Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

Darwinian Debating Device # 18: “Me or Your Lying Eyes”

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The chutzpah Darwinists sometimes bring to the table is often breathtaking. This tactic is based on the old saw about the wife who catches her husband in flagrante delicto with another woman and the following exchange ensues:

Wife: “How could you?”

Husband: “How could I what?”

Wife: “Be in bed with another woman of course!”

Husband: “I’m not in bed with another woman.”

Wife: “I see her right there.”

Husband: “No you don’t.”

Wife: “Yes I do”

Husband: “Who are you going to believe, me our your lying eyes?”

It is not unusual for an exchange with a Darwinist to go like this:

Darwinist unambiguously advances proposition X.

IDer quotes the Darwinist and demonstrates that proposition X is an error.

Darwinist: “I didn’t advance proposition X. You are lying when you say I did.”

IDer: “Yes you did. I quoted you advancing proposition X just now.”

Darwinist: “No, you didn’t.”

IDer. “Uh, yes I did.”

Darwinist: [always implied; never stated]: “Who are you going to believe, me or your lying eyes?”

Here’s an example with a Darwinist who goes by Adapa :

In a previous thread William J. Murray advanced this proposition:

If something with CSI over the threshold limit can be shown at least in principle to be plausibly generated from some combination of natural laws and chance, then ID as a theory is falsified.

Adapa responded:

Since science has already conclusively demonstrated that the observed natural process of random genetic variations filtered by selection and retaining heritable traits is sufficient to produce the biological life variations we see today, what you call “CSI”, then ID speculation (it’s never been a theory) has been falsified. You can go home now.

It is glaringly obvious that Adapa is saying not only that unguided natural forces are sufficient to produce the diversity of life but in fact have been demonstrated to have done so and therefore the ID position (i.e., that the process is guided) has been falsified.

If the idea “ID has been falsified” means anything at all, it means that Adapa is saying that the process has been shown to be unguided. That is, in fact, the whole point of Adapa’s comment. In summary, he is saying: “The idea that evolution is “guided” has been falsified. Go home now.”

William J. Murray asked Adapa to back up his assertion. Instead of backing up his position Adapa hurls verbal abuse at WJM.

Realizing that he is fighting a losing battle, Adapa then resorts to the “who are you going to believe, me or your lying eyes tactic.” He denies saying what he has just been quoted as saying:

Adapa again:

I [only] said then ID has been falsified by WJM’s offered falsification criteria.

In other words instead of admitting his error and retracting it, Adapa resorts to the “me or your lying eyes tactic.” He says he did not make the unqualified assertion that science has demonstrated that evolution is unguided. He says he made that assertion only in a qualified way. Adapa is saying that everything in his assertion is qualified by the phrase: “what you call ‘CSI.’” Blithering nonsense. Take the clause out and the meaning of the sentence does not change one iota. Adapa says ID has been falsified. Period. Indeed, that is the whole point of his assertion.

The “me or your lying eyes” tactic is hilarious in a sense, but at a more basic and important level, it is sad and pathetic.

Update: HT to Vishnu for point out that in the same thread Adapa had affirmatively used the word “unguided” to characterize his proposition: Here and Here

Adapa said:

The process itself is unguided just like in the real world.

All evolution requires is imperfect self-replicators competing for resources and the unguided processes take over from there.

Comments
KF, Thanks, I think that answers the question. Orgel and Dembski definitely don't think of complexity in the same way. If Orgel is looking at complexity in terms of the assembly instructions, then he would not consider a perfect cube of steel sitting on the moon to be complex. Therefore he would not consider it to have specified complexity. Dembski would. (This assumes that in the excerpt you provided, the reference to Orgel's thoughts on assembly instructions is tied to his notion of complexity. Please tell me if you think it's not.) I do not expect this to shift the party line. Orgel = Dembski, the die is cast and shall not be reconsidered.Learned Hand
November 23, 2014
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BA, If you're referring to this comment, as I wrote before that refers to why crystals aren't intelligently designed, not why they aren't complex. His other writing suggests that he doesn't think crystals are intelligently designed because they have a "physical necessity" cause, not because they aren't complex. I think he has to call them complex, because otherwise the Kubrick Monolith wouldn't be complex. Maybe I'm wrong, I don't claim to know Dembski's mind on this issue very well, but it's going to take more than a literature bluff to defuse the question. The whole conversation shows how Dembski thinks of "complexity" as a function of probability, which is nowhere in any snip, excerpt, or paraphrase of Orgel's work I've ever seen. Or, apparently, that you or KF have ever seen, because all we keep getting are the same copy-and-paste jobs showing a very different concept of "complexity." So why do you think that Orgel and Dembski are using the words in "exactly" the same way? One's probabilistic, one's not.Learned Hand
November 23, 2014
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It's interesting that KF's preferred example of design -- the Abu 6500 C3 fishing reel, with which he bores us to death -- is full of gears, yet only one case of gearing has ever been found in nature. Did God the Designer finally get around to taking a mechanical engineering course before designing Issus coleoptratus?keith s
November 23, 2014
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The equation is about whether the observed specification is the result of intelligent design or not.Joe
November 23, 2014
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keith s is confused. The equation is about whether or the observed specification is the result of intelligent design or not. Also improbability is a way to measure complexity. It is very telling that keith doesn't understand that fact.Joe
November 23, 2014
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Barry, By Dembski's own equation, something exhibits CSI/specified complexity if P(T|H) is sufficiently low. P(T|H) is a probability, not a measure of complexity. A cylindrical crystal of pure silicon is not complex at all, yet it is highly improbable by purely natural processes. That's why we have to grow them to make silicon wafers instead of just mining them somewhere. Dembski's equation would therefore attribute CSI/specified complexity to such a crystal, despite its simplicity. "Complex specified information" is really "improbable (under natural processes) specified information". "CSI" is a misnomer.keith s
November 23, 2014
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LH, let me snip TMLO by Thaxton et al Ch 8: ___________ >> Order vs. Complexity in the Question of Information Only recently has it been appreciated that the distinguishing feature of living systems is complexity rather than order.4 This distinction has come from the observation that the essential ingredients for a replicating system---enzymes and nucleic acids---are all information-bearing molecules. In contrast, consider crystals. They are very orderly, spatially periodic arrangements of atoms (or molecules) but they carry very little information. Nylon is another example of an orderly, periodic polymer (a polyamide) which carries little information. Nucleic acids and protein are aperiodic polymers, and this aperiodicity is what makes them able to carry much more information. By definition then, a periodic structure has order. An aperiodic structure has complexity. In terms of information, periodic polymers (like nylon) and crystals are analogous to a book in which the same sentence is repeated throughout. The arrangement of "letters" in the book is highly ordered, but the book contains little information since the information presented---the single word or sentence---is highly redundant. It should be noted that aperiodic polypeptides or polynucleotides do not necessarily represent meaningful information or biologically useful functions. A random arrangement of letters in a book is aperiodic but contains little if any useful information since it is devoid of meaning. [NOTE: H.P. Yockey, personal communication, 9/29/82. Meaning is extraneous to the sequence, arbitrary, and depends on some symbol convention. For example, the word "gift," which in English means a present and in German poison, in French is meaningless]. Only certain sequences of letters correspond to sentences, and only certain sequences of sentences correspond to paragraphs, etc. In the same way only certain sequences of amino acids in polypeptides and bases along polynucleotide chains correspond to useful biological functions. Thus, informational macro-molecules may be described as being and in a specified sequence.5 Orgel notes: Living organisms are distinguished by their specified complexity. Crystals fail to qualify as living because they lack complexity; mixtures of random polymers fail to qualify because they lack specificity.6 Three sets of letter arrangements show nicely the difference between order and complexity in relation to information: 1. An ordered (periodic) and therefore specified arrangement: THE END THE END THE END THE END Example: Nylon, or a crystal. [NOTE: Here we use "THE END" even though there is no reason to suspect that nylon or a crystal would carry even this much information. Our point, of course, is that even if they did, the bit of information would be drowned in a sea of redundancy]. 2. A complex (aperiodic) unspecified arrangement: AGDCBFE GBCAFED ACEDFBG Example: Random polymers (polypeptides). 3. A complex (aperiodic) specified arrangement: THIS SEQUENCE OF LETTERS CONTAINS A MESSAGE! Example: DNA, protein. Yockey7 and Wickens5 develop the same distinction, that "order" is a statistical concept referring to regularity such as could might characterize a series of digits in a number, or the ions of an inorganic crystal. On the other hand, "organization" refers to physical systems and the specific set of spatio-temporal and functional relationships among their parts. Yockey and Wickens note that informational macromolecules have a low degree of order but a high degree of specified complexity. In short, the redundant order of crystals cannot give rise to specified complexity of the kind or magnitude found in biological organization; attempts to relate the two have little future. Information and Entropy There is a general relationship between information and entropy. This is fortunate because it allows an analysis to be developed in the formalism of classical thermodynamics, giving us a powerful tool for calculating the work to be done by energy flow through the system to synthesize protein and DNA (if indeed energy flow is capable of producing information). The information content in a given sequence of units, be they digits in a number, letters in a sentence, or amino acids in a polypeptide or protein, depends on the minimum number of instructions needed to specify or describe the structure. Many instructions are needed to specify a complex, information-bearing structure such as DNA. Only a few instructions are needed to specify an ordered structure such as a crystal. In this case we have a description of the initial sequence or unit arrangement which is then repeated ad infinitum according to the packing instructions. Orgel9 illustrates the concept in the following way. To describe a crystal, one would need only to specify the substance to be used and the way in which the molecules were to be packed together. A couple of sentences would suffice, followed by the instructions "and keep on doing the same," since the packing sequence in a crystal is regular. The description would be about as brief as specifying a DNA-like polynucleotide with a random sequence. Here one would need only to specify the proportions of the four nucleotides in the final product, along with instructions to assemble them randomly. The chemist could then make the polymer with the proper composition but with a random sequence. It would be quite impossible to produce a correspondingly simple set of instructions that would enable a chemist to synthesize the DNA of an E. coli bacterium. In this case the sequence matters. Only by specifying the sequence letter-by-letter (about 4,000,000 instructions) could we tell a chemist what to make. Our instructions would occupy not a few short sentences, but a large book instead! . . . >> _____________ I trust this begins to give some context. (Please read on at the linked as they go into further relevant points. I use Dolphin as this is in HTML format.) KFkairosfocus
November 23, 2014
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LH @ 42:
I think Dembski would call them [crystals] complex . . .
And you would be wrong. As I have told you before, citing the specific passage in his book. That you still think this suggests that your opinions are impervious to conclusive evidence to the contrary.Barry Arrington
November 23, 2014
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PPS: I note that just the gear train -- gears are not simple things! -- and slipping clutch drag mechanism are more than enough to infer FSCO/I beyond plausible reach of chance and necessity.kairosfocus
November 23, 2014
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PS: I am not here to defend either BA or WmAD, I am looking at the matter for myself. Orgel is the source who put specified complexity into play in recent decades, and Thaxton et al picked up on it and its significance in a thermodynamic context that brought to bear not only classical but statistical issues [hence the signigicance of Boltzmann's W or the alternative Omega in these discussions]. Thaxton et al juxtaposed Wicken, and the two together are the source of my own descriptive abbreviation, FSCO/I (and also, bearing in mind DNA, dFSCI) -- functionally specific complex organisation and/or associated information. FSCO/I is readily observed from wiring diagram organisation, linked interaction and resulting function dependent on being specifically configured. A commonplace, I simply use the Abu 6500 C3 as it is very convenient. This same pattern is found in life forms, including esp. the protein synthesis process. It is consistently associated with design, even just as simple induction. Elaboration of metric models of specified complexity is an onward step, but it is organically connected. The one elaborated by Dembski in 2005, turns out on log reduction, to be an info beyond a threshold metric. That can be turned into a simple model that can be readily used to come up with specified, functional info values and thresholds that make it implausible for that much FSCO/I to have arisen by blind chance and mechanical necessity. Yes, there is a grand apparatus of dismissive critique and not a little personal ridicule connected. But the basic problem with such is readily apparent once one sees that the critics are hyperskeptical to the point of being unable to bring themselves to acknowledge a commonplace of a technological world. Specific function based on complexity described by a wiring diagram; which BTW may readily be turned into a string of structured -- description language -- Y/N q's that specify the functional state in the wiring diagram and measure its info content in functionally specific bits. That selective hyperskepticism in the teeth of patent readily observed realities, should speak volumes to you.kairosfocus
November 23, 2014
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LH, I repeat, Orgel speaks, not simply of complexity but of specified complexity, which once one sees the tightly constraining context of functionality as setting the specification, leads to a distinct isolated zone T in the field of possible configs, W. Complexity, by itself, is not in need of any elaborate explanation beyond chance -- a jumbled pile of fishing reel parts can be exceedingly complex, but because there isn't any particular reason for any one jumbled state to be significantly marked off from the others, being in a jumbled state requires no particular special explanation beyond blind chance and mechanical necessity . . . once we take the parts as givens. A set of parts assembled in accord with the Abu 6500 C3 wiring diagram, and turning out to be in a state of very good value for money fishing reel function is an utterly different kettle of fish. That state is maximally implausible and of utterly low probability on blind chance plus mechanical necessity. It is however not implausible on the action of a reasonably skilled assembler following the wiring diagram. So, yes, probabilities and their linked information metrics, are quite organically relevant to what Orgel said. And, your consistent missing of the significance of Orgel's actual phrase, specified complexity, is significant also. KFkairosfocus
November 23, 2014
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kf:
As AutoCAD etc show, that can be reduced to a structured string of answers to y/n q’s, which can be captioned to highlight the description language being used. This is of course already a metric of functionally specific complex organisation in bits, an information metric. More sophisticated metrics can be constructed on observing statistical patterns etc but that is already good enough for purpose.
You're asking an ID critic to admit to the obvious. Good luck with that.Mung
November 23, 2014
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KF, one of us is failing to communicate. My question is so simple that I'm going to go ahead and assume it's not me. Orgel obviously does not think of "complexity" as a question of likelihood. Dembski does. Orgel does not think crystals are complex (and note that he does address that question without tying complexity and specificity together); I think Dembski would call them complex, although I don't know that for a fact. I thought you might be able to say one way or another, but I honestly can't even tell if you're trying to answer the question at this point. Orgel and Dembski do not define "complex" the same way. I think that makes it unrealistic to say that they mean the same thing by "specified complexity," which is no surprise as Orgel certainly didn't think of it in terms of intelligence or design. And to his credit, I don't think Dembski ever claimed they were the same concept--I think he was pretty clear that he developed his own concept but pointed to Orgel as one inspiration. I think you're going to go on telling people that intelligent design goes all the way back to Orgel, citing the fact that he uses the words "specified complexity," without ever coming to terms with the fact that Orgel meant something completely different. And I think you're going to respond with another dense non sequitor that utterly fails to address the underlying question, perhaps by ironically accusing me of using distracting, turnaround tactics. But just in case, could you please try answering the question simply and concisely? I'd love to hear something along the lines of, "Dembski and Orgel meant the same thing by specified complexity because..." or "They didn't mean exactly the same thing because..." To be clear, I don't mean this as a criticism of Dembski. I think it's fine and dandy to extend on a previous idea, even if it means changing it substantively. My interest in this specific question came partly from your repeated citation of Orgel's work, relying on a few short excerpts without context or any attempt to actually show that the concepts are the same. And then my interest was piqued when Barry Arrington told me, with his characteristic bullish confidence and factual sloppiness, that Orgel and Dembski meant "exactly" the same thing. Since then, I've been looking to see what it takes to just get an IDer (or UDer, if there's a difference in this case) to say, "Yes, that was wrong. They're not quite the same thing." Apparently it takes more than simply being wrong to admit being wrong.Learned Hand
November 23, 2014
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LH, please re-read what Orgel said. He very emphatically speaks of a joint specificity-complexity pattern in life forms [thus, implicitly of function], contrasting that with the order of a crystal [which has a unit cell periodically repeated] and the [salt-grain scatter like] randomness of minerals mixed in granite. That complexity-specificity jointness is pivotal, he is not merely speaking of complexity simpliciter. If you do not get that jointness- by- contrast, you will not correctly understand what he is saying. Wicken explicitly uses function, speaking of functional organisation, in accordance with a wiring diagram and the associated high information content. KF PS: Have you ever wired up a complex electronic circuit in accord with such a diagram or the like? Do you know what a crystal unit cell is and how it is replicated in space to form a mass of crystalline substance? Are you familiar with the pattern of crystals that can be seen in many examples of granite?kairosfocus
November 23, 2014
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KF, your answer is a non sequitor. I asked how we know that Orgel and Dembski had the same definition of complex, given Dembski's non-standard probabilistic approach and their different approach to regular forms like crystals. Saying that Orgel also talked about specificity doesn't answer that question; it begs the question of whether they defined specificity the same way. (Someone else argued earlier that they didn't, since Dembski's is pre- and Orgel's is post-hoc, but I don't understand Dembski's specification arguments well enough to have an opinion). Saying you don't know, or that they defined the terms differently, are perfectly fine answers. Avoiding the question is just acknowledging that without getting credit for being straightforward about it.Learned Hand
November 23, 2014
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Mung, Nyquist is one of the early contributors too. GN Lewis, as cited by Wiki:
. . . in the words of G. N. Lewis writing about chemical entropy in 1930, "Gain in entropy always means loss of information, and nothing more". To be more concrete, in the discrete case using base two logarithms, the reduced Gibbs entropy is equal to the minimum number of yes–no questions needed to be answered in order to fully specify the microstate, given that we know the macrostate.
KFkairosfocus
November 23, 2014
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LH, do you notice how you did not cite what Orgel actually wrote, namely SPECIFIED COMPLEXITY? No, he did not actually just use the word, "complex." He took time to highlight the context of functional life forms and the difference between that type of aperiodic organisation that is pointing to a function and random (dusted salt like) mixes of granite crystals or the order of a common crystal. Functional, complex specificity based on interactive arrangement and coupling of parts. Wicken adds, that the organisation on a wiring diagram is informational, which is instantly demonstrable on reducing to nodes and arcs then using a description language equivalent to a string of Y/N q's to specify state. I suggest to you, that the difference between what Orgel wrote and how you tried to distance my comments from it by twisting them into Orgel spoke in effect only of complexity (as opposed tot he actual SPECIFIED complexity), is unfortunately sufficient to constitute a strawman caricature, given the fact that I highlighted the key words so that they could not be missed by a reader of reasonable diligence in a controversial context. Please correct that gap and then re-address the matter. KFkairosfocus
November 23, 2014
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PS: Please distinguish an abbreviation and a particular descriptive phrasing from the underlying observable and recognisable reality and the widespread concept familiar from wiring diagrams, exploded views etc.kairosfocus
November 23, 2014
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Sparc, I spotted a remark you made. I ask you, go to a sporting goods shop or better a specialty tackle shop. Ask for and inspect an Abu 6500 C3 reel. Can you see the wiring diagram in the insert and recognise the fitted together parts in your hand? Do you see how the parts fit together in quite specific ways such that by correct interaction they achieve a functionality that would not be achieved by vastly many more ways the same parts could be clumped together or scattered? If your heart tells you but of course, you have instantly recognised FSCO/I, not in a big and complicated case like a 747 Jumbo Jet, but in something that is a lot simpler than a watch. FSCO/I, I repeat is highly and readily evident to the senses, so much so that to deny it while staring it in the face is patently absurd. Next, this is a commonplace in a world of wiring diagram functionality. By using those engineering terms, Wicken acknowledged that this is familiar from an age of technology. Both he and Orgel saw this same pattern in the world of cell based life in the further context of investigating OOL. Meyer, Behe and Dembski are speaking to this overwhelmingly evident reality also, and are in effect building on the recognition across the 1970's. Where also, the very point of a wiring diagram is that specific orientation and arrangement of parts to form a functional whole may be described graphically by a nodes-arcs network. (The most familiar such being a circuit diagram.) As AutoCAD etc show, that can be reduced to a structured string of answers to y/n q's, which can be captioned to highlight the description language being used. This is of course already a metric of functionally specific complex organisation in bits, an information metric. More sophisticated metrics can be constructed on observing statistical patterns etc but that is already good enough for purpose. The objectivity of functionality is readily apparent from whether or no the reel works in relevant ways. Where also, one may generalise from functional specificity to an abstract zone T in an equally abstract config space W. That's what Dembski explored in NFL and subsequently constructed a metric model. I simply point out that a log reduction to info beyond a threshold is readily seen, and that a reasonable I-value and threshold value can be given. That such a dog and pony skeptics' show of who do you believe, me or your lying eyes and hands has had to be constructed to deny the patent inadvertently underscores the force of the point on the objectivity of FSCO/I and its only actually-- and readily -- observed cause. We are fully entitled to hold on that familiarity that FSCO/I is a reliable sign of design, and therefore at minimum design should sit at the table to account for the FSCO/I in life forms by right not sufferance. And for sure the ideologically loaded refusal to allow that is a sobering warning sign on the breakdown of scientific objectivity in our day. It is time for fresh and reasonable thinking in light of evident facts such as FSCO/I. KFkairosfocus
November 23, 2014
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Sorry for messing up the HTML tags and forgetting the word "it" further down in my previous comment. It should have read:
FSCO/I is instantly recognisable as an objective phenomenon.
Well, when you google FDCO/I it becomes obvious that FSCO/I not so recognisable as an objective phenomenon as you think. Despite all your efforts here and elsewhere it remains your always linked to and even more often copied and pasted private idea without any relevance even among ID proponents other than maybe JoeG and BA77. If you continue claiming that FSCO/I is of any importance please show us who else actually ever discussed it seriously. And please don’t stop pretending that dead scientists like Orgel were referring to and actually meant FSCO/I when they were discussing something different.sparc
November 22, 2014
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KF:
FSCO/I is instantly recognisable as an objective phenomenon.>/blockquote> Well, when you google FDCO/I it becomes obvious that FSCO/I not so recognisable as an objective phenomenon as you think. Despite all your efforts here and elsewhere it remains your always linked to and even more often copied and pasted private idea without any relevance even among ID proponents other than maybe JoeG and BA77. If you continue claiming that FSCO/I is of any importance please show us who else actually ever discussed seriously. And please don't stop pretending that dead scientists like Orgel were referring to and actually meant FSCO/I when they were discussing something different.
sparc
November 22, 2014
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sparc:
KF, did relevant figures in the ID field like Dr. Dembski, Dr. Behe or Dr. Marks ever refer to your FSCO/I?
Who cares? The concept of information as something quantifiable and measurable has been around for almost a century now (if not longer). KF doesn't need the approval or recognition of Dembksi, Behe or Meyer for him to have a valid argument. So, just another way to avoid the argument. And this constitutes a challenge to ID how? If you follow the link to the Hartley paper:
Finally the point of view developed is useful in that it provides a ready means of checking whether or not claims made for the transmission possibilities of a complicated system lie withing the range of physical possibility.
Mung
November 22, 2014
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KF: "Mung, you are going back to Hartley." Indeed. :) Transmission of Information Do you know of anything earlier? Nyquist perhaps? The critics seem to think you just make this stuff up. The fundamentals of the theory have been out there for almost a century now. What was that infamous quote by G.N. Lewis? When was that, 1933? I have a book of his on thermodynamics, btw.Mung
November 22, 2014
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KF, all that does is establish that Orgel used the word "complex." You're trying to establish that when he used it, he meant the same thing that you and Dembski mean. It's fine for Dembski to define "complex" differently than Orgel did--language isn't much good if it isn't flexible. But when I keep asking, "How do you justify claiming that they used the word in the same way?" And you keep responding with copied-and-pasted excerpts that are completely nonresponsive, you give me the very strong impression that you are unable or unwilling to answer the question. You've taken a position on the issue. It's OK--I promise, it's really and truly OK--to say, "I was wrong," or even, "I might not have been right about that." It would be a lot easier than pounding the table over and over and over again with the same nonresponsive mantra. But hey, maybe I'm the one who's wrong. So let me ask again: What makes you think that Dembski and Orgel were defining "complex" in the same way, given (a) Dembski's nonstandard, probabilistic definition and (b) their apparently different views on whether regular forms like crystals are complex? FYI-FTR, simply repeating that Orgel used the word "complex" is not an answer. I know he used the word "complex." The question is whether he and Dembski are using it in the same sense.Learned Hand
November 22, 2014
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MT: where did you ever get the notion from that design theory per se is about an omnipotent agent? That is a rhetorical, loaded projection on what design theory is coming from objectors of the ilk of the misleading accusation "Creationism in a cheap tuxedo." From Thaxton et al on, those who make the design inference on the world of life have been quite plain that evidence that is pointing to design of life does not of itself characterise a relevant designer as within or beyond the cosmos; in my words a molecular nanotech lab some generations beyond Venter et al would be a sufficient cause for cell based life. Fine tuning evidence raises the issue of a cosmos building designer, but even a powerful designer at that level is not to be automatically equated to an all-powerful one, a philosophical term. Belief in an Omnipotent being is a worldview level matter, in a different province of thought entirely. KFkairosfocus
November 22, 2014
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LH, let me simply clip what Orgel and wicken said, as noted in the recent FTR, just for the most recent citation: >> ORGEL, 1973: . . . In brief, living organisms are distinguished by their specified complexity. Crystals are usually taken as the prototypes of simple well-specified structures, because they consist of a very large number of identical molecules packed together in a uniform way. Lumps of granite or random mixtures of polymers are examples of structures that are complex but not specified. The crystals fail to qualify as living because they lack complexity; the mixtures of polymers fail to qualify because they lack specificity [--> joint complexity-specificity criterion in the context of the organisation and function of life forms at micro, molecular level especially, per OOL]. [The Origins of Life (John Wiley, 1973), p. 189.] WICKEN, 1979: ‘Organized’ systems are to be carefully distinguished from ‘ordered’ systems. Neither kind of system is ‘random,’ but whereas ordered systems are generated according to simple algorithms [i.e. “simple” force laws acting on objects starting from arbitrary and common- place initial conditions] and therefore lack complexity, organized systems must be assembled element by element according to an [originally . . . ] external ‘wiring diagram’ with a high information content . . . Organization, then, is functional complexity and carries information. It is non-random by design or by selection, rather than by the a priori necessity of crystallographic ‘order.’ [“The Generation of Complexity in Evolution: A Thermodynamic and Information-Theoretical Discussion,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 77 (April 1979): p. 353, of pp. 349-65. (Emphases and notes added. Nb: “originally” is added to highlight that for self-replicating systems, the blue print can be built-in.)] >> The source of and even words used in "functionally specific, complex organisation and associated information are obvious. There are even hints that the wiring diagram is a way to move to information content quantification. I cannot stop you from laying at message dominance manipulative games, but I can simply speak the direct truth as I earned it over the years. And no I am not indulging any group think or the like games, nor am I doing anything more than pointing out what is a common observable fact of functional systems based on interaction of parts that I have dealt with since the days of my Mitchell 602A round reel when I was a teen. KFkairosfocus
November 22, 2014
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KF ID should clearly state that the ID agent is omnipotent. I don't know why IDer are afraid to go beyond 'ID just detects design and does nothing else' stance. As it stands now, ID offers no mechanism, no sense of ID agent (if omnipotent) or thousands of non-omnipotent ID agents. No alternate mechanisms is being debated. How is ID theory any different from just CSI ? Me_Think
November 22, 2014
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Mung, you are going back to Hartley. KFkairosfocus
November 22, 2014
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F/N Let's give clips: Dembski: >> We know from experience that intelligent agents build intricate machines that need all their parts to function [[--> i.e. he is specifically discussing "irreducibly complex" objects, structures or processes for which there is a core group of parts all of which must be present and properly arranged for the entity to function (cf. here, here and here)], things like mousetraps and motors. And we know how they do it -- by looking to a future goal and then purposefully assembling a set of parts until they’re a working whole. Intelligent agents, in fact, are the one and only type of thing we have ever seen doing this sort of thing from scratch. In other words, our common experience provides positive evidence of only one kind of cause able to assemble such machines. It’s not electricity. It’s not magnetism. It’s not natural selection working on random variation. It’s not any purely mindless process. It’s intelligence . . . . When we attribute intelligent design to complex biological machines that need all of their parts to work, we’re doing what historical scientists do generally. Think of it as a three-step process: (1) locate a type of cause active in the present that routinely produces the thing in question; (2) make a thorough search to determine if it is the only known cause of this type of thing; and (3) if it is, offer it as the best explanation for the thing in question. [--> Notice the vera causa based inference] [[William Dembski and Jonathan Witt, Intelligent Design Uncensored: An Easy-to-Understand Guide to the Controversy, pp. 20-21, 53 (InterVarsity Press, 2010). HT, CL of ENV & DI.]>> MEYER: >> [[W]e now have a wealth of experience showing that what I call specified or functional information (especially if encoded in digital form) does not arise from purely physical or chemical antecedents [[--> i.e. by blind, undirected forces of chance and necessity]. Indeed, the ribozyme engineering and pre-biotic simulation experiments that Professor Falk commends to my attention actually lend additional inductive support to this generalization. On the other hand, we do know of a cause—a type of cause—that has demonstrated the power to produce functionally-specified information. That cause is intelligence or conscious rational deliberation. As the pioneering information theorist Henry Quastler once observed, “the creation of information is habitually associated with conscious activity.” And, of course, he was right. Whenever we find information—whether embedded in a radio signal, carved in a stone monument, written in a book or etched on a magnetic disc—and we trace it back to its source, invariably we come to mind, not merely a material process. Thus, the discovery of functionally specified, digitally encoded information along the spine of DNA [--> notice the direct parallel to dFSCI, and the case being used parallel to GP's discussions], provides compelling positive evidence of the activity of a prior designing intelligence. This conclusion is not based upon what we don’t know. It is based upon what we do know from our uniform experience about the cause and effect structure of the world—specifically, what we know about what does, and does not, have the power to produce large amounts of specified information . . . . [Meyer, Stephen C: Response to Darrel Falk’s Review of Signature in the Cell, SITC web site, 2009. (Emphases and parentheses added.)] >> That should suffice to show that the terms I have used are not merely idiosyncratic, especially when the onward context of Orgel and Wicken is brought to bear with the underlying observable wiring diagram based functionality. KFkairosfocus
November 22, 2014
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Adapa, is it a lie to say that you admit that certain aspects of living organisms exhibit CSI. Just wondering if you're going to disavow that claim too.Mung
November 22, 2014
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