Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

Hyperskepticism: The Wrong Side Of A Continuum

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Philosophers and scientists who know their business recognize that any attempt to seek knowledge presupposes the existence of a rational universe ripe for investigating. The fact that we even bother to make the effort says something about our nature. As Aristotle says, “all men by nature want to know.” That is why the discovery of a new fact or truth can be a joy for its own sake. To be sure, knowledge also provides practical benefits, empowering us to pursue a self-directed life style, but it also edifies us, leading us on the road to self-actualization. To be intellectually healthy is to be curious.

On the other hand, we can, by virtue of our free will, act against our natural desire to know. For better or worse, there are some truths that many of us would prefer not to know about. The compelling nature of an objective fact can pull us in one direction while the force of our personal desires can pull us in the opposite direction. When this happens, a choice must be made. “Either the thinker conforms desire to truth or he conforms truth to desire.”–E. Michael Jones

Because we experience this ambivalence about the truth, we must be on guard against two errors: (a) talking ourselves out of things that we should believe [hyperskepticism] or (b) talking ourselves into things that we should not believe [gullibility]. Hyperskeptics attempt to justify the first error by calling attention to the second error, as if there was no reasonable alternative to either extreme. On the contrary, the ideal solution is to seek a rational midpoint –to balance a healthy skepticism about unconfirmed truth claims with a healthy confidence in truths already known. The one thing a thinker should not do is be skeptical or open-minded about the first principles of right reason, without which there is no standard for investigating or discoursing about anything “Merely having an open mind is nothing. The object of opening the mind, as of opening the mouth, is to shut it again on something solid.”– G. K. Chesterton

In the spirit of public service, then, I present this little test for analyzing our readers’ proclivity for hyperskepticism. Hopefully, those who indulge will not find any predictable patterns, since I strove to keep them at a minimum.

Yes or No

[1] Can we know anything about the real world?

In asking this question, I am probing for your orientation on the matter of external facts with respect to our internal experience. Can we really know if such a thing as a tree exists, or is it the case that we simply experience mental representations of something that may not be a tree at all? [Reminiscent of Kant’s hyperskepticism]

[2] If the answer to [1] is no, is it, under those circumstances, possible to conduct rational investigations or participate in rational discourse?

If I can feel the experience of something that seems like a tree, without knowing that it is a tree, or if I am just using words to describe my experience, can I use my reason to draw other meaningful conclusions about the world? In other words, can I, absent a knowable external reality, reason not just validly [with internal consistency] but also soundly [align my understanding with the truth of things]?

True or False

[3] The law of non-contradiction [a thing cannot be and not be at the same time] is not a self-evident truth.

Inasmuch as scientific progress has demonstrated that Aristotle was wrong about the four basic elements of the earth, it is not unreasonable to suggest that he was also wrong about his so-called laws of logic.

[4] The law of causality is a self-evident truth.

I can accept this proposition unconditionally, not only as a second law of logic, but also as an intellectual companion to the first law of logic? Put another way, if a thing cannot be and not be at the same time, that fact influences or informs the law that nothing can come into existence without a cause. There is a logical connection between the claim that Jupiter cannot both exist and not exist and the claim that it cannot come into existence without a cause?

[5] Our knowledge of the real world is reliable but imperfect.

We may not know everything there is to know about a tree, but we do know that something is there that we call a tree and that it is more than just a collection of parts–something that exhibits “treeness.”

[6] A finite whole can be less than any one of its parts.

A crankcase can, in some cases, be greater than the automobile of which it is a part.

[7] The universe is ordered.

Material objects move in such a way as to indicate some kind of function or purpose.

[8] The universe may be ordered to a purpose, but that doesn’t necessarily mean it needed an intelligence to do the ordering or establish the purpose.

Purpose can exist without intelligence.

[9] The universe is, indeed, ordered, but that doesn’t mean that its order is synchronized with our mind’s logic.

The mind’s logic [if it’s raining, the streets will get wet] may be inconsistent with the order of the universe [If it’s raining, the streets may not necessarily get wet.] The proposition that there is an unfailing correspondence between the logic our rational minds and ordering of the rational universe is something that should be demonstrated through evidence and cannot be reasonably accepted as a “self-evident truth.”

[10] There can be more than one truth?

Each specialized branch of knowledge can have its own brand of truth, and that truth may well be incompatible with truths found in other specialized areas.

[11] In some cases, a cause can give more than it has to give.

Something can come to exist in the effect that was not first present in the cause. It may well be, for example, that an immaterial mind could emerge from matter even though matter has no raw materials containing anything like immaterial mental substances.

12-20, Yes, No, or I don’t know.

[12] Does truth exist?

Is truth absolute, not relative–objective, not subjective–universal, not contextual–and indivisible, not many?

[13] Is there such a thing as the natural moral law?

Is there an objective standard of right and wrong that we [humans] did not invent [or socially construct] and to which we are morally obliged to follow in spite of our personal preferences or in spite of public opinion?

[14] Does the human conscience exist?

Do we, as humans, possess some kind of inborn instinct that makes us feel bad about ourselves when we do something wrong and feel good about ourselves when we do something right. Can that same conscience be habitually silenced and ignored to the point at which it stops sending signals?

[15] Is design detectable?

Can we discern the presence of intelligence from the biological and cosmological patterns found in nature? Can we discover the presence of intelligence from patterns found in human artifacts even if we know nothing about the history of those artifacts? Can minds detect the activity of other minds?

[16] Does God exist?

Is there a personal, omniscient, omnipotent, eternal, self-existent God who created the universe and all the creatures that inhabit it?

[17] Is God organic with the universe?

Could God and the universe be one and the same thing?

[18] Can matter investigate itself?

In order for a scientist or a philosopher to investigate the universe or the world, must he exist as a substance of a different kind than the object of his study? Are two such realms of existence really necessary, or can the relationship between the investigator and the object of investigation be explained from a monistic framework.

[19] Evidence can speak for itself; it need not be interpreted by or mediated through the rules of right reason.

Science can stand alone. It needs no metaphysical foundations in order to be rational.

[20] Ask yourself this question: Do I have free will?

Do I have something to say about my fate? Can I say that I could have made choices other than the ones that I did make, or that I could have created outcomes different than the ones I did create? Do I have the power to act contrary to my nature, predisposition, desires, and appetites?

True/ False

[21] If the ordered universe is synchronized with the laws of logic, it could be a coincidence.

Even if we do have “rational” minds, and even if they do correspond to a “rational universe,” there is no reason to suggeset that it had to be set up by something or someone. It could just be that way.

[22] Theistic Darwinism is a reasonable hypothesis.

A purposeful, mindful God may well have used a purposeless, mindless process to create humans.

[23] A universe can come into existence without a cause.

Not all effects require causes. Further, some things that are often characterized as effects, such as our universe, may not really be effects at all. Even if it does, itself, act as a cause, the physical universe could be, but need not be, the result of a prior cause.

[24] Unguided evolution is a reasonable hypothesis.

There is no reason to believe that humans could not emerge as a lucky accident from solely naturalistic forces.

[25] Cause and effect can occur without a first cause.

Granted, a cause/effect chain exists in nature, but that fact alone does not compel us to posit that only a first cause or causeless cause can explain

Comments
there not theirvividbleau
October 17, 2010
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aleta "And, out of curiosity, what do you consider the essential assumptions we do make? Do you agree with the one I mentioned, and do you have other?" I do agree with the one you mentioned. The others would be the assumption that we live in a rational universe that is open to rational investigation, that physical laws are uniform, that there are causes for things that happen around us,evidence from the natural world can be used to determine those causes,there is consistency in causes that operate in the natural world. I am sure their are others. Vividvividbleau
October 17, 2010
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Yes, we do start with some assumptions - I agree with that. For instance, we assume that there is an external world, and that our sensory experience of it, (with certain caveats, checks, and balances) is reliable. I agree with your point. I don't think that changes the basic outline of how we apply logic to the real world. And, out of curiosity, what do you consider the essential assumptions we do make? Do you agree with the one I mentioned, and do you have other?Aleta
October 17, 2010
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aleta "One starts with facts about the world that we have reached by induction, model them into a logical system, apply logic, and then go back and test our conclusions." Aleta one does not start with facts about the world. In any scientific investigation one starts with non emperical assumptions about the world. Vividvividbleau
October 17, 2010
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Hmmm, lots to think about since I posted last. Let m try to organize my thoughts. I am interested in four topics here: 1) The relationship between logic/math and reality 2) Stephen's claim that the effect must be present in the cause, and his claim that the law of casuality is violated if something emerges, as opposed from unfolds, from a earlier set of conditions. 3) The issue of whether in theories of free will, human acts of free will constitute local uncaused causes, and 4) Whether quantum events also constitute uncaused causes. I'll start with 2), and then move on. In 271, Stephen writes, "The only time I mentioned final causes or other varieties of causes was to explain to Aleta the difference between emergence, which is not associated with any kind of causality, and a guided developmental process, which is. In no other context did I refer to anything other than efficient causes. Please make a note of it and please stop insinuating that it has anything to do with any discussion about the law of causality or the subject of free will. It doesn’t." Well, it does, Stephen. How can you possible say that emergence is "not associated with any kind of causality." Your distinction between emergence and unfolding was this, from 93:
If the universe “unfolds,” the seeds of its development were already in place in the form of causal conditions. It can only become that which it was caused to become. If it “emerges,” there are no seeds to define its development, no program to direct its path, no cause. It it had a cause, the cause would define, shape, and sustain its development. Without the power or direction to develop, it has no cause.
When I questioned this, in 155 you wrote,
Also, you seem unaware of the fact that scientific causes [efficient] causes are not the only kinds of causes. On the contrary, there are also formal causes, material causes, and most important final causes. The law of causality is not restricted to efficient causes. Is that the problem you are having? ...
I am simply referring to the fact that only when something unfolds according to a pre-established pattern has its development been caused." So your argument that emergence violates the law of causality was precisely that the thing that emergence was not planned - that what is being violated is some combination of first, final and material causes. If our discussion is limited to efficient causes, emergence does not violate the law of causality. You are combining causes in a similar way in respect to free will, as has been pointed out by Green and me. Your argument is that because God created the capability for us to have free will, our free will choices are also caused. But this again conflates other kinds of causes with efficient causes. As I pointed out earlier, the particular choice one makes is uncaused - that's what free will means, even though the capability to make a free choice was caused. Our free will choice has no antecedent efficient cause. Here's an analogy: God created the universe and gave it the capability (to unfold, if you like) to create galaxies, solar systems, planets, etc. Eventually a tornado forms in Oklahoma, whose immediate, proximate causes are a complex set of weather conditions. We could say that God was the cause because he gave the universe the capability to make tornadoes, but that would not address the issue of the actual efficient cause of the tornado. Similarly, the fact that God gave us the ability to make free will decisions doe not make him the efficient cause of the decisions we do make: those decisions, as free will acts, are uncaused. ========== A few notes to Green: You quote Craig as writing, "In the case of quantum events, there are any number of physically necessary conditions that must obtain for such an event to occur, and yet these conditions are not jointly sufficient for the occurrence of the event… The appearance of a particle in a quantum vacuum may thus be said to be spontaneous, but it cannot properly be said to be uncaused, since it has many physically necessary conditions." I like the word spontaneous here to represent the random, uncaused nature of a quantum event. However, I'll note tha Craig is, like Stephen, trying to get around the violations of causality by invoking a larger set of causes than just efficient causes. Of course, every cause has a larger content in which it happens, so that if that context were to change the efficient cause would not function in the same manner, or not at all. However, this does chaneg the fact that the quantum event appears to us to happen spontaneously, as a probabilitic buy not determined event. 2) I concur with your post at 277 ====== At 279,above says, "-“As Monton says, standard quantum theory states that there is no particular cause of certain quantum events.” That is nonsense. QM does not deny causality and never has. Just because we currently cannot determine all the necessary and sufficient causes in QM, that does not warrant his conclusion." No, this is an undecided issue: some believe that true randomness kies at the heart of QM, and other believe that there are causes, even though they may be forever beyond the reach of our investigation. Therefore, some interpretations wouuld deny causality, or in the language we have uses here, that quantum events are very small, local uncaused causes. ==== Now back to the issue of logic and models. At 259, Stephen wrote,
Aleta: “I’ve discussed that subject a number of times, explaining the difference between the laws of logic themselves and the application of them through a model,” No, actually you have presented no examples or models at all. You allude to their existence, but you do not specify. —and I’ve explained that sometimes the model doesn’t work and then we have to refine the model, and I’ve given examples.” You have provided no examples.
First of all, the first sentence you quoted didn't mean to say that I'd given examples, but just that my point was that we applied logic and math by creating models, but I can see how you might have interpreted it that way. FWIW, though, I did give models in a answer to Clive back at 171, concerning 2 + 2 = 4 and a bird giving live birth. I also discussed this with the example of quantum events at 198. You write, "If I begin with a sound premise [something true about the real world], and if I reason properly, I will draw a sound conclusion–a truth about the real world. No one, least of all myself, has ever suggested that a syllogism, or any other form of deductive logic can, without any sound input about the real world, teach us anything about the world. So please turn loose of that strawman. You are choking him to death." This is not a strawman - this is the key point. You now say here that "if I begin with a sound premise [something true about the real world],..." Yes, but how do you know that you have a sound premise - something true about the real world? That is the point I'm making: that to apply logic to the world, you have to start with some statements about the world, and logic itself can't provide those true statement. One starts with facts about the world that we have reached by induction, model them into a logical system, apply logic, and then go back and test our conclusions. If the conclusions appear correct in the real world, we have improved confidence that our starting premise was sound, and if not we strive to correct our premises. For instance, consider the statement "every event has an immediate, proximate efficient cause." If we consider that a statement about the real world, it may or may not be true - only investigation can tell, and quantum mechanics has called it into question. It may or may not be a sound premise in all situations, in which case we need to revise our model of causality. And note, logic itself can't help us decide whether the statement is true or not.Aleta
October 17, 2010
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---Green: “SB, I quoted him directly, literally verbatim. Please be reasonable and acknowledge the facts. Don’t deny that someone has said something just because you don’t like what they say.” Green, I don’t read his words exactly the way you do. O’Connor says the “libertarian is free to” [do this or that] implying that the typical libertarian feels no hesitancy to take the view that he claims they take. I do not interpret that as a bald claim that ALL libertarians agree on the matter. Either way, though, O’Connor is wrong. Libertarians do not think that at all. It is a mischaracterization. ---“[Connor] He also wrote the SEP article on free will. If this doesn’t make him a leading proponent, I don’t know what does.” As I pointed out on another thread, the SEP is not a reliable source on this question, having left out a number of important authors. At the time, you did not respond to the point or the new information I provided, choosing rather to come back here and repeat your talking points. I interpreted your failure to follow up as a lack of intellectual curiosity. [I suggested that Green begin to read Normal Geisler, William Craig Lane, and Peter Kreeft.] ---“Have any of these authors actually published peer-reviewed work specifically on the topic of libertarian free will? I have googled all three of them to try and find peer-reviewed publications on the topic and have found none.” So, it appears that, even at this late date, you are less curious about their real position and more curious about whether they have written in a peer reviewed journal. Have you forgotten the context? You made the false claim that all advocates for libertarian free will acknowledge uncaused events. When I ask you to defend your false claim, listing a number of prominent authors who do not fit that mold, you promptly question their credentials [they have probably authored 50-100 books and volumes among them]. What is wrong with this picture? ---“So I am unsure what Dr Craig’s view is on libertarianism. And as for Geisler and Kreeft, I am not aware of any peer-reviewed publications they have on the topic either. Are they aware of the 3 different categories of free will?” Yes, I know you that are unaware Dr. Craig’s views, just as I know that you are unaware of Geisler’s views, just as I know that you are unaware of Kreeft’s views, and the views of countless others, all who take a position similar to mine. If you were aware of what those outside your inner circle are saying, you would not take the position that you take. ---“Have they adopted a particular position?” The time to ask that question is in advance of making your many claims, not after the fact. ---As I’ve mentioned on here before, it is my experience that many people band about the term “free will” – but have absolutely no idea what they are saying or what they are committing to. If Norman Geisler says that he believes in both libertarianism and the law of causality, then I can only conlude that he is either equivocating over the term “cause” in the law of causality, or he is ignorant of what libertarianism entails. As you also seem to be.” Yes, I know that has been your experience, but your perceptions have mislead you. ---Your next few paragraphs are full of contradictions and equivocations (or perhaps just misunderstandings). You say that human beings are not unmoved movers because God created them. How can you not see that this does nothing to change the fact that they are still unmoved movers in the local sense?” ---“Further down you say that the self is the “instigator of self caused actions. Now you seem to be conceding that agents ARE unmoved movers in the local sense. If something instigates something, then it is the INITIAL event in that chain of cause and effect. Geisler says the same thing in the quote you gave: “The self is the FIRST-CAUSE of personal actions”. Here too he is saying that the self is an uncaused cause (in the local sense of the word). I provided an analogy that I hoped would help you. Somehow, perhaps under the influence of questionable sources, you have come to picture the human will as a kind of transformer that transmits the energy [power] it receives from a generator. The human will is not like that. It is a power, a faculty, a means for choosing. It is less of an unmoved mover and more of a new causal source, caused by a previous causal source. If you feel the need to connect God’s current activity with his creature’s current activity, if that is your hang up, then think of it this way: God did not simply create [cause] the human will, he continues to [cause] the will in the sense of maintaining it or keeping it in existence Thus, God’s causal influence is always present, yet the human self is free to make choices of his own. The law of causality is in force, and the human will is free. ---“Neither of you, however, have got around the problem of local uncaused events.” A “local” causal event is simply one initiated by a causal agent that has been given the power to initiate local causes. A human being is not a transformer.StephenB
October 17, 2010
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Very well articulated kairosfocus. I thoroughly enjoyed your exposition. Two things became evidently clear in your analysis about the materialist: 1. Rejection causality is imperative at all costs in order to salvage his belief system 2. The rejection of agency and consequently the rejection of the self as a means to surrender to his/her idol I think Gabriel Marcel said it best when he explained that scientism/technology assume the role of the human subject and the human subject consequently becomes the object of investigation. Man (the materialist at least) does so because of the authority he has bestowed upon his idol (technology/scientism). In effect as Marcel states, scientism persuades man to rejoice in his own annihilation. Marcel’s words are so true and yet so disturbing…above
October 17, 2010
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Above: This sort of game goes far back. I am looking at how Hume dismissed the concept of cause, using of course the fire example (Copi knew what he was doing!): ______________________ >>Thus we remember to have seen that species of object we call *FLAME*, and to have felt that species of sensation we call *HEAT*. We likewise call to mind their constant conjunction in all past instances. Without any farther ceremony, we call the one *CAUSE* and the other *EFFECT*, and infer the existence of the one from that of the other." [Treatise of Human nature] >> ________________________ a --> Now, indeed, we do observe and remember that fire and heat are routinely connected, maybe starting with a bad encounter with a stove when we were 2 years old. b --> But the mere fact of our being involved does not destroy the truthfulness of the observation, memory and fact. Yes, we are finite, fallible and sometimes mistaken, but we are equally also sometimes correct. c --> And in this case, that we are correct is manifestly true and easily, routinely shown and relied on -- e.g. how does a car engine work, but by the causal principles of fire; without serious counter-example. (Sounds familiar? This is how the design inference on observed cause of dFSCI in say DNA is dismissed.) d --> Now comes the selectively hyperskeptical word magic to dismiss the inconvenient line of reasoning: Without any farther ceremony, we call the one *CAUSE* and the other *EFFECT*, and infer the existence of the one from that of the other . . . e --> Just one minute! DISMISSIVE STRAWMAN MISREPRESENTATION. f --> What actually happens is that we recognise on experience that that fires -- a common fact of experience -- have beginnings, and that fires go out. g --> Moreover, they do so under particular recognisable chemico-physical circumstances [heat + fuel + oxidiser --> flame, a certain kind of exothermic chain reaction that then gives off heat (and often light) that tends to perpetuate itself] h --> From the first, the first principle of right reason that things that begin or may stop have causes, cues us to look for the factors and circumstances at work that contribute to or trigger the fire or help sustain it. (Notice, such factors may be contributory, necessary, sufficient or even both necessary and sufficient. That we label them causes is a convenience but that label attaches to a reality of experience. We don't just willy nilly attach labels heat and flame and jump to conclusions about a link from one to the other, without seeing a pattern of connexion, a dynamic if you will.) i --> In this case we then observe empirically that heat is a particular necessary factor for fire [as is fuel, as is oxidiser]. Notice, Hume is not able to give a case of fire without heat! He is arguing in absence of facts, even in defiance of them, and he is dismising without even mentioning, how we go about identifying causal connexions from seeing just how such factors contribute to an effect. j --> Lack of counter example and strawmannising orf those whose thought he objects to are clues that objectors like Hume are fishing for a hyperskeptical dismissal. Of course observation does not demonstrate beyond all doubt relative to universally acceptable premises, but it often testifies to us accurately about what is real, and can deliver moral certainty sufficiently solid that only a madman would dismiss it; just check your friendly neighbourhood fire brigade! That is what our attention is being distracted from by the word magic above. k --> But the underlying issue is the principle of right reason: that which begins to exist or may cease from existing has a cause. l --> This means that first we are dealing with change in time, and with contingent phenomena: beginnings, endings, endurings, sustainings, intensifyings, diminishings, etc. And, we are saying that to begin or to sustain something which might not be but becomes and is, requires something else to be there to bring it about and to keep it going. m --> Is this something that we can see is so, and must be so on pain of absurdity on its rejection? YES n --> That which begins or may cease plainly has no necessary existence in all possible worlds. Beginning as process or event, and sustaining as process or event, then must have an answer to why, why then, why there. THE ANSWER TO THESE QUESTIONS IS THE CAUSE (WHICH MAY OF COURSE BE A COMPLEX OF FACTORS), and the consequence of the cause is the effect we observe. o --> Let us assert instead that there is no why, it just happens, anywhere, anytime, any-when, out of anything or nothing. Could such a world be possible, or intelligible? (Here I bring to bear the morally certain fact that we experience an intelligible world that permits the existence of C-chemistry, cell based intelligent beings.) p --> Were that the case, the world would not be intelligible, and science in particular would be impossible. Not even magic would be possible, for magic seeks to influence occult patterns of occurence. We would live in a chaos not a cosmos. And that would include our bodies and the universe that makes our bodies possible. q --> So, the rejection of cause would lead to a chaos, not a cosmos which are inconsistent with our own existence, while manifestly we live in a cosmos, a circumstance which is necessary for us to have even bodily existence. In short, causality and cosmos are necessary conditions for us to be here to even ask these questions. Rejection of causality leads to absurdity relative to morally certain facts that would be impossible if causality were false in general. r --> And that should have been plain in Hume's day even before we knew as much chemistry, biochemistry and cosmology as we do today: food is food and poison is poison, and if there was no reliable distinction between the two, life would be impossible. s --> In the more restricted cases, quantum events such as radiodecay by alpha emission, beta emission or gamma emission etc, we see that there are always necessary antecedent conditions for the events to occur, which we often characterise in laws, models and theories. From repeated cases here at UD, the attempt to label such as causeless or acausal, consistently turns on the word magic of trying to make it out that a necessary causal factor is not a causal factor. Sorry, that is a gross error. t --> What about origin of our observed cosmos? On thermodynamic grounds and cosmological observations and inferences, it is very probable that the observed cosmos had a beginning, one that is extraordinarily fine-tuned in ways that facilitate the existence of C-chemistry, cell based life. That beginning points to cause, and that finetuning makes intentional cause by powerful, designing agent a reasonable option. [Notice we are here pointing to an issue that puts worldview level motives on the table: if you are hostile to this possibility you may take any steps "necessary" to drive it away from the circle of plausibility.] u --> We see speculations that the laws of physics made the cosmos appear, without a cause; and from an M-theory domain. But, in fact as explored yesterday, again the matter pivots on rejecting that necessary causal factors are causal factors. At no point has it been shown that the observed universe credibly came from nowhere, noting at any time or is eternal. And the speculative multiverses are locked away from observation. That is, these are worldview level faith commitments, not empirically observed facts or empirically based explanations. v --> If you are determined to be a materialist then you choose this and dismiss the significance of contrary evidence [e.g. the empirically based significance of functionally specific complex organisaton and associated information], it seems. w --> Worse, the universe is more or less the world in which we live, so if it popped out of nowhere, from nothing for no reason, then we are right back at the chaos beyond even magic. This one proposed exception chaotically swallows up everything, as already pointed out. x --> So the very intelligibility and lawful orderliness of the world we live in as a matter of moral certainty beyond rational dispute, is strong evidence that the existence of the universe is not a counter-example to the principle that that which begins to exist has a cause. y --> Underlying, is the intent to dismiss the person as a cause. Without getting into further debates, that is directly contradicted by our experience of ourselves as conscious, minded, enconscienced, morally bound creatures. We may suppress the significance of these first facts, but that simply comes at a price of further reductio ad absurdum; whether or no we admit it. _________________ Okay, back to my constitution crisis. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
October 17, 2010
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-"Monton substituting “condition” for cause. But, cause, of course is not synonymous with sufficiency of a set of factors. As just seen, necessary factors too have a causal impact. They must be present or the effect CANNOT happen" Well said. That's precisely the type of linguistic gimmicks that I mentioned earlier. The substitution of condition for cause and the consequent erection of a false dichotomy. What surprizes me though is how unscrupulous individuals like montonabove
October 17, 2010
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F/N; Onlookers, it is clear from his dismissive emphases on Craig in 272, that Green thinks that necessary causal factors are not causal factors, they are just mere conditions, as he cites approvingly from Monton. Pardon, that's a distinction without a difference, meant to allow dismissal without addressing a serious point. Take away the fuel and see if you have a fire. Take away the oxidiser and see if you have a fire. Quench the heat and see if you have a fire. When he cited Craig, Green actually cited Craig's remarks on how necessary causal factors are causal factors, as though Craig spoke nonsense, on the strength of Monton substituting "condition" for cause. But, cause, of course is not synonymous with sufficiency of a set of factors. As just seen, necessary factors too have a causal impact. They must be present or the effect CANNOT happen. (As Copi pointed out long ago now [and, pardon -- I cite this to show that his is 101 level basics stuff . . . but if you go wrong at the foundation, no amount of erudition will save you higher up in the structure: "little errors at he beginning . . . "], if you want to fight a fire, your concern is with necessity not sufficiency. So, you knock out one or more of the legs of the fire triangle.)kairosfocus
October 17, 2010
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@Kairosfocus I too noticed the comment he made and thought was out of line. I have seen Green post here before and have always thought he was very respectful to others. So naturally I surprized to see that myself.above
October 17, 2010
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@kairosfocus -"Speaking of which, NOTICE HOW THE WORD “EFFECT” IS EXTREMELY COMMON IN PHYSICAL ANALYSIS. (Peltier effect, Photoeffect, Hall effect, Kerr-Pockels effect, etc etc etc.)" Excellent point!!! And as we all know, an effect cannot be without a cause.above
October 17, 2010
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Green You have responded to a serious comment with what frankly comes across as a personalised insult: as if, if I fail to agree with you and raise points and cases to show why, I am so ignorant or stupid as to be utterly confused. And of course having trashed and dismissed, you need not answer on the merits, a la MF. That is sad. I think onlookers will be able to look at my specific cases and points and see who understands just what happens in e.g. scientific analysis, and who is dismissing without coming to grips with the issues and specific cases. Starting with a lighted match. Cho man, do betta dan dat! G'day. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
October 17, 2010
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Also in regards to the O 'Connor quote Green presented, the author in the following paragraph states: "Agent-control - the type of immediate control we take ourselves to have over our own actions - is clearly causal in nature." What Green is saying here is not as simple as he makes it out to be. For there is the nuance of event-causality and agent-causality in the discussion of that particular topic in the article. I'm not going to argue either way... The article is called "Agent Causation". People can read it and interpret O 'Connor as they wish.above
October 17, 2010
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Just to let you know: I will be away for a few days now so will be a couple of days before replying.Green
October 17, 2010
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I rarely dismiss opinions so readily but the nonsense propagated by monton are of a spectacular nature. First monton’s understanding of quantum physics is terrible if he thinks they are devoid of cause. His arguments against Craig are equally as bad. The existence of the club as a necessary condition is part of the cause. Without the existence of the club, there would obviously be no desire on his behalf to go and therefore no action initiated by him (the agent) to go. But of course, in his simplistic understanding he misses it. It’s a terrible example for analogy anyways… -“As Monton says, standard quantum theory states that there is no particular cause of certain quantum events.” That is nonsense. QM does not deny causality and never has. Just because we currently cannot determine all the necessary and sufficient causes in QM, that does not warrant his conclusion. What he’s trying to do here is hide behind our epistemic limitations and play linguistic games. Which is rather ironic in light of his criticisms. His second argument has already been refuted by many thinkers. One of them being Craig. Lol no wonder why he’s like that… His third criticism is hume all over again. That too has been refuted numerous times. Just because QM and relativity (m and string are not great theories… they are not even theories in fact) may not use causal language that does not mean anything. Science’s inability to penetrate the reality of causality is due to its own limitations and nothing more. Causality is a metaphysically necessary truth that without the world is unintelligible. But if he wants to believe that things just pop into and out of existence and that there is not real cause behind anything then I would like to hear a reason why I should even listen to his rubbish…above
October 17, 2010
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PPS: As a physicist, I am utterly puzzled and even incensed by the bold claim that cause plays no material part in serious scientific work. NONSENSE! Let us start with the concept of dynamics: initial conditions, with certain constraints and driving forces lead through a change process and on to an end state. Those are causal factors at work, and the premise -- cf how calculus works by assessing rates and accumulations of change -- is that preceding circumstances drive changes in very predictable or at least model-able ways. That holds for Newtonian dynamics -- force is the rate of change of momentum [takes in NLs 1 and 2] or F = d/dt[m*v], bodies interact in pairs by exerting equal sized, oppositely directed forces, bodies attract by mutual gravitation depending on their mass and separation at a particular rate tied to the geometry of 2-d space and the flux of a field, and all that -- and it holds in Relativity. It holds in pure and applied aspects of physical science, which is foundational to all other sciences. And, where statistical, probabilistic behaviour is injected, there are always many necessary constraints that have causal effect. Notice how the statistical patterns are not capricious, they exhibit certain patterns that lead to particular distributions. Whether we see a gaussian distribution for lengths of bars cut by a machine, or a Weibull one for wind strength at a given site, or a Boltzmann type distribution for energy levels of molecular scale particles or whatever, we still see order, not utter caprice. And, radioactive decay shows a specific controlling constant that gives us the half-life of a given species. Think about how Einsein starts formt he premise that the speed od light will take the same meadsure in any interial frame of reference, and the laws of physics will take the same simplest form in such an IFR. Similarly, consider his equivalence between a gravity field and acceleration in the generalised relativity. Or simply how the space-time continuum is warped by a massive object so that light form a distant star is bent making it appear in a different location in the sky beyond what is predictable from any other theory, circa 1916 - 1919. Remember Eddington's eclipse observations? In the applied side, when we design or troubleshoot a system that uses physical materials, structures, laws and processes organised to yield a function [e.g. to analyse a simple common-emitter, fixed bias bipolar junction transistor circuit in action], we are again looking at causal chains. That base region is lightly doped and thin so that charge carriers from the emitter will diffuse across the base into the collector to be swept up by the bias on the terminal. And, we select semiconductor materials and dope them in order to set up the required structures and effects. Speaking of which, NOTICE HOW THE WORD "EFFECT" IS EXTREMELY COMMON IN PHYSICAL ANALYSIS. (Peltier effect, Photoeffect, Hall effect, Kerr-Pockels effect, etc etc etc.) Let us look in a dictionary:
ef·fect (-fkt) n. 1. Something brought about by a cause or agent; a result. cause (kôz) n.1.a. The producer of an effect, result, or consequence. b. The one, such as a person, event, or condition, that is responsible for an action or result. [AmHD]
All of these and many many other circumstances are utterly riddled with cause-effect chains used in the heart of the analysis, and resting on identifying necessary factors, sufficient ones, contributory ones and where possible necessary and sufficient ones. I think that the claim that cause is absent in physical analysis or phenomena is utterly specious. If Monton means to say that, he is wrong, spectacularly wrong.kairosfocus
October 17, 2010
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Kairosfocus: I'm sorry, I don't have the time to respond to your posts; they are so full of misunderstandings, non-sequiters and irrelevant information.Green
October 17, 2010
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StephenB @ 269:
Green, I didn’t miss it. Your claim was that libertarians themselves all agree that libertarian free will requires causeless events. First, your preferred author is not saying that. You are putting words in his mouth.
SB, I quoted him directly, literally verbatim. Please be reasonable and acknowledge the facts. Don’t deny that someone has said something just because you don’t like what they say.
Second, meaning no disrespect, I do not consider him a “leading proponent” of libertarian free will.
I can only conlude that you are ignorant of the literature on this matter, and I mean this in all sincerity. I studied libertarianism in depth for about 6 months, and used to be a libertarian myself. I know your position inside out, so all I can say here is that from my experience, O’Connor has written the most to defend agent-causal libertarianism (which seems to be the type you defend). He also wrote the SEP article on free will. If this doesn’t make him a leading proponent, I don’t know what does.
Third, even if he was saying it, which he wasn’t, I know dozens of advocates for libertarian free will who do NOT believe that events of that kind are uncaused. I will just list three: Normal Geisler, William Craig Lane, and Peter Kreeft.
Have any of these authors actually published peer-reviewed work specifically on the topic of libertarian free will? I have googled all three of them to try and find peer-reviewed publications on the topic and have found none. If you know of any, please show me. I have been trying to work out what type of libertarianism William Lane Craig defends for a while. He’s had Stewart Goetz on his Q&A section before (talking about the mind-body problem – see Q&A 119), and I know Goetz defends what is known as “non-causal” libertarianism, which very very clearly endorses uncaused events. (The other types do as well, but not in the same explicit way that Goetz’s view does). Having Goetz on, though, doesn’t mean that Craig also defends that view. In general, I get the impression that he hasn’t committed to a specific type of libertarianism (e.g. some of his comments in this article show that he is aware of the different strands, but hasn’t committed to a specific one of them: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5169). So I am unsure what Dr Craig’s view is on libertarianism. And as for Geisler and Kreeft, I am not aware of any peer-reviewed publications they have on the topic either. Are they aware of the 3 different categories of free will? Have they adopted a particular position? If they have, I would greatly appreciate you pointing me to their papers. As I’ve mentioned on here before, it is my experience that many people band about the term “free will” – but have absolutely no idea what they are saying or what they are committing to. If Norman Geisler says that he believes in both libertarianism and the law of causality, then I can only conlude that he is either equivocating over the term “cause” in the law of causality, or he is ignorant of what libertarianism entails. As you also seem to be. Your next few paragraphs are full of contradictions and equivocations (or perhaps just misunderstandings). You say that human beings are not unmoved movers because God created them. How can you not see that this does nothing to change the fact that they are still unmoved movers in the local sense? Further down you say that the self is the “instigator of self caused actions. Now you seem to be conceding that agents ARE unmoved movers in the local sense. If something instigates something, then it is the INITIAL event in that chain of cause and effect. Geisler says the same thing in the quote you gave: “The self is the FIRST-CAUSE of personal actions”. Here too he is saying that the self is an uncaused cause (in the local sense of the word). Basically: you think that God creating unmoved movers satisfies the law of causality (as does Geisler). Neither of you, however, have got around the problem of local uncaused events.Green
October 17, 2010
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PS: Green, notice the point that causal factors come tin three or four forms: contributory, necessary, sufficient. Quantum events, we do not know hte sufficient conditions for, esp say RA decay. But we do definitely know necessary conditions for them. E.g. No RA atom, no decay. So RA decay as a quantum event is not acausal simply because we are so far -- and may even alwy7s be -- unable to specify the sufficient conditions that make this particular atom decay at that particular moment. This is not a fallacy of equivocation, it is a simple recognition of a well-known feature of cause as familiar as Copi's fire example in his classic Logic. To pretend that a necessary cause is not a cause is where the real fallacy lies.kairosfocus
October 17, 2010
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Green: And, what, pray tell is the source of your post just now? Random noise in the neuronal net of your brain? The laws of physics, as filtered through the biology and socio-psychological circumstances that brought you here? The caprice of the aliens who set up the matrix pod in which you reside? In short, cause is a real phenomenon, and one we need to take seriously not find tendentious objections to. It is not simply this after that so because of it. Cause has a context, where we know contributory factors, necessary ones and sufficient ones. I suggest you get a box of matches, and strike a few. See how heat, fuel and oxidiser are each contributory, indeed necessary, and are jointly sufficient to initiate and sustain the effect we know as a fire. It has a beginning, and it may come to an end, so it has a cause. That cause can be studied empirically,and may be analysed logically as I just outlined. Going beyond the match, consider the striker thereof. What came to put the box in your hand just so, and he head against the friction striking strip? How did the head sweep rapidly across the strip igniting a flame, save thqat with a purpose in mind an agent decided so to strike, using his bodily organs to give effect to his volition based on knowledge and reason? And, whence cometh that volition? The reason? The knowledge? Those who would explain such on chance plus necessity only reliably will end in the most patent of absurdities. Never mind the clever objections they cast at those who call attention to the basic fact of our conscious, volitional, minded existence. Indeed, the very first fact is that we are conscious, cognitive, enconscienced responsibly acting creatures. And to discard this first fact lands us in self referential absurdity and lands the community in a dark morass of manipulation or naked tyranny. No worldview that ignores the first fact that we are self-acting agents -- ensouled creatures if you will, is capable of accounting for fact no 1 of our existence. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
October 17, 2010
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StephenB @ 271: thanks for clarifying that you are only talking about efficient causes.Green
October 17, 2010
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Hi vivid @ 270: Monton critiques the law of causality on 4 accounts. I’ll just list 3 of them as I don’t fully understand his last criticism. They are as follows: 1) Its defenders equivocate over the word “cause” 2) Causation is arguably just a temporal notion 3) Causation is folk science (i.e. there is no such thing as causation) Regarding equivocation (i.e. (1)), Monton says that this is what William Lane Craig does when trying to account for quantum events. Craig acknowledges that the conditions in place for quantum events are not sufficient to produce the effects that ensue, but he equivocates over the term cause in order to get around the idea that they are uncaused. He quotes Craig as saying:
In the case of quantum events, there are any number of physically necessary conditions that must obtain for such an event to occur, and yet these conditions are not jointly sufficient for the occurrence of the event… The appearance of a particle in a quantum vacuum may thus be said to be spontaneous, but it cannot properly be said to be uncaused, since it has many physically necessary conditions.
Basically Craig is saying that events that appear to be spontaneous are actually caused, because such events have physically necessary conditions for their occurence. However, as Monton points out, one cannot equate necessary conditions with causes. A necessary condition for ‘x’ is just a condition that has to hold in order for ‘x’ to come about. It is not the efficient cause: it is not the specific thing that brings the event about. To give an example, Monton says that a necessary condition for him going clubbing tonight is that clubs exist. But the existence of clubs is not the cause of his going clubbing tonight. In the same way, the necessary conditions of certain quantum events are not the specific causes of those events: they are not the things that bring about the specific effects. As Monton says, standard quantum theory states that there is no particular cause of certain quantum events. (pp88). So if one is to refrain from equivocating, then the law of causality seems false. (2) is self explanatory; I can give details if you like. If true, it would show that the law of causality is not universal. (3) is the idea that causation itself doesn’t even exist; it is just “folk science”. Various philosophers have argued that if causation existed – if causal principles were fundamental principles of nature – then you would expect physics to discover them. In other words, you would expect our best theories in physics to tell us, for any two events, whether one event is a cause of the other event. However, if you look at our best physical theories, like quantum theory, general relativity, or M-theory; they don’t talk about causes at all. They talk about energies, forces, and conservation laws, but not causes. Some theories give equations specifying that if the system is in a certain state at some time, then it will be in a different state (with respect to some probability) at a different time. But the earlier state of the system isn’t identified as a cause of the later state of the system; the equation just describes how the system evolves through time. Monton then says: “Now, you might think: “granted, the physical theories don’t actually use the language of causation. But surely what they’re talking about is causation, even if they’re not using that sort of terminology. We just need to find a way to redescribe what physical theories are telling us in causal terms” ". He goes on to say that many philosophers have tried to do this and failed, and he argues that this history of failure has led some people to conclude that causation isn’t a fundamental part of nature at all. It is just “folk science” (p92). This conclusion obviously nullifies the law of causality, since it entails that causation does not actually exist. (For the record, though, Monton doesn’t think (3) is conclusive; he says that maybe it is not physics’ job to uncover causal principles; maybe causal principles are only present in chemistry or biology. He also says that future physical theories may uncover causes, and we can't rule that out. But he does think that even though (3) isn’t conclusive, it should make us less sure of the law of causality, as SB calls it).Green
October 17, 2010
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Green and Aleta, I need to call your attention to something. Each of you have suggested several times that I integrate numerous kinds of causes in my analysis. ---"Aleta: I wondered about this very question in a previous thread about free will with Stephen. I claimed that acts of free will were little “local” uncaused causes, and that the law of causality was violated by our acts of free will. He claimed this didn’t violate the law of causality, but since then I have found out that he had been lumping a variety of types of causes (efficient, first, final, etc.) all into one category." The only time I mentioned final causes or other varieties of causes was to explain to Aleta the difference between emergence, which is not associated with any kind of causality, and a guided developmental process, which is. In no other context did I refer to anything other than efficient causes. Please make a note of it and please stop insinuating that it has anything to do with any discussion about the law of causality or the subject of free will. It doesn't.StephenB
October 16, 2010
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Green re 268 I would be interested in reading your summary. Vividvividbleau
October 16, 2010
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---Green: “SB, in case you missed it, I already have supported my claim. In #212 I gave you a quote by Timothy O’Connor – one of the leading proponents of agent-causal libertarianism (which is the type you seem to defend) – which affirmed my exact point. You seemed to ignore it, so here it is again: … “no answer could be given to the question of what was the cause of a given agent-causal event, and hence that the question is ill-framed, resulting from a failure to understand the peculiar nature of such an event… the libertarian may acknowledge without embarassment that events of this type are uncaused.” Green, I didn’t miss it. Your claim was that libertarians themselves all agree that libertarian free will requires causeless events. First, your preferred author is not saying that. You are putting words in his mouth. Second, meaning no disrespect, I do not consider him a “leading proponent” of libertarian free will. Third, even if he was saying it, which he wasn’t, I know dozens of advocates for libertarian free will who do NOT believe that events of that kind are uncaused. I will just list three: Normal Geisler, William Craig Lane, and Peter Kreeft. Please do not make this claim again until you can quote from all three authors that I recommended and show that each believes what you say he believes. If you run out of authors, let me know and I will give you five or ten more. ---Since you now seem to be arguing otherwise, please tell me; what is it that you think moves the agent (to satisfy the law of causality), but does not stop it from being an unmoved mover (to maintain libertarian free will)? I have always argued the same way. You are using the wrong language to describe the relationship between the law of causality and free will. As a result, your assumptions about free will and causality are erroneous. Neither the human being nor his will is an unmoved mover, or an uncaused cause, or anything else of the kind. How can a caused self, act as an uncaused cause? You state: ---“Libertarians need something that is free from the law of causality – not something that is subject to it.” As I have tried to inform you, the human agent is BOTH the EFFECT of a cause [a created reality caused by God] AND a CAUSE of new effects, an instigator of SELF CAUSED actions. God, a creator of effects, is one person and the person he created is another creator of effects. The human will is not like a transformer reflecting willful decisions coming from a generator. It is a faculty which contains the power to choose good or evil, to follow the truth or remain in error, to love or hate. ---“If an agent is subject to the law of causality, then all the choices he makes are part of a deterministic chain of cause and effect. I.e. his choices are part of a deterministic process.” That statement is simply not true. “There is no violation of the actual principle of causality in the exercise of free actions. The principle does not claim that every thing (being) needs a cause. Finite things need a cause. God is uncaused. The person performing free actions is caused by God. The power of freedom is caused by God, but the exercise of freedom is caused by the person. The self is the first-cause of personal actions. The principle of causality is not violated because every finite thing and every action has a cause.” ---Normal Geisler If you want to continue reading from the compatibilists, open theists, and other skewed authors, by all means, go ahead. Please do not ask me to explain this again, though, until you have absorbed what others outside your closed circle are saying, until you can present their arguments [and mine] accurately and in the best possible light, and until you can provide a counter answer to their arguments as they express them, not as you or your favorite authors may choose to misrepresent them.StephenB
October 16, 2010
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If anyone is interested, Bradley Monton has a discussion of William Lane Craig and this "law of causality" on pp.87-88 of his Seeking God in Science: an atheist defends intelligent design. I can give a summary here if anyone wants.Green
October 16, 2010
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Aleta @ 214:
Green: “How can the law of causality be true, and yet agents also be able to initiate novel chains of cause and effect.”
Aleta: I wondered about this very question in a previous thread about free will with Stephen. I claimed that acts of free will were little “local” uncaused causes, and that the law of causality was violated by our acts of free will. He claimed this didn’t violate the law of causality, but since then I have found out that he had been lumping a variety of types of causes (efficient, first, final, etc.) all into one category.
Thanks Aleta, bringing in different types of causation is interesting. I must say, though, I've had the impression that we're talking about efficient causes here. In #107, StephenB wrote:
"Defined in this context, a cause would simply be something that brings something else about."
"Bringing something about" implies that we're talking about efficient causation in reference to the law of causality, I think. :)Green
October 16, 2010
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StephenB @ 215:
Green @213. I answered your question @110.
If you think you've answered my question, then I must not be making myself clear, since you haven't addressed it. Essentially I said that unmoved movers violate the law of causality because they are unmoved (read: uncaused). You said they don't violate it because God created these unmoved movers. This is not particularly relevant, though. The point is that these agents are still unmoved movers. All you've basically said is: "God has created types of events that can subsequently come about without a cause." I hope this has made it clear why your post in 215 does not address the issue. You also wrote:
Also, your statement that “libertarians themselves all agree that libertarian free will requires causeless events” is false.I am not going to embarrass you by asking you to support your claim because I already know that you cannot.
SB, in case you missed it, I already have supported my claim. In #212 I gave you a quote by Timothy O'Connor - one of the leading proponents of agent-causal libertarianism (which is the type you seem to defend) - which affirmed my exact point. You seemed to ignore it, so here it is again:
… no answer could be given to the question of what was the cause of a given agent-causal event, and hence that the question is ill-framed, resulting from a failure to understand the peculiar nature of such an event… the libertarian may acknowledge without embarassment that events of this type are uncaused.
Since you now seem to be arguing otherwise, please tell me; what is it that you think moves the agent (to satisfy the law of causality), but does not stop it from being an unmoved mover (to maintain libertarian free will)?Green
October 16, 2010
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Aleta you state, 'and only testing can determine whether any one real space matches any one model.' So If we would expect to find a universe that was created and sustained from a higher dimension, yet was created so that intelligent '3-Dimensional' beings could consistently apply mathematics so that two parallel lines never crossed, then should we not find that the curvature of 4-D space-time to be flat? Which just so happens to be what we find for our 'test'. Or say that if we thought the universe was created and sustained from a higher dimension so that intelligent 3-Dimensional creatures would also be able to consistently apply 3-dimensional mathematics, then should we not also find that the expansion of the 4-D space-time of the universe to be exceedingly consistent for all 3-D points in the universe? which just so happens to be the result of the test if anyone would have been foresighted enough to predict such a result for Theism.bornagain77
October 16, 2010
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