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RDF/AIG as a case of the incoherence and rhetorical agenda of evolutionary materialist thought and/or its fellow- traveller ideologies

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For the past several weeks, there has been an exchange that developed in the eduction vs persuasion thread (put up May 9th by AndyJones), on first principles of right reason and related matters.  Commenter RDF . . .   has championed some popular talking points in today’s intellectual culture.

We can therefore pick up from a citation and comment by Vivid, at 619 in the thread (June 12th), for record and possible further discussion.

Accordingly, I clip comment 742 from the thread (overnight) and headline it:

_____________

>>. . . let us remind ourselves of the context for the just above exchanges, by going back to Vivid at 619:

[RDF/AIG:] And once again I must remind you that you are mistaken. We cannot be absolutely certain of anything, and you will see that I have never said that we could be absolutely certain of anything. I don’t think this is a very difficult point, but you keep misquoting me.

[Vivid, replying:} I apologize I did not intend to misquote you I now understand your position better. You are not absolutely certain that there is no such thing as absolute certainty but you want Stephen[B] to concede to that which you are not absolutely certain about. Got it.

Notice, this is what RDF has to defend, cited from his own mouth:

[RDF:] We cannot be absolutely certain of anything . . .

This absolute declaration of certainty that we cannot be certain of anything, aptly exposes the underlying incoherence of what RDF has been arguing.

"Turtles, all the way down . . . " vs a root cause
“Turtles, all the way down . . . ” vs a root cause

He has spent much time trying to ignore a sound worldviews foundation approach, and has sought to undermine first principles of right reason in order to advance an agenda that from its roots on up, is incoherent.

So, let it be understood that when reason was in the balance, he was found wanting, decisively wanting. Again and again.

In particular, observe his willful unresponsiveness to and “passive” resistance by that unresponsiveness, to the basic point that by direct case, Royce’s Error exists, we can show that there are truths that are generally recognised, are accessible to our experiences, are factually grounded, and can be shown to be undeniably true and self evident, constituting certain knowledge of the world of things in themselves accessible to humans.

Thus, his whole project of want of grounding for reasoning and building worldviews collapses from the foundations.

In particular, observe as well that he has for hundreds of comments, waged an ideological talking point war against cause and effect, trying to poison the atmosphere to disguise the want of a good basis for rejecting it.

For instance, observe how he has never seriously engaged the point that once a thing A exists, following Schopenhauer, we may freely ask, why and expect to find a reasonable, intelligible answer. (This is in part a major basis for science, and also for philosophy.)

This principle, sufficient reason, is patently reasonable and self-evident: that if A is, there is a good explanatory reason for it.

First, that A’s attributes, unlike those of a square circle, are coherent. So, from this point on, the law of non-contradiction is inextricably entangled int he possibility of being. Consequently we see the antithesis: possibility vs impossibility of being.

Next, by virtue of possible worlds analysis, we can distinguish another antithesis: contingent vs non-contingent (i.e. NECESSARY) beings.

A unicorn, a possible being (HT: Baggins Book Blogger, Blogspot)
A unicorn, a possible being (HT: Baggins Book Blogger, Blogspot)

That is, we can have possible worlds in which certain things — contingent beings, C — could exist and others in which C does not exist. For instance, a horned horse is obviously a possible being but happens not to exist as of yet in the actual world we inhabit. But it is conceivable that within a century, through genetic engineering, one may well exist. (I am not so sure that they will be able to make a pink one, but a white one is very conceivable.)

We are of course just such members of class C.

(And this wider class C further opens the way to significant choice by humans, by which we can imagine possible futures, and by rational evaluation of the consequences of our ideas, models and plans, decide which to implement, e.g. by choosing a design of the building to replace the WTC buildings in NYC knocked down by Bin Laden and co on Sept 11, 2001 — a date chosen by him on the probable grounds that it was the 318th anniversary less one day, from the great cavalry attack led by Jan III Sobieski of Poland and Lithuania, which broke the final Turkish siege of Vienna under the Caliph at that time in 1683. That is, by choosing the day, UBL was making a message to his fellow radicalised Muslims that he was taking over from the previous high-water mark of IslamIST expansionism. And that he was doing so in the general area of Khorasan would also be of significance to such Muslims, who would immediately recognise the significance and relevance of black flag armies from that general area. I give these examples, to underscore the significance of contingency and intelligent, willed choice in humans, something that RDF/AIG also wishes to undermine. He does not see the fatal self-referential incoherence that stems from that, and doubtless would dismiss the significance of incoherence as well. The circle of ideological irrationality driven by a priori evolutionary materialism and its fellow traveller ideas and agendas, closes.)

But C has its antithesis in a world partition, class NOT-C; let us call it N.

Necessary beings, such as the number two, 2 or the true proposition 2 + 3 = 5, etc.

Fire_tetrahedron
The fire tetrahedron, showing the cluster of enabling factors that are each necessary and jointly sufficient for a fire to begin (Wiki)

Members of C are marked by dependence on ON/OFF enabling factors, e.g. as we have frequently discussed, how a match flame depends on each of: heat, fuel, oxidiser and chain reaction. Such enabling factors are necessary causal factors, all of which must be present for a member of class C to be actualised. A sufficient condition for such a member will have at least all of the factors like this, met.

We naturally and reasonably say that such a member of C is CAUSED when its conditions to exist are met by a sufficient cluster of factors, and that E is an effect; the cluster of factors being causes. So, even if we do not know the full set of causal factors for C, we can be confident that a contingent being, that has a beginning and may end or could conceivably not have been at all, is caused.

However, not all things are like that. Some things have no such dependence on causal factors, and are possible beings. These beings will be actual in all possible worlds, i.e. they are necessary beings.

One and the same object cannot be circular and square in the same sense and place at the same time
One and the same object
cannot be circular and
square in the same
sense and place at the same time

A serious candidate necessary being will be either impossible (blocked by having incoherent proposed attributes such as a square circle), or it will be possible and actual. As noted, S5, in modal logic, captures part of why. {Cf. here.} In effect we can see that such a being just is, inevitably, and its absence would be impossible.

For example the number 2 just is. Even in an empty world, one can see that we have the empty set { } –> 0. Thence, we may form a set which collects the empty set: {0} –> 1. Then, in the next step, we simply collect both: {0, 1} –> 2. For modern set theory, we simply continue the process to get 3, 4, 5 . . . , but this is enough for our purposes. Doing this abstract analytical exercise does not create 2, it simply recognises how inevitable it is. It is impossible for 2 not to exist. Similarly, the true proposition 2 + 3 = 5 is like that, and much more besides.

We thus see that necessary beings exist and are knowable, even familiar in some cases.

We see further that such beings are without beginning, or end. They are not caused, they hold being by necessity, which its their sufficient reason for existing. They have no dependence on external enabling causal factors.

A flying spaghetti monster knitted doll, showing how this is used to mockt eh idea of God as necessary being (note the words on the chalk board)
A flying spaghetti monster knitted doll, showing how this is used to mock the idea of God as necessary being (note the words on the chalk board)

A serious candidate to be a necessary being will be independent of enabling factors, likewise (flying spaghetti monsters need not apply) and will not be composed of material parts. The abstract, thought-nature of cases like 2, 2 + 3 = 5 etc shows that such beings point to mind, and one way of accounting for such beings is that they are eternally contemplated by God. Where also God is regarded as an eternal, necessary, spiritual being who is minded and the root of all being in our world, the ultimate enabling factor for reality.

BTW, this means that those who would dismiss God’s existence do not merely need to establish that in their view God is improbable, but that God is impossible, as God is a serious candidate to be a necessary being.

That is, since RDF is so hot to undermine the intellectual credibility of the existence of God, it is worth pausing to highlight a few points on this matter, connected to the logic of necessary beings and other relevant points. For, even before we run into other things that point like compass needles to God: the evident design of a fine tuned cosmos set up for C-chemistry, aqueous medium cell based life that makes an extra cosmic, intelligent agent with power to create a cosmos the explanation to beat, the significance of our being minded and characterised by reason, as well as the existence of a world of life in that context, the fact that we inescapably find ourselves under moral government by implanted law, and of course the direct encounter with God that millions report as having positively transformed their lives, and more.

Nope, unlike the pretence of too many skeptics would lead us to naively believe, the acceptance of God’s reality is a very reasonable position to hold. (Scroll back up and observe the studious silence of RDF et al on such matters.)

So, never mind the ink-clouds of distractive or dismissive or confusing talking-points, we are back to the worldview level significance of first principles of right reason and pivotal first, self-evident truths.

{Let us add, an illustrative diagram, on how naturally these principles arise from a world-partition, e.g. by having a bright red ball on a table:}

Laws_of_logic

{And,we may clip Wikipedia’s article on laws of thought:

The law of non-contradiction and the law of excluded middle are not separate laws per se, but correlates of the law of identity. That is to say, they are two interdependent and complementary principles that inhere naturally (implicitly) within the law of identity, as its essential nature . . .   whenever we ‘identify’ a thing as belonging to a certain class or instance of a class, we intellectually set that thing apart from all the other things in existence which are ‘not’ of that same class or instance of a class. In other words, the proposition, “A is A and A is not ~A” (law of identity) intellectually partitions a universe of discourse (the domain of all things) into exactly two subsets, A and ~A, and thus gives rise to a dichotomy. As with all dichotomies, A and ~A must then be ‘mutually exclusive’ and ‘jointly exhaustive’ with respect to that universe of discourse. In other words, ‘no one thing can simultaneously be a member of both A and ~A’ (law of non-contradiction), whilst ‘every single thing must be a member of either A or ~A’ (law of excluded middle).

What’s more . . .  thinking entails the manipulation and amalgamation of simpler concepts in order to form more complex ones, and therefore, we must have a means of distinguishing these different concepts. It follows then that the first principle of language (law of identity) is also rightfully called the first principle of thought, and by extension, the first principle reason (rational thought) . . .

Another illustration shows how world view roots arise:}

A summary of why we end up with foundations for our worldviews, whether or not we would phrase the matter that way}
A summary of why we end up with foundations for our worldviews, whether or not we would phrase the matter that way

Prediction (do, prove me wrong RDF et al): this too will be studiously ignored in haste to push along with the talking point agenda. The price tag for such apparently habitual tactics, is willful neglect of duties of care to be reasonable, to seek and face truth, and to be fair in discussion.

That is, it is “without excuse.”

(And yes, the allusion to Rom 1:19 – 25 and vv. 28 – 32 is quite deliberate.)  >>

____________

A squid ink cloud escape tactic
A squid ink cloud escape tactic (Google)

So, we face the issue of worldview foundations, in light of first principles of right reason.

(One that — per fair comment, for weeks now, RDF/AIG has studiously ducked, behind a cloud of talking points.)

How will we respond?

On what basis of reasoning?

With what level of certainty?

Why? END

Comments
I'm much less comfortable than KF is in talking about "self-evident truths" or "first principles," though I don't believe I've done a good job of explaining why such talk leaves me uneasy. Firstly, I do think -- and this is a rather important point, I believe -- that each of the different dimensions of human discourse and thought has its own distinct constitutive principles. What those principles are, however, is just a metalinguistic expression of the underlying rules of that dimension. The principles are authoritative for that discourse. Thus, once we've committed ourselves to talking about objects, the Aristotelian laws are clearly the right principles. If we'd embraced a 'metaphysics' of Heraclitean flux or Buddhist co-dependent origination, instead of a 'metaphysics' of objects and properties, I don't think we'd regard the Aristotelian laws as being so 'self-evident' as we do. The 'self-evidence' of the Aristotelian laws is an illusion produced by the fact that we in the West have been tacit, implicit Aristotelians for thousands of years. Secondly, while there are different constitutive principles for different dimensions of discourse, I hesitate to say that there are constitutive principles for all discourse. For one thing, we do not know what new ways of speaking, thinking, and feeling will be invented by subsequent generations. So who are we to prescribe for all times and places what will count as 'rational discourse'? Does the intelligibility of rational discourse as such really depend on having one set of laws to rule them all? Thirdly, an ambiguity in the 'firstness' of 'first principles' must be noted -- as first noticed by Aristotle, developed nicely by Hegel, and then by Sellars -- priority in the order of understanding is not priority in the order of being. (That is Sellars' formulation -- Aristotle's, if memory is accurate, goes something like "what is first in relation to us is not what is first in itself".) That is, the most basic and fundamental categories of reality -- or, as I would prefer, of discursively structured experience -- since I do not think that reality has categorical structure -- are disclosed to us through reflection and analysis, and are not apparent at the beginning of reflection.Kantian Naturalist
June 23, 2013
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PS: Some truths I hold to be evident and start-points for reasoning about the world and its meaning. WCT 1: Error exists, so we should recognise that truth exists as what is there that we may be in error about; truth saying of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not. --> From this, we may immediately see that we can know that truth exists, so knowledge -- warranted, credible truth -- exists. --> Thus also, we may make mistakes about it so we need and OUGHT to be open to well-warranted correction. WCT 2: The first, intuitive principles of real-world logic: [a] A thing is what it is (the law of identity); [b] A thing cannot at once be and not-be (the law of non-contradiction); [c] A thing cannot neither be nor not-be (the law of the excluded middle). [Cf clarifications and rebuttals to challenges here. And, kindly note, we are specifically speaking with reference to the experienced real world of real things, so extensions to empty-set contexts in which issues over contrasted empty sets -- that is, quite literally: no-thing -- arise, are irrelevant.] --> In that context — and Aristotle was discussing the nature of truth in Metaphysics 1011b, when he said what follows — [d] the truth is that which says of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not. --> It is worth the while to pause and read Aristotle's own words; though this again is significantly technical. Highlighting will help: That the most certain of all beliefs is that opposite statements are not both true at the same time, and what follows for those who maintain that they are true, and why these thinkers maintain this, may be regarded as adequately stated. And since the contradiction of a statement cannot be true at the same time of the same thing, it is obvious that contraries cannot apply at the same time to the same thing . . . . Nor indeed can there be any intermediate between contrary statements, but of one thing we must either assert or deny one thing, whatever it may be. This will be plain if we first define truth and falsehood. To say that what is is not, or that what is not is, is false; but to say that what is is, and what is not is not, is true; and therefore also he who says that a thing is or is not will say either what is true or what is false. But neither what is nor what is not is said not to be or to be. Further, an intermediate between contraries will be intermediate either as grey is between black and white, or as "neither man nor horse" is between man and horse. [Metaphysics, 1011b] WCT 3: We live in a real world that exists, and contains individual things that also have real existence. (Just try to deny that and see where it lands you!) WCT 4: That which exists has a good and logically sufficient reason/ explanation — notice the worldviews level application of abduction! — as to why: i.e. (i) if it begins to exist and/or may go out of existence, it has a cause; and (ii) it is logically possible for one or more necessary beings to exist which are the ultimate causal grounds for such contingent beings [as in (i)]. (Also, since it is credible that we live in a contingent observed world and that we are contingent ourselves, both it and us require an adequate causal explanation in a non-contingent, self-existent order of existence. On this, the former Steady State Universe model proposed that a material cosmos was that necessary being, but the want of evidence has led to the collapse of this view. The evidence pointing to the beginning of the cosmos in which we live therefore points also beyond the observed cosmos; to an order of existence that grounds it. And to posit that it comes from nothing — not space, time or matter or energy — by nothing and for nothing, is therefore absurd on its face. [Indeed, that is why multiverse models are now a popular notion.]) WCT 5: As reflecting on the familiar example of a fire will illuminate, causal — as opposed to merely logical — factors may be: (i) necessary [without which the result is blocked -- no fuel, no fire; if something has a beginning, it has at least one necessary causal factor, that was not "on" until it began, i.e. anything that has a beginning is caused and is contingent on external factors], (ii) sufficient [once present the result will always happen or exist, as the classic fire triangle illustrates: air + heat + fuel --> fire], or even (iii) necessary and sufficient [e.g. air, fuel and heat are each necessary for and are jointly sufficient to initiate and/or sustain a fire]. (iv) contributory, though not necessary. WCT 6: Evil exists (NB: this is best understood as the objectionable, harmful and destructive privation and/or perversion of the good), so that governing moral truth, principle and obligation also objectively exist. --> Thus also, only a worldview that has a grounding IS that is a proper foundation for OUGHT is a reasonable faith. [This insight is actually one of decisive ones that Paul was alluding to.] WCT 7: We, our circumstances, challenges and our common world are at least in significant part intelligible (and so discuss-able) in light of reason, experience and credible first principles used with good inferential logic. (Try to deny it and see where this gets you!) KFkairosfocus
June 23, 2013
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F/N: Mortimer Adler has somewhat to say on synthetic a priori truth claims vs self-evidence that needs to be heard, per little errors in the beginning that then lead us on far and wide at the end: ___________ >> The little error in the beginning, made by Locke and Leibniz, perpetuated by Kant, and leading to the repudiation of any non-verbal or non-tautological truth having incorrigible certitude, consists in starting with a dichotomy instead of a trichotomy — a twofold instead of a threefold distinction of types of truth. In addition to merely verbal statements which, as tautologies, are uninstructive and need no support beyond the rules of language, and in addition to instructive statements which need support and certification, either from experience or by reasoning, there is a third class of statements which are non-tautological or instructive, on the one hand, and are also indemonstrable or self-evidently true, on the other. These are the statements that Euclid called “common notions,” that Aristotle called “axioms” or “first principles,” and that mediaeval thinkers called “propositions per se nota.” One example will suffice to make this clear — the axiom or selfevident truth that a finite whole is greater than any of its parts. This proposition states our understanding of the relation between a finite whole and its parts. It is not a statement about the word “whole” or the word “part” but rather about our understanding of wholes and parts and their relation. All of the operative terms in the proposition are indefinable. We cannot express our understanding of a whole without reference to our understanding of its parts and our understanding that it is greater than any of its parts. We cannot express our understanding of parts without reference to our understanding of wholes and our understanding that a part is less than the whole of which it is a part. When our understanding of an object that is indefinable (e.g., a whole) involves our understanding of another object that is indefinable (e.g., a part), and of the relation between them, that understanding is expressed in a self-evident proposition which is not trifling, uninstructive, or analytic, in Locke’s sense or Kant’s, for no definitions are involved. Nor is it a synthetic a priori judgment in Kant’s sense, even though it has incorrigible certitude; and it is certainly not synthetic a posteriori since, being intrinsically indemonstrable, it cannot be supported by statements offering empirical evidence or reasons. The contemporary denial that there are any indisputable statements which are not merely verbal or tautological, together with the contemporary assertion that all non-tautological statements require extrinsic support or certification and that none has incorrigible certitude, is therefore falsified by the existence of a third type of statement, exemplified by the axiom or self-evident truth that a finite whole is greater than any of its parts, or that a part is less than the finite whole to which it belongs. It could as readily be exemplified by the self-evident truth that the good is the desirable, or that the desirable is the good — a statement that is known to be true entirely from an understanding of its terms, both of which are indefinables. One cannot say what the good is except by reference to desire, or what desire is except by reference to the good. The understanding of either involves the understanding of the other, and the understanding of both, each in relation to the other, is expressed in a proposition per se nota, i.e., self-evident or known to be true as soon as its terms are understood. Such propositions are neither analytic nor synthetic in the modern sense of that dichotomy; for the predicate is neither contained in the definition of the subject, nor does it lie entirely outside the meaning of the subject. Axioms or self-evident truths are, furthermore, truths about objects understood, objects that can have instantiation in reality, and so they are not merely verbal. They are not a priori because they are based on experience, as all our knowledge and understanding is; yet they are not empirical or a posteriori in the sense that they can be falsified by experience or require empirical investigation for their confirmation. The little error in the beginning, which consists in a non-exhaustive dichotomy mistakenly regarded as exhaustive, is corrected when we substitute for it a trichotomy that distinguishes (i) merely verbal tautologies, (ii) statements of fact that require empirical support and can be empirically falsified, (iii) axiomatic statements, expressing indemonstrable truths of understanding which, while based upon experience, do not require empirical support and cannot be empirically falsified.[6]>> ___________ My own take on self evident truths, is that they will have two key characteristics: (i) once one properly understands on the common sense derived from being an experienced human being, one will see it to be true and to be necessarily true, and (ii) one will find that on rejecting it, one will end in PATENT -- not subtle, hard to work out -- self referential incoherence or contradictions to other patent facts of one sort or another. The case, that error exists as an objective matter, is an example, one that is more accessible and shows how undeniable it is. It is also freighted with major direct implications that overturn many popular po mo worldview notions in our day. That is, it answers to some pretty big questions. While I am at it, we should note that the man who would imagine that per our constitution we cannot know (or even know for sure) anything about the external world of things in themselves, is claiming such a case of knowledge, and self refutes. This F H Bradley pointed out long ago, in case someone wants to go down that particular tack again. KFkairosfocus
June 23, 2013
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KN: The prob there is that per a pattern played out over a month, the "exaggerated" views are part of a one-two punch combination. They have to be pinned down and dealt with. Bobbing, weaving and rope a dope etc, only highlight that we are dealing with a co-ordinated strategy not someone going off the rails then acknowledging [that is consistently not happening . . . a key sign] and walking back to more reasonable territory. KF PS: The writers block advice is based on experience. Forcing yourself to do a concept map -- a sales name is "mind map" -- of the territory really works wonders, though it can at first be painful. PPS: While the broader metaphysics points are nice, the focal issue is that it is not just human finitude and fallibility as fact that are on the table. The pivotal point is that error objectively exists, yes as acknowledged fact but also as undeniable truth. Symbolising as E, we generate ~E and conjunct: E AND ~E, which being an AND of the mutually opposed and exhaustive, must be false. So, we have an undeniable case of error, and E is so, ~ E therefore is false. This then shows a case of undeniably certain knowledge, a case where the perception does correspond across the ugly gulch to empirical reality, and where we have knowable truth to patently undeniable certainty, i.e self evident truth. Systems of thought -- their name is Legion -- that are incompatible with such then fall victim to the reverse of implication: p => q entails that q is necessary for p to be true. So, we go ~q => ~p. That cuts a big swath across metaphysical territory. And indeed that was why Royce started from that point of consensus E in the first place. Solid knowledge that grounds a lot.kairosfocus
June 22, 2013
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I think there is always the chance that we push back the boundaries of metaphysics here and there with science, as we have in the past. That is why I often add the qualifier presently or currently when I lament the state of our metaphysical knowledge. Experiments like Libet’s or Wegner’s eventually could shed light on issues surrounding volition, for example. If there was ever any convincing evidence of psychic or paranormal phenomena, they might help rule out various metaphysical positions. And advances in machine intelligence could shed empirical light on what is currently philosophy of mind.
Further refinement in machine intelligence or in the neural correlates of voluntary action would be fascinating, but I'm not sure what they'd tell us about any traditional metaphysical issues. Then again, I'm not sure what else metaphysics is besides empirical inquiry + conceptual refinement.Kantian Naturalist
June 22, 2013
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Hi Phinehas,
While it is true that RDF added this qualifier elsewhere, I was obviously not correcting him about that statement, but about the one where he’d blatantly misrepresented my position. RDF has continued to act as though he never made the statement that I all but quoted word for word.
You are entirely correct here. I hadn't found the other statement where I had omitted the qualifier - I had meant to say that you were insisting that there were possibly such people, not that there were necessarily such people. I hadn't considered this to be a vitally important distinction so I wasn't particularly careful in adding that qualifier. I still do not consider the omission of this qualifier as a gross mischaracterization of your position by any means. Still, my sincere apologies for missing the relevant quote from myself.
You know what, even though I still think you are misunderstanding Peter’s position on this, I am willing to give you the benefit of the doubt and assume that you are not deliberately mischaracterizing in this particular instance. I retract my accusation that you were and apologize for making a false accusation.
No problem.
If you are sincere in wanting to avoid mischaracterizations and straw man arguments,...
I have no interest in building strawmen, and so I never do. If I get somebody's position wrong, which I may do frequently, it is because we do not always use language concisely, and because we write these posts quickly and without editing (at least I do). When somebody gets my position wrong (which happens frequently), I do not jump to the conclusion that they are intentionally building strawmen.
...feel free to reference the above as a traditional and reasonable belief that happens to be contrary to your own. Many of us have pointed out that there are often competing reasons both to believe X or to not believe X. In addition, we are often presented with life decisions that are contingent upon what we believe about X so that, practically speaking, we cannot remain impartial or indifferent. In these cases, we will choose to believe X or not believe X, and our choice will be reflected in the actions that follow.
Everything you say here is obviously true except your choice of the word "choose" is, in my view, problematic. If instead you wrote "In these cases, we will come to believe X or not believe X, and our belief will be reflected in the actions that follow" then I would agree with everything you said. And even this is true: If we defined a "choice" as a "selection among alternatives" rather than an "uncaused selection among alternatives", then I would agree with every word just as you wrote it. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 22, 2013
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Hi Kantian Naturalist,
But, when it comes to metaphysics (those pesky “synthetic a priori” claims), we have neither: being ‘synthetic’ rather than ‘analytic’, formal or deductive logic is of little assistance, and being a priori rather than a posteriori, empirical evidence is also of little assistance. So the very criteria which make possible resolution of disagreement about logico-mathematical or empirical issues are missing when it comes to metaphysics (as traditionally construed).
Well stated indeed!
As I see it, the real issues are whether this means that all metaphysics is bunk (as the logical positivists thought) or whether there are good prospects for a critical and scientific metaphysics (as the pragmatists thought).
I think there is always the chance that we push back the boundaries of metaphysics here and there with science, as we have in the past. That is why I often add the qualifier presently or currently when I lament the state of our metaphysical knowledge. Experiments like Libet's or Wegner's eventually could shed light on issues surrounding volition, for example. If there was ever any convincing evidence of psychic or paranormal phenomena, they might help rule out various metaphysical positions. And advances in machine intelligence could shed empirical light on what is currently philosophy of mind. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 22, 2013
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I've been following the exchange, off and on. As I read RDFish's view, he exaggerated his own view when he said "we can't be certain of anything," and that he has plenty of other statements in which he's far more cautious. So I don't consider "we can't be certain of anything" to be his considered view. Thanks for the advice about writer's block. If it works, I'll refrain from frequent commenting, but I somehow suspect that you'll all manage without me.Kantian Naturalist
June 22, 2013
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F/N: For writers block, try first a good nature walk then come back and do a concept map type connected note. Then have a chat with a colleague or better yet an intelligent person from another discipline. If all else fails write bullet points and then edit into sentences, take an overnight and re-read then fix up.kairosfocus
June 22, 2013
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PPS: Wittgenstein et al are using unusual terminology that is not helpful to our case. It is common to speak of knowledge that is not provisional, and when we, say, say we know ourselves to be aware or conscious, we are certain. Being appeared to redly is similar.kairosfocus
June 22, 2013
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PS: The significance of Error exists as knowable truth has wide consequences for worldviews -- admittedly, pro grade philosophers are too sophisticated to make what Dr W used to call "one step too far" but such views are commonplace in a po mo world -- that imply the opposite.kairosfocus
June 22, 2013
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KN: Pardon, you have stepped in after a month of exchanges, and you need to realise the pattern of on one hand then a tangential subject-switching on the other that shields. This is the pivotal issue and concern highlighted in the OP and which is self-referentially incoherent:
RDF: We cannot be absolutely certain of anything, and you will see that I have never said that we could be absolutely certain of anything . . .
This is blatantly self referentially incoherent, but the distractions have obfuscated the fact that RDF has never admitted such and that something is deeply wrong here. Going further, I have pointed out the significance of the direct example, Royce's: error exists; which RDF refuses to touch. There's more, but just so you know where you have stepped in. KFkairosfocus
June 22, 2013
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What the heck, I'll play. I'm not getting any writing done today anyway.
I again challenge RDF et al to actually examine Royce’s proposition, Error exists, on the merits. Let’s pose some questions that it would be interesting to see responses to: 1: Is this or is it not a case of a proposition that addresses “big questions” Y/N: ________ . Why or why not: ________________ 2: Is it generally acknowledged as a matter of experience and fact that error exists? (Say, starting from doing sums in school.) Y/N: ________. Why or why not: ______________ 3: Can it be shown (cf. the above or the like) that Error exists is UNDENIABLY true? Y/N: _______ . Why or why not: ______________ 4: Is Error exists, then, a case of certain, certainly known truth? Y/N: _______ . Why or why not: _______________ 5: What are the epistemological, logical and worldview consequences of your conclusions at 1, 2, 3, 4; why: __________________________ >>
(1) The fact of human finitude ("error exists") belongs to a different class of claims than 'the Big Questions' (e.g. free will/determinism, appearance/reality, accident/essence, mind/body, theism/atheism), hereafter 'traditional metaphysics'. Traditional metaphysics is concerned with claims that (a) have semantic content that is not strictly logical (in the 'formal' sense of logic) nor strictly empirical; (b) refer to states of affairs that would obtain even if there were no human beings to take notice of them. In other words, traditional metaphysics attempts to describe the basic categories of reality, independent of everything that human beings bring to the table. But the fact of finitude is not a deep truth about the nature of reality; it is a deep truth about the nature of us. So it belongs to a different class of propositions than do 'the Big Questions.' (2) Yes, though the fact of finitude is not something we know through experience -- it is a fundamental presupposition for our being able to have the kinds of experiences that do have, as human beings. (I'll take this as also answering (3).) (4) I would follow Peirce, Wittgenstein, and C. I. Lewis in distinguishing between 'certainty' and 'knowledge.' Wittgenstein puts this as a 'grammatical' (logical-semantic) point: that it only makes sense to talk about knowledge in cases where doubt is also intelligible. 'Certainty' is a pragmatic-transcendental; it's a different category. The existence of error is certain, but just for that reason, it is not known. So the fallibile-but-corrigible picture of knowledge as a self-correcting enterprise in which any claim can be contested is one thing, and what is 'certain' -- the facts of human embodiment and finitude -- is another. (5) I'm not at all averse to Royce's argument that begins with 'error exists' and then seeks the necessary conditions of possibility for error. But whereas Royce argues that only the existence of a higher, all-inclusive Mind can fully account for the existence of error, I think that error can be explained in terms of the continual process of adjustment between (i) ourselves and other people and (ii) ourselves and the world. (It cannot be explained in terms of (i) or (ii) alone.) In short, I think that Royce's starting-point is no problem for the version of pragmatism that I accept.Kantian Naturalist
June 22, 2013
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RDF:
PETERJ: Now I didn’t have any evidence that there was a God, or particularly believed everything that my parents told me (for good reason too), but for some reason chose to believe. … I distinctly remember being asked that question and for some reason i changed my mind and decided that I no longer believed. … No matter how rubbish my football team begin the season I choose to believe that they will win the league. … Belief can be a matter of choice…
RDF: So you are wrong again. I said that I encountered people on this forum who chose their beliefs without good reason and believed whatever they wanted to, and this is who I was thinking of.
You know what, even though I still think you are misunderstanding Peter's position on this, I am willing to give you the benefit of the doubt and assume that you are not deliberately mischaracterizing in this particular instance. I retract my accusation that you were and apologize for making a false accusation. Having said that, I still believe that the following is a much better characterization of what is actually a pretty traditional belief, and of what we have been arguing (including Peter, though I don't want to speak for him or anyone else, and would be happy to be corrected if they believe otherwise). Many of us have pointed out that there are often competing reasons both to believe X or to not believe X. In addition, we are often presented with life decisions that are contingent upon what we believe about X so that, practically speaking, we cannot remain impartial or indifferent. In these cases, we will choose to believe X or not believe X, and our choice will be reflected in the actions that follow. If you are sincere in wanting to avoid mischaracterizations and straw man arguments, feel free to reference the above as a traditional and reasonable belief that happens to be contrary to your own.Phinehas
June 22, 2013
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RDF says:
RDF: Phinehas had no other counter-argument, but rather repeated his insistence that some select group of people have well-justified knowledge, and all other groups of people who disagree with them are wrong. [emphasis mine]
In my response, I quote him nearly word for word.
PHIN: I’ve never insisted that some select group of people have well-justified knowledge. I’ve merely pointed out that you have no warrant for continued insistence that nobody does. [emphasis mine]
RDF: See? I never said that you insisted that some select group of people have these justifications.
Not only had RDF said exactly what I claimed he said, but he'd said that my insistence was repeated.
RDF: I said that you claimed there might be these people, just as you yourself were claiming!
While it is true that RDF added this qualifier elsewhere, I was obviously not correcting him about that statement, but about the one where he'd blatantly misrepresented my position. RDF has continued to act as though he never made the statement that I all but quoted word for word.
RDF: It’s all right here in black and white, Phinehas – everybody can read these things – I represented your views just as you said them.
Indeed it is. RDF said nearly word for word what I claimed was a gross misrepresentation, and instead of admitting this, has continued to act as though he never said it. But it is still there in black and white.
And then, when I pointed this out to you, did you acknowledge your false accusation and apologize to me? No, you didn’t – you ignored what I said, and then you double down and do the very same thing again. And you are completely wrong one again: I have not misrepresented anyone’s views, either deliberately or by mistake.
My accusation was not false. I did not continue to argue my point because I was going to just drop it. But when RDF then stepped right back into throwing up straw man arguments, I thought the continuing pattern deserved being exposed.
This really is pathetic, my friend: If you want to debate, then by all means let’s continue. If you want to whine and cry and pretend that I’m misrepresenting you then we’re not going to get anywhere and you’re going to look really stupid.
And again RDF is mischaracterizing. I am not whining and crying, but rather pointing out an ongoing pattern of behavior that is unbecoming for one who is searching for truth through fair debate. In the context of accusing me of whining and crying, RDF's use of "my friend" appears a bit disingenuous.
KF: I suggest, you need to think again, and treat people with a mite more of respect.
RDF: I’ve never disrespected Phinehas...
Thanks KF. We can let the impartial reader decide who is showing disrespect and who is not.Phinehas
June 22, 2013
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In re: RDFish @ 113:
In any event, there have been no counter-arguments to my simple point that in contrast to a vast amount of well-justified knowledge that we all share regarding the world, answers to the questions discussed in this forum (including questions regarding origins, mind/body ontology, and free will) have no certain answers at all.
I share RDFish's shrug-of-the-shoulders attitude towards "traditional metaphysics" (what post-Kantian philosophers dismiss as "pre-critical metaphysics), including such areas as appearance/reality, accident/essence, mind/body, free will/determinism, and inner mind/outer world. That is not to say that metaphysics as such is bunk -- far from it! -- but rather that traditional metaphysics is, well, bunk. One way of getting a bit clearer on this point is to think about the criteria we employ for resolving disagreements. When it comes to disagreements about scientific theories, we have a rough-and-ready set of criteria to which we can appeal: simplicity; fecundity; how many ad hoc hypotheses are necessary to reconcile the central claims of the theory with anomalous evidence, and so on. And when it comes to logical and mathematical systems, we also have a fairly precise set of criteria to which we can appeal -- though of course deductive proofs are quite different from empirical explanations. But, when it comes to metaphysics (those pesky "synthetic a priori" claims), we have neither: being 'synthetic' rather than 'analytic', formal or deductive logic is of little assistance, and being a priori rather than a posteriori, empirical evidence is also of little assistance. So the very criteria which make possible resolution of disagreement about logico-mathematical or empirical issues are missing when it comes to metaphysics (as traditionally construed). As I see it, the real issues are whether this means that all metaphysics is bunk (as the logical positivists thought) or whether there are good prospects for a critical and scientific metaphysics (as the pragmatists thought).Kantian Naturalist
June 22, 2013
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RDF: With all due respect your behaviour across more than one thread -- do you recall it? -- has led me (and others) to draw the conclusion, for cause, that you are pursuing an ideological talking point agenda (though it seems you have been blind to just how you have projected yourself attitudinally . . . ). Maybe I need to ask you to look at this with fresh eyes to see how it is going to look to others who have come to a different view, often after serious intellectual effort:
Some people (including me) come to their beliefs by good reasons and evidence. In that case, they are not choosing what they want to be true, but rather they discover what they find to be true. Other people (like our friend PeterJ) just choose what they want to be true and start believing it.
Do you begin to grasp how that comes across? ( I do not want to have to put it in words, but it is not favourably.) In addition, just above your discussion of PJ when he was not around to speak for himself was simply out of order. Which is what I have spoken to as part of my responsibilities in this thread. You know what you can do to revise that opinion. As for the matters on merits, I would suggest that the above list of questions would be a good start point. Also, that hose points would contain an answer to your often repeated assertion [which is one of your on the other hand distractive points, but has some substance on its own], and the assertion in the OP that you still need to address. However, you have been consistently evasive and clever in a way that does not commend itself. Good day. KFkairosfocus
June 22, 2013
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KF,
I suggest, you need to think again, and treat people with a mite more of respect.
I've never disrespected Phinehas, nor have I ever disrespected anyone's religious views. On the contrary, as has been pointed out by others here, I've said there is nothing irrational about holding religious beliefs, and there is likely personal benefits for many of those who do. You, on the other hand, have never been anything but disrespectful to me and my views. The last time I attempted to discuss anything with you I asked you to adhere to a few simple principles of common courtesy and refrain from personal attacks... and you immediately wrote a long screed attacking me personally. You are not capable of civil discourse, which is why I refuse to debate anything with you. In any event, there have been no counter-arguments to my simple point that in contrast to a vast amount of well-justified knowledge that we all share regarding the world, answers to the questions discussed in this forum (including questions regarding origins, mind/body ontology, and free will) have no certain answers at all. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 22, 2013
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F/N: RDF, are you aware that PJ is a case of someone whose life was rescued and transformed by encounter with God? That I am someone who would have been dead decades ago apart from a miracle of guidance in answer to a prayer of desperate surrender by my Mom? That there are many, many, many more like us out there? Have you (given your evident rhetorical habit of studiously ignoring the other side) even bothered to seriously glance at relevant evidence -- e.g. cf. 101 level summaries here on and here on (and there is much more at more sophisticated levels) -- or are you just putting on skeptical and intellectual airs? Especially, given your evident views on logic and fundamental self-evident truth? I suggest, you need to think again, and treat people with a mite more of respect. KFkairosfocus
June 21, 2013
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RDF, I draw your attention to a specific challenge at 108 above; yes, the same that you have consistently pretended is not there, the better to drum out favourite talking points one more time: ____________ >> I again challenge RDF et al to actually examine Royce’s proposition, Error exists, on the merits. Let’s pose some questions that it would be interesting to see responses to: 1: Is this or is it not a case of a proposition that addresses “big questions” Y/N: ________ . Why or why not: ________________ 2: Is it generally acknowledged as a matter of experience and fact that error exists? (Say, starting from doing sums in school.) Y/N: ________. Why or why not: ______________ 3: Can it be shown (cf. the above or the like) that Error exists is UNDENIABLY true? Y/N: _______ . Why or why not: ______________ 4: Is Error exists, then, a case of certain, certainly known truth? Y/N: _______ . Why or why not: _______________ 5: What are the epistemological, logical and worldview consequences of your conclusions at 1, 2, 3, 4; why: __________________________ >> _____________ When you show a cogent cluster of responses to the above, then we can take further remarks from you seriously. KFkairosfocus
June 21, 2013
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Hi Phinehas:
And again you tear down a strawman. After repeated mischaracterizations, it becomes increasingly difficult to believe that the pattern is not deliberate. Furthermore, it becomes increasingly apparent that you don’t trust the strength of your own arguments that you would need to resort to this sort of tactic.
Let's take a good hard look at this, shall we? On your last post you accused me of deliberately misrepresenting your position. Here is what I said (adding emphasis):
RDF: Rather, Phinehas here is claiming that there are (or at least might be) some people who have good justifications for their beliefs regarding what we’ve been calling The Big Questions,…
Got that? I said that you claimed that THERE MIGHT BE some people with these justifications. Then you got all huffy and accused me of DELIBERATELY MISPRESENTING YOUR VIEWS:
PHIN: I’ve never insisted that some select group of people have well-justified knowledge. I’ve merely pointed out that you have no warrant for continued insistence that nobody does.
See? I never said that you insisted that some select group of people have these justifications. I said that you claimed there might be these people, just as you yourself were claiming! It's all right here in black and white, Phinehas - everybody can read these things - I represented your views just as you said them. And then, when I pointed this out to you, did you acknowledge your false accusation and apologize to me? No, you didn't - you ignored what I said, and then you double down and do the very same thing again. And you are completely wrong one again: I have not misrepresented anyone's views, either deliberately or by mistake. This really is pathetic, my friend: If you want to debate, then by all means let's continue. If you want to whine and cry and pretend that I'm misrepresenting you then we're not going to get anywhere and you're going to look really stupid.
“Compelling” is another one of those words that is ripe for equivocation. Can the argument not stand without such qualifiers?
OF COURSE my argument can stand without that word! Take it out! Use "good reasons" or "strong reasons" or "sufficient evidence" or whatever you would like to say. I'm not equivocating - you are wrong yet again.
I have not read anything that would make me believe that anyone here holds the position that they can simply make up their mind that they want to believe X without any reason at all.
HELLO? You were debating me in this thread: https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/can-a-darwinist-consistently-condemn/ And you presumably read where PeterJ said exactly that (see @111 there) where he said this:
PETERJ: Now I didn’t have any evidence that there was a God, or particularly believed everything that my parents told me (for good reason too), but for some reason chose to believe. ... I distinctly remember being asked that question and for some reason i changed my mind and decided that I no longer believed. ... No matter how rubbish my football team begin the season I choose to believe that they will win the league. ... Belief can be a matter of choice...
So you are wrong again. I said that I encountered people on this forum who chose their beliefs without good reason and believed whatever they wanted to, and this is who I was thinking of.
(Without quoting out of context, please either show that this is not true or drop the pretense of being forthcoming and sincere in your argument.)
Now that I have shown you that you are wrong in every single accusation you've made, will you apologize and stop being such a loser and either try to mount an argument or concede that you are wrong about everything?
Many of us have pointed out that there are often competing reasons both to believe X or to not believe X.
Yes, obviously.
In addition, we are often presented with life decisions that are contingent upon what we believe about X so that, practically speaking, we cannot remain impartial or indifferent. In these cases, we will choose to believe X or not believe X, and our choice will be reflected in the actions that follow.
Some people (including me) come to their beliefs by good reasons and evidence. In that case, they are not choosing what they want to be true, but rather they discover what they find to be true. Other people (like our friend PeterJ) just choose what they want to be true and start believing it. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 21, 2013
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RDF:
Now I do accept, after speaking with people here, that not everybody is the same in this regard. Some people simply make up their mind that they want to believe in X or Y or Z, and they do not need to have compelling reasons at all – they simply begin to believe whatever they want to.
And again you tear down a strawman. After repeated mischaracterizations, it becomes increasingly difficult to believe that the pattern is not deliberate. Furthermore, it becomes increasingly apparent that you don't trust the strength of your own arguments that you would need to resort to this sort of tactic. "Compelling" is another one of those words that is ripe for equivocation. Can the argument not stand without such qualifiers? I have not read anything that would make me believe that anyone here holds the position that they can simply make up their mind that they want to believe X without any reason at all. (Without quoting out of context, please either show that this is not true or drop the pretense of being forthcoming and sincere in your argument.) So that impartial readers may better see the nature of the strawman that has been laid out by RDF, here is the fleshed out version that he'd, evidently, rather not address: Many of us have pointed out that there are often competing reasons both to believe X or to not believe X. In addition, we are often presented with life decisions that are contingent upon what we believe about X so that, practically speaking, we cannot remain impartial or indifferent. In these cases, we will choose to believe X or not believe X, and our choice will be reflected in the actions that follow.Phinehas
June 21, 2013
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F/N: One of the most important things in reasoning is to understand what happens if one believes and reasons from that which is false, and then meets that which is actually true and cuts across it. Ex falso quodlibet: from that which is false, we may deduce anything, but of course, from the truth we may properly infer only that which is true. (Such is the nature of implication logic.) The answer is obvious: believing the false true, we will too often hardly be able to see the actual truth as less than absurd. Hence, the difference we must make between seeming absurd and finding something an actual redutio ad absurdum, reducing to contradiction within itself, or to contradicting that which is credible and warranted separately as fact. Thus also, that finding something personally compelling or the opposite may say very little more than the state of one's preferences and dispositions. It certainly has not said that one has done due diligence on duties of care to warrant. (Where also we must note that part of what is being disputed, mostly on the side opposed to design thought, is first principles of right reason. Reason itself is in the balance.) Thence, the value of what I have invited over and over again fruitlessly (in respect of RDF): actually examining that "Error exists" -- let us symbolise as E again, and its denial NOT-E as ~E -- is not just acknowledged fact but is in fact demonstrated to be undeniably true. To see the undeniability, in short steps of thought:
a: Take E and ~ E and join them: (E AND ~E) b: These being mutually opposed and exhaustive of possible alternatives, the AND must be false. ___________________________________ c: So, we know that E is true, as this conjunction is an error. The very attempt to deny that Error exists creates, by simply joining the two opposed claims, an example of error, showing that error indeed exists.) d: So also, we know that ~ E is false, an error. =============== e: Further, this is undeniable, is warranted to certainty, and is true. It is thus objectively and even absolutely certain knowledge [it is undenaiable], and it is on an obvious big question, as it speaks to the actuality of certainly knowable truth and knowledge. f: Hence, systems of thought that deny the possibility of certain knowledge of truth, especially on big questions, are shown to be erroneous. g: Hence, also, we can see that it is not being persuaded by an argument, or whether there is widespread agreement or acknowledgement of a truth. (In a world of deeply polarised and too often closed minded parties, multiplied by the sort of means of public manipulation offered by the major media etc, that appeal to the mass of the public or the learned, cannot be a reasonable test of truth or right. Appeal to the crowd is an obvious fallacy, and no authority, collective or individual, is better than its evidence, facts, reasoning and underlying assumptions. Ironically, it is design objectors who so commonly speak about appeal to personal incredulity, by way of dismissal. Nope, design thinkers are appealing to inductive inference to best explanation on observing the reality of FSCO/I especially dFSCI such as is found in a digital world and its known only known source, then are inferring that this is a reliable sign of design as cause. Thence, when we see the same in the world of life, design is the reasonable best explanation. If you object, kindly show us a case of such FSCO/I genuinely being produced by blind chance and mechanical necessity, in our observation, at or beyond the 500 - 1,000 bits threshold. This is not even close to being achieved. The inference to design as best causal explanation on seeing FSCO/I is highly reliable as an induction.)
(Notice, that not once has RDF in a month actually deigned to actually look at this seriously. Instead, he has consistently followed the all too commonly met evil counsel classically found in Wilson's The Arte of Rhetorique, to evade and pass by as though it were not there, that which is inconvenient to where one wishes to go. [This is diagnostic, sadly so, that we are really dealing with a rhetorical agenda here.]) I again speak for record, for those who will consider it. Not that I fool myself that we are not in a perilous day where as the apostle warned, "men will not put up with sound instruction, but instead will gather to them those who will tickle their itching ears with what they want to hear." Hence, too, we see Jesus' grim warning about a debased mind:
Jn 8: 43 Why don’t you understand what I am saying? It is because you cannot accept my teaching . . . 45 But because I am telling you the truth, you do not believe me.
If we are unduly committed to the false, it can shut our ears and eyes to the truth, and can incline us to hate that which cuts across what we want to hear. Ultimately, to the point of rage against any who would dare oppose -- or even just question -- what we mindlessly follow. Hence, the classic problem that democracy too easily falls into being mob-rule where the madness of crowds stirred up by agitators, leads to passionate actions that are utterly unwise and too often unjust. An example I recently saw, was a book lender- borrower matching service that then pointed people back to the ebook sales services that offered a one time only lending capacity. (That's bad BTW, that an ebook can be lent legitimately just once is something that we need to address.) The word was spread among so-called indie authors that the site which offered loans and advertised purchases of the same books (hoping to eventually make commissions off sales) was a pirate site, that hosted copies of books for loan without permission. A Web mob attack ensued, leading to crashing the site, and through threatening letters, the closing of the site for a time. The owner's reputation was trashed -- apparently, an injured war veteran. All, based on passionately believed misinformation. Some few of the authors have subsequently tried to apologise, but damage has been done and now there is a retaliation of people going to ebook offering pages and doing the one-star review tactic. BTW, resemblance to what is happening just now with Darwin's Dilemma and with the longstanding spreading of ever so many toxic claims about design theory and design thinkers, is NOT coincidental. That is why I am stressing the importance of due diligence on duties of care to truth, right, warrant, and fairness. And it is why I again challenge RDF et al to actually examine Royce's proposition, Error exists, on the merits. Let's pose some questions that it would be interesting to see responses to: 1: Is this or is it not a case of a proposition that addresses "big questions" Y/N: ________ . Why or why not: ________________ 2: Is it generally acknowledged as a matter of experience and fact that error exists? (Say, starting from doing sums in school.) Y/N: ________. Why or why not: ______________ 3: Can it be shown (cf. the above or the like) that Error exists is UNDENIABLY true? Y/N: _______ . Why or why not: ______________ 4: Is Error exists, then, a case of certain, certainly known truth? Y/N: _______ . Why or why not: _______________ 5: What are the epistemological, logical and worldview consequences of your conclusions at 1, 2, 3, 4; why: __________________________ KFkairosfocus
June 21, 2013
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Hi seventrees
But to summarize, I have chosen to believe some things considered absurd by some people, as I think I have reasons to do so.
If I evaluated the reasons for believing X, and found that the reasons were compelling, then I would believe X. But I would not call this a "choice", since I could not simply choose to find the reasons compelling or not. Rather, I would discover if I found the reasons were good enough to make me believe in X. Now I do accept, after speaking with people here, that not everybody is the same in this regard. Some people simply make up their mind that they want to believe in X or Y or Z, and they do not need to have compelling reasons at all - they simply begin to believe whatever they want to. Frankly I find this upsetting, but apparently it happens. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 20, 2013
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Sorry RDFish, You actually typed
In any event, you could not choose to believe all of the various things that other people are certain of even if you tried!
And I stated we. Sorry about that.seventrees
June 20, 2013
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Hi RDFish
They are beliefs that are solemnly held by many millions of people who adhere to the religions of Mormonism and Scientology, respectively.
And I assumed those last two were hypothetical examples to help me see your point. If I knew, I wouldn't have done so. (That's why I didn't do so for example 1). I'll be more careful next time.
Could you choose to believe these things if you tried?
I answered that already. But to summarize, I have chosen to believe some things considered absurd by some people, as I think I have reasons to do so.
If I was told that an absurd claim was true with “100% certainty”, then I would not simply believe it – I would need to be convinced of it. This is not a process of choosing; it is a process of being convinced by evidence (My emphasis).
I could not believe these things if my life depended on it, any more than I could believe that 2+2=5. I don’t think you could either.
My question was "If you have good reasons to believe a claim which was patently absurd to you..." To be clearer, I was not focusing on absurdities like 2+2 = 5, but on the things which cannot be proven with 100% certainty using solely the formal rules of logic. And as to what I emphasized, I will assume that you are honest. But, I doubt everyone wants to be convinced by evidence, even though they say they want to be. This is a reason why I had a difficulty understanding why you said we cannot choose what we believe. The difficulty is still there, but I see that it is possible to choose to believe.seventrees
June 20, 2013
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RDF: Pardon but this is a smoking gun:
of course there are plenty of people who think their answers to the Big Questions are justified. I don’t think that was in question – I meet them all the time. I’m saying they are mistaken about that, because they can’t demonstrate that to me or anyone else that their answers are correct.
In short, in your opinion you don't need to even seriously check that YOU could be in error, you are so sure those who differ with you must be wrong. Hence, of course, refusal over the course of a solid month to actually address Royce's proposition on the merits: Error exists (with implications that truth that is knowable even to certainty on at least some subjects exists -- as big a question as they come). Which is a general consensus as fact, and which you can easily see -- if you wanted to -- just happens to be undeniably true on grounds that trying to deny it instantiates it. But, after for weeks, the onward tactic is predictable: willfully ignoring or evading what you should and can easily know. Sorry to have to be so direct, but that is the direct implication of what you just put on the table. After a month, I have no illusions that you will suddenly be willing to drop your ideological agenda and suddenly be concerned about such duties of care, but the matter needs to be highlighted on record. And just maybe, if enough people point it out, you may be forced to wake up from dogmatic slumbers. KFkairosfocus
June 20, 2013
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Hi Phinehas
Seriously? After patiently explaining my position again and again, the best you can do is to deliberately misrepresent it?
I never deliberately mispresent people's position. Either you haven't made yourself clear, or I misunderstood you, or both - just like when you get me wrong.
1. I’ve never insisted that some select group of people have well-justified knowledge. I’ve merely pointed out that you have no warrant for continued insistence that nobody does.
I said just that! Here is what I said, emphasis added to show how you twist my words!
RDF: Rather, Phinehas here is claiming that there are (or at least might be) some people who have good justifications for their beliefs regarding what we’ve been calling The Big Questions,...
So get off your high horse and stop accusing me of deliberately misrepresenting your views. Nobody has been more mispresented than me here, and I am very, very, very patient with my detractors.
2. If there are those who have well-justified knowledge, then they certainly are not going to agree with your insistence that they cannot. So yes, I suppose, on this issue at least, they are pretty much going to agree with me.
Uh, yes, of course there are plenty of people who think their answers to the Big Questions are justified. I don't think that was in question - I meet them all the time. I'm saying they are mistaken about that, because they can't demonstrate that to me or anyone else that their answers are correct. In contrast, other questions (such as "How long ago did the universe begin?") have been answered with very good justifications.
3. I’ve also never claimed that all people who believe otherwise are choosing to believe the wrong thing because they want to.
??? You said: Everybody disagrees on these issues because we have the ability to choose what we believe, and some choose to believe what is false..
Whereas I am open to the idea that we can and often do choose to believe what we want and then filter evidence and muster arguments to support that choice, you apparently are not.
I am open to the idea of course; I simply observe that it is false for myself. I cannot choose to believe things that I do not believe; rather, I either find that I have been convinced or not. I am open to the idea that other people can simply choose to believe whatever they want to for whatever reason or no reason at all. It is very foreign to me to be that way, and I do not think it is a good way to be, but I cannot deny that some people seem to be that way.
I am also open to the idea that many people simply do not know.
And I am arguing that nobody does of course, when it comes to the Big Questions.
Again, the main area with which I take issue is that I don’t believe you can build certainty on top of uncertainty. I believe it is incoherent to be certain that everything is uncertain. I believe that certainty can only come from certainty, and uncertainty can only lead to more uncertainty.
My point is that no particular answers to these questions (among others): 1) Origin of life and the universe 2) Mind/body ontology 3) Causal nature of human volition ... have good enough justifications to consider that we know the answer. Nobody knows the answers, and nobody can provide good enough justification to convince other people that they are right. This is not the case with many other questions, but it is the case with these. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 20, 2013
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Hi seventrees,
Honestly, the last two examples made me laugh.
They are beliefs that are solemnly held by many millions of people who adhere to the religions of Mormonism and Scientology, respectively. How would you like it if people laughed at the thought that there is a god who had a son with a human woman and the son died and then came back to life?
I wonder if these people did not choose to believe them. What made them choose is a different matter.
Could you choose to believe these things if you tried?
A question: If you have good reasons to believe a claim which was patently absurd to you, and let us say hypothetically, there is 100% certainty that the claim is true, and let us say this claim can change your life. Are you telling me that being a new believer of this claim did not involve any will yours? Just not to misunderstand you.
If I was told that an absurd claim was true with "100% certainty", then I would not simply believe it - I would need to be convinced of it. This is not a process of choosing; it is a process of being convinced by evidence.
Throwing back that same question at me, I might be resistant to believe for a while, but I will have to choose, especially that I know it can affect my life.
I could not believe these things if my life depended on it, any more than I could believe that 2+2=5. I don't think you could either. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 20, 2013
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RDF:
Phinehas had no other counter-argument, but rather repeated his insistence that some select group of people have well-justified knowledge, and all other groups of people who disagree with them are wrong. Presumably the group of people who have the right answer are those who agree with Phinehas, and all other people are choosing to believe the wrong thing because they want to.
Seriously? After patiently explaining my position again and again, the best you can do is to deliberately misrepresent it? 1. I've never insisted that some select group of people have well-justified knowledge. I've merely pointed out that you have no warrant for continued insistence that nobody does. 2. If there are those who have well-justified knowledge, then they certainly are not going to agree with your insistence that they cannot. So yes, I suppose, on this issue at least, they are pretty much going to agree with me. 3. I've also never claimed that all people who believe otherwise are choosing to believe the wrong thing because they want to. Whereas I am open to the idea that we can and often do choose to believe what we want and then filter evidence and muster arguments to support that choice, you apparently are not. I am also open to the idea that many people simply do not know. Again, the main area with which I take issue is that I don't believe you can build certainty on top of uncertainty. I believe it is incoherent to be certain that everything is uncertain. I believe that certainty can only come from certainty, and uncertainty can only lead to more uncertainty.Phinehas
June 20, 2013
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