Upright Biped’s summary on information systems in cell based life

_{kairosfocus

December 4, 2017

Design inference, Food for thought, ID Foundations, Origin Of Life, rhetoric, Selective Hyperskepticism, specified complexity}

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UD participant Upright Biped (of ~~Complexity Cafe~~ U/D: Biosemiosis) has commented recently in the what is knowledge thread, replying to frequent objector CR by summarising key aspects of the role of information systems in observed cell based life. His remarks are well worth headlining:

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UB, 195: >>We can start by summarizing the core physical requirements of the system we are trying to explain: an autonomous self-replicator with open-ended potential (i.e. it can describe itself or any variation of itself).

The system requires:

1) a sequence of representations in a medium of information.

2) a set of physical constraints to establish what is being represented.

3) a system of discontinuous association between representations and referents, based on spatial orientation (i.e. a reading-frame code)

4) functional coordination (semantic closure) between two sets of sequences; the first set establishes the constraints that are necessary to interpret the representations, and the second set establishes a system whereby the representations and their constraints are brought together in the specify way required to produce a functioning end product – an autonomous self-replicator. Coordination is required because changes to the first set affect the second set.

Did you follow all that? You have to have a medium of information, representations, constraints, discontinuous association, a reading-frame code, and semantic closure in order to create a material system capable of Darwinian evolution. Each interdependent piece has a physical manifestation, and each brings a critical capacity to the system.

So … when you remove the translation machinery in order to simplify the system (to meet your ideological requirements), you remove the capacity of the system to specify objects among alternatives. You remove the physical capacities that are enabled only by having a medium of information organized within a system (i.e. RNA, for instance, is only a medium of information when it is organized as such, otherwise it’s just another molecule with its particular characteristics, determined by energy). In other words, you remove the very system that enables Darwinian evolution to exist, not to mention removing the very thing that enables biological organization in the first place.

Thus, what are you then left with? You are left with a system that can only organize itself based upon the energy of the individual and collective components in the system (i.e. your “no-design laws”). But, magnetism does not establish a medium of information. Thermodynamics does not create a reading-frame code. Dissipative processes do not coordinate semantic closure among unrelated sequences of symbols. In other words, you have nothing but your prior assumptions.

So now that we have a lay of the land, we can take a look at your claims:

Claim #1: Darwinian evolution is the source of the translation apparatus.

This claim is dead on arrival. The only way to resuscitate this claim is through a) massive equivocation of terms, and b) abject denial of molecular science. In other words, it’s right up your alley.

Claim #2: Only high fidelity replication requires translation.

You need to get your head straight. The simpler system you are talking about is not a semiotic system that merely operates with poor fidelity, it is a non-semiotic system that operates by pure dynamics. It doesn’t establish a medium of information; it cannot specify objects among alternatives, and it obviously cannot achieve semantic closure. In an effort to save your theory, you can certainly start to equivocate on terms like “specify” and “medium of information”, but at the end of the day, the only thing that such an entity can lead to (be the source of) will be determined solely by dynamics. Thus, I asked you the clarifying question: Does the non-semiotic system you assume preceded and created the semiotic system have to specify the semiotic system that follows it? If so, then how does it do that?

You have no response to that question that doesn’t also include repeating your claim and assuming its true.

The bottom line is that there is no conceivable environment at the origin of life on Earth that inanimate matter operating under physical law (your “no-design laws” for crying out loud) where purely dynamic properties such as electromagnetism, hydrophobicity, etc., will push and pull and cajole molecules and constituents into simultaneously creating a sequence of symbolic representations, interpretive constraints, a system of discontinuous association, a reading frame code, and semantic closure. In short, the issues surrounding the origin of a semiosis in the cell are not about “fidelity”, they are about organization instead.>>

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Again, food for thought. END

PS: As debate points have been raised, here is a summary of protein synthesis, from Wiki:

This should be seen i/l/o this more complete overview of the whole synthesis:

Here is Yockey’s info-system view:

Yockey’s analysis of protein synthesis as a code-based communication process

And, here is a summary of the wider metabolism set:

Comments

From this video....
I used to say that the quantum theory of computation is the whole of physics because of this property. But then I realized that that isn't quite true, and there's an important gap in that connection. Namely, although the quantum computer can simulate any other object and can represent any other object so that you can study any object via its characteristic programs, what the quantum theory of computation can't tell you is which program corresponds to which physical object. This might sound like an inessential technicality, but it's actually of fundamental importance because not knowing which abstraction in the computer corresponds to which object is a little bit like having a bank account and the bank telling you, "Oh, your balance is some number." Unless you know what number it is, you haven't really expressed the whole of the physical situation of you and your bank account. Similarly, if you're only told that your physical system corresponds to some program of the quantum computer, and you haven't said which, then you haven't specified to the whole of physics. Then I thought, what we need is a generalization of the quantum theory of computation that does say that, that assigns to each program the corresponding real object. That was an early conception of constructor theory, making it directly a generalization of the theory of computation. But then I realized that that's not quite the way to go because that still tries to cast constructor theory within the same mold as all existing theories and, therefore, it wouldn't solve this problem of providing an underlying framework. It still would mean that, just as a program has an initial state and then laws of motion (that is, the laws of the operation of the computer) and then a final state (which is the output of the computer), so that way of looking at constructor theory would have simply been a translation of existing physics. It wouldn't have provided anything new. The new thing, which I think is the key to the fact that constructor theory delivers new content, was that the laws of constructor theory are not about an initial state, laws of motion, final state or anything like that. They are just about which transformations are possible and which are impossible. The laws of motion and that kind of thing are indirect remote consequences of just saying what's possible and what's impossible. Also the laws of constructor theory are not about the constructor. They're not about how you do it, only whether you can do it, and this is analogous to the theory of computation. The theory of computation isn't about transistors and wires and input/output devices and so on. It's about which transformations of information are possible and which aren't possible. Since we have the universal computer, we know that each possible ones corresponds to a program for a universal computer, but the universal computer can be made in lots of different ways. How you make it is inessential to the deep laws of computation. In the case of constructor theory, what's important is which transformations of physical objects are possible and which are impossible. When they're possible, you'll be able to do them in lots of different ways usually. When they're impossible, that will always be because some law of physics forbids them, and that is why, as Karl Popper said, the content of a physical theory, of any scientific theory, is in what it forbids and also in how it explains what it forbids. If you have this theory of what is possible and what is impossible, it implicitly tells you what all the laws of physics are. That basis, very simple basis, is proving very fruitful already, and I have great hopes that various niggling problems and notorious difficulties in existing formulations of physics will be solved by this single idea. It may well take a lot of work to see how, but that's what I expect, and I think that's what we're beginning to see. This is often misunderstood as claiming that only the scientific theories are worth having. Now that, as Popper once remarked, is a silly interpretation. For example, Popper's own theory is a philosophical theory. He certainly wasn't saying that was an illegitimate theory.
Constructors are abstract in the same sense that a universal computer can be made of cogs, transistors, vacuum tubes, etc. How you make them is inessential to the deep laws of computation. Yet there are no non-physical computers or constructors.critical rationalist_{December 14, 2017
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Did you miss the “in the prevailing conception” part? Deutsch does not agree with the prevailing conception and proposes his alternative.
He doesn't "agree"? Huh? This is yet another indication that you do not understand constructor theory. Saying constructor theory is more fundamental and can genuinely contribute new content doesn't mean the current conception has not been successful. After all, the theory of quantum mechanics is the most successful theory we have. Constructor theory makes a significant contribution precisely because the current conception cannot mention / identify constructors in a system to abstract them - allowing us to focus on what's left over: substrates and inputs. So, it's more than just the current conception of physics.
What Deutsch is saying is this: let’s ignore the fact that constructors are physical themselves by ‘abstracting them away’, and next let’s pretend that constructors are fundamental to physics (hahaha!) — instead of dependent on it — and express all fundamental questions of physics in constructor theoretical terms.
Except, again, constructor theory isn't a theory of everything. Constructors are abstract because multiple "things" can be a constructor for the same task. For the umpteen time, a theory can be the most fundamental we currently have without being a theory of everything.critical rationalist_{December 14, 2017
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CR @
Deutsch: ... most constructors are themselves composite objects. So, in the prevailing conception, no law of physics could possibly mention them: the whole continuous process of interaction between constructor and substrate is already determined by the universal laws governing their constituents.

CR: Here, it is explicitly clarified that the interactions between constructor and substrates are determined by universal laws. So, it’s more than that….
Did you miss the “in the prevailing conception” part? Deutsch does not agree with the prevailing conception and proposes his alternative.
Deutsch: ... the idea is that the fundamental questions of physics can all be expressed in terms of those issues, and that the answers do not depend on what the constructor is, so it can be abstracted away, leaving transformations (2) as the basic subject matter of the theory.
What Deutsch is saying is this: let’s ignore the fact that constructors are physical themselves by ‘abstracting them away’, and next let’s pretend that constructors are fundamental to physics (hahaha!) — instead of dependent on it — and express all fundamental questions of physics in constructor theoretical terms. It is simply incoherent.Origenes_{December 14, 2017
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Besides it far more efficient to say that B is going to happen, then to provide an extensive “forbidden-list” of all things that are “~ B”.
Yet, you then go on to quote an example that is more efficient at describing what isn't possible.
Deutsch: For example, consider the difference between saying that a purported perpetual motion machine cannot be made to work as claimed ‘because that would violate a conservation law’ and that it won’t work ‘because that axle exerts too small a torque on the wheel’. Both explanations are true, but the former rules out much more, and an inventor who understood only the latter might waste much more time trying to cause the transformation in question by modifying the machine.
The conservation law is a law about lows. But, since it cannot be a law in that sense, because it would make them siblings, it is a principe about laws. So, It would underly all laws in that sense.
The same nonsense. The notion “because that would violate a conservation law” rests entirely on our understanding of what a conservation law (positively) does.
Again, you're assuming they are siblings, in which it case would be circular. But they are not siblings. And you seem to be referring to essences, based on some kind of identity. Something does something because of its identity. But that is essentialism.critical rationalist_{December 14, 2017
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@Origenes
Nonsense. Of course, they are not more fundamental.
Constructor theory underlies general relativity and quantum mechanics. It proposes laws about laws. It's in this sense that a conception of physics can be more fundamental without being a theory of everything.critical rationalist_{December 14, 2017
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Correction:
In a system, substrates are the thing that are transformed. Constructors do the transforming when the right inputs are present. They already exist and are modified.
critical rationalist_{December 14, 2017
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We want to know what transformations we can make happen and why. One such example would be to cure cancer. That can be expressed as a network of possible transformations of substrates by constructors. The same can be said for high-fidelity replicating cells. We can model replication as transformations of substrates by constructors. In all cases the system in question can be segmented as constructors and substrates with inputs and outputs. In primitive cells, the constructor was just the environment and the cell was the substrate. In current day cells, the network of transformations includes the environment and the cell's recipe. This transition is made visible and naturally explained in constructor theory because constructors are abstract entities which represent the things that do not change. The network of tasks still contains generic transformations performed by the environment, such as how a builder uses gravity to hold down a board while it is nailed into place. During the transition, the identities are not static. The roles of what is the substrate and what is the constructor changes, but replication continues to occur at different levels of accuracy.critical rationalist_{December 14, 2017
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If at time t, (substrate) A causes (constructor & task) B, then it is not possible for B to cause A — given that time-travel is not an option.
In a system, substrates are the thing that are transformed. Constructor do the transforming when the right inputs are present. They actually exist and are modified.critical rationalist_{December 14, 2017
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Again, you still seem to be confused. It’s all about what changes we can bring about. Describing a possible deltas we can bring about, as opposed to being based on some initial conditions and laws of nature.
Very few such transformations happen spontaneously; that is to say, almost all require a constructor, which I shall define as anything that can cause transformations in physical systems without undergoing any net change in its ability to do so. I shall call those physical systems the constructor’s substrates: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . constructor input state of substrate(s) ______> output state of substrate(s). (1)
A transformation, regarded as being caused by a constructor, I call a construction. IOW, parts that causes transformations and can cause that change again, since the key parts that result in those transformations do not undergo change themselves in the process, are constructors. The other parts, which actually undergoes those transformations, are substrates. This is significantly more than stating “the physical transforms the physical”
Constructors appear under various names in physics and other fields. For instance, in thermodynamics, a heat engine is a constructor because of the condition that it be capable of ‘operating in a cycle’. But they do not currently appear in laws of physics. Indeed, there is no possible role for them in what I shall call the prevailing conception of fundamental physics, which is roughly as follows: everything physical is composed of elementary constituents such as particles, fields and spacetime; there is an initial state of those constituents; and laws of motion determine how the state evolves continuously thereafter. In contrast, a construction (1) is characterized only by its inputs and outputs, and involves subsystems (the constructor and the substrate), playing different roles, and most constructors are themselves composite objects. So, in the prevailing conception, no law of physics could possibly mention them: the whole continuous process of interaction between constructor and substrate is already determined by the universal laws governing their constituents.
Here, it is explicitly clarified that the interactions between constructor and substrates are determined by universal laws. So, it’s more than that….
However, the constructor theory that I shall propose in this paper is not primarily the theory of constructions or constructors, as the prevailing conception would require it to be. It is the theory of which transformations
input state of substrates ? output state of substrates (2)
can be caused and which cannot, and why. As I shall explain, the idea is that the fundamental questions of physics can all be expressed in terms of those issues, and that the answers do not depend on what the constructor is, so it can be abstracted away, leaving transformations (2) as the basic subject matter of the theory. I shall argue that we should expect such a theory to constitute a fundamental branch of physics with new, universal laws, and to provide a powerful new language for expressing other theories. I shall guess what some of those laws may be, and explore the theory’s potential for solving various problems and achieving various unifications between disparate branches of physics and beyond, and propose a notation that may be useful in developing it.
The above is the “theory” part of constructor theory.
I provisionally define a construction task (or ‘task’, for short) as a set of pairs such as (2), each designating a legitimate input state for the task and associating that with a legitimate output state for that input. (So constructor theory might be more accurately called construction task theory, but I think the shorter name is preferable.) A constructor is capable of performing a task A if, whenever it is presented with substrates in a legitimate input state of A , it transforms them to one of the output states that A associates with that input.
Again, what is key here is the delta between inputs states and output states in regards to substrates, not some ultimate explanation of substrates.
O: Well, Deutsch does not agree with you when he says that they are explanations of substrates — here is the relevant quote again:

It may be that construction tasks are the primitive entities in terms of which the laws of nature are expressed. In that case, a ‘set of ordered pairs of states’ would be only a provisional way of conceiving of tasks: ultimately substrates, states and transformations would be understood in terms of tasks, not vice versa.
Thinks can only be “understood” in an reductionist sense? And, again, as a Popperian, and author that explicitly denies this, constructor theory is not a of everything, which you apparently suddenly do not agree with anymore? From this video….
Not knowing which abstraction in the computer corresponds to which object is like having a bank account and being told your balance is “some number.” Unless you know what number it is, you haven’t expressed the whole of physics.
Expressing the whole of physics is not the same as being a theory of everything.
There is a sense in which the top-left cell of Table 1 (computation) contains the whole table (the whole of physics), namely: for every possible motion of every object permitted by the laws of physics, there exist virtual-reality renderings in which the simulated object mimics all the observable properties of the real one with arbitrary accuracy short of perfection. Thus any physically possible process corresponds to some set of computer programs; moreover every program, when running, is a physical process. Does the theory of computation therefore coincide with physics, the study of all possible physical objects and their motions? It does not, because the theory of computation does not specify which physical system a particular program renders, and to what accuracy. That requires additional knowledge of the laws of physics. In particular, most programs, if regarded as virtual-reality renderings of physical objects, only render other computers running an equivalent program, and only their computational variables at that. So the theory of computation is only a branch of physics, not vice versa, and constructor theory is the ultimate generalization of the theory of computation.
critical rationalist_{December 14, 2017
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Deutsch's paper is a treasure trove for students of incoherent thought:
Deutsch: Moreover, the prevailing conception itself is not consistent about that issue, for the idea of a universal law is part of it too, and the empirical content of such a law is in what it forbids by way of testable outcomes (Popper 1959, §31 & §35) – in other words in what transformations it denies can be caused to happen, including to measuring instruments in any possible laboratories. Explanatory theories with such counterfactual implications are more fundamental than predictions of what will happen.
Nonsense. Of course, they are not more fundamental. Given that you know what will happen, by implication you know what will not happen. It is simple : A —> B. What is not going to happen? ~B. In fact, the only way to know ~B is by knowing B. Besides it far more efficient to say that B is going to happen, then to provide an extensive "forbidden-list" of all things that are “~ B”.
Deutsch: For example, consider the difference between saying that a purported perpetual motion machine cannot be made to work as claimed ‘because that would violate a conservation law’ and that it won’t work ‘because that axle exerts too small a torque on the wheel’. Both explanations are true, but the former rules out much more, and an inventor who understood only the latter might waste much more time trying to cause the transformation in question by modifying the machine.
The same nonsense. The notion “because that would violate a conservation law” rests entirely on our understanding of what a conservation law (positively) does. By understanding that it causes B, it follows logically that any ~B is not an option. Again, there is no other way to know ~B than by knowing B. Amazingly, Deutsch, like many things, has it backwards: he seems to think that charges in clouds cause lightning, because teapots, ladies' undergarments, computers, horses and junk-food are forbidden.Origenes_{December 13, 2017
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follow-up #122 // To be clear: If at time t, (substrate) A causes (constructor & task) B, then it is not possible for B to cause A — given that time-travel is not an option. Put another way: If A is foundational to the existence of B (if B can only exist because A exists), then B cannot be foundational to A's existence.Origenes_{December 13, 2017
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CR @120
CR: No, constructors transform physical substrates.
Yes, and given that constructors are physical themselves, that amounts to the unremarkable claim: “the physical transforms the physical”.
CR: They [constructor tasks] are not the explanations of substrates in some ultimate sense.
Well, Deutsch does not agree with you when he says that they are explanations of substrates — here is the relevant quote again:
Deutsch: … ultimately substrates, states and transformations would be understood in terms of tasks, not vice versa.
So, Deutsch doesn’t think that it is logically impossible for a constructor & task to create itself, by causing its own substrate.
CR: Are you claiming the current conception of physics the only valid mode of explanation?
No, my claim is that constructors & tasks cannot be foundational to the physical layer on which it sits.Origenes_{December 13, 2017
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@daveS
But after skimming a little information here and there, am I on the right track with this thinking: As an analogy, there are many formulations of QM, for example formulations in terms of path integrals or matrices. Does constructor theory “simply” provide another setting in which you can formulate physical theories?
In a sense, yes. But it is a new mode of explanation as opposed the current conception of physics. It underlies our most fundamental theories, such as quantum mechanics and general relativity. Its about principles, which are laws about laws. Somewhat like our current principles of thermodynamics in which it is thought that all laws must conform to.
critical rationalist_{December 13, 2017
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@Origenes
So, given causal determinism, there is no “departure” from the prevailing conception of fundamental physics at all:
The departure is from how we explain things in the prevailing conception of physics. Not that physics is somehow different in constructor theory.
We learn that constructors have physical substrates. [...] Constructors, as we already learned, depend on physical substrates.... [...] Same thing here: constructors depend on physical substrates & laws, so they cannot be the explanation of substrates.
No, constructors transform physical substrates. They are not the explanations of substrates in some ultimate sense. Again, you're expecting it to be a theory of everything. It's not. It's a new mode of explanation. We're not trying to solve the same problems. Are you claiming the current conception of physics the only valid mode of explanation? If so, how have you justified that claim?critical rationalist_{December 13, 2017
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Haven't forgot about you. I have been blocked on a project by a client and they just dumped everyone in my lap. Furthermore, example "why"s have already presented in the three papers I referenced so, apparently, you're still having difficulty grasping how constructor theory is a genuinely new mode of explanation, which is fundamentally different than the current conception of physics. Repeating them again will be unlikely to help, so I'm trying to figure out how to address that. To summarize, constructor theory isn't about constructors. It's about breaking down transformations into tasks with inputs and outputs. A subsidiary theory says these specific laws of nature makes this tasks possible, these laws of nature make these transformation impossible, which is why, when presented with these inputs something (an abstract constructor) can produce these outputs again and again. So, to use an example, it's not about determining where an asteroid will be at some time in future, because we know its initial conditions and apply laws of motion. Constructor theory is about where an asteroid can be made to go using resources, such as rockets, fuel and even knowledge. https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=2&v=8DH2xwIYuT0critical rationalist_{December 13, 2017
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CR does not want to tell us that constructors and their tasks depend on matter & law. Why not? Because he, like Deutsch, wants constructors to be "more fundamental"... From Deutsch’s paper:
Deutsch: Constructor theory seeks to express all fundamental scientific theories in terms of a dichotomy between possible and impossible physical transformations – those that can be caused to happen and those that cannot. This is a departure from the prevailing conception of fundamental physics which is to predict what will happen from initial conditions and laws of motion.
If physical transformations are fully determined by initial conditions & laws, then the same goes for what is possible and impossible. IOWs the initial state and laws determine what will happen and “what will happen” is the exact same thing as “what is possible” — and “all other outcomes” would be "what is impossible.” So, given causal determinism, there is no “departure” from the prevailing conception of fundamental physics at all: 1. Possible transformations = what will happen according to physics. 2. Impossible transformations = anything other than what will happen according to physics. Note that, according to CR , constructor theory is compatible with determinism.
Deutsch: Very few such transformations happen spontaneously; that is to say, almost all require a constructor, which I shall define as anything that can cause transformations in physical systems without undergoing any net change in its ability to do so. I shall call those physical systems the constructor’s substrates: input state of substrate(s) —> constructor —> output state of substrate(s). A transformation, regarded as being caused by a constructor, I call a construction.
What is being said here? We learn that constructors have physical substrates. So, given physical reductionism, constructors are reducible to the physical. If so, what does it mean to say that constructors cause transformations in physical systems? Constructors depend on physical substrates & laws and are physical themselves, so what is Deutsch saying beyond “physical stuff causes transformations in physical stuff”?
Deutsch: It may be that construction tasks are the primitive entities in terms of which the laws of nature are expressed. In that case, a ‘set of ordered pairs of states’ would be only a provisional way of conceiving of tasks: ultimately substrates, states and transformations would be understood in terms of tasks, not vice versa.
This is simply incoherent. Let’s break it down:
Deutsch: It may be that construction tasks are the primitive entities in terms of which the laws of nature are expressed.
Constructors, as we already learned, depend on physical substrates & laws, so, since nothing can cause itself, it is logically impossible that any aspect of constructors (such as its task) can cause the laws of nature.
Deutsch: … ultimately substrates, states and transformations would be understood in terms of tasks, not vice versa.
Same thing here: constructors depend on physical substrates & laws, so they cannot be the explanation of its substrates & laws. Final note: if constructor tasks are emergent properties, it is equally incoherent to state that an emergent property causes the substrate & laws from which it emerges.Origenes_{December 13, 2017
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CR @
Again, constructor theory is not a theory of everything.
You keep repeating that over and over. I did not claim that is was. I do not care about that at all. If it is of any help to you: I declare that I do not believe that constructor theory is a theory of everything. Now can we get passed that?
Furthermore, what you’re looking for is specific to individual subsidiary theories. ... So, you’re question is not possible to answer.
Okay, since you cannot answer why, in general, constructors perform tasks, can you at least give one example of a specific constructor and tell me why it performs it task? A kettle heating water perhaps?Origenes_{December 12, 2017
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@origines Again, constructor theory is not a theory of everything. Yet, it is more fundamental than our most fundamental physical theories in the current conception of physics. Furthermore, what you're looking for is specific to individual subsidiary theories. I cannot list and develop subsidiary theories of every current scientific theory, in addition to theories that do not yet exist. So, you're question is not possible to answer. Constructor theory is the theory that we can developer subsidiary theories for all scientific theories. But we have yet to develop every scientific theory. The "why" would be in all of those theories, including those we have yet to develop.critical rationalist_{December 12, 2017
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CR, First, I don't know anything about constructor theory at all. But after skimming a little information here and there, am I on the right track with this thinking: As an analogy, there are many formulations of QM, for example formulations in terms of path integrals or matrices. Does constructor theory "simply" provide another setting in which you can formulate physical theories? I get the impression that your interlocutors believe constructor theory is some wacky idea, but if my understanding is at least close to correct, it doesn't appear to be so.daveS_{December 12, 2017
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CR@
O: So, in general, why do constructors perform tasks?

CR: You’ve got it backwards. Constructors are constructors because they perform tasks.
I have asked you 4 questions. You selected one of them and follow up by not answering it? There simply must be a reason why constructors perform tasks. Something has to drive them. So, why not answer my simple question?
Why do constructors perform tasks?
Hint: "I have no clue at all" is also an answer.Origenes_{December 12, 2017
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@origenes
Why does a constructor perform any task at all? Why not, instead, perform no task? So, in general, why do constructors perform tasks?
You've got it backwards. Constructors are constructors because they perform tasks. If something didn't meet the definition of a constructor then, well, it's not a constructor. So, if there were no possible physical tasks, then there could be no constructors. And the same can be said if nothing was capable of performing those tasks again as a constructor. Nor is constructor theory a theory of everything, as some people have mistakenly concluded. But this definition was described in the paper, which you read, right? And I even quoted it above. Here, I'll quote it again....
The definition of a constructor for a task A requires it to be a constructor for A again after performing an instance of A . Its other attributes may change, but what the user must do in order to cause it to perform the task must remain the same. (The term ‘user’ here is not intended to have any anthropomorphic connotation; the user is whatever presents the constructor with its substrates, causing it to perform its task.) If a machine stops being capable of performing a task A after its N’th run because its battery has run down, then it is not a constructor for A after the (N?1)’th run either, because the N’th run does not end with it being such a constructor – and so it follows by induction that it never was one. However, the same machine excluding the battery could still be a constructor for a related task whose substrates include a battery whose legitimate input states specify enough charge to perform A at least once.
Is there something about the above that you do not understand?critical rationalist_{December 12, 2017
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CR@ Why does a constructor perform any task at all? Why not, instead, perform no task? So, in general, why do constructors perform tasks?Origenes_{December 12, 2017
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CR: Now do you see why expecting to get an answer for that question indicates a fundamental misunderstanding of constructor theory? O: So, why do constructors perform tasks, according to these theories?
I'll take that as a "No". There is no one explanation for "why constructors are performing tasks" across all subsidiary theories. That's my point. It would be specific to each subsidiary theory, including those that do not exist yet. So, how could I possibly answer that? From the paper....
The definition of a constructor for a task A requires it to be a constructor for A again after performing an instance of A . Its other attributes may change, but what the user must do in order to cause it to perform the task must remain the same. (The term ‘user’ here is not intended to have any anthropomorphic connotation; the user is whatever presents the constructor with its substrates, causing it to perform its task.) If a machine stops being capable of performing a task A after its N’th run because its battery has run down, then it is not a constructor for A after the (N?1)’th run either, because the N’th run does not end with it being such a constructor – and so it follows by induction that it never was one. However, the same machine excluding the battery could still be a constructor for a related task whose substrates include a battery whose legitimate input states specify enough charge to perform A at least once.
So, the term "constructors" can refer to anything that is capable of performing a task in that way. They are abstractions, because it's not really about constructors. It's about specific physical transformations. So, in that sense, the "why" is specific to each subsidiary theory. That would be like asking what is the sum of "numbers", except there is no yet to be conceived of number. You cannot sum the abstract concept of numbers. You can only sum specific, concrete numbers. Right? Again, it would be helpful if you actually read the paper, rather than just repeating the same question. Or perhaps I'm mistaken in that you're not genuinely interested in an answer? I would point out that initial conditions do not play a special role in constructor theory. Perhaps you're confusing constructor theory with the current conception of physics?
The prevailing conception regards the initial state of the physical world as a fundamental part of its constitution, and we therefore hope and expect that state to be specified by some fundamental, elegant law of physics. But at present there are no exact theories of what the initial state was. Thermodynamics suggests that it was a ‘zero-entropy state’, but as I said, we have no exact theory of what that means. Cosmology suggests that it was homogeneous and isotropic, but whether the observed inhomogeneities (such as galaxies) could have evolved from quantum fluctuations in a homogeneous initial state is controversial. In the constructor-theoretic conception, the initial state is not fundamental. It is an emergent consequence of the fundamental truths that laws of physics specify, namely which tasks are or are not possible. For example, given a set of laws of motion, what exactly is implied about the initial state by the practical feasibility of building (good approximations to) a universal computer several billion years later may be inelegant and intractably complex to state explicitly, yet may follow logically from elegant constructor-theoretic laws about information and computation
Of course, you knew this already since you've already read the paper, right?critical rationalist_{December 11, 2017
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CR @ You focus on just one of my questions, yet, you have not answered it.
It’s these Individual theories that explain “why constructors are preforming tasks”.
So, why do constructors perform tasks, according to these theories?Origenes_{December 11, 2017
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Let me try again. For example, you asked "why are constructors performing tasks." Constructor theory is the idea that all scientific theories can be expressed as a dichotomy between physical transformations that are possible, physical transformations that are impossible and why. It is thought that all scientific theories - existing and those that will be developed in the future - can be reformatted / expressed in this way. Constructor theory provides a formalism for describing networks of tasks, just like algebra provides a formalism for working with variables. In fact, constructor theory has its own algebra of tasks, parallel and serial networks of tasks, etc.. which is described in the paper. Constructors are not really the subject of constructor theory. Rather the transformations are what take center stage. Nor do the initial conditions play any special role in constructor theory. IOW, constructor theory represents a new mode of explanation which is more fundamental than our most fundamental theories in the current conception of physics: general relativity and quantum mechanics. In addition, constructor theory brings emergent explanations into fundamental physics, such as information etc. This is why, for example, a kettle can be modeled as a constructor, despite the fact that we cannot predict the motion of each water molecule or the initial conditions outside acting on the kettle, etc. We can abstract alway the kettle and just talk about which transformations of matter that are possible / impossible and why, that explains how it is possible to make tea. So, constructor theory is a kind or class of explanation or type of explanation, not a concrete explanation. (Just like emergent explanations are a type or class of explanation) If constructor theory is not an explanation in itself, but a formalism, then is it explanation-less and therefore empty? No, it is not. That would be like saying algebra is empty because it doesn't include every possible explanatory theory that someone could possibly model with it. There will be theories modeled in algebra that do not exist today. Algebra cannot possibility contain those theories because they haven’t been developed yet. Nor can it include all existing theories modeled with it today. We don't go around updating it every time new models are formulated with it. That’s simply a category error. It is in this sense that explanations are developed in constructor theoretic terms that often correlate to existing scientific theories in our current conception of physics and even future theories that haven’t been developed yet. Theories developed in constructor theory are called subsidiary theories. This is where your question of "why are constructors performing tasks." comes into play. It’s these Individual theories that explain “why constructors are preforming tasks”. And only a few of the theories in our current conception of physics have been reformulated in this way. I cannot reformulate every existing theory as subsidiary theories. Nor can I reformulate theories that have ye to be conceived of yet. It’s in this sense that constructor theory is not a theory of everything, but a formalism that can be used to describe every scientific theory. It says that every scientific theory can be described in constructor theoretic terms, even those that have not be developed yet. But this is not a theory of everything, because it does not contain every possible subsidiary theory. Now do you see why expecting to get an answer for that question indicates a fundamental misunderstanding of constructor theory?critical rationalist_{December 11, 2017
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CR@ What is your problem? Just answer my questions.Origenes_{December 11, 2017
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Just so I have this straight, you were able to tell your questions wasn't the paper in 19 minutes or less? Note: I commented at 1:56pm and you just posted at 2:15pm. Is that what you're suggesting? Again, your previous questions suggested you didn't understand constructor theory. Yet, you haven't changed them. I've even pointed out where and why that is the case, by indicating where one of the problems was. Yet, 19 minutes later, you still seem to think they are valid questions. So, I'll ask again, did you actually read the paper? Did you try to understand it?critical rationalist_{December 11, 2017
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The paper does not provide answers to my questions CR.Origenes_{December 11, 2017
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@Origenes
Ok, so let me repeat:
Let me repeat...
Read the actual papers I’ve referenced, rather than a popular article, then ask your questions.
Did you read the paper? Did you read my comment? I'm asking because, you've come back and asked the very same questions, which indicates you don't seem to have a better understanding of why your questions were problematic the first time round. For example, why are they performing tasks... "is found in subsidiary theories that uses the formalism of constructor theory to describe them." I've already said this and so did the paper. Your question simply doesn't make sense. I can't reformulate every single current scientific theory from the current conception of physics into a subsidiary theory in constructor theory, let lone theories we haven't come up with yet. Right? You don't seem to see the problem, which suggests you do not understand constructor theory, and continue to be willfully ignorant of it. This is why I asked you to come back after you've read the paper. I'll ask again, have you read the paper? If you have questions about specific parts of the paper, in particular, then reference those parts with your question. If anyone is being patient here, it's me.critical rationalist_{December 11, 2017
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Okay, so let me repeat: Where do these constructors come from? Why are they preforming tasks? Where do the laws come from? How do laws impose their instructions on constructors?Origenes_{December 11, 2017
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