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RDF/AIG as a case of the incoherence and rhetorical agenda of evolutionary materialist thought and/or its fellow- traveller ideologies

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For the past several weeks, there has been an exchange that developed in the eduction vs persuasion thread (put up May 9th by AndyJones), on first principles of right reason and related matters.  Commenter RDF . . .   has championed some popular talking points in today’s intellectual culture.

We can therefore pick up from a citation and comment by Vivid, at 619 in the thread (June 12th), for record and possible further discussion.

Accordingly, I clip comment 742 from the thread (overnight) and headline it:

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>>. . . let us remind ourselves of the context for the just above exchanges, by going back to Vivid at 619:

[RDF/AIG:] And once again I must remind you that you are mistaken. We cannot be absolutely certain of anything, and you will see that I have never said that we could be absolutely certain of anything. I don’t think this is a very difficult point, but you keep misquoting me.

[Vivid, replying:} I apologize I did not intend to misquote you I now understand your position better. You are not absolutely certain that there is no such thing as absolute certainty but you want Stephen[B] to concede to that which you are not absolutely certain about. Got it.

Notice, this is what RDF has to defend, cited from his own mouth:

[RDF:] We cannot be absolutely certain of anything . . .

This absolute declaration of certainty that we cannot be certain of anything, aptly exposes the underlying incoherence of what RDF has been arguing.

"Turtles, all the way down . . . " vs a root cause
“Turtles, all the way down . . . ” vs a root cause

He has spent much time trying to ignore a sound worldviews foundation approach, and has sought to undermine first principles of right reason in order to advance an agenda that from its roots on up, is incoherent.

So, let it be understood that when reason was in the balance, he was found wanting, decisively wanting. Again and again.

In particular, observe his willful unresponsiveness to and “passive” resistance by that unresponsiveness, to the basic point that by direct case, Royce’s Error exists, we can show that there are truths that are generally recognised, are accessible to our experiences, are factually grounded, and can be shown to be undeniably true and self evident, constituting certain knowledge of the world of things in themselves accessible to humans.

Thus, his whole project of want of grounding for reasoning and building worldviews collapses from the foundations.

In particular, observe as well that he has for hundreds of comments, waged an ideological talking point war against cause and effect, trying to poison the atmosphere to disguise the want of a good basis for rejecting it.

For instance, observe how he has never seriously engaged the point that once a thing A exists, following Schopenhauer, we may freely ask, why and expect to find a reasonable, intelligible answer. (This is in part a major basis for science, and also for philosophy.)

This principle, sufficient reason, is patently reasonable and self-evident: that if A is, there is a good explanatory reason for it.

First, that A’s attributes, unlike those of a square circle, are coherent. So, from this point on, the law of non-contradiction is inextricably entangled int he possibility of being. Consequently we see the antithesis: possibility vs impossibility of being.

Next, by virtue of possible worlds analysis, we can distinguish another antithesis: contingent vs non-contingent (i.e. NECESSARY) beings.

A unicorn, a possible being (HT: Baggins Book Blogger, Blogspot)
A unicorn, a possible being (HT: Baggins Book Blogger, Blogspot)

That is, we can have possible worlds in which certain things — contingent beings, C — could exist and others in which C does not exist. For instance, a horned horse is obviously a possible being but happens not to exist as of yet in the actual world we inhabit. But it is conceivable that within a century, through genetic engineering, one may well exist. (I am not so sure that they will be able to make a pink one, but a white one is very conceivable.)

We are of course just such members of class C.

(And this wider class C further opens the way to significant choice by humans, by which we can imagine possible futures, and by rational evaluation of the consequences of our ideas, models and plans, decide which to implement, e.g. by choosing a design of the building to replace the WTC buildings in NYC knocked down by Bin Laden and co on Sept 11, 2001 — a date chosen by him on the probable grounds that it was the 318th anniversary less one day, from the great cavalry attack led by Jan III Sobieski of Poland and Lithuania, which broke the final Turkish siege of Vienna under the Caliph at that time in 1683. That is, by choosing the day, UBL was making a message to his fellow radicalised Muslims that he was taking over from the previous high-water mark of IslamIST expansionism. And that he was doing so in the general area of Khorasan would also be of significance to such Muslims, who would immediately recognise the significance and relevance of black flag armies from that general area. I give these examples, to underscore the significance of contingency and intelligent, willed choice in humans, something that RDF/AIG also wishes to undermine. He does not see the fatal self-referential incoherence that stems from that, and doubtless would dismiss the significance of incoherence as well. The circle of ideological irrationality driven by a priori evolutionary materialism and its fellow traveller ideas and agendas, closes.)

But C has its antithesis in a world partition, class NOT-C; let us call it N.

Necessary beings, such as the number two, 2 or the true proposition 2 + 3 = 5, etc.

Fire_tetrahedron
The fire tetrahedron, showing the cluster of enabling factors that are each necessary and jointly sufficient for a fire to begin (Wiki)

Members of C are marked by dependence on ON/OFF enabling factors, e.g. as we have frequently discussed, how a match flame depends on each of: heat, fuel, oxidiser and chain reaction. Such enabling factors are necessary causal factors, all of which must be present for a member of class C to be actualised. A sufficient condition for such a member will have at least all of the factors like this, met.

We naturally and reasonably say that such a member of C is CAUSED when its conditions to exist are met by a sufficient cluster of factors, and that E is an effect; the cluster of factors being causes. So, even if we do not know the full set of causal factors for C, we can be confident that a contingent being, that has a beginning and may end or could conceivably not have been at all, is caused.

However, not all things are like that. Some things have no such dependence on causal factors, and are possible beings. These beings will be actual in all possible worlds, i.e. they are necessary beings.

One and the same object cannot be circular and square in the same sense and place at the same time
One and the same object
cannot be circular and
square in the same
sense and place at the same time

A serious candidate necessary being will be either impossible (blocked by having incoherent proposed attributes such as a square circle), or it will be possible and actual. As noted, S5, in modal logic, captures part of why. {Cf. here.} In effect we can see that such a being just is, inevitably, and its absence would be impossible.

For example the number 2 just is. Even in an empty world, one can see that we have the empty set { } –> 0. Thence, we may form a set which collects the empty set: {0} –> 1. Then, in the next step, we simply collect both: {0, 1} –> 2. For modern set theory, we simply continue the process to get 3, 4, 5 . . . , but this is enough for our purposes. Doing this abstract analytical exercise does not create 2, it simply recognises how inevitable it is. It is impossible for 2 not to exist. Similarly, the true proposition 2 + 3 = 5 is like that, and much more besides.

We thus see that necessary beings exist and are knowable, even familiar in some cases.

We see further that such beings are without beginning, or end. They are not caused, they hold being by necessity, which its their sufficient reason for existing. They have no dependence on external enabling causal factors.

A flying spaghetti monster knitted doll, showing how this is used to mockt eh idea of God as necessary being (note the words on the chalk board)
A flying spaghetti monster knitted doll, showing how this is used to mock the idea of God as necessary being (note the words on the chalk board)

A serious candidate to be a necessary being will be independent of enabling factors, likewise (flying spaghetti monsters need not apply) and will not be composed of material parts. The abstract, thought-nature of cases like 2, 2 + 3 = 5 etc shows that such beings point to mind, and one way of accounting for such beings is that they are eternally contemplated by God. Where also God is regarded as an eternal, necessary, spiritual being who is minded and the root of all being in our world, the ultimate enabling factor for reality.

BTW, this means that those who would dismiss God’s existence do not merely need to establish that in their view God is improbable, but that God is impossible, as God is a serious candidate to be a necessary being.

That is, since RDF is so hot to undermine the intellectual credibility of the existence of God, it is worth pausing to highlight a few points on this matter, connected to the logic of necessary beings and other relevant points. For, even before we run into other things that point like compass needles to God: the evident design of a fine tuned cosmos set up for C-chemistry, aqueous medium cell based life that makes an extra cosmic, intelligent agent with power to create a cosmos the explanation to beat, the significance of our being minded and characterised by reason, as well as the existence of a world of life in that context, the fact that we inescapably find ourselves under moral government by implanted law, and of course the direct encounter with God that millions report as having positively transformed their lives, and more.

Nope, unlike the pretence of too many skeptics would lead us to naively believe, the acceptance of God’s reality is a very reasonable position to hold. (Scroll back up and observe the studious silence of RDF et al on such matters.)

So, never mind the ink-clouds of distractive or dismissive or confusing talking-points, we are back to the worldview level significance of first principles of right reason and pivotal first, self-evident truths.

{Let us add, an illustrative diagram, on how naturally these principles arise from a world-partition, e.g. by having a bright red ball on a table:}

Laws_of_logic

{And,we may clip Wikipedia’s article on laws of thought:

The law of non-contradiction and the law of excluded middle are not separate laws per se, but correlates of the law of identity. That is to say, they are two interdependent and complementary principles that inhere naturally (implicitly) within the law of identity, as its essential nature . . .   whenever we ‘identify’ a thing as belonging to a certain class or instance of a class, we intellectually set that thing apart from all the other things in existence which are ‘not’ of that same class or instance of a class. In other words, the proposition, “A is A and A is not ~A” (law of identity) intellectually partitions a universe of discourse (the domain of all things) into exactly two subsets, A and ~A, and thus gives rise to a dichotomy. As with all dichotomies, A and ~A must then be ‘mutually exclusive’ and ‘jointly exhaustive’ with respect to that universe of discourse. In other words, ‘no one thing can simultaneously be a member of both A and ~A’ (law of non-contradiction), whilst ‘every single thing must be a member of either A or ~A’ (law of excluded middle).

What’s more . . .  thinking entails the manipulation and amalgamation of simpler concepts in order to form more complex ones, and therefore, we must have a means of distinguishing these different concepts. It follows then that the first principle of language (law of identity) is also rightfully called the first principle of thought, and by extension, the first principle reason (rational thought) . . .

Another illustration shows how world view roots arise:}

A summary of why we end up with foundations for our worldviews, whether or not we would phrase the matter that way}
A summary of why we end up with foundations for our worldviews, whether or not we would phrase the matter that way

Prediction (do, prove me wrong RDF et al): this too will be studiously ignored in haste to push along with the talking point agenda. The price tag for such apparently habitual tactics, is willful neglect of duties of care to be reasonable, to seek and face truth, and to be fair in discussion.

That is, it is “without excuse.”

(And yes, the allusion to Rom 1:19 – 25 and vv. 28 – 32 is quite deliberate.)  >>

____________

A squid ink cloud escape tactic
A squid ink cloud escape tactic (Google)

So, we face the issue of worldview foundations, in light of first principles of right reason.

(One that — per fair comment, for weeks now, RDF/AIG has studiously ducked, behind a cloud of talking points.)

How will we respond?

On what basis of reasoning?

With what level of certainty?

Why? END

Comments
Just for practice:
To quote some text, if you type this...
Thanks a lot, once more, RDFish. Ahhh!! Writing codes again. I really have something against them. Back to the discussion Honestly, the last two examples made me laugh. But the word "choose" is my issue. I wonder if these people did not choose to believe them. What made them choose is a different matter. You stated:
In my opinion, we needn’t accept their claims at face value, but rather it behooves us to require good reason to believe that they are correct.
A question: If you have good reasons to believe a claim which was patently absurd to you, and let us say hypothetically, there is 100% certainty that the claim is true, and let us say this claim can change your life. Are you telling me that being a new believer of this claim did not involve any will yours? Just not to misunderstand you. Throwing back that same question at me, I might be resistant to believe for a while, but I will have to choose, especially that I know it can affect my life. If it did not, I might not even think about the claim. (I think this should answer in part the questions you just asked me). So, to answer you fully, I have to make a choice to believe some things, depending on the situation. Some beliefs, I cannot choose to believe them, simply because I might not have adequate reasons to do so (or because I do not think I have adequate evidence to believe such).seventrees
June 20, 2013
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Hi seventrees,
In any event, you could not choose to believe all of the various things that other people are certain of even if you tried!” — Why cannot I choose? I’m curious to understand what you mean.
Many people believe they have been abducted by aliens into spaceships and given invasive medical examinations. Do you believe this? Many people believe that when you die, you may become the God of a new universe. Do you believe this? Many people believe that inside each of us is the soul of a dead alien life form. Do you believe this? So first, pick a claim that you do not currently believe. If you actually find that you believe all of these claims I just listed, then try to think of something you really do not believe at all. Ok, got it? Now, choose to believe this claim. Ok, done? Now introspect: Do you actually believe this claim that you just chose to believe, even though you previously disbelieved it? I think not. I think you don't believe it any more than you did a few moments ago - because we can't choose our beliefs. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 20, 2013
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Arrgh! Ok, that didn't work. The "&lt" should be typed as a less-than sign (left angle bracket) and the "&gt" should be typed as a greater-than sign (right angle bracket).RDFish
June 20, 2013
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seventrees, To quote some text, if you type this: &ltblockquote&gtyour text goes here&lt/blockquote&gt It will look like this:
your text goes here
Replace "blockquote" in these tags with "i" to use italics, "b" to use bold.RDFish
June 20, 2013
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To any commenter here, I find it difficult to use the HTML tags and attributes. I need some help. To anyone who does, thanks for his/her patience in advance.seventrees
June 20, 2013
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Just in case someone might misunderstand me, what I understood as systems of formal logic are things like LNC, LEM, LOI and logical fallacies. "In any event, you could not choose to believe all of the various things that other people are certain of even if you tried!" -- Why cannot I choose? I'm curious to understand what you mean.seventrees
June 20, 2013
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Hi seventrees,
“What I’m saying is that nobody has successfully placed epistemology on a rock-solid footing.” — “Nobody”? I beg to differ here, if at all we consider at face value the claims made by some people
I understand that many people claim to have absolute knowledge regarding all sorts of things. In my opinion, we needn't accept their claims at face value, but rather it behooves us to require good reason to believe that they are correct. In any event, you could not choose to believe all of the various things that other people are certain of even if you tried!
But from what I can tell, the systems of formal logic, in philosophical terms, are necessary but not sufficient to know what is true and what is not true.
I think you are correct about this. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 20, 2013
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Hi Kantian Naturalist - AND Phinehas
If you really want to get your views across, I think you’d be better off clarifying the criteria by which you would distinguish (1) formal truths (logic, mathematics, the analytic and/or a priori; (2) common-sense experience, empirical knowledge, and science; (3) metaphysics and epistemology.
Really? I don't see anyone arguing against me regarding the distinctions among these things. Rather, Phinehas here is claiming that there are (or at least might be) some people who have good justifications for their beliefs regarding what we've been calling The Big Questions, despite the fact that there is a huge and non-converging plurality of beliefs about these questions in general. And that is his reason for denying my observation that the answers to these questions are highly uncertain. My counter-argument is that if these people did have such good justifications for particular beliefs, why wouldn't these beliefs gain general acceptance, the way so many other beliefs have? Phinehas' counter-argument was that the people choose to believe in things that are false. My counter-argument was that people believe in things that are shown to be true by a large amount of good evidence. I provided the example of the belief in the Big Bang, which gained general acceptance because of the strength of the evidence - even with those who were ideologically predisposed to disbelieve it. Phinehas had no other counter-argument, but rather repeated his insistence that some select group of people have well-justified knowledge, and all other groups of people who disagree with them are wrong. Presumably the group of people who have the right answer are those who agree with Phinehas, and all other people are choosing to believe the wrong thing because they want to. I would hold that my explanation of the plurality of views on these questions is more plausible: Nobody knows the right answer, and so nobody can demonstrate the truth about these things in any convincing fashion, and so people continue to believe all sorts of things about these questions, just as they have for thousands of years. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 20, 2013
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Hi RDFish I started following the discussion from when it started. Some things I did not understand, so, I stopped at some point. "What I’m saying is that nobody has successfully placed epistemology on a rock-solid footing." --- “Nobody”? I beg to differ here, if at all we consider at face value the claims made by some people. If you said "In my opinion, nobody has successfully placed epistemology on a rock-solid footing", then no disagreement here. Everyone has his reasons to disbelieve or be skeptical of certain claims. An example: The beliefs of at least the Christians of old was the certainty that Jesus was dead and resurrected. Vivid at post 71 was at least trying to point out this your claim is not true. Anyway, I repeat again: I disagree with you if we consider their claims at face value. I cannot adequately deal with your other points, considering who I am at this stage of my life. But from what I can tell, the systems of formal logic, in philosophical terms, are necessary but not sufficient to know what is true and what is not true. So I tend to agree with you when you say, “...we might be able to rely on principles of math and logic that appear self-evidently true, but that does not allow one to speak about things in the real world with the same sort of certainty available in formal systems.” Anyway, after reading your points now, I see where you're coming from. And it still shows that it was better if you typed “We cannot be absolutely certain of everything”. And error and non-error exists (but I doubt you disagree with that). P.S: As I told you before, some things caught my attention. This is just one of them, which to me is satisfactorily resolved.seventrees
June 20, 2013
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Greetings, KF Yes, I am a new commenter. As you said, I hope with this, these confusions can be resolved.seventrees
June 20, 2013
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RDFISH: If anyone had figured out these answers with sufficiently compelling justification, then there would be a general acceptance of the answers. PH: It is interesting that we keep coming back to this. Failure to justify? Or failure to persuade? I don’t think your assertion above has been supported in the least.
RDF: Huh? I keep coming back to this because you ignore it of course! What assertion is it you think is unsupported? That there is no consensus regarding metaphysics?
No, the part where there would be a general acceptance of the answers. Again, this could easily be turned back on your own claim that nobody knows these answers. If you had a sufficiently compelling justification, then there would be general acceptance, but there isn't, so your claim must be false. I don't think the "there would be general acceptance" is a valid argument. It belongs in the trash bin right alongside consensus science in my view.Phinehas
June 20, 2013
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RDFish, If you really want to get your views across, I think you'd be better off clarifying the criteria by which you would distinguish (1) formal truths (logic, mathematics, the analytic and/or a priori; (2) common-sense experience, empirical knowledge, and science; (3) metaphysics and epistemology. With regard to (3), there's got to be some rough distinction to be drawn between (a) what must be presupposed in order for there to empirical knowledge at all and (b) what is the case (or not the case) beyond all (possible?) empirical knowledge. I would assume -- though I don't know this for sure -- that you would only counsel agnosticism about (3b). (There are countless arguments in favor of agnosticism about those items, most of them inspired by Hume or Kant.) If that is indeed your view, then I would recommend being much clearer about that -- doing so could permit more productive conversations than the ones you've been having here so far.Kantian Naturalist
June 20, 2013
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P, just now: well said. KFkairosfocus
June 20, 2013
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RDF: Simply take up the case Error exists. Show how it is uncertain, and let's see from there. Apart from that by now it should be utterly plain that the consistent problems you have circle around self-referential incoherence and conflating knowledge with the consensus of come reference group. The statement in the OP is self refuting and the attempts to rescue it fail. If it were instead that you spoke about a lack of certainty about everything, that is no problem. But that has room for special cases like: Error exists. As for consensus, given our commonplace willfulness, that is not a safe base. Bitter enders will ride their scheme down in flames, sometimes literally. KFkairosfocus
June 20, 2013
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RDF:
Here is what I said: If we do not know whether or not we can know X, then we do not know X.
And here is what I responded: Of course! Provided the set of entities described by “we” is exactly the same in both places. But you keep wanting to make the second “we” universal while the first “we” may well be limited in scope. While it may be readily apparent that anyone who doesn’t know whether or not they can know X will also not know X (else they would know that X can be known), it does not follow that the set described by either formulation must be universal. You can only imply otherwise by equivocating on “we.” To recap… Granted: Nobody who doesn’t know whether or not they can know X knows X. Unsupported: Nobody knows X.Phinehas
June 20, 2013
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fg
I actually also think there is one thing we can be absolutely certain about, and that is that ‘something exist’. What I am less sure about is what that something actually is – is it the I (and what exactly is the I?), or reality (what is reality?),
It is possible that we are caught in some kind of matrix or experiencing an illusion but I am absolutely certain that I think I am writing this.
But there has to be something or else, well, my head would explode!
I call it a charley horse between the ears.
But purely logically speaking, I don’t see why it would be impossible.
As RDF correctly observed we can imagine such a thing happening but speaking for myself I am absolutely certain that something cannot "pop into existence" from nothing. Others disagree. To speak of nothing we have to use language and thus we are forced to speak in nonsensical terms. If there is not a reason for its "popping into existence" ( of course into and from cannot be applied to nothing) then it would not be reasonable for me to accept such a thing. Of course this will not preclude someone from arguing that, something/nothing, using reason to argue for that that is unreasonable. To use reason in order to convince me why I should accept something not reasonable.
So I tend to be wary about knowledge claims that are non-empirical (or that are not logical extensions of empirical knowledge).
Each and everyone of us start with empiricaly unprovable presuppositions thats just the way it is. Vividvividbleau
June 20, 2013
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Hi Phinehas,
As an aside, I would argue (not necessarily with you, since I don’t know your views on such things) that common sense leads rather unambiguously to the conclusion that life is designed.
Two things: 1) Not all common sense is very certain (I've made this clear in my wording). The gambler's fallacy is common sense... and wrong. Much of our common sense regarding probabilities, physical motion, and other things have turned out to be wrong when studied scientifically. There is still a vast amount of common sense that is certain, but like everything else - open to revision in the face of compelling evidence. 2) Common sense tells people to attribute things they don't understand to invisible human-like beings (gods, demons, ghosts, trolls, elves, fairies, poltergeists) but historically many of these explanations have been abandoned in the face of other explanations.
This is why Dawkins has to warn us all to continually remind ourselves that the design our common sense readily discerns in life and its organized structures is only apparent.
Dawkins is fighting a losing battle. Nobody knows how biological complexity came to exist, and saying it is "designed" does not, per se, tell us anything at all. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 20, 2013
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Hi Phinehas,
(Copied from the old thread so that we don’t have to keep returning to it.)
Thank you!!!
RDFISH: If anyone had figured out these answers with sufficiently compelling justification, then there would be a general acceptance of the answers. PH: It is interesting that we keep coming back to this. Failure to justify? Or failure to persuade? I don’t think your assertion above has been supported in the least.
Huh? I keep coming back to this because you ignore it of course! What assertion is it you think is unsupported? That there is no consensus regarding metaphysics?
(I think the “sufficiently compelling” part could be seen as begging the question, so I’m going to ignore it.) I believe folks can choose to not be persuaded despite justification.
People born into religions that believe in reincarnation usually believe in reincarnation; people born into religions that believe in an afterlife in heaven or hell usually believe that, and so on. But there is no good reason to believe any of these things. Some people believe in contra-causal free will and some people don't, but nobody has a way to demonstrate what is true about the matter. Same with how life got started, or why the universe exists... In some cases the evidence is so compelling that virtually everyone does adopt a particular position on one of these questions. For example, while there was great disagreement and resistance to the idea of the Big Bang, the evidence mounted to the point where pretty much every reasonable person agreed that the universe did indeed have a beginning 13+BYO. The same thing happened with heliocentrism, etc.
Except for the answer that says no one answer should be considered certain knowledge. It is with this exception that I take issue, since it purports to arrive at certainty through uncertainty.
I've explained this many times. Some things fall toward the highly certain end of the spectrum, some toward the highly uncertain end. The metaphysical questions we've listed fall to the "highly uncertain" end of the spectrum.
You’ve basically claimed that uncertainty about uncertainty cashes out to certainty about uncertainty, and I keep saying that, no, uncertainty about uncertainty is still just uncertainty about uncertainty.
Here is what I said: If we do not know whether or not we can know X, then we do not know X. And [U]ncertainty about uncertainty simply produces uncertainty, rather than somehow cancelling out. We are highly uncertain about these metaphysical questions. Saying that we are highly uncertain if we are highly uncertain does not help at all - it just says nobody knows. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 20, 2013
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Hi Seventrees,
In all honesty, I did not follow your discussion all through with StephenB.
I understand completely: It is a very long discussion :-)
At least, this statement clearly takes into account human limitations.
What I'm saying is that nobody has successfully placed epistemology on a rock-solid footing. We begin with the fact that we cannot remove all doubt that our own minds are reliable. If our minds are reliable, we might be able to rely on principles of math and logic that appear self-evidently true, but that does not allow one to speak about things in the real world with the same sort of certainty available in formal systems. In other words, we cannot prove things to be true about the world the way we prove things to be true in systems of math and formal logic. Most importantly, I was pointing out that the answers to questions that arise often on forums like this - such as the relationship between mind and matter, the nature of mental causation, the origin of the universe and life, the nature of moral imperatives, and so on - are far less certain than much of our knowledge about other things. We have a vast amount of common-sense and scientific knowledge that is very certain, and consequently virtually everyone agrees about it. However, despite thousands of years of concerted effort by great thinkers, the answers to these metaphysical questions remain in dispute and nothing approaching general acceptance of any particular set of answers has ever been achieved. I thought these observations would be uncontroversial - they seem very obvious to me! Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 20, 2013
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RDF: In addition, as I've pointed out before, our uniform and repeated experience in this forum and elsewhere, is one in which all parties assume certainty regarding the validity of their thinking and the reliability of their logic, even when they are arguing in favor of uncertainty.Phinehas
June 20, 2013
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RDF:
In contrast to a vast catalogue of common sense and scientific knowledge, the answers to metaphysical questions cannot be clearly derived from our uniform and repeated experience. As a result, despite millenia of concerted effort, no single answer to these metaphysical questions has been demonstrated definitively enough to gain general acceptance.
As an aside, I would argue (not necessarily with you, since I don't know your views on such things) that common sense leads rather unambiguously to the conclusion that life is designed. This is why Dawkins has to warn us all to continually remind ourselves that the design our common sense readily discerns in life and its organized structures is only apparent. More to the point, what does and does not qualify as "scientific knowledge" is itself a metaphysical question. Every bit of uniform and repeated experience must be filtered and interpreted by a consciousness that is also the subject of many metaphysical questions. The house cannot be any more certain than its foundation. Further, metaphysical questions tend to have some built-in conclusions with which many are uncomfortable, leading to a much greater likelihood that they will choose to believe what they will. Where science approaches these same conclusions, you will see just as much debate and disagreement despite any claims to science's transcendency.Phinehas
June 20, 2013
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FG:
The argument why there is no such thing as absolute certainty has already been laid out – does anyone here disagree with it?
Absolutely. ;)Phinehas
June 20, 2013
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Vivid, Nice to see you too, I hope all is well. I actually also think there is one thing we can be absolutely certain about, and that is that 'something exist'. What I am less sure about is what that something actually is - is it the I (and what exactly is the I?), or reality (what is reality?), or what? But there has to be something or else, well, my head would explode! About things popping into existence, I don't know if that exists or not. I don't think it is logically impossible because I can imagine a situation where one moment there isn't anything and the next moment there is. Now, for sure, that doesn't mean that I think for instance Stephen's brick wall will suddenly appear out of nothing. That would violate some fundamental laws of physics, and of course such a thing has never been observed to happen so there is no empirical support whatsoever to think it can happen. But purely logically speaking, I don't see why it would be impossible. The thing wouldn't have to appear from 'somewhere'. Simply, one moment it isn't there, the next moment it is. Weird, for sure, never observed as far as I know, violating physical law, but logically impossible? I'm not convinced. And maybe it has been observed at quantum level, smarter minds than mine have suggested this, I don't know. Knowledge and belief is a thorny subject. I hope think we can probably all agree on empirical knowledge, the kind of knowledge we get through our senses plus our reasoning abilities, and in principle repeatable for different persons. The interesting question is if there is other knowledge than that. 'True justified belief' is one oft mentioned set of criteria but I always wonder how we can come to agree on this? We won't dispute if someone claims to have a belief, but we can argue about the strength of the justification, and even if we were to agree on that, how do we know that the justified belief is actually true, thereby fulfilling all the criteria? That seems to require an independent arbiter who can inform us if our belief is true or not, which to me makes the argument circular because how does the arbiter herself know if the belief is true? It comes full circle. So I tend to be wary about knowledge claims that are non-empirical (or that are not logical extensions of empirical knowledge). I'm not suggesting that I 'know' better than the person expressing the claim, but surely a degree of skepticism is in order. How else would we deal with numerous conflicting non-empirical beliefs that we are exposed to on a daily basis? We can't all consider them true, therefore knowledge, but what are the criteria to decide between them? If someone maintains that they have been abducted by aliens who subsequently removed all physical evidence for their dastardly act, surely there is justification to be skeptical? fGfaded_Glory
June 20, 2013
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(Copied from the old thread so that we don't have to keep returning to it.) RDF:
PHINEHAS: Some people might know the answers to the Big Questions and others might not. RDFISH: If anyone had figured out these answers with sufficiently compelling justification, then there would be a general acceptance of the answers.
It is interesting that we keep coming back to this. Failure to justify? Or failure to persuade? I don't think your assertion above has been supported in the least. (I think the "sufficiently compelling" part could be seen as begging the question, so I'm going to ignore it.) I believe folks can choose to not be persuaded despite justification.
And that is why I say no one answer should be considered certain knowledge.
Except for the answer that says no one answer should be considered certain knowledge. It is with this exception that I take issue, since it purports to arrive at certainty through uncertainty. You've basically claimed that uncertainty about uncertainty cashes out to certainty about uncertainty, and I keep saying that, no, uncertainty about uncertainty is still just uncertainty about uncertainty.Phinehas
June 20, 2013
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Seventrees: You seem to be new to commenting, so let me issue a welcome. I note your:
“We cannot be absolutely certain of everything”.
I agree to this statement, noting room in it that there are some specific things we can be sure of, and room that there are many others we can be highly or sufficiently confident of that we can take them as reliable bases for action. Let's see if this can move the ball forward. KFkairosfocus
June 20, 2013
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F/N: I should add that some of the above hints at the idea that there is an ugly gulch between our inner phenomenal world and the external world of things in themselves. F H Bradley's self referential objection holds, that to so hold is to claim to know something about the external world, leading to self referential incoherence. Better, to accept the possibility of error, and to see that even that is something we do know and is true about the external world.kairosfocus
June 20, 2013
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Greetings RDFish, In all honesty, I did not follow your discussion all through with StephenB. I only followed what caught my attention, like what KF is pointing out. To me, if anyone says to me "We cannot be absolutely certain of anything", I always think of absolute. The word "anything" could mean "anything" (if I decide to take it in the context this was used). To me, that statement could mean I cannot be absolutely sure I am making a contribution here. But reading a bit your defenses, it was better if you typed "We cannot be absolutely certain of everything". At least, this statement clearly takes into account human limitations.seventrees
June 20, 2013
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RDF: Re:
60:Plantinga’s famous argument against naturalism does exactly this, but his arguments do not undermine themselves (just as mine do not). We simply acknowledge that there is a finite chance that our minds are unreliable, and that modus ponens and LNC and other self-evident truths are actually false. If that is the case, then all of our arguments are unreliable, and that is all that can be said about it. Still and yet, it is one reason why epistemologists like Plantinga concede that there is no such thing as 100% absolute certainty about anything. All of this is, of course, not the interesting part of my point. The point I’m interested in is how the answers to the Big Questions are so much less certain than the vast amounts of common-sense and scientific knowledge that each of us have. 64: let’s just start over. 1) Think of a continuum reflecting the strength of justification (or “warrant”) accruing to any particular claim 2) On one end of this continuum claims with a tremendous amount of justification, and we label this end “Highly Certain Knowledge” 3) On the other end of this continuum are claims with little or no justification, and we label this end “Very Speculative Beliefs” My point is that any particular answer to any of the foundational existential questions (or metaphysical) I’ve mentioned will lie toward the “Very Speculative Beliefs” end of the spectrum.
1 --> Are you here walking back your claim headlined in the OP: We cannot be absolutely certain of anything? 2 --> You actually managed to repeat the self-referential incoherence at 60: epistemologists like Plantinga concede that there is no such thing as 100% absolute certainty about anything. 3 --> Including this? 4 --> I doubt this, what is the case is that for systems as a whole there will be areas of greater and lesser certainty, the probability of errors in the whole and more. But on narrow, specific points such as Error exists or || + ||| --> ||||| (2 + 3 = 5), we can indeed find certainty, self-evident, undeniable certainty. If you dispute this, take on Error exists specifically, and show how it fails of certainty. 5 --> The point being, that it is impossible to show Error exists is an error, as the attempt will end up sustaining it. 6 --> The further implication being that this sweeps a wide cut across the current worldviews scene, showing that objective and even absolute truth do exist, that such are capable in certain cases of warrant to undeniable certainty per self-evidence, and reduction to absurdity on attempted denial. Thus, knowledge as fully justified, absolutely true belief. Thence, falsification of entire systems of thought dedicated to the proposition that such is impossible. 7 --> Humility would be not to deride, divert from and dismiss this, but to acknowledge it, and recognise this most humbling of all truths: our fallibility. 8 --> So also, this ought to motivate finding reliable tools to test our beliefs and systems of belief, such as the also self-evident laws of thought. After all, distinct realities such as red cricket balls on tables are undeniable, and the act of using symbolic language (the vehicle of abstract, verbal thought and communication) itself pivots on such. 9 --> So, the world partition: W = {A | NOT-A} is real and consequential. LOI, LNC, LEM are self-evident, as direct corollaries of world partition on existence of a distinct thing. Our thoughts and language, thence reasoning, reflect this, for instance observe: {S |NOT-S} + {o | NOT-o} --> { So | NOT-So} -- I recall you had a visceral reaction to this case of textual words earlier, but that does not make it any less valid. (And that is what is at stake here in the end, rationality itself and reasonable communication itself.) 10 --> So also, we may apply PSR, weak form: Why A, expecting a reasonable answer. 11 --> From which, interwoven with the identity cluster pivoting on distinction, we see possibility/impossibility of being, nothing as non-being, contingency/non-contingency, thus cause in light of on/off enabling factors [think, struck match here], necessity of being which has no beginning, no end, is eternal. Case a: the number 2, case b: proposition 2 + 3 = 5. 12 --> Onward, we see that serious candidate necessary beings (spaghetti monsters, pink unicorns and red dragons need not apply) will be either impossible due to incoherence of attributes (a circular square for instance) or will be possible and actual in all possible worlds. Which raises sobering questions on God as serious candidate Necessary Being and on the views and rhetorical approaches of objectors to the reality of God. 13 --> I would think that truth exists, knowable truth exists even to certainty, etc and that God as a serious candidate to be a necessary being will be ether impossible per contradictory attributes (as was formerly commonly thought among skeptics, on the problem of evil) or possible and -- as independent of on/off enabling factors -- actual, would all be serious cases of big questions. 14 --> So, again, I invite a serious examination of the Royce proposition, Error exists. 15 --> Is this true, is it undeniably true? Why or why not? (My answer is clipped at 40 above.) Where does this lead us? KFkairosfocus
June 20, 2013
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Vivid: Good to see you still intervening. Useful point, too. My thought is, that the root of this sort of thinking is a few hundred years old, and we too often fall into its patterns. Indeed, we see people too often trying to make virtue out of blindness in faith. I think we need to take the word back, and stand on the understanding that it primarily denotes trust, often based on good warrant but extending through hope to what is not seen but confidently expected. Secondarily, it reflects the pattern of the chain of warrant and the implications of our finitude, fallibilityand more. Start with A, why accept it? Because of some warrant, B. But we can ask, why B? C. Thus, infinite regress -- turtles all the way down -- or circularity, or taking a stand on a faith point, F, arrived at by collective or individual comparative difficulties, that is partly self evident, partly enfolds matters that one has moral certainty regarding, and certain elements that are either axiomatic and successful (such as systems in Mathematics) or help make sense per inference to best and most coherent, useful explanation (e.g. many key scientific postulates and invisible constructs). What removes such from the province of circularity is the openness to comparative difficulties on factual adequacy, coherence and explanatory power. What removes it from the infinite regress of challenges to warrant, is that we are willing to take a stand on faith, on trustworthy ground, in light of experience, and are open to change as more evidence comes in. But, understanding our finitude and fallibility, we do not accept a need for self-defeating, hopeless infinite regress. Mere selective or universal skepticism and the sort of Plato's Cave world models already mentioned need not apply, as they radically undermine rationality. I forget: we all live by faith, the issue is in what, why. KFkairosfocus
June 20, 2013
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The rest of the disagreement seems to hinge around deciding when a paticular conviction is a belief and when it is knowledge. Why not share viewpoints on this?
They do get intertwined and warranted belief is woven through the tapestry of knowledge. There has been a noticable shift over the last 100 years or so where faith has been morphed into fideism, blind faith or faith in spite of the facts. Blind faith ie fideism is not the same as faith because of the reasons. Most of us are familiar with Gould's "Rock of Ages" and his various magestariums which defined what I label the faith fact distinction. Facts are those things that we can demonstrate empericaly. Facts are what many would claim constitute objective knowlege. So objective knowledge resides within the sphere of scientific inquiry. Anything that cannot be empericaly demonstrated are non factual,subjective and do not qualfy as knowledge. The result is predictable wherein faith has now been redefined as fideism and takes a back seat to what is objectively true. However there is one problem, if "only that which can be empericaly demonstrated is fact/knowledge and everything else is subjective, non factual fideism." Since the statement itself cannot be empericaly demonstrated and confirmed then per its own criteria it is non factual and subjective. I will end with this. When it comes to beliefs in the end we all end up believing what we want. Vividvividbleau
June 20, 2013
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