehow excepting oneself from the problem is self-reerential incoherence. I suggest, you would be well advised to pause and think again. KFkairosfocus_{November 30, 2017
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CR @159
CR: Recognize anything here?
Not at all. Frankly I have no idea why you wanted me to read that. I suggest that you simply address my arguments directly.Origenes_{November 30, 2017
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UB @ 157:
That is perhaps [Critical Rationalist's] underlying strategy: simply repeat the claim without addressing the details of any counter arguments, and then wait for the person to mercifully drop dead. Its an argument by attrition.
CR @ 158 responds by, wait for it, wait for it . . . Repeating the claim yet again. UB has discovered (actually he already knew) that CR believes that "ability to type" and "ability to argue" mean the same thing. But, to paraphrase Capote's famous take down of Kerouac, "that's not arguing; that's typing."Barry Arrington_{November 30, 2017
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CR @160
CR: An incoherent statement would be “I am certain that this statement is false.”
Correct, that is indeed another self-defeating statement. As you may have noticed, there are many to choose from.
CR: That’s not the start of statement that Deutsch is making.
Again correct, as has been pointed out to you Deutsch makes several self-defeating statements, but they are not identical to the one in your quote.
CR: And I’m non responsive?
What do you reckon?Origenes_{November 30, 2017
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@ origines An incoherent statement would be "I am certain that this statement is false." That's not the start of statement that Deutsch is making.
Furthermore, I’m make the same argument I presented to KF. Out of all ideas, which are basic beliefs? Give me examples.
Still waiting. And I'm non responsive?critical rationalist_{November 30, 2017
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@origines & KF From this blog post...
So “critical examination” seems to involve two criteria: non-incoherence and non-falsity. We can never prove a theory to be true, but if it’s not incoherent and is not proven to be false, then it would count as scientific knowledge—the best we have to describe reality. But then how do you know it’s not incoherent? How do we know it’s false? I mean, why can we trust the validity of confusion as an indication of falsity more than clear and distinct ideas as an indication of truth, for example? With italics applied to “if we are lucky” and “may”, Popper himself seems to be implying that there is no way we can know for sure that something is false, either. But it does seem as if he believes that we have more hope in knowing something to be false than in knowing something to be true. My question is: why? Perhaps due to this doubt, and the fact that I believe in God, I am having difficulty integrating Popper’s theory into my own existing mental structure of things. In Popper’s framework, I seem to be exactly the classic empiricist/rationalist with whom he disagrees. I believe that the ultimate source of knowledge is God in the form of nature and God’s Revelation, and in order to transform the information we gather from these sources (namely nature and revelation) into knowledge i.e. justified belief that corresponds to the reality, we need to apply, on these data, our God-given ability to reason. My current (tentative and evolving) epistemic view can be captured as follows: Input (Sources): the universe (Bacon’s book of Nature), God’s Revelation The Machine (me): observation + reason Output (Knowledge): truths/facts, i.e. beliefs that correspond to reality Although I see most of the reasoning behind Popper’s argument (except for the question I raised above), I am not sure how to fit it into my view. I suppose in his view, I will not necessarily get knowledge this way because my sources have no authority and my ability to observe or to reason is not fallible either. The best I can do to get knowledge is to see if the information I obtain from these sources are not internally incoherent and to verify that they are not false. But maybe due to the fact that I have faith in God, I find that these sources and my ability to sense and reason do have authority. I may not be 100% certain that the universe exists or that Qur’an is the Word of God, and I may be even less certain about my observation and reasoning abilities, but because I have faith in God, I deem these sources sufficiently certain and my ability sufficiently reliable that they could act as an authority to justify my beliefs. So it seems that “faith in God” is what causes my view to diverge from Popper’s… I don’t know. There’s a lot to think about.
Recognize anything here?critical rationalist_{November 30, 2017
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@UB
He claims that Darwinian evolution is the source of the translation apparatus, I correct him that Darwinian evolution requires the translation apparatus in order to even exist (and have long since gone through the physical details to support my claim), and he responds by merely repeating the claim — as if repeating the claim was his evidence, and as if his repetition actually answered the details of the counter argument.
And I corrected you in that it is only high-fidelity replication requires the transition system. You still haven't responded beyond the assumption that the very distant past will resemble the distant past, which is a variation of inductivism. When did you get around to responding to this? If you can't point to it, then why don't you summarize it? Again you speak of avoiding evidence, yet....
CR: When we left off, I had asked the following question: During the critical test between Newton’s Laws and Einstein’s’ general relativity, what it necessary to avoid the evidence that we can use Newton’s Laws to launch rockets into space? I have yet to hear an answer.
It incase it's to clear to you, your "theory of knowledge", and all of the physical details that supposedly support it, are like the physical details that support Newton's laws of motion. I don't need to avoid it any more than the critical test of general relativity didn't need to avoid the ability to launch rockets into space. Newton's laws are an approximation. So, is your theory of knowledge. I keep repeating this because you still haven't addressed it. Still waiting....critical rationalist_{November 30, 2017
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I was wrong in my previous assessment. CR won't wait for a new thread to repeat his schtick, he'll do it right here. His #132 is a perfect example. He claims that Darwinian evolution is the source of the translation apparatus, I correct him that Darwinian evolution requires the translation apparatus in order to even exist (and have long since gone through the physical details to support my claim), and he responds by merely repeating the claim -- as if repeating the claim was his evidence, and as if his repetition actually answered the details of the counter argument. That is perhaps his underlying strategy: simply repeat the claim without addressing the details of any counter arguments, and then wait for the person to mercifully drop dead. Its an argument by attrition. CR, all your arguments have already been fatally criticized. All of them.Upright BiPed_{November 30, 2017
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CR @155 You are being unresponsive.
CR: Again, I’m suggesting you’re asking the wrong question. It’s not what sources we should turn to, such as who should rule.
Even if I did ask this question in some other thread, what does this have to do with the logical errors that underlie Deutsch's reasonings?
CR: ... the question should be, how can we find errors in our ideas.
Well, if Deutsch is correct and criticism, like all ideas/beliefs/knowledge, has no foundation, then, obviously criticism is not the way out.Origenes_{November 30, 2017
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@origins Deutsch actually presents an alteranative in which he is infallible and then tries to criticize it. That’s exactly what he’s referring to. Again, I’m suggesting you’re asking the wrong question. It’s not what sources we should turn to, such as who should rule. Rather, the question should be, how can we find errors in our ideas. You’re still stuck in the former. Furthermore, I’m make the same argument I presented to KF. Out of all ideas, which are basic beliefs? Give me examples.critical rationalist_{November 30, 2017
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CR: Deutsch doesn’t precede every sentence with “this is a conjecture”. So what?
Do you naively believe that adding “this is a conjecture” somehow turns a self-referentially incoherent sentence into a coherent one? Get real! It obviously does not help to say:
This is a conjecture: no one can tell you the truth.
Your idiotic conjecture, Mr. Deutsch, is self-defeating. And BTW nowhere did you address my argument that Deutsch cannot make claims, like "all knowledge is suspect", without arrogating to himself a position outside of 'the circle'. See posts #5, #42, #47, #89. In short:
… those who claim that all beliefs, acts of reasoning, etc., are nonveracious are positing a closed circle in which no beliefs are produced by the proper methods by which beliefs can be said to be veracious or rational. Yet at the same time, they are arrogating to themselves a position outside of this circle by which they can judge the beliefs of others, a move they deny to their opponents. Since the raison d’être of their thesis is that there is no outside of the circle, they do not have the epistemic right to assume a position independent of it, and so their beliefs about the nonveracity of beliefs or reasoning are just as nonveracious as those they criticize. If all of the beliefs inside the circle are suspect, we cannot judge between truth and falsity, since any such judgment would be just as suspect as what it seeks to adjudicate. We would have to seek another argument, another chain of reasoning, another set of beliefs, by which we can judge the judgment—and a third set to judge the judgment of the judgment, ad infinitum. At no point can they step out of the circle to a transcendent standpoint that would allow them to reject some beliefs as tainted while remaining untainted themselves. [Slagle, ‘The Epistemological Skyhook’]
Origenes_{November 30, 2017
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So? The same can be said of abstract “no-design laws.”
You might want to go back and read the paper again. Specifically, the paper was addressing the idea that for replicators to form and replicate in a high-fidelity way, the laws of physics must have had the design of replicators already present in them. "No-design laws" is the alternative that the design of high fidelity replicators are not already present there. Only genetic laws are present. So, "no-design laws" cannot be the explanation because it doesn't contain the design of replicators already present.critical rationalist_{November 30, 2017
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Kairosfocus @148
Origines, I think everything you believe is false may be a step too far, but certainly the all is suspect is there ...
Point taken. I was paraphrasing of course. Deutsch comes pretty close though:
The inherent limitation on human reason, that it can never find solid foundations for ideas, does not constitute any sort of limit ... The absence of foundation, whether infallible or probable, is no loss to anyone ...
A strict interpretation of these lines comes pretty close to "everything you believe is false" which BTW Deutsch asks us to seriously consider in the following tortured sentence:
Deutsch: For instance, can it be true that absolutely anything that you think is true, no matter how certain you are, might be false? [emphasis in the original]
Origenes_{November 30, 2017
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Origenes,
Show me what my translation leaves out.
Any reasonable concept of infallibility. Under your scheme, a stopped clock, a buggy computer program, and a magic 8-ball all can "infallibly tell you what is infallible".daveS_{November 30, 2017
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If free choices can somehow get arguments from sense information, without a principle of induction we can use in practice, what's left? Apparently, choice is some kind of authority? And were did that come from? Some ultimate authority. And what is the explanation for that authority? It just was.critical rationalist_{November 30, 2017
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@KF From the article..
Dykes tries to refute Popper’s arguments against inductivism. Inductivism is the belief that there is a method called induction by which people can get new ideas from sense information and then confirm those ideas.
The thing is, we cannot get new ideas from sense information. This is because it is possible to conjecture an infinite number of "patterns" from sense information. So, the idea that there is a pattern comes *before* the sense information itself. Nor is it out there for us to obtain via sense information. Now, you might be saying that this is one of many inductive conclusions, but that is a misnomer, because that conclusion didn't come from induction. Why? No one has formulated a "Principe of induction" that we can choose between new ideas, in practice. You made an educated guess. So, if your not saying it confirms something is true or confirms that it is probably true, then all you're doing is muddying the water. For example, of all the trillions of designers we've observed, every one of them has had a complex material nervous system. So, would it be an inductive conclusion to say that all designers have complex material nervous systems? Furthermore, organisms have appeared in the order of least complex to most complex. So would it be an inductive conclusion to assume that new organisms more complex than humans will appear? Again, this is just what I came up with off the top of my head. Yet, I'm guessing you would disagree with each of these things. So, do you disagree because they are not inductive conclusions? If not, then why? So, if what you mean by an "inductive conclusion" is one of an infinite number of interpretations of sense information, which did not actually come from a "principle of induction" that could be used in practice, then what does "induction" have to do with anything? Why muddy the water? Conjectures without criticism is faith. Specifically formatting ides so they cannot be criticized or assuming they don't need criticism is, well, an attempt to derail or deny the means to correct errors. Which leads us to ID. If ID isn't an inductive conclusion, then what is it? An explanation? But in what sense? Human beings are good explanations because of their human limitations. ID's designer is abstract and has no limitations. So, the very thing that makes designers good explanations for designed things is literally lost attempting to define ID in such a way that it doesn't exclude God. It's all left at the door. ID's designer is an authoritative source of knowledge.critical rationalist_{November 30, 2017
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Origines, I think everything you believe is false may be a step too far, but certainly the all is suspect is there, something I responded to some time ago when in effect a point by point rebuttal was demanded. And was given. KF PS: Sadly, many Physicists traipse into philosophy in a dismissive way and make quite basic errors. See: http://edwardfeser.blogspot.co.uk/2011/02/why-are-some-physicists-so-bad-at.htmlkairosfocus_{November 30, 2017
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