Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

Hyperskepticism: The Wrong Side Of A Continuum

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Philosophers and scientists who know their business recognize that any attempt to seek knowledge presupposes the existence of a rational universe ripe for investigating. The fact that we even bother to make the effort says something about our nature. As Aristotle says, “all men by nature want to know.” That is why the discovery of a new fact or truth can be a joy for its own sake. To be sure, knowledge also provides practical benefits, empowering us to pursue a self-directed life style, but it also edifies us, leading us on the road to self-actualization. To be intellectually healthy is to be curious.

On the other hand, we can, by virtue of our free will, act against our natural desire to know. For better or worse, there are some truths that many of us would prefer not to know about. The compelling nature of an objective fact can pull us in one direction while the force of our personal desires can pull us in the opposite direction. When this happens, a choice must be made. “Either the thinker conforms desire to truth or he conforms truth to desire.”–E. Michael Jones

Because we experience this ambivalence about the truth, we must be on guard against two errors: (a) talking ourselves out of things that we should believe [hyperskepticism] or (b) talking ourselves into things that we should not believe [gullibility]. Hyperskeptics attempt to justify the first error by calling attention to the second error, as if there was no reasonable alternative to either extreme. On the contrary, the ideal solution is to seek a rational midpoint –to balance a healthy skepticism about unconfirmed truth claims with a healthy confidence in truths already known. The one thing a thinker should not do is be skeptical or open-minded about the first principles of right reason, without which there is no standard for investigating or discoursing about anything “Merely having an open mind is nothing. The object of opening the mind, as of opening the mouth, is to shut it again on something solid.”– G. K. Chesterton

In the spirit of public service, then, I present this little test for analyzing our readers’ proclivity for hyperskepticism. Hopefully, those who indulge will not find any predictable patterns, since I strove to keep them at a minimum.

Yes or No

[1] Can we know anything about the real world?

In asking this question, I am probing for your orientation on the matter of external facts with respect to our internal experience. Can we really know if such a thing as a tree exists, or is it the case that we simply experience mental representations of something that may not be a tree at all? [Reminiscent of Kant’s hyperskepticism]

[2] If the answer to [1] is no, is it, under those circumstances, possible to conduct rational investigations or participate in rational discourse?

If I can feel the experience of something that seems like a tree, without knowing that it is a tree, or if I am just using words to describe my experience, can I use my reason to draw other meaningful conclusions about the world? In other words, can I, absent a knowable external reality, reason not just validly [with internal consistency] but also soundly [align my understanding with the truth of things]?

True or False

[3] The law of non-contradiction [a thing cannot be and not be at the same time] is not a self-evident truth.

Inasmuch as scientific progress has demonstrated that Aristotle was wrong about the four basic elements of the earth, it is not unreasonable to suggest that he was also wrong about his so-called laws of logic.

[4] The law of causality is a self-evident truth.

I can accept this proposition unconditionally, not only as a second law of logic, but also as an intellectual companion to the first law of logic? Put another way, if a thing cannot be and not be at the same time, that fact influences or informs the law that nothing can come into existence without a cause. There is a logical connection between the claim that Jupiter cannot both exist and not exist and the claim that it cannot come into existence without a cause?

[5] Our knowledge of the real world is reliable but imperfect.

We may not know everything there is to know about a tree, but we do know that something is there that we call a tree and that it is more than just a collection of parts–something that exhibits “treeness.”

[6] A finite whole can be less than any one of its parts.

A crankcase can, in some cases, be greater than the automobile of which it is a part.

[7] The universe is ordered.

Material objects move in such a way as to indicate some kind of function or purpose.

[8] The universe may be ordered to a purpose, but that doesn’t necessarily mean it needed an intelligence to do the ordering or establish the purpose.

Purpose can exist without intelligence.

[9] The universe is, indeed, ordered, but that doesn’t mean that its order is synchronized with our mind’s logic.

The mind’s logic [if it’s raining, the streets will get wet] may be inconsistent with the order of the universe [If it’s raining, the streets may not necessarily get wet.] The proposition that there is an unfailing correspondence between the logic our rational minds and ordering of the rational universe is something that should be demonstrated through evidence and cannot be reasonably accepted as a “self-evident truth.”

[10] There can be more than one truth?

Each specialized branch of knowledge can have its own brand of truth, and that truth may well be incompatible with truths found in other specialized areas.

[11] In some cases, a cause can give more than it has to give.

Something can come to exist in the effect that was not first present in the cause. It may well be, for example, that an immaterial mind could emerge from matter even though matter has no raw materials containing anything like immaterial mental substances.

12-20, Yes, No, or I don’t know.

[12] Does truth exist?

Is truth absolute, not relative–objective, not subjective–universal, not contextual–and indivisible, not many?

[13] Is there such a thing as the natural moral law?

Is there an objective standard of right and wrong that we [humans] did not invent [or socially construct] and to which we are morally obliged to follow in spite of our personal preferences or in spite of public opinion?

[14] Does the human conscience exist?

Do we, as humans, possess some kind of inborn instinct that makes us feel bad about ourselves when we do something wrong and feel good about ourselves when we do something right. Can that same conscience be habitually silenced and ignored to the point at which it stops sending signals?

[15] Is design detectable?

Can we discern the presence of intelligence from the biological and cosmological patterns found in nature? Can we discover the presence of intelligence from patterns found in human artifacts even if we know nothing about the history of those artifacts? Can minds detect the activity of other minds?

[16] Does God exist?

Is there a personal, omniscient, omnipotent, eternal, self-existent God who created the universe and all the creatures that inhabit it?

[17] Is God organic with the universe?

Could God and the universe be one and the same thing?

[18] Can matter investigate itself?

In order for a scientist or a philosopher to investigate the universe or the world, must he exist as a substance of a different kind than the object of his study? Are two such realms of existence really necessary, or can the relationship between the investigator and the object of investigation be explained from a monistic framework.

[19] Evidence can speak for itself; it need not be interpreted by or mediated through the rules of right reason.

Science can stand alone. It needs no metaphysical foundations in order to be rational.

[20] Ask yourself this question: Do I have free will?

Do I have something to say about my fate? Can I say that I could have made choices other than the ones that I did make, or that I could have created outcomes different than the ones I did create? Do I have the power to act contrary to my nature, predisposition, desires, and appetites?

True/ False

[21] If the ordered universe is synchronized with the laws of logic, it could be a coincidence.

Even if we do have “rational” minds, and even if they do correspond to a “rational universe,” there is no reason to suggeset that it had to be set up by something or someone. It could just be that way.

[22] Theistic Darwinism is a reasonable hypothesis.

A purposeful, mindful God may well have used a purposeless, mindless process to create humans.

[23] A universe can come into existence without a cause.

Not all effects require causes. Further, some things that are often characterized as effects, such as our universe, may not really be effects at all. Even if it does, itself, act as a cause, the physical universe could be, but need not be, the result of a prior cause.

[24] Unguided evolution is a reasonable hypothesis.

There is no reason to believe that humans could not emerge as a lucky accident from solely naturalistic forces.

[25] Cause and effect can occur without a first cause.

Granted, a cause/effect chain exists in nature, but that fact alone does not compel us to posit that only a first cause or causeless cause can explain

Comments
fg “Well yes, everything that begins to exist has a beginning. This is not controversial" This is laughable!!! Literlly ever few days there are multiple posters who assert this very thing, some on this very thread. Any way I comforted to know that you dont hold to the notion that the big bang came from nothing. Or do you? Vividvividbleau
October 14, 2010
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RE 129 FG "Well yes, everything that begins to exist has a beginning. This is not controversial, ‘to begin to exist’ and ‘to have a beginning’, are of course identical concepts in our language" They are NOT identical concepts. fg "The real issue is, you say logic doesn’t demand that everything that exists has a beginning, yet you also say that everything that begins to exist has a cause. Why is the one statement not demanded by logic, yet the other one is? Care to explain?" What logical law demands that existence must be preceded by 1)a cause and 2)a beginning? Logic only demands that an existence that begins to exist must have a cause and a beginning. fg"I maintain: neither of them is demanded by logic. Both are a priori axioms, not logical deductions." By all means maintain all you want. fg"I believe StephenB will agree with me here." I dont think so. Vividvividbleau
October 14, 2010
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Well yes, everything that begins to exist has a beginning. This is not controversial, ‘to begin to exist’ and ‘to have a beginning’, are of course identical concepts in our languagevividbleau
October 14, 2010
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Clive writes, "Is it illogical that a bird should give live birth instead of laying eggs? Is it impossible in the way 2+2=0 is?" That's an interesting question, because it contrasts two different kinds of situations. Let's take 2 + 2 = 4, not 0 first. As I explained in another thread a while back, the counting numbers are modeled by correlating them with discrete objects, such as pebbles. Once we agree on symbols to represent different quantities (1 = *, 2 = **, 3 = ***, etc.), then the fact that 2 + 2 = 4 can be modeled in the real world by putting a pile of two with another pile of 2 (with "putting together" the correlate of +). This is a case where the model is consistently confirmed, and works in the real world all the time - with the important qualification that the objects are clearly discrete. This qualification helps me illustrate one of my other points: the mathematical system must map clearly with its real world correlates. It wouldn't make sense in many cases to say that 2 clouds + 2 clouds = 4 clouds, because often a cloud is not a distinct, discrete enough entity to know where it leaves off and another cloud begins. Similarly, if I were to ask you to count all the mountains in Colorado, we would have to come up with some clear, unequivacable definitions of what counted as a mountain before we could start to count. So 2 + 2 = 4 is a fact in the world of math that consistently and accurately maps to the real world as long as the correlate units are clearly discrete. Therefore, given the meaning of the symbols, 2 + 2 = 0 is just wrong. The bird example is different though. We have defined what a bird is, and it's fairly clearcut the criteria for something being a bird: I don't think I know any very ambiguous situations. However, we do know that some snakes lay eggs and some give live birth. It is possible (empirically, not logically) that sometime in the future someone could find an animal that had all the characteristics of a bird and yet gave live birth. In this case we'd have to decide how we wanted to refine our model: do we expand our definition of bird to include this case, or retain our definition and categorize the creature as something other than a bird. This is a choice we can make, depending on the utility to us. If someone were to insist that "it's not logical for a bird to lay eggs" they would mean not consistent with our current definition. But logic itself doesn't impose that definition on us: the definition is part of the model, not part of the pure abstract logic. Thanks for the question, Clive - it was a good opportunity to expand on my position.Aleta
October 14, 2010
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Aleta,
Notice that the testing process requires empirical evidence if it is to apply to the real world. Logic itself can tell us nothing about the real world – it is a tool (a very powerful one) for thinking about the world using symbols, but only testing our conclusions against the world can validate a particular model.
Is it illogical that a bird should give live birth instead of laying eggs? Is it impossible in the way 2+2=0 is?Clive Hayden
October 14, 2010
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Response to Stephen's post at 143. Stephen: "Self-evident truths are not being posited as arguments, they are being posited as the means by which arguments are made." Yes, I know that. The point under consideration is if the things that you say are self-evident are in fact self-evident, or more specifically, if they can be used in the contexts that you wish to use them, or if they lead to the conclusions you say they do. Stephen: "If you don’t think that the law of causality, a self-evident truth, serves as the rational rule for science, then tell us what does. Earlier, when pressed, you stated that you accept this law, but now, when you come face to face with its implications, your reject it once again." In the discussion in this thread, I have been talking about proximate, efficient causes within our universe. I think I specifically set aside the first cause/origin of the universe topic for the sake of this thread (and we discussed that extensively a while back.) Then, after a constructive discussion, I found out that you were also referring to final causes, which require an causal agent acting for a purpose or to fulfill an intention. In respect to the flow of events in the material world, I don't believe in that, so at that point we parted company. So I'm not rejecting the law of causality in repect to efficient, proximate causes in the material world - I am just rejecting applying the idea of intention or purpose to the material world. So when you ask, "How does one search for causes in the event that causality is not a law? How would you know which events were caused and which ones were not? How would you know that ANYTHING is caused?", the answer in principle is simple: we look for regularities in the flow of moment-to-moment events in time and space. I said way back in the beginning, in response to your question, that I believe we live in an orderly universe in which chains of cause-and-effect connect all the moments clear back to the beginning of time. I have changed in holding that opinion. And last, you write, "If you don’t think that the law of non-contradiction, a self evident truth, is the starting point for deductive logic, then tell us what is. Please tell us how any IF/THEN proposition is possible absent the law of non-contradiction. Please tell us how a syllogism could be considered valid reasoning under those circumstances. Please tell us how any kind of reasoning process can begin without a self-evident truth as its starting point." The subject of the role of logic and math (and langauge in general) is critical to the discussions we have here. I will re-summarize my position in respect to logic, although the same remarks apply to math. Logic is an abstract, internally consistent system for manipulating symbols. When we apply logic to the real world we create a model in which the symbols of logic represent some aspect of the real world - we hypothesize a correspondence between the symbols and the real world. If we have then apply the rules of logic to the model we often (most of the time, because we've been doing this for a long time) find that the logical results match what goes on in the world. However, we sometimes find the the model does not work, not because the logic is wrong but because the model is faulty. In that case, we have to refine our model. Notice that the testing process requires empirical evidence if it is to apply to the real world. Logic itself can tell us nothing about the real world - it is a tool (a very powerful one) for thinking about the world using symbols, but only testing our conclusions against the world can validate a particular model. So we really can't apply the same logic we use in our world to what be "outside of/before" our world, because we can't test the model. So much of what Stephen does is manipulate symbols within a closed set of concepts, much like the game of chess where the rules only apply to the game and not to any external reality, and then declare that the conclusions he reaches are self-evident. We agree on the basic laws of logic - what we disagree is the model to which the laws are being applied.Aleta
October 14, 2010
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Stephen - in the flurry of discussion, I didn't see 143 until now - I'll take a look now.Aleta
October 14, 2010
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Pedant asks in 162: "Whether something is rational or not is a value judgment. My question is simply: what law of logic does self-creation violate?" As Stephen, UB and me have pointed out it would empirically invalidate laws of logic. Is rationality (for example 1 + 1 = 2) a value judgment? Yes in a sense that a person who calculates this believes in rationality. In a world where things can come out of nothing for no reason at all the calculation of 1 + 1 = 2 would not describe reality as it is and thus would be false.Innerbling
October 14, 2010
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---Pedant to Upright Biped: "Whether something is rational or not is a value judgment. My question is simply: what law of logic does self-creation violate?" Self creation violates every aspect of logical reasoning. Here are the conditions needed for the the universe to create itself: [a] It would have to exist before it existed. [b] It would have to exist and not exist at the same time and in the same relationship. {violation of the law of non-contradiction] [c] It would have to be a non-reality making itself into a reality, {violation of the law of causality, which is a derivative of the law of non-contradiction} Without understanding and honoring these distinctions, it is impossible to reason in the abstract. It has nothing to do with "value judgments" and everything to do with the capacity to think.StephenB
October 14, 2010
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Pedant, A) Are you really asking me to justify calling it "irrational" to think that something that does not exist can cause itself to exist? B) Are you then suggesting, after I make it clear that self-creation is irrational, that I think that my position posits a self-creating God? I thought I made myself abundantly clear: "If everything in this material universe is contingent, then there must be at least one thing that is necessary – and that thing must not be contingent upon this material universe, but transcend it instead. Instead of violating a law of logic to postulate an extenal transcendence, logic all but demands it."Upright BiPed
October 14, 2010
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Aleta, are you prepared to answer my questions @143?StephenB
October 14, 2010
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WJM @158. It is interesting that we agree on so many things but disagree on this topic. I would hold that the will is free with limitations, and you seem to hold that a truly free will allows of no limitations at all. With that definition of free, I don't think anyone would argue for free will. Indeed, most advocates for free will, myself included likely would argue that, among other things, we are limited by psychodynamic, behavior, and biological limitations but can make free choices in that context. I have a lot to say about my final destiny, but choosing my parents, my intelligence, my race, my height, weight, and a million other things is not part of the package.StephenB
October 14, 2010
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Upright BiPed, I wonder whether you have an answer to the question I put to you at comment 118:
Whether something is rational or not is a value judgment. My question is simply: what law of logic does self-creation violate?
Or to my question at 119:
Those are good reasons for postulating a self-creating God. But if postulating a self-creating God does not violate logic, how does postulating a self-creating universe violate logic?
Or any reaction at all?Pedant
October 14, 2010
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UB, there can't be an unmarried bachelor. Is that a statement about words or reality?Aleta
October 14, 2010
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Aleta,
"When I look back at my posts, and the topics we’ve been discussing, I see that I have clearly said that there are some kinds of things – metaphysical reality – that we can’t know about. There are other things that we can know a great deal about. I see nothing where I’ve said anything that implies that we “can’t know anything at all.”
Of course you do not imply it Aleta, you avoid it as a consequence of your position. Go back and deal with #149.Upright BiPed
October 14, 2010
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I don't want to belabor the point, but, UB, you wrote, "you must first deal with the fact that there are some ideas, that if held, cause the loss of being able to know anything at all.” When I look back at my posts, and the topics we've been discussing, I see that I have clearly said that there are some kinds of things - metaphysical reality - that we can't know about. There are other things that we can know a great deal about. I see nothing where I've said anything that implies that we "can't know anything at all." Maybe what you are thinking about is obvious to you, but it's not obvious to me.Aleta
October 14, 2010
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StehenB, In my view, human* will and Divine will are the same thing, so it's not like I'm a "puppet" of god. God's free will is my free will. *humans with free will. I don't believe all humans have free will. The short version of the "free" problem is what "freedom" necessarily entails; in order for will to be meaningfully free and not caused in any way by context, it must be omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent. Othwewise, specific characteristics of will would necessarily be caused by location, limitation, and/or ignorance. In order to generate a "separate" will, there must be someplace that god is not, or someplace where the 2nd will and the first do not overlap. In order for the 2nd will to "not be god", it cannot be omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent. The 2nd will must have defined characteristics that differentiate it from the divine will. I don't see how this can be logically true given the nature of god, what "free" must mean, and if our will is truly free and acausal. There is no logical room for, or means to differentiate, 2 truly "free" wills, IMO.William J. Murray
October 14, 2010
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Aleta, I think pretending you don't know what is being discussed (given that you just directly responded to that discussion) is a sure mark of avoidance. To want to place that avoidance on my shoulders instead of your own is an obvious tactic. Feel free to use eit.Upright BiPed
October 14, 2010
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OK, UB, then don't discuss. Fine with me.Aleta
October 14, 2010
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William J. Murray, thanks for the comment. I am not clear on the matter of what constitutes "not A and "A."--nor am I clear on specifically which consequences get violated with a distinctly free will. Fair enough on the theological matter. However, I think the problem persists in the ethical realm. If the human will is an aspect of [extension of?] the Divine will, then any unethical human act would seem to be an unethical Divine act and the human will little more than a faculty for ratifying Divine choices. Thus, only the Divine [person?] would bear responsibility for the choices made, which is another way of saying that the human will is not free [to make other choices].StephenB
October 14, 2010
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That is another punt. Read your 147.Upright BiPed
October 14, 2010
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UB writes, "Aleta, you must first deal with the fact that there are some ideas, that if held, cause the loss of being able to know anything at all." Could you list some of those ideas, please, so I know what you are referring to.Aleta
October 14, 2010
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and ....what is the gain? Being able to avoid what?Upright BiPed
October 14, 2010
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Aleta, you must first deal with the fact that there are some ideas, that if held, cause the loss of being able to know anything at all.Upright BiPed
October 14, 2010
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"Let me break my response into two parts, and work backwards. I am not faulting Stephen for making assertions of faith. For the theist to say “I believe in God, and that he both created and sustains all of existence” is fine – it is a statement of religious faith and a centrally important thing for a Christian to say. I am faulting Stephen for not accepting that this is a statement of faith, but rather insisting that this is a logical conclusion that it would be irrational to deny. Do you see the difference?" Your second comment was based on your first, and your first was flatly incorrect.Upright BiPed
October 14, 2010
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"These are good examples of things that are impossible because the words don’t make sense: the issue is not about what God can or can not do, but rather about the meanings of the words that we are using." This is a punt Aleta. It has nothing to do with the "words" being used. Call these things anything you like, it matters not in the least. It is not the words that do not work, it is the reality of such things.Upright BiPed
October 14, 2010
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StephenB, The nature of what "free" must mean, in context with will, prevents the Divine will from generating something that is both "not A" and "A" at the same time, which is what it would be tasked to do. The "free" in free will has logical and necessary consequences that would be violated if the Divine Will generated another truly "free" will that was identifiably distinct from itself. As for the sin question, it's not an issue in my worldview.William J. Murray
October 14, 2010
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Hi Clive. You write, "Can we at least say that nonsense is still nonsense when we talk it about God? Wouldn’t it be true to say that God cannot make a square circle, not because it is a limit on God’s power, but because a square circle is a nonentity, in other words, it is nonsense? God can do all things, but a square circle is not a thing. It would be akin to saying that God knows, in inches, how far it is from London Bridge to Christmas Day" These are good examples of things that are impossible because the words don't make sense: the issue is not about what God can or can not do, but rather about the meanings of the words that we are using. You write,
There are somethings we can say about God, and some things we can’t. It is not all a matter of faith. It sounds like you’re saying that we cannot know anything about God, but this itself would be something known. The agnostic must, to be consistent, claim that we don’t know enough about the unknown to know that it is unknowable. The agnostic must admit the possibility that some things can be known. For the agnostic is saying “I don’t know anything” and cannot then say “Well, at least I know this much about God, I know that God is unknowable”, for that is a contradiction, and betrays an assertion of faith, the same assertion of faith, in the respect that it is an assertion of faith, that you seem to be faulting StephenB for.
Let me break my response into two parts, and work backwards. I am not faulting Stephen for making assertions of faith. For the theist to say "I believe in God, and that he both created and sustains all of existence" is fine - it is a statement of religious faith and a centrally important thing for a Christian to say. I am faulting Stephen for not accepting that this is a statement of faith, but rather insisting that this is a logical conclusion that it would be irrational to deny. Do you see the difference? You write, "The agnostic must, to be consistent, claim that we don’t know enough about the unknown to know that it is unknowable." I agree with this. Agnosticism about anything is a tentative position - an agreement with oneself to live with uncertainty. However, if one believes, as I do, that we can't know the nature of metaphysical reality, then thinking about the properties of God becomes meaningless. If we can't know whether a divine being exists, then trying to think further about the nature of such a being can't be done either.Aleta
October 14, 2010
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And also the argument “everything that exists has a beginning” would immediately lead into absurdity as it would create an infinite regress of beginnings as a necessary conclusion or the axiom has not always been in effect thus making it arbitrary and thus unnecessary.Innerbling
October 14, 2010
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As further note I think that the existence of immaterial laws such as laws of logic thus completely invalidate the argument "everything that exists has a beginning" as laws of logic have no beginning nor end.Innerbling
October 14, 2010
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