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Materialist Poofery

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From time to time we see materialists raising the “poof objection” against ID. The poof objection goes something like this: An ID theorist claims that a given organic system (the bacterial flagellum perhaps) is irreducibly complex or that it displays functional complex specified information. In a sneering and condescending tone the materialist dismisses the claim, saying something like “Your claim amounts to nothing more than ‘Poof! the designer did it.’”

I have always thought the poof objection coming from a materialist is particularly ironic, because materialists have “poofery” built into their science at a very basic level. Of course, they don’t use the term “poof.” They use a functional synonym of poof – the word “emergent.”

What do I mean? Consider the hard problem of consciousness. We all believe we are conscious, and consciousness must be accounted for. For the ID theorists, this is easy. The mind is a real phenomenon that cannot be reduced to the properties of the brain. Obviously, this is not so easy for the materialist who, by definition, must come up with a theory that reduces the mind to an epiphenomenon of the electro-chemical processes of the brain. What do they do? They say the mind is an “emergent property” of the brain. Huh? Wazzat? That means that the brain system has properties that cannot be reduced to its individual components. The system is said to “supervene” (I’m not making this up) on its components causing the whole to be greater than the sum of the parts.

And what evidence do we have that “emergence” is a real phenomenon? Absolutely none. Emergence is materialist poofery. Take the mind-brain problem again. The materialist knows that his claim that the mind does not exist is patently absurd. Yet, given his premises it simply cannot exist. So what is a materialist to do? Easy. Poof – the mind is an emergent property of the brain system that otherwise cannot be accounted for on materialist grounds.

Comments
Hazel, we know what causes hurricanes, that is, we know about low pressure, condensation, and all that, but we don't know everything. The point is that the term “emergence,” in my judgment, is a science stopper. I don’t think we need to resort to such explanations. No doubt, multiple causes generate hurricanes, but "emergence," doesn't count as a cause.StephenB
April 25, 2009
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----David: "Second, in no case would it be a scientific explanation to say that (in the absence of such an explanation) hurricanes, bird flocks, termite mounds, convection, turbulence, sand dunes must be designed or have a nonmaterial source." I agree again. We should not assume a non-material cause. On the other hand, we should not assume that we know the cause when we don't, much less should not up our ignorance with the word "emergence." We should simply say, "I don't know." Example: In the field of psychology, we have the principle called "synergy," in which it appears that "whole is greater than the sum of all the parts." When several individuals plan together, the result often surpasses the collective wisdom of the group." However, we should not assume that the difference comes from something like "emergence." We could explain the increased whole by added information coming from the unconscious mind, which, if taken into account, would mean that the whole was not greater than the sum of the parts after all. If we just assume "emergence," we will not probe for the added causes. The irony is that ID is not the science stopper; it is the materialist concept of emergence that grinds things to a halt. Similary, thinking of God as the ultimate cause does not intrude on science at all. The question remains, "How did he do it." Materialism, on the other hand, is a science stopper, becuase it rules out that which is obvious---Someone made it all happen. If you begin with the "poof" premise, you will always err both philosophically and scientifically.StephenB
April 25, 2009
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We have no idea about the causes of hurricanes? Is this a serious statement, Stephen?hazel
April 25, 2009
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JTaylor:
StephenB: “Meanwhile, you have two choices, God, and Poof. I choose god; you choose poof.” Seriously, is there any difference?
I see one difference: While both our nouns, one is a mechanism and the other is a proper name.crater
April 25, 2009
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StephenB: "Meanwhile, you have two choices, God, and Poof. I choose god; you choose poof." Seriously, is there any difference? If we postulate God, and that there is some kind of embodied mind (soul? spirit? that inhabits the physical brain - how did it get there? After all if we follow what David K is saying, most Christians would assume that this embodied soul is probably not present in animals. We could also likely assume that this embodied non-materialist mind is irreducible complex, fair? Since then we there are no known physical processes for which such an embodiment that could occur, the likely scenario is that God installed these 'souls' onto the mind. If that isn't the very definition of 'poof' I'm not sure what is.JTaylor
April 25, 2009
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Also, as the original post shows, Barry doesn't understand the first thing about emergence in any case.David Kellogg
April 25, 2009
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The problem is that emergence (which is a legitimate way of describing complex phenomena) is dismissed by Barry as "poof." A scientific description of the mind (as emergent or not) is of course incomplete. Barry would prefer that it not even be attempted.David Kellogg
April 25, 2009
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----David: "StephenB, I don’t choose “poof.” I choose to think that describing the mind scientifically is not encroaching on God’s territory." I agree. So, what's the problem.StephenB
April 25, 2009
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-----mauka: "It apparently hasn’t occurred to Stephen that if that is a legitimate “explanation”, then so is this: the brain gives rise to consciousness." Apparently, he hasn't occurred to mauka that his account has occurred to me.StephenB
April 25, 2009
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"All your claims are statments of faith." The claim that emergence is real is not a statement of faith. Barry's claim that emergence is without support, on the other hand, is an outright falsehood. StephenB, I don't choose "poof." I choose to think that describing the mind scientifically is not encroaching on God's territory.David Kellogg
April 25, 2009
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From time to time we see materialists raising the “poof objection” against ID. The poof objection goes something like this: An ID theorist claims that a given organic system (the bacterial flagellum perhaps) is irreducibly complex or that it displays functional complex specified information. In a sneering and condescending tone the materialist dismisses the claim, saying something like “Your claim amounts to nothing more than ‘Poof! the designer did it.’”
The argument against irreducible complexity was that it was an insupportable claim of certainty. Saying that something absolutely could not have evolved through small incremental steps is a lot different from saying that we cannot imagine how it formed. When biologists suggested possible evolutionary pathways to allegedly IC structures they completely undermined the original claim. That said, Barry Arrington has a good point. It is a fascinating topic and he is right, calling something an emergent property does not tell us how it emerged. It is just a placeholder for a presumed causal connection that we have yet to observe and explain. However, we should be wary of viewing this gap in our knowledge as another opening through which to squeeze a supernatural explanation like God. Does our inability to deduce the properties of water from our knowledge of elementary hydrogen and oxygen mean that no naturalistic explanation exists or that it does but we just have not found it yet? In the absence of any demonstrable supernatural explanations and based on the relative success of naturalistic explanations we can argue that that the latter is more likely to be true but we cannot claim the certainty that some people crave.Seversky
April 25, 2009
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Question for the ID supporters here: Do non-human animals have minds? If so, are their minds material, or do they have souls as well?David Kellogg
April 25, 2009
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StephenB: "I choose god; you choose poof." Are you calling us a bunch of poofters? But does not God himself delight in the act of poofting from time to time - e.g., turning water into wine, burning bush, walking on water etc?JTaylor
April 25, 2009
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Hazel, mauka, David, I don't have time to answer you all, but I need not do so anyway. All your claims are statments of faith. You have no idea about the causes of any of the events you describe. You just say they "emgerge."StephenB
April 25, 2009
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Stephen - do you accept that the word emergence doesn't mean uncaused or out of nowhere, and that phenomena like hurricanes are emergent. That is. leaving consciousness out of it, do you accept that our universe displays emergent properties as I described them above?hazel
April 25, 2009
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----David Kellogg: "If by “explanation” (minds) you mean scientific or just non-religious, methinks you’ll be waiting a while." I expect that no scientific explanation will be forthcoming inasmuch as it is hard to reduce creativity to a scientific paradigm. Meanwhile, you have two choices, God, and Poof. I choose god; you choose poof.StephenB
April 25, 2009
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David Kellogg wrote:
mauka, perhaps Barry’s non-materialist “explanation” is like StephenB’s:
The theist, for example, has no difficulty explaining the existence of a mind. God created the human soul, complete with the faculties of intellect and will.
Heh. It apparently hasn't occurred to Stephen that if that is a legitimate "explanation", then so is this:
The physical brain gives rise to consciousness.
mauka
April 25, 2009
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I'd amplify "it is not at all clear that first person subjectivity and experience necessarily arise from the interaction of non-conscious components (such as neurons - although I personally believe that it does)" by stating that I believe that subjectivity necessarily arises from very particular forms of organization and interaction of non-conscious components. Kidneys are complex, but presumably do not give rise to conscious experience; the difference between kidneys and brain, with respect to consciousness, lies in the specifics of their physical organization, not a differences of a metaphysical kind.Diffaxial
April 25, 2009
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mauka, perhaps Barry's non-materialist "explanation" is like StephenB's:
The theist, for example, has no difficulty explaining the existence of a mind. God created the human soul, complete with the faculties of intellect and will.
If by "explanation" you mean scientific or just non-religious, methinks you'll be waiting a while.David Kellogg
April 25, 2009
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I wrote:
While it’s true that materialists have not explained how consciousness arises, neither have non-materialists.
Barry replied:
I do not agree with this statement.
Then by all means, explain to us how consciousness arises in immaterial entities. Barry:
But let it’s grant it for the sake of argument. An important distinction remains. If their premises are correct, materialists can NEVER account for consciousness.
Can you demonstrate the truth of that assertion?
On the other hand, ID theorists face no such limits. They may not at any given time know the details of how a designer designed a particular thing such as an embodied mind. Yet they know that, in principle, a designer can design massively complex and information rich things. They know this by just looking around and observing the massively complex and information rich things designed by intelligent agents that happen to be laying around all over the place.
Look closely at your argument, Barry. It boils down to this:
1. Humans have designed massively complex and information-rich things. 2. Therefore we know that it is possible for massively complex, information-rich things to be designed. 3. An embodied immaterial mind is a massively complex, information-rich thing. 4. Therefore it is possible for an embodied immaterial mind to be designed.
That argument is flawed. First, note that if the argument were true, then it would necessarily mean that humans can currently design embodied immaterial minds, which I'm sure you didn't intend. Observe:
1. Humans have designed massively complex and information-rich things. 2. Therefore we know that humans can design massively complex, information-rich things. 3. An embodied immaterial mind is a massively complex, information-rich thing. 4. Therefore humans can design embodied immaterial minds.
The flaw, of course, is that #2 is being interpreted as if it meant this...
2. Therefore we know that humans can design all possible massively complex, information-rich things.
...when it really means this:
2. Therefore we know that humans can design at least some massively complex, information-rich things.
The same flaw applies to your original argument, and so your conclusion -- that it must be possible in principle for a designer to create an embodied, immaterial mind -- is invalid. Like it or not, you and I are in the same boat with respect to consciousness. We both know that consciousness is possible, because it exists. However, neither of us can explain it (yet) within his own worldview. So on that particular issue, neither worldview has an advantage. On the other issues, materialism has the overwhelming advantage (as I pointed out in comment #20). Funny how that worked out.mauka
April 25, 2009
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hazel,
No one says that hurricanes “come out of nowhere” or that they are uncaused.
True. But they could be designed:
But the Lord hurled a great wind upon the sea, and such a mighty storm came upon the sea that the ship threatened to break up. (Jonah 1:4)
David Kellogg
April 25, 2009
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This is similar to hazel at 35. Is emergence a real phenomenon? It clearly is, although what is less clear is whether emergence has bearing upon the hard problem of consciousness. As examples, the liquidity of water emerges from molecules that are themselves neither wet nor liquids. Similarly, living organisms are composed of physical components that are themselves not alive. No one who understands the basis of wetness or the physical basis of life asserts that water isn't wet and organisms are not alive. The parallel assertion at question is: can experiential phenomena arise from the aggregation and interaction of components that that are themselves not characterized by experience? If so, how? Arguably, the wetness of water is ultimately predictable from, and supervenes upon, the properties of water molecules, which are such that they slide by one another rather than forming a lattice. It is not at all clear that first person subjectivity and experience necessarily arise from the interaction of non-conscious components (such as neurons - although I personally believe that it does). Indeed, we are not at all sure how to think about the problem (which is probably a major component of the problem). Thomas Nagel's book "The View From Nowhere" underscored the paradoxes that arise when attempting to give objective explanations (describable from an stance of abstraction that is independent of subjective or first person dependencies) of subjective phenomena. What we do know is that virtually all phenomena we understand as "mental" or "experiential" are intimately tied to the organization and functioning of the brain, such as specific disruption of that functioning disrupts specific mental processes, including (in some instances) global consciousness. With respect to the latter, bilateral damage to the Intra-Laminar Nuclei of the thalamus - small clusters of neurons about the size of a pencil eraser located on either side of the brain's midline - completely and permanently abolishes consciousness. Therefore there are strong reasons to believe that brain functioning and consciousness are intimately intertwined. It doesn't follow that "mind doesn't exist," which is itself a philosophical rather than scientific assertion, although some certainly do assert it (e.g. "neurophilosophers" such as the Paul and Patricia Churchland, among others). It may follow that "mind is what brains do" (among other things), and as John Searle once asserted, the "mind-brain problem is as vexing as the "stomach - digestion" problem. Yet even Searle doesn't assert that "digestion" is an illusion, or an epiphenomenon. I also would argue that Barry's characterization of "materialists" as simply claiming "emergence" and stopping there is inaccurate. There is a huge philosophical literature conducted among philosophers of all stripes, arguing everything from eliminative materialism to panpsychism (e.g. Galen Strawson), and it is quite a struggle. That is why we call the problem "hard." The problem with "The mind is a real phenomenon that cannot be reduced to the properties of the brain" is that one may reply, "OK. Where do you go with that?" It turns out not to be a very useful conceptual tool for doing science addressing the question. Nor does it really explain much: The question, "how are non-corporeal entities conscious" has a whack of a lot less going for it than models that assume that consciousness is emergent from living processes (including social processes), and work from there.Diffaxial
April 25, 2009
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Stephen re 53, your explanation about what emergence means is not at all correct: emergence is not saying that something came out of nowhere, nor that we don’t know its cause. It is revealing that you think it means these things, though, as that explains a great deal about the confusion in this discussion. Emergence means that the interaction of simpler constituent parts creates new properties that apply to those parts taken as an interactive whole - properties which do not apply to the constituent parts taken individually. David mentioned hurricanes as an emergent phenomenon. Individual air molecules have fairly simple properties (from one point of view - from the point of view of quantum physics, air molecules themselves are emergent phenomena). When you put a whole bunch of air molecules on a planet covered by a fairly random combination of ocean and land masses, and then tilt the axis of that planet and revolve it around the sun, the interaction of all those air molecules on that planet exhibit patterns - emergent phenomena - that are not a property of any one air molecule itself. Climate and weather are thus emergent phenomena. Even more so is a hurricane. A hurricane is a highly organized and structured weather phenomena. It has properties that are unique to it, and which vanish when the hurricane dissipate. No one says that hurricanes “come out of nowhere” or that they are uncaused. Rather we mean that the cause can only be found by understanding the complex interplay of the parts - the cause can not be found by merely studying the constituent parts individually. The system has properties that the parts don’t. Note well that in this post I am not addressing the issue of consciousness at all. However, to the extent that the opening post is based on an inaccurate understanding of what emergent means, it seems like we ought to clear up this misunderstanding first.hazel
April 25, 2009
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JohnADavison:
have done all I can do with this thread. I have infected it with my convictions only to be ignored so I will bid this thread adieu and, like Diogenes, looking for an honest man, try to find another “author’s” private sanctuary were he and he alone can dictate the progress of the discussion.
You made two posts; one was basically a definition of what a materialist; the other was a plug for a paper which you think we should all stop what we are doing and immediately go read (you could at least provide us with the abstract). You really are a legend in your own mind aren't you?JTaylor
April 25, 2009
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An interesting side note: what we know about evolution fits very nicely with what we know about differences in brain architecture. See the work of Sam Wang's group: Clark, Damon A., Partha P. Mitra, and Samuel S. H. Wang. "Scalable Architecture in Mammalian Brains." Nature 411, no. 6834 (2001): 189-193. Burish, M. J., H. Y. Kueh, and S. S. H. Wang. "Brain Architecture and Social Complexity in Modern and Ancient Birds." Brain Behavior And Evolution 63, no. 2 (2004): 107-124.David Kellogg
April 25, 2009
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Further, I don't know of anybody who says we know the mind is an emergent property. It seems likely, however, and it's a useful framework that leads to very helpful results (in cognitive science and elsewhere). For example, we don't fully know how the visual system works. But thinking about visual perception as an emergent system has had practical results: it has helped people model facial recognition software even before we have a full account of how the visual receptors, the optic nerve, the visual cortex, and the LGN work together to produce recognizable images.David Kellogg
April 25, 2009
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StephenB, you write:
In all cases that we know of, when something seems to emerge, that is, when we cannot trace its cause, we discover each time that something knowable really did cause it to happen. The mystery becomes solved. Meanwhile, we acknowledge that we don’t know what we don’t know.
OK, fine. But first, we don't fully understand any of the phenomena I mentioned. Second, in no case would it be a scientific explanation to say that (in the absence of such an explanation) hurricanes, bird flocks, termite mounds, convection, turbulence, sand dunes must be designed or have a nonmaterial source.David Kellogg
April 25, 2009
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-----David Kellogg: "Emergence is a way of thinking about all sorts of things that can’t be reduced to their individual components. In fluidic systems, turbulence and convection can be thought of in emergent terms. Nobody claims that turbulence and convection don’t result from material properties (including the movements and temperatures of all the individual parts of the system) but you can’t fully describe it simply by describing all those properties." Here is the point that you are missing. In all cases that we know of, when something seems to emerge, that is, when we cannot trace its cause, we discover each time that something knowable really did cause it to happen. The mystery becomes solved. Meanwhile, we acknowledge that we don't know what we don't know. The principle may be summarized as follows: There is a big difference between coming from the "unknown"[design theory] and coming from "nowhere" [materialism] When a design theorist cannot explain an event, he assumes that some existing property or thing caused it to happen, and confesses his ignorance, in other words, he says that it came out of the “unknown.” He understands that to maintain a rational framework, he must retain the principle of cause and effect, which stands on the axiom that something cannot come from nothing. On the other hand, when the materialist cannot explain this new development, he rules out design, abandons causation, and proposes that it just came out of nowhere. He refuses to say, "I don't know." Quite the contrary, he says, "I do know; it was "emergence." For him, things just go poof! The theist, for example, has no difficulty explaining the existence of a mind. God created the human soul, complete with the faculties of intellect and will. He recognizes that [A] cannot give to [B] something that [A] does not have to give, another axiom by the way. The materialist, however, has another explanation. He thinks that not only can [A] give something to {B] that that [A] doesn't have, he takes it one step further and declares that [A] need not exist at all. Still, he senses that this is madness, so he calls [A] "poof." One day, poof made a universe; then poof made brains; then poof converted brains into minds. Poof is a spoof!StephenB
April 25, 2009
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"Silence is golden." Thomas Carlyle. I have done all I can do with this thread. I have infected it with my convictions only to be ignored so I will bid this thread adieu and, like Diogenes, looking for an honest man, try to find another "author's" private sanctuary were he and he alone can dictate the progress of the discussion. "You can lead a persron to the literature but you cannot make him comprehend it." John A. Davison Besides, I have no intention of further sharing this thread with Alan Fox. "When you lie down with dogs you run the risk of getting up with sarcoptic mange or maybe rabies." anonymouus old proverbJohnADavison
April 25, 2009
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BarryA:
JTaylor, re your [47]. In my [39] I demonstrate that explaining the existence of the mind is impossible even in principle for the materialist but not for the ID theorist. You do not offer even a scintilla of a rebuttal to that claim. Instead, you change the subject. Is that all you’ve got? Can I conclude from your silence regarding the basic premise of the original post and your attempt to change the subject, that you’ve got nothing to say, that you’ve been struck dumb by the scintillating brilliance of my reasoning [it’s a joke, lighten up will ya]?
I wasn't offering a rebuttal; I was asking why you think the problem of consciousness for the ID theorist is easy. How was I changing the subject if all I was doing was asking questions on the very things that you yourself said? Secondly I was asking for information on how the designer designs the embodied mind (because you said: "They may not at any given time know the details of how a designer designed a particular thing such as an embodied mind", which implies that they must know at least something. It's true that I'm frequently struck dumb by reading this site, but not for the reasons you cite.JTaylor
April 25, 2009
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