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Mark Frank poses an interesting thought experiment on free will

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In a comment on kairosfocus’ latest excellent post, Does ID ASSUME “contra-causal free will” and “intelligence” (and so injects questionable “assumptions”)?, Mark Frank proposes a thought experiment in support of his view that determinism is fully compatible with free will. It goes as follows:

Start with a dog. Dogs make choices in the sense that they may accept or reject a treat, may obey or disobey an order, may chase a rabbit or not. Suppose we advance our understanding of dogs’ brains and thought processes so that a genius vet can predict with 100% accuracy how a dog will choose in any given situation given its past history and current circumstances. Surely this is conceivable? If we manage this do we now say that dogs are making real choices? If it they are real choices then this is compatibilism in action. So I guess, in these circumstances, you would say that we have shown they do not really have free will.

Now extend it to infants – say two year olds. They make choices – eat or don’t eat, cry or don’t cry, hug or don’t hug. So let’s imagine we repeat the process with them. A genius paediatrician in this case (maybe you one day!). Are the infants also lacking free will? Either compatabilism is true or they haven’t got free will.

OK. Now apply it to an adult human. If it is conceivable for a dog and an infant then surely it is conceivable for an adult. A genius psychologist observes an adult and is able to predict all their decisions and explain why – exactly how each decision is determined by their genetics, personal history and current environment (it doesn’t have to be a materialist explanation). Has that adult got free will? Either compatabilism is true or they haven’t got free will.

And finally apply to yourself. Suppose it turns out a genius psychologist has been monitoring you all your life and has been able to correctly predict all your decisions and also how the decision making process worked in detail – how your different motivations were balanced and interacted with your perceptions and memories resulting in each decision (including any dithering and worrying about whether you got it right). Would that mean you thought you had free will but actually didn’t? Either compatabilism is true or you haven’t got free will.

As my computer is currently kaput, this will be a very short post. I’d like to suggest that what Mark Frank has left out of the equation is language, the capacity for which is what differentiates us from other animals. (Human infants possess this capacity but do not yet exercise it, partly because their brains, when they are newborn, are still too immature for language production, and also because they have yet to build up a linguistic databank that would enable them to express what they want to get across.)

Language is central to human rationality because rationality is not just a matter of selecting the appropriate means to realize a desired end: it is also a critical activity, in which agents are expected to be able to justify their choices and respond to questions like “Why did you do that?” People don’t just act rationally; they give reasons for their actions. In order to do that, you need a language in which you can generate an indefinitely large number of sentences, as the range of possible situations in which you might find yourself is potentially infinite – particularly when we factor in the little complicating circumstances that may arise.

What is distinctive about human language, as opposed to animal “language,” is precisely this ability to generate an infinite number of sentences. This uniquely human ability was the subject of a recent article in the Washington Post titled, Chirps, whistles, clicks: Do any animals have a true ‘language’?, which was discussed in a recent post by News (emphases are mine – VJT):

A new study on animal calls has found that the patterns of barks, whistles, and clicks from seven different species appear to be more complex than previously thought. The researchers used mathematical tests to see how well the sequences of sounds fit to models ranging in complexity…

“We’re still a very, very long way from understanding this transition from animal communication to human language, and it’s a huge mystery at the moment,” said study author and zoologist Arik Kershenbaum, who did the work at the National Institute for Mathematical and Biological Synthesis…

“What makes human language special is that there’s no finite limit as to what comes next,” he said….

But what separates language from communication? Why can’t we assume that whales, with their elaborate songs, are simply speaking “whale-ese”?

To be considered a true language, there are a few elements that are usually considered to be essential, says Kershenbaum. For one, it must be learned rather than instinctive — both whales and birds have this piece covered. For instance, killer whale calves learn a repertoire of calls from their mothers, and the sounds gradually evolve from erratic screams to adult-like pulsed calls and whistles.

What holds whales and other animals back from language is that there is a limit to what they can express. There are only so many calls that each may convey different emotions, but only we have an unlimited ability to express abstract ideas.

The problem for scientists is that no one knows how language evolved. Oddly enough, there don’t seem to be any transitional proto-languages between whale and bird songs — said to be the most sophisticated animal calls — and our own speech.

There are two conflicting theories of how language evolved in humans. The first is that human language evolved slowly and gradually, just as most traits evolved in the animal world. So perhaps it started with gestures, and then words and sentences. Or language may have started out more like bird song — with complex but meaningless sounds — and the last stage was attaching meaning to these sounds.

Reading the last paragraph in the passage quoted above brings to mind Nobel Laureate John Eccles’ derisive remarks about “promissory materialism.” The fact is that scientists haven’t got a clue how language evolved – and for a very good reason. The gap between the law-governed deterministic processes we observe in Nature and the infinite flexibility of human language is an unbridgeable one.

That is why no psychologist could ever, even in principle, predict everything that a rational adult human being will think, say and do. Language, which is fundamentally unpredictable, is part of the warp-and-woof of human life. Hence the antecedent in Mark Frank’s thought experiment – “What if a psychologist could predict every decision that you make?” – is impossible, by definition.

Back in 1957, behaviorist B. F. Skinner wrote a best-selling book with the amusing title, Verbal Behavior. I hope readers can see now why language is much more than mere behavior.

Thoughts?

Comments
KF When Paul and Peter were jailed and warned to stop preaching The Way, but they kept doing it, regardless of the expected consequences, does that act relate to free will?Dionisio
September 3, 2014
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PS: The Eng Derek Smith model, of a cybernetic loop "robot" with a two tier controller with shared resources is summarised here. The in the loop i/o controller can easily be seen as an influenced computational device that hosts an oracle that transcends the blind computational, Turing type device limit. In a world of quantum influences with astonishing impacts of the act of observation, this is not foolish on its face. The alternative, that this higher order controller is simply more of the same, runs into not only difficulties with evolutionary writing of FSCO/I rich programming, but also with the inherent limits of blind GIGO limited cause effect chain computational processing. Ponder why system development requires so much troubleshooting and debugging.kairosfocus
September 3, 2014
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#126 follow-up If someone is under strong peer pressure to do something, but he/she resists the pressure, even if it upsets many around, and even suddenly makes him/her 'unpopular' and 'outcast', does that action relate to free will?Dionisio
September 3, 2014
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KF If I'm very tempted to do something (I could provide specific examples upon request), but I decide to act contrary to the temptation, is that related to free will?Dionisio
September 3, 2014
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KF Have you heard of the Maximilian Kolbe case in WW2? Could that be an example of free will?Dionisio
September 3, 2014
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G2: The first level onward answer is, consult and take seriously common sense views on responsible freedom on the ground then refine such in light of our experience of self-aware responsible choice as a conscious creature. Now, too, the decision process you outline -- and BTW cf. here on decision theory in outline (cf a short course note here) -- depends on:
a: being able to reason (not merely carry out blind mechanical cause-effect chain GIGO limited computational processing predetermined by an underlying design and/or programming, maybe with some fed in random variables . . . ), ground and warrant alternatives in a rational manner, b: as a self-aware, situation-aware, insightful, purposeful, valuing and morally governed contemplative logical thinker c: who is able to follow logic and weigh relative merits on at least an ordered ranking scale as well as handle risk and uncertainty [cf. the linked defn in the first linked from Investopedia], d: then go out and do whichever comes up best as opposed to merely popping up on the statistical odds or being driven by blind, mechanical cause-effect chains and whatever hidden forcings or irresistible impulses or warped perceptions they impose . . . in all this, e: exhibiting bounded rationality. In turn f: that requires genuinely responsible freedom, not g: the sort of determinism that results from evo mat or its fellow travellers, and h: it is decisively counter to the clever but loaded redefinition of "choice" in so-called compatibilism. i: Compatibilism ends up (perhaps by subtler routes of thought . . . hint on self referential troubles, here) in the same basic error of grand delusion as the sort of blatant electrochemical determinism that Sir Francis Crick advocated in his 1994 The Astonishing hypothesis:
. . . that "You", your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules. As Lewis Carroll's Alice might have phrased: "You're nothing but a pack of neurons." This hypothesis is so alien to the ideas of most people today that it can truly be called astonishing.
Philip Johnson has replied that Sir Francis should have therefore been willing to preface his works thusly: "I, Francis Crick, my opinions and my science, and even the thoughts expressed in this book, consist of nothing more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules." Johnson then acidly commented: “[[t]he plausibility of materialistic determinism requires that an implicit exception be made for the theorist.” [[Reason in the Balance, 1995.] William Provine in his well known U Tenn 1998 Darwin Day Keynote put it this way:
Naturalistic evolution has clear consequences that Charles Darwin understood perfectly. 1) No gods worth having exist; 2) no life after death exists; 3) no ultimate foundation for ethics exists; 4) no ultimate meaning in life exists; and 5) human free will is nonexistent . . . . The first 4 implications are so obvious to modern naturalistic evolutionists that I will spend little time defending them. Human free will, however, is another matter. Even evolutionists have trouble swallowing that implication. I will argue that humans are locally determined systems that make choices. They have, however, no free will . . .
So, I am not going after a mere strawman, there is a genuine incompatibility between evolutionary materialism (and its fellow travellers) and responsible freedom. Which is a precondition of rationality. For myself, I have outlined (the original is about 25 years back) how I see evolutionary materialism as irretrievably falling into self-referential incoherence . . . even without first demanding an answer as to how the FSCO/I rich neural network programming in our CNS that gives us the pivotal linguistic ability was supposedly incrementally composed on credible empirical evidence and pop genetics:
a: Evolutionary materialism argues that the cosmos is the product of chance interactions of matter and energy, within the constraint of the laws of nature; from hydrogen to humans by undirected chance and necessity. b: Therefore, all phenomena in the universe, without residue, are determined by the working of purposeless laws of chance and/or mechanical necessity acting on material objects, under the direct or indirect control of happenstance initial circumstances. (This is physicalism. This view covers both the forms where (a) the mind and the brain are seen as one and the same thing, and those where (b) somehow mind emerges from and/or "supervenes" on brain, perhaps as a result of sophisticated and complex software looping. The key point, though is as already noted: physical causal closure -- the phenomena that play out across time, without residue, are in principle deducible or at least explainable up to various random statistical distributions and/or mechanical laws, from prior physical states. Such physical causal closure, clearly, implicitly discounts or even dismisses the causal effect of concept formation and reasoning then responsibly deciding, in favour of specifically physical interactions in the brain-body control loop; indeed, some mock the idea of -- in their view -- an "obviously" imaginary "ghost" in the meat-machine. [[There is also some evidence from simulation exercises, that accuracy of even sensory perceptions may lose out to utilitarian but inaccurate ones in an evolutionary competition. "It works" does not warrant the inference to "it is true."] ) c: But human thought, clearly a phenomenon in the universe, must now fit into this meat-machine picture. So, we rapidly arrive at Crick's claim in his The Astonishing Hypothesis (1994): what we subjectively experience as "thoughts," "reasoning" and "conclusions" can only be understood materialistically as the unintended by-products of the blind natural forces which cause and control the electro-chemical events going on in neural networks in our brains that (as the Smith Model illustrates) serve as cybernetic controllers for our bodies. d: These underlying driving forces are viewed as being ultimately physical, but are taken to be partly mediated through a complex pattern of genetic inheritance shaped by forces of selection [["nature"] and psycho-social conditioning [["nurture"], within the framework of human culture [[i.e. socio-cultural conditioning and resulting/associated relativism]. And, remember, the focal issue to such minds -- notice, this is a conceptual analysis made and believed by the materialists! -- is the physical causal chains in a control loop, not the internalised "mouth-noises" that may somehow sit on them and come along for the ride. (Save, insofar as such "mouth noises" somehow associate with or become embedded as physically instantiated signals or maybe codes in such a loop. [[How signals, languages and codes originate and function in systems in our observation of such origin -- i.e by design -- tends to be pushed to the back-burner and conveniently forgotten. So does the point that a signal or code takes its significance precisely from being an intelligently focused on, observed or chosen and significant alternative from a range of possibilities that then can guide decisive action.]) e: For instance, Marxists commonly derided opponents for their “bourgeois class conditioning” — but what of the effect of their own class origins? Freudians frequently dismissed qualms about their loosening of moral restraints by alluding to the impact of strict potty training on their “up-tight” critics — but doesn’t this cut both ways? Should we not ask a Behaviourist whether s/he is little more than yet another operantly conditioned rat trapped in the cosmic maze? And -- as we saw above -- would the writings of a Crick be any more than the firing of neurons in networks in his own brain? f: For further instance, we may take the favourite whipping-boy of materialists: religion. Notoriously, they often hold that belief in God is not merely cognitive, conceptual error, but delusion. Borderline lunacy, in short. But, if such a patent "delusion" is so utterly widespread, even among the highly educated, then it "must" -- by the principles of evolution -- somehow be adaptive to survival, whether in nature or in society. And so, this would be a major illustration of the unreliability of our conceptual reasoning ability, on the assumption of evolutionary materialism. g: Turning the materialist dismissal of theism around, evolutionary materialism itself would be in the same leaky boat. For, the sauce for the goose is notoriously just as good a sauce for the gander, too. h: That is, on its own premises [[and following Dawkins in A Devil's Chaplain, 2004, p. 46], the cause of the belief system of evolutionary materialism, "must" also be reducible to forces of blind chance and mechanical necessity that are sufficiently adaptive to spread this "meme" in populations of jumped- up apes from the savannahs of East Africa scrambling for survival in a Malthusian world of struggle for existence. Reppert brings the underlying point sharply home, in commenting on the "internalised mouth-noise signals riding on the physical cause-effect chain in a cybernetic loop" view: . . . let us suppose that brain state A, which is token identical to the thought that all men are mortal, and brain state B, which is token identical to the thought that Socrates is a man, together cause the belief that Socrates is mortal. It isn’t enough for rational inference that these events be those beliefs, it is also necessary that the causal transaction be in virtue of the content of those thoughts . . . [[But] if naturalism is true, then the propositional content is irrelevant to the causal transaction that produces the conclusion, and [[so] we do not have a case of rational inference. In rational inference, as Lewis puts it, one thought causes another thought not by being, but by being seen to be, the ground for it. But causal transactions in the brain occur in virtue of the brain’s being in a particular type of state that is relevant to physical causal transactions. [[Emphases added. Also cf. Reppert's summary of Barefoot's argument here.] i: The famous geneticist and evolutionary biologist (as well as Socialist) J. B. S. Haldane made much the same point in a famous 1932 remark: "It seems to me immensely unlikely that mind is a mere by-product of matter. For if my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically. And hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms. In order to escape from this necessity of sawing away the branch on which I am sitting, so to speak, I am compelled to believe that mind is not wholly conditioned by matter.” [["When I am dead," in Possible Worlds: And Other Essays [1927], Chatto and Windus: London, 1932, reprint, p.209. (Highlight and emphases added.)] j: Therefore, though materialists will often try to pointedly ignore or angrily brush aside the issue, we may freely argue: if such evolutionary materialism is true, then (i) our consciousness, (ii) the "thoughts" we have, (iii) the conceptualised beliefs we hold, (iv) the reasonings we attempt based on such and (v) the "conclusions" and "choices" (a.k.a. "decisions") we reach -- without residue -- must be produced and controlled by blind forces of chance happenstance and mechanical necessity that are irrelevant to "mere" ill-defined abstractions such as: purpose or truth, or even logical validity. (NB: The conclusions of such "arguments" may still happen to be true, by astonishingly lucky coincidence — but we have no rational grounds for relying on the “reasoning” that has led us to feel that we have “proved” or "warranted" them. It seems that rationality itself has thus been undermined fatally on evolutionary materialistic premises. Including that of Crick et al. Through, self-reference leading to incoherence and utter inability to provide a cogent explanation of our commonplace, first-person experience of reasoning and rational warrant for beliefs, conclusions and chosen paths of action. Reduction to absurdity and explanatory failure in short.) k: And, if materialists then object: “But, we can always apply scientific tests, through observation, experiment and measurement,” then we must immediately note that -- as the fate of Newtonian Dynamics between 1880 and 1930 shows -- empirical support is not equivalent to establishing the truth of a scientific theory. For, at any time, one newly discovered countering fact can in principle overturn the hitherto most reliable of theories. (And as well, we must not lose sight of this: in science, one is relying on the legitimacy of the reasoning process to make the case that scientific evidence provides reasonable albeit provisional warrant for one's beliefs etc. Scientific reasoning is not independent of reasoning.) l: Worse, in the case of origins science theories, we simply were not there to directly observe the facts of the remote past, so origins sciences are even more strongly controlled by assumptions and inferences than are operational scientific theories. So, we contrast the way that direct observations of falling apples and orbiting planets allow us to test our theories of gravity.
Fellow-traveller schemes that do not decisively repudiate these schemes end in much the same morass. KFkairosfocus
September 3, 2014
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gpc: My use of the term 'process' is a bit vague, 'algorithm' may be a better word, but the point is that some agent (the soul, whatever, I don't care) is making a decision. It may 'react' to something else, but in the end this reaction is a process that is describable. It must be either an algorithm, or random. I don't know of any 3rd way.Graham2
September 3, 2014
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Graham2: Begore you accuse me of introducing new and strange undefined concepts, "oral" should be "moral". :)gpuccio
September 3, 2014
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Graham2: What do you mean: a process? It's an event, not a process. I am saying that consciousness perceives its flow of representations, and reacts to it according to a oral intuition. IOWs, we are at some level aware that we can react in different ways, and that those different ways have different moral meaning. And we are free to choose. That's what libertarian free will has always meant. Billions of intelligent and serious people have believed for centuries that this is exactly what happens in their individual consciousness. If you have decided a priori that any possible event must be either a process (that is, I suppose, algorithmic) or random, then you are simply begging the question. You are free to do that, but why should I, or anyone else, agree with you? Those who believe in libertarian free will obviously believe that free choices from conscious agents are an integral part of reality, as much as necessity and randomness. You are free to disagree. But you cannot impose your view as though it were necessarily true.gpuccio
September 3, 2014
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gp: That's an awful lot of fluff, but in the end, you are still describing a process. You use the word 'react' a few times, which is exactly the point I am getting at: free will or consciousness or whatever engage in some sort of process. If it isn't a process, it must be random, unless there is a 3rd possibility Im not aware of. That's the only point I (and I thnk MF) are making.Graham2
September 3, 2014
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Graham2 and Mark: I have expressed many times my point of view: Decisions are complex processes in the mind. They certainly imply algorithmic elaborations, and probably random events. Some decisions are certainly more compulsive, others less. Free will is the power of consciousness to react differently (not randomly, but according to an intuition of some moral orientation, what we usually call "conscience") to all the contents of the conscious flow of representations, including "decisions". The different reactions of consciousness to its contents, which have a specific moral meaning, influence the flow of contents, and therefore also the final outputs. In that sense, decisions, like feelings and cognition, have a free component, which comes from the conscious "I" and has a moral meaning. That free component can be more or less prominent in observed outputs, according to our real chances to change it, which depend on inner and outer constraints, and not on our free will. IOWs, our free will can change our outputs. Wow much it can change them strictly depends on many other things.gpuccio
September 3, 2014
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MF: I am trying to get any of the creationists to fess up to how they think a decision is made. It can only be a random act (of no interest) or the result of some process (weighing up alternatives). Whether this is done in the brain, the soul, the liver or whatever is not important. However, when they quite honestly admit all their decisions are made in the soul, I just get the awful sinking feeling that we are not in the same universe.Graham2
September 3, 2014
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Graham2 I apologise - I had not been reading your comments which do seem to address much the same point.Mark Frank
September 3, 2014
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Its slowly dawning on me that MF & I are chasing the same point. VJT: You don't need to refer to other stuff, just your opinion in your own words is fine. (Please don't do a Bornagain77 on me) Your reply, in essence, was this: my decisions are ... acts of my soul If this is the case, then I don't think we can go much further. Someone who thinks the decision (to have a chocolate) is made in the soul is not really going to make a lot of sense.Graham2
September 3, 2014
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#114 VJ I think your posts and comments have improved since your computer went kaput - but you know my taste. Constructing a vision is also an act done out of free will is it not? So what was it based on? This is not a trivial point. This thread has brought home to me that one of the problems of libertarian free will is the infinite regress of choosing to choose, which can also be phrased as controlling my choice because controlling X entails choosing to do X.Mark Frank
September 3, 2014
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Hi Graham2, You ask:
If we are to choose, say between A & B, and we choose (say) A, then how did we make the choice? By throwing a dart? By applying a criterion ? How do you think we do it? Also, do you think the final decision is made in our brain ? In a 'mind'? In our soul?
Quick answer (as my computer is still kaput and as I'm in an Internet cafe, with 8 minutes to spare): I've discussed these issues in a couple of posts of mine: https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/why-i-think-the-interaction-problem-is-real/ https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/how-is-libertarian-free-will-possible/ https://uncommondescent.com/philosophy/battle-of-the-two-elizabeths-are-free-will-and-physical-determinism-compatible/ https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/is-free-will-dead/ https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/free-will-why-reports-of-its-death-are-greatly-exaggerated/ In short: my decisions are made by me, but they are non-bodily acts, and hence acts of my soul alone. Decisions are not random. They are based on a vision which I construct for myself of what's good for me - here and now, and in the long-term. Of course, in constructing such a vision, it is possible to willfully ignore certain facts that one should advert to, because of over-weening self-love - which is what makes wickedness possible.vjtorley
September 3, 2014
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SA #104
I read that you’re not going to respond further here and that’s understandable but I just wanted to offer a few more comments.
It was only the debate with JDH that I felt had run its course – although I am not going to sustain the thread as a whole much longer.
I’d think you’d have a much higher success rate in predicting your own behavior than anyone else would,though. As you weigh options, you improve your own ability to predict yourself. This is all done internally and I’d question how an external agent could predict your choices better than you can.
I am not sure that is true. I think it is easy to get muddled about when you make the decision. Suppose you announce to the world “in 10 minutes I will choose to eat a bar of chocolate” and then 10 minutes later you do.  Actually you chose to eat the bar of chocolate when you made the announcement and I am not at all sure you would predict you were going to make the announcement the day before whereas someone who was rather clever and knew you well might well have predicted it better.
I guess it’s “somewhat predictable” as another option. I don’t understand how predictiblity works in this case, without knowing why all of those decisions could be predicted.Could someone predict the outcomes of a random event with 100% accuracy? We can imagine that happening — perhaps someone with unusual ability or luck could do it. There are fictional stories about people who do such things. But does that mean the events are not random? I don’t think the luck ability to predict something says anything about the thing that is being predicted, necessarily.
To me random entails unpredictable and that doesn’t mean always different from what everyone predicts – it means that if the outcome of X is random then people who predict the outcome of X are wrong a consistent and significant proportion of the time and however much they work at it they will never improve on that. But the big question is: is there some third option other than predictable and random? I can’t see what it is.Mark Frank
September 2, 2014
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KF: Im not sure what any of that means ... my question relates to the process we follow to choose between, say, A & B. I presume we assess alternatives, etc,etc, and based on some sort of weighting, choose one, say A. Is this what you have in mind ?Graham2
September 2, 2014
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G2: Many, many times -- I even had to pass an exam on that once, Decision Theory. One of the pivotal issues there, was that a decision node is not a probabilistic distribution node. Similarly, in programming at mac code level, one goes off and inspects the flag register to trigger which of alternative sequences is done, maybe looping back for a do while/until. In Monte Carlo sims, statistical seeds drove explorations of credible ranges of outcomes in situations with a blend of mechanical sequence and injected randomness. But all of that was not yet actual rational decision. I still think Reppert has captured essentials, in building on a point by Lewis:
. . . let us suppose that brain state A, which is token identical to the thought that all men are mortal, and brain state B, which is token identical to the thought that Socrates is a man, together cause the belief that Socrates is mortal. It isn’t enough for rational inference that these events be those beliefs, it is also necessary that the causal transaction be in virtue of the content of those thoughts . . . [[But] if naturalism is true, then the propositional content is irrelevant to the causal transaction that produces the conclusion, and [[so] we do not have a case of rational inference. In rational inference, as Lewis puts it, one thought causes another thought not by being, but by being seen to be, the ground for it. But causal transactions in the brain occur in virtue of the brain’s being in a particular type of state that is relevant to physical causal transactions.
Absent real, rational insight and understanding driven contemplative choice, knowledge, reason and morality alike collapse in grand delusion self referential incoherence fallacies. And while it is easy to make up arguments as to how subjective choosing is compatible with objective dynamics of blind chance and mechanical necessity, that in the end is in the same problem of grand delusion . . . when you argue, should I just say, you can do no other than your programming never mind the subjective sense of having "reasons" for your conclusions? Shipwreck. KFkairosfocus
September 2, 2014
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Not at all, gpuccio. They do tend to sound more snazzy. Even when merely of an automotive persuasion, such as mine.Axel
September 2, 2014
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That's a bit too cryptic for me, mung. Unless you mean a delightful 'au pair' girl having a snooze! But my half-baked attempts at a 'furren' vernacular, I expect, invite gobbledygook and misunderstandings galore.I blame it on my swiftly advancing years.Axel
September 2, 2014
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Axel: I am very excited at the thought that I have a furren name! Thank you. :)gpuccio
September 2, 2014
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Acartia_bogart: Thank you to you! It is perfectly possible to have different convictions, and share them in respect. I would say that we should probably stick to d), without any prejudice. It is very difficult to prove that "we can destroy and/or interrupt consciousness". I don't believe that is possible, and I have debated that point many times, but probably this is not the right moment to do that again. However, when I say that we should study the interface and its laws, I am not assuming that consciousness does not arise form matter. It is not necessary to assume anything for that. You see, the interface exists. It is the interface between two different observed things: subjective phenomena and objective configurations of matter. Those two series of facts are perceived differently, and there is no doubt that they interact. Therefore, we can observe an interface between the two series of facts, and study it. No assumptions are needed.gpuccio
September 2, 2014
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Axel, Thank you for explaining that term that I didn't know. My vocabulary has increased. :)Dionisio
September 2, 2014
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JDH Yes. Thank you.Dionisio
September 2, 2014
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Mark #75 I read that you're not going to respond further here and that's understandable but I just wanted to offer a few more comments.
I don’t find that at all obvious, especially if you allow for determined to include determined plus random. The word programmed is misleading because that implies some other body planning what you are to do. If you substitute predictable then it becomes more palatable and if you then add with possibly an unpredictable element very palatable. But I guess it is a question of how you define free will.
I'll admit that I'm confused on this. We have a case where every decision is predicted with 100% accuracy. This same case includes a random element. I don't think any sequence that can be predicted with 100% accuracy can truly be considered random. Predictability implies regularity and a law-like function. We have also a mix of predictable and random in your instance and I don't understand how that works. But we can leave it for another discussion on another thread.
I can’t predict what I am going to choose in many situations.
I'd think you'd have a much higher success rate in predicting your own behavior than anyone else would,though. As you weigh options, you improve your own ability to predict yourself. This is all done internally and I'd question how an external agent could predict your choices better than you can.
So I am not saying it is an illusion or that notions of accountability etc don’t count. I am just saying we don’t need a third alternative to predictable or unpredictable!
I guess it's "somewhat predictable" as another option. I don't understand how predictiblity works in this case, without knowing why all of those decisions could be predicted. Could someone predict the outcomes of a random event with 100% accuracy? We can imagine that happening -- perhaps someone with unusual ability or luck could do it. There are fictional stories about people who do such things. But does that mean the events are not random? I don't think the luck ability to predict something says anything about the thing that is being predicted, necessarily.Silver Asiatic
September 2, 2014
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Mark Frank - First of all, I disagree with your premises. I don't have any problem with the idea of a dog having free will, and I doubt that even if we knew 100% the content of their brain, we might not be able to predict its actions. Likewise for that of an infant. I think VJ Torley hit the nail on the head when he pointed out that our available responses grow as we mature, which makes the effect of the will greater. Likewise, as VJT pointed out, the development of language (really, it is higher-level thought, but language enables it) allows us to expand our range of available effects as well. Therefore, the reason why it *looks* like the infant and the dog are predictable is because their will is overwhelmed by the limited scope of the choices they can participate in. As they grow (especially humans) their abilities grow, as does the effect of their choices, and therefore, their will.johnnyb
September 2, 2014
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As in, What's that all over the couch? Furren stuff.Mung
September 2, 2014
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Dio, 'furren' means 'foreign'. It was my haplessly attempting to express myself in an American, rustic patois of the South. Well, as far as that made-up word, 'furren' is concerned, anyway.Axel
September 2, 2014
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In #89, Dio, I addressed GP, when actually, I believe, I was responding to your #87. Though it gets quite convoluted one way or another. Anyway, evidently no offence taken, so I'm pleased.Axel
September 2, 2014
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