Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

Stirring the Pot, 3: What about the so-called Laws of Thought/First Principles of Right Reason?

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Cf follow up on laws of thought including cause, here

In our day, it is common to see the so-called Laws of Thought or First Principles of Right Reason challenged or dismissed. As a rule, design thinkers strongly tend to reject this common trend, including when it is claimed to be anchored in quantum theory.

Going beyond, here at UD it is common to see design thinkers saying that rejection of the laws of thought is tantamount to rejection of rationality, and is a key source of endless going in evasive rhetorical circles and refusal to come to grips with the most patent facts; often bogging down attempted discussions of ID issues.

The debate has hotted up over the past several days, and so it is back on the front burner.

But, why are design thinkers today inclined to swim so strongly against a cultural tide that may often seem to be overwhelming?

Perhaps, Wikipedia, speaking against known ideological inclination on the Law of Thought, may help us begin to see why:

That everything be ‘the same with itself and different from another’ (law of identity) is the self-evident first principle upon which all symbolic communication systems (languages) are founded, for it governs the use of those symbols (names, words, pictograms, etc.) which denote the various individual concepts within a language, so as to eliminate ambiguity in the conveyance of those concepts between the users of the language. Such a principle (law) is necessary because symbolic designators have no inherent meaning of their own, but derive their meaning from the language users themselves, who associate each symbol with an individual concept in a manner that has been conventionally prescribed within their linguistic group . . . .

we cannot think without making use of some form of language (symbolic communication), for thinking entails the manipulation and amalgamation of simpler concepts in order to form more complex ones, and therefore, we must have a means of distinguishing these different concepts. It follows then that the first principle of language (law of identity) is also rightfully called the first principle of thought, and by extension, the first principle reason (rational thought).

In short, to think reasonably about the world, we must mentally dichotomise, and once that is done, the first principles of right reason apply.

For instance (to connect to reality not just words), consider say a bright red ball on a table:

Where Jupiter (seen here in IR some days after the Shoemaker-Levy 9 multiple comet impact) is the ultimate “red ball” — but one — in our solar system:

 

Or, analysing in terms of an abstraction of this observational/experiential situation that brings out the laws of thought and the issue of warrant against accuracy to experiential reality:

Okay, you may say:  that addresses the world of thinking. In cases where we mark distinctions, then the distinction obtains, but that does not bridge to reality.

Or, does it?

So long as there is a distinction between the red ball on the table and the rest of the world, and so long as it is inevitable that we do know something about the world, on pain of absurdity, these will also apply to external reality. The laws are objective not just subjective.

Take, one who suggests there is an ugly gulch between our inner world of appearances and thoughts, and the outer one of things in themselves, so that we can never bridge the gap.

But, to make such a claim is to make a claim to know something about  external reality, its alleged un-knowable nature.

Self-referential incoherence leading to confusion, in short.

(That will not faze some, but that only tells the rest of us, that such are beyond the reach of reason. Pray for them, that is their only hope.)

So, we are back at the objectivity of these first principles of right reason.

Let me now clip a comment just made in the KN thread:

This, from Wiki speaking against known ideological inclination, on the Laws of Thought c. Feb 2012 [cf Rationale], may help in understanding how the three key first principles of right reason are inextricably linked:

The law of non-contradiction and the law of excluded middle are not separate laws per se, but correlates of the law of identity. That is to say, they are two interdependent and complementary principles that inhere naturally (implicitly) within the law of identity, as its essential nature . . . whenever we ‘identify’ a thing as belonging to a certain class or instance of a class, we intellectually set that thing apart from all the other things in existence which are ‘not’ of that same class or instance of a class. In other words, the proposition, “A is A and A is not ~A” (law of identity) intellectually partitions a universe of discourse (the domain of all things) into exactly two subsets, A and ~A, and thus gives rise to a dichotomy. As with all dichotomies, A and ~A must then be ‘mutually exclusive’ and ‘jointly exhaustive’ with respect to that universe of discourse. In other words, ‘no one thing can simultaneously be a member of both A and ~A’ (law of non-contradiction), whilst ‘every single thing must be a member of either A or ~A’ (law of excluded middle).

See what happens so soon as we make a clear and crisp distinction?

Therefore, why I highlight how we are using glyphs, characters, words, sentences, symbols, relations, expressions etc in trying to make all of these novel “logics” or Quantum speculations, etc?

That is, we inescapably are marking distinctions and are dichotomising reality, into (T|NOT-T) . . . (H|NOT_H) . . . (A|NOT_A) . . . (T|NOT_T) etc. just to type out a sentence. The stability of identity of T, H, A, T then leads straight to the correlates, that we have marked a distinction that is “‘mutually exclusive’ and ‘jointly exhaustive’ with respect to that universe of discourse.”

The implication is, that so soon as we make sharp distinctions and identify things on the one side thereof, we are facing the underlying significance of such distinctions: A is A, A is not NOT_A, and there is not a fuzzy thing out there other than A and NOT_A. of course, there are spectra or trends or timelines that credibly have a smooth gradation along a continuum, there are superpositions and there are trichotomies etc [which can be reduced to structured sets of dichotomies). But so soon as we are even just talking of this, we are inescapably back to the business of making (A|NOT_A) distinctions.

That is where I find myself standing this morning.

What about you? END

Comments
For my part, I would say that I find there to be quite serious problems with Berkeley's position, independent of his theism. It's up to you if you want to get into it or not.Kantian Naturalist
March 28, 2013
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KN, re. 141 again: A footnote: I had the thought that perhaps the reason I am satisfied with Berkeley's solution and you are not is that I am certain of the existence of the Divine, which makes Berkeley's thought complete, whereas you at least have doubts on that score. What do you think?Bruce David
March 28, 2013
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Ericm re. #142:
No. The difficulty has arisen because you insist on using the word in a way that is different than practically every other English speaker uses the word. That indeed makes conversation difficult. But it does not point to any deep philosophy.
The subject under discussion is precisely whether ordinary use of the words and the concepts which underlie them are an accurate reflection of the way things really are. A criticism based on the way "practically every other English speaker uses the word" is thus not really relevant. If you think the concepts I am trying to illuminate don't "point to any deep philosophy", I refer you to KN's post above (#141) and also the book Biocentrism by Robert Lanza and Bob Herman, both distinguished scientists (in other words, no slouches intellectually). There is an entire chapter in that book devoted to precisely the question KF and I are discussing (Chapter 5, "Where Is the Universe?") as part of a philosophical argument for a complete re-imagining of the nature of reality.Bruce David
March 28, 2013
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KN, re. 141:
Kant was after Berkeley, not before.
Really? I must be misremembering my college philosophy course where we studied Kant and the empiricists. But that was quite some time ago. For the rest, thank you very much for your description of Berkeley's thought. It is exactly what I believe to be the case, but you said it much better than I have been able to. It is really quite a beautiful description in very few words. It have been discussing with KF the question of whether red exists in the object or only in our minds, taking it as given for the sake of the discussion that there may be something "out there", something described by physics. But really, in the back of my mind, I have always held that the perception is the object. It has no other existence. I have (probably foolishly) been trying to show KF the inconsistency in his own point of view. Always a fool's errand, I guess.Bruce David
March 28, 2013
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Bruce David @135:
I respectfully disagree. Whether color is an inherent property of the object or something added to it by our perception of it is a subtle philosophical point, in my view.
It is not a subtle philosophical point. It is a semantic game. Which can be demonstrated quite easily. You say that we perceive something. Fine. And you say that our perception is where "red" is, rather than in the object. Fine. So if we take that definition of "red" then we now just have to come up with another word to describe whatever it is we are perceiving. It must be something. We don't just imagine redness all around us in random ways. I have a red mouse on my desk and every time I look at it, I perceive it to be red. The other objects around it are not perceived as red. So there is something about the object that I am perceiving that causes me to perceive red (using your concept). The question then remains: what is it about the object -- what property -- makes me perceive it as red. And the answer, in simple, everyday, ordinary language is that it is in fact red. Now you can think of the "redness" existing only in your perception all you want. But that doesn't change the reality that the very fact you have a perception means that you are perceiving something. And that something is what virtually everyone (except apparently you, and perhaps a couple of other folks) calls "red." (And, BTW, the perception of red we would call the "perception of red.") We can redefine and shift terms all we want, but it is just a semantic game.
Witness the difficulty KF and I are having on this very question. The resolution of that question also has larger philosophical implications.
No. The difficulty has arisen because you insist on using the word in a way that is different than practically every other English speaker uses the word. That indeed makes conversation difficult. But it does not point to any deep philosophy. ----- Anyway, I was just trying to determine if there might be some substance, but it is clear to me that this is a semantic issue only, so I probably won't comment further as it is unlikely to be productive.Eric Anderson
March 28, 2013
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Bruce David, (1) Kant was after Berkeley, not before. :) (2) A better way of putting it, perhaps, would be to say that under Berkeleyian idealism, there is no appearance/reality divide to begin with. (At least this is how Berkeley presents it -- I just finished teaching Berkeley, so it's fresh in my mind.) As Berkeley puts it, his view arises from two assertions: (1) that the really existing things are the things that are immediately perceived; (2) that everything immediately perceived is 'internal' to some mind or other. (3) Hence there is no 'divide', whether ontological or epistemological, between "noumena" and "phenomena" -- Berkeley's is a What You See Is What You Get philosophy. (4) An interesting feature of Berkeley's philosophy -- though this is perhaps going into more detail than anyone here cares about -- is that, as he sees it, if you're going to start off with a roughly Cartesian/Lockean picture of the mind, then one cannot avoid skepticism and Other Bad Stuff if one then also insists on making room for physical objects. Objective knowledge is saved by denying the existence of physical objects, not imperiled by doing so. (5) Personally, I read Berkeley as a profound and serious philosopher whose view turns out to be a reductio ad absurdum of the Cartesian picture of mind. That's why the basic impetus of my thought is to provide a better picture, one that begins with Kant and was increasingly refined by pragmatists and phenomenologists. And a key point there is to distinguish between the capacity whereby we are sensually directed towards particular objects, and the capacity whereby we are able to form judgments about those objects, evaluate those judgments, and so on.Kantian Naturalist
March 28, 2013
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KF, re. #139
Has it ever dawned on you that to ascertain that a certain band of wavelengths of light is consistently perceived as red, there has to be first a spectroscopic investigation that identifies light by wavelength; then a second one to see how a population responds to light of the different frequencies under standardised conditions? That there is in fact a resulting consensus that has been reported and is now in international standards? [This happens to be important to colour printing, photography and video etc.)
I am well aware of this. I am in fact an amateur photographer who uses the color capabilities of Photoshop. But these facts only support my point. The process underlying color vision, involving light emitted by the object, processed by the eye and then the brain, leading ultimately to the experience of seeing color just underscores the fact that color does not inhere in the object. It is produced in the mind. Our seeing an object as some color is an illusion. There is no color "out there", only "in here". One can define a certain band of wavelengths of EM radiation as red if one wants, but the vision, the experience, of the color red is qualitatively different from photons of a given frequency. They simply are not the same thing.
Going further, you are suspiciously close to the overly sharp dichotomising of things as perceived or conceived and things in themselves that tends to self referential incoherence. The one who imagines that there is an ugly, uncrossable gulch between the one and the other is in the incoherent position of claiming to know about the external world, its unknowability.
We've been over this already. The first thinker to suggest this "gulch" was Kant, I believe. It was later taken up by Berkeley, who dispensed with physical, independently existing "things in themselves" altogether, a view with which I, as I have already said (#94), and many other deep thinkers, concur. There is nothing incoherent about this view. You may not agree. That is your prerogative, of course. But you cannot disprove it. Too many competent thinkers have thought it through too carefully for that to be possible. We disagree, fundamentally, KF. Just let it be.Bruce David
March 28, 2013
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BD: Nope. The perception and conceptual labelling of a colour is a perceptual-cognitive exercise, but the physical excitation that triggers it is not simply a subjective process. Has it ever dawned on you that to ascertain that a certain band of wavelengths of light is consistently perceived as red, there has to be first a spectroscopic investigation that identifies light by wavelength; then a second one to see how a population responds to light of the different frequencies under standardised conditions? That there is in fact a resulting consensus that has been reported and is now in international standards? [This happens to be important to colour printing, photography and video etc.) The sum of the evidence is that there is an objective, consistent response that identifies redness as perception with an objective physical process. Going further, you are suspiciously close to the overly sharp dichotomising of things as perceived or conceived and things in themselves that tends to self referential incoherence. The one who imagines that there is an ugly, uncrossable gulch between the one and the other is in the incoherent position of claiming to know about the external world, its unknowability. A saner view is to recognise the difference, to accept the possibilities of truth and error, and to revert to warrant to identify cases of reliable knowledge. Redness happens to be one of these. KFkairosfocus
March 28, 2013
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KF, re. #136:
The AmHD is accurately summarising the view of physicists as a body of relevant empirically grounded expertise, which I had already taken time to outline.
What actually happens in the object/human system during perception is properly a subject for physics and biology, but the question of whether color is inherent in the object or located entirely in the perceiver's mind is a matter of interpretation, and essentially a question of philosophy rather than physics. Like biologists (Richard Dawkins comes to mind), physicists are no more or less qualified to answer philosophical questions than any other educated intelligent person, and in all humility, I do think I qualify on that score.
How redness works physically (and physiologically — triggering sensory cells and neural paths) does not undermine the fact of redness of objects
It most certainly does. The redness, the color which is actually perceived, is clearly not in the object itself. It is in the mind of the perceiver. We are just going to have to agree to disagree on this one.Bruce David
March 28, 2013
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Eric, re. #135
It is clear that the reason we perceive the object as having a red color is due to some physical characteristic of the object. So whether we define the word “color” as (i) the actual characteristic of the object or (ii) our perception of the actual characteristic of the object, seems to be a semantic game. It is not a subtle philosophical point.
I respectfully disagree. Whether color is an inherent property of the object or something added to it by our perception of it is a subtle philosophical point, in my view. Witness the difficulty KF and I are having on this very question. The resolution of that question also has larger philosophical implications.
What is your larger point?
My larger point can be found in #130.Bruce David
March 28, 2013
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BD: Please don't try that one on me. The AmHD is accurately summarising the view of physicists as a body of relevant empirically grounded expertise, which I had already taken time to outline. On this matter, Ise be one of dose who does hab likkle knowledge. How redness works physically (and physiologically -- triggering sensory cells and neural paths) does not undermine the fact of redness of objects. That is, again, you are on the wrong side of identity, non contradiction and excluded middle, leading to -- pardon directness -- incoherence. KFkairosfocus
March 28, 2013
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Bruce David @134: Sorry to butt in on the conversation in a drive-by fashion, but I'm wondering what your larger point is? It is clear that the reason we perceive the object as having a red color is due to some physical characteristic of the object. So whether we define the word "color" as (i) the actual characteristic of the object or (ii) our perception of the actual characteristic of the object, seems to be a semantic game. It is not a subtle philosophical point. What is your larger point?Eric Anderson
March 28, 2013
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Really, KF. This is a very subtle philosophical point. You're not going to settle it one way or the other with a dictionary definition, for Pete's sake! I'm talking about where the actual redness that we perceive is located, according to the understanding of modern science. I say it is entirely created by our minds and is not in the object at all. We perceive the object as having a red color, as being red. However, this is an illusion created by our minds. The object itself has no color at all. The color we see is supplied by our minds. This, to me, is beyond dispute. The fact that the color red is commonly defined in terms of the wavelength of light is irrelevant to the truth of the above paragraph.Bruce David
March 28, 2013
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BD, I don't have a lot of time just now, so I will say simply this: the redness of an object is an objective characteristic associated with the sense of being appeared to redly. AmHD:
red (rd) n. 1. a. The hue of the long-wave end of the visible spectrum, evoked in the human observer by radiant energy with wavelengths of approximately 630 to 750 nanometers; any of a group of colors that may vary in lightness and saturation and whose hue resembles that of blood; one of the additive or light primaries; one of the psychological primary hues. b. A pigment or dye having a red hue. c. Something that has a red hue. 2. a. often Red A Communist. b. A revolutionary activist.
KFkairosfocus
March 28, 2013
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KF, re. 131:
Not so, an object is by definition red if it reflects or emits light of certain wavelengths.
The fact that people agree to call it red when it satisfies certain conditions does not mean that it is red. The red color that we perceive does not inhere in the object. It is formed in our minds and exists there and there alone. Similarly with its solidity. We perceive it as solid, that is, exhibiting no spaces within or surface openings. That is what our senses tell us is true about it. This, however, is an illusion---it is composed almost entirely of empty space. The solidity (lack of any internal spaces or surface openings) we perceive exists entirely in our minds and not in the object itself, according to the current understanding of physics.
Absent the reality of those particles, we would not have a solar system, or a star in its middle that gives off the light and heat we need to live. And, on any reckoning, that reality preceded our own as a race.
Not in my philosophy (and Bishop Berkely's and Jonathan Edwards', and Bruce Gordon's, and Richard L. Thompson's, to name just a few). In that system, the universe works just fine, even though it is "merely" a kind of virtual reality. You can't prove that this point of view is false, KF; you may as well stop trying. I realize that I can't prove it is true either, but I believe I have very good reasons for holding it. I enumerated those reasons in #94. And please stop telling me to "think again". It should be abundantly clear that I have already given a great deal of thought to these matters. Thinking again is not going to cause me somehow to come around to your way of looking at the world.Bruce David
March 28, 2013
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BD: Pardon, but I think I need to mark up: ________ >> But what does modern science say about it? Well, for one thing, it isn’t red. It isn’t any color at all. It merely emits certain frequencies of light in response to incident light.>> 1: Not so, an object is by definition red if it reflects or emits light of certain wavelengths. 2: What science has shown here is HOW a red object is red, not at all the absurdity that a red object has no colour. >>The color is created by and exists only in our minds.>> 3: Not so, the PERCEPTION and label red are mental, but that does not mean that such are therefore not real or objective. 4: For instance (save those of us who have defects, which are observable and measurable, giving from one of my prof's report a greyish perceived colour), under reasonable and consistent circmstances, we readily recognised a red ball as just that, red. >>It isn’t solid either.>> 5: Nope, again a confusion, what we learned is HOW a solid object works, works to maintain a consistent shape and size under similar circumstances. 6: If an object does that, it is solid, not liquid (consistent volume, flows under its weight so no consistent shape) or gaseous (no consistent shape or volume, flows and spreads to fill container). >>It is made up of atoms, in turn composed of electrons and quarks [protons, neutrons etc, in turn composite in many cases at lower scales], which are almost entirely empty space.>> 7: Again, the way a solid object is made up does not change the fact that it is a solid object, it only gives us insights on how it works as such. >>Can we perceive those subatomic particles? No, we cannot. They are concepts created by physicists about which they write mathematical equations to describe the results of their experiments.>> 8: The particles are indeed below our scale of perceiving, and well below optical scale with microscopy. However, there is more than sufficient evidence that they are real. >>Are those subatomic particles “real”? That is, do they have an existence independent of our minds?>> 9: Absent the reality of those particles, we would not have a solar system, or a star in its middle that gives off the light and heat we need to live. And, on any reckoning, that reality preceded our own as a race. >> In my philosophy they are do not. >> 10: So much the worse for your philosophy, it fails the test of factual adequacy. _________ Please, think again. KFkairosfocus
March 28, 2013
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Box, et al, What is KF’s red ball? Our senses tell us that it is a spherical, solid object, colored red. But what does modern science say about it? Well, for one thing, it isn’t red. It isn’t any color at all. It merely emits certain frequencies of light in response to incident light. The color is created by and exists only in our minds. It isn’t solid either. It is made up of atoms, in turn composed of electrons and quarks, which are almost entirely empty space. Can we perceive those subatomic particles? No, we cannot. They are concepts created by physicists about which they write mathematical equations to describe the results of their experiments. Are those subatomic particles “real”? That is, do they have an existence independent of our minds? In my philosophy they are do not. However, the scenario I lay out below works either way. So the red ball is a concept that exists in our minds based on our sense impressions, which as englishmaninistanbul correctly points out, have an enormous range of subtlety and variation. Imagine the following scenario: KF’s daughter, one day while KF is away at a conference, picks up the ball from his desk. For the sake of my story, let’s say it is a red, wooden, croquet ball. She takes it out into the back yard and plays with it, and while doing so, drops it so that it rolls underneath a bush. She tries to retrieve it, but she can’t reach it. She starts to go into the house to get her mother to help her, but on the way she becomes distracted by a squirrel and forgets about the ball (she is only six, after all). When KF returns, he eventually notices that the ball is no longer on his desk, but it was not that important to him in the first place, so he doesn’t mention it to anyone. 20 years later, now married with a daughter of her own, his daughter is visiting her father and she decides to clear out some of the dead brush in the back yard. While doing so, accompanied by her daughter, she comes across the ball now half buried in the dirt and having lost its color. The discovery triggers the memory of that day so long ago when the ball rolled under the bush and she couldn’t get it back. She says to her own daughter, “Look, that’s the red croquet ball I lost here when I was your age.” Her daughter runs over and pulls the object from the earth. The half that was underground has by now mostly turned to soil, and what remains is decayed wood. Of the atoms that originally made up the ball, many are now in the soil, and many of the others have been reconfigured into new molecules by the soil organisms responsible for decay. “That’s not a ball,” her daughter exclaims. “Yes it is; it’s the ball I dropped here 20 years ago. I distinctly remember,” her mother replies. “But it isn’t even round,” her daughter points out. And at this particular moment, the ball---which remember was always simply a concept in the minds of the members of KF’s household---both exists (in KF’s daughter’s mind) and does not exist (in her daughter’s mind) at the same time and in the same sense.Bruce David
March 28, 2013
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EII: Rx, go watch a Test match or at least some 20-20. Sadly, the Windies have so long been in a mess I have given up hope for a generation -- I recommend, Australia or somebody like that. On Zeno, I would suggest that Calculus has answered, that his concepts were inadequate and so he saw conundrums that have been resolved. The problem is, Calculus is no slouch on the difficulty scale, it requires a personal intellectual revolution to understand. My best effort is to highlight that when we do a freeze frame snapshot, we see things in positions, even while they are also moving and have momentum. There is no inherent contradiction between the two. Multiply by the L'Hospital principle of the ratios of series that converge to finite limits, and the other part comes out. Namely, that ratios of form infinity-limit to infinity limit, depend term by term on which is getting there fastest and can come out to hold finite values. That is we can pass through an infinite succession of points in a finite time, and hit a limit where Achilles overtakes the tortoise. I think the modern era of digital approximations in rapid succession should tell us something. Beyond, of course, I hold that in the freeze frame the streamer tailed hummingbird -- Jamaica's Doctor Bird -- is still the hummingbird, never mind it is in a process of flying from flower to flower by furiously flapping those wings. Hence the famous buzz. The point being, that once there is a distinct identity [Doctor Bird, D], we have a dichotomy {D|NOT_D} and the laws of identity, non contradiction and excluded middle apply. KFkairosfocus
March 28, 2013
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Eric @122 It's been my stomping ground for as long as anywhere else, and even though I have since relocated to the south I inevitably gravitate back once in while. Wonderful city to visit, hellish city to live in. KF @123 Well, it was almost a cricket ball but it didn't have any stitches, some kind of cricketennisnooker ball. Funny how the brain generalises. ------- I would like to think that as a bilingual person with extensive training in translation I have a useful perspective to bring to the table, a small but unique piece to slot somewhere in the puzzle. From my angle these debates about reality can end up treating words as more real than the realities we are using them to describe. Stuff exists. Stuff happens. The only question is, are we up to describing it? To make sense of the world, we come up with (1) definitions, classifications of things, and then try to extrapolate (2) rules that apply to the classes of things thus defined. Then we see how these fare when we superimpose them on our experience of reality, and repeat. When the rules we extrapolate and adjust turn out to be consistently correct, then we have good reason to treat our definitions as a reflection of reality. But they are always provisional, subject to the discovery of any exceptions to our extrapolated rules. Water doesn't know it's in any state at all, it just does its thing. We, however, have to find a way of dealing with it practically. We notice that it acts differently at different temperatures, and so we find a name for these natures: "states" (definition). We name three states: "fluid" for when it goes splash, "solid" for when it's cold and hard, and "gas" for when it gets really hot and turns into clouds (more definitions). We then carry out some experiments and extrapolate rules that it turns solid below a certain temperature, gaseous above a certain other temperature, and stays liquid between the two temperatures. The rule turns out to be consistently correct and so we provisionally accept our definitions as valid. And by valid, we do not mean that our definitions have somehow become reality themselves, merely that they are a useful tool to process our experiences and successfully deal with reality. When we get to phase transitions, we start to see that our rules for the behaviour of solids, fluids and gases start to break down. Where is the line between one and another of the three states? Or is this transitional stage a fourth state? Oh my goodness, is this a challenge to the fabric of reality? No, this is just a problem with our system of definitions and rules. Water is water, it's just doing its thing. This is why Zeno's paradoxes, clever as they are, seem to me to be little more than navel gazing. So our system for describing the world gets tied up in knots from time to time, so what? It's a work in progress.englishmaninistanbul
March 28, 2013
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Box, The Law of Contradiction applies to what is actual, not what is potential. An object can be potentially F and potentially not F, but it cannot be actually F and actually not F at the same time. Water can be potentially steam or potentially ice at the same time, but it cannot actually be both steam and ice at the same time. In keeping with that point, Hydrogen cannot be Oxygen, but it can mix with oxygen to become water without changing its basic nature. So what about the midpoint? Several distinctions must be made. There is a stage at which water, at 32degrees, doesn’t seem to be fully liquid or fully solid, appearing to be almost part liquid and part solid. It is, as you put it, “becoming” a solid if the temperature is going down from 40 degrees or “becoming” a liquid if the temperature is going up from 30 degrees. Still, water cannot become steam or ice at the same time. Remember, that H2o is the “thing,” not the conditions that affect its state. It is its nature that is subject to the Law of Non-Contradiction. Water can BECOME either steam or ice, but it cannot also have the nature of oil, which can also change form in a different way and under different conditions (usually more severe) because it has a different nature. Without the Law of Non-Contradiction, I could not make even one of these distinctions. It is true at all times, in all places, and under all circumstances. To deny it is to embrace madness.StephenB
March 27, 2013
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Box: the calculus principle aptly captures being at the moment, in the midst of change, and it links how change leads to becoming, via cumulative effect. KFkairosfocus
March 27, 2013
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Hello KF, thank you for your response. Zeno's paradoxes come to mind indeed. I think my beef is with 'is' - 'being'/'existence'. We do not know what it is. This problem reminds me of 'I think therefor I am', which for me is undeniably true. The problem however is that we do not know what 'I' is, we do not know what 'think' is and we do not know what 'am' is. So one could wonder as to what we are talking about. The same problem emerge with LNC: we do not know what 'is' is. Allow me to introduce a definition of being. Suppose that there is Not-Being (A) and Being (B). B is a glorious enlightened state with perfect knowledge about oneself. Suppose all organisms are all somewhere between A and B on their individual road towards B. Suppose life is about learning. We already knew that life is different from things. I believe life also exists in a different way than static things. Life is becoming. I wonder if calculus concepts will be of any use here. The question, rather, is whether the LNC is an umbrella for all forms of existence. Or is tgpeeler right when he said:
To say that one is more real than the other doesn’t make any sense. Existence is existence. One either is, or one is not, whether one is God or not-God makes no difference.
Box
March 27, 2013
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Box: I'll bite briefly. The fact that you are able to recognise a distinct thing, whatever change process it is undergoing, means that here is a distinct identity. If you want to push it, you are on the road to non-standard analysis and the infinitesimal, i.e. the state in an infinitesimal instant that we can in some ideal sense snapshot -- as in, in that limit to "freeze motion" snapshot you have both present state and "momentum" on the change trend. Accumulation of incremental change on a trajectory gives achieved state relative to original. So, yes even that which is always becoming does fit in, just we now have to look to calculus concepts. And this does address Zeno's paradoxes. KFkairosfocus
March 27, 2013
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EII: Sounds almost like a cricket ball to me! KFkairosfocus
March 27, 2013
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englishmaninistanbul @120: Well said. This is also wholly relevant to the discussion we've been having on the other thread with Alan Fox, who has now expanded the thread to many comments, debating what the word "thing" means, in order to avoid the substantive question. --- BTW, are you really in Istanbul? I've had a chance to visit Istanbul a couple of times and ride across the Bosphorus. But that was many years ago . . .Eric Anderson
March 27, 2013
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What if something is in a constant flux of becoming, positioned somewhere between not-being and being - just transitional points? Suppose we as human beings are a movement between 'being unconscious' and 'being conscious'? How does LNC deal with this? Can we pin the flux down for LNC? Can we say 'this process of becoming is X and is not NOT X' ? --- @StephenB (119), can you please elaborate? I don't see how your answer connects to my question (117).Box
March 27, 2013
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If I may... Language is a vehicle for getting my thoughts into your head. But language is a few thousand labels we call words arranged in various sequences, while the thoughts, visions and sounds inside my head are crammed with practically infinite detail and texture, and rush by at great speed. Therefore words are approximations, functional tools that help me interact with you by transferring a rough outline of my thoughts at practical speeds to your mind so that we can get stuff done together. It's rather like the difference between analogue and digital imagery. I point my camera at a real scene and take a photograph broken up into digital pixels (analogous to describing something you see). When I display it on a screen your eye reconstructs an analogue image (your thoughts when you hear/read my explanation). Your reconstruction is not the same as the original, but close enough for you to recognise the real thing when you see it, even if the image I showed you was a grotty GIF. For example, while idly perusing some of the comments I saw frequent reference to a "red ball". When I saw the word "red ball" what I imagined was something hard, teracotta coloured, and roughly the size of a tennis ball. When I scrolled up to read the actual OP I saw the actual image the author used: a pilates ball on a desk. But because I know that that image is also classified in English as a "red ball", I instantly recognised it for what it was. Words are more to do with specifying what something is not than what it is. This is why centuries ago when describing the meaning of words the English started to use the word "definition", which at the time meant "the setting of boundaries". The matrix of words in English used for colours and objects places a natural limit on what the words "red ball" can be used to mean, and so I am unphased when confronted with a picture of a red ball that is different to the image in my mind when I first saw the words. Another example: In English we have the words "hair" and "feather". To us, two completely different objects. But in Turkish, the word for "feather" is "ku? tüyü", or "bird hair". So if you imagine there's a feather on the floor and I say to you, in English, "Could you please pick up the hair", you would look at me strange and say "What hair?" But if I asked you in Turkish "Tüyü al?r m?s?n?" you would pick it up without a moment's hesitation. So all this "When does a red ball stop being a red ball?" is nonsense, because it treats words as more real than the reality we use them to describe. A red ball stops being a red ball when you no longer understand what I mean when I refer to a red ball. The question of whether or not the red ball is really "real" or is just the "appearance" of some transcendent reality that merely manifests itself to our senses as a red ball is utterly, utterly beside the point. I call it a red ball. You call it a red ball. For goodness sake IT'S A RED BALL. Now let's get back to work. This is why the last paragraph in the OP contains the following caveat:
of course, there are spectra or trends or timelines that credibly have a smooth gradation along a continuum, there are superpositions and there are trichotomies etc [which can be reduced to structured sets of dichotomies). But so soon as we are even just talking of this, we are inescapably back to the business of making (A|NOT_A) distinctions.
In other words, for science to work we have to narrow our definitions down until they include arrays of objects for which rules start to work. "Red balls always..." is not a sentence that can be finished with anything useful, but "Iron balls of diameter x will always..." is. For example, "... weigh y." If you are going to argue that there are circumstances when iron balls of diameter x do not weigh y you had better have a good reason. For example, "when on Mars". This is why—and this is what I think is the whole point of the OP—it is an egregious cop-out to try to argue that there are circumstances when functionally specified information is not the product of an intelligent entity by challenging the principles of reason itself.englishmaninistanbul
March 27, 2013
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Box
If the universe at one point in time did not exist and at another point in time did exist, it follows that there was a transitional point in time – when it did not exist and exist at the same time?
According to the Law of Non-Contradiction, the universe cannot exist and not exist at the same time and in the same sense, that is, "under the same formal circumstances"). That last prepositional phrase is critical to understanding the principle.StephenB
March 27, 2013
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Box, re. #117: That's a good question. It also applies to things going the other direction as well, i.e., into dissolution. For example, let's say KF's red ball was a wooden croquet ball, and his daughter took it from the table and left it out in the garden, where it slowly biodegrades. At what point does it cease to be a ball (or red). Is there a period of time when it is both a ball and not a ball? This is not a trivial question, for the truth is that everything in the world of appearances changes over time, and often those changes are quite gradual. The law of identity essential applies to a static universe, but the universe isn't static; it is in constant flux.Bruce David
March 26, 2013
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If the universe at one point in time did not exist and at another point in time did exist, it follows that there was a transitional point in time – when it did not exist and exist at the same time? More general, how does the LNC deal with change? When something changes, it goes from 'potency' to 'act' with respect to an attribute. How about that transitional moment in time: the coming into existence of the attribute?Box
March 26, 2013
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