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Is Atheism Rationally Justifiable?

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First, I’d like to thank Mr. Arrington for granting me posting privileges.  I consider it quite an honor, and I hope this post (and any future posts) warrants this trust.

Second, the following is an argument I think will help us to focus on a fundamental issue that lies behind ever so many of the debates here at Uncommon Descent, and elsewhere.  That is, is the sort of implicit or even explicit atheism that is so often built in on the ground floor of a “scientific” mindset truly rationally justifiable? Such cannot be assumed, it needs to be shown.

I’ll begin by defining some terms for the sake of this argument:

Definition of God (for the purpose of this thread): First cause, prime mover, root of being, objective source of human purpose (final cause) and resulting morality, source of free will, mind, consciousness; omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent inasmuch as principles of logic allow; an interventionist as necessary to facilitate movement towards final cause and also inasmuch as logical principles are not violated; source of logic — “reason itself.” (I am not talking in particular about any specifically defined religious interpretation of god, such as the Chrstian or Islamic God.)

Definition: Weak, or negative atheism is the lack of any belief that a god exists, and the position that a god probably doesn’t exist, and is not the positive belief that gods do not exist (strong atheism), and is not agnosticism (the lack of belief that god either does or does not exist and the further view that there is a lack of sufficient probability either way).  Strong atheism is the belief that no god or gods exist at all.

Definition: A worldview or mindset is rationally justified when it answers adequately to the facts of the real world as we experience or observe it, makes good sense and fits together logically, is simple but not simplistic, and honestly faces the issues and difficulties that all worldviews face.

Definition: Intellectual dishonesty occurs when (1) one deliberately mischaracterizes their position or view in order to avoid having to logically defend their actual views; and/or (2) when someone is arguing, or making statements against a position while remaining willfully ignorant about that position, and/or (3) when someone categorically and/or pejoratively dismisses all existent and/or potential evidence in favor of a conclusion they claim to be neutral about, whether they are familiar with that evidence or not.

These will be important as we consider:

Evidence in favor of God:  The following is a brief summary of the evidence that typically leads many people to make a general finding that a god (as described above) exists, even if variantly interpreted or culturally contextualized:

(1)
Anecdotal evidence for the apparently intelligently ordered anomalous, miraculous (defying expected natural processes and probabilities) events attributed to god, such as signs, supernatural events (e.g. Fatima, Guadeloupe, Paul’s Damascus Road Experience), or answers to prayers to god;

(2)
Testimonial evidence (first-hand accounts) of experience of such phenomena, including interactions with a god-like being or accounts of god-like interventions;  Also, the testimony of religious adherents of various specific gods can be counted as evidence of the god premised in this argument in the manner that various cultures can vary widely in their description of certain phenomena or experiences, and come up with widely variant “explanations”; what is interesting as evidence here, though, is the widespread crediting of similar kinds of phenomena and experience to a “god” of some sort (which might be the case of blind or ignorant people touching different parts of an elephant and thus describing “what the elephant is” in various ways). Such testimonial evidence can be counted in favor of the premise here, but cannot be held against it where it varies, because it is not testimony that such a god doesn’t exist.

(3)
The various Cosmological and Ontological Arguments for the existence of god;

(4)  The Strong Anthropic (or Fine Tuning) argument and other evidences for design of our world and of life in it;

(5) The empirical, scientific evidence assembled in support of the design arguments in #4 (such as recently persuaded Antony Flew — formerly the world’s leading philosophical atheist — that there is a god);

(6) The Moral arguments for the existence of god.

(7) Empirical and testimonial evidence of phenomena closely correlated to the existence of a god as described above, such as the survival of consciousness after death, and the existence of an afterlife realm; the evidence for interactions with correlated entities such as angels and demons (which seem to act to influence our free will towards or away from our human purpose), etc., gathered by various serious and scientific investigations into what is often referred to as the “paranormal”, including mediumship studies dating back to William Crooke and ongoing through the work at Pear Labs and the Scole Experiment, including consciousness-survival research published in the Lancet. While indirect, this evidence tends to support the proposition that god exists.

While the various arguments listed above have been subjected to counter-arguments and rebuttals of varying strengths and weaknesses across the ages, one must not lose sight that while there is much evidence of all sorts (as listed above) in favor of the existence of god; there is zero empirical evidence (to my knowledge) or and little in the way of rational argument that no such god exists.  In other words, decreasing the value of the arguments and evidence for god does not increase the value of the position that there is no god; it can only increase the reasonableness of the “weak atheist” (there isn’t enough evidence) or an agnostic position.

The commonly seen rebuttals to these argument are simply attempting to show weaknesses in or alternatives to the arguments themselves so that such arguments cannot be taken as demonstratively convincing (that god exists); such counter-arguments as a rule do not actually make the case that god (as described above) in fact does not exist.

The argument against weak atheism:

The above shows us that, ironically, strong atheism is a weak position. That is probably why atheism advocates seldom defend it in informed company. So, we must first focus on the “stronger” atheist position, the one they defend in public: “weak atheism,” generally described as absence of belief in god or gods. I will argue that it too is far weaker than is commonly recognized.

I know of no positive arguments for the strong “there is no god” position, other than the argument from evil which has been addressed by Boethius, Adams  and Platinga. Aside from that, there are only rebuttals/reactions to various “there is a god” arguments. This exemplifies how rebutting an argument does not eliminate it as evidence, it only offers an alternative perspective that one  can evaluate along with the original argument.   Depending on the strength of the rebuttal or alternative explanation, that particular positive evidence for god may be decreased in value, but there is no concurrent increase in the value of an argument against the existence of god (as described above).

If a “weak atheist” claims to “lack belief” because there is “no evidence for god,” he or she is necessarily being intellectually dishonest, because we certainly aren’t privy to all potential or available evidence. Are such atheists claiming to be omniscient? If not, then, a more modest and reasonable point would be that they are not aware of evidence for god. However, given what we have already seen, such “weak atheists” cannot genuinely claim to not know of “any” evidence for god after having perused any of the above evidence.  That is to say, there is evidence for god, just, they don’t accept it. But incredulity or hyper-skepticism on your part does not equate to “no evidence” on my part. Testimony from otherwise credible sources is not made “less credible” simply because the testimony is about something the listener personally finds to be in-credible; it is not intellectually honest to discredit the credibility of testimony only on the basis of the subject matter being debated.

Also, strong atheists often only refer to themselves as weak atheists because they have realized that the strong atheist position is an assertion they cannot support in informed company.  They do this to provide cover for their real view, which is an obvious form of intellectual dishonesty.  One can often discern when this is going on when the person ridicules belief in god or makes categorical dismissals about evidence they have never even seen; they believe there is no god, and so assume there can be no valid evidence for god, and advocate for that position rhetorically via ridicule.

Even if the “weak atheist” is not aware of any compelling evidence for god, he or she must know that we humans are quite limited in what we know, and may often be unaware of mistakes in what we think we know. That means that any categorical claim a “weak” atheist makes about the available evidence he or she is not privy to — that it is not credible or convincing — is again intellectually dishonest because you cannot justifiably make a categorical claim about something you have no knowledge of.

So, if we have a weak atheist who is aware of the existence of the above evidence and agrees that there might be more evidence they are not privy to; and who does not categorically assert problems with the evidence they have not yet seen; and who does not categorically dismiss the available evidence as “non-evidence” due to hyper-skeptical bias but rather states that the available evidence they have seen is not compelling towards a conclusion that god exists; then one must ask the following:

In the face of such overwhelming amounts of evidence — thousands of years of testimony and anecdotal stories; many serious arguments based on credible empirical evidence and apparently necessary logical premises and inferences; and, the complete lack of any generally successful attempt to make a sound argument that god in fact does not exist — one must ask: how can any intellectually honest person come to any conclusion other than that on the balance of the evidence, god probably exists,  even if god is poorly and diversely defined, and even if the experience of god is open to various interpretations and even to misunderstanding?

As an analogy: even if one has never personally experienced “love”; in the face of thousands of years of testimony and anecdotal stories that love exists, and empirical evidence supporting that certain physical states correspond to assertions of experiences of love, would it be intellectually honest to “lack belief” that love exists, or would it be intellectually honest to hold the view that even though one doesn’t experience love (or using the same argument, color, joy, dreams, etc.), that love probably exists – even if people are widely disparate in their explanation, description, or presentation of what love is?

Another analogy: because witnesses disagree in their description of a criminal suspect in a crime, or disagree about the particulars of the crime they witnessed, this doesn’t mean there is no criminal at all.  Depending on the testimony and evidence, one may hold that it is likely that a crime occurred, and so it is likely that a criminal exists, but that the arguments, testimony and evidence are  not enough reach a finding of “guilty” for any particular suspect.

As far as I am aware of there is no anecdotal or testimonial evidence that god does not exist (because lack of experience of a thing isn’t evidence the thing doesn’t exist), very little in the way of logical argument towards that conclusion, and there is a vast array of logical, anecdotal, testimonial and empirical evidence that god (at least as generally described above) does exist. Because a billion people did not witness a crime, and only a handful did, doesn’t tilt the scales in favor of no crime having been committed at all; imagine now a billion people that report witnessing a crime, and handful that did not, and you have something more comparable to the state of evidence concerning the existence of god.

Even if one doesn’t find that evidence compelling for for a final conclusion that god exists,  when one weighs the balance of the evidence for and against god, one should be willing to at least consider whether it is more probable that god (as described above) exists than that god does not exist.  Problematically (for the atheist), the view that it is more likely that god exists than not is not any sort of an atheistic position.

The argument against strong atheism:

Strong atheism is defined as the assertion that no god or gods exist whatsoever.

First, it is obvious that strong atheism cannot be logically supported, simply because it is impossible to prove (not in the absolute sense, but in the “sufficient evidence” sense). There may be evidence and good argument that certain gods, or kinds of gods, do not exist; but there is certainly no generally accepted evidence or successful argument that no significant, meaningful god or gods whatsoever exist, including the one as defined for this thread.

Instead of trying to actually support their own claim, strong atheists usually attempt to shift the burden of proof onto theists by essentially asking the theists to prove the atheist position wrong, implying or asserting that atheism must be held true by default.  That is, such try to argue that they have nothing to argue and can sit comfortably on their view as a default. However, that is not so; every worldview of consequence has a duty to show that it is factually adequate, coherent and explains reality powerfully and simply.  Strong atheism is not a default position; it is a positive assertion that no god or gods exist.  The default position is always “I don’t know” or true agnosticism.

Strong atheism is a sweeping, categorical assertion that something does not exist. As such, It has the job of proving a universal negative.  Perhaps this could be accomplished by showing the converse positive claim to be self-contradictory, and readers advocating strong atheism are invited to make their case based upon the definition of God at the top of this post.

Also, however unlikely it may seem to an atheist, it might be true that a god of some sort exists outside of the circle of what she or he knows or what the collective of atheists actually know. After all, we all know full well that “to err is human.” So, since the atheist could be mistaken or ignorant of the key fact or argument that would be decisive,  the strong atheist position unjustifiably excludes a potentially true explanation from consideration.  What is the rationally useful point of a metaphysical position that excludes a potentially true explanation from consideration?  Especially when it requires asserting an unsupportable universal negative? What, then, does strong atheism bring to the table of debate other than the potential for intractable error and denial of potential truth for the sake of a sweeping, unsupportable, universally negative assertion?

Conclusion: atheism is an untenable position for any intellectually honest, rational, and informed person. The belief that god (as described above, which is supported by the listed evidence) does not exist, or that it isn’t more likely that god exists than not, can only be a position based on ignorance of the available evidence and argument for god, or a hyper-skeptical, intellectually dishonest, ideologically biased, a priori dismissal of all of the evidence for the existence of god.

Comments
Kantian Naturalist (397) I don’t think that the real conflict here — pluralism and monism — I don’t think that is amenable to reason. I think that some people are perfectly content with pluralism, and others are not, they want monism.
First I want to praise you for your analysis of the conflict: ‘pluralism and monism’. You bring light to the discussion; a fine example of intellectual honesty. But I’m not sure about your assessment of the scope of reason in regard to conflicts of this order. What about heliocentrism vs geocentrism, is that conflict too beyond the scope of reason? What do you think about the role of Ockham’s razor in these matters? The limited scope of reason is a returning theme in your reasoning:
Kantian Naturalist (405) :”To some extent, a pragmatic naturalism of the sort I advocate looks askance at excessive rationalism. Reasoning is a powerful tool in human life, and one that I sincerely wish was more often displayed by those in power. But that doesn’t mean that everything must have some reason or other.”
If not ‘everything must have some reason’ are there any objective rules to guide our reason? Or are we allowed to choose what to explain and what not to explain in order to get results that we 'want'?Box
January 11, 2013
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KN, you're not a reductionist. Do you accept top-down causation?Mung
January 11, 2013
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...how does one establish that it is possible that God exists? It is either possible, or it is not. Unless you reject reason. And no doubt the fact that we exist enters in to the equation.
Mung
January 11, 2013
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If I were inclined to argue against the existence of God on logical grounds -- and since it's a Friday night and I haven't yet decided to go out or not, so at present I have nothing better to do -- I would be inclined to the following line of thought: how does one establish that it is possible that God exists? How do get to that starting point? We don't get that "for free," so to speak. Or, put otherwise, yes, it's true that in strictly modal terms, that's where we'd have to begin, but are we entitled to use modal terms? So, there's this interesting discussion about the relationship between conceivability and possibility (conversely, between inconceivability and impossibility). One might think, "well, I can conceive of God's existing, so it's possible that God exists." Not so fast, buckaroo, because that only works if conceivability entails possibility, and it's just not really clear if it does. In fact, it's just got to be the case that conceivability doesn't entail possibility, because otherwise, we wouldn't be able to conceive of impossible things, such as geometrical objects that have both four internal right angles and all the points of which are equidistant from the center, or formal systems that are both rich enough to express arithmetic and in which all sentences can be proven either true or false. To show that God is impossible is a much taller order -- I mean, He certainly seems possible, right? Well, maybe. Maybe not. If God is impossible, it would be because the concept contains a contradiction. So, is the concept of God contradictory? I don't know, but I certainly have entertained from time to time the following bit of sophistry. God has psychological properties -- He has desires and beliefs. (Ex hypothesi, He has all the true beliefs that there are.) And certainly He wants certain things, such as it being the case that humanity desires and pursues the good. God is a mind (though perhaps also more than a mind?). He is an (or the?) infinite mind. But, is there a contradiction within the concept of an infinite mind? A mind is, among other things, something that perceives, thinks, and acts. But perception and action require that there be something external to the mind -- namely, a world. But since God is infinite, nothing is external to Him. Before He created, He was; He was the infinite mind that He is prior to anything other than Himself coming into existence. But does it even make sense to suppose that a mind could exist without some world? Is the very concept of an infinite mind something like a square circle?Kantian Naturalist
January 11, 2013
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KN, you are a strange bird! Not insult intended. Theists believe things happen for one reason. Atheists believe things happen for many reasons (or at least three). You seem to want to tread a middle ground, some things happen for no reason at all. Assuming your view is correct, how do we differentiate?Mung
January 11, 2013
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I probably should have written; It is not possible that x is the case, therefore ~x must be the case. But the limb is still shaking. :)Mung
January 11, 2013
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KN: I doubt there is a case of affirming the consequent, lol. It is not possible that x is the case, therefore y must be the case. Sounds more like a reductio. But I am seriously out on a limb here, admittedly.Mung
January 11, 2013
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PS: Remember, too, how we get to the affirming the consequent [ATC] fallacy: confusing implication for equivalence. Showing double implication step by step in light of additional info is not ATC, for example. And where there is substantial additional information at work, that is not a tautology nor begging the question.kairosfocus
January 11, 2013
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To some extent, a pragmatic naturalism of the sort I advocate looks askance at excessive rationalism. Reasoning is a powerful tool in human life, and one that I sincerely wish was more often displayed by those in power. But that doesn't mean that everything must have some reason or other. At any rate: the power of reason to guide human affairs, to indicate the possibilities for action, to suggest new avenues for empirical inquiry, and to check our passions and prejudices, is not the slightest bit imperiled by the thought that it is simply a brute fact that the multiverse is of such a nature that our particular universe, with its biogenic laws of physics, just happens to be among those that it causes.Kantian Naturalist
January 11, 2013
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KN: Not so, there is no sequence like that, the intervening steps are key. And, Necessarily (God exists) DOES entail that (God exists) -- necessary beings exist in all possible worlds. (At the tail it is a bit pedantic on symbol reduction.) The critical step is the assertion that it is possible for God to exist, which is the point, once it is possible for a necessary being candidate to exist, it exists in at least one possible world and this propagates to all such including the actual one. Or, it is impossible to build a possible world in which an actually necessary being does not exist. The 3 + 2 = 5 example, thanks to the power of the empty set and abstract manipulations, will even exist in an empty world. The issue is back to: God's existence [remember, eternal so necessary], for the atheist, is implicitly impossible. So, what is the warrant for that claim or implication, now that the deductive form of the problem of evil is dead and things like no being can be omnipotent because such cannot make the equivalent of a square circle have also fallen by the wayside? KFkairosfocus
January 11, 2013
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Kantian Naturalist:
That’s because the theist has a single explanation for (i) the existence of the universe; (ii) the existence and history of life; (iii) the nature of rational norms, including moral norms. The atheist doesn’t have a single explanation for all three things; she has three different explanations for each of those three things, each of which has some degree of plausibility.
Given that theism has a single explanation for everything, how do you explain the rise of science in the context of a theistic world view? The atheist, on the other hand, does not have a separate explanation. "It wasn't God," is the unifying underlying metaphysic (or I really really hope it wasn't god).
The problem, as I see it, is just this: theism offers a single, nice, coherent explanation for the existence of the universe, the history of life, the objectivity of morality, the necessity of mathematics, the regularity of empirical nature, etc. Atheism doesn’t offer a single, nice, coherent explanation that covers all those topics. In a sense, what it really means to be an atheist is to deny that there is any such tidy explanation. An atheist needs to accept many different explanations. So there’s a certain pluralistic patchwork to the atheist’s worldview.
Atheism sees no unity and yet science proceeds as if all is unified. Go figure.Mung
January 11, 2013
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Atheism doesn’t offer a single, nice, coherent explanation that covers all those topics.
"It just happened, that's all," pretty much covers it all. It's true, that's not all that coherent or even remotely satisfying an explanation. Therefore, science. IOW, science stands in opposition to atheism.Mung
January 11, 2013
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PS: Evidentialism is patently self refuting. A worldview that acknowledges that we have first plausibles that we accept as just that without further "proof" (though we may compare difficulties and address factual adequacy, coherence and explanatory power) is NOT evidentialist. But, it may seek to be a reasonable -- as opposed to unreasonable -- faith. Which echoes a certain recent book's title, I know.kairosfocus
January 11, 2013
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I have a question about the proof at 396. It looks as though it's supposed to be read as:
(1) g --> Ng (2) Ng ------------------ (3) g
Put that way, it looks like "affirming the consequent":
(1) p --> q (2) q ------------------ (3) p
and that's formally invalid. Revise and resubmit! :)Kantian Naturalist
January 11, 2013
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KN: It seems that what is at stake here is, first, whether reality and truth are a unified coherent whole that adequately answers to the facts and is sufficiently intelligible to make elegant, simple (not simplistic) powerful sense. This is of course the vision that drove the rise of modern science. Second, the implications of the sense of sufficient reason, that for that which is, it can be asked why, bring to bear issues of cause and that which is, being uncaused -- necessary being. Somewhere in this lurks the same point made way above: you may choose to reject the theistic world picture and its rational vision, but that comes at a metaphysical price. One that, cumulatively may be surprisingly stiff. I see for instance a shock on the issue of implying and needing to warrant the impossibility of God. KFkairosfocus
January 11, 2013
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Box: sorry, we are in deep waters here, as my just above will show. (That was lurking under the surface [this same issue was debated at UD some time ago), and I now think it necessary to "go naked." It will help to follow to read aloud, e.g. N(g) v ~N(g) says, it is necessary that God exists OR it is not necessary that God exists, i.e. this is a dichotomy.) KFkairosfocus
January 11, 2013
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In re: Kairosfocus @ 284
What is the question is that we are part of a credibly contingent world in a context where a beginning is also highly credible. We need to reckon with the absence of causal efficacy of non-being, and account for contingency. That leads to necessity as ground of contingent reality. That necessity has been drawn out on the terms of lacking enabling causal factors and so being eternal. Multiply by fine tuning and evident design and we are at purpose, skill, knowledge and power to effect same. Bring in our being under moral government and we have a necessary being who is the purposeful, enormously powerful, knowledgeable, rational and skillful architect and maker of the world who is moral governor as the explanation to beat. So far, nothing proffered from the atheistical side has come close.
That's because the theist has a single explanation for (i) the existence of the universe; (ii) the existence and history of life; (iii) the nature of rational norms, including moral norms. The atheist doesn't have a single explanation for all three things; she has three different explanations for each of those three things, each of which has some degree of plausibility. But I really do not believe for a moment that either theism or atheism has a rational basis. I think that William James was exactly right when he criticized evidentialism in his "The Will to Believe." When it comes to embracing a comprehensive world-view, it's not that we believe what we 'want' to, but that we embrace a vision of things that we need to embrace, that calls out to us. I've known people who were miserable as atheists and overjoyed to become theists, and likewise, people who were miserable as theists and overjoyed to become atheists. And I know quite a view who are perfectly happy as agnostics. I have absolutely zero interest in arguing against theism. I'm interested in defending atheism against some of the criticisms raised against it. Is atheism rationally justifiable? To a considerable extent, I think it is, but there are limits, and it's interesting to see where those are. The problem, as I see it, is just this: theism offers a single, nice, coherent explanation for the existence of the universe, the history of life, the objectivity of morality, the necessity of mathematics, the regularity of empirical nature, etc. Atheism doesn't offer a single, nice, coherent explanation that covers all those topics. In a sense, what it really means to be an atheist is to deny that there is any such tidy explanation. An atheist needs to accept many different explanations. So there's a certain pluralistic patchwork to the atheist's worldview. I don't think that the real conflict here -- pluralism and monism -- I don't think that is amenable to reason. I think that some people are perfectly content with pluralism, and others are not, they want monism. And from where I sit, they're fine to want that -- they'll get no grief from me.Kantian Naturalist
January 11, 2013
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F/N: For those willing to kick it up several notches, cf here on modal logic, esp S5. Then you may want to look at the discussion here. Hey, let me clip this last:
Hartshorne's ontological argument is based on Anselm's second argument and claims that God's existence is logically necessary. Hartshorne's argument is given here, where "N(A)" means "it is logically necessary that A," "~A" means "it is not the case that A," "-->" is strict implication, "v" means "or," and "g" means "God exists": g --> N(g) N(g) v ~N(g) ~N(g) --> N(~N(g)) N(g) v N(~N(g)) N(~N(g)) --> N(~g) N(g) v N(~g) ~N(~g) N(g) N(g) --> g g This argument is valid. Furthermore, given an Anselmian conception of God, premises one and five are sound. Premise two is just the law of the excluded middle, and premise three is a law of the modal logic S5. Premise nine is obviously sound, so this leaves premise seven as the only premise to question. Premise seven says that it is logically possible that God exists . . . . The argument turns on the distinction between necessity and contingency, and upon the distinction between mere possibility and the nature of necessary being as not mere possible. In other words, God is either necessary or impossible. If God exists than he is ontologically necessary, because he is logically necessary by definition. But if he does not exist than it is ontologically impossible that he exists, or could come to exist. This is because God cannot be contingent, by definition. A contingency is just not God. So if God is possible, he can't be "merely possible" and thus is not impossible, which means he must be necessary.
The key point comes back to where the exchange started, as eternality is core to the concept of God and is known to mean necessity of being, the objector to the existence of God faces the challenge that he implies that God is impossible. KFkairosfocus
January 11, 2013
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Reason, is the capacity for consciously making sense of things, for establishing and verifying facts, and changing or justifying practices, institutions, and beliefs based on new or existing information.
There's that nasty I word again.Mung
January 11, 2013
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A hypothesis of mine is that religious people, living today, to at least 90 per cent are brought up by religious parents. What about you? Were your parents religious?
I have a hypothesis as well. My hypothesis is that all people, living today, were brought up by fallible parents who held a range of beliefs, where some of those beliefs were correct while others were incorrect. One wonders how I could possibly construe this fact as interesting in a discussion where I attack what others believe and have been challenged to justify what I believe. Such an exercise on my part could only demonstrate that I seek to confirm my beliefs with meaningless observations, in place of justifying them with reason. :|Upright BiPed
January 11, 2013
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p.s. unless you can tell me what it means that is sufficient to correct what I know about it and many many more - thus the statistical improbability question. quit already Alan will ya!alan
January 11, 2013
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LT: alan@334: It’s said in a later comment that UD is not a biblical exegesis forum, so I’ll respect that and not remark on Daniel 9:25. I wonder, however, why you ask the question and what you hope it will accomplish. The question is way peripheral to the larger point I was making, which boils down to different interpretive approaches generating very different readings and reading traditions. Hardly controversial. Well - you are the one claiming to have put all this to bed with you contextual analysis etc., but what it might accomplish could be beyond your imagination and I don't mean that in any way patronizing. OH - the end - maybe....alan
January 11, 2013
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I'd like to meet a rational atheist some day, just to be able to say I'd done it before I pass on. I just added that to my "bucket list."Mung
January 11, 2013
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LT: One excuse after another ("various interpretations" = bla, bla, bla), obfuscate the subject, and don't deal with evidence, - just sad. AGAIN: (everyone - anyone) the type and precision of the information found in ancient pre Christ writings (regardless of who, why or language used or interpretations) is MUCH BETTER EXPLAINED as having arose by an INTELLIGENT AGENT and of such precision and character as having a weight far beyond computing ALL the constants and uniquely unlikely characteristics melding together to allow life and the observation and exploration of both life and the material construct of the universe. In this I am making a scientific / mathematical argument - NOT a "religious" one though really any belief system or position is religious having it own faith component. As I tried to point out: "And we have the word of the prophets made more certain, and you will do well to pay attention to it, as to a light shining in a dark place, until the day dawns and the morning star rises in your hearts." So how does all this relate to atheism being rational? - With this type of information existing on planet Earth - well it just isn't, only seemingly so from the imaginations of a materialist conditioned mind set. LT: I am eager for you to help me understand why you said I am "way over my head" on this and would truly love specifics and teaching to show me as I am truly open to correction. I guess we are all ready to move on though...alan
January 11, 2013
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I almost forgot: My thanks to bornagain77 (339) and kaiofocus (341) for their explanations. I’m still trying to figure it out.Box
January 11, 2013
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@ LarTanner - 313
LarTanner: “It [telling people about atheism] is important to me. It’s something I value because hearing such a case articulated plainly and directly helped me immensely. It’s also something I value for my children.”
I have had an atheistic upbringing. And I vividly remember that at the age of 6 my mother explained ‘death’ to me in terms of ‘total blackness’ and ‘the end’. I also remember that I objected: ‘But that does not go for us, right mom? You and me are not going to die, right mom?’. ‘We are going to die as well as anybody else my son’, she answered. This ‘news’ was completely shocking to me. I remember that I was laying in my bed staring in the darkness and was not able to sleep. There was no reason to check this with anybody else, everything my mother said was the absolute truth. I don’t think that I exaggerate when I say that this has had a major impact on me for a very long time. But of course not all children are alike, maybe your children will benefit from atheism.Box
January 11, 2013
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Murray; A hypothesis of mine is that religious people, living today, to at least 90 per cent are brought up by religious parents. What about you? Were your parents religious?Elvis4708
January 11, 2013
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F/N 2: Maybe this from Plato in The Laws Bk X will help: ____________ >> Ath. . . . when one thing changes another, and that another, of such will there be any primary changing element? How can a thing which is moved by another ever be the beginning of change? Impossible. But when the self-moved changes other, and that again other, and thus thousands upon tens of thousands of bodies are set in motion, must not the beginning of all this motion be the change of the self-moving principle? . . . . self-motion being the origin of all motions, and the first which arises among things at rest as well as among things in motion, is the eldest and mightiest principle of change, and that which is changed by another and yet moves other is second. [[ . . . .] Ath. If we were to see this power existing in any earthy, watery, or fiery substance, simple or compound-how should we describe it? Cle. You mean to ask whether we should call such a self-moving power life? Ath. I do. Cle. Certainly we should. Ath. And when we see soul in anything, must we not do the same-must we not admit that this is life? [[ . . . . ] Cle. You mean to say that the essence which is defined as the self-moved is the same with that which has the name soul? Ath. Yes; and if this is true, do we still maintain that there is anything wanting in the proof that the soul is the first origin and moving power of all that is, or has become, or will be, and their contraries, when she has been clearly shown to be the source of change and motion in all things? Cle. Certainly not; the soul as being the source of motion, has been most satisfactorily shown to be the oldest of all things. Ath. And is not that motion which is produced in another, by reason of another, but never has any self-moving power at all, being in truth the change of an inanimate body, to be reckoned second, or by any lower number which you may prefer? Cle. Exactly. Ath. Then we are right, and speak the most perfect and absolute truth, when we say that the soul is prior to the body, and that the body is second and comes afterwards, and is born to obey the soul, which is the ruler? [[ . . . . ] Ath. If, my friend, we say that the whole path and movement of heaven, and of all that is therein, is by nature akin to the movement and revolution and calculation of mind, and proceeds by kindred laws, then, as is plain, we must say that the best soul takes care of the world and guides it along the good path. [[Plato here explicitly sets up an inference to design (by a good soul) from the intelligible order of the cosmos.] >> ____________ Now, remember, we are not looking for a classic deductive proof on premises that are evident and acceptable to all [after Godel that is probably a hopeless project in any case once we have any rich system], but for a worldview framework that per the alternatives is factually adequate, coherent, and elegantly simple and powerful but not simplistic in explanations, on comparative difficulties. Remember, all worldviews have clusters of first plausibles on which they stand, and that is what we are fishing for here. Now, look back above, have you seen in outline or linked the various options? Which has been most satisfioactory, why? KFkairosfocus
January 11, 2013
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bornagain77; Wow! I´m impressed by all your talking. I need some time to digest and evaluate what you are saying. I´ll come back.Elvis4708
January 11, 2013
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F/N: Just in brief reminder, agent explanations inherently are about self-moved first causes, and they are not explained on being necessitated or being chance driven. Indeed if you have done decision tree analysis you will see that, that is why probability distributions are not assigned to agent actions. Now that we are here, obviously it is necessary that some cause acted adequate to ground that. That is not the question. What is the question is that we are part of a credibly contingent world in a context where a beginning is also highly credible. We need to reckon with the absence of causal efficacy of non-being, and account for contingency. That leads to necessity as ground of contingent reality. That necessity has been drawn out on the terms of lacking enabling causal factors and so being eternal. Multiply by fine tuning and evident design and we are at purpose, skill, knowledge and power to effect same. Bring in our being under moral government and we have a necessary being who is the purposeful, enormously powerful, knowledgeable, rational and skillful architect and maker of the world who is moral governor as the explanation to beat. So far, nothing proffered from the atheistical side has come close.kairosfocus
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