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Rabbi pleads with Darwinian atheists: Turn back from legal pedophilia. But they can’t.

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Moshe Averick
Jewish? I'll pester you until you take your heritage seriously ...

The Maverick Rabbi, author of The Confused, Illusory World of the Atheist speaks up on the unmentionable subject in “A Plea to Atheists: Pedophilia Is Next On the Slippery Slope; Let Us Turn Back Before It Is Too Late” (Algemeiner, August 29, 2011) Moshe Averick points out that materialist atheism is intrinsically amoral. One results is capsuled by the journey of a philosophy professor:

Joel Marks, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the U. of New Haven, who for 10 years authored the “Moral Moments” column in Philosophy Now, made the following, rather shocking about-face in a 2010 article entitled, “An Amoral Manifesto.”

“This philosopher has been laboring under an unexamined assumption, namely that there is such a thing as right and wrong. I now believe there isn’t…The long and short of it is that I became convinced that atheism implies amorality; and since I am an atheist, I must therefore embrace amorality…I experienced my shocking epiphany that religious fundamentalists are correct; without God there is no morality. But they are incorrect, I still believe, about there being a God. Hence, I believe, there is no morality.

Marks then quite boldly and candidly addresses the implications of his newfound beliefs:

“Even though words like “sinful” and “evil” come naturally to the tongue as say a description of child molesting. They do not describe any actual properties of anything. There are no literal sins in the world because there is no literal God…nothing is literally right or wrong because there is no Morality…yet we human beings can still discover plenty of completely naturally explainable resources for motivating certain preferences. Thus enough of us are sufficiently averse to the molestation of children and would likely continue to be…

At this point the utter intellectual (and moral) bankruptcy of Marks’ position becomes apparent. After correctly concluding that a world without God is free from the shackles of the illusory concepts of morality and immorality, he pathetically attempts to have his cake and eat it too by suggesting that there is something “good” or “better” about the preference to being averse to child molestation.

Well, Darwin – the materialist atheist’s only true deity – could explain the preference of some for molesting girls because it sexualizes a girl early, resulting in more selfish genes being spread later. Of course, he can’t offer quite the same explanation for molesting boys. Oh wait, Darwinian theory accounts for homosexuality because gays can help siblings raise children, thus spreading some of their selfish genes more successfully. Thus molesting boys gets them into the habit of helping others spread their selfish genes.

What about those uptight folk who oppose the practice? Darwin can explain that too, as it happens: They evolved in such a way as to conserve their selfish genes until there is a high chance of success.

It all lays waste to any argument for protecting children.

In this context, “atheists” means “materialist atheists,” of course. The Dalai Lama (as other Buddhists) is technically an atheist, but the heart of Buddhism is the idea that the cosmos is – among other things – profoundly moral. Thus karma forbids any escape from the consequences of one’s actions. That kind of atheism is unlikely to catch on seriously in today’s West.

The Darwinian atheist, by contrast, thinks that morality is an illusion, as Michael Ruse puts it – maybe useful, maybe not. But the atheist decides which it is, depending on the preferences dictated by his selfish genes. That’s just so much more attractive.

How will it end? In “Our atheist commenters have kindly explained why atheism is doomed”, we see how atheists will destroy atheism: From time immemorial, people who flirt with “no actual morality” are easy prey for people dedicated to an evil morality.

See also: “Rabbi: Dawkins claimed that a debate he lost had never occurred – until it was posted online”, featuring yet another rabbi who doesn’t play rollover for Darwinists.

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Comments
MarkF, The conclusion you're following this to is a logical one, but based on a hypothetical. We could go a step further. What if God decides tomorrow that the sound of birds should become the sounds of nails on a blackboard or that we should all wake up with bamboo under our fingernails? It doesn't matter whether he commands us to do something hurtful or just does it himself. Either way we're in for a world of hurt. A few factors to consider: God (as I believe in him) only does good, even at his own expense, and has demonstrated it. His wisdom is greater than my own, so I have greater reason to trust him. Unlike Stalin, he created me and therefore has the right to my obedience. And finally, the Bible teaches that it is the only true revelation of his will, so if some crazy person tells you that God wants you to kill people, just look in the Bible. (It's not God's fault if people do what they want anyway.) You're right, though. That's not the most common approach to morality. I'm describing what the Bible says, not what people do in practice. I know that all of this logic is based on at least two premises that you don't accept (God and the Bible.) But upon those premises it makes sense. It even makes testable predictions. For example, the Bible indicates that not long after Christianity began it would appear to morph into something completely unrecognizable. Even an atheist historian can see the difference between Christianity in the first century and a few hundred years later.ScottAndrews
September 8, 2011
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Elizabeth said:
I don’t see anything either solid or logical about this reasoning! It seems like a truism followed by a non sequitur to me. Your argument seems to me to boil down to:
Do you remember when you asked me to specifically point out where you made "arguments" (and rebuttals) by referring to the way things seem to you? What do you want me to respond to ... your feelings? I dont care how things "seem" to you; what I care about are sound premises, sound inferences, and sound conclusions. Your "feeling" like a necessary premise is nothing more than a "truism" is a post-modernist irrelevancy. Your feelings ("it seems to me") are not logical rebuttals.
In order to argue that some action is good you must assume there is such a thing as a good action. Which is self-evidently true to the point of near-tautology.
It is a tautology - a self-evidently true one. Good for you!
Then you seem to claim, with no logical steps intervening, that there can only be good actions if we were made by a sentient creator with the intention that we should perform good actions.
Untrue. All the intervening steps are there, you are either blind to them or are choosing to ignore them. I'll reiterate: What does "good action" mean? How can one action be good, and another not good? Actions are just actions unless they are considered according to a purpose or goal; then - and only then - can one make a rational judgement about whether or not any action is "good". Let's consider using "conscience", or "feeling", as a guide to moral behavior. An action might make you feel good; and one might then claim that because the action made them feel good, the action is good. This equates "good" with a sensation. However, that places the nature of good squarely upon subjective feelings; if it makes me feel good to torture infants, then by that perspective of "good", torturing infants would be "good". If moral behavior is not arbited by how we feel, then it must be arbited by principles. If we select those principles subjectively, then once again we are basing morality on "how we feel", because we can select any principle we feel like selecting. If morality describes anything more than (essentially) what we feel, or what "seems" to us to be the correct thing, then it must describe an objective purpose for humanity. But - and this is the essential connection to god - there cannot be an objective purpose to the existence of humankind unless humankind has a sentient creator, because "purpose" can only be imbued upon a thing by a sentient entity. Furthermore, if some powerful being happend by after humans came into existence and asserted "okay, your purpose is to mine gold for our extraterrestrial empire", that would just be a subjective purpose imposed on something that already exists by a subjective entity. If humans simply select "what the purpose of humankind" is, and write it down so that it objectively exists, it still has been chosen subjectively by whatever means humans have subjectively decided is a good way to choose it. It is an invented good we made up, not a discerned, true good that exists independently of our subjective considerations. Unless "the good" is an inherent, objective aspect of existence, and humans were intentionally created to fulfill that purpose, there cannot be an "objective good", there can only be subjctively-imposed purposes placed on us after the fact, much like I can pick up a rock I find in the field and use it as a doorstop.
In order to argue that some action is good, we must first agree on a definition of what constitutes a good action.
And this is the place where you refuse to follow the necessary reasoning to it's diabolical, necessary conclusion. What you describe is morality defined by consensus - IOW, the good "is" whatever people agree that it is; if they agree that torturing infants for personal pleasure is good, then it is good by definition under the consensus model. Also, under your consensus basis for good, you have no principled right to challenge whatever the consensus morality in your area is. IOW, you have no right to challenge religious edicts of morality if they are the consensus view in your area. Is that really the argument you want to pursue?
In contrast, your system provides no criteria at all to judge what is good and what is not, but merely demands the conviction that some things are good and some are not.
I guess, if you equate "extrapolating self-evidently true moral statements via logic towards sound conclusions" with "mere conviction". But then, if the two "seem to you" to be the same thing, what else matters?William J Murray
September 8, 2011
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Ah boy, are.kairosfocus
September 8, 2011
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Mark, post 29.3 was aimed at you by the way.Chris Doyle
September 8, 2011
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It would be good if you replied to post 36.1.1.1.9 over on the Three Silly Objections to Cosmological Fine Tuning (part one) thread: https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/the-universe-is-too-big-too-old-and-too-cruel-three-silly-objections-to-cosmological-fine-tuning-part-one/comment-page-1/#comment-398816 Or at least, admit that you're unable to respond to that post because reason is on my side, not yours.Chris Doyle
September 8, 2011
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A, please remember the problem of desiring properly forbidden fruit. Desirability is a part of the good, but just because something is desired does not mean that it is good. Gkairosfocus
September 8, 2011
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I will echo the appreciation. But I'm afraid I remain uninspired, because kf's argument (and your own) appear to me to be circular. Sure, if we posit a good creator God, we can attribute our understanding of goodness to that God. And mostly, we tend to regard as good, actions that promote the welfare of others, or minimise harm to others, even at our own expense, hence the universality of the Golden Rule. But to argue that because we have this capacity to recognise goodness, therefore we must have been made by a good creator God, means defining goodness a priori. And if we do that a priori, then we don't need God to define goodness. You may consider the door open wide, but it doesn't even look like a door from here. I think the problem is the old confounding of ethics and morality again. Let's try to unpack: let's say that "ought" is the word we use to refer to some action that you are not immediately inclined to do, but know will have some deferred benefit (to yourself or to someone else), as in "I'd love a chocolate biscuit but I ought not to", or "I'd love go straight home, but I ought to visit my grandmother". They are, in other words, about deprioritising proximal goals in favour of distal goals. I suggest that ethical systems are systems that enshrine, in a series of culturally shared abstractions, a set of distal goals that benefit members of that culture collectively, and morality is what we call our capacity to voluntarily prioritise those distal goals. We also call ethical systems, "justice" systems, as they are devised to promote just - fair - societies, and, to ensure that the goal of a just society is achieved, the word "justice" is also used to refer to the punitive actions we take, usually as a society, to discourage and prevent "cheaters" - those who pursue actions that benefit themselves at the expense of the rest of us. None of this requires us to posit a good God, unless you happen to think that only a good God could have created a universe that contains creatures capable of devising such systems. But even then, you'd be defining goodness first, and then attributing its origins to God second, not the other way round.Elizabeth Liddle
September 8, 2011
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And let us not forget the actual focal case in this thread: an attempt to create the perception that sexual depredations on young boys and girls is acceptable. Let us never forget that.kairosfocus
September 8, 2011
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Onlookers: The best answer to MF's tactic here is to cite Aristotle in The Rhetoric, Bk I Ch 2, on how arguments persuade:
Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker [ethos]; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind [pathos]; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself [logos]. Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible . . . Secondly, persuasion may come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions. Our judgements when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile . . . Thirdly, persuasion is effected through the speech itself when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question . . .
No appeals to emotion are better than the underlying accuracy to reality of the perceptions and judgements that excite the emotions. Just ask the ghosts of Socrates and those who unjustly sentenced him to die on ill-founded feelings and perceptions. MF persistently refuses to engage those issues, which I have summarised above. Let Alcibiades, the prototype for the Nietzschean superman, therefore stand as our warning on what clever manipulators will do if they can get away with it, and the result for the community. The utter bankruptcy of evolutionary materialism, stands exposed for all to see. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
September 8, 2011
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Hi, Lizzie. Just for fun, I will answer your question. According to the Bible, that which is objectively “good” is life. God formed man from the dust of the earth and breathed into him the breath of life. This makes like sacred. Now as you know, to say that something is “good” simply means that it is desirable. There is no “goodness” without desirability. I admire the heroic efforts of some commenters to make it seem otherwise, but desirability is the objective content of goodness. And for men, the most desirable thing of all is life: “In him was life, and this life was the light of men.” I’m going to tell you a story about what is “good,” how we lost it, and how we can get it back again that uses no axioms. It is not based on reason. It is based entirely on desirability. Man was given the gift of life and put into a paradisical place on our beautiful planet where he had access to the tree of life. He himself was not immortal, like God—he was a created being—but neither was he mortal as long as he had access to this tree. Out of vanity, he made a deliberate choice to accept death. God told him that if he ate of the forbidden fruit he would surely die. He did it anyway because he wanted to be “like God.” That is, he was not content to be a creature and wanted to be equal to the creator. Because of his sin, he was cursed with death. He was cast out of paradise and lost access to the tree of life. He lost the highest good, which, according to the Bible, is life, and this was the source of his sorrow. After his sin, all of creation “groans in bondage to the grave.” There is a fundamental difference between “the good” of Plato and Aristotle and what is good or most highly desirable in the Bible. The philosophers thought “the good” was intellect, in which case you are right—it requires axioms. But the Bible identifies life as the good. Life becomes our standard of value, and by this light it is possible to identify good behavior without resorting to axioms. Everything that preserves and builds up life is objectively good; everything that detracts from life is evil. Or as you would put it, hurting other people is bad. Your observation that atheists can be moral is perfectly reasonable because atheists are no different from anyone else. They too innately value life—their own, at the very least. Christ reversed the curse by restoring the tree of life to men on the cross. Unlike Adam, he did not consider equality with God as something to be grasped. Instead he poured out his life out of love for the world, so that we could have life, the thing we thirst for. You say treating others well makes you happy. The Bible says the same thing. It proposes a way of living that leads to happiness, and this way is based entirely on love of God and love of our neighbor. Happiness is the good most men seek. You and the Bible agree on its source.allanius
September 8, 2011
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William - when debating whether something is right or wrong I maintain that not only is acceptable to make an (explicit) appeal to emotions - it is unavoidable. Even you have to do it - although you may not realise. When debating what is the correct description of morality i.e. the debate we having now - then it is not necessary or apppropriate to appeal to emotions and I don't think I have done it at any stage. The question of the nature of morality is not itself a moral issue (just as the question of the nature of science is not itself a scientific issue). When it came to debating whether something is right or wrong I directed you to one or thousands of examples where clearly the proponents were appealing to emotion and yet the debate seemed rational enough. You were unwilling to provide any examples of the kind of debate of an ethical issue that you maintain is required for it to be rational. Here is an analogy which may help. Some people play a variant of chess which does not allow for en passant or for a pawn to move two squares on its first move (these were relatively recent iinnovations). Suppose two people from these different traditions are organsing a tournament. The question arise - ought we allow players to move two pawns two squares on the first move. Your position is like saying that we cannot have a rational debate about this until we decide which set of rules we are following. (You can imagine one person saying "of course they ought to be allowed to move two squares - that is the rules of chess" - and the other saying something similar in favour of only one square). I am saying that they should decide which set of rules on the (emotional) grounds of which set will provide the most entertaining and satisfactory game.markf
September 8, 2011
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;)Upright BiPed
September 8, 2011
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In this particular case, the argument reveals that in order to have a rational, universally applicable moral system by which one is logically empowered and sustained to challenge any moral edict or rule with reasoned, grounded argument, is if and only if one holds that morals must correspond to an objectively exsistent, universal “good” (purpose, final cause). This solid, logical reasoning reveals that we must posit another premise in order to achieve (ground, provide basis for) a universally-applicable objective good; we must have sentient creator that provides a “purpose” or “final cause”.
I don't see anything either solid or logical about this reasoning! It seems like a truism followed by a non sequitur to me. Your argument seems to me to boil down to: In order to argue that some action is good you must assume there is such a thing as a good action. Which is self-evidently true to the point of near-tautology. Then you seem to claim, with no logical steps intervening, that there can only be good actions if we were made by a sentient creator with the intention that we should perform good actions. Here is my position: In order to argue that some action is good, we must first agree on a definition of what constitutes a good action. No sentient creator is required, and far from being "subjective", to reach agreement on criteria for goodness there must be a shared recognition of what the essentials of goodness are - i.e. some measure of objectivity. In contrast, your system provides no criteria at all to judge what is good and what is not, but merely demands the conviction that some things are good and some are not.Elizabeth Liddle
September 8, 2011
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I don't think markf abides by the rules of argument theory; his comments (I believe) are generated to elicit a feeling in the audience (appeal to emotion) rather than as an attempt to discern truth. From what I understand (from what he has explicitly said elsewhere), that is how markf defines "a rational debate". From "The Universe is Too Big... (Part One)": Me:
Since you have already in this thread said that you consider debates about morality where appeals to emotion are used to reach conclusions are a form of “rational debate”, it is clear that you and I fundamentally disagree on what constitutes a “rational debate”".
markf responds:
That’s true. Is there any disadvantage to my kind of rational debate? (There is a difference between manipulating emotions and making a straightforward argument to emotion). It is certainly the most common kind of debate.
Since markf is admittedly not compelled to conduct his debate in accordance with argument theory or abide rules of logic, and admits (even endorses) use of fallacies such as appeals to emotion, I suggest respondents and onlookers keep that in mind.William J Murray
September 8, 2011
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Complex question fallacy.kairosfocus
September 8, 2011
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Kairosfocus, Posts such as yours above open the door wide, leaving it only up to the choice of the reader to take the step through or not. As always, your enduring patience and efforts are not only appreciated, but are inspiring.William J Murray
September 8, 2011
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Pardon, MF, but that looks a lot like trying to bury quite reasonable explorations and answers under a blizzard of fallaciously complex questions repeated drumbeat style, in the teeth of any and all responses that threaten to resolve them. For instance, why are you suggesting there may be no ultimate answer as your rebuttal to a test case on a necessary being who would perforce be the ultimate answer: the inherently good, creator God, if real [and I here allude to the issue in Modal logic on necessary beings and possibility vs actuality]? Why not instead actually engage the points made, cogently, on the merits?kairosfocus
September 8, 2011
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MarkF asks:
William – when you say someone is behaving morally what do you mean?
It means they are pursuing/fulfilling the good, which is embodied by God. In practical, specific terms, it means they are behaving in a way that comports with self-evidently true moral statements (such as: it is always immoral to torture infants for personal pleasure) and rationally-derived extensions and inferences based on those true statements, arbited by first principle considerations (we exist, other things exist, logic works, we are capable of discerning true statements from false, there is an objective good, we are responsible for our intentions). Elizabeth says:
I have a longer response to make to this, but first tell me how you yourself discern the goal of moral behaviour from theism.
The goal is a necessary extension of the logic; since god is "what good is", and morality is the pursuit or fulfillment of the good, the goal can only be to become like god, towards union with or re-union with god, or to get closer to god. There are many ways to phrase it. IOW, we are not now as "like god" as we could be; we have the option (free will) to choose to become more like god (move in god's direction), to hang around in our current status, or to actively pursue the opposite. BTW: under this argument, since god "is" what existence "is", and god "is" what love is; and god "is" what good "is"; and god "is" what reason "is"; I leave it to you to figure out the inescapable consequences of a path of god-abandonment. Gravity, if sapient, might say "Don't step off the cliff!", but it cannot stop being gravity if you are intent on doing so. God cannot stop being god, nor change the consequences of a path of god-abandonment.William J Murray
September 8, 2011
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There are so many different questions here it is beginning to make my head hurt.  So I am going to try and identify what I think are the most important ones and comment on them. I am sorry it is rather long. Q1) What do words like “good”, “bad”, “right” and “wrong” mean when used in their moral sense? (a) If we are using them in different ways then our dispute is purely semantic and not very important. (b) Assuming we are using them in the same way, then clearly they do not mean something like “as God ordains” because many of us don’t even believe in God – so we can’t be meaning that! (c) The answer may not be easy.  Just because you know how to use a word it doesn’t mean it is easy to describe how you use it – just like riding a bicycle. Q2) Is there an ultimate justification for our moral judgements which is objective and in some sense the true or correct justification? (a) We all justify our moral judgements in the sense of producing reasons, but this doesn’t entail there is an ultimate justification.  There may only be partial justifications available which influence others but are not logically clinching. (b) Many people, if challenged, will produce a set of rules which they consider to be their justification.  For some this is based on their God and the rules they believe their God has given them for being moral.  For others (including some theists) it is based on considerations such as the Golden rule.  (c) Others, including myself, don’t think such a set or rules can ever be an ultimate justification because for any such set of rules you can always ask “but why do you believe this set of rules to be good?” i.e. you have to make a subjective decision about which objective set of rules to adopt.  We base on our justification on common human nature and the natural desire most of us have to help others. For us, following Hume, we believe ethical rules to be descriptive rather than prescriptive (or possibly to be useful heuristic tools to help us behave in a manner most of us find (subjectively) moral. (d) It is inadequate to answer this by saying your set of rules defines what is good. This is to provide an answer to question 1 not question 2!  If you define good as conforming to your God’s rules then we have a semantic dispute – because that is not what I mean by good. Q3) If people do not believe in an ultimate justification how will they behave? Chris in particular seems to think they will behave very badly. (a) This is a question about how people will behave given a belief.  It is not a question about whether that belief is true.  It might be the case that there is no ultimate justification for morality but we ought to keep quiet about it because if the truth were known people would behave very badly. (b) The answer to this question is empirical not logical, to be discovered through studying how people actually do behave. The experts are psychologists and sociologists – not philosophers or theologians. (c) It is closely related to the question – how will people behave if they do not believe there will be an ultimate sanction for misbehaviour.  Again this is an empirical question – not a logical or theological one. Q4) If there is no ultimate set of rules why wouldn’t I behave amorally? (a ) Almost the same as Q3 but this is asking what logical reason is there for me to behave morally if there is no set of rules.  Lizzie gave a list of reasons above: Avoiding punishment Avoiding disapprobation Wanting to be liked Wanting to be approved of Enjoying being appreciated Enjoying seeing others unhappy (or happy) Enjoying the sense of having stuck it to people they dislike, or having helped out someone they like Enjoying the sense that after they die, they will be remembered with fear and respect, or – due to deception – remembered fondly Enjoying the sense that after they die, even after they have been forgotten, they will have left their mark.markf
September 8, 2011
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But then your theism is based on your moral arguments, not the other way round.
In this particular case, the argument reveals that in order to have a rational, universally applicable moral system by which one is logically empowered and sustained to challenge any moral edict or rule with reasoned, grounded argument, is if and only if one holds that morals must correspond to an objectively exsistent, universal "good" (purpose, final cause). This solid, logical reasoning reveals that we must posit another premise in order to achieve (ground, provide basis for) a universally-applicable objective good; we must have sentient creator that provides a "purpose" or "final cause". This is not what my theism is based on; it is one argument for the existence of god I've developed after becoming a theist.William J Murray
September 8, 2011
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Elizabeth asks:
And I agree. But why is that process not available to an atheist?
There's no such thing as a self-evidently true moral statement under atheism, because there is no objective good that could produce self-evidently true, universal moral statements. Under atheism, all "oughts" are derived from subjectively-chosen purposes.
But that makes belief in God secondary to the understanding of what is good. It doesn’t render the first part dependent on the second.
It doesn't make god a secondary conclusion; it makes god a necessary premise. IOW, you can't claim a universal, objective good for humanity exists (good, which is a final cause, goal or purpose) without also premising God (sentient creator) as the source of that goal or purpose.William J Murray
September 8, 2011
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OOPS, I forgot to close an italicisation properly.kairosfocus
September 8, 2011
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Onlookers (And Dr Liddle and Mr MarkF et al): Pardon some painful but neccessary corrective steps: 1: First, do you observe the denial- of- the- patently- plain tactic in action above on the part of advocates for evolutionary materialism? 2: I am really disappointed to see these sorts of tactics surfacing. 3: In the in brief previously linked, on dealing on the Euthyphro dilemma, had there been a willingness to seriously read and reflect then address the matter on the merits [instead of simply to brush the response aside], you would have seen:
. . . the point of this dilemma is to try to suggest that theism or the like has no real answer to the is-ought gap [faced by evolutionary materialism] either. So in effect, we have to shrug, take moral feelings as a brute given, and try to work out the best compromise we can. However, the fatal defect of the dilemma argument lies in its pagan roots: the Greek gods in view in Socrates' original argument were not the true root of being; so, they could not ground reality. But the God of theism is the ground of reality, so it is a classic theistic answer that the inherently good Creator of the cosmos made a world that -- in accordance with his unchangeably good character -- not only is replete with reliable, compelling signs pointing to his eternal power and Deity as the root of our being, but also builds in a real, reasonable, intelligible moral principle into that world. That intelligible moral principle is implanted inextricably in our very nature as human beings, so that for instance by our nature as creatures made in God's image with ability to know, reason and choose, we have a known duty of mutual respect. And, when this inherently good Creator-God and Lord commands us on moral matters, what he says will be decisively shaped by that goodness on the one hand -- commandments are "for our good" -- and will also reflect a responsiveness to human beings who are morally governed creatures, in a relevant situation. (A subtlety in this, is that there will be cases where there is ameliorative regulation of behaviour too deeply rooted in a culture shaped by "the hardness of our hearts" to be pulled up at once without unacceptable harm [cf. here the classic "I hate divorce" case of the Judaeo-Christian tradition], but there will also be provision onwards for reformation of the culture [cf. here for a similar case, on slavery].) As a result, objective morality is grounded in the roots of our nature and in the moral Creator behind those roots.
4: That's the in-brief part. In the immediately following text at IOSE, reference was then made to Locke's use of Hooker's discussion in Ecclesiastical Polity [1594+] in Ch 2 of his second essay on civil govt, when he grounded the principles of liberty, justice, rights and self-defence [individual and collective] in the community. 5: Let me cite Hooker, as Hooker actually elaborates on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, to explain himself:
. . . if I cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man's hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire which is undoubtedly in other men . . . my desire, therefore, to be loved of my equals in Nature, as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to themward fully the like affection. From which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn for direction of life no man is ignorant . . . [[Hooker then continues, citing Aristotle in The Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 8:] as namely, That because we would take no harm, we must therefore do none; That since we would not be in any thing extremely dealt with, we must ourselves avoid all extremity in our dealings; That from all violence and wrong we are utterly to abstain, with such-like . . . ] [[Eccl. Polity,preface, Bk I, "ch." 8, p.80]
6: In short, the central issue is to ground OUGHT in an IS in the foundation of a worldview, given the force of Hume's notorious "I am surprized" IS-OUGHT challenge. And, as WJM et al have highlighted, oughtness is also inextricably bound up with the purpose of that which the ought applies to. It is also tied into a concept of reciprocity of equals that ties into mutual respect. 7: As long since repeatedly highlighted, evolutionary materialism as a matter of patent fact has in it no IS that can ground OUGHT, thus it is inherently radically relativist and amoral, reducing morality to psycho-social or rhetorical manipulation and might makes right. 8: The utter destructiveness of that is patent, on abundant history -- and notice the telling silence on Alcibiades (the real world historical prototype for the Nietzschean superman, if we needed one . . . ) as linked above. 9: Since there is no justification of morality on evo mat -- patent to all who would behold and reflect ever since the days of the collapse of Athens that was so materially contributed to by the machinations of said Alcibiades through his amoral behaviour -- the rhetorical tactic of resort is to try to drag theism down to the same level. 10: If that tactic succeeds rhetorically, we would think we were all in the same amoral boat -- observe for instance the increasingly common atheistical pretence that God giving us commands for our own good [as in "when all else fails follow the manufacturer's instructions'] is equivalent to a Hitler or a Stalin imposing evil by might makes "right" totalitarian tactics. 11: Truly, out of the abundance of the heart, the mouth speaks! And, by your words you are justified or condemned! (Such words of projection -- and outright blasphemy, frankly -- are an utterly telling self-condemnation.) 12: Now, with the modern use of the Euthyphro so-called dilemma, we are here dealing with a bit subtler level; one that is not so crude. But it is the same fundamental error. 13: You will see in the clip above, that I pointed out the correction tot he Euthyphro dilemmma that has been on the table for 1500 or more years: an objection to the limitations of gods who were in effect Nietzschean supermen writ large, has nothing to do with the grounding of morality in the goodness of the Creator God who is -- by core conception -- the foundation of reality. 14: In short the Euthyphro dilemma, as used nowadays to try to undermine the ethics of theism, is a subtle strawman argument, which is also therefore automatically a red herring distractor from the real issue. [Strawman arguments are inherently distractive and irrelevant, so this fallacy is always a sub-set of the red herring fallacy.] 15: Let me repeat, as such needs to be hammered home to get through the protective roof of fallacies that deflects the force of the issues faced by evo mat and its fellow travellers: the Euthyphro dilemma is simply and utterly irrelevant to the grounding of OUGHT in the inherently good character of the Creator, Lord and God who made us, loves us, and guides us towards our purpose as his stewards on earth, stewards who by DESIGN are free so we can have actual capacity to love and act towards virtue under moral government. 16: Now, let us look briefly at the logical structure of the grounding of OUGHT in that IS:
a --> God -- by core concept -- is the ground of being, the necessary being behind our contingent world, the Creator and Lord, so all of reality would be rooted in that IS. b --> And if you doubt or reject that IS, remember that first, the issue is the validity, just look at this as an explanation on a candidate. Then, you can also explore -- start here on -- why there is a serious reason to accept that this IS is not only suggested, or possible, but actual. (That is an important but tangential issue dealt with elsewhere, so let us not go off after a second distraction.) c --> As Designer, Maker and Creator, God's intent would build purpose into the cosmos, and what is in it, including us. So, the concept of goodness and that of oughtness, will be deeply embedded with that purposiveness. d --> The pivot is that God's character is INHERENTLY good, so his purposes and operations to give those purposes effect will reflect that character. Therefore the OUGHTNESS built into the cosmos and those in it, will be good. e --> Nor is this circular, as the goodness of God and the reasonablenesss of the principles of ought are sufficiently intelligible to the willing heart and mind, that we can see that reasonableness and find it sufficiently warranted to be plainly responsible to act on it. As Hooker highlighted in the clip above, and as Locke says elsewhere in his too often overlooked "candle that is set up in us" remark. f --> As I have repeatedly pointed out (and just as repeatedly been studiously ignored on), the Categorical Imperative approach that examines the sustainability of a pattern of thought or speech or action, is a good example on this. g --> That is, actions that are morally unsound parasite off the fact that the majority of people, the majority of the time, do not act like that, or society would be seriously harmed or would even collapse. h --> For instance, if we could not take it as given that most of the time, most people tell the truth so far as they know it, verbal communication would break down and society would collapse, frustrating human flourishing. i --> Similarly, if sufficient of a proportion of checques in a community become rubberised, the whole enterprise of using checques will collapse. j --> Yet again, if enough counterfeit money gets into a society, the money will be discredited and the economy would suffer severely, again undermining human flourishing. And so forth. k --> So, we can recognise enough about the purpose of our existence, that we can see that specific evils, if hey become prevalent, would undermine it. That is, key moral principles are objectively discernible, once one is willing to accept that there is a purpose to human existence and a consequent moral value of the individual human being, thence an equality among us that should be respected. l --> Immediately, it is apparent that that which persuasively tends to undermine our ability to discern our purpose, value, dignity and equality, is an existential threat to humanity. (And evolutionary materialists, in case you were wondering: this means your favourite worldview, whether dressed up in the holy lab coat and pronounced in suitably august tones by the new high priesthood as they censor questions and exposure of problems, or not.) m --> By utter contrast, the inherently good God, has a goodness that is discernible to those who will but look and reflect seriously. And the basic principles of commanded morality do commend themselves as being consistent with that sustainability principle. Namely, the Golden Rule, as we all know, and as Hooker so eloquently discussed. And indeed, from this and its cognate, to respect as well our inherently good Creator, all the law and prophets do depend.
17 --> So, plainly, theism has an IS that can properly ground OUGHT. Actually, the only serious candidate to be such an IS: the inherently good Creator God. 18 --> nor is this a secret or an unintelligible mystery. Save, to those who have so willfully forgotten their purpose that they have sought to create a world of knowledge that locks out the possibility of God from what they will accept as knowledge. 19 --> The entirely predictable result is en-darkened minds, and benumbed consciences, leading to the sort of incoherent, patently absurd chaos that we have been warned against for thousands of years, starting with Plato in The Laws, Bk X, with Alcibiades as Exhibit no 1. 20 --> In case you are inclined to doubt me on the specific relevance or accuracy of this, let me cite again prof Lewontin in that famous 1997 NYRB article, on Sagan and the scientific elites, per the refreshingly honest report of one of said elites:
. . . To Sagan, as to all but a few other scientists, it is self-evident [[actually, science and its knowledge claims are plainly not immediately and necessarily true on pain of absurdity, to one who understands them; this is another logical error, begging the question , confused for real self-evidence; whereby a claim shows itself not just true but true on pain of patent absurdity if one tries to deny it . . ] that the practices of science provide the surest method of putting us in contact with physical reality, and that, in contrast, the demon-haunted world rests on a set of beliefs and behaviors that fail every reasonable test [[i.e. an assertion that tellingly reveals a hostile mindset, not a warranted claim] . . . . It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes [[another major begging of the question . . . ] to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute [[i.e. here we see the fallacious, indoctrinated, ideological, closed mind . . . ], for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door. [And if you have become so endarkened as to imagine tha the immediately following words JUSTIFY the above, kindly cf here for the fuller cite and notes with onward links.]
_____________ The matter is plain enough for those who are willing to see. Let us see if we will now at length have a serious engagement on the merits, instead of more dismissive or distractive rhetoric. GEM of TKI
kairosfocus
September 8, 2011
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Unless by this:
How do we know what specific acts/intentions are good/not good? The same way we know anything about anything; we find self-evidently true moral statements; we take those statements, combined with other necessarily true first principles (right reason, existence, capacity to discern true statements), and reason necessarily true moral statements; find generally true moral statements, and solutions to contingencies.
But then your theism is based on your moral arguments, not the other way round. And I agree. But why is that process not available to an atheist? I'm fine with a theology that says that God is good - it was, and in sense remains, my own theology. But that makes belief in God secondary to the understanding of what is good. It doesn't render the first part dependent on the second.Elizabeth Liddle
September 8, 2011
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You say:
How do we know what specific acts/intentions are good/not good? The same way we know anything about anything; we find self-evidently true moral statements; we take those statements, combined with other necessarily true first principles (right reason, existence, capacity to discern true statements), and reason necessarily true moral statements; find generally true moral statements, and solutions to contingencies.
And I agree. But why is that process not available to an atheist? I'm fine with a theology that says that God is good - it was, and in sense remains, my own theology. But that makes belief in God secondary to the understanding of what is good. It doesn't render the first part dependent on the second.Elizabeth Liddle
September 8, 2011
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Possibly true. How impotent that is, of course, is an empirical question.Elizabeth Liddle
September 8, 2011
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I have a longer response to make to this, but first tell me how you yourself discern the goal of moral behaviour from theism. And what it is.Elizabeth Liddle
September 7, 2011
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William - when you say someone is behaving morally what do you mean?markf
September 7, 2011
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His laws and principles contain all of his expectations of us, both our inner thoughts and our actions. Therefore we don’t need to ‘be moral’ or ‘have morality.’ We just need to obey.
That's very honest but rather frightening. Suppose someone believes that God expects him to kill all Jews (it doesn't even have to be a correct interpretation). Do you really want him to obey? Doesn't it remind you of someone who is dedicated follower of a dictator such as Stalin? That is why I not only think that morality is based on our subjective emoptions (primarily compassion) but also think it is important that this is recognised. Luckily it is by far the most common approach to morality in practice.markf
September 7, 2011
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And that's why I am curious to know how you derive any specific moral precepts from your theism.Elizabeth Liddle
September 7, 2011
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