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Christopher’s Challenge

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Christopher Hitchens is nothing if not a straight-shooter. He calls it like he sees it, and not even a vicious attack could stop him from denouncing evil, racist ideologies that are still with us today. He is also a fearless and formidable debater. In recent years, he has declared himself an anti-theist, a term he defines as follows:

You could be an atheist and wish that the belief was true. You could; I know some people who do. An antitheist, a term I’m trying to get into circulation, is someone who’s very relieved that there’s no evidence for this proposition.

On Bastille Day in 2007, in response to an article entitled What Atheists Can’t Answer by op-ed columnist Michael Gerson in The Washington Post, Christopher Hitchens threw down the gauntlet to theists:

Here is my challenge. Let Gerson name one ethical statement made, or one ethical action performed, by a believer that could not have been uttered or done by a nonbeliever. And here is my second challenge. Can any reader of this column think of a wicked statement made, or an evil action performed, precisely because of religious faith? The second question is easy to answer, is it not? The first – I have been asking it for some time – awaits a convincing reply. By what right, then, do the faithful assume this irritating mantle of righteousness? They have as much to apologize for as to explain.

Hitchens has repeated this challenge on numerous occasions since then. The first time I heard him issue this challenge, I thought: “He has a point.” Going through the Ten Commandments (a natural starting point for someone raised in the Judeo-Christian tradition), it seemed to me that the only ones that a nonbeliever couldn’t keep were the ones relating to the worship of God. But Christopher Hitchens might reasonably object that if religious belief only makes believers more ethical in the way they relate to God, then it has no practical moral value. Surely, if God exists, then the belief that God is real should also infuse a deeper meaning into our interactions with other people. For the belief that God is real is meant to transform the way in which we think about and act towards others. In that case, there should be ethical actions directed at other human beings that a believer can perform, and that a nonbeliever cannot.

Christopher Hitchens has been criticized before for failing to provide a secular justification for his moral beliefs, and for waffling on the subject of free will. I will not rehash those criticisms here. Instead I will throw the floor open, and invite submissions from readers in answer to the following question:

Can you name an ethical action directed at other human beings, that a believer could perform, and that a nonbeliever could not?

To help readers along, I’ll make my question more focused. Let’s call it “Christopher’s Challenge”:

Can you name an ethical action directed at Christopher Hitchens, that a believer could perform, and that a nonbeliever could not?

I’m deeply ashamed to say that it took me two whole weeks to think of the answer to this question, and then I kicked myself hard for not having thought of it sooner. But I confidently predict that someone reading this post will come up with the answer within 24 hours.

Answers, anyone?

Update on Professor Feser’s response to my post

(By the way, I would like to thank Professor Edward Feser for his lengthy and detailed reply to my post, and I would like to add that I deeply respect his passion for truth. Professor Feser and I have a somewhat different understanding of Thomist metaphysics and how it should be interpreted in the 21st century, and I would also disagree with his bold claim that even if scientists one day managed to synthesize a life-form from scratch in a lab, that life-form would not be an artifact. But in the meantime, I would like to draw readers’ attention to a remark Professor Feser made in his post, “Intelligent Design” theory and mechanism, on 10 April 2010:

Perhaps the biological world God creates works according to Darwinian principles; and perhaps not.

Those were incautious words, and I believe they betray a profound misunderstanding of what Aquinas wrote on the Creation. In a forthcoming post, I will demonstrate that Aquinas would never have accepted the Darwinian account of how evolution is supposed to work, even if he had known then what we know now. I will also show that according to Aquinas, certain life-forms cannot be generated from non-living matter by any kind of natural process, even in a universe sustained by God, and rife with final causes. Stay tuned!)

Comments
And I apologize for possibly derailing this thread with my question in comment #134, and beg forgiveness on the basis that perhaps it might at least partially illuminate why I committed the "fundamental attribution error" in comment #86 for which I apologized in comment #132.Allen_MacNeill
April 21, 2010
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I'm curious how many people reading this thread know anyone who (like my best friend and her brother) were repeatedly beaten by their extremely devout Christian mother as a way to force them to go to church and recite fervently the lessons being forced upon them there, and who today have no contact with their mother because she believes them to be "fallen" and quite possibly "demonically possessed"?Allen_MacNeill
April 21, 2010
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In comment #127 vjtorley wrote:
"In order to get to Heaven, you have to lose your attachment to yourself, or “die to self” as St. Paul would say. (Sounds like a tall order!) Love is the best way – indeed, the only way – of truly dying to self. Love of others can enable you to you forget yourself; love of a Transcendent God goes one step further, as it takes you completely out of this world and the cares associated with it. Additionally, you lose your preoccupation with mortality by realizing that you have one foot in eternity. Part of you is not bounded by time. To get to Heaven, you have to be capable of loving God for his own sake, as well as showing unselfish love towards others. Having lost your attachment to self, you forget about self-gratification, and stop chasing after rewards. But you do not lose your personal identity. You are still a “self”; it’s just that you are no longer preoccupied with yourself. If you die in this state of non-attachment to self, with a heart that is open to the love of God and others, you are pleasantly surprised to encounter God on the other side. You will find the experience of Heaven delightful, and hence rewarding; but by this stage, you’re not chasing a reward, and you love God for who He is. Does that still strike you as selfish?"
Not at all; indeed, it strikes me as being a succinct summary of the basic principles of Buddhism, as taught to me by my roshi many years ago (different words, of course, but the same spirit; after all, "the letter killeth but the spirit giveth live").Allen_MacNeill
April 21, 2010
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Re charles in comment #121: Thank you for your impassioned critique of my earlier comment. I freely admit that the arguments that I made were directed, not at the kind of Christians described in your comment (e.g. the kind of Christians with whom I meet on First Day at the Ithaca Friends Meeting), but rather at those who (like Ann Coulter, Pat Robertson, Jimmy Swaggart, Oral Roberts, Garner Ted Armstrong, and the like) seem to delight in demonizing anyone who does not hew to exactly their interpretation of Christian gospel, and who condemn atheists as the most depraved and demonic of all. And, after reading charles's response, I realize that my generalization of my experiences with the "demonizing" type of Christian is what could easily be referred to as "fundamental attribution error". And so, I admit that I have in comment #85 committed precisely such an error and will attempt to be more careful in the future. I stand corrected.Allen_MacNeill
April 21, 2010
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#126 Clive All attempts at a scientific study of the efficacy of prayer are misguided I agree (but for different reasons from C.S. Lewis). I wonder what vjtorley and bornagain77 think?Mark Frank
April 21, 2010
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Clive Hayden: Thank you for the quotation from Lewis in comment #126. It is because of arguments like this (most of them from Lewis) that I both appreciate his immense compassion and envy his extraordinary erudition (yes, it is a sin, but I try to avoid it).Allen_MacNeill
April 21, 2010
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In comment #119 charlie asked: "...what theory of ethics does not ultimately rest on reward or punishment?" All deontological theories of ethics (such as those formulated by Kant and Rawls, among others), plus almost all eudaimonian/virtue theories of ethics are (as G. E. M. Anscombe pointed out a long time ago) non-consequentialist, and therefore do not ultimately rest on reward or punishment.Allen_MacNeill
April 21, 2010
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Apparently the subtlety of my response in[69] has been lost. In my response, I noted that St. Peter, as a believer, was able to invoke and utilize supernatural powers. The key word is this response is the word 'supernatural'. If Hitchens asks what ethical statement or action "could not" be "done" by an atheist, then the response is: None! Why? Because each human being, each having a soul, have the same dynamic powers available to us whether we believe or don't believe. These powers, or faculties, are intrinsic to each human, and is not dependent on our faith. Now justification by faith is another thing; but this, again, is in, and at, the supernatural plane. Hitchens seizes hold of this invariable nature of humankind to present his challenge. But, this challenge already takes for granted that the origin of human nature is purely materialistic. This kind of presupposition is all too familiar to us here at UD. TO challenge Hitchens in return, one would then ask such questions as: what is the origin of consciousness? What is the origin of reason itself? What is the origin of the ethical sense, or even the aesthetic sense for that matter? Well, I'm sure we could go round and round on that one. And, of course, no one will be able to dislodge Hitchens from his materialistic base. So, the really pertinent question is not what could a believer do that an atheist couldn't, but what do believers do that atheists don't do. That certainly puts you immediately in the realm of prayer, but I think more immediately of Mother Teresas of Calcutta: she picked up dying people out of the open sewers and cleaned them up and helped them die with dignity, knowing human love as they died. You see, any atheist COULD do this; but I sure don't see any of them DOING it. This is sort of like the expression: the exception proves the rule. There's lots of things they could do, and the fact that we don't see them doing it says a lot about the difference between atheists and believers. As to what terribel things have been done in the name of religion, why not turn the tables on Hitchens: the Catholic Church could have put to death 60 million people like the atheist Mao Zedong did; but they only put 160 to death over three centuries during the Inquistion. Why doesn't Hitchens answer for the incredible inhumanity demonstrated by atheists over the last few centuries? Dinesh D'Souza challenges Hitchens in this way, and Hitchens runs for cover.PaV
April 21, 2010
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Allen MacNeill (#115) Thank you for your post. You write:
Here is Hitchens’ challenge, quoted directly from the OP:
“…name one ethical statement made, or one ethical action performed, by a believer that could not have been uttered or done by a nonbeliever.”
And here is how I reworded his statement in comment #108:
“The question under discussion in this thread is whether atheists can do genuinely good things without believing in a deity (and, presumably, not therefore following the deity’s commands to do good things).”
If you perceive that these two statements are not virtually logically equivalent, then please by all means point out how they are not.
Allen, if I may say so, there's a fairly obvious non-equivalence between the two statements. The first statement implicitly acknowledges that a nonbeliever can perform ethical actions, and challenges the believer to nominate even one good action that he/she could perform and that a nonbeliever could not. The second statement addresses the question of whether belief in a deity is required to perform virtuous acts in general. It does not address the question of whether there is some particular ethical action that only believers can perform. On the question of whether Heaven is a reward: I would say that it's rewarding, without being a reward as such. Here's how I picture it. In order to get to Heaven, you have to lose your attachment to yourself, or "die to self" as St. Paul would say. (Sounds like a tall order!) Love is the best way - indeed, the only way - of truly dying to self. Love of others can enable you to you forget yourself; love of a Transcendent God goes one step further, as it takes you completely out of this world and the cares associated with it. Additionally, you lose your preoccupation with mortality by realizing that you have one foot in eternity. Part of you is not bounded by time. To get to Heaven, you have to be capable of loving God for his own sake, as well as showing unselfish love towards others. Having lost your attachment to self, you forget about self-gratification, and stop chasing after rewards. But you do not lose your personal identity. You are still a "self"; it's just that you are no longer preoccupied with yourself. If you die in this state of non-attachment to self, with a heart that is open to the love of God and others, you are pleasantly surprised to encounter God on the other side. You will find the experience of Heaven delightful, and hence rewarding; but by this stage, you're not chasing a reward, and you love God for who He is. Does that still strike you as selfish?vjtorley
April 21, 2010
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Mark Frank,
I am afraid this is only true if the fair-minded person is a bit naive about statistics and experimental design.
All attempts at a scientific study of the efficacy of prayer are misguided: The Efficacy of Prayer by C. S. Lewis Quote: “What sort of evidence would prove the efficacy of prayer?” The thing we pray for may happen, but how can you ever know it was not going to happen anyway? Even if the thing were indisputably miraculous it would not follow that the miracle had occurred because of your prayers. The answer surely is that a compulsive empirical Proof such as we have in the sciences can never be attained.... Some things are proved by the unbroken uniformity of our experiences. The law of gravitation is established by the fact that, in our experience, all bodies without exception obey it. Now even if all the things that people prayed for happened, which they do not, this would not prove what Christians mean by the efficacy of prayer. For prayer is request. The essence of request, as distinct from compulsion, is that it may or may not be granted. And if an infinitely wise Being listens to the requests of finite and foolish creatures, of course He will sometimes grant and sometimes refuse them. Invariable “success” in prayer would not prove the Christian doctrine at all. It would prove something much more like magic—a power in certain human beings to control, or compel, the course of nature... Other things are proved not simply by experience but by those artificially contrived experiences which we call experiments. Could this be done about prayer? I will pass over the objection that no Christian could take part in such a project, because he has been forbidden it: “You must not try experiments on God, your Master.” Forbidden or not, is the thing even possible? I have seen it suggested that a team of people—the more the better—should agree to pray as hard as they knew how, over a period of six weeks, for all the patients in Hospital A and none of those in Hospital B. Then you would tot up the results and see if A had more cures and fewer deaths. And I suppose you would repeat the experiment at various times and places so as to eliminate the influence of irrelevant factors. The trouble is that I do not see how any real prayer could go on under such conditions. “Words without thoughts never to heaven go,” says the King in Hamlet. Simply to say prayers is not to pray; otherwise a team of properly trained parrots would serve as well as men for our experiment. You cannot pray for the recovery of the sick unless the end you have in view is their recovery. But you can have no motive for desiring the recovery of all the patients in one hospital and none of those in another. You are not doing it in order that suffering should be relieved; you are doing it to find out what happens. The real purpose and the nominal purpose of your prayers are at variance. In other words, whatever your tongue and teeth and knees may do, you are not praying. The experiment demands an impossibility. Empirical proof and disproof are, then, unobtainable. But this conclusion will seem less depressing if we remember that prayer is request and compare it with other specimens of the same thing. We make requests of our fellow creatures as well as of God: we ask for the salt, we ask for a raise in pay, we ask a friend to feed the cat while we are on our holidays, we ask a woman to marry us. Sometimes we get what we ask for and sometimes not. But when we do, it is not nearly so easy as one might suppose to prove with scientific certainty a causal connection between the asking and the getting. Your neighbor may be a humane person who would not have let your cat starve even if you had forgotten to make any arrangement. Your employer is never so likely to grant your request for a raise as when he is aware that you could get better money from a rival firm and is quite possibly intending to secure you a raise in any case. As for the lady who consents to marry you—are you sure she had not decided to do so already? Your proposal, you know, might have been the result, not the cause, of her decision. A certain important conversation might never have taken place unless she had intended that it should. Thus in some measure the same doubt that hangs about the causal efficacy of our prayers to God hangs also about our prayers to man. Whatever we get we might have been going to get anyway. But only, as I say, in some measure. Our friend, boss, and wife may tell us that they acted because we asked; and we may know them so well as to feel sure, first that they are saying what they believe to be true, and secondly that they understand their own motives well enough to be right. But notice that when this happens our assurance has not been gained by the methods of science. We do not try the control experiment of refusing the raise or breaking off the engagement and then making our request again under fresh conditions. Our assurance is quite different in kind from scientific knowledge. It is born out of our personal relation to the other parties; not from knowing things about them but from knowing them. Our assurance—if we reach an assurance—that God always hears and some­times grants our prayers, and that apparent grantings are not merely fortuitous, can only come in the same sort of way. There can be no question of tabulating successes and failures and trying to decide whether the successes are too numer­ous to be accounted for by chance. Those who best know a man best know whether, when he did what they asked, he did it because they asked. I think those who best know God will best know whether He sent me to the barber’s shop because the barber prayed. For up till now we have been tackling the whole question in the wrong way and on the wrong level. The very question “Does prayer work?” puts us in the wrong frame of mind from the outset. “Work”: as if it were magic, or a ma­chine—something that functions automatically. Prayer is either a sheer illusion or a personal contact between embryonic, incomplete persons (ourselves) and the utterly concrete Person. Prayer in the sense of petition, asking for things, is a small part of it; confession and penitence are its threshold, adoration its sanctu­ary, the presence and vision and enjoyment of God its bread and wine. In it God shows Himself to us. That He answers prayers is a corollary—not necessarily the most important one—from that revelation. What He does is learned from what He is.Clive Hayden
April 21, 2010
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By the way, Heaven is not a reward for being good and eternal life is not the result of good acts. Heaven is not a carrot, lollipop or any other such goodie attained by works.
That, of course, depends on who you talk to. Even if you don't believe it is theologically sound, there are millions of people on this Earth who still believe it and thus one would have to assume that it will at least sometimes factor into their decision to commit an altruistic act. But I do agree that it is all but impossible to act completely selflessly given the obvious (and scientifically confirmed) fact that people get a kick out of doing charitable work, both psychologically and physiologically. So even the most anonymous of religious or atheistic charity-givers cannot completely isolate themselves from personally benefiting from their "selfless act."tyke
April 21, 2010
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One error is that you misremembered and it was not Collin who asked (not asserted) if MacNeill was being a jerk, but me, Charlie.
Indeed.Charles
April 21, 2010
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Good comment #120, Charles. One error is that you misremembered and it was not Collin who asked (not asserted) if MacNeill was being a jerk, but me, Charlie.Charlie
April 21, 2010
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By the way, Heaven is not a reward for being good and eternal life is not the result of good acts. Heaven is not a carrot, lollipop or any other such goodie attained by works.Charlie
April 21, 2010
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Allen_MacNeill at 85:
charles presents a very telling logical elision:
An "elision is a deliberate act of omission, i.e. MacNeill accuses Charles of deliberately omitting some logic, which deliberate omission MacNeill deems to be "very telling" (ostensibly about Charles). But MacNeill has constructed a self-serving strawman:
And here is a logical inference: 3) the father cannot be both unloving and Christ-believing
That would be MacNeill's logical inference, as Charles knows as a general proposition that many fathers have been both believers and unloving. Believing in Christ does not make one sinless or perfect. Charles notes specifically about the father in question that he:
felt angry and wanted to just let his son go to hell. But as he prayed he felt different. A thought came into his mind that he should write letters to his son. His son wouldn’t talk to him anymore, but the father knew his address. So each week for about a year he wrote his son a letter, telling him that he loves him and that he hopes his son would come back.
Prayer (or its answer) mitigated the father's anger and reinvigorated his pursuit of his son. So the facts demonstrate that MacNeill's logical inference is neither logical nor true. The father hated his son's behavior, but he loved his son, and he believed in prayer. MacNeill then stuffs a bit more of his own straw into his creation:
And in my experience [that would MacNeill's, not Charles'] many Christians also assert: 5) non-Christ-believing people are unloving and indifferent because they do not believe in Christ (i.e. they are atheists)
and has transitioned from his own specific experience of what many Christians assert about non-Christians to the unqualified proposition that "atheists are unloving and indifferent"
and [further in MacNeill's experience of what many Christians assert:] 6) Christ-believing people must be loving and concerned because they believe in Christ (i.e. they are not atheists).
Charles would point out (not that Charles' actual opinion matters in such strawmen) that Christians likely assert they should be loving, they are commanded to be loving, but often are not actually, in practice, as loving as they should be. And Charles would further point out that loving the person is not the same as loving their behavior or actions. The father can love his son and yet hate his "drugs and petty crime and risky sex" behavior. This distinction between loving the person and hating their behavior seems to have eluded MacNeill. Yet our intrepid strawman philosopher continues:
From this flows the (flawed) logic that: 7) Atheists are necessarily hedonistic, selfish, unethical, and ultimately evil people because they do not believe in Christ (Don’t think this is a fair characterization? Read some of Ann Coulter’s so-called “essays”.)
Note particularly MacNeill's leaps from what Charles actually wrote to MacNeill's experiences of what Christians assert to MacNeills final generalization that Athesists are necessarily hedonistic, etc., rather than what they can be as Charles would agree about Atheists (and Christians alike) too. Again those are MacNeill's strawman constructive leaps, not Charles' statements or thinking.
Which is easily elided into: Anyone and everyone who does not believe in Christ must be hedonistic, selfish, unethical, and ultimately evil.
MacNeill puts the finishing touch on his strawman with the gross generalization that not only are Atheists necessarily, but now anyone and everyone necessarily (except by implication Christians) are hedonistic, etc. A masterpiece of illogic, distortion, and projection. Let's note for the record MacNeills "elisions": - a Christian father can be unloving, though he should be loving. - a person can be loved, but their behavior can be hated. - non-believer's can be loving - not all atheists, and certainly not any and every non-Christian, are hedonistic, selfish, unethical, and ultimately evil. Further neither must anyone so be. - Christians (initially) can be hedonistic, selfish, unethical, and ultimately evil, though true Christians progressively shed these behaviors in their pursuit of being more Christ-like. MacNeill closes with the rhetorical:
What’s wrong (if anything) with this “logic”?
To which the easier question might be "What is right with it"? It is so bad it's not even wrong. Let us note also MacNeill's umbrage against Collin in post at @ 59
And who is being uncivil and casting aspersions on someone else’s character (as opposed to the logic of their arguments), and who is attempting to have a meaningful discussion of the logic behind vj torley’s query?
Your problem, Mr. MacNeill, is you often don't in fact address the logic of someone's arguments, do you. No. You instead construct strawmen and cast aspersions on what (at bottom) is your logic projected onto others, and your attempts at meaningful discussion are few and far between. This is the most recent example of your frequent insincerity. Your motives, as all can see, are seldom (not never, but seldom) "meaningful discussion", but usually antagonistic strawman polemics. You earlier constructed a strawman from Collin's viewpoint in your post at 55, just as you attempted with mine. Collin never proffered "direct and unequivocal evidence for the assertion that the prayers were the cause of the son’s reclamation," nor had anyone up to that point in the discussion similarly so stated. But you nonetheless saw fit to recast Collin's suggestion as something it wasn't and proceeded to attack that. And you took umbrage when Collin objected to your being "a jerk". Collin's only error was in not phrasing his objection as "Allen, why are making such jerky arguments?" Lastly, MacNeill complained that the father's prayer wasn't "direct and unequivocal evidence". Indeed it wasn't, but again, Collin never qualified it as such. By way of contrast I offered "deliverance" and vjtorley added "excorcism" (both with some qualifications) more along the lines of "direct and unequivocal evidence". But if as MacNeill would seem have us infer, that any non-believer could have done what the father did and obtain the same results, then logically the only difference between what Collin suggested and what MacNeill argues, is the prayer, and prayer is about belief in the Christian God, and that prayer made the only difference, if MacNeill's implications are correct. If there is no difference in the character or actions of the believer and non-believer, then prayer (and whomever answers it) is the only distinctive. A non-believer can't logically pray to something he disbelieves. At the moment of prayer, at a minimum, the non-believer in fact is hoping (on blind faith) that somehow his prayer will be heard and answered. The only difference between the prayer of the hopeful non-believer and that of a Christian believer, is the Christian knows in whom his hope is placed and why. If the non-believer, OTOH, is not actually hoping for an answer or that any answer is the result of purely humanist purposes or chance, then that is the insincerity distinctive mentioned earlier. Such prayer is no different than praying to the dice at a Vegas crap table. So much for logic, but what of practical evidence? Attributing "direct and unequivocal evidence" to answered prayer is indeed difficult. But far less so with "deliverance" and "excorcism".
I did not mean to insert a “Joe Cool” emoticon into that last assertion; it was an unfortunate typo
Of course, since it otherwise is obviously so out of character for you, isn't it.Charles
April 21, 2010
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“…name one ethical statement made, or one ethical action performed, by a believer that could not have been uttered or done by a nonbeliever.” And here is how I reworded his statement in comment #108: “The question under discussion in this thread is whether atheists can do genuinely good things without believing in a deity (and, presumably, not therefore following the deity’s commands to do good things).”
The two statements are not only not virtually identical but could scarcely be more different and reside in the same discussion. One presupposes that atheists can do good and seeks for one instance in which said good-doing atheist would be at a loss. Your example ignores this presupposition and dashes off to find offence where there is none. The Christopher challenge makes no mention of, nor relies upon all atheistic acts being inherently opposed to the good. In fact, the OP states that VJ required weeks to find one such act. You are harping on an interpretation of a theological point regarding man's fallenness that has nothing to do with the question posed.Charlie
April 21, 2010
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Hi Allen, no I didn't mean that the sciences of physics and biology reward so-called altruistic acts. I also do not mean that the physics and biology classes studied in school do, or that physics and biology textbooks do. I was talking about physics and biology. If doing good makes one feel good, then it has been rewarded. Same thing if doing so releases pleasant hormones. Or if it alleviates unpleasant sensations caused by mirror neurons. Or if it passed one's genes into the next generation, or helped kin to pass their genes into the next generation. So all the theories of ethics and altruism that derive from such states of affairs would be, as you have said, not about ethics and altruism. You have brilliantly noted the fallacy of the is/ought as well. I wish I'd thought of that. So again, such theories can not actually be about morality - as I said already in 110. So again I ask, what theory of ethics does not ultimately rest on reward or punishment? Not theories relying on Nirvana or Enlightenment, obviously. So which ones?Charlie
April 21, 2010
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The Cambrian explosion does not qualify as evidence against common descent. As many paleontological studies have pointed out, the various phyla of animals that appear in rocks dated to the Cambrian have ancestors that appear in rocks dated prior to that time [see, for example, Peterson, K., McPeek, M., and Evans, D. (2005) Tempo and mode of early animal evolution: Inferences from rocks, Hox, and molecular clocks. Paleobiology, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 36-55] What the Cambrian explosion does qualify as is a paradigmatic example of adaptive radiation resulting from the "invasion" of a new adaptive zone. There is now very good evidence from comparative genomics (as well as more evidence from comparative anatomy and paleontology) that the various phylogenetic lines that are so prominent in the Cambrian rocks are descended from ancestral lines that date back to the origin of multicellular eukaryotes over a billion years ago, and perhaps even further. Also, Dr. Behe is not the only prominent ID supporter who accepts the evidence for common descent. Dr. Dembski does as well, and has written as much several times in the recent past (thus rendering the name of this website not a little self-contradictory).Allen_MacNeill
April 21, 2010
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Sorry to get off topic guys, but I'm reading Behe's Edge of Evolution. He said there is very strong support for common descent. He also believes in common descent. So i thought i might find a different approach here and see the arguments for and against common descent. There's no debate about this on the podcasts. I'm wondering what is Behe's basis for stating this? What evidence is there against common descent other than the Cambrian Explosion? Can anyone point me in some direction? Thanks!jacobpressures
April 21, 2010
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Also re charlie in comment #111:
"What if physics and biology reward it?"
Are you referring to the sciences of physics and biology, or to the objects and processes which those sciences seek to analyze? And, reward what, exactly? I can't even figure out what this question is supposed to mean; it seems logically incoherent and obscure to the point of meaninglessness. Please clarify.Allen_MacNeill
April 21, 2010
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Re charlie in comment #111: Here is Hitchens' challenge, quoted directly from the OP:
"...name one ethical statement made, or one ethical action performed, by a believer that could not have been uttered or done by a nonbeliever."
And here is how I reworded his statement in comment #108:
“The question under discussion in this thread is whether atheists can do genuinely good things without believing in a deity (and, presumably, not therefore following the deity’s commands to do good things).”
If you perceive that these two statements are not virtually logically equivalent, then please by all means point out how they are not.Allen_MacNeill
April 21, 2010
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I find it interesting that Charlie would link mirror neurons, selfish genes, kin selection, etc. with altruism and moral behavior. These are all natural phenomena (i.e. phenomena that have a basis in observable, quantitative, and therefore natural processes). Ergo, using them to justify any ethical system is to commit what G. E. Moore has called the "naturalistic fallacy". Or, to put it much more simply, "is" statements cannot be used to justify "ought" statements. So yes, if such phenomena work the way they appear to work, then they (like any ethical system grounded on reward or punishment) are not a valid foundation for ethics, neither for "materialists" nor for "theists". Now that that's out of the way, how about presenting an outline of an ethical system that is not grounded in a logical fallacy nor reducible to either unsupported assertion, arguments by analogy, or self-interest?Allen_MacNeill
April 21, 2010
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"The question under discussion in this thread is whether atheists can do genuinely good things without believing in a deity (and, presumably, not therefore following the deity’s commands to do good things)." You keep saying this is the point. I don't see that this is the point. The point was to answer Christopher's challenge. "I have already pointed out that, if a deity rewards or punishes doing good or bad things, then one’s behavior ceases being ethical or altruistic, and becomes merely prudent and self-interested." What if physics and biology reward it?Charlie
April 21, 2010
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Mirror neurons, selfish genes, kin selection, etc., does any theory not assert that altruism and moral behaviour are, at their ultimate level, are rewarded? Does this mean that they are not positing true altruism or morality? Could be, as so many materialists will assert.Charlie
April 21, 2010
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#99 vjtorley Thanks - that must have taken a lot of time. I agree with you when you write: I’d say that for the time being, we’re not going to see any solid evidence that intercessory prayer works. The key seems to be the Hodge meta-study. It covers 17 studies of which 6 showed a statistically significant benefit for intercessory prayer. Of these 6 one was dismissed as more or less a known fraud by Novella (Cha and Wirth, 2001). But the key response which you very honestly included was Peter Norvig. I am really suprised by your comment: Personally, I don’t think it makes any new criticisms of the Hodge study that Novella doesn’t cover: namely, that the Wirth study is highly questionable Norvig demolishes three more of the six studies: Byrd 1988, Harris et al 1999, and Leibovici 2001. The first two commit a number of design sins but most importantly they were guilty of data-mining. Leibovici was the "retrospective" study and was only intended as a joke in the first place! This leaves just two significantly studies out of 17 (Furlow and O'Quinn 2002 and Sicher et al 1998) both of which have extremely small sample sizes (21 and 20 respectively). Norvig did not address these, presumably because Dossey did think them worth mentioning and Norvig was responding to Dossey. You originally wrote: A fair-minded person would conclude that there is good evidence that prayer works sometimes. I am afraid this is only true if the fair-minded person is a bit naive about statistics and experimental design.Mark Frank
April 21, 2010
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In comment #106 andrew wrote:
"I personally object to having to pay for evolutionary biologists claiming to perform biological alchemy, even if they stumble upon the occasional scientific observation of interest, like the chemical alchemists of medieval times."
I personally object to religious organizations (including my own) not having to pay taxes on their income (like the rest of us do), even if they use that income to do "good things". And, as a Friend, I strongly object to the government using my taxes to pursue wars of any kind, and especially aggressive wars against nations that have not done anything to harm (or even threaten) our national interests. Are either of my objections (or andrew's objections in comment #106) relevant to the discussion in this thread? Of course not, so why make them? I made them to point out the lack of intellectual rigor in virtually all of andrew's "arguments". The question under discussion in this thread is whether atheists can do genuinely good things without believing in a deity (and, presumably, not therefore following the deity's commands to do good things). I have already pointed out that, if a deity rewards or punishes doing good or bad things, then one's behavior ceases being ethical or altruistic, and becomes merely prudent and self-interested. Furthermore, including reward and punishment in the question of ethics also implicitly includes questions of quantity: doing "better" things logically requires "higher" payoffs. While it is the case that some ethical theories, such as utilitarianism, include concepts of quantity (i.e. "doing the greatest good for the greatest number"), most people feel a little uncomfortable with linking the quality of "goodness" with some notion of quantity of "goodness". This is especially the case for deontological ethics, which are neither consequentialist (i.e. not determined by effects or rewarded/punished by some "payoff") nor quantitative: either an act is good/right or bad/wrong according to an absolute, universalizable standard. As far as rewards and punishments are concerned, the third major type of ethics (eudaemonian or "virtue" ethics), rather than depending on consequences or adherence to rules (with a concomitant promise of reward or threat of punishment) eudaemonian ethics are grounded in being virtuous: "virtue is its own reward". Contrary to many of the comments in this thread, Christians do not have a monopoly on virtue. Consider the following:
People in whom the Tao Acts without impediment Harm no other beings By their actions Yet they do not know themselves To be "kind", to be "gentle" People in whom the Tao Acts without impediment Do not worry about their own interests And do not despise Others who do They do not struggle to make money And do not make a virtue of poverty They go their own way Without relying on others And do not pride themselves On walking alone While they do not follow the crowd They don't complain of those who do. Rank and reward Make no appeal to them Disgrace and shame Do not deter them They are not always looking For "right" and "wrong" Always deciding "yes" or "no" The ancients said, therefore:
People of Tao Remain unknown Perfect virtue Produces nothing "No-self" Is "True-self" And the greatest person Is nobody
- Chuang Tzu [translated by Thomas Merton, with slight alterations by Allen MacNeill]
Or consider this:
The Way of Liberation is not limited The Way of Liberation has no boundaries Everyone and everything everywhere Resonates within it endlessly The Way of Liberation cannot be named The Way of Liberation cannot even be described It is always eternally ever-present But it cannot be bought or stolen The only entrance to the Way of Liberation Is through That Which Is Surrender to That Which Is And you shall be set free
Allen_MacNeill
April 21, 2010
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In comment #105 andrew wrote:
"I’ll bet you cannot give me an example from history of an atheist that fulfils the conditions in the paragraph above."
How can I possibly do this? the conditions you specified are:
"A Christian will sometimes do some good deed for someone else in such a way that nobody (not even the person benefited) will *ever* find out." [Emphasis added]
If I take the word ever literally (which andrew seems to be asserting I must, by bracketing it with **s), then how can I possibly provide evidence that anyone, atheist or Christian, has ever done this? Either andrew does not understand basic logical argument, or he posted this comment in the full knowledge that his demand couldn't possibly be met by anyone (except God, of course, Who knows when you've been bad or good, so be good for goodness' sake). And I can't fulfill andrew's logically unfulfillable conditions because I'm not an atheist (see http://evolutionlist.blogspot.com/2009/03/answer-now-what-was-question.html ). So, I hereby assert that andrew's demand was pointless as it was based on a logically contradictory requirement, and will not address it further. As to my argument that "heaven" qualifies as a reward for doing good things, does any Christian argue otherwise? What is the point of even mentioning heaven (or "paradise" or whatever you want to call "the eternal reward") if it is not intended to function as a reward for good behavior? And if it is, then Christians are not altruists, they are simply doing what they do in order to obtain a payoff (or, as andrew might like to refer to it, their salary for a job completed on time and under budget). Have I trivialized the concept of heaven by referring to it as an "eternal lollipop" or the "amusement park in the sky", or do Christians do this? After all, what distinguishes between heaven, lollipops, and amusement parks is not their quality as rewards but merely the degree to which they qualify as rewards. Or, to put it another way, should you do something because God will punch your ticket to ride, or should you do it because it's the right thing to do? Asserting that God will "pay" a Christian for anonymously doing something good or right is to strongly imply that one would otherwise not do that thing. After all, we do our hobbies without getting paid, but we expect to get paid for doing our jobs (which are sufficiently onerous that we would not do them without getting paid). My point: justifying any act by rewarding it with an essentially infinite payoff, or abjuring any act by punishing it with an essentially infinite penalty is to convert what should be an ethical choice into a prudential choice grounded in the purest of self-interest.Allen_MacNeill
April 21, 2010
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To andrew #106 I strongly object to your assertion. I am a non-believer, and I have done good deeds that no-one knows about. Many times. What you say is simply rubbish.Graham
April 21, 2010
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Allen objected to the idea of people doing good things because of some motivation of reward. This objection strikes me as very queer. It is a simple enough moral principle: if people do some *work* they deserve to get paid for it. I personally object to having to pay for evolutionary biologists claiming to perform biological alchemy, even if they stumble upon the occasional scientific observation of interest, like the chemical alchemists of medieval times. I do not see why we should have to pay people claiming to weave gold threads for the emperor’s new clothes. But, I bet Allen feels otherwise: he claims he deserves to be paid for a day’s work. It’s the same principle: people who spend their lives working evil deserve their wages and those who try their hardest to continually work good (despite all the difficulties that life throws at them) deserve to get their pay at the end of the day, too. You’ll need to do some study in Romans 2, Allen, here. But the principle is pretty-well accepted by all working adults. It’s the same principle that demands restitution after somebody slams their car into the back of yours. There is *and there should be* a payback. Why anybody should be faulted for going through life expecting to be rewarded for going out of their way to do good, instead of living in complete self-interest, is beyond me. I don’t get your exasperation at the argument, Allen. It sounds more like an argument from emotion or outrage than anything else. I don’t think there is any logic or morality in the view. In any case, Jesus said nothing about heavenly rewards in the passage in Mt. 6, and in fact he said that the meek will inherit the earth (Mt. 5). Where Allen got the idea of heaven from is beyond me. Why Allen should take such an emotional reaction to the idea of heaven is also beyond me, calling it an ‘eternal lollipop’ and a ‘heavenly amusement park’. Why such bitterness, Allen?andrew
April 21, 2010
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Allen MacNeill seemed to take such particular distaste to my little attempt to answer a question posed on this site that he had to write two posts in response. Maybe I hit on a sore spot. On a charitable reading of his posts, I’ll assume that I did not explain myself well enough. The more I think about it, the more I like my argument. It was perfectly decent. It was this: A Christian will sometimes do some good deed for someone else in such a way that nobody (not even the person benefited) will *ever* find out. An atheist would not do this sort of thing because, like other human beings, he will be sorely tempted to tell somebody, or to make sure he was noticed by somebody, somewhere. The reason why this good deed is not truly good is that it contains an element of self-promotion, self-aggrandisement and therefore, hypocrisy. Allen objected that this was simply an assertion. There are two responses to this. One, the reason why I think an atheist would not do such a thing is that I, as a Christian, find it very difficult to do such things, and I have a motive for doing them! Two, Allen, feel free to go ahead and prove me wrong instead of squealing about unsubstantiated assertions: I’ll bet you cannot give me an example from history of an atheist that fulfils the conditions in the paragraph above. I happen to think that my challenge is pretty-well impossible to answer, because if you were to find out about such a good deed, the atheist has already got his reward (see Mt. 6 again). In any case, I do not have to prove that there are no purple swans on Pluto – you have to prove that there are. Now, I am perfectly happy that my suggestion fulfils the criteria set out in Christopher’s challenge. A theist will do something good that an atheist will never do. Why? Because the atheist has absolutely no motive to act in such a way. Since UD has been going on about Aristotle of late, I find it puzzling why Allen should think that talk of final causes should be forbidden in such discussions.andrew
April 20, 2010
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