What is knowledge?

_{kairosfocus

November 26, 2017

Food for thought, Logic and Reason, Philosophy, Sciences and Theology, Selective Hyperskepticism}

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Sometimes, exchanges at UD come down to truly basic (and hard) issues.

This is one such time, where Origenes has challenged prolific objector Critical Rationalist in the Personal Incredulity thread:

>>100 Origenes November 25, 2017 at 7:01 pm

CR

What is your definition of valid knowledge?>>

I have thought this worthy of responding to and of headlining:

KF, 106: >> Origines,

Generally, I would argue that “knowledge” is used in a weak form sense: warranted, credibly true (and reliable) belief.

Drawing out, slightly:

Warranted —

there is an available account (as opposed to internal to the given knower, who may simply accept a message from reliable sources . . . ) that, properly understood, would justify accepting or treating belief x as true in serious contexts.

Credibly true —

the warrant for and circumstances of belief x are such that we can have good confidence that the belief is likely to be true or capture enough truth that we are entitled to trust it.

Reliable —

the warrant for x is such that if we act on the belief that-x in a consequential situation, we are unlikely to be let down.

Belief —

that which is accepted, perceived, or held to be so; often in this context, for good reason.

Of course in today’s day and age, “faith” and “belief” are often despised and dismissively contrasted with “science,” “reason/rationality” and “knowledge,” etc. as though acknowledged faith/trust/belief is invariably ill-warranted.

Such reflects dominance of radical secularism and evolutionary materialistic scientism, which, ironically are not well warranted, are not trustworthy (being fallaciously rooted, esp. through self-referential incoherence and/or the fostering of ill-advised cognitive biases) and should not be permitted to act as gate-keepers on what we regard as knowledge.>>

So, arguably, knowledge is well-warranted, credibly true (and reliable) belief.

Many will find that unpalatable, but I confidently predict that they will have difficulty proposing another succinct account that answers to issues ranging from the classical “justified, true belief” definition of epistemology, to the fact that scientific knowledge is not utterly certain, to the challenge of Gettier counter-examples, to the Grue issue, to the Agrippa trilemma challenge and more. END

Comments

Origenes,
Because, as part of the test, he labors under the assumption that his belief is true (or certain). The question “Is that certain?” simply asks to confirm the assumption of truthfulness of his strongly held belief.
All I see is that you're putting words in Deutsch's mouth. He's not here to respond, but if it were me in the conversation, I would answer "no" at that point.daveS_{November 29, 2017
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DaveS @115
DaveS: Under the assumption that there are indeed no infallible sources of truth, D could not be certain of this, so he would not answer “Sure”.
Yes he would.
DaveS: Why do you think he would say “Sure”?
Because, as part of the test, he labors under the assumption that his belief is true (or certain). The question "Is that certain?" simply asks to confirm the assumption of truthfulness of his strongly held belief.Origenes_{November 29, 2017
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Origenes,
Okay then, let’s look at the possibility that his strongly held belief is indeed true. Suppose it is true that “nothing can infallibly tell you what is infallible, nor what is probable”. What do we get? Let’s do the test: * The “It is true that nothing can tell you what is certain” test * D: Nothing can tell you what is certain. Is that certain? D: Sure. So … you just told me what is certain? D: Yes, I sure did. But you said that no one can do this? D: Oops.
Under the assumption that there are indeed no infallible sources of truth, D could not be certain of this, so he would not answer "Sure". Why do you think he would say "Sure"?daveS_{November 29, 2017
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DaveS @112
DaveS: “Perhaps” is too weak. His belief is strong enough that he wrote up an article to advocate for these positions. I think he strongly believes “nothing can infallibly tell you what is infallible, nor what is probable”.
You don't seem to grasp the problem .... Okay then, let’s look at the possibility that his strongly held belief is indeed true. Suppose it is true that “nothing can infallibly tell you what is infallible, nor what is probable”. What do we get? Let's do the test: * The "it is true that nothing can tell you what is certain" test * D: Nothing can tell you what is certain. Is that certain? D: Sure. So … you just told me what is certain? D: Yes, I sure did. But you said that no one can do this? D: Oops. IOWs if Deutsch, as you say, strongly believes that "nothing can tell you what is certain", then he does not seem to understand that he is being self-referentially incoherent.Origenes_{November 29, 2017
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CR: Again, your responses indicate you are making the same mistakes are Dyke. Have you actually read the referenced article?
I did read that horrible article and nowhere are my arguments addressed. So, I have no idea what you are talking about.Origenes_{November 29, 2017
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Origenes,
To be clear, are you saying that Deutsch actually meant to say: “*perhaps* … nothing can infallibly tell you what is infallible, nor what is probable.” and “*perhaps* … nothing obstructs access to the truth like a belief in absolute truthfulness.”? If not, what is he saying according to you?
"Perhaps" is too weak. His belief is strong enough that he wrote up an article to advocate for these positions. I think he strongly believes "nothing can infallibly tell you what is infallible, nor what is probable". Regarding the second statement, I don't think he means it literally (there are likely things which obstruct access to the truth even more), but rather means something like "belief in absolute truthfulness can, paradoxically, obstruct access to the truth". His statement is more memorable, as it echoes the famous proverb "nothing succeeds like success". And yes, I mixed up the subtitle with another sentence in the article.daveS_{November 29, 2017
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Let me summarize things as I see them. UB presents an argument that seems flawed, in that it appears inductive in nature. So, I try to better understand it in case I’m missing something.
More dissembling. More preening. More positioning. You argued that Darwinian evolution is the source of the genetic translation apparatus. I corrected you that Darwinian evolution requires the genetic translation apparatus in order to exist. If A requires B for A to exist, then A cannot be the source of B. This is fatal to your theory. No amount of diversion is going to change it.Upright BiPed_{November 29, 2017
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KF @106
.. in a previous generation all students in a university were steeped in a philosophy-enriched climate so their arguments were subtly shaped by that context and would not make gross errors such as not understanding enough of being to realise that nothing properly means non-being, not even abstracta. Sadly, that was generations ago.
Perhaps there is a method behind all this madness: getting rid of philosophy clears the way for atheism.Origenes_{November 29, 2017
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DaveS @102 To be clear, are you saying that Deutsch actually meant to say: "*perhaps* … nothing can infallibly tell you what is infallible, nor what is probable." and "*perhaps* ... nothing obstructs access to the truth like a belief in absolute truthfulness.”? If not, what is he saying according to you?
DaveS: It’s a subtitle to an article on a website.
No, it's not, it is from the main text alinea 16 (below second picture).Origenes_{November 29, 2017
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KF,
DS & CR, perhaps, you should ponder the square of opposition, to understand what ALL A is B and NO A is B mean. When it came to black swans, the issue is, is whiteness (or at least non-blackness) an essential property of being a swan? Where, generally colour is not an essential core characteristic of things, e.g. blue diamonds. Obviously when a certain bird was seen in Australia, it was recognised as clearly and decisively swannish despite its colour, or it would have been termed something like a near-swan. And had there been no such birds it is likely that the claim all swans are white would be held a summary of empirical findings that were not necessary facets of being a swan, not a binding law of nature, as we have any number of species with variable colouration — including our own.
So, based on empirical evidence, at the time it was credibly true that "all swans are white". Given that large parts of the world remained unexplored (from a European perspective) I doubt anyone would claim that with certainty. Aren't we therefore agreeing?daveS_{November 29, 2017
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DS & CR, perhaps, you should ponder the square of opposition, to understand what ALL A is B and NO A is B mean. When it came to black swans, the issue is, is whiteness (or at least non-blackness) an essential property of being a swan? Where, generally colour is not an essential core characteristic of things, e.g. blue diamonds and pink pearls (natural ones from the Queen Conch -- v. rare). Obviously when a certain bird was seen in Australia, it was recognised as clearly and decisively swannish despite its colour, or it would have been termed something like a near-swan. And had there been no such birds it is likely that the claim all swans are white would be held a summary of empirical findings that were not necessary facets of being a swan, not a binding law of nature, as we have any number of species with variable colouration -- including our own. Just today and yesterday, I have seen near midnight black, various shades of brown, Hispanic-Caribbean with significant Amerindian in the mix, Indian -- light and relatively dark, Chinese, Caucasian and Amerindian [Carib]. In absolutely none of these cases did colour affect fundamental human-ness. All of this, fits in with Newton's advice as already was cited. KFkairosfocus_{November 29, 2017
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Origines, in a previous generation all students in a university were steeped in a philosophy-enriched climate so their arguments were subtly shaped by that context and would not make gross errors such as not understanding enough of being to realise that nothing properly means non-being, not even abstracta. Sadly, that was generations ago. Physicists of today would be well advised to avoid traipsing over the border into domains that are not only not the prime academic qualification, but domains where there is little or no familiarity with the basics. A good start-point would be to realise that evolutionary materialistic scientism and its fellow travellers are utterly ill-founded; never mind the confident manner of many adherents and institutional dominance. KFkairosfocus_{November 29, 2017
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@Origenes Again, your responses indicate you are making the same mistakes are Dyke. Have you actually read the referenced article? For example....
Section 10 Dykes attacks Popper’s theory of the three worlds. World 1 is the world of physical objects, world 2 is the world of psychological states and world 3 is the world of the objective content of our knowledge. How does Dykes argue against this?
First, there seems little conjectural about the theory of worlds 1, 2, & 3. In none of Popper’s several presentations is the theory offered as an hypothesis. Rather, it is laid out as a discovery, as what Popper thought the facts to be.
Popper doesn’t precede every sentence with “this is a conjecture”. So what?
critical rationalist_{November 29, 2017
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The fact that Deutsch is a physcicist, brings to mind the article 'Why are (some) physicists so bad at philosophy?', by Edward Feser. Excerpt:
.. when I read this foray into philosophy by physics professor Ethan Siegel, which a reader sent me, asking for my reaction. Do give it a read, though I’ll summarize it for you: Arguments for God as cause of the universe rest on the assumption that something can’t come from nothing. But given the laws of physics, it turns out that something can come from nothing. Here was my reaction: Is this guy serious? The laws of physics aren’t “nothing.” Ergo, this isn’t even a prima facie counterexample to the principle that ex nihilo, nihil fit. That’s just blindingly obvious. Is this guy serious? (Actually, that was not my reaction. My actual reaction cannot be printed on a family-friendly blog. This is the cleaned up version.)
Origenes_{November 29, 2017
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CR:
UB presents an argument that seems flawed, in that it appears inductive in nature. So, I try to better understand it in case I’m missing something.
Imagine CR as a defense lawyer arguing in front of a judge and jury. Your honor, the case against my client is deeply and irrevocably flawed in that it is inductive in nature. If the glove doesn't fit, you must acquit.Mung_{November 29, 2017
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Origenes,
If so, those people should not make the claim “there are no black swans”, but instead something along the lines of “as far as I know, there are no black swans.”
People sometimes elide these things when it's obvious.
We are not discussing common usage of language in daily life. Or are we? Because I have little interest in that. David Deutsch writes:
nothing can infallibly tell you what is infallible, nor what is probable.
Deutsch himself italicizes “nothing”. He wants his readers to really notice the term “nothing” and emphasizes “nothing”. How does that tell you that he is uncertain about “nothing”, or that it is just a casual inaccurate everyday way of expressing oneself?
It's a subtitle to an article on a website. People often use rhetorical devices (e.g., hyperbole) in such situations. In my experience, the use of such devices, even when they result in a slightly inaccurate statement, can be helpful to the reader.
That is appropriate on many occasions, but not in philosophy. In philosophy, when someone makes the claim “there are no true statements”, we are not supposed to “understand what the author means.”
It's a philosophically oriented article posted on a website. Here are a few other snippets from that website:
Consciousness Began When the Gods Stopped Speaking We Need Conscious Robots Shakespeare’s Genius Is Nonsense
daveS_{November 29, 2017
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DaveS @100
Well, apparently at one time (some) people believed that there were no black swans … I have to assume these people knew about the pitfalls of induction, so they would have been aware that it’s practically (and perhaps literally) impossible to be certain about the claim “there are no black swans”.
If so, those people should not make the claim “there are no black swans”, but instead something along the lines of “as far as I know, there are no black swans.”
The same goes for unicorns. I believe it’s true that no human can be certain that no unicorns exist, but if I say “no unicorns exist”, that’s not going to start a fight. Everyone would understand that I mean it’s a credibly true statement, not that I’m certain it’s true.
We are not discussing common usage of language in daily life. Or are we? Because I have little interest in that. David Deutsch writes:
… nothing can infallibly tell you what is infallible, nor what is probable.
Deutsch himself italicizes “nothing”. He wants his readers to really notice the term “nothing” and emphasizes “nothing”. How does that tell you that he is uncertain about “nothing”, or that it is just a casual inaccurate everyday way of expressing oneself?
I guess you can do that, but doesn’t that mean you also don’t care about whether Deutsch is “utterly unaware of the problem of self-referentiality”?
In his writings he shows no awareness of the problem. That’s all I care about.
In my view, if we really want to understand what the author means, we need to acknowledge that we often include tacit assumptions in our statements.
That is appropriate on many occasions, but not in philosophy. In philosophy, when someone makes the claim “there are no true statements”, we are not supposed to “understand what the author means.”Origenes_{November 29, 2017
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Origenes,
On its own any universal claim implies certainty. This also goes for your examples — “There are no unicorns” and “there are no black swans”. Q: Are you certain there are no black swans? A: Well, of course, otherwise I would not have said “there are no black swans”. Indeed, is there any other answer? “No I am not certain, but I say it anyway”, doesn’t seem like a reasonable answer to me.
Well, apparently at one time (some) people believed that there were no black swans, a conclusion they presumably arrived at through induction. And one does not arrive at certainty through inductive reasoning. I have to assume these people knew about the pitfalls of induction, so they would have been aware that it's practically (and perhaps literally) impossible to be certain about the claim "there are no black swans". The same goes for unicorns. I believe it's true that no human can be certain that no unicorns exist, but if I say "no unicorns exist", that's not going to start a fight. Everyone would understand that I mean it's a credibly true statement, not that I'm certain it's true.
You say that we could make a universal claim “with the understanding that we might be in error.” And, indeed, maybe Deutsch is doubting his universal claims, but I don’t care about all that.
I guess you can do that, but doesn't that mean you also don't care about whether Deutsch is "utterly unaware of the problem of self-referentiality"? In my view, if we really want to understand what the author means, we need to acknowledge that we often include tacit assumptions in our statements.daveS_{November 29, 2017
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DaveS @97 On its own any universal claim implies certainty. This also goes for your examples — “There are no unicorns” and “there are no black swans”. Q: Are you certain there are no black swans? A: Well, of course, otherwise I would not have said “there are no black swans”. Indeed, is there any other answer? "No I am not certain, but I say it anyway", doesn't seem like a reasonable answer to me. You say that we could make a universal claim "with the understanding that we might be in error." And, indeed, maybe Deutsch is doubting his universal claims, but I don't care about all that. I look at the statement on its own (an sich). And when I take a universal claim serious, then I must assume certainty.Origenes_{November 29, 2017
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@UB Let me summarize things as I see them. UB presents an argument that seems flawed, in that it appears inductive in nature. So, I try to better understand it in case I'm missing something. When I visit his website, a quick scan though referenced papers that supposed support his argument, none share his conclusion of ID. In fact, one paper explicitly says that ID is not a conclusion. However, I do see something about a triangle or pyramid in which each side plays a specific role. Apparently, this has some significance which I’m unclear on and ask for a theory of information as the only one present on his site is Shannon’s. Much evasion occurs. Regardless I point out (1) this specific number / roles does not hold with quantum information. (2) In the translation system, doesn’t always have that exact number of objects. (3) The objects in question are themselves information, in that they can in be in other states / places which controls translation. This would cause an infinite regress. (4) Theories of information are much more comprehensive, in that they include tasks such as copying, which would have implications regarding any theory of how external information would have been put in a cell. We find ourselves with the very same problem in that you have information in physical form, which needs to be explained, etc. (5) We can define information in a more fundamental, physical way that unifies classical physics and quantum information via the constructor theory of information, which defines information as possible tasks. IOW, UB’s “theory” of information is an approximation which does not scale. (6) All of the parts in the translation system can be expressed as a network of possible tasks, as defined in the Constructor theory of life. UB suggests I’m avoiding “evidence on the table”. However, I point out this is similar to trying argue for Newton’s laws of motion by pointing out we can use it to launch rockets into space. His only response was to say the analogy I presented was an analogy because I “quoted” what he didn’t write. No other response was given, such as the analogy doesn't fit. When we left off, I had asked the following question: During the critical test between Newton’s Laws and Einstein’s’ general relativity, what it necessary to avoid the evidence that we can use Newton’s Laws to launch rockets into space? I have yet to hear an answer.critical rationalist_{November 29, 2017
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Origenes,
DaveS @95 Can you offer a universal claim that does not presuppose certainty?
That's not my job*. You have made the universal claim that all universal claims presuppose certainty and I'm asking for support. ____ *I've already offered a couple in #93.daveS_{November 29, 2017
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DaveS @95 Can you offer a universal claim that does not presuppose certainty? Deutsch does not say: "*Perhaps* nothing obstructs access to the truth like a belief in absolute truthfulness.” Saying that would render his claim meaningless.Origenes_{November 29, 2017
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Origenes,
A universal claim presupposes certainty.
What?? Can you provide some support for this?daveS_{November 29, 2017
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KF @91
KF: As to whether Deutsch claims certainty, the answer is that he has patently asserted a universal, negative claim.
Exactly. A universal claim presupposes certainty. In this article, where CR often cites from, Deutsch passes universal claims around like candy. He seems to be utterly unaware of the problem of self-referentiality. The subtitle(!) of Deutch's article reads:
“Nothing obstructs access to the truth like a belief in absolute truthfulness.”
- Do you believe that universal claim to be absolutely true? D: Yes, I believe in the absolute truthfulness of that universal claim. - So, you believe in absolute truthfulness? D: Yes, I believe in absolute truthfulness. - So — per your own claim — you do not have access to the truth? D: Indeed, because of my belief in absolute truthfulness my access to the truth is obstructed. - Well, that’s good to know.Origenes_{November 29, 2017
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KF,
DS (Attn Origines & CR), a self-refuting, necessarily false claim cannot be credibly true.
Yes, but in the context of my question, no one is making any claims, necessarily false or otherwise. No one is asserting that we are (nearly) completely deluded. You and I both believe that we understand the world to some extent, at least enough to know when we are driving through an intersection and fortunately, to know when the light is green. I thought this might be interesting to look at in order to possibly contrast the strong and weak forms of knowledge, but on second thought, maybe it doesn't reveal any new information.
As to whether Deutsch claims certainty, the answer is that he has patently asserted a universal, negative claim. As we just saw. A single sound counter-example suffices to overturn such, and the claim is self-referential. It denies that it can exist. It refutes itself per logic of being and per import of distinct identity. It is self-contradictory and cannot describe a true state of affairs in our world.
Yes on the first paragraph, no on the second (after the first sentence). We make universal negative claims all the time with the understanding that we might be in error. "There are no unicorns" or "there are no black swans", for example. One can assert that there are no infallible sources of knowledge as well, and one might turn out to be wrong, but you wouldn't know this until you actually find an infallible source of knowledge.daveS_{November 29, 2017
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It remains to be seen if CR is willing to heed such.
Unfortunately, he is not. CR claims that "knowledge" is information that causes itself to be retained in a material medium. Such claims have a physical manifestation that is both unavoidable and exclusively identifiable. I showed him months ago that his claims completely fail to account for those physical conditions. In other words, his position doesn't survive even the first criticism. During our conversations, (with unassailable material facts on the table), I basically refused to become sidetracked by his constant dissembling about reasoning. I see here that you and Origenes have gutted even that dissembling. So it would seem to me that basically every claim CR has made on this forum, going back to the very start of this year, has been thoroughly and fatally trounced and criticized and gutted. Yet, I can tell you exactly what will result from it. In a day or two, some new topic will emerge on these pages and CR will reappear and repeat the same words all over again. That has been his pattern for months now. His entire worldview is wrapped up into it, so he has no other choice.Upright BiPed_{November 28, 2017
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DS (Attn Origines & CR), a self-refuting, necessarily false claim cannot be credibly true. However, if one takes a crooked yardstick and makes it one's standard for things like straightness, accuracy and uprightness a peculiar effect results. For, then, there is a closing of the mind to soundness: what is in actuality straight, accurate and upright cannot ever pass the test of conformity to a crooked yardstick, so by being committed to crookedness one is led to lock out soundness. This is why a few self-evident, plumb-line naturally sound truths are so pivotal. As the plumb-line is naturally straight and upright, it reveals what is crooked beyond reasonable, responsible doubt. Our onward response then reveals whether we have fallen into the utter folly of clinging to absurdity in the face of undeniable correction. One of these plumb-line truths is that bare consciousness is undeniably real -- one who doubts must be conscious to doubt. Similarly, distinct identity starts with, "I . . ." and with our having a world. And as this involves W = {A|~A} then we immediately see how LOI, LNC, LEM are immediately present in such distinct identity. Similarly, two-ness and with that the endless chain of naturals. We can quickly associate logic of being issues: possible vs impossible, non-being vs being, of possible, contingent vs necessary. Where, unfortunately in our day we typically simply have not been exposed to that. But one criterion of being is that all true circumstances must be true together, i.e. must be mutually consistent or compatible. Thus, a candidate being whose core characteristics stand in irreconcilable contradiction cannot exist in any possible world, the classic test case being a Euclidean space square circle. The test then becomes, are we humble and docile -- teachable -- in the face of the import of plumb-line sound truths? If not, we are in stubborn folly. Sadly, we seem to increasingly have a civilisation of such folly. Which, cannot end well. The question is, will we turn back before it is too late and the cliff's edge crumbles underfoot. I have serious doubts. (Those were not helped by the 50 minute ICBM test flight over Japan yesterday . . . Physics and Chemistry have given great power to the world, but they cannot give the wisdom to guide and restrain that power through rational responsibility under sound moral government. All we can do is to warn on the gap between is and ought.) Origines and I (as well as others) have long since pointed out the incoherence and unsoundness of key views adopted by CR. In this and other recent threads, we have pointed out serious errors in the work of Deutsch et al. It remains to be seen if CR is willing to heed such. Let's clip briefly:
D: No one can tell you what is certain. [O:] Is that certain? D: Sure. [O:] So … you just told me what is certain? D: Yes, I sure did. [O:] But you said that no one can do this? D: Oops.
As to whether Deutsch claims certainty, the answer is that he has patently asserted a universal, negative claim. As we just saw. A single sound counter-example suffices to overturn such, and the claim is self-referential. It denies that it can exist. It refutes itself per logic of being and per import of distinct identity. It is self-contradictory and cannot describe a true state of affairs in our world. And this, being directly rooted in self-evident first principles of right reason, is rooted in strong-form knowledge. One may put up the abstract possibility of error to dismiss such a claim, but in fact such hyperskepticism with a swivel the better to dismiss what one does not like, is irresponsible. One needs to show where the error lies, and in fact the showing has been done, the opposite way. Logic of being, likewise, grounds that we may responsibly warrant as reliable and even credibly true, things which reveal themselves as consistent and apparently fundamentally rooted patterns of the world through empirical investigation and inductive inference. A mango tree, consistently, will produce mangoes and a kusha bush will produce needle-like thorns. A Manchineel tree produces fruit that are deceptively like small green apples or similar fruit, but it is a dangerous tree. (The article reveals that they seem to taste sweet, I have utterly no desire to test that one empirically! Never mind, that I have sometimes had lunch by a nearby beach, under a thicket with the fruit scattered across the ground -- and a clue is, NOTHING tries to eat that little, apple-like fruit. BTW, that sweetness backed by terrible causticity would make them an exception to the rule I have long heard, that natural fruit that taste sweet are not poisonous. However, they are a key part of the ecosystem. The tree-line is a guide to the sea-turtles coming to a beach to nest and lay eggs, for instance. And should you try chopping down or burning, you will pay a natural price . . . people have been hospitalised. Chemical warfare is a part of nature.]) I fear, as a civilisation we are being invited to feast on deceptively sweet but ultimately caustic "beach apples." Ill-advised. KFkairosfocus_{November 28, 2017
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Does Deutsch claim certainty here? I'm not familiar with the quotation, so I don't know if he's referring to a merely "credibly true" proposition.daveS_{November 28, 2017
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CR According to Deutsch there are no infallible sources of knowledge. All information is suspect; information stemming from direct experience included. IOWs he posits a closed circle in which no belief can be said to be infallible. Yet at the same time, he arrogates to himself a position outside of this circle by which he can (infallibly) judge beliefs and knowledge, a move he denies to his opponents. Since the raison d’être of his thesis is that there is no outside of the circle, he does not have the epistemic right to assume a position independent of it, and so his beliefs about the fallibility of beliefs or reasoning are just as fallible as those he criticizes.
"If all of the beliefs inside the circle are suspect, we cannot judge between truth and falsity, since any such judgment would be just as suspect as what it seeks to adjudicate. We would have to seek another argument, another chain of reasoning, another set of beliefs, by which we can judge the judgment—and a third set to judge the judgment of the judgment, ad infinitum. At no point can they step out of the circle to a transcendent standpoint that would allow them to reject some beliefs as tainted while remaining untainted themselves." [Slagle]
When Deutsch writes “nothing can infallibly tell you what is infallible”, he does not seem to understand that he is being self-referentially incoherent: D: No one can tell you what is certain. Is that certain? D: Sure. So … you just told me what is certain? D: Yes, I sure did. But you said that no one can do this? D: Oops.Origenes_{November 28, 2017
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Origenes: You cannot doubt your own existence. You cannot be wrong about the fact that you exist. Nothing and no one is capable of deluding you on that issue. Hence, you cannot be completely deluded.

CR: Yet, this has already been addressed.
Can you criticize it? If not, what does that tell you? Also, given that we want to understand and seek truth, we have to assume that we are free and rational. Do you agree with that? And BTW what is not addressed is my refutation of your fallibilism — see #42 and #47
CR: And as for knowing that “I” exist because I think—note that your knowledge that you think is only a memory of what you did think, a second or so ago, and that can easily be a false memory.
“In order to have a false memory … I must exist.”Origenes_{November 28, 2017
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