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Metaphors, Design Recognition, and the Design Matrix

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Here are excerpts from The Design Matrix by Mike Gene:

Metaphors such as “fear”, “cost”, “abhor” and “angry”, commonly share the projection of consciousness onto the world. Metaphors such as these represent the human tendency to view the world through anthropomorphic glasses. However, the metaphors employed by molecular biologists are not of this type.
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Metaphors typically break down when we begin to take them literally.

[but] The design terminology that is used in the language of molecular biology does not break down when interpreted literally
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there is a basic and literal truth to the use of design terminology in molecular biology–these technological concepts are just too useful. Metaphors are certainly useful when explaining concepts to other human beings, yet the design terminology often goes beyond pedagogy–it provides true insight into the molecular and cellular processes. An understanding of our own designed artifacts, along with the principles required to make them, can guide the practice of molecular biology.

Why is it that some metaphors are no where near as effective for describing biology as well other metaphors, especially design metaphors?

Mike Gene recognizes qualitatively the enigma that others recognize quantitatively. There is an improbable coincidence between the architecture of human-made systems and the architecture of biological systems. Recognition of these coincidences is the recognition of specified complexity, and recognition of specified complexity is the recognition of design. Outside of biotic reality, there are no other assemblages of matter in the universe which fit design metaphors more exactly than those found in biology.

I liked Mike’s book, but I especially liked Chapter 3. Chapter 3 suggests the fact that biology is well described by design metaphors is a clue that biological systems (like birds, plants, and bunnies) are intelligently designed. UD readers are invited to read about the other clues which Mike outlines in his book, and the consilience of these clues constitutes The Design Matrix.

Notes:

From wiki:

Metaphor (from the from Latin metaphora; see the Greek origin below) is language that directly compares seemingly unrelated subjects. It is a figure of speech that compares two or more things without using the words “like” or “as.” More generally, a metaphor describes a first subject as being or equal to a second object in some way. This device is known for usage in literature, especially in poetry, where with few words, emotions and associations from one context are associated with objects and entities in a different context. A simpler definition is the comparison of two unrelated things without using the words “like” or “as”, the use of these words would create a simile. For example,she is a button.(as cute as a button)

Comments
Allen MacNeill:
As I pointed out, natural selection isn’t a mechanism, it’s an outcome. Furthermore, natural selection doesn’t (indeed, cannot) create anything new at all. On the contrary, natural selection simply removes some of the inter-individual variations that are produced by the “engines of variation”.
If it isn't a mechanism- and I agree that it isn't- how can it remove anything? The mechanisms of "sh!t happens" and "ooops shouldn't have done that", are good at removing things.Joseph
March 24, 2009
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Jerry Of course the mechanism of the origin of new life forms has always been the crucial question. It may never be answered. First causes are like that. The important point is to emhasize that chance could never have played any role in that event or events. The Darwinians believe that it is intrinsic in the nature of matter to self assemble into a living, metabolizing, evolving organism at least once. I cannot accept that perspective and I cannot understand how any serious student of the living world can. As I have explained in my essays, there is no more reason to believe in a monophyletic evolution than there is in a monotheistic God. There is very little that is known with certainty about the origins of ontogeny and phylogeny. Leo Berg proposed that there were tens of thousands of primary forms. There is nothing that we know for certain that is at variance with that remarkable summary and much with which it is in accord. Any honest appraisal of that which is certain must conclude that it is a very short list indeed. As for Darwinism with all its necessary assumptions I quote Bertrand Russell - "It is undesirable to believe a proposition when there is no ground whatsoever for believing it to be true."JohnADavison
March 24, 2009
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"An evolution driven by chance and selection is the most ridiculous notion ever proposed by an overactive human imagination. It dwarfs the Phlogiston of Chemistry and the Ether of Physics." John, we agree. That is those who support ID agree. It is just the specific mechanism used to enable how the various species came into being that is under debate. However, how the first bird arrived and how all the rest of the birds arrived seem to be a separate issue. Or is it?jerry
March 24, 2009
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Natural Selection is very real and very important. It prevents change. Just as Nature abhors a vacuum so does She abhor change right to the bitter end of extinction. That is the undeniable testimony of the fossil record. "The struggle for existence and natural selection are not progressive agencies, but being, on the contrary, conservative, maintain the standard." Leo Berg, Nomogenesis, page 406 We are now witnessing the extinction of the climax biota which was planned probably millions of years ago. Chance has never played a role in either ontogeny or phylogeny. "Neither in the one nor in the other is there room for chance." Leo Berg, Nomogenesis, page 134. The origin of every taxon from Phylum to species was an instantaneous event without any continuous transformations whatsoever. Gradualism in ANY form is without verification. That is why, with no exceptions, every species representing an orthogenetic series is so different from its presumed predecessor that it must be assigned to a separate genus. "We might as well stop looking for the missing links as they never existed...The first bird hatched from a reptilian egg." Otto Schindewolf "Any system that purports to account for evolution must invoke a mechanism not mutational and aleatory." Pierre Grasse, Evolution of Living Organisms, page 245 Every aspect of the Darwinian model is an experimental and descriptive disaster. My conclusions and my Prescribed Evolutionary Hypothesis are based on the independent findings of a handful of the finest minds of the post Darwinian era not one of whom was either a professed atheist or a religious fanatic. I didn't come here to "debate." I came to offer an antidote to the Godless Darwinism that still is allowed here for reasons I fail to understand. An evolution driven by chance and selection is the most ridiculous notion ever proposed by an overactive human imagination. It dwarfs the Phlogiston of Chemistry and the Ether of Physics. It is hard to believe isn't it?JohnADavison
March 24, 2009
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Allen, I answered John Davison's comment without seeing yours above it. I wrote about this at length the other day but did not express it as well as you did here. I made the point that to take a fairly large family of species that have a fossil history of several million years and to map the genomes of all the species to see the differences and that you would find two types of changes that led to differences between the individual species. 1) changes that could arise strictly from the genetic side of evolution including natural selection, drift, epigenetic factors etc. due to simple variation arising from any of your engines of variation or from variation already in the gene pool with the boundary conditions that the environment provides. ID would have no quarrel with any of these. These are changes that do not produce novel complex capabilities, the issue at hand. Each change should be visible in the genome as a result of gradual changes and should be discernible by analyzing the various species in the families and when in time they separated. 2) changes that are novel, complex and represent new capabilities for a particular species. The argument is that these changes would not arise from the processes outlined in 1). In other words there would be no gradual set of changes leading up to the capability. So the question is how did such changes arise. This supposes that there are no changes in 2) that can be traced to some form of gradual process. The Darwin crowd and the Gould crowd both espouse some form of gradualism. But what if some change can not be seen as arising from such a process. What is the explanation. Some form of evo devo or is it that begging the question by assuming that these capabilities lie within the original gene pool and just needs some trigger to get them out. Or is another very different paradigm necessary? There is another possibility. Namely, that all the changes in most species are of type 1. And the question is then, why? With all these reproductive events, why didn't the forces of nature produce at least one such new capability. Which is why there should be a lot of work done on echo location and flight with bats and the blood pressure system of giraffes. You can probably think of other novel capabilities. This debate will rage till the genomes are mapped, analyzed and understood and it is determined how all significant changes arose. And if it is still a mystery after this, is it time to move to a new paradigm. Or possibly support the 8000 pound gorilla that is not allowed in the door that predicted it would be impossible to generate the information to get to these new capabilities. It should be an interesting next 30-40 years to find the answers to all this. I personally believe it is all in the genomes and it will eventually support ID at some point that will be hard to deny.jerry
March 24, 2009
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JohnADaviison, Nearly all of Darwin's ideas have been discarded by evolutionary biology. What is left is natural selection and they still worship common descent. But natural selection that is left is an empty shell of its former self. There are all types of selection but the real game is in the origin of variation such as proposed by Lynch and the punctuated equilibrium crowd. Darwin's form of gradualism is dead but Gould's latent gradualism is starting to rule the kingdom. Only when the new appears can any of the selection models step in. They are powerless without novel input.jerry
March 24, 2009
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If Allen MacNeill has been "moderated off," just who is sending these enormously long messages under his name? On the outside chance that it is really Allen MacNeill, let me remind him that there is absolutely nothing in the Darwinian model that ever had anything whatsoever to do with the formation of true species or with the appearance of any other taxonomic category. All that has ever been demonstrated through selection, natural or artificial, is the production of intraspecific varieties and largely unverified subspecies. Darwinism in all its guises is the most persistent hoax in the history of science. To continue to support the Darwinian myth here or anywhere is no longer acceptable and all such attempts should be summarily rejected as pseudoscience. Furthermore, there is no place for "debate" in science. There is only "discovery." "A past evolution is undeniable, a present evolution undemonstrable."JohnADavison
March 24, 2009
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In #24 jerry wrote:
"Once the new thing appears. natural selection can work with it if in fact the new thing affects reproduction. It is just that the natural selection process cannot create what is not there in the first place."
This was precisely my point in the post I made on the subject of the "engines of variation" at The Evolution List: http://evolutionlist.blogspot.com/2007/06/what-is-engine-of-evolution.html and http://evolutionlist.blogspot.com/2007/10/rm-ns-creationist-and-id-strawman.html As I pointed out, natural selection isn't a mechanism, it's an outcome. Furthermore, natural selection doesn't (indeed, cannot) create anything new at all. On the contrary, natural selection simply removes some of the inter-individual variations that are produced by the "engines of variation". So, I basically agree that we shouldn't be focussing our attention on natural selection as the source of innovations in phenotypes. Rather, we should be focussing our attention on the various mechanisms by which phenotypic variations are generated. This will, of course, require us to become informed about them, which is quite a task (there are over 50 mechanisms already known, ranging in scope from single point mutations to whole genome fusion). If I were interested in forwarding the agenda of ID, this is what I would spend my time and energy investigating, rather than posting the same old negative arguments that "RM + NS can't do it". Nobody is now saying they can, nor do they need to. To kick off this discussion, let me pose a question: since the "engines of variation" are what produce new, and therefore presumably adaptive phenotypic variations, it seems reasonable to expect that, if there is anything to ID, one should be able to show empirically that the appearance of new variations is not random. Furthermore, if ID is to actually have any ontological force, it should be possible to show empirically that a particular new phenotypic variant would qualify as a "foresighted" variation, thereby biasing natural selection toward favoring it. Has anyone attempted to approach the question of variation from this viewpoint?Allen_MacNeill
March 24, 2009
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Re #23 by ab: Greetings, Jon. I have already posted my response to your offer at my blog. As I stated there,
"As you can clearly see, you haven't been banned from this blog. On the contrary, I am ready to discuss with you whatever you want to discuss, and agree to abide by your stated rules of civility and full disclosure. So , what would you like to discuss first?"
We will have to take up the conversation at The Evolution List. I have not been able to register for your site, despite following the instructions listed.Allen_MacNeill
March 24, 2009
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The mystery of apprehending an infinitude of reality with a finite set of symbols has long perplexed logicians and linguists. Most every theory is an atomic theory, i.e., words are defined by semantic features (elemental units of meaning). The trouble is that these features generally wind up as idiosyncratic and nonuniversal as the words they supposedly define. One way to constrain the set of features is to look to grammar. Language is a combination of symbols (words) and grammar, with the former coding the more specific meanings and the latter the more general features of consciousness, intention, cause and effect, time and perspective. Also, as it turns out, those very features are the ones that become grammaticalized across all human languages. George Lakoff’s main contribution was to show that some metaphors are universal (such as life equals a journey) and others more culture specific (time equals money), and that metaphors are not just memorized memes but also on the spot creations based on these relationships. And, as various linguists (T. Givón, Joan Bybee, …) have shown, it is a relatively small set of universal metaphors that effect grammaticalization in the world’s languages. For example, if a language has a future tense and we know its origin, it is always based on the sense that time is motion (thus the English gonna) or that volition is toward the future (e.g., the Eng. will future). Another helpful contribution has been the prototype semantics of Eleanor Rosch. Some features of a word are more salient than others—values are not simply plus or minus. Grammatical categories are also prototypes with more central and more extended applications. Now the question (as I think all this might apply here): Just as the cosmos was designed for discovery, might our minds also have been designed for the same? Much has been made of the counterintuitive findings of physics. Let me make a prediction. Someday the physicist’s counterintuitive Block Time and antipathy to free will will be discarded and some of the aspects of quantum theory that materialists find counterintuitive will be seen as both intuitive and the best theory.Rude
March 24, 2009
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There are many in evolutionary biology that question most of Darwin's ideas but never the naturalistic origin of evolution or that natural selection works once something new appears. The essence of the discussion is always what causes new things to appear. Once the new thing appears. natural selection can work with it if in fact the new thing affects reproduction. It is just that the natural selection process cannot create what is not there in the first place. So as the old saying goes, It is not the selection of the fittest that is under scrutiny but the arrival of the fittest. So we have to be careful when we criticize Darwinian mechanisms as to exactly what is meant.jerry
March 24, 2009
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BTW, Allen MacNeill, John A. Davison has much to say to you about your Darwinian mechanism/s (especially about natural selection), would you go ahead already and get the show started while John is still alive or would you rather prefer to continue and hide behind your UD friends here?ab
March 24, 2009
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Yes it is true we should not confuse analogies and metaphors with reality. However when analogies and metaphors fit the bill, so to speak, then it would be very unscientific to not investigate whether or not they have any merit. IOW if something has the appearance of design then it would be a mistake not to investigate whether or not that design is real. I say that because experience has taught us that it matters a great deal to an investigation whether or not that which is being investigated arose via agency involvement or nature, operating freely. Therefor to refute the design inference all one has to do is to demonstrate that nature, operating freely, can account for it.Joseph
March 24, 2009
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Teleological concepts seem to be abundant in biology. However there was at least one notable application of teleological concepts in physics, namely, least action principles. For reference here is some info on teleology in physics from some of my prior posts at UD: Teleology and ID in physics, ID-inspired least action principles and Cosmological ID in 1744?.scordova
March 24, 2009
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My point is this: that a metaphor is tempting is a reason to avoid embracing it scientifically. It’s a reason to be suspicious.
Dr. Kellogg, Thank you for you comment. I agree that wrong metaphors will hinder scientific advancement. For example, here are some wrong metaphors which have been damaging to exploration: "junk DNA" "junk RNA" certain "vestigial" organs. In contrast, there are some metaphors that have been extraordinarily useful. As Mapou pointed out, even the notion of Genus and Species is useful. The most powerful metaphors, imho, have been the machine metaphors for biology, especially the cell being called a Turing machine. I think using metaphors as a scientific hypothesis is legitimate. When we say DNA is "transcribed" or "translated", this seems like the correct description. It seems awfully hard to argue that these metaphors are wrong. I recognize the problem of subjectivity, and subjectivity is something that seems loathesome in the scientific enterprise. However, subjectivity is the order of the day when characterizing both human-made and naturally existing machines. For example, when we say something is a "sensor", or "amplifier", or "decoder", or "error correction mechanism", we can't justify that claim in terms physics and chemistry. Does that make the application of a metaphor scientifically illegitimate? The moment we begin to characterize something in terms of teleology and purpose in science, we have stepped over into the subjective. I do not believe this is wrong. It's very much par for the course in engineering, especially in Information Technology, where we frequently ascribe subjective interpretations to inanimate matter. Pure reductionism and objectivity does not apply in the world of information processing. An image is not reducible to the Cartesian coordinates and color properties of the pixels. A sentence is more than the letters which compose it. A sentence is meaningful because of how the observer perceives it. A computer program is meaningless without a machine to interpret it. Bits inside of a computer are meaningless without the interpretive machinery surrounding it. Context is important! The momement we begin to describe biology in terms of information and engineering metaphors, we have crossed over into the subjective. Nevertheless, from an engineering standpoint, this seems correct. Avoiding this subjectivity seems deeply awkward, if not wrong. To quote Allen (from something he wrote in 2006), the fact biology seems to be so amenable to being described by engineering metaphors is "The Paradox of Purpose".scordova
March 24, 2009
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Evolutionists don't like analogies because they do not have any. What would they say? "Hey look at that pile of twisted metal and broken glass- yeah just like biological organisms!" LoL!!! As a matter of fact all evolutionists can do is hide behind father time and invoke magical mystery mutations. Oh well...Joseph
March 24, 2009
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Allen [16], let me follow up in a slightly tangential way. Without going too deeply into the source/target issue, I want to critique Sal's claim that "the fact that biology is well described by design metaphors is a clue that biological systems (like birds, plants, and bunnies) are intelligently designed." I want to say, No, it's not. In fact, Gene's characterization of such metaphors as "just too useful: suggests that we should avoid the temptation to conflate the metaphor with the reality. Consider the following pair of metaphors: LIFE IS PRESENCE DEATH IS ABSENCE We use these metaphors when we send a card saying "Congratulations on your new arrival" or when we speak of someone having "passed away," when we say that people have "left this earth" or "come into the world." Such metaphors may be useful theologically, but scientifically, they fundamentally misrepresent life and death. They make it easier for us to come to grips with death, personally and within our tradition; they don't, however, do much else. In fact, they may lead to outlandish attempts to "prove" that a soul leaves the body at the moment of death -- it would have to, if death meant absence, because the body is still there. My point is this: that a metaphor is tempting is a reason to avoid embracing it scientifically. It's a reason to be suspicious.David Kellogg
March 23, 2009
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And here is my response to Sal's post on Genetic ID and design detection: http://evolutionlist.blogspot.com/2006/05/genetic-id-and-explanatory-filter.htmlAllen_MacNeill
March 23, 2009
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I have a problem with the division of the content of analogies and metaphors into "sources" and "targets". While that may be the case in at least some linguistic analogies, it is clearly not the case in "natural" analogies. The whole "source"/"target" terminology seems to me to be analogous to Batesian mimicry. For example, in the famous monarch/viceroy butterfly example, the monarch butterfly is the "model" and the viceroy butterfly is the "mimic", in much the same way as Lakoff's et al "source" and "target" are related to each other. That is, we say the viceroy butterfly "looks like" the monarch butterfly because it is the viceroy that has converged on the monarch prototype, and not the other way around. However, there is another kind of mimicry: Müllerian mimicry, in which equally repellent "models" all converge on each other's phenotypes (or, to be more precise, they all converge on an "average" phenotype). This kind of mimicry is "equidirectional", and there is no "source" or "target" involved (or, each convergent butterfly species is both "model" and "mimic" simultaneously). I believe the same thing is true for the analogies we perceive between similar objects. For example, we would find a "natural" analogy between green apples, green oranges, green pears, green plums, etc., but we would be hard-pressed to say which of these were the "source" and which the "target". In the same way, it seems difficult (indeed, perhaps impossible) to say which is the "source"/"model" and which the "target"/"mimic": biological complexity or humanly engineered complexity. And if one can't determine which direction the analogy is being made, then it would appear to me that Mike Gene's argument falls apart.Allen_MacNeill
March 23, 2009
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Allen wrote: To verify that an analogy is “natural” requires an independent source of validation for the assertion that the analogy is “real” and not merely “semantic”. At this stage in my reasoning about this subject I am not at all sure how one would go about this.
I agree that we cannot prove the analogy is "real". As far as the ID/EB debate goes, what might be feasible is determining what mechanims (like random mutation) are unlikely to create such an analogy. For example, with Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) when a company like Genetic-ID discovers a sequence in an organism that matches a signature in their database, there is an undeniable analogy. They can rule out certain mechanisms which created that analogy. [For the reader's benefit, here is my post on genetic-ID: Genetic-ID,an instance of design detection.] I believe the very powerful impression that biological systems are analogous to human engineered artifacts cannot be achieved via:
1. natural selection (for the reasons I cited above) 2. neutral evolution 3. any variety of mutation except maybe pre-programmed mutations
I think #1 and #2 are correct. I think #3 is not conclusive. I looked at your rather daunting list of mutational mechanisms, and it would be unfair to dismiss the list your presented outrightly. But you are aware of my biases on the matter. :-) That is my current view, anyway. regards, Salscordova
March 23, 2009
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Doesn’t everyone agree that the architectures of human-made systems and the architectures of biological systems are all selected?
I mention here are some systems (redunant systems) which would evade selection: Airplane magnetos, contingency designs, and reasons ID will prevail So that's one problem. Other systems might resist selection because they are irreducibly complex. Third, even if all the above problems were solved, there are the issues of population resources. One may not have the population resources for natural selection to work. There are: Speed Limits to Evolution. The list goes on.
Doesn’t everyone agree that the architectures of human-made systems and the architectures of biological systems are all selected?
No. Not every thing will be selected for the reasons listed above and more. Not to mention, random selection often over-rides natural selection. See: Gambler's Ruin is Darwin's Ruin.scordova
March 23, 2009
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David wrote: In fact, there’s a sense in which it depends on ignorance of the target domain
Thank you for your comment. We may be ignorant of most of the characteristics of the target domain, but this still may not decrease the applicability of a metaphor: Here are source descriptions of the target domain of "a cell". The metaphors do not have to be a comprehensive descriptor of the cell, but they can still be completely accurate: 1. a computer 2. a software processor 3. an information processing system 4. an energy consumer 5. a language processor 6. a signal processor 7. an inegrated system 8. a self-replicating Turing machine 9. a parallel processor or the parts of the cell: 1. decoders 2. encoders 3. sensors 4. feedback control systems 5. memory etc. I don't think a metaphor has to completely describe something to be totally accurate. To say someone is a human being is completely accurate, even though that description does not totally describe that person.scordova
March 23, 2009
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Nice to hear from you, too, Sal. We've had this conversation on analogies and metaphors before, and it pleases me to take it up again. That's what these debates are for, IMHO; clarifying our own thoughts on where we stand on these issues.Allen_MacNeill
March 23, 2009
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Dear Allen, David, (and other gentlemen), If it is any consolation, even some of my comments are being trapped in the spam buffer (on other threads at UD). I can release some of the comments, but not all of them. It appears, the comments posting to my threads can be released by me. I can't release comments on other threads. I try to monitor the spam queue (which has 190,000 comments). Please save your fine work before posting. I will do my best, but sometimes things slip through the cracks. If you are posting on my thread, I'll try to make sure your comments are released. Thank you for your comments. Sorry for the delays and technical problems. PS Nice to see you again Allen!scordova
March 23, 2009
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Just Another One of the Boyz in the Banned... A quick note to say that I have apparently once again been "moderated" off of the threads at Uncommon Descent. Apparently my comments were cutting a little too close to the bone. One could almost say I'd been Expelled (No intelligence Allowed)... And to Timaeus and others from UD: I will be indirectly responding to some of the posts at Uncommon Descent at The Evolution List (time and weather permitting, of course).Allen_MacNeill
March 23, 2009
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Just a quick note to say that I have apparently once again been "moderated" off of the threads at Uncommon Descent. Apparently my comments were cutting a little too close to the bone. One could almost say I'd been Expelled (No Intelligence Allowed)... And to Timaeus and others from UD: I will be indirectly responding to some of the posts at Uncommon Descent at The Evolution List (time and weather permitting, of course).Allen_MacNeill
March 23, 2009
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Though I would add that the argument for design is not for metaphorical design but for actual or literal design- that is that terms like "molecular machine" are not metaphor's but what actually exists with subjects like the cell.Frost122585
March 23, 2009
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Very nice post Cordova, and nice fallow up as well Mapou.Frost122585
March 23, 2009
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There is an improbable coincidence between the architecture of human-made systems and the architecture of biological systems.
So who are these people who think it's an improbable coincidence? Doesn't everyone agree that the architectures of human-made systems and the architectures of biological systems are all selected?Freelurker
March 23, 2009
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Metaphors are a special case of analogies (the other being similes). I have written extensively on the subject of the application of analogies and metaphors in science, and especially in the evolution/design debate: http://evolutionlist.blogspot.com/2009/01/tidac-identity-analogy-and-logical.html http://evolutionlist.blogspot.com/2006/08/follow-up-post-on-analogies-in-science.html http://evolutionlist.blogspot.com/2006/06/inference-and-boundaries-of-science.html The fundamental question in this ongoing debate is, how do we know an analogy really exists? For example, do we have any objective way to determine if one rock is analogous with another? Or whether an anatomical feature (or a protein/substrate binding site) is analogous to another? As in the case of agency detection, we think we can do this very easily (just as we can easily identify what looks like design), but I would argue that this is because both "finding" analogies and "finding" design and purpose are capabilities of the human mind (and the nervous system that supports it) that have conferred enormous adaptive value on our ancestors. As in the case of our hypothesized "innate agency/design/purpose detector" (which first becomes active in very early infancy), our "analogy detector" also appears to become active at a very early age, and operates entirely in the background. That is to say, we are almost totally unaware of its operation, and concentrate only on its output. Our ability to detect (and construct) analogies is, IMO, the core of our intelligence, as demonstrated by the fact that identifying analogies has been traditionally used as one of the most sensitive gauges of general intelligence in intelligence tests (such as the Miller Analogies Test). And, as Sal and others have pointed out in other venues, doing engineering, and especially mathematics, is essentially the construction of highly compact analogies, in which numerical (and sometimes physical) relationships are expressed in the form of abstract symbols. Indeed, many mathematical relationships (especially in the natural sciences) are expressed as equations, which are quite literally metaphors expressed in symbolic form. For example, Newton's equation for force:
F = ma
is a metaphor linking the concept of force with the concepts of mass and acceleration. In molecular biology we encounter once again the concept of metaphors, for what is the genome of an organism but a highly abstract metaphor for the fully embodied and operating organism itself? I agree with those (and I expect Sal would number himself among them) who assert that the encoding of "life" into a string of nucleotides is indeed the crucial difference between biological "metaphors" and physical "direct necessities". Gravity isn't "encoded" in anything, but proteins are, and so are cells, tissues, organs, organ systems, organisms, and (at least at some level) their behaviors. So, is there a way to verify if an analogy or metaphor is "real"? In the case of some analogies in biological systems we have an independent double-check on our identification of analogies. This is based on the evolutionary concept of homology, or derivation from a common ancestor. If two structures on two different organisms (say a small bone of the jaw of a reptile and the even smaller bone in the middle ear of a mammal) appear to be analogous (on the basis of size, location, relationship to other bones, etc.) there are at least two different, though related, methods of verifying that these structures are indeed analogous (and not just accidentally similar). One way is by means of comparative paleoanatomy, in which a series of fossils of known age are compared to determine if there is a connection between the evolutionary pathways of derivation of the structures. If such a pathway can be empirically shown to exist, this would be strong evidence for both the analogous and homologous nature of the objects. Alternatively one could compare the nucleotide sequences that code for the structures to determine if they are sufficiently similar to warrant a conclusion of homologous derivation. In both cases, evidence for homology, combined with our intuitive "identification" of analogous structure and/or function, both point to the same conclusion: that the two structures are both analogous and homologous. This is why structures that appear to be analogous, but for which there is no convincing evidence of homology (as in the wings of birds and insects) can present a serious problem to evolutionary biologists, and especially those engaged in biological classification. Such apparent similarities (technically called homoplasies) can either be the result of "true" (i.e. partial) analogy at the functional (and/or structural) level (and therefore assumed to be the result of convergent evolution) or they can be completely accidental. Simple inspection is often insufficient to separate these two hypotheses, and lacking either fossil or genomic evidence, conclusions about the validity of such analogies can be extremely difficult to draw. However, if there is fossil and/or genomic evidence and it points away from homology (i.e. descent from a common ancestor), then the structures can be considered to be analogous, but not homologous. One of the dangers in invoking analogies and metaphors is overusing the concept of analogy to mean almost anything. Indeed, it is essential in discussions such as these that we be as precise as possible about our definitions, as imprecision can only lead to confusion (at best) and unsupportable conclusions (at worst). Perhaps the most essential distinction to be made in this regard is between "analogies of description" (which could also be called "semantic analogies") and "analogies of function/structure" (which could also be called "natural analogies"). The former (i.e. "semantic analogies") are merely artifacts of the structure of human cognition and language, as happens whenever we describe an analogy that we have perceived. By contrast, the latter (i.e. "natural analogies") are the actual similarities in function/structure that we are describing (i.e. that resulted in our identification and description in the first place). As in the Zen koan about the roshi and the novice in the moonlit garden, much of the confusion about which of the two types of analogies we are discussing seems to stem from confusion between the moon that illuminates the garden and the finger pointing at the moon. In the brief example that Sal posted at the head of this thread, the implication is that the analogies we perceive between biological systems and those engineered by humans are "natural analogies"; that is, they are real analogies, and not simply a form of linguistic convenience. However, there is nothing about the finding of an analogy that necessarily verifies that the analogy is "natural" (i.e. "real"), as opposed to "semantic" (i.e. "imaginary"). To verify that an analogy is "natural" requires an independent source of validation for the assertion that the analogy is "real" and not merely "semantic". At this stage in my reasoning about this subject I am not at all sure how one would go about this. However, one thing I am sure of is that simply asserting over and over again that one has perceived an analogy, and that this is all that is necessary to validate the analogy, is not sufficient. Even I am but mad north-north-west: when the wind is southerly I know a hawk from a handsaw.Allen_MacNeill
March 23, 2009
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