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Well, So Long As They Are Not Just Any Old Preferences

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This will be my last post on this subject.  In the comments to my prior post, groovamos wrote a comment that contains a personal history followed by a gut wrenching story (which is in bold):

I am in no sense as qualified as most on this thread to debate philosophy. However as one who embraced materialism TWICE in my youth, separated by a 3 year period of interest in mysticism, I’ll have a go.

At the end of sophomore year I had converted to the typical campus leftist stance of the day, cultural zeitgeist being the driver, sexual license sealing the deal. Not outwardly religious as a kid, I quickly gave up belief in a supreme being. And just as naturally I gave up any belief in ‘truth’ as something relevant to all human activity, and sure enough out the window was any belief in ‘evil’ as a concept. Soon enough I found that lying was acceptable as long as it was me doing it. Especially since I was self assured as one with a degree in a difficult discipline (hip too, self-styled). And who enjoyed hedonistic pursuits and shallow short term relationships. And lying sort of fit into the whole picture.

But here is the interesting part looking back on it. Whenever I would read in the news of acts of insane depravity and wickedness, I would go into a mentally confused state and would feel like I had no bearings in order to process what I had just encountered. It was extremely uncomfortable. I’m talking about the acts of Jeffery Dahmer, and others. One of these I remember that particularly caused me disorientation as if I, the atheist, were the one that might risk insanity just thinking about it (in the early ’80′s).

In this particular case the police arrived at a house where a man had just dismembered and sliced up his mom, her screams having been heard by neighbors. The man did not notice the police had entered and was found masturbating with a section of rectum he had excised. When asked how he had disposed of his mother’s breasts, he said “I think I ate them”.

Congrats to any atheist on here finding the story ‘unfavorable’. Congrats on your faith that someday ‘science’ will discover every event in the long chain for that experience. ‘Science’, answering all questions, will describe for you every neural, synaptic event, every action potential, every detailed cascade of chemical analogues and concentration gradients in your visual system and brain. And you will know EXACTLY the complete ‘science’ behind your disfavoring the story, so it will fit like a glove over your materialist philosophy, and maybe even reveal why the guy did it. And if you are a little disoriented, like I seriously was, you may be saved from that in future by ‘science’.

In the very next comment Mark Frank writes (Mark added the bold, not I):

The OP quotes me but omits a paragraph which I think is important. Here is the complete text:

As a materialist and subjectivist I agree with Seversky:

A ) Personal preferences can be reduced to the impulses caused by the electro-chemical processes of each person’s brain.

B) There is no such thing as objective good and evil.

C) Statements about good and evil are expressions of personal preferences.

(I would add the proviso that these are not any old preferences. They are altruistic preferences that are deeply seated in human nature and are supported by evidence and reasoning. They are also widely, but not universally, shared preferences so they are often not competing.)

Now, of course, the point of this entire exercise has been to demonstrate a truth, which I will illustrate by the following hypothetical dialogue between Mark and the man in groovamos’s story (let’s call him “John” for convenience):***

Mark: John, dismembering and eating your mother is evil, and by ‘evil’ I mean ‘that which I do not personally prefer as a result of impulses caused by the electro-chemical processes of my brain.”

John: But Mark, I preferred to dismember and eat my mother. Otherwise I would not have done it; no one forced me to after all. Therefore, under your own definition of good and evil it was “good,” which you tell me means ‘that which I personally prefer as a result of impulses caused by the electro-chemical processes of my brain.”

Mark: Not so fast John, I would add a proviso that my preference is not just any old preference. It is an altruistic preference that is deeply seated in human nature and is supported by evidence and reasoning. It is also widely, but not universally, shared. And your preference is none of these things.

John: Are you saying that your preference not to dismember and eat your mother, which preference resulted from the impulses caused by the electro-chemical processes of your brain, is objectively and demonstrably good, and that therefore my preference to dismember and eat my mother, which preference also resulted from the impulses caused by the electro-chemical processes of my brain, is objectively and demonstrably evil?

Mark: Of course not. There is no such thing as objective good and evil.

John: Well at least you are being consistent, because we both know the electro-chemical system in your brain just is. And as Hume demonstrated long ago, “ought” cannot be grounded in “is.” Your preference just is. My preference just is. Neither is objectively superior to the other.

Mark: Certainly that follows from my premises.

John: You can say your preference is “good” but if good is defined as that which you prefer you are saying nothing more than “my preference is my preference.” Your little proviso, Mark, does not make your preference anything other than your preference; certainly it does not demonstrate that it is in any way more good than my preference. So, my question to you is, why do you insist on the proviso?

Mark: _____________ [I will let Mark answer that]

I will give my answer as to why Mark insists on his proviso. He has the same problem Russell did: “I cannot see how to refute the arguments for the subjectivity of ethical values, but I find myself incapable of believing that all that is wrong with wanton cruelty is that I don’t like it.” Russell on Ethics 165/Papers 11: 310–11.

Russell was incapable of believing the conclusions that followed ineluctably from his own premises. Dissonance ensued. For most people materialism requires self deception to deal with the dissonance of saying they believe something that it is not possible for a sane person to believe. Thus WJM’s dictum: “No sane person acts as if materialism is true.”

So why does Mark insist on his proviso that in the end makes absolutely zero difference to the conclusion that must follow from his premises? He is trying to cope with his dissonance.

If my premises required me to engage in acts of self-deception in order to cope with dissonance, I hope I would reexamine them.

___________
***I am not saying Mark has said or would say any of these things. I am saying that the words I put in his mouth follow from his premises. If he does not believe they do, I invite him to demonstrate why they do not

Comments
@WJM
No, they are illusory in the sense that a hallucination or a mirage are illusionary. They, too, are real phenomena under materialism but they are illusory in the sense that what they appear to be is not what they are unless the person understands that it is, in fact, an illusion of X, and not an actual X.”
So, yes, on many forms of materialism, folk psychology, the more broad basket of intuitions you are referring to, is mistaken, incompatible with what is really going on in terms of objective, physical interactions outside of the mind. You offer these like it's a complain, or somehow a deficiency of reality, if it is the case. I understand it's not something that dovetails with your intuitions, but reality is what it is, yeah? If it's an "illusion", but that's the reality of your folk psychology, then what? It sounds like you're prepared to shake your fist in anger at reality and insist on keeping your illusions. As the great philosopher W. Axl Rose once advised: 'Use your illusions'. Is this an exercise in making your illusions work for you, then?
This is the problem; you are using what you call “higher levels of description” to mask the fundamental difference between an illusion of X and an actual X by claiming that what X means under materialism is “the illusion of X”. Under materialism, the sense of actual top-down prescriptive control of mind-over-matter (body) is an illusion in the same way that a mirage of an oasis is an illusion of an oasis. It’s not actual top-down, ghost-in-the-machine, prescriptive control; it’s an illusion of such generated by bottom-up, non-teleological happenstance interactions of matter.
On materialism, any sense you have supernatural or immaterial interverntion in natural process is confused or mistaken. You have that right. I guess I'm missing the larger point of that observation, though. If materialist understandings are correct, your intuitions are mistaken. So what?
Unless top-down, prescriptive mind-over-body control actually exists, the sense of it is an illusion by definition. You don’t get to equivocate between X and the illusion of X by saying that “illusion of X” is what “X” means under materialism.
So, assume for the sake of argument that your understandings on this are wrong, and your sense of immaterial control over the natural world is wholly illusory; what you thought was true about your mind is not true, and not even close. What's the problem with this, beyond any frustrations you or I may have in accepting that were mistaken??eigenstate
April 17, 2015
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Mark Frank: I don't know if that can help, but I can agree that materialism and determinism are not necessarily the same thing. We could say that materialism in a sense implies determinism, and that is certainly true of some forms of materialism, but maybe not of all. Determinism has a very precise meaning: it implies that all that happens in a system can be explained by laws. As you well know, quantum mechanics is not necessarily deterministic, it depends on how you interpret its probabilistic part. However, as I have said many times, libertarian free will has a very precise meaning too: it means a worldview where conscious choices change objective events, and cannot be entirely explained neither as deterministic results of laws nor as random events. IOWs, conscious choices have a subjective menaing, which is not dependent on the objective influences which affect the conscious agent. So defined, libertarian free will is completely incompatible with both determinism and compatibilism. You know too well that this has always been my position. It still is.gpuccio
April 17, 2015
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WJM @ 98: Indeed. The difference to which you allude is the difference between epistimology and ontology, between ratio cognoscendi (the reason for the perception that something is the case) and ratio essendi (the reason something actually is the case).Barry Arrington
April 17, 2015
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William J Murray: Very well said. An illusion is essentially a wrong cognitive judgement. I can believe that I am thin when I am fat, and that is an illusion. An illusion is a very real thing, but it is not a correct cognitive judgement. The simple point is: we strongly feel that we act with some freedom, and that our acts can change our personal destiny. That can be true or false. If it is true, our feeling is a correct intuition of truth. Otherwise, it is an illusion. Now, I am sure that many times we are deluded about our true freedom when we act. I certainly believe that in many cases we believe that we are choosing, and that is not the case. In other cases, we believe that we are forced to do something, and again that is not the case. That means that, even if free will is the true thing, our ideas about our specific level of freedom in specific circumstances can well be illusions. Sometimes. But many times they are not. And, in general, the intuition that we are free agents and that we can change our personal destiny remains true. On the other hand, if true libertarian free will is not a reliable map of reality (IOWs, if it is a bad philosophy), then those who believe thet in general we have some free will are deluded. If, on the other hand, libertarian free will is a good map of reality, then both determinists and compatibilists are deluded. Whatever they can say, these are two incompatible views of reality. If one is true, the other one is false, and vice versa.gpuccio
April 17, 2015
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Onlookers, notice how eigenstate continues to insist on his patently flawed walking analogy in the teeth of KF's corrective at 92. Notice how he continues to insist events attributable to nothing more than an amalgamation of atoms are not reducible (for reasons he never explains) to the interactions of the atoms that constitute the amalgamation. Such willful self deceit is, in my experience, invincible to attempts to correct it. Nevertheless, we at UD are grateful to eigenstate for continuing to give us examples of the incoherence of the materialist worldview as fodder for our discussions.Barry Arrington
April 17, 2015
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5MM You are quite right - compatabilism does not require materialism. I am glad I have an ally here!Mark Frank
April 17, 2015
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Eigenstate said:
Again, it’s “illusory” with respect to dualist intuitions about mind.
No, they are illusory in the sense that a hallucination or a mirage are illusionary. They, too, are real phenomena under materialism but they are illusory in the sense that what they appear to be is not what they are unless the person understands that it is, in fact, an illusion of X, and not an actual X." This is the problem; you are using what you call "higher levels of description" to mask the fundamental difference between an illusion of X and an actual X by claiming that what X means under materialism is "the illusion of X". Under materialism, the sense of actual top-down prescriptive control of mind-over-matter (body) is an illusion in the same way that a mirage of an oasis is an illusion of an oasis. It's not actual top-down, ghost-in-the-machine, prescriptive control; it's an illusion of such generated by bottom-up, non-teleological happenstance interactions of matter. Unless top-down, prescriptive mind-over-body control actually exists, the sense of it is an illusion by definition. You don't get to equivocate between X and the illusion of X by saying that "illusion of X" is what "X" means under materialism.William J Murray
April 17, 2015
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Can we still be free if we could not have acted otherwise? Baggini is surely right to claim that we can.
That ranks right up there with Hawking's universes from nothing. In any event, Eagleton is apparently mistaking free choice for free will, and our apparent inability to immediately choose what we feel for what we intend to do about it. We can, in fact, decide to change how we feel about things even if we cannot change it immediately; we can change our visceral reactions over time by willfully changing how we look at things - by contextualizing them differently thus altering our perception of things. We can also desensitize ourselves over time by submitting to various processes that do this.William J Murray
April 17, 2015
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MF says, Compatibilism is the view that non-conscious, non-teleogical materials and forces do interact in such a way as to give genuine free will in any sensible meaning of the word (the bottom-up/top-down business does not apply – there is no up and down). I say, Mark I think your definition is incorrectly constrained. As a Calvinist I believe that free will is compatible with determinism and therefore I consider myself a Compatibilist. However the determinism I hold to is is not a physical determinism. Our choices are constrained by our nature and other forces which can not be reduced to matter. Simply put I believe our choices are real and not constrained by "non-conscious, non-teleogical materials and forces". Perhaps you should qualify your view as "Materialistic Compatibilism" to avoid any confusion with the traditional understanding of the term. What you describe could be a form of Compatibilism but it is certainly not the only one or even the most common. peacefifthmonarchyman
April 17, 2015
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1. Whether or not the universe is determined, the logically consistent moral subjectivist admit that under materialism, all things are ultimately explicable by the interactions of matter and energy under the guiding influences of natural law and mechanical probability.
See my points on Barry's problems with levels of description, above. It's true to say what you've said by way of excluding, say, the supernatural, or some idea of an immaterial deity. Materialism is not constrained to descriptions, concepts and distinctions that are only expressed at the level of elementary particles. Humans are made of atoms, but humans can "walk", despite the fact that any atom you might choose from human cannot "walk".
2. Matter and energy are neither conscious or intentional agencies under materialism, but rather only produce effects that we label with those terms. However, those labels – under materialism – do not and can not indicate anything categorically different from matter and energy interacting according to law and probability. There is no such thing as anything “intervening” in the lawful and probabilistic outcomes of material processes because there is nothing exterior to such processes that can intervene and change them from their normal course.
Materialists are not unified on this, and materialism does not entail consciousness as purely illusory or as a real phenomenon. In any case, you are drinking from Barry's cup of errors here with "Matter and energy are neither conscious or intentional agencies..." Again, atoms don't walk under materialism, yet humans do, and humans are made from atoms! An atom is not "conscious", and yet humans (in some flavors of materialism) are actually conscious, and humans are made of atoms! On materialism, any "intervening" if it were actual, would be a "material intervening", though, you're right, and thus part of the material universe and processes. There is no supernatural magic acknowledged by materialism.
3. This means that conscious thoughts and intentions cannot suspend or intervene on the ongoing material processes; they are nothing more than product of or a part of those selfsame material processes. The sensation of an ought cannot physically intervene, suspend or change the normal, natural course of matter and energy interacting according to physical law and mechanical probability.
On materialism, the sensation of ought *is part of* the normal, natural course of interactions, yes. That is just to say that "sense of ought" is a real phenomenon.
The crucial point here is that while the sensation of an ought might be part of a sequences of events, and the temporal location of that sensed ought might be at the point where ones actions appear to change, the sensation of locally commanding the ensuing action in a top-down, mind-over-matter fashion is necessarily an illusion, because both the sensation of the ought and the “decision” to change physical course are entirely produced by ultimately non-conscious, non-teleological, bottom-up interacting materials and forces.
It's not correct to say "non-conscious", at least under many materialist frameworks. Consciousness may be purely epiphenomenal or it may not be -- materialism doesn't demand it be one way or the other. But you are certainly right to say that materialism does not and cannot accommodate concepts like "mind over matter", where I understand you to mean mind as "something more than matter (and energy), something immaterial". That's a feature, not a bug. You can call such an idea a "delusion" under materialism, or "imaginary", doesn't matter. On materialism, these ideas are superstitions that are not grounded in the facts of our extramental reality.
4. Under materialism, there is no top-down ghost in the machine or emergent capacity available that can intervene in the natural procession of material interactions. Any so-called “emergent properties” are simply variant expressions of natural law and mechanical probability in certain specific conditions, ultimately generated entirely by bottom up, non-conscious, non-teleological matter & energy.
No "ghost in the machine". Right.
5. So, under materialism, mind and morality can be accurately categorized as delusions, mirages of top-down, deliberate, prescriptive control, sensations manufactured by happenstance interactions of non-conscious, non-teleological matter that can have no prescriptive power whatsoever to alter the course of the normal, lawful and probabilistic behavior of matter.
Well, *your* conception of "mind" and "morality" can be fairly categorized as delusions, yes. These are misconceptions, and badly understand the facts and effective concepts at work in our extramental reality on materialism. This does NOT mean that "mind" is not a real phenomenon or a meaningful concept on materialism. It just doesn't resemble dualist intuitions about mind.
Under materialism, the self is nothing more than a set of illusory qualia entirely produced and directed by law and probability, existing as nothing more than a kind of happenstance-generated internal hologram that is along for the ride, so to speak, as the interacting matter (that is producing the local hologram of self) does whatever it does anyway.
Again, it's "illusory" with respect to dualist intuitions about mind. On a scientific understanding, qualia may be understood as concrete phenomenon, the kind of phenomenon you could observe and measure with an fMRI, or some more advanced instrument yet to be developed. What's at stake is not "mind" or "percept" in general, but dualist and theistic intuitions about those concepts. If your intuitions one this are wholly misgiven, "mind" and "percept" and "consciousness" remain real phenomena, and useful, semantically rich terms and concepts. They just don't comport with *your* intuitions.
All that mind and morality can be is a description of sensation and they cannot have any prescriptive power to intervene or change material processes because that’s all they can be in the first place. A hologram cannot deliberately change its “programming” in any rational sense; its programming (what it does) is entirely generated by natural law and probability even if, from the hologram’s perspective, it appears as if he is doing it independently of natural law and/or probabilities, as if he has independent agency.
Being wholly natural in no way prevents a mind, or a system from being dynamic. A brain's plasticity allows for marked changes in the way it computes and triggers action depending on input from the body and the external environment. Behaviors and reactions can and do change over time, demonstrably, and there's nothing in that that conflicts with the brain/mind being wholly natural in the materialist sense. On materialism, any notion or intuition of "doing it independently of of natural law" is confused and mistaken, though, correct.
It would be no more different than if a rock had consciousness and felt like it was making a decision to move every time it happened to move. The sensation of the teleological “decision” is concurrent with the movement but cannot represent a true top-down command of the movement because materialism doesn’t offer top-down, teleological control even from emergent properties.
Apparently by "top down" you mean "immaterial" or "supernatural". If so, then certainly, on materialism, such teleology does not exist. But this does not negate "consciousness", "decisions" or "sensations" as wholly natural phenomena that operate as part of a consistent, coherent natural framework.
To sum up: under materialism, mind and morality are delusions of independent prescriptive power that a programmed hologram of “self” experiences while being carried wherever natural law and mechanical probability take it and while being whatever natural law and mechanical probability make it. TL;DR: In a materialist world, if you stripped humans of consciousness all you would ultimately lose (wrt the debate here) is the delusion that one has the top-down, prescriptive power to alter the normal course of matter and energy interacting according natural law and mechanical probability.
Simplified: On materialism, many of my dualist intuitions about the world are WAY wrong!eigenstate
April 17, 2015
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//on D.Dennett, ‘Freedom Evolves’, Chapter 4 // Dennett mostly seems to argue against determinism by means of pointing out unpredictable processes—as if unpredictability can secure free will. Boring reading material to me, because IMO it is irrelevant. It doesn’t occur to me to term some unpredictable quantum event “free”.
Dennett: As Kane himself puts it, “In short, when described from a physical perspective alone, free will looks like chance” (Kane 1996, p. 147). And chance looks exactly the same, whether it is genuinely indeterministic or merely pseudo-random or chaotic.
The obvious question is: who is in charge, a person of some randomizing process? And if the latter, then obviously personal freedom is completely out of the window.
Dennett: Kane has suggested to me (personal correspondence) that “The indeterminacy-producing mechanism must be responsive to the dynamics within the agent’s own will and not override them or it would be making the decisions and not the agent.” His concern is that a remote source of randomness would threaten your autonomy, and be likely to take control of your thinking processes. Wouldn’t it be much safer and hence more responsible-to keep the randomizer inside you, under your watchful eye in some sense?
Everyone can understand Kane’s concern here: What is meant by “free will” if some “indeterminacy-producing mechanism” is in the driver seat, so to speak? Here’s Dennett’s answer to Kane’s clear question, I leave it up to reader to judge whether Dennett actually addresses it:
Dennett: No. Randomness is just randomness; it isn’t creeping randomness. Programmers routinely insert calls to the random number generator in their programs, not worrying about it somehow getting out of hand and providing chaos where it isn’t wanted.
Okay, those were some first impressions. I leave it to Mark Frank to present more relevant parts of Dennett’s work.Box
April 17, 2015
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KF @ 92:
ES, the emergence of walking as a mechanical process can be explained mechanically. The CHOICE as to where to walk or not to walk, is a volitional/intellectual process and is not accounted for on mechanisms.
That eigenstate seems genuinely incapable of grasping this concept beggars belief. His analogy between walking and making choices is patently absurd. His case of self-deception is perhaps the most severe I have ever seen. I truly feel sorry for him. The intellectual cancer of his worldview has metastasized to such an extent that it has been literally terminal vis-a-vis his ability to grasp the obvious.Barry Arrington
April 17, 2015
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ES, the emergence of walking as a mechanical process can be explained mechanically. The CHOICE as to where to walk or not to walk, is a volitional/intellectual process and is not accounted for on mechanisms. By their (flawed) analogies shall ye know them. KF PS: I recall seeing, ever so often in a neighbourhood etc in Cuba, more or less: Zona Militar -- no pasa! (Think about the use of symbols to convey meaning and prescriptive information to instruct people not to pass that way . . . in a country officially devoted to a worldview that denies responsible freedom.)kairosfocus
April 17, 2015
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Folks, No authority -- individual, collective, oral or written, etc. -- is any better than his/her facts, reasoning and underlying assumptions. To the merits, to the merits, to the merits . . . KFkairosfocus
April 17, 2015
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@Box,
The difference between ‘walking’ and let’s say ‘choosing’ is that the latter implies downward causation. By definition a choice cannot be wholly upwardly determined. The same goes for ‘person’, ‘agency’ and ‘free will’—they all imply downward causation by definition. In order to accommodate downward causation a worldview must allow for the existence of phenomena independent and distinct from matter. It goes without saying that materialism does not allow for the existence of such things.
First, this avoids the thrust of my comment, which was to ask how walking can exist when a person is made up of atoms, and everyone knows an atom can't walk?! No one on the theistic side has yet shown they grasp the problem and related concepts, here. I'm sure it's not beyond their skills, but acknowledging it makes Barry's error a realized, and recognized error. As for choice, I think you are helping yourself to some self-interested definitions, here. There's no contradiction between "choice" and "wholly upwardly determined". On some forms of materialism that is how all choices occur, driven wholly by lower level interactions. So, your "definition" can't be "the" definition, it's just a definition you privilege to fit your understanding. But even if I grant the difference you are pointing to is a difference given your self-serving restrictions on the definitions, what of it? Does "top down agency" explain how "walking" exists when a person is made of atoms, and now has "agency", in your view? Agency and downward causation don't help on this point -- it's a red herring. The problem for you -- this is Barry's error that you are taking up -- is that he (and you?) are apparently confused about levels of description. If you are familiar with the Fallacy of Division and the Fallacy of Composition, these errors stem from the same problem. My "walking" question is a riff on the Fallacy of Decomposition: if a person can walk and is "just atoms", then by reduction, an atom can walk, right? Agency or no, Barry's error is quite plain to see in considering this question. We don't ascribe "walking" to any individual atom or any group of atoms. But we do understand particular configurations of in the form of an "animal" -- a higher level description of a very large collection of atoms -- to "walk".eigenstate
April 17, 2015
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WJM @ 85:
Otherwise, you are saying “My position is described in this book; go read it and explain to me why it is wrong”. Really? You think that’s a proper defense of a worldview?
That tactic seems to be standard among materialists nowadays. RDFish employs it almost every time he posts. "I've read some books, and they say I'm right. QED."Barry Arrington
April 17, 2015
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MF, the attempt to redefine responsible choice to say in effect it is an illusion but we can use the same terminology and say that if things are not gun to the head coerced they are "free" in the sense we now will accept is a case of a verbal bait and switch. Nope, if you do not have genuine choice across genuine alternatives so you could have acted otherwise -- hence, are responsible to act aright in respect of intellectual and moral matters -- you are not free. KFkairosfocus
April 17, 2015
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WJM This is not about whose job it is to make a particular point. I am just pointing out that you have made an assertion as though it is self-evidently true but many distinguished people disagree - so perhaps you should examine it more carefully. I don't have the time, space or clarity to make the case myself so I refer you to a better source. Ignore it if you wish - but be aware you have not dealt with some significant counter-arguments.Mark Frank
April 17, 2015
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#82 Box Good question. I am looking through my copy to see if there any sections that stand-alone. I would certainly recommend chapter 4 but you might find it hard going without the preceding chapters. Incidentally the highly religious immaterialist Terry Eagleton says this about free will:
Can we still be free if we could not have acted otherwise? Baggini is surely right to claim that we can. In fact, most of the things that matter – being in love, composing a superb sonata, detesting Piers Morgan, feeling horrified by the slave trade – have a smack of inner necessity about them, as this book argues in a perceptive chapter on art. What define the self most deeply are the sort of commitments from which we could not walk away even if we tried. The point, however, is that we don’t want to. Freedom from such engagements would be no freedom at all. True liberty lies in being able to realise such a self, not shuck it off.
(Thanks to Denyse for this reference) It seems compatabilist ideas are not confined to materialists! At least it may give the idea more respectability in some UD reader's eyes.Mark Frank
April 17, 2015
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Mark Frank said:
Compatibilism is the view that non-conscious, non-teleogical materials and forces do interact in such a way as to give genuine free will in any sensible meaning of the word (the bottom-up/top-down business does not apply – there is no up and down).
In the first place, MF, you equivocate by using the phrase "in any sensible meaning of the word". Sensible to whom? Sensible under what worldview? The label "free will" is necessarily a place-holder for a more detailed description, so when you say it you mean one thing, when I say it I mean another, and the two can be contradictory. So, when you say "compatibilism offers true free will," you've offered nothing of any substance other than a series of words that semantically, but not substantively, counters my point. It's like saying "does too!" Under compatibalism, even if blind, non-teleolgical physical forces determine a choice, "free will" still exists as long as no other people or institutions have interfered with or coerced their behavior. That is contradictory to the non-materialist view of free will, where an individual still has free will regardless of what others or institutions do, and that such free will is beyond the causal reach of the physical world. You can call a thing "free will", or "moral"; but unless you are just using those terms to hide behind, what you must argue from is their more detailed descriptions, and what you must argue about is if those more detailed descriptions hold up logically and practically.
This is a widespread, respected (and in my view correct) school of thought.
Then unless this is just a blatant appeal to authority and/or popularity, you should be able to defend it. Do so.
I am sure you will disagree with it – but until you have understood it and found what is wrong with it your assertion is nothing but an assertion needing proof.
It's not my job to show how your assertion that "it is correct" is wrong; it's your job to defend it. It's your job to present it and show how materialism can adequately ground morality, how it logically explains our actual behavior, and how it offers a morality worth caring about in the first place. Otherwise, you are saying "My position is described in this book; go read it and explain to me why it is wrong". Really? You think that's a proper defense of a worldview?William J Murray
April 17, 2015
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MF @ 79:
[Compatibilism]is a widespread, respected (and in my view correct) school of thought.
It is not correct. Briefly, a compatibilist is someone who tries to avoid the logic of his premises by resorting to semantic dodges about the meaning of free will. The compatibilist says that free will is compatible with determinism (thus the name). Isn’t that kinda like saying my existence is compatible with my nonexistence? Yes, it is. But the compatibilist avoids this problem by re-defining “free will.” The compatibilist says that “free will” does not mean “the liberty to choose, i.e., the ability to have done otherwise;” instead, says he, it means “the absence of coercion.” In other words, he says that so long as a choice is not coerced it is completely free even if it is utterly determined. The problem with this approach is easy to see – just as we don’t get to win a game by changing the rules to suit us in the middle of the game, we don’t get to impose meaning on words to suit the conclusion we want to reach. The entire issue in the determinism/free will debate is whether we have liberty to choose defined as "the ability to have done otherwise." Suppose I ask my friend the following question: “Do I have free will, if by 'free will' I mean ‘the ability to have done otherwise?’” It is obviously no answer to that question for him to say, “Yes, indeed, you have free will if by free will you mean, 'the absence of coercion.'” I really do want to explore the question about whether I have the ability to have done otherwise, and my friend's answer is not helpful. You might even say he dodged the question. Thus, in the end, the compatibilist answers a question no one has asked. “Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1953, aphorism 109Barry Arrington
April 17, 2015
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MF, Kindly cf Reppert above. Compatibilism, so called, fails. Fails, because to try to account for responsible freedom on blind chance and mechanical necessity must fail. But, it does help to enable this generation's bewitchment to self refuting evolutionary materialism by making it seem that somehow the rabbit can be pulled out of the non-existent hat, and we can get North by heading West. KFkairosfocus
April 17, 2015
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Mark Frank, Can you refer to a specific part of Daniel Dennett’s Freedom Evolves? I have the book here right in front of me; just kindly point me in the right direction.Box
April 17, 2015
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Eigenstate @71 said:
My question for you, then, is the same simple one I put to ebenezer: is a a rock a bolt of lightning, given that they are both just “matter and energy moving around”? There’s not dispute about free will and choices in this to distract or complicate, there’s no moral or ethical questions to bother with either. It’s a question that just looks at the problem you are struggling with, which is applying concepts at different levels of description. If you say “yes, a rock is a bolt of lightning, and they cannot be meaningfully distinguished”, I will be happy with that, and the discussion goes one way. If you say “no, a rock is not a bolt of lightning, and they are meaningfully distinguishable”, then you will have shown all ready the disingenuous nature of dozens of your posts here in the past few days.
We can apply different labels that serve as place-holders for more detailed descriptions to different things we experience. You and I can point to the same thing and call it "immoral", but the germane point is not that we agree to call the thing in question "immoral", but whether or not our internal, more detailed description of that thing is the same, and whether or not: (1) we have really thought about what that more detailed description is, (2) what, if true, it means, and (3) if it comports with how we actually behave, and (4) if it is logically consistent with our other views, most importantly, our fundamental worldview. You seem to be making the case that whatever the internal, detailed description of "immoral" is, it is irrelevant to the fact that we both happen to point at the same thing and call it "immoral". The question at the table is not whether we both agree it is immoral, but rather what the more detailed description logically indicates and whether it provides a basis for morality worth caring about in the first place. If Mr. Arrington's more detailed description is valid (and it appears that you agree that it is), then that necessarily means that any sensation of top-down, prescriptive control over ones behavior is ultimately (more detailed description) illusory. So while you and I might point at a thing and we both might say "that behavior is immoral and we have the free will capacity to decide not to act that way", those same terminological labels have entirely different, contradictory more detailed descriptions when you and I use them. The pertinent point that Mr. Arrington and others are attempting to point out is the materialist's more detailed description of those terms renders morality logically and practically absurd for several reasons, and as I've pointed out, nobody can live as if the more detailed description is true. What you call a "higher level description" is a mere label, and in the case of materialist morality it is a label that hides the fact that the more detailed description reveals inescapable logical and practical problems.William J Murray
April 17, 2015
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Seversky, nope. When the logical entailment of a view is that rationality and responsibility evaporate, it is self referentially incoherent. It is self refuting. You may find it all but impossible to acknowledge that but it does not change the point. Reppert is right:
. . . let us suppose that brain state A, which is token identical to the thought that all men are mortal, and brain state B, which is token identical to the thought that Socrates is a man, together cause the belief that Socrates is mortal. It isn’t enough for rational inference that these events be those beliefs, it is also necessary that the causal transaction be in virtue of the content of those thoughts . . . [[But] if naturalism is true, then the propositional content is irrelevant to the causal transaction that produces the conclusion, and [[so] we do not have a case of rational inference. In rational inference, as Lewis puts it, one thought causes another thought not by being, but by being seen to be, the ground for it. But causal transactions in the brain occur in virtue of the brain’s being in a particular type of state that is relevant to physical causal transactions.
As, is Haldane:
"It seems to me immensely unlikely that mind is a mere by-product of matter. For if my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically. And hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms. In order to escape from this necessity of sawing away the branch on which I am sitting, so to speak, I am compelled to believe that mind is not wholly conditioned by matter.” [["When I am dead," in Possible Worlds: And Other Essays [1927], Chatto and Windus: London, 1932, reprint, p.209.
Pearcey caps off:
A major way to test a philosophy or worldview is to ask: Is it logically consistent? Internal contradictions are fatal to any worldview because contradictory statements are necessarily false. "This circle is square" is contradictory, so it has to be false. An especially damaging form of contradiction is self-referential absurdity -- which means a theory sets up a definition of truth that it itself fails to meet. Therefore it refutes itself . . . . An example of self-referential absurdity is a theory called evolutionary epistemology, a naturalistic approach that applies evolution to the process of knowing. The theory proposes that the human mind is a product of natural selection. The implication is that the ideas in our minds were selected for their survival value, not for their truth-value. But what if we apply that theory to itself? Then it, too, was selected for survival, not truth -- which discredits its own claim to truth. Evolutionary epistemology commits suicide. Astonishingly, many prominent thinkers have embraced the theory without detecting the logical contradiction. Philosopher John Gray writes, "If Darwin's theory of natural selection is true,... the human mind serves evolutionary success, not truth." What is the contradiction in that statement? Gray has essentially said, if Darwin's theory is true, then it "serves evolutionary success, not truth." In other words, if Darwin's theory is true, then it is not true. Self-referential absurdity is akin to the well-known liar's paradox: "This statement is a lie." If the statement is true, then (as it says) it is not true, but a lie. Another example comes from Francis Crick. In The Astonishing Hypothesis, he writes, "Our highly developed brains, after all, were not evolved under the pressure of discovering scientific truths but only to enable us to be clever enough to survive." But that means Crick's own theory is not a "scientific truth." Applied to itself, the theory commits suicide. Of course, the sheer pressure to survive is likely to produce some correct ideas. A zebra that thinks lions are friendly will not live long. But false ideas may be useful for survival. Evolutionists admit as much: Eric Baum says, "Sometimes you are more likely to survive and propagate if you believe a falsehood than if you believe the truth." Steven Pinker writes, "Our brains were shaped for fitness, not for truth. Sometimes the truth is adaptive, but sometimes it is not." The upshot is that survival is no guarantee of truth. If survival is the only standard, we can never know which ideas are true and which are adaptive but false. To make the dilemma even more puzzling, evolutionists tell us that natural selection has produced all sorts of false concepts in the human mind. Many evolutionary materialists maintain that free will is an illusion, consciousness is an illusion, even our sense of self is an illusion -- and that all these false ideas were selected for their survival value. So how can we know whether the theory of evolution itself is one of those false ideas? The theory undercuts itself. A few thinkers, to their credit, recognize the problem. Literary critic Leon Wieseltier writes, "If reason is a product of natural selection, then how much confidence can we have in a rational argument for natural selection? ... Evolutionary biology cannot invoke the power of reason even as it destroys it." On a similar note, philosopher Thomas Nagel asks, "Is the [evolutionary] hypothesis really compatible with the continued confidence in reason as a source of knowledge?" His answer is no: "I have to be able to believe ... that I follow the rules of logic because they are correct -- not merely because I am biologically programmed to do so." Hence, "insofar as the evolutionary hypothesis itself depends on reason, it would be self-undermining."
Evolutionary materialism collapses in self refutation. KFkairosfocus
April 17, 2015
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WJM -
the sensation of locally commanding the ensuing action in a top-down, mind-over-matter fashion is necessarily an illusion, because both the sensation of the ought and the “decision” to change physical course are entirely produced by ultimately non-conscious, non-teleological, bottom-up interacting materials and forces.
Compatibilism is the view that non-conscious, non-teleogical materials and forces do interact in such a way as to give genuine free will in any sensible meaning of the word (the bottom-up/top-down business does not apply - there is no up and down). This is a widespread, respected (and in my view correct) school of thought. I am sure you will disagree with it - but until you have understood it and found what is wrong with it your assertion is nothing but an assertion needing proof. The best book on it that I know is Daniel Dennett's Freedom Evolves.Mark Frank
April 17, 2015
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eigenstate, misquotes me to manufacture a contradiction: What Eigenstate said I said:
Just so I understand you going forward, pick one of these mutually contraditctory statements you just offered: 1. [Empathy] is an abstraction. 2. Empathy is a chemical reaction in your brain.
What I actually said: 1. "Empathy is not a physical force like gravity. It is not a causal agent. It is an abstraction. 2. "That feeling you call “empathy” is a chemical reaction in your brain. To say “empathy” caused this or that is to say 'chemistry reactions caused this or that.'" E, if I had to lie about what people said in order to make my case, I hope I would stop and rethink. I doubt that you will. Barry Arrington
April 17, 2015
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** redundantBox
April 17, 2015
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Argumentum ad consequentiam Even if the the theory of evolution implies such consequences, even if they are regarded as adverse, they have no bearing on whether the theory is a sound account of how life on Earth changed and diversified over time. And, although Velikovskys provided a very good counter, there is still a very difficult question for Christians, which is that an omniscient God with demonstrated foreknowledge of our future itself undermines the possibility of free will.Seversky
April 17, 2015
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1. Whether or not the universe is determined, the logically consistent moral subjectivist admit that under materialism, all things are ultimately explicable by the interactions of matter and energy under the guiding influences of natural law and mechanical probability. 2. Matter and energy are neither conscious or intentional agencies under materialism, but rather only produce effects that we label with those terms. However, those labels – under materialism – do not and can not indicate anything categorically different from matter and energy interacting according to law and probability. There is no such thing as anything “intervening” in the lawful and probabilistic outcomes of material processes because there is nothing exterior to such processes that can intervene and change them from their normal course. 3. This means that conscious thoughts and intentions cannot suspend or intervene on the ongoing material processes; they are nothing more than product of or a part of those selfsame material processes. The sensation of an ought cannot physically intervene, suspend or change the normal, natural course of matter and energy interacting according to physical law and mechanical probability. The crucial point here is that while the sensation of an ought might be part of a sequences of events, and the temporal location of that sensed ought might be at the point where ones actions appear to change, the sensation of locally commanding the ensuing action in a top-down, mind-over-matter fashion is necessarily an illusion, because both the sensation of the ought and the "decision" to change physical course are entirely produced by ultimately non-conscious, non-teleological, bottom-up interacting materials and forces. 4. Under materialism, there is no top-down ghost in the machine or emergent capacity available that can intervene in the natural procession of material interactions. Any so-called "emergent properties" are simply variant expressions of natural law and mechanical probability in certain specific conditions, ultimately generated entirely by bottom up, non-conscious, non-teleological matter & energy. 5. So, under materialism, mind and morality can be accurately categorized as delusions, mirages of top-down, deliberate, prescriptive control, sensations manufactured by happenstance interactions of non-conscious, non-teleological matter that can have no prescriptive power whatsoever to alter the course of the normal, lawful and probabilistic behavior of matter. Under materialism, the self is nothing more than a set of illusory qualia entirely produced and directed by law and probability, existing as nothing more than a kind of happenstance-generated internal hologram that is along for the ride, so to speak, as the interacting matter (that is producing the local hologram of self) does whatever it does anyway. All that mind and morality can be is a description of sensation and they cannot have any prescriptive power to intervene or change material processes because that’s all they can be in the first place. A hologram cannot deliberately change its “programming” in any rational sense; its programming (what it does) is entirely generated by natural law and probability even if, from the hologram’s perspective, it appears as if he is doing it independently of natural law and/or probabilities, as if he has independent agency. It would be no more different than if a rock had consciousness and felt like it was making a decision to move every time it happened to move. The sensation of the teleological "decision" is concurrent with the movement but cannot represent a true top-down command of the movement because materialism doesn't offer top-down, teleological control even from emergent properties. To sum up: under materialism, mind and morality are delusions of independent prescriptive power that a programmed hologram of "self" experiences while being carried wherever natural law and mechanical probability take it and while being whatever natural law and mechanical probability make it. TL;DR: In a materialist world, if you stripped humans of consciousness all you would ultimately lose (wrt the debate here) is the delusion that one has the top-down, prescriptive power to alter the normal course of matter and energy interacting according natural law and mechanical probability.William J Murray
April 17, 2015
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