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Well, So Long As They Are Not Just Any Old Preferences

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This will be my last post on this subject.  In the comments to my prior post, groovamos wrote a comment that contains a personal history followed by a gut wrenching story (which is in bold):

I am in no sense as qualified as most on this thread to debate philosophy. However as one who embraced materialism TWICE in my youth, separated by a 3 year period of interest in mysticism, I’ll have a go.

At the end of sophomore year I had converted to the typical campus leftist stance of the day, cultural zeitgeist being the driver, sexual license sealing the deal. Not outwardly religious as a kid, I quickly gave up belief in a supreme being. And just as naturally I gave up any belief in ‘truth’ as something relevant to all human activity, and sure enough out the window was any belief in ‘evil’ as a concept. Soon enough I found that lying was acceptable as long as it was me doing it. Especially since I was self assured as one with a degree in a difficult discipline (hip too, self-styled). And who enjoyed hedonistic pursuits and shallow short term relationships. And lying sort of fit into the whole picture.

But here is the interesting part looking back on it. Whenever I would read in the news of acts of insane depravity and wickedness, I would go into a mentally confused state and would feel like I had no bearings in order to process what I had just encountered. It was extremely uncomfortable. I’m talking about the acts of Jeffery Dahmer, and others. One of these I remember that particularly caused me disorientation as if I, the atheist, were the one that might risk insanity just thinking about it (in the early ’80′s).

In this particular case the police arrived at a house where a man had just dismembered and sliced up his mom, her screams having been heard by neighbors. The man did not notice the police had entered and was found masturbating with a section of rectum he had excised. When asked how he had disposed of his mother’s breasts, he said “I think I ate them”.

Congrats to any atheist on here finding the story ‘unfavorable’. Congrats on your faith that someday ‘science’ will discover every event in the long chain for that experience. ‘Science’, answering all questions, will describe for you every neural, synaptic event, every action potential, every detailed cascade of chemical analogues and concentration gradients in your visual system and brain. And you will know EXACTLY the complete ‘science’ behind your disfavoring the story, so it will fit like a glove over your materialist philosophy, and maybe even reveal why the guy did it. And if you are a little disoriented, like I seriously was, you may be saved from that in future by ‘science’.

In the very next comment Mark Frank writes (Mark added the bold, not I):

The OP quotes me but omits a paragraph which I think is important. Here is the complete text:

As a materialist and subjectivist I agree with Seversky:

A ) Personal preferences can be reduced to the impulses caused by the electro-chemical processes of each person’s brain.

B) There is no such thing as objective good and evil.

C) Statements about good and evil are expressions of personal preferences.

(I would add the proviso that these are not any old preferences. They are altruistic preferences that are deeply seated in human nature and are supported by evidence and reasoning. They are also widely, but not universally, shared preferences so they are often not competing.)

Now, of course, the point of this entire exercise has been to demonstrate a truth, which I will illustrate by the following hypothetical dialogue between Mark and the man in groovamos’s story (let’s call him “John” for convenience):***

Mark: John, dismembering and eating your mother is evil, and by ‘evil’ I mean ‘that which I do not personally prefer as a result of impulses caused by the electro-chemical processes of my brain.”

John: But Mark, I preferred to dismember and eat my mother. Otherwise I would not have done it; no one forced me to after all. Therefore, under your own definition of good and evil it was “good,” which you tell me means ‘that which I personally prefer as a result of impulses caused by the electro-chemical processes of my brain.”

Mark: Not so fast John, I would add a proviso that my preference is not just any old preference. It is an altruistic preference that is deeply seated in human nature and is supported by evidence and reasoning. It is also widely, but not universally, shared. And your preference is none of these things.

John: Are you saying that your preference not to dismember and eat your mother, which preference resulted from the impulses caused by the electro-chemical processes of your brain, is objectively and demonstrably good, and that therefore my preference to dismember and eat my mother, which preference also resulted from the impulses caused by the electro-chemical processes of my brain, is objectively and demonstrably evil?

Mark: Of course not. There is no such thing as objective good and evil.

John: Well at least you are being consistent, because we both know the electro-chemical system in your brain just is. And as Hume demonstrated long ago, “ought” cannot be grounded in “is.” Your preference just is. My preference just is. Neither is objectively superior to the other.

Mark: Certainly that follows from my premises.

John: You can say your preference is “good” but if good is defined as that which you prefer you are saying nothing more than “my preference is my preference.” Your little proviso, Mark, does not make your preference anything other than your preference; certainly it does not demonstrate that it is in any way more good than my preference. So, my question to you is, why do you insist on the proviso?

Mark: _____________ [I will let Mark answer that]

I will give my answer as to why Mark insists on his proviso. He has the same problem Russell did: “I cannot see how to refute the arguments for the subjectivity of ethical values, but I find myself incapable of believing that all that is wrong with wanton cruelty is that I don’t like it.” Russell on Ethics 165/Papers 11: 310–11.

Russell was incapable of believing the conclusions that followed ineluctably from his own premises. Dissonance ensued. For most people materialism requires self deception to deal with the dissonance of saying they believe something that it is not possible for a sane person to believe. Thus WJM’s dictum: “No sane person acts as if materialism is true.”

So why does Mark insist on his proviso that in the end makes absolutely zero difference to the conclusion that must follow from his premises? He is trying to cope with his dissonance.

If my premises required me to engage in acts of self-deception in order to cope with dissonance, I hope I would reexamine them.

___________
***I am not saying Mark has said or would say any of these things. I am saying that the words I put in his mouth follow from his premises. If he does not believe they do, I invite him to demonstrate why they do not

Comments
Alicia Renard: You say: "Then reject “materialism” (whatever that means)." I do. However, I agree that "materialism" is a confusing term. "Matter" is a vague idea, ambiguous at best. What I do reject is the theory that consciousness (subjective experiences) can be explained in terms of configurations of objective events. You say: "And… They would be?" I accept consciousness as an empirical fact, and in no way I believe it can be explained in objective terms. Consciousness and its functions and processes can be observed and described, and its interactions with objects can be analyzed empirically. ID theory is all about this: the study of those configurations of objective events and objects which can originate only in conscious processes and representations.gpuccio
April 17, 2015
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gpuccio writes:
Materialism cannot explain (among other things) most of my perceptions and intuitions about myself and others,...
Then reject "materialism" (whatever that means).
...therefore I think that it is a very bad explanation of reality, and I choose other explanations, which behave much better.
And... They would be?Alicia Renard
April 17, 2015
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Materialism means never having to say you're wrong.William J Murray
April 17, 2015
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The only way out for a materialist—who is not satisfied with the notion that ‘consciousness is just an illusion’— is emergentism. It’s an attempt to at least partly explain downward causation—consciousness, free will, morality and so forth. How does one get from atoms to consciousness? Emergentist: it’s a higher level property like the property “walking” which emerges from a certain configuration of atoms. One crucial problem with this comparison: The property “walking” has no independence from the parts that produce it. It has no power to distance itself from the parts and do anything other than what the parts orders it to do. It’s fully produced by the parts and the interactions between the parts. There is zero wiggle room for the property, it depends on the parts for 100%. What the materialist desperately needs in order to describe mental reality is true downward causation: a free person who can make decisions based on reason—and not chemistry—perhaps for the sole reason that only such an agent has the ability to do science. :)Box
April 17, 2015
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eigenstate said:
How does WJM’s lament about his intuitions being mistaken or illusory obligate reality to be one way or the other? On materialism, he’s badly mistaken, and complaining about being mistaken isn’t going to compel reality to reformulate and reconstitute to “deillusionize” WJM, is it?
I have never made an argument about what reality is. My arguments are about the logic (consistency and consequences), and about the practicality of moral views, not whether or not any particular moral view factually represented reality.
I don’t see the relevance of complaining about “illusions”, here. If it’s illusory, it’s illusory. If it’s not, it’s not. In either case, whining about putative illusions doesn’t change anything one way or another, does it? Maybe I’m missing the substance of the argument and it’s something like this:
I'm not complaining that it is an illusion; I'm pointing it out for those in the audience that want their cake and think they can eat the illusion. They cannot. If they are fine with admitting they are behaving delusionally, I'm fine with leaving the argument there. I'm fine with any argument where my opponent wishes to end it by saying "Yes, I'm delusional. So what? You are, too! So is everyone else!"William J Murray
April 17, 2015
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Prediction @ comment 126 confirmed almost immediately @ comment 128. :-)Barry Arrington
April 17, 2015
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The error is yours. If what is at stake is the characterisitic of whether or not a thing has top-down, prescriptive control, that characteristic cannot exist under the assumption that all behaviors are causally generated by that which lies at the bottom.
This persists in the level of description error. If we are talking about morality, we cannot say "humans cannot be moral, because humans are made of atoms, and everyone knows that an atom is not a moral agent". Right? It doesn't help to say: "It's all STEM" (MELP is a very confused and problematic term, I think STEM is what you really want to point to). That just restates the error: "Humans cannot be moral (on materialism), because humans are just space/time/energy/matter, and everyone knows none of those things are more. Behaviors being caused does NOT negate their efficacy or their effects by being "naturally caused" vs. "supernaturally caused".
IOW, if MELP (matter/energy/law/probability) causes all effects and phenomena, then no phenomena can have the characteristic of not being caused by MELP.
Tautologically true. If all phenomena are products of STEM, then all phenomena are products of STEM, agreed.
This is the essence of Mr. Arrington’s argument; under materialism, moral preferences and choices and actions cannot be said to be “caused by” any top-down aggregate or emergent property without that term being used as a deceptive place-holder for being caused by MELP.
There's nothing deceptive or unclear about the materialist framework. It just entails that you and Barry are confused about causation, mind, agency, morality, ethics and a number of other concepts if it's true. On a scientifically-informed materialism, human morality obtains objective -- the subjective elements of human judgements on morality are grounded in objective facts about human nature. It's no more deceptive than theistic misconceptions about (dualist) mind. On materialism, it is a misconception, and dualist understandings of mind cannot be mapped to anything real, so their definitions are "illicit" in terms of corresponding to reality, but words mean what we agree they mean, and "morality", as thoroughly confused as theistic definitions of that term may be, is not "owned" by materialists. Theists can define morality in any crazy way they like, so long as we can agree and understand what they mean. ;-) These definitions *must* be different to be internal consistent with the different frameworks in which they are used (e.g. materialism, theism).eigenstate
April 17, 2015
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ES: >> If I say: 1. Water is wet. 2. Water is made of H an O atoms 3. ERGO: H and O atoms are wet The error is NOT contingent on my providing any mechanical explanation for “wetness” or not. The error obtains in attributing characteristics to the parts are NOT characteristics of the parts, but are only characters of the whole.>> a --> Yes, when the whole simply supervenes upon and emerges from interaction of the parts, the very definition of a mechanical system. b --> In pointing to walking, it is wholly explained on the cumulative levels of cellular dynamics resting on molecules and atoms, then upwards to muscles, bones and nerves etc, i.e. it is a position-arm system applied to a particular use, walking. c --> At no level is there something that is not adequately explained by what comes before. d --> The problem comes in when you then make the leap across to a decision as to where to walk, which is NOT wholly explained on such, on pain of reducing our cognitive realm to self referential incoherence. e --> Let me again cite Reppert, to see the point, in respect of the rational inference involved in a deductive argument resting on on blind symbols but meaningful terms:
. . . let us suppose that brain state A, which is token identical to the thought that all men are mortal, and brain state B, which is token identical to the thought that Socrates is a man, together cause the belief that Socrates is mortal. It isn’t enough for rational inference that these events be those beliefs, it is also necessary that the causal transaction be in virtue of the content of those thoughts . . . [[But] if naturalism is true, then the propositional content is irrelevant to the causal transaction that produces the conclusion, and [[so] we do not have a case of rational inference. In rational inference, as Lewis puts it, one thought causes another thought not by being, but by being seen to be, the ground for it. But causal transactions in the brain occur in virtue of the brain’s being in a particular type of state that is relevant to physical causal transactions.
f --> To attempt to reduce the inference and conclusion process to blind mechanism, is to fundamentally undermine its character. g --> That is, blindly mechanical computation is not equal to rational contemplation, on pain of self referential incoherence, and that is without addressing the further problem, GIGO and the expectation of writing sophisticated software out of lucky noise, a further absurdity. h --> The attempt to reduce rational contemplation to blindly mechanical computation on some substrate -- here electrochemical neural networks -- is better compared to trying to get North by insistently heading due West. >> I may completely unaware of any mechanism for the phenomenon of “wetness”, that does not make my argument 1-3 sound.>> i --> The problem here, is that you have failed to distinguish distinct cases that are categorically distinct, and this because you are locked up in a fundamentally mechanistic view of reality that can only see mechanism and so runs in futile circles round and round ever faster West, insisting that hat is the only way to get North. j --> But that is exactly what has broken down decisively here. In Haldane's terms:
"It seems to me immensely unlikely that mind is a mere by-product of matter. For if my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically. And hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms. In order to escape from this necessity of sawing away the branch on which I am sitting, so to speak, I am compelled to believe that mind is not wholly conditioned by matter.” [["When I am dead," in Possible Worlds: And Other Essays [1927], Chatto and Windus: London, 1932, reprint, p.209.
k --> As long as reason is distinct from blind mechanism, it cannot be reducible to computing substrates and whatever software happens to ride on them. Such are inherently blind and non-rational, driven by the iron grip of GIGO. l --> To further see the problem of utter distinction between true/false or right/wrong and things like mV action potentials in neurons, consider the implied challenge in Haldane:
a: Evolutionary materialism argues that the cosmos is the product of chance interactions of matter and energy, within the constraint of the laws of nature; from hydrogen to humans by undirected chance and necessity. b: Therefore, all phenomena in the universe, without residue, are determined by the working of purposeless laws of chance and/or mechanical necessity acting on material objects, under the direct or indirect control of happenstance initial circumstances. (This is physicalism. This view covers both the forms where (a) the mind and the brain are seen as one and the same thing, and those where (b) somehow mind emerges from and/or "supervenes" on brain, perhaps as a result of sophisticated and complex software looping. The key point, though is as already noted: physical causal closure -- the phenomena that play out across time, without residue, are in principle deducible or at least explainable up to various random statistical distributions and/or mechanical laws, from prior physical states. Such physical causal closure, clearly, implicitly discounts or even dismisses the causal effect of concept formation and reasoning then responsibly deciding, in favour of specifically physical interactions in the brain-body control loop; indeed, some mock the idea of -- in their view -- an "obviously" imaginary "ghost" in the meat-machine. [[There is also some evidence from simulation exercises, that accuracy of even sensory perceptions may lose out to utilitarian but inaccurate ones in an evolutionary competition. "It works" does not warrant the inference to "it is true."] ) c: But human thought, clearly a phenomenon in the universe, must now fit into this meat-machine picture. So, we rapidly arrive at Crick's claim in his The Astonishing Hypothesis (1994): what we subjectively experience as "thoughts," "reasoning" and "conclusions" can only be understood materialistically as the unintended by-products of the blind natural forces which cause and control the electro-chemical events going on in neural networks in our brains that (as the Smith Model illustrates) serve as cybernetic controllers for our bodies. d: These underlying driving forces are viewed as being ultimately physical, but are taken to be partly mediated through a complex pattern of genetic inheritance shaped by forces of selection [["nature"] and psycho-social conditioning [["nurture"], within the framework of human culture [[i.e. socio-cultural conditioning and resulting/associated relativism]. And, remember, the focal issue to such minds -- notice, this is a conceptual analysis made and believed by the materialists! -- is the physical causal chains in a control loop, not the internalised "mouth-noises" that may somehow sit on them and come along for the ride. (Save, insofar as such "mouth noises" somehow associate with or become embedded as physically instantiated signals or maybe codes in such a loop. [[How signals, languages and codes originate and function in systems in our observation of such origin -- i.e by design -- tends to be pushed to the back-burner and conveniently forgotten. So does the point that a signal or code takes its significance precisely from being an intelligently focused on, observed or chosen and significant alternative from a range of possibilities that then can guide decisive action.]) e: For instance, Marxists commonly derided opponents for their “bourgeois class conditioning” — but what of the effect of their own class origins? Freudians frequently dismissed qualms about their loosening of moral restraints by alluding to the impact of strict potty training on their “up-tight” critics — but doesn’t this cut both ways? Should we not ask a Behaviourist whether s/he is little more than yet another operantly conditioned rat trapped in the cosmic maze? And -- as we saw above -- would the writings of a Crick be any more than the firing of neurons in networks in his own brain? f: For further instance, we may take the favourite whipping-boy of materialists: religion. Notoriously, they often hold that belief in God is not merely cognitive, conceptual error, but delusion. Borderline lunacy, in short. But, if such a patent "delusion" is so utterly widespread, even among the highly educated, then it "must" -- by the principles of evolution -- somehow be adaptive to survival, whether in nature or in society. And so, this would be a major illustration of the unreliability of our conceptual reasoning ability, on the assumption of evolutionary materialism. g: Turning the materialist dismissal of theism around, evolutionary materialism itself would be in the same leaky boat. For, the sauce for the goose is notoriously just as good a sauce for the gander, too. h: That is, on its own premises [[and following Dawkins in A Devil's Chaplain, 2004, p. 46], the cause of the belief system of evolutionary materialism, "must" also be reducible to forces of blind chance and mechanical necessity that are sufficiently adaptive to spread this "meme" in populations of jumped- up apes from the savannahs of East Africa scrambling for survival in a Malthusian world of struggle for existence . . . . j: Therefore, though materialists will often try to pointedly ignore or angrily brush aside the issue, we may freely argue: if such evolutionary materialism is true, then (i) our consciousness, (ii) the "thoughts" we have, (iii) the conceptualised beliefs we hold, (iv) the reasonings we attempt based on such and (v) the "conclusions" and "choices" (a.k.a. "decisions") we reach -- without residue -- must be produced and controlled by blind forces of chance happenstance and mechanical necessity that are irrelevant to "mere" ill-defined abstractions such as: purpose or truth, or even logical validity. (NB: The conclusions of such "arguments" may still happen to be true, by astonishingly lucky coincidence — but we have no rational grounds for relying on the “reasoning” that has led us to feel that we have “proved” or "warranted" them. It seems that rationality itself has thus been undermined fatally on evolutionary materialistic premises. Including that of Crick et al. Through, self-reference leading to incoherence and utter inability to provide a cogent explanation of our commonplace, first-person experience of reasoning and rational warrant for beliefs, conclusions and chosen paths of action. Reduction to absurdity and explanatory failure in short.) k: And, if materialists then object: “But, we can always apply scientific tests, through observation, experiment and measurement,” then we must immediately note that -- as the fate of Newtonian Dynamics between 1880 and 1930 shows -- empirical support is not equivalent to establishing the truth of a scientific theory. For, at any time, one newly discovered countering fact can in principle overturn the hitherto most reliable of theories. (And as well, we must not lose sight of this: in science, one is relying on the legitimacy of the reasoning process to make the case that scientific evidence provides reasonable albeit provisional warrant for one's beliefs etc. Scientific reasoning is not independent of reasoning.) l: Worse, in the case of origins science theories, we simply were not there to directly observe the facts of the remote past, so origins sciences are even more strongly controlled by assumptions and inferences than are operational scientific theories. So, we contrast the way that direct observations of falling apples and orbiting planets allow us to test our theories of gravity . . .
>>Your objection doesn’t address the actual problem I’m pointing at.>> k --> On the contrary, it is dead on target. You are just trying to brush it aside. l --> In fact, just to write your objection, you are forced to appeal to exactly the sort of responsible freedom that you deny, and you are forced to rely on the power of rational contemplation that you cannot account for on your premises. KFkairosfocus
April 17, 2015
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“Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1953, aphorism 109 Eigenstate’s comment at 110 shows how deeply bewitched his intellect is: At 92 KF writes:
ES, the emergence of walking as a mechanical process can be explained mechanically. The CHOICE as to where to walk or not to walk, is a volitional/intellectual process and is not accounted for on mechanisms.
At 110 eigenstate responds:
If I say: 1. Water is wet. 2. Water is made of H an O atoms 3. ERGO: H and O atoms are wet The error is NOT contingent on my providing any mechanical explanation for “wetness” or not. The error obtains in attributing characteristics to the parts are NOT characteristics of the parts, but are only characters of the whole. I may completely unaware of any mechanism for the phenomenon of “wetness”, that does not make my argument 1-3 sound.
Thus, the analogy is: 1. The brain makes volitional choices. 2. The brain is made of atoms. 3. Ergo, atoms make choices. The error, according to E, is that KF has attributed to the parts (i.e., atoms) characteristics that are not characteristics of the parts but are only characteristics of the whole (i.e. the brain). Nonsense. As G cogently observer above, “the wet property of water can be understood in terms of the interaction of atoms, according to known laws.” Conversely, the issue on the table in KF’s statement is whether an amalgamation of atoms can, in principle, make “choices.” As WJM has demonstrated (a demonstration with which eigenstate agrees),
No such top-down control exists even given a purely materialist world; everything is generated and caused bottom-up whether or not the caused properties and behaviors are reducible to the properties and behaviors of the individual things at the bottom. Those emergent properties are expressions of what, at the bottom, is causing them in certain conditions.
It follows that
under materialism, mind and morality (in the sense that they are experienced as what seems to be top-down, prescriptive control over thoughts and body), must be illusionary.
Under materialism, therefore, the ability to make “choices (the experience of having top-down, prescriptive control over thoughts and body) must be an illusion. Therefore, E’s analogy fails because the wet property of water can be understood in terms of the interaction of atoms according to known laws. But the experience of having top-down, prescriptive control over thoughts and body on materialist premises, but be an illusion whether one is talking about the parts OR the sum of the parts. Atoms lack the capacity to choose; so do amalgamations of atoms. As usual (again) WJM put the whole thing better:
The error is yours. If what is at stake is the characterisitic of whether or not a thing has top-down, prescriptive control, that characteristic cannot exist under the assumption that all behaviors are causally generated by that which lies at the bottom. IOW, if MELP (matter/energy/law/probability) causes all effects and phenomena, then no phenomena can have the characteristic of not being caused by MELP. This is the essence of Mr. Arrington’s argument; under materialism, moral preferences and choices and actions cannot be said to be “caused by” any top-down aggregate or emergent property without that term being used as a deceptive place-holder for being caused by MELP.
And so does KF at 127. Prediction: eigenstate's "error of division" argument has been demolished in four different ways by four different commenters. Nevertheless, he will cling to it with a fierce irrational tenacity. Barry Arrington
April 17, 2015
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eigenstate
1. Water is wet. 2. Water is made of H an O atoms 3. ERGO: H and O atoms are wet
Water doesn't choose to be wet. It just is. Wetness does not set a standard for water to achieve. Wetness comes after the molecules bond. Another way to look at it: The whole is greater than the parts. The whole exists because the parts came together. The whole does not set the standard, rules, control, command or govern what the parts did to come together. Because the whole came after the parts and was caused by the parts. The whole did not choose to become the whole - it did not tell the parts to create it. Materialism: Morality emerges from parts (chemicals) Morality exists because the chemicals bonded in a certain way. Morality does not govern the chemical reactions. Morality does not tell the chemicals what to do. The chemicals do not act to conform to morality.Silver Asiatic
April 17, 2015
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eigenstate: Why not: Materialism cannot explain (among other things) most of my perceptions and intuitions about myself and others, therefore I think that it is a very bad explanation of reality, and I choose other explanations, which behave much better.gpuccio
April 17, 2015
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Barry Arrington(8), "Nonsense. The American founders recognized that..." I think your facts are a bit outdated. You are correct that the American founders were determined to build a system of checks and balances based upon their belief that every man is capable of evil. However, somewhere in the last 150 years their message was lost. If you observe the American determination to spread the American gospel, you will see that the core of that gospel, that which our current society sees as its greatness, is democracy. Oh, a side thought: > Materialists views the world as "might makes right". > Materialists recognizes that the community is stronger than any individual. > For maximum community adhesion, the materialist ends up with a simple "moral" foundation: "do unto others as you would have them do to you".bFast
April 17, 2015
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@Barry,
WJM destroys this argument and E immediately changes his story to “yeah it is an illusion, so what.”
There's no change in the story. Do you suppose I had previously been thinking that on materialism, WJM's dualism was just what it seemed to him? Lol. How does WJM's lament about his intuitions being mistaken or illusory obligate reality to be one way or the other? On materialism, he's badly mistaken, and complaining about being mistaken isn't going to compel reality to reformulate and reconstitute to "deillusionize" WJM, is it? I don't see the relevance of complaining about "illusions", here. If it's illusory, it's illusory. If it's not, it's not. In either case, whining about putative illusions doesn't change anything one way or another, does it? Maybe I'm missing the substance of the argument and it's something like this: 1. On materialism, many of my dualist intuitions are illusory. 2. My intuition is that my intuitions are not illusions 3. ERGO, materialism is false. Is that what's being pursued here?eigenstate
April 17, 2015
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Barry,
The compatibilist says that “free will” does not mean “the liberty to choose, i.e., the ability to have done otherwise;” instead, says he, it means “the absence of coercion.” In other words, he says that so long as a choice is not coerced it is completely free even if it is utterly determined.
That's exactly the answer I usually receive when I ask how we can have free will if there is a God that knows the future. The problem being that if the future is known, then it is determined. Most theists tell me that although God knows the future there is still an "absense of coercion." (Not all theists though; there are many that don't believe in free will because of this issue.)
The entire issue in the determinism/free will debate is whether we have liberty to choose defined as “the ability to have done otherwise.”
Which is precisely my reply. If the future is determined than there is no actual "ability to have done otherwise." There are "compatibilist" methods to get around the problem though.goodusername
April 17, 2015
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eigenstate said:
Whether you can explain it mechanically (or non-mechanically) is irrelevant to the problem Barry is having with composition and levels of description. It’s an exercise in the fallacy of division.
The error is yours. If what is at stake is the characterisitic of whether or not a thing has top-down, prescriptive control, that characteristic cannot exist under the assumption that all behaviors are causally generated by that which lies at the bottom. IOW, if MELP (matter/energy/law/probability) causes all effects and phenomena, then no phenomena can have the characteristic of not being caused by MELP. This is the essence of Mr. Arrington's argument; under materialism, moral preferences and choices and actions cannot be said to be "caused by" any top-down aggregate or emergent property without that term being used as a deceptive place-holder for being caused by MELP.William J Murray
April 17, 2015
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Mark: You say: "You can define libertarian free will that way if you like which of course defines it as incompatible with determinism and random events. This simply changes the question to: 1) Does Libertarian free will correspond to our day to day experience of free will? 2) Is Libertarian free will a coherent concept? My answer to both is no." I like that. I completely agree with you on that, except obviously that my answer to both is yes. I am happy that we have a very good agreement on the matter, at last. Your honesty of thought is really remarkable.gpuccio
April 17, 2015
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Eigenstatte: So, assume for the sake of argument that your understandings on this are wrong, and your sense of immaterial control over the natural world is wholly illusory; what you thought was true about your mind is not true, and not even close.
Let’s go all the way. Particles in motion are the only carriers of true existence. Everything else is just happenstance amalgamation of those particles in motion. Hence I do not exist. Okay, here goes:
“I do not exist”
Wait a minute, the fact that I think that I do not exist presupposes my existence. Okay, let’s start over:
“I doubt my existence”
Wait a minute, in order for me to doubt my existence I must exist, otherwise I cannot doubt my existence. Hmm. Okay, next and last try:
“FOR SOLID EVOLUTIONARY REASONS, I’VE BEEN tricked into looking at life from the inside. Without scientism, I look at life from the inside, from the first-person POV (OMG, do I not know what a POV is?—a “point of view”). The first person is the subject, the audience, the viewer of subjective experience, the self in my mind.”*
Wait a minute in order to be tricked into believing something by evolution, Lügengeist, or whatever, I must exist. THEREFOR I AM. This does ring a bell. Oh yes, that’s right, this is just “cogito ergo sum” by Descartes. * //see A.RosenbergBox
April 17, 2015
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Materialists are stuck in the early days of Genesis. Day One and Day Two. Before life, before consciousness, before soul. Materialists are stuck in a pre-Darwinian state.ppolish
April 17, 2015
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goodusername @ 69: In 64, you reply to Cross thus:
It all boils down to “might makes right”.
That would imply an objective morality.
In 69, you reply to me thus:
No one might is guaranteed to want what another might does, so we don’t get objectivity from this.
Well, of course. That’s just one of many problems one will run in to if one seriously argued that “might makes right”.
Which is it? I suppose if you do genuinely try to take both sides it will be a bit more difficult to argue…
I don’t believe that “might makes right” because while the mighty can enforce what they believe to be right, that doesn’t mean that what they believe to be right is objectively right. I’m not going to change my mind on what I believe to be right based on who’s in power.
I’m going to take the liberty of adding emphasis to that to let you more clearly see what you just said:
I don’t believe that “might makes right” because while the mighty can enforce what they believe to be right, that doesn’t mean that what they believe to be right is objectively right. I’m not going to change my mind on what I believe to be right based on who’s in power.
Again: Materialism has no objective morality. This refutes that conclusion how?
Again we are bringing this back to “increases survival value” as “right” and “harms a species” as “wrong”… when will this ever end?
Umm, no. I said “traits that we prefer”. I don’t prefer homicidal thieving rapists. Do you think I’m assuming too much to believe that most of the people here would agree?
Whether or not anyone prefers that is completely irrelevant. Here’s what you said:
If you mean traits that we prefer, I think the example we used helps to show that. The violent rapist isn’t going to last very long.
How do we distinguish “last very long” from… “survival”? You’ll need to demonstrate the distinction if you’d like “Umm, no. I said ‘traits that we prefer’” to be a relevant response. And unless someone can demonstrate a distinction, that answer is as relevant and compelling as “Umm, no. I like peanut butter!”ebenezer
April 17, 2015
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eigenstate said:
You offer these like it’s a complain, or somehow a deficiency of reality, if it is the case. I understand it’s not something that dovetails with your intuitions, but reality is what it is, yeah?
I'm not making a case about my "intuitions"; I'm pointing out that, under materialism, mind and morality (in the sense that they are experienced as what seems to be top-down, prescriptive control over thoughts and body), must be illusionary. The fact that all of us act as if we have top-down, prescriptive control over our behavior would appropriately be cosidered a delusion. That is not "assuming a non-materialist framework" or passing judgement from that framework onto yours, but simply by definition of what illusions and delusions are. No such top-down control exists even given a purely materialist world; everything is generated and caused bottom-up whether or not the caused properties and behaviors are reducible to the properties and behaviors of the individual things at the bottom. Those emergent properties are expressions of what, at the bottom, is causing them in certain conditions. Since no top-down control exists or even can exist, the sensation of top-down control is necessarily an illusion. Acting in accordance with such illusions as if they were not illusions is called a delusion.
So, assume for the sake of argument that your understandings on this are wrong, and your sense of immaterial [top-down] control over the natural world [my body and thoughts] is wholly illusory; what you thought was true about your mind is not true, and not even close. What’s the problem with this, beyond any frustrations you or I may have in accepting that were mistaken??
Do you really not know what the problem is in insisting in a debate that everyone, yourself included, is delusional? If you do not assume the law of non-contradiction, you have nothing to argue about. If you do not assume the principles of sound reason, you have nothing to argue with. If logic is not assumed to be a causally independent, authoritative arbiter of true statements, there’s no reason to apply it. If you do not assume libertarian free will, you have no one to argue against. If you do not assume morality to be an objective commodity, you have no reason to argue in the first place. If you do not assume mind is primary, there is no “you” to make any argument at all. If it is your assumption that we are all delusional and that all of the above things are simply causally-generated, subjective qualia with no actual top-down control over what we say, think and do, why the heck are you bothering contributing here? Do you also attempt to argue leaves out of their shape, or do you try to convince water to not run downhill ?William J Murray
April 17, 2015
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Gpuccio
However, as I have said many times, libertarian free will has a very precise meaning too: it means a worldview where conscious choices change objective events, and cannot be entirely explained neither as deterministic results of laws nor as random events. IOWs, conscious choices have a subjective menaing, which is not dependent on the objective influences which affect the conscious agent.
You can define libertarian free will that way if you like which of course defines it as incompatible with determinism and random events. This simply changes the question to: 1) Does Libertarian free will correspond to our day to day experience of free will? 2) Is Libertarian free will a coherent concept? My answer to both is no. But we have been over this many times and I don't plan to do it again. I was simply aware that there were relatively new members to this forum who may not even have been aware of compatabilism.Mark Frank
April 17, 2015
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eigenstate: Emergent properties emerge because of laws that can be understood, and often are. The wet property of water can be understood in terms of the interaction of atoms, according to known laws. Consciousness (the existence of subjective experiences) cannot be explained in terms of any known, or even realistically imaginable law. That's the essence of the hard problem of consciousness. Free will, if it exists, is a function of consciousness. therefore, if it exists, it cannot be explained as an emergent property of atoms or of any other objective component of reality. Maybe free will does not exist, and is only an illusion. As I have said, each one of us has to choose his own worldview, be it by an existing free will or as the result of bottom up objective events. However, intellectual honesty implies that one accepts fully the implications of his own worldview. Like not being able to explain what consciousness, which is without any doubt a big part of reality, is.gpuccio
April 17, 2015
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WJM:
Your [i.e., eigenstate's] “higher level descriptions” are nothing but superficial labels that hide the truth of what logically consistent materialism actually means.
Just so. With each post his frenetic efforts to hide the truth becomes more manifest. Here's the kicker. He is most desperate to hide the truth from himself. “I cannot see how to refute the arguments for the subjectivity of ethical values, but I find myself incapable of believing that all that is wrong with wanton cruelty is that I don’t like it.” Russell on Ethics 165/Papers 11: 310–11. eigenstate suffers from one of the most acute cases of Russell's dilemma I have ever seen. Again, I pity him. His head must be ready to explode from dissonance.Barry Arrington
April 17, 2015
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Interesting. Even if an emergent property creates a phenomenon as an aggregate, sum-greater-than-parts, it is entirely caused by the bottom-up materials and cannot provide a top-down control of them. Morality, rules, standards - are all top-down governance. They require a higher level ordering principle that does not exist in materialism. Morality would merely be an emergent property of the chemical reaction, the way heat is from a fire. The heat doesn't tell the process of combustion what to do or what it should do.Silver Asiatic
April 17, 2015
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KF.
ES, the emergence of walking as a mechanical process can be explained mechanically. The CHOICE as to where to walk or not to walk, is a volitional/intellectual process and is not accounted for on mechanisms. By their (flawed) analogies shall ye know them. KF
Whether you can explain it mechanically (or non-mechanically) is irrelevant to the problem Barry is having with composition and levels of description. It's an exercise in the fallacy of division. If I say: 1. Water is wet. 2. Water is made of H an O atoms 3. ERGO: H and O atoms are wet The error is NOT contingent on my providing any mechanical explanation for "wetness" or not. The error obtains in attributing characteristics to the parts are NOT characteristics of the parts, but are only characters of the whole. I may completely unaware of any mechanism for the phenomenon of "wetness", that does not make my argument 1-3 sound. Your objection doesn't address the actual problem I'm pointing at.eigenstate
April 17, 2015
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Notice also how eigenstate refuses to be pinned down. First he speaks like the amalgamation of atoms is somehow greater than the sum of the atoms (the walking metaphor he keeps insisting on):
[WJM:] “Matter and energy are neither conscious or intentional agencies…” Again, atoms don’t walk under materialism, yet humans do, and humans are made from atoms! An atom is not “conscious”, and yet humans (in some flavors of materialism) are actually conscious, and humans are made of atoms!
WJM destroys this argument and E immediately changes his story to "yeah it is an illusion, so what." Sad. Very sad. But all too typical of the materialist mode of argument.Barry Arrington
April 17, 2015
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eigenstate said:
Apparently by “top down” you mean “immaterial” or “supernatural”.
Under materialism: Bottom = matter, energy, natural laws and mechanical probability. Top = an aggregate of matter/energy caused to exist by the lawful and probabilistic interactions of matter and energy. Under materialism, if the bottom is dictating everything the aggregate does, then there is no top-down control in any meaningful sense. If the bottom-up process generates a sensation that one has top-down, mind-over-body control of what one does or thinks, that sensation is necessarily, definitionally illusory because the materials and forces at the bottom dictate the behavior of thoughts of the aggregate. Just because physical forces produce a hallucination or a delusion does't make those things not hallucinations, illusions or delusions. Even if those bottom-up materials and forces produce an "emergent" phenomena that cannot be reduced to constituent materials and forces, that phenomena was still caused by and is an expression of a that which lies at the bottom. Under materialism, the emergent phenomena is not independent of the bottom; it is indeed caused by the bottom. Everything the emergent phenomena "does" or "is" is caused by the bottom even though it may not be "reducible" to the qualities of individual parts and forces at the bottom. "Not being reducible to" is not the same as "not necessarily and sufficiently caused by". Thus, under materialism, everything, including emergent phenomena, are necessarily and sufficiently caused by that which is at the bottom - matter, energy, natural law and mechanical probability. The sensation of top-down causal control over what are necessarily bottom-up effects can only be categorized as the illusion of top-down control. The aggregate's actions are not, and cannot be, uncaused by bottom-up physics. To say that the aggregate did it is necessarily (under materialism) a shorthand way of saying that matter and energy interacting by law and probability did it. Your "higher level descriptions" are nothing but superficial labels that hide the truth of what logically consistent materialism actually means.William J Murray
April 17, 2015
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eigenstate:
So, assume for the sake of argument that your understandings on this are wrong, and your sense of immaterial control over the natural world is wholly illusory; what you thought was true about your mind is not true, and not even close. What’s the problem with this, beyond any frustrations you or I may have in accepting that were mistaken??
There is no problem at all. I quote here what I have just posted in another thread: "It’s simple, after all: both views have their inner consistency, and their necessary implications. We are free to choose. but it seems that those who choose the materialist context are always trying to cheat about the implications, maybe because those implications are really, really bad for everything we consider human. But that is not intellectual honesty." I think that we choose our personal worldview. That choice comes ultimately from our free will, but it is certainly influenced by many considerations, including, I suppose, how well our map of reality explains our intuitions about ourselves.gpuccio
April 17, 2015
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Onlookers, eigenstate's next gambit (on display at 104) is as tiresome as it was sadly predictable. Eisgenstate knows he cannot answer WJM's objections. He literally has nothing. So instead of admitting WJM's criticism he tries to change the subject from the entailments of materialism to "dualism has problems too." Perhaps dualism does have problems. That is not what we are talking about today though. We are talking about materialism and its entailments. I hope WJM does not rise to the bait and allow E to change the subject. It is too much fun watching him squirm as WJM holds his feet to the fire. BTW, E's use of the phrase "folk psychology" is a sure sign that he has drunk deeply from Daniel Dennett's sophistry.Barry Arrington
April 17, 2015
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Eigenstate: There’s no contradiction between “choice” and “wholly upwardly determined”. On some forms of materialism that is how all choices occur, driven wholly by lower level interactions. So, your “definition” can’t be “the” definition, it’s just a definition you privilege to fit your understanding.
This is an absurd conversation. How about the tautology "free choice"? Or are you willing to tell me that "there’s also no contradiction between “free choice” and “wholly upwardly determined”? If so, I'm not sure how to proceed.Box
April 17, 2015
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