Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

Stirring the Pot, 3: What about the so-called Laws of Thought/First Principles of Right Reason?

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Cf follow up on laws of thought including cause, here

In our day, it is common to see the so-called Laws of Thought or First Principles of Right Reason challenged or dismissed. As a rule, design thinkers strongly tend to reject this common trend, including when it is claimed to be anchored in quantum theory.

Going beyond, here at UD it is common to see design thinkers saying that rejection of the laws of thought is tantamount to rejection of rationality, and is a key source of endless going in evasive rhetorical circles and refusal to come to grips with the most patent facts; often bogging down attempted discussions of ID issues.

The debate has hotted up over the past several days, and so it is back on the front burner.

But, why are design thinkers today inclined to swim so strongly against a cultural tide that may often seem to be overwhelming?

Perhaps, Wikipedia, speaking against known ideological inclination on the Law of Thought, may help us begin to see why:

That everything be ‘the same with itself and different from another’ (law of identity) is the self-evident first principle upon which all symbolic communication systems (languages) are founded, for it governs the use of those symbols (names, words, pictograms, etc.) which denote the various individual concepts within a language, so as to eliminate ambiguity in the conveyance of those concepts between the users of the language. Such a principle (law) is necessary because symbolic designators have no inherent meaning of their own, but derive their meaning from the language users themselves, who associate each symbol with an individual concept in a manner that has been conventionally prescribed within their linguistic group . . . .

we cannot think without making use of some form of language (symbolic communication), for thinking entails the manipulation and amalgamation of simpler concepts in order to form more complex ones, and therefore, we must have a means of distinguishing these different concepts. It follows then that the first principle of language (law of identity) is also rightfully called the first principle of thought, and by extension, the first principle reason (rational thought).

In short, to think reasonably about the world, we must mentally dichotomise, and once that is done, the first principles of right reason apply.

For instance (to connect to reality not just words), consider say a bright red ball on a table:

Where Jupiter (seen here in IR some days after the Shoemaker-Levy 9 multiple comet impact) is the ultimate “red ball” — but one — in our solar system:

 

Or, analysing in terms of an abstraction of this observational/experiential situation that brings out the laws of thought and the issue of warrant against accuracy to experiential reality:

Okay, you may say:  that addresses the world of thinking. In cases where we mark distinctions, then the distinction obtains, but that does not bridge to reality.

Or, does it?

So long as there is a distinction between the red ball on the table and the rest of the world, and so long as it is inevitable that we do know something about the world, on pain of absurdity, these will also apply to external reality. The laws are objective not just subjective.

Take, one who suggests there is an ugly gulch between our inner world of appearances and thoughts, and the outer one of things in themselves, so that we can never bridge the gap.

But, to make such a claim is to make a claim to know something about  external reality, its alleged un-knowable nature.

Self-referential incoherence leading to confusion, in short.

(That will not faze some, but that only tells the rest of us, that such are beyond the reach of reason. Pray for them, that is their only hope.)

So, we are back at the objectivity of these first principles of right reason.

Let me now clip a comment just made in the KN thread:

This, from Wiki speaking against known ideological inclination, on the Laws of Thought c. Feb 2012 [cf Rationale], may help in understanding how the three key first principles of right reason are inextricably linked:

The law of non-contradiction and the law of excluded middle are not separate laws per se, but correlates of the law of identity. That is to say, they are two interdependent and complementary principles that inhere naturally (implicitly) within the law of identity, as its essential nature . . . whenever we ‘identify’ a thing as belonging to a certain class or instance of a class, we intellectually set that thing apart from all the other things in existence which are ‘not’ of that same class or instance of a class. In other words, the proposition, “A is A and A is not ~A” (law of identity) intellectually partitions a universe of discourse (the domain of all things) into exactly two subsets, A and ~A, and thus gives rise to a dichotomy. As with all dichotomies, A and ~A must then be ‘mutually exclusive’ and ‘jointly exhaustive’ with respect to that universe of discourse. In other words, ‘no one thing can simultaneously be a member of both A and ~A’ (law of non-contradiction), whilst ‘every single thing must be a member of either A or ~A’ (law of excluded middle).

See what happens so soon as we make a clear and crisp distinction?

Therefore, why I highlight how we are using glyphs, characters, words, sentences, symbols, relations, expressions etc in trying to make all of these novel “logics” or Quantum speculations, etc?

That is, we inescapably are marking distinctions and are dichotomising reality, into (T|NOT-T) . . . (H|NOT_H) . . . (A|NOT_A) . . . (T|NOT_T) etc. just to type out a sentence. The stability of identity of T, H, A, T then leads straight to the correlates, that we have marked a distinction that is “‘mutually exclusive’ and ‘jointly exhaustive’ with respect to that universe of discourse.”

The implication is, that so soon as we make sharp distinctions and identify things on the one side thereof, we are facing the underlying significance of such distinctions: A is A, A is not NOT_A, and there is not a fuzzy thing out there other than A and NOT_A. of course, there are spectra or trends or timelines that credibly have a smooth gradation along a continuum, there are superpositions and there are trichotomies etc [which can be reduced to structured sets of dichotomies). But so soon as we are even just talking of this, we are inescapably back to the business of making (A|NOT_A) distinctions.

That is where I find myself standing this morning.

What about you? END

Comments
KN, the problem is simply this. As you stated previously:
"'I' am my body"
In that you hold that the 'I' of that statement is co-terminus with your body and that there is nothing transcendent within your body that lives past the death of your body. i.e. you do not believe that 'You' are a soul. I've already pointed out the argument from divisibility that refutes your position (JP Moreland; Hemispherectomies). But to focus in more on the topic at hand,,, Information is transcendent:
“One of the things I do in my classes, to get this idea across to students, is I hold up two computer disks. One is loaded with software, and the other one is blank. And I ask them, ‘what is the difference in mass between these two computer disks, as a result of the difference in the information content that they posses’? And of course the answer is, ‘Zero! None! There is no difference as a result of the information. And that’s because information is a mass-less quantity. Now, if information is not a material entity, then how can any materialistic explanation account for its origin? How can any material cause explain it’s origin? And this is the real and fundamental problem that the presence of information in biology has posed. It creates a fundamental challenge to the materialistic, evolutionary scenarios because information is a different kind of entity that matter and energy cannot produce. In the nineteenth century we thought that there were two fundamental entities in science; matter, and energy. At the beginning of the twenty first century, we now recognize that there’s a third fundamental entity; and its ‘information’. It’s not reducible to matter. It’s not reducible to energy. But it’s still a very important thing that is real; we buy it, we sell it, we send it down wires. Now, what do we make of the fact, that information is present at the very root of all biological function? In biology, we have matter, we have energy, but we also have this third, very important entity; information. I think the biology of the information age, poses a fundamental challenge to any materialistic approach to the origin of life.” -Dr. Stephen C. Meyer earned his Ph.D. in the History and Philosophy of science from Cambridge University for a dissertation on the history of origin-of-life biology and the methodology of the historical sciences.
Yet our material bodies are transient and disintegrate fairly rapidly upon the death of our bodies:
The Unbearable Wholeness of Beings - Steve Talbott Excerpt: Virtually the same collection of molecules exists in the canine cells during the moments immediately before and after death. But after the fateful transition no one will any longer think of genes as being regulated, nor will anyone refer to normal or proper chromosome functioning. No molecules will be said to guide other molecules to specific targets, and no molecules will be carrying signals, which is just as well because there will be no structures recognizing signals. Code, information, and communication, in their biological sense, will have disappeared from the scientist’s vocabulary.,,, ,,,Rather than becoming progressively disordered in their mutual relations (as indeed happens after death, when the whole dissolves into separate fragments), the processes hold together in a larger unity. http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-unbearable-wholeness-of-beings
Thus how is it that the transient, "I' am my body!", can apprehend the transcendent meaning of information? Exactly what gives my material body a subjective 'separate' experience in which I can introspect?
Self-awareness in humans is more complex, diffuse than previously thought - August 22, 2012 Excerpt: "What this research clearly shows is that self-awareness corresponds to a brain process that cannot be localized to a single region of the brain,",,, http://medicalxpress.com/news/2012-08-self-awareness-humans-complex-diffuse-previously.html
This is a much deeper problem than you either realize or that you are willing to let on. As far as empirics go, no one has been able to locate memories within our material bodies:
A Reply to Shermer Medical Evidence for NDEs (Near Death Experiences) – Pim van Lommel Excerpt: For decades, extensive research has been done to localize memories (information) inside the brain, so far without success.,,,,So we need a functioning brain to receive our consciousness into our waking consciousness. And as soon as the function of brain has been lost, like in clinical death or in brain death, with iso-electricity on the EEG, memories and consciousness do still exist, but the reception ability is lost. People can experience their consciousness outside their body, with the possibility of perception out and above their body, with identity, and with heightened awareness, attention, well-structured thought processes, memories and emotions. And they also can experience their consciousness in a dimension where past, present and future exist at the same moment, without time and space, and can be experienced as soon as attention has been directed to it (life review and preview),,, http://www.nderf.org/vonlommel_skeptic_response.htm
I know many others on UD can point this problem out much better that I, but in so far as I can effectively communicate the absurdity of your position, I find no warrant for your 'soul-less' naturalistic beliefs no matter how much word salad you dress them up to be with, just so to separate them from the dreaded Darwinian reductionist you pretend to be better than!
Jerry Coyne, a Holy Warrior for Darwin - James Barham - April 20, 2012 Excerpt: Darwinists deny the objective existence of purpose, value, and meaning.,,,, (Yet) everyday human life as we experience it is saturated with purpose, value, and meaning. Therefore, to ordinary people -- as to most philosophers who have given the matter deep thought -- the reductionist claims of the Darwinists are absurd on their face. In fact, they are self-contradictory, and just plain silly. Every word that comes out of Jerry Coyne's mouth contradicts his official philosophy. Why? Because he presumably means something by what he says. Because he obviously values some things (Darwinism) and disvalues other things (religion). And because he manifestly has the purpose of convincing his readers that he is right and religious believers are wrong. http://www.evolutionnews.org/2012/04/jerry_coyne_a_h058811.html
bornagain77
April 1, 2013
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I don't really understand what you're asking me here, or challenging me to say, or whatever. There's very little in (174) that makes sense to me. (I should immediately add that this is not because of BornAgain's exposition, which is perfectly clear, but because of the vast difference between our respective views, and in particular, because of the vast difference between the version of naturalism I actually hold and the reductive, Epicurean naturalism that BornAgain thinks I hold, because on his conceptual map, that's the only alternative to theism. I don't just have a different view than he does -- I have a different map of the possible views that one could have.) Now for the details: the starting-point of Bornagain's (174) looks to me like a bit of "Humpty-Dumpty" reasoning. That's what happens when you start off with one thing, and then split them up into two different things which are conceptualized as being so different from each other that it becomes a mystery as to how they are related to one another at all. "And then all the king's horses, and all the king's men, couldn't put Humpty-Dumpty back together again." On my view, no one "assigns" meanings to the noises and marks, because the very distinction between "meanings" on the one hand, and "noises and marks" on the other, is reifying a somewhat helpful distinction into a completely useless dichotomy. To avoid doing that, avoid the illusion of mystery by paying careful attention to the phenomena -- in this case, words-as-meaningful. And doing that, on the inferential holism that I favor, involves thinking about the rules or norms that constitute linguistic meaning. And those are fundamentally social: I do not "assign" "meanings" to "noises and marks" because I am not the sole inventor of the language I speak. (By the way: I tend not to watch videos of any sort, because I can absorb information much more quickly -- and retain much more of it -- by reading. So I'll read articles, but videos are a waste of my time. No doubt others here find them useful. But, just thought you all should know that about me.)Kantian Naturalist
April 1, 2013
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But KN, that still does not tell me exactly how 'you' can know that words 'mean' anything. What is it in 'you' that is assigning transcendent meaning to squiggly lines on a piece of paper, or to waves of sound in the air, or to any particular arrangements of matter, or to any light traveling through the space. i.e. What is it in 'you' that is able to tell that the particular arrangement of matter and/or energy contains 'transcendent' information within it or on it? To say that the transient components which make up your material body assign transcendent meaning to words which is not reducible to matter/energy seems absurd in the highest degree,,, John Lennox does an excellent job of drawing this paradox for the naturalist out in this video:
(Semiotics) Is There Evidence of Something Beyond Nature? John Lennox - video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F6rd4HEdffw
as John Lennox stated in the last part of the video, because of the billions of letters on our DNA,,,
"The beginnings of super-nature are already to be seen within you."
The Naturalist is simply at a complete loss to explain why this transcendent component is within us, much less how we can (begin to) understand this transcendent component. But the Theist has no such difficulty. We were made with a transcendent soul to deeply understand, and have a relationship with, a 'transcendent' reality more glorious than we can imagine right now in this temporal life:
John 1:1-5 In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was with God in the beginning. Through him all things were made; without him nothing was made that has been made. In him was life, and that life was the light of all mankind. The light shines in the darkness, and the darkness has not overcome it. Genesis 1:27 So God created mankind in his own image, in the image of God he created them; male and female he created them. Genesis 2:7 And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul.
Music:
Majestic - Lincoln Brewster http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JaLnEGzKo90
bornagain77
April 1, 2013
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Why, Box, I thought you'd never ask! :) I hold a view called "semantic holism." "Semantic atomism" is the view that meanings are assigned to words one by one; "semantic holism" is the view that words have meaning by virtue of their relationships, and that no word has meaning all by itself. More specifically, I like a version of semantic holism called inferential semantics: the view that meaning is constituted by inferential role, or the role that a term plays within a pattern of inference. For example, a parrot could be trained to say, "that's red!" whenever you show it something that's red. (Of course it would not appear red to the parrot, because parrots don't have the kind of eyes that primates have, but that's another matter.) Would we say that the parrot knows what "red" means? Perhaps, but I think not. I think we would say that, in order to know what "red" means -- in order to really have one's mind around the concept "red" -- one would need to know how to draw the correct and incorrect inferences. One would need to know that if something is red, then it is not green, or that if something is red, then it has a color. One would need, in short, a practical mastery of the relevant material inference rules for color terms. One would need to know "how to go on," as Wittgenstein likes to put it, and sort the inferences into correct and incorrect types. That's different from just being able to sort the objects under the right labels ("red" and "blue" or "triangular" or whatever). One interesting version of inferential semantics contends further that meaning is not just holistic but also strongly externalistic or communal. So, what a term means is not just up to the individual speaker. Now, philosophy of language is not my strongest suit, and I'm well aware that there are objections to semantic holism. The debates become very subtle, very quickly, and I have only recently begun to explore them. One problem with inferential semantics is that it seems to deny that non-linguistic animals have anything at all like meaningful thoughts or experiences, and that's just daft. And in fact one of the things I'm working on "in real life" is a view about animal semantic content, and how it's similar to and different from the semantic content of language-users. Lately I've been reading Paul Churchland's stuff about "neurosemantics," which strikes me as not real semantics but a sort-of-like semantics (though far preferable to Fodor's language-of-thought). I don't think that the brain is merely a syntactic engine -- but it's not a full-blown semantic engine, either! Humans and animals are semantic engines, not their brains (at least not their brains alone). Now, inferential semantics does commit me to the irreducibility of normativity to naturalism -- as I've expressly avowed many times -- and it's the normativity that I really care about. My attitude is, if it turns out that normativity cannot be satisfactorily reconciled with naturalism, then so much the worse for naturalism. But my expectation is that a sufficiently deflationary and modest account of normativity can be reconciled with a sufficiently rich and complex account of nature. So the hard work lies in figuring out what is "sufficient"!Kantian Naturalist
April 1, 2013
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Kantian Naturalist, what’s your view of semantics? How is your semantics consistent with naturalism? :)Box
April 1, 2013
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I'm not interested in defending Rosenberg's view; I'm interested in defending my own. If you want to ask, "what's your view of semantics?" and "how is your semantics consistent with naturalism?" I'd be willing to answer.Kantian Naturalist
April 1, 2013
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But KN let's get to the foundation. As a naturalist, with no 'I' apart from the atoms of your body, how can you truly explain how words can 'mean' anything in the first place? Evolution of the Genus Homo – Annual Review of Earth and Planetary Sciences – Ian Tattersall, Jeffery H. Schwartz, May 2009 Excerpt: “Unusual though Homo sapiens may be morphologically, it is undoubtedly our remarkable cognitive qualities that most strikingly demarcate us from all other extant species. They are certainly what give us our strong subjective sense of being qualitatively different. And they are all ultimately traceable to our symbolic capacity. Human beings alone, it seems, mentally dissect the world into a multitude of discrete symbols, and combine and recombine those symbols in their minds to produce hypotheses of alternative possibilities. When exactly Homo sapiens acquired this unusual ability is the subject of debate.” http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.earth.031208.100202 Is Metaphysical Naturalism Viable? - William Lane Craig - video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HzS_CQnmoLQ 1. The argument from the intentionality (aboutness) of mental states implies non-physical minds (dualism), which is incompatible with naturalism 2. The existence of meaning in language is incompatible with naturalism, Rosenberg even says that all the sentences in his own book are meaningless 3. The existence of truth is incompatible with naturalism 4. The argument from moral praise and blame is incompatible with naturalism 5. Libertarian freedom (free will) is incompatible with naturalism 6. Purpose is incompatible with naturalism 7. The enduring concept of self is incompatible with naturalism 8. The experience of first-person subjectivity (“I”) is incompatible with naturalismbornagain77
April 1, 2013
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In re: 164 Well, the history of science is full of all sorts of fascinating examples of conceptual innovation (often by way of analogy) -- Rutherford's deployment of the word "nucleus" is a wonderful case. And I think that concepts pretty much just are the rules that govern how words are used, that determine correct or incorrect usage. So I'll grant that Rutherford invented a new concept of "nucleus", and taught the rest of us to do likewise. My point, though, was that Rutherford already had a functioning vocabulary for classifying and distinguishing the regularities in his experience. And it is the vocabulary as a whole -- the living language, sedimented in or rooted in the linguistic traditions in which are raised -- that is not directly 'read off' from the regularities of experience. That is, objects do not present themselves to us with their labels on, telling us what to call them -- and that is what I meant by "concept empiricism". The labels we employ are what we bring to experience in order to discern what regularities are there. (And as we develop new concepts (theories, vocabularies, languages), our ability to notice more and more fine-grained regularities, to classify and describe, becomes correspondingly more precise. I make this point in order to underscore how a rejection of concept empiricism is consistent with scientific realism.) Though the connection might not be apparent at first, concept empiricism is the very edifice upon which everything else in Berkeley (and Locke, and Hume) depends. I say that because Berkeley's entire structure depends on the sensory-cognitive continuum: that the very fabric of experience ("sensations" or "ideas of sense") comes to us pre-classified and pre-categorized, and all we need to do is find the right words for that pre-classified structure. Whereas on my view, there is no pre-classification -- in the absence of concepts, all there is what James called "a blooming, buzzing confusion" (his wonderful phrase for the sensory consciousness of a baby). There is, therefore, no consciousness of objects, no consciousness of anything as being external, and hence no consciousness of anything being internal, either. The classification of experiences into those that are "psychological" (thoughts, sensations, feelings, desires) and those that are "physical" (spatio-temporal objects) is itself a product of acquiring a language, and both basic categories -- "the psychological" and "the physical" -- arise together and in fact are inter-dependent. I see no hope for the thought that our psychological vocabulary is more logically primitive than our physical vocabulary, nor for the thought that our psychological vocabulary has an higher ontological status than our physical vocabulary does.Kantian Naturalist
April 1, 2013
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KF, re. #165:
BD, re 156: Do you not see how you directly implied self-referentiality? That is inadvertently quite revealing. KF
I agree with Berkeley that we perceive objects directly and that they exist in a mind or minds and nowhere else. Whose minds? Ours and God's. The reference is to the mind of God, not to myself. That is where the objectivity resides. The perception is "false" if and only if we posit the existence of an independently existing physical reality that is its object. As I explained in #94, there is no need for such an assumption, and furthermore that making such an assumption creates what I regard as insurmountable philosophical difficulties. The fact that you are singularly unable to see that this point of view is not self-referential is quite revealing. If you wish to continue believing in a physical reality that exists independently of our minds and God's mind, be my guest. But I'd like to know how you solve the mind/body problem. So do yourself a favor and stop trying to prove that my view is wrong. It can't be done.Bruce David
March 30, 2013
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Box, thank you for a meaningful and stimulating discussion.StephenB
March 30, 2013
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Stephen B, Thank you for your (again) analytical clarifying comment, which shows that human potential is present at hierarchically distinct levels. Certainly food for thought. One day I will hopefully reach to my spiritual potential.Box
March 30, 2013
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BD, re 156: Do you not see how you directly implied self-referentiality? That is inadvertently quite revealing. KFkairosfocus
March 30, 2013
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KN, re. #153
The problems here come to a head in what’s sometimes called “concept empiricism,” of which Berkeley is a shining example (along with Locke and Hume). Concept empiricism says that we first notice regularities in our experience, then learn how to classify those regularities by means of concepts. The converse view, which I think is correct, holds that we are only able to notice the regularities for which we have the corresponding concepts. So this undermines the most basic premise from which all empiricism, whether classical or logical, springs forth.
My first thought is that scientific theory generation tends to work as concept empiricism would have it. For example, Rutherford, I believe it was, shot alpha particles at gold foil and noticed that a very small fraction of them were deflected. From this he created the concept of the atom as mostly empty space with a nucleus at the center. Another example: Einstein formulated the concept of light as particles based on experimental findings related to black body radiation. However, scientific hypothesis formulation is admittedly a special case. Most of the concepts with which we organize our experience are formed very early in our development. It's a kind of chicken and egg problem, and I suspect that the process is one in which both concepts and awareness of regularities in experience kind of develop in tandem. Also, the acquisition of language and through this the influence of older members of the child's circle of acquaintance must also play a role. Also, if I am right in my belief in reincarnation, then the soul that comes in to the newborn perhaps brings with it a wealth of accumulated experience from its prior lives. In either case, I don't see that the Berkeleyan model is invalidated. As for whether Berkeley's beliefs were the product of a "repressed hatred of one’s embodiment", I can only tell you that it certainly isn't true of me. You'll just have to take my word for that.Bruce David
March 29, 2013
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Box, re. #161:
Why not call it real? Your argument for calling it unreal was that you created it all.
An argument for calling it unreal (although I never used that word) is that it is the appearance of a physical universe "out there" that doesn't actually exist. Another argument is that the mystics throughout the ages and myriad spiritual traditions have affirmed that true reality exists beyond what our senses perceive and which cannot be described.Bruce David
March 29, 2013
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Box:
However an agent does. An agent controls its own potential – at least to some extent. This is an entirely different way of being. [than water]
Yes, that’s right. A human agent can realize its potential in many different ways. In each case, we must examine the context. Here are three brief examples of the ways a human can develop his potential: Biologically, a human being can, in the course of a lifetime, grow as a thing, but it cannot morph into another thing. An embryo, for example, can develop as a fetus, form into an adolescent, and mature into an adult. In this sense, he is developing as a thing, but he is not morphing into another kind of thing. In no way can he be or become a rabbit. Intellectually and morally, he can also develop as a thing, growing in wisdom and virtue, that is, as a human being perfecting his nature. While he cannot become a different kind of thing, he can, indeed, transform himself into a different kind of person. Among other things, he can progress in wisdom and virtue, or, sad to say, he can go the other way, pervert his own nature through vice, and regress. Spiritually, he can literally morph into different kind of thing—on the condition that he will die to his lower nature. Just as a plant can die to itself by becoming food for an animal, becoming a part of the animal; and just as an animal can die to itself by becoming food for a human, becoming a part of the human; a human can die to his lower nature (sin) and become an adopted Son of God, becoming a totally new creature. Notice that in each case, potential is being realized but in a different way, under different conditions, within certain constraints. Once again, it would be impossible to analyze these different contexts in the absence of the Law of Non-Contradiction. In keeping with that point, we cannot analyze the notion of "potential" without understanding the context in which the word is being used.StephenB
March 29, 2013
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BD: I (and you and Box) inhabit a virtual reality controlled by God. It appears real.
Why not call it real? Your argument for calling it unreal was that you created it all. 'Reality' was not out there but only in your mind. It looks like that is off the table, since you told us that God - and not you - creates and maintains it. So now this so called virtual reality is external to you and comes from God.Box
March 29, 2013
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KN, re. #153: Thank you very much for your critique of Berkeley. I haven't forgotten you, but I am cogitating on what you said. I have some ideas, but they aren't yet fully developed. You will hear from me anon.Bruce David
March 29, 2013
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KF, re #157:
Box is right, the participation in a simulated world requires willing suspension of disbelief.
Only up to a point. The pilot in the simulator always knows he is in a simulator and will not really die, no matter how immersed in the experience he becomes. And I, incarnated in this body, am aware that my environment is the "world of appearances" even as I am immersed in the experience. This is not a problem, KF. Read my lips, THIS IS NOT A PROBLEM. You are making up problems for me that simply do not exist. Get over it.
The fatal flaw in your scheme has been pointed out. Any scheme which requires us to hold our overall sense of the real world false — whether by it’s all in your mind or otherwise — is utterly self referential and cuts itself to shreds.
Utter nonsense! There is nothing self referential about it. I (and you and Box) inhabit a virtual reality controlled by God. It appears real. It's supposed to. But sooner or later each of us realizes it isn't real---it's an illusion. But it has a holy purpose. In other words, KF, my very life is a refutation of your contention. I live in this world, knowing that it is only appearance and not reality, but operating here as though it were real, because that is what one does when one is immersed in a virtual reality in which one has chosen to participate. And THERE IS NO PROBLEM. My life works just fine, in fact more than fine; it's pretty close to spectacular. Your protestations smash to pieces on the rock of my life as I live it. Get used to it.Bruce David
March 29, 2013
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Box, re. 156:
Bruce David, You spoke of your perception of Jupiter as your concept – created by your mind. This seems to be inconsistent with the virtual reality of a online computer game, since such a virtual reality is not created by you or the other participants but by the designer.
To oversimplify somewhat, my experience in the virtual reality is managed and controlled by God. The concepts with which I organize, filter, and understand that experience are my creation.Bruce David
March 29, 2013
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BD: Box is right, the participation in a simulated world requires willing suspension of disbelief. The fatal flaw in your scheme has been pointed out. Any scheme which requires us to hold our overall sense of the real world false -- whether by it's all in your mind or otherwise -- is utterly self referential and cuts itself to shreds. For, the second order scheme is subject to the same objection and so forth. That you have problems with the reality of a red ball on a table, with the Planet Jupiter -- including with its unexpected features from the Galilean satellites to the Cometary impacts of the 90's -- with what it means for a solid object to be solid and more, are all telling. At this stage, you are living in a hall of mirrors and have all the difficulties implied by that classic metaphor. Please, think again. KFkairosfocus
March 29, 2013
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Bruce David, You spoke of your perception of Jupiter as your concept - created by your mind. This seems to be inconsistent with the virtual reality of a online computer game, since such a virtual reality is not created by you or the other participants but by the designer.Box
March 29, 2013
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KF, re. #150: I'll give you one thing, KF. You are nothing if not tenacious. However, you are confusing regularity, predictability, and consequences with existence. I refer you again to the airline pilot in the cockpit of a 747 flight simulator handling a simulated emergency situation. He will see things, hear things, and take action. The visual and auditory cues he gets will have predictable consequences, and if he responds incorrectly, his simulated plane will crash and he will "die". But none of this regularity, predictability, and consequence in any way implies that the simulated world in which he is temporarily immersed has an objective reality. I believe that all there is is mind---our minds and God's mind. I presented the reasons for my belief in #94. God has created this virtual reality we inhabit when in a physical body for the purpose of our soul's evolution. It is intended to be compelling. To be otherwise would be to defeat its purpose. So, like the flight simulator, it includes regularity, predictability, and consequences. That does not imply that it has any existence independent of the minds that perceive it (ours and God's). There is nothing incoherent or self-referential about this philosophical system. You can't disprove it, nor can you even show that it is more reasonable to believe as you do. I believe that I presented very good reasons in #94 for my metaphysical choices. Nothing you have said comes remotely close to a good reason for me to abandon them.Bruce David
March 29, 2013
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Stephen B: (127) The Law of Contradiction applies to what is actual, not what is potential. An object can be potentially F and potentially not F, but it cannot be actually F and actually not F at the same time. Water can be potentially steam or potentially ice at the same time, but it cannot actually be both steam and ice at the same time.
This distinction between actuality and potentiality is very clear, very helpful. Let me try to build on that. From the perspective of water there is a canyon between actuality and potentiality. Water cannot reach to its potential from within; it depends on an external cause – environmental temperature. This canyon makes your analysis so very clear. Actuality and potentiality are two different planes separated by a canyon. Actual water is what it is, incapable of annexing its potential. However an agent does. An agent controls its own potential – at least to some extent. This is an entirely different way of being. I can make plans. In the here and now I reach into what I become. In a person actuality and potentiality blend in, the canyon is not present. The being of an agent is not confined to actuality but is also potential. An agent is becoming - change from within. Potentiality is part of who he is. At the beginning of this sentence I’m already the man who wrote this sentence. The writing of this sentence is one experience – a flux of midpoints rather than confined isolated moments. The man who did not write this sentence and the man who did write this sentence are one and the same. In me actuality and potentiality are one. I am becoming.
Stephen B (127):Remember, that H2o is the “thing,” not the conditions that affect its state.
I agree, and it is different with an agent.Box
March 29, 2013
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In re: 149, a brief critique of Berkeley: Berkeley, like most philosophers of the modern period, is committed to the sensory-cognitive continuum: the view that there is no difference in kind between perceptions and judgments. (Examples: Descartes thinks that sensations and thoughts differ only because the former are "vague and confused" and the latter are "clear and distinct"; Berkeley distinguishes between "ideas of sense" and "ideas of imagination" (also, quite notoriously, between "ideas" and "notions"); Hume distinguishes between "impressions" and the "ideas" that are "copied" from them.) I think that the SCC is a serious mistake; perceptions and thoughts are quite different, although correctly describing that difference is not easily done. I have my own view on how to do that, and so do lots of other people working on this topic. The problems here come to a head in what's sometimes called "concept empiricism," of which Berkeley is a shining example (along with Locke and Hume). Concept empiricism says that we first notice regularities in our experience, then learn how to classify those regularities by means of concepts. The converse view, which I think is correct, holds that we are only able to notice the regularities for which we have the corresponding concepts. So this undermines the most basic premise from which all empiricism, whether classical or logical, springs forth. (Notice: what prevents this view from being full-blown Hegelian idealism is that the possession of the concepts is the ground of the noticing of the regularities -- conceptuality does not constitute those regularities.) So that's one point. Another problem I have with Berkeley's immaterialism is that the denial of the existence of physical objects, including one's own body, really does look to me like an expression of repressed hatred of one's embodiment -- what Nietzsche calls "the ascetic ideal" -- when one's own sensuality becomes a site of anxiety. To even want to deny the existence of one's own body is, on this view, an expression of a life that does not want to live, that is, a kind of sick or diseased life. There's this persistent anxiety about "matter" -- as that which is inert, passive, dead -- at work in Berkeley's philosophy, and an instinctive recoil -- it's as if he finds matter repulsive or disgusting. I know that's not really much of an argument against immaterialism; it's more of a diagnosis of what is really going on, psychologically, with Berkeley's wanting that view to be true.Kantian Naturalist
March 29, 2013
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Okay, I will not try to redo the comment, too much on the table. I will instead snip the remark by Locke on the need to take due balance on degree of certainty regarding knowledge and the fundamentally silly nature of hyperskepticism, in whatever forms:
Men have reason to be well satisfied with what God hath thought fit for them, since he hath given them (as St. Peter says [NB: i.e. 2 Pet 1:2 - 4]) pana pros zoen kaieusebeian, whatsoever is necessary for the conveniences of life and information of virtue; and has put within the reach of their discovery, the comfortable provision for this life, and the way that leads to a better. How short soever their knowledge may come of an universal or perfect comprehension of whatsoever is, it yet secures their great concernments [Prov 1: 1 - 7], that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their Maker, and the sight of their own duties [cf Rom 1 - 2 & 13, Ac 17, Jn 3:19 - 21, Eph 4:17 - 24, Isaiah 5:18 & 20 - 21, Jer. 2:13, Titus 2:11 - 14 etc, etc]. Men may find matter sufficient to busy their heads, and employ their hands with variety, delight, and satisfaction, if they will not boldly quarrel with their own constitution, and throw away the blessings their hands are filled with, because they are not big enough to grasp everything . . . It will be no excuse to an idle and untoward servant [Matt 24:42 - 51], who would not attend his business by candle light, to plead that he had not broad sunshine. The Candle that is set up in us [Prov 20:27] shines bright enough for all our purposes . . . If we will disbelieve everything, because we cannot certainly know all things, we shall do muchwhat as wisely as he who would not use his legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no wings to fly. [Emphases added. Text references also added, to document the sources of Locke's biblical allusions and citations.]
kairosfocus
March 29, 2013
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Moderator: WP just vanished a significant comment I spent a fair time on, on the no-warning excuse that I must be logged in to comment. Is that a bug or a "feature."? KFkairosfocus
March 29, 2013
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BD: You are rejecting adequate warrant. There is adequate warrant that there is such a thing as objective redness -- indeed, of many shades of red, as artists and fashion-conscious ladies will inform us. Your problem seems rooted in a demand for a kind of certainty in knowledge of the external world that is simply not in our gift. I assure you, however, that if you had medicines that bore the label that if they go off the pills will turn red, and you saw that happen, you would stop taking the pills. Similarly, I am fairly sure you stop at red lights. So the idiosyncratic demand that we reject the evidence that there is an objective state of affairs, redness, and with it accept the notion that first principles of right reason are merely linguistic, conventional and arbitrary by implication, is plainly unreasonable. I respectfully suggest that you think again. KFkairosfocus
March 29, 2013
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KN, re. #146
For my part, I would say that I find there to be quite serious problems with Berkeley’s position, independent of his theism. It’s up to you if you want to get into it or not.
Yes, please. I would love to hear what you have to say on that subject. If I'm missing something, I really would like to know.Bruce David
March 28, 2013
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KF, re. 147:
A physical investigation will lead to the conclusion that objects that will appear red to us under normal circumstances do so by reflecting or emitting a certain bandwidth of light. Such objects may reasonably be labelled red to denote this identifying characteristic, though of course certain languages do not do so.
The fact that we label something red after having learned the physical mechanisms that correlate to our minds perceiving that color simply isn't a warrant for claiming that the color actually exists in the object. It doesn't. It exists solely in our minds. Unless, of course, as Berkeley claims and I actually believe, the perception is the object. But I know you aren't willing to go anywhere near that far.
But I have long since learned that mere adequacy of warrant for a point will almost never be enough for those committed not to see the point.
I'm sure it comes as no surprise that that is exactly how I see your unwillingness or inability to grasp the point which I have been trying to make.Bruce David
March 28, 2013
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BD: I have already pointed out enough to show that there are objective states of affairs concerning objects that make for the case that we consistently perceive redness in certain objects, like the exercise ball on the table in the OP. A physical investigation will lead to the conclusion that objects that will appear red to us under normal circumstances do so by reflecting or emitting a certain bandwidth of light. Such objects may reasonably be labelled red to denote this identifying characteristic, though of course certain languages do not do so. However, someone who speaks such a language, and who has normal colour vision, can be led to understand what red is. In short, there is an objective state of affairs, part of the distinct identity of certain objects, that makes them red, leading to a particular stimulus, often labelled "red" or "rojo" etc. The denial of that distinct identity as a facet of reality simply leads to incoherence, as is seen above. But I have long since learned that mere adequacy of warrant for a point will almost never be enough for those committed not to see the point. KF PS: Onlookers interested in some of the background may want to look here on in context.kairosfocus
March 28, 2013
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